Ahmad Jamal vs U.P. Sunni Central Waqf Board And 2 Others

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
WAQF APPEAL No. - 20 of 2026
Ahmad Jamal
…..Appellant(s)
Versus
U.P. Sunni Central Waqf Board and 2 others
…..Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s) : Tanishk Goyal
Counsel for Respondent(s) : Sudhanshu Pandey
AFR
Court No. - 35
HON'BLE DR. YOGENDRA KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J.
1. Heard Sri Tanishk Goyal, appearing along with Sri Arpit Agarwal
learned counsel for the appellant, Sri Devendra Mishra, holding brief of
Sri Punit Gupta learned counsel appearing for Respondent No. 1-U.P.
Sunni Central Waqf Board and Sri Sudhanshu Pandey, learned counsel
appearing for respondent No. 3.
2. The present appeal, preferred under Section 83(9) of The Unified
Waqf Management, Empowerment, Efficiency and Development Act,
1995 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act of 1995’), is directed against the
order dated 31.08.2026 passed by the U.P. Waqf Tribunal, Lucknow
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Tribunal’) in Waqf Appeal No. 05 of 2018
(Ahmad Jamal v. U.P. Sunni Central Waqf Board and Others), whereby
the appellant's application, Paper No. ka-104, seeking amendment of the
memorandum of appeal, has been rejected.

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WQPL No. - 20 of 2026
3. By the impugned order, the Tribunal declined to permit the
amendments proposed by the appellant under Order VI, Rule 17 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘CPC’).
The Tribunal essentially proceeded on the consideration that the
memorandum of appeal, as already amended pursuant to its earlier order
dated 29.12.2022 passed on application Paper No. ka-121, contained
sufficient factual averments and legal grounds to enable adjudication of
the controversy; that the further amendments sought were not necessary
for determining the real questions in controversy; and that the appellant
had failed to furnish a satisfactory explanation for not incorporating the
additional grounds now sought to be introduced at the earlier stage,
despite having knowledge of the relevant facts.
4. The Tribunal also considered the application in the backdrop of
the judgment and order dated 17.02.2025 passed by this Court in Civil
Revision No. 36 of 2025, whereby the earlier decision of the Tribunal
was set aside and the matter remitted for fresh adjudication in the light of
specified considerations, subject to a direction for time-bound disposal.
5. The principal issue arising for consideration in the present appeal
is whether, having regard to the nature of the proposed amendments, the
pleadings already on record, the stage of the proceedings and the scope
of the remand, the Tribunal was justified in declining the amendment or
whether its decision suffers from any legal infirmity warranting
interference by this Court.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND LITIGATION HISTORY
6. The controversy giving rise to the present appeal emanates from a
protracted dispute concerning the management of a Waqf-alal-aulad
created by Haji Sheikh Abdul Samad under a registered Waqf deed dated
04.08.1931. The dispute, in particular, concerns succession to and
continuance in the office of Mutawalli, governed by the terms and
stipulations contained in the said deed.
7. The registered Waqf deed dated 04.08.1931 prescribed the line of
hereditary succession and the eligibility criteria for appointment to the
office of Mutawalli from amongst the descendants of the waqif.

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WQPL No. - 20 of 2026
Following the demise of the founder, Haji Abdul Hai functioned as
Mutawalli. Upon his death, Nizam-ul-Hai alias Titu alias Farid was
appointed Mutawalli on 20.05.1999. However, the order appointing
Nizam-ul-Hai alias Titu alias Farid was subsequently recalled and on
04.09.2000, the appellant namely Ahmad Jamal was appointed as a
Mutawalli of the said Waqf.
8. The order dated 04.09.2000, whereby the appellant was appointed
as Mutawalli, was initially challenged by Nizam-ul-Hai before this Court
by filing a writ petition, which came to be dismissed. The said
appointment was thereafter questioned by him by way of a reference
before the Board, which was also dismissed. Consequently, the appellant
continued to hold the office of Mutawalli pursuant to the aforesaid
appointment.
9. The controversy resurfaced when Zia-ul-Islam, father of Nizam-
ul-Hai, asserted an independent claim to the office of Mutawalli and
initiated proceedings before the Board by moving an application under
Section 64 of the Act, 1995, seeking removal of the appellant. The
Board, by order dated 04.04.2018 removed the appellant from the office
of Mutawalli.
10. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the appellant instituted Waqf
Appeal No. 05 of 2018 before the Tribunal under Section 64(4) of the
Act of 1995. The challenge, inter alia, was founded upon alleged
violations of the principles of natural justice, non-service of notice, non-
supply of the inquiry report and non-compliance with the statutory
safeguards contemplated under Section 64(3) of the Act of 1995.
11. During the pendency of the appeal, the original complainant, Zia-
ul-Islam, died on 12.12.2021. Thereafter, by order dated 18.05.2022, the
Board appointed respondent No. 3, Firoz Adil, son of late Zia-ul-Islam,
as Mutawalli of the waqf.
12. Upon coming to know of the aforesaid appointment, the appellant
moved an application seeking amendment of the memorandum of
appeal, registered as Paper No. ka-121. The proposed amendment
sought, inter alia, to bring on record the subsequent appointment of

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WQPL No. - 20 of 2026
respondent No. 3, raise objections concerning his lineage and eligibility
with reference to the terms of the registered Waqf deed, and question the
manner in which the appointment had been made, including the alleged
denial of an opportunity of hearing. The Tribunal, by an order dated
29.12.2022, allowed the application, pursuant to which the memorandum
of appeal was amended.
13. The Tribunal thereafter proceeded to adjudicate the appeal and, by
judgment dated 19.11.2024, dismissed Waqf Appeal No. 05 of 2018,
thereby sustaining the order of the Board removing the appellant from
the office of Mutawalli.
14. The appellant assailed the judgment dated 19.11.2024 before this
Court by instituting Civil Revision No. 36 of 2025. This Court, by
judgment and order dated 17.02.2025, set aside the decision of the
Tribunal and remitted the matter for fresh adjudication. The Tribunal was
directed to decide the appeal afresh, in accordance with law, within two
months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the order, after
affording an opportunity of hearing to both parties, taking into
consideration Sections 14, 22 and 64(3) of the Act of 1995 and returning
a decision on Issue No. 6 framed in its earlier judgment dated
19.11.2024.
15. Following the remand, certain further procedural steps were taken
before the Tribunal. On 12.05.2026, the appellant submitted a proposed
list of additional issues. Subsequently, by order dated 06.07.2026, the
Tribunal permitted respondent No. 3 to place additional written
objections on record. Thereafter, on 30.07.2026, the appellant moved a
further application seeking amendment of the memorandum of appeal,
registered as Paper No. ka-104. Thus, the application came to be filed
after the earlier amendment had already been allowed and the
proceedings had undergone adjudication once before being remitted by
this Court for fresh consideration.
16. By application Paper No. ka-104, the appellant sought to introduce
further factual averments and legal grounds, besides certain
consequential corrections and modifications to the prayer clause. The

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WQPL No. - 20 of 2026
proposed amendments, broadly speaking, pertained to the following
aspects:
(i) The alleged non-service of show-cause notices dated 04.10.2017 and
15.11.2017, as well as the subsequent publication of the latter notice in
newspapers, which, according to the appellant, reflected mala fide
intentions in the proceedings initiated for his removal from the office of
Mutawalli;
(ii) The legality and validity of the order dated 18.05.2022, passed by the
Chairman of the Board acting singly, whereby respondent No. 3 was
appointed as Mutawalli on the basis of a legal opinion dated 13.05.2022.
The appellant sought to question the said appointment on the grounds,
inter alia, that it was made without affording him an opportunity of
hearing and without jurisdiction or authority under the Act of 1995;
(iii) The alleged violation of the principles of natural justice and Article
14 of the Constitution of India, with particular reference to Sections
32(2)(d) and 32(2)(g) of the Act of 1995, to contend that the power in
question vested in the Board and could not have been exercised by the
Chairman acting singly;
(iv) The issuance of a notice dated 16.10.2019 under Section 54 of the
Act of 1995 to late Zia-ul-Islam, and the relevance thereof to the
controversy;
(v) Certain consequential corrections, including correction of the
reference to respondent No. 2 as respondent No. 3 in the memorandum
of appeal, and modification of the prayer clause to specifically
incorporate the order dated 04.04.2018, the office memorandum dated
10.04.2018, the corrigendum dated 24.04.2018 and the connected order.
17. The application was opposed by the respondents. Their principal
objection was that the material facts sought to be introduced through the
proposed amendments, particularly those concerning the appointment of
respondent No. 3 on 18.05.2022, were already within the appellant's
knowledge when he had moved the earlier amendment application,
Paper No. ka-121, in 2022. It was contended that, despite having
obtained permission to amend the memorandum of appeal at that stage,

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WQPL No. - 20 of 2026
the appellant had failed to incorporate the additional grounds now sought
to be introduced and had furnished no satisfactory explanation for
seeking a further amendment after an unexplained and prolonged
interval. It was also urged that permitting the proposed amendments
would unnecessarily enlarge the scope of the controversy and impede the
expeditious adjudication mandated by this Court in its remand order
dated 17.02.2025.
18. By the impugned order dated 31.08.2026, the Tribunal rejected
application Paper No. ka-104. In doing so, it essentially held that the
memorandum of appeal, as amended pursuant to the earlier order dated
29.12.2022, already contained adequate factual averments and legal
grounds to enable adjudication of the challenge to the removal order
dated 04.04.2018; and that the further amendments sought were not
necessary for determining the real questions in controversy. The Tribunal
also took into consideration the fact that the application sought to
introduce further amendments at a stage when the matter had already
been remitted for fresh adjudication under a time-bound mandate issued
by this Court. It was in these circumstances that the Tribunal declined to
permit a further amendment of the memorandum of appeal, leading to
the institution of the present appeal.
RIVAL SUBMISSIONS
Submissions on behalf of the Appellant
19. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant assailed the impugned
order and advanced the following submissions:
19.1 It was contended that an appeal is a continuation of the original
proceedings and that the principles governing amendment of pleadings
under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure apply equally to
a memorandum of appeal. An amendment necessary for determining the
real questions in controversy ought not to be declined on technical or
procedural considerations. According to learned counsel, the eligibility
of respondent No. 3 for appointment as Mutawalli, particularly in the
light of the registered Waqf deed dated 04.08.1931, was intrinsically
connected with the dispute concerning the appellant’s removal and the

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WQPL No. - 20 of 2026
subsequent appointment made during the pendency of the appeal. It was,
therefore, urged that the proposed amendments were relevant to the
controversy already before the Tribunal and that their rejection was
inconsistent with the principles governing the exercise of power to
permit amendment of pleadings.
19.2 It was further submitted that, although the Tribunal had allowed
the earlier amendment application, Paper No. ka-121, by order dated
29.12.2022, it had failed to frame specific issues concerning the
appointment and eligibility of respondent No. 3. The subsequent
application, Paper No. ka-104, was stated to have become necessary to
address that omission and to place the appellant’s objections on record
with greater precision. Learned counsel submitted that specific issues
were required to be framed concerning the validity of the appointment of
respondent No. 2 by order dated 04.04.2018; the lineage and eligibility
of respondents Nos. 2 and 3 in the light of the registered Waqf deed; and
the validity of the appointment of respondent No. 3 on 18.05.2022
during the pendency of the appeal, allegedly without affording the
appellant an opportunity of hearing. It was urged that, in the absence of
appropriate pleadings and issues, material aspects of the controversy
would remain unaddressed and that the proposed amendment was
necessary to facilitate their effective adjudication.
19.3 Learned counsel maintained that the proposed amendments
neither introduced a controversy foreign to the proceedings nor altered
their fundamental nature. The central dispute, according to him,
continued to concern the legality of the appellant’s removal from the
office of Mutawalli and the consequences arising therefrom. The
proposed amendments were stated to elaborate the existing challenge by
incorporating further averments concerning the proceedings culminating
in the appellant’s removal, the subsequent appointment of respondent
No. 3, and the statutory and procedural requirements governing such
appointment. It was also submitted that the amendment application
contained an explanation for not incorporating the proposed averments at

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an earlier stage, which, according to learned counsel, had not received
adequate consideration in the impugned order.
19.4 It was further contended that the proposed amendments raised
material questions concerning the appointment of respondent No. 3 on
18.05.2022, allegedly made by the Chairman of the Waqf Board acting
singly, and the competence of the authority which had made the
appointment under the Act of 1995. The appellant sought to question the
appointment with reference to Sections 32(2)(d), 32(2)(g) and 63 of the
Act of 1995, the alleged absence of notice or opportunity of hearing, and
the eligibility of respondent No. 3 under the registered Waqf deed dated
04.08.1931. Learned counsel submitted that the office of Mutawalli
could not be regarded as devolving automatically upon the heir of an
incumbent merely upon the latter’s death, and that the appointment of
respondent No. 3 required examination in the light of the governing
statutory provisions and the terms of the Waqf deed. The proposed
amendments were also stated to be necessary for clarifying the
consequential relief sought in relation to the order dated 04.04.2018 and
the subsequent appointment dated 18.05.2022.
19.5 Learned counsel next placed reliance upon the judgment and
order dated 17.02.2025 passed by this Court in Civil Revision No. 36 of
2025, whereby the Tribunal’s earlier decision had been set aside and the
case remitted for fresh adjudication after hearing the parties and taking
into consideration the matters specified therein. It was contended that the
proposed amendments ought to have been considered in the context of
the direction for fresh adjudication. Reliance was also placed upon the
order dated 06.07.2026, by which the Tribunal had permitted respondent
No. 3 to place fresh written objections on record. According to learned
counsel, the receipt of further pleadings from respondent No. 3 after
remand was a relevant circumstance which warranted consideration of
the appellant’s request to amend the memorandum of appeal, insofar as
such amendment was necessary for determining the controversy. The
Tribunal’s decision to permit respondent No. 3 to supplement his

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objections while declining the appellant’s request was, therefore,
questioned as being unjustified.
19.6 Lastly, learned counsel submitted that the Tribunal had erred in
treating the time limit fixed by this Court for disposal of the appeal as a
ground for rejecting the amendment application. It was contended that a
direction for expeditious disposal could not, by itself, preclude an
amendment otherwise necessary for effective adjudication of the dispute.
Learned counsel also pointed out that, according to the appellant,
effective steps towards compliance with the remand directions had not
been taken for a considerable period, whereas on 06.07.2026, fresh
objections on behalf of respondent no.3 were entertained by the Waqf
Tribunal. In these circumstances, it was urged that the application for
amendment ought to have been examined on its own merits and not
declined merely with reference to the time-bound direction for disposal.
On the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel prayed that the impugned
order dated 31.08.2026 be set aside and the application for amendment,
Paper No. ka-104, be allowed.
Submissions on behalf of the Respondents
20. Learned counsel appearing for the Board and learned Counsel
appearing for respondent No. 3 opposed the appeal and supported the
impugned order, advancing the following submissions:
20.1 The respondents submitted that respondent No. 3 had been
appointed as Mutawalli on 18.05.2022 and that the appellant, having
thereafter moved an application for amendment of the memorandum of
appeal, registered as Paper No. ka-121, which was allowed on
29.12.2022, was fully aware of the said appointment. The appellant had,
at that stage, an opportunity to incorporate his objections concerning the
appointment, lineage and eligibility of respondent No. 3. No satisfactory
explanation, however, had been furnished for seeking a further
amendment through Paper No. ka-104, filed on 30.07.2026, after a
considerable lapse of time.
20.2 It was further submitted that the order dated 17.02.2025 passed by
this Court in Civil Revision No. 36 of 2025 had remitted the matter for

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fresh adjudication in the light of the statutory provisions and the specific
issue identified therein. The remand, according to the respondents, did
not contemplate an unrestricted reopening of the proceedings or permit
the introduction of additional controversies beyond what was necessary
for the adjudication directed by this Court. The proposed amendments,
particularly those concerning the lineage, pedigree and eligibility of the
respondents and the validity of subsequent appointments, were stated to
enlarge the scope of the appeal beyond the controversy required to be
reconsidered pursuant to the remand.
20.3 The respondents contended that the memorandum of appeal, as
amended pursuant to the order dated 29.12.2022, already contained
grounds challenging the order dated 04.04.2018 and that the appellant
could advance his submissions on the basis of the existing pleadings and
material available on record. The omission to frame particular issues by
the Tribunal did not, by itself, render a further amendment necessary. It
was urged that the appellant could not rely merely upon the absence of
separately framed issues to justify the introduction of additional
pleadings, particularly when the relevant facts were already within his
knowledge and an earlier application for amendment had been allowed.
20.4 It was also submitted that the proposed amendments sought to
introduce further factual and legal questions concerning the appointment
of respondent No. 3 on 18.05.2022, the competence of the Chairman to
make such appointment, the applicability of Sections 32 and 63 of the
Act of 1995, and the eligibility of the respondents under the terms of the
registered Waqf deed. According to the respondents, these grounds could
not be introduced at such a belated stage in the absence of a satisfactory
explanation for their omission from the earlier amendment. The
appellant had, therefore, failed to demonstrate that the proposed
amendments were necessary for adjudication of the controversy arising
from the existing pleadings.
20.5 The respondents further submitted that the Tribunal’s decision to
permit respondent No. 3 to place additional written objections on record
by order dated 06.07.2026 did not, by itself, confer upon the appellant an

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automatic right to seek a further amendment of the memorandum of
appeal. The application for amendment was required to be considered
independently, with reference to the necessity of the proposed
amendments, the explanation for the delay and their effect upon the
scope of the proceedings. It was contended that the appellant had failed
to establish that the permission granted to respondent No. 3 furnished
any justification for allowing the amendments sought through Paper No.
ka-104.
20.6 Lastly, the respondents submitted that, in view of the earlier
adjudication, the limited scope of the remand by this Court and the
direction for expeditious disposal, the Tribunal had rightly declined to
permit further amendments which would enlarge the controversy and
impede the proceedings. The impugned order, it was urged, did not
deprive the appellant of the opportunity to advance submissions on the
basis of the existing pleadings or prevent the Tribunal from considering
the grounds already forming part of the memorandum of appeal. It was,
therefore, contended that no error in the exercise of the Tribunal’s
discretion had been demonstrated so as to warrant interference by this
Court in the present appeal under Section 83(9) of the Act of 1995.
POINTS FOR DETERMINATION
21. Upon consideration of the rival submissions, the impugned order
and the material available on record, the following questions arise for
determination:
21.1. The scope and extent of the power of an appellate forum, including
a Waqf Tribunal exercising appellate jurisdiction, to permit amendment
of a memorandum of appeal under Order VI Rule 17 read with Section
107(2) and Order XLI Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
21.2. Whether, following a remand by the High Court directing fresh
adjudication within a specified period and with reference to identified
matters, an appellant may seek a further amendment introducing factual
grounds which were already in existence and within his knowledge prior
to the remand and, if so, the considerations governing the exercise of
such power.

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21.3. Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the
Tribunal was justified in rejecting the amendment application, Paper No.
ka-104, and whether the impugned order warrants interference by this
Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under Section 83(9) of
the Act of 1995.
STATUTORY FRAMEWORK AND JURISPRUDENTIAL ANALYSIS
Scope of the power to amend pleadings in appellate proceedings
22. The controversy in the present appeal raises questions concerning
the exercise of the power to amend a memorandum of appeal at a stage
when the proceedings have already undergone an earlier amendment,
adjudication by the Tribunal and remand by this Court for fresh
consideration in accordance with specified directions. The question is
not merely whether an amendment can be permitted in appellate
proceedings, but whether the particular amendments sought by the
appellant were necessary for effective adjudication of the controversy
before the Tribunal and whether the discretion exercised by it in
declining the application was consistent with the principles governing
amendment of pleadings.
23. The power to permit amendment of pleadings is intended to
advance the cause of justice by enabling the court to determine the real
questions in controversy between the parties. Such power, however, is
neither unfettered nor exercisable as a matter of course. Its exercise
requires consideration of the nature and relevance of the proposed
amendment, its necessity for determining the controversy, the stage of
the proceedings, the explanation furnished for the delay, the prejudice
likely to be caused to the opposite party and whether the amendment
would merely elaborate an existing case or introduce a substantially new
or inconsistent factual foundation. The object is to facilitate a fair and
effective adjudication, without permitting the amendment process to
become a means of unnecessarily enlarging or recasting the dispute.
24. These considerations assume particular significance in the present
case. The appellant had earlier obtained permission to amend the
memorandum of appeal by order dated 29.12.2022 on application Paper

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No. ka-121. The Tribunal thereafter decided the appeal on 19.11.2024.
This Court, by judgment and order dated 17.02.2025 passed in Civil
Revision No. 36 of 2025, set aside that decision and remitted the matter
for fresh adjudication. The subsequent application, Paper No. ka-104,
was filed on 30.07.2026, seeking further amendments concerning, inter
alia, the alleged non-service of notices, the legality of the appointment of
respondent No. 3, the authority of the Chairman of the Board to make
such appointment, and consequential modifications to the pleadings and
prayer clause. The permissibility of these amendments must, therefore,
be examined in the light of the statutory framework governing
amendment of pleadings, the nature of the existing controversy and the
terms of the order of remand.
Order VI Rule 17 read with Section 107(2) of the Code of Civil
Procedure
25. Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, confers
power upon the court to permit either party to alter or amend its
pleadings at any stage of the proceedings, on such terms as may be just,
where such amendment is necessary for determining the real questions in
controversy between the parties. The provision embodies the principle
that procedural rules are intended to facilitate adjudication on the merits
and that a party should not ordinarily be deprived of an opportunity to
have the real controversy determined merely on account of an avoidable
deficiency in its pleadings. At the same time, the requirement that the
amendment must be necessary for determining the real questions in
controversy imposes a judicial restraint upon the exercise of that power.
26. Section 107(2) CPC provides that, subject to the conditions and
limitations prescribed, an appellate court shall have the same powers and
shall perform, as nearly as may be, the same duties as are conferred and
imposed by the Code upon courts of original jurisdiction in respect of
suits instituted therein. The provision enables an appellate court to
exercise appropriate procedural powers, including the power to permit
amendment of a memorandum of appeal, subject to the applicable
statutory requirements and the nature of the appellate proceedings.

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27. Consequently, the circumstance that an amendment is sought in a
memorandum of appeal, rather than in a plaint or written statement, does
not, by itself, place the request beyond the scope of amendment
jurisdiction. The appellate forum possesses the requisite procedural
authority to consider such an application. Equally, the availability of that
power does not confer an unconditional right upon a litigant to amend
the memorandum of appeal whenever a further ground or factual
assertion is sought to be introduced. The proposed amendment must
satisfy the governing requirements of relevance, necessity, procedural
fairness and consistency with the nature and scope of the proceedings.
28. It is, therefore, necessary to distinguish between the existence of
the power to permit an amendment and the circumstances in which that
power ought to be exercised. While the appellate forum is competent to
consider an amendment, the exercise of that authority remains subject to
judicial scrutiny. The forum must examine whether the proposed
amendment assists in determining the real controversy, whether it merely
clarifies or elaborates a case already set up or introduces a substantially
new factual foundation, and whether its allowance would prejudice the
opposite party or disrupt the orderly progress of the proceedings. The
mere fact that an amendment is procedurally permissible does not
dispense with the requirement of establishing its necessity in the facts of
the particular case.
Principles governing the exercise of amendment jurisdiction
29. The governing principles for determining an application for
amendment have been authoritatively explained by the Supreme Court in
1
Revajeetu Builders & Developers v. Narayanaswamy & Sons , and Life
2
Insurance Corporation of India v. Sanjeev Builders Private Limited . The
primary consideration is whether the proposed amendment is necessary
for determining the real questions in controversy. The court must also
examine whether the amendment is bona fide, whether it alters the
fundamental nature of the case, whether it causes prejudice or injustice
to the opposite party, and whether the controversy can be effectively
1 (2009) 10 SCC 84
2 (2022) 16 SCC 1

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adjudicated on the basis of the existing pleadings and material. These
considerations are not to be applied mechanically or in isolation, but
cumulatively, having regard to the facts and procedural stage of the case.
30. In State of Maharashtra v. M/s. Hindustan Construction Company
3
Ltd., , the Supreme Court recognised the power of an appellate court to
permit amendment of the memorandum of appeal and the introduction of
additional grounds, subject to the principles governing the exercise of
such discretion. The fact that an amendment is sought at the appellate
stage does not, by itself, constitute a sufficient ground for its rejection.
The nature of the proposed amendment, its connection with the
controversy already before the appellate forum and its effect upon the
rights of the opposite party remain material considerations. A distinction
must, therefore, be maintained between a ground which elaborates an
existing controversy and one which introduces a new factual case
requiring further investigation.
31. This Court has considered the application of these principles in
4
Smt. Munni Devi v. Smt. Shashikala Pandey . It was held that the
proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC cannot be applied in a rigid or
mechanical manner to an amendment of grounds in appellate or
revisional proceedings. The fact that the proviso may not operate as an
inflexible statutory embargo in such proceedings, however, does not
confer an unrestricted right to amend. The considerations underlying the
requirement of due diligence remain relevant to the exercise of
discretion, particularly where the proposed amendment seeks to
introduce factual pleas which were within the applicant’s knowledge and
could reasonably have been raised at an earlier stage. A distinction must
also be maintained between a pure question of law arising from the
existing pleadings and record and a new factual plea which would
require the factual controversy to be reopened. The bona fides of the
applicant, the necessity of the proposed amendment, the possibility of
prejudice and its effect upon the progress of the proceedings are,
therefore, relevant considerations.
3 (2010) 4 SCC 518
4 2026:AHC:58829

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32. The principle has also been applied by this Court in Asif Ansari v.
5
Himanshu Sharma and Another . While considering an application
seeking amendment of the memorandum of appeal, this Court held that
an amendment which merely reiterates legal pleas already forming part
of the pleadings or grounds of appeal may be declined as unnecessary.
Such refusal does not, by itself, extinguish the right of a party to advance
a pure question of law arising from the existing pleadings and material at
the stage of final hearing, provided its consideration does not require
investigation into facts not already on record. The determinative
consideration is, therefore, not the mere omission of a legal proposition
from the existing grounds, but whether the proposed amendment is
necessary for effective adjudication and whether its refusal would result
in prejudice or failure of justice.
33. The aforesaid principles require the proposed amendments in the
present case to be examined in the context of the pleadings and
amendments already forming part of the pending appeal. The fact that
the memorandum of appeal had earlier been amended by Paper No.
ka-121 is not, by itself, a ground for refusing a subsequent amendment.
Equally, the fact that the proposed amendments relate to the broader
dispute concerning the office of Mutawalli does not establish their
necessity. The material question is whether the additional averments and
grounds sought to be introduced are necessary for adjudication of the
controversy or whether the existing pleadings and record already permit
the appellant to advance the relevant contentions. Where a proposed
amendment merely supplies further particulars to a ground already
available, its necessity must be demonstrated. Where it introduces new
factual allegations requiring a fresh inquiry or enlarges the controversy
beyond what is necessary for deciding the pending appeal, the forum
may decline it. The absence of a satisfactory explanation for belatedly
seeking such an amendment is also relevant in assessing its bona fides
and necessity, but cannot substitute for an examination of the nature and
effect of the amendment itself.
5 2026:AHC:131272

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Due diligence and the effect of delay
34. The proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC places an additional
restriction upon the exercise of the power to amend pleadings after
commencement of trial. It provides that no application for amendment
shall be allowed after the trial has commenced unless the court comes to
the conclusion that, despite due diligence, the party could not have raised
the plea before commencement of trial. The statutory requirement is
intended to prevent a party from introducing, at an advanced stage,
factual pleas which could reasonably have been raised earlier and to
ensure that the process of amendment does not result in avoidable delay
or disruption of the adjudication.
35. The requirement of due diligence cannot be treated as a mere
formality. The court must examine whether the plea sought to be
introduced was within the applicant's knowledge, whether it could
reasonably have been raised at an earlier stage and whether the
explanation furnished accounts for its omission. The mere assertion that
an amendment is necessary for determining the real controversy does not
dispense with the obligation to satisfy the applicable statutory
requirements. Equally, due diligence must be examined in the factual
context of the proceedings, having regard to the nature of the proposed
amendment, the stage at which it is sought and the explanation furnished
for the omission.
6
36. In Chander Kanta Bansal v. Rajinder Singh Anand , the Supreme
Court explained the significance of due diligence in the context of the
7
proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC. Similarly, in Vidyabai v. Padmalatha ,
the Court emphasised the mandatory nature of the statutory restriction
applicable after commencement of trial. These decisions underscore that
the court must address the statutory conditions governing amendment
rather than proceed solely on the general proposition that amendments
should ordinarily be permitted to facilitate adjudication on the merits.
37. The application of these considerations to appellate proceedings
requires attention to the procedural stage and the nature of the
6 (2008) 5 SCC 117
7 (2009) 2 SCC 409

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WQPL No. - 20 of 2026
proceedings. The proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC expressly refers to
commencement of trial. An appellate proceeding, particularly one in
which the earlier decision has been set aside and the proceedings
remitted for fresh adjudication, cannot in every respect be equated with a
suit in which evidence is being recorded for the first time. The proviso,
therefore, cannot be applied mechanically merely because an amendment
is sought in an appeal. At the same time, the considerations underlying
due diligence, including the applicant’s knowledge of the relevant facts
and the explanation for not raising them earlier, remain material to the
exercise of amendment jurisdiction. The court must assess the proposed
amendment in the context of the stage actually reached and the nature
and scope of the proceedings restored for adjudication.
38. In the present case, the order dated 29.12.2022 permitting the
earlier amendment assumes significance. The appointment of respondent
No. 3 had already taken place on 18.05.2022. The appellant, upon
becoming aware of that appointment, had moved application Paper No.
ka-121, seeking to bring the appointment on record, question it with
reference to the registered Waqf deed dated 04.08.1931 and raise
objections concerning the lineage and eligibility of respondent No. 3.
The Tribunal allowed that application by a detailed order dated
29.12.2022. The subsequent application, Paper No. ka-104, filed on
30.07.2026, therefore, required the appellant to explain not merely his
knowledge of the appointment, but also why the additional factual pleas
and statutory grounds now sought to be introduced had not been
incorporated in the earlier amendment.
39.  The explanation sought to be given in this regard has to be
examined in the context of the fact that the appointment of respondent
No. 3 and the appellant’s objections thereto were already the subject of
the earlier amendment application. The proposed grounds concerning the
appointment, the authority of the Chairman and the eligibility of
respondent No. 3 were not founded upon an event which occurred only
after the earlier amendment had been allowed. The appellant was,
therefore, required to demonstrate why those grounds could not

19
WQPL No. - 20 of 2026
reasonably have been raised when Paper No. ka-121 was filed and
allowed. The explanation furnished must be assessed against this
procedural history and the nature of the additional pleas now sought to
be introduced.
40. Delay, by itself, is not conclusive of the question whether an
amendment should be permitted. The decisive consideration is whether
the explanation for the omission is satisfactory when examined alongside
the nature and necessity of each proposed amendment and whether the
existing pleadings and material are inadequate to enable adjudication of
the issues properly arising in the pending appeal. In the present case, the
fact that the appellant had already obtained permission to amend the
memorandum of appeal after becoming aware of the subsequent
appointment, but did not then incorporate the additional factual pleas
now sought to be introduced, is a relevant circumstance. It assumes
particular significance where the proposed amendments would require
the Tribunal to examine additional factual questions which are not
shown to be indispensable for deciding the appeal within the scope of
the remand.
Amendment of pleadings and the limits of adjudication
41. The power to amend pleadings must also be considered in the light
of the fundamental principle that adjudication ordinarily remains
confined to the case presented by the parties. In Ram Sarup Gupta
8
(Dead) by LRs v. Bishun Narain Inter College , the Supreme Court
emphasised that pleadings serve to inform the opposite party of the case
it has to meet and that, although their substance must be considered
rather than their form, a party ordinarily cannot travel beyond the
material facts pleaded in support of its case. The same principle was
9
reiterated in Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal , wherein the Supreme
Court explained that a court cannot ordinarily adjudicate upon a distinct
factual case which was neither pleaded nor one which the opposite party
had an adequate opportunity to meet. A deficiency in the express
formulation of pleadings, however, does not necessarily defeat
8 (1987) 2 SCC 555
9 (2008) 17 SCC 491

20
WQPL No. - 20 of 2026
adjudication where the parties understood the controversy and had an
adequate opportunity to address it.
42. The requirement of pleadings must not, however, be confused with
a prohibition against elaborating an existing case. Where an amendment
merely clarifies the factual basis of a challenge already raised, its
consideration may facilitate adjudication without altering the essential
nature of the proceedings. On the other hand, where an amendment
introduces a distinct cause of challenge or raises disputed questions of
fact requiring a fresh inquiry, the court must examine whether such
questions properly arise within the scope of the proceedings and whether
the opposite party would be afforded an adequate opportunity to
respond. The relevant distinction is between supplying particulars
necessary to determine an existing controversy and introducing a
separate factual controversy under the guise of amendment.
43. In the present case, the appellant's challenge to the order dated
04.04.2018 concerns his removal from the office of Mutawalli. The
subsequent appointment of respondent No. 3, made during the pendency
of the appeal, may be relevant to the extent that it has a bearing upon the
controversy already before the Tribunal or the relief sought by the
appellant. However, the validity of that appointment cannot
automatically be treated as an unrestricted and independent subject of
adjudication merely because it concerns the same office. The
relationship between the challenge to the appellant's removal and the
subsequent appointment must be examined with reference to the existing
pleadings, the nature of the relief claimed and the questions which the
Tribunal is required to determine in the pending appeal.
44. The same consideration applies to the proposed averments
concerning lineage, pedigree and eligibility under the registered Waqf
deed dated 04.08.1931. The fact that the deed governs succession to or
eligibility for the office of Mutawalli may be relevant to the controversy,
but the mere reference to the deed does not, by itself, make every
question concerning the appointment of a subsequent Mutawalli
necessary for adjudication of the appeal against the appellant's removal.

21
WQPL No. - 20 of 2026
The Tribunal was required to examine whether the proposed
amendments were necessary to determine an issue already arising from
the existing pleadings or whether they would introduce a distinct
controversy requiring adjudication beyond the proper scope of the
pending appeal.
Amendment of the memorandum of appeal and the appellate forum's
discretion
45. The existence of the power to permit amendment of a
memorandum of appeal must be distinguished from the question whether
a particular amendment ought to be allowed. In M/s. Hindustan
Construction Company Ltd. (supra), the Supreme Court, upon
considering Order XLI Rules 2 and 3 CPC, recognised the power of an
appellate court to permit amendment of the memorandum of appeal. The
existence of such power, however, does not dispense with the
requirement that its exercise must be justified having regard to the nature
of the proposed amendment and the controversy already before the
appellate forum. The exercise of that power must remain consistent with
the nature of appellate adjudication and the procedural rights of the
parties.
46. An appeal ordinarily proceeds upon the grounds stated in the
memorandum of appeal, subject to the applicable procedural rules
governing the consideration of additional grounds. Order XLI Rule 2
CPC regulates the grounds upon which an appellant may be heard and
the circumstances in which additional grounds may be considered. The
provision is required to be read in conjunction with the general appellate
powers under Section 107 CPC and the principles governing amendment
of pleadings. It is, therefore, necessary to distinguish between a request
to amend the memorandum by incorporating further factual averments
and a request to urge an additional legal ground on the basis of facts and
material already forming part of the record. The latter may, in an
appropriate case, be considered without requiring a corresponding
amendment of the pleadings.

22
WQPL No. - 20 of 2026
47. The power to permit amendment cannot be exercised without
regard to the stage of the appeal, the nature of the proposed changes and
the procedural rights of the respondent. The appellate forum must ensure
that an amendment does not operate to circumvent the requirements
governing the introduction of additional grounds or convert the pending
appeal into proceedings of a substantially different character. Where the
proposed amendment requires the introduction of new factual material,
the court must also consider whether the opposite party would require an
opportunity to file a response, produce evidence or otherwise meet the
case sought to be introduced. Such consequences are relevant in
determining both the necessity and the permissibility of the amendment.
48. In the present case, the appellant relies upon the circumstance that
the earlier amendment was permitted on 29.12.2022, but the Tribunal
failed to frame specific issues concerning the appointment and eligibility
of respondent No. 3. This contention brings into focus the distinction
between amendment of pleadings and formulation of issues. The purpose
of framing issues is to identify the material propositions of fact and law
upon which the parties are at variance and which require adjudication. If
the existing pleadings disclose a controversy requiring determination, the
omission to frame an appropriate issue may call for its formulation or
reconsideration by the Tribunal. Such omission does not necessarily
mean that the pleadings themselves require a further amendment.
49. Where the existing memorandum of appeal already contains the
material factual averments and grounds necessary to raise a particular
controversy, the appropriate course may be to consider the framing or
reformulation of issues, as permissible under the applicable procedure. A
further amendment would be warranted only if the existing pleadings do
not adequately disclose the material facts or grounds sought to be urged.
The distinction is material because the power to amend pleadings is
intended to facilitate determination of the real controversy and cannot be
treated as a substitute for every procedural step which the adjudicating
forum may be required to undertake in deciding the appeal. Conversely,
the availability of the power to frame or reformulate issues cannot be

23
WQPL No. - 20 of 2026
used to decide a distinct factual case which has not been pleaded and
which the opposite party has not had an opportunity to meet.
Effect and scope of an order of remand
50. The scope of proceedings following remand is determined
primarily by the terms and substance of the remand order. Where an
appellate or revisional court sets aside an earlier decision and directs
fresh adjudication subject to specified directions, the subordinate forum
is bound to proceed in accordance with those directions. A remand does
not, by itself, extinguish every procedural power otherwise available to
the forum, nor does it confer an unrestricted right upon either party to
reopen all aspects of the dispute. The forum is required to give effect to
the remand order while exercising its procedural powers in a manner
consistent with the purpose and scope of the remand.
51. A direction for time-bound disposal is a relevant consideration in
determining whether a proposed amendment would unnecessarily
prolong the proceedings. Such a direction, however, cannot, by itself, be
construed as an absolute prohibition against every amendment sought
after remand. Where an amendment is demonstrably necessary for
determining a material question arising from the existing controversy
and falling within the scope of the proceedings, its consideration cannot
be excluded solely on the ground that a time limit has been prescribed.
The adjudicating forum must balance the requirement of expeditious
disposal against the need for fair and effective adjudication. The time-
bound nature of the remand may weigh against an amendment which
introduces an avoidable factual inquiry, but it cannot justify refusal of an
amendment which is genuinely indispensable for deciding the appeal in
accordance with law.
52. Conversely, a remand for fresh adjudication does not
automatically entitle a party to introduce every factual ground which
could have been raised before the earlier decision. Where the proposed
amendments relate to facts already within the applicant's knowledge, the
forum must examine whether the amendments are genuinely necessary
for determining the issues arising in the pending appeal and within the

24
WQPL No. - 20 of 2026
scope of the remand, or whether they would enlarge the controversy
beyond what is required for fresh adjudication. The fact that the earlier
decision has been set aside and the proceedings restored for
reconsideration does not, by itself, afford a fresh opportunity to
reconstruct the pleadings without regard to the stage already reached or
the explanation for the earlier omission.
53. The permission granted to one party to place fresh pleadings on
record does not, by itself, confer an unconditional right upon the
opposite party to amend its pleadings. The nature and scope of the
additional pleadings, their relevance to the issues under consideration
and the extent to which they introduce a new plea requiring a response
are relevant considerations. The requirement of procedural fairness may
necessitate an appropriate opportunity to meet a permissible new case.
Such opportunity, however, does not invariably require or justify an
unrestricted amendment of the memorandum of appeal. The forum must
examine the actual contents of the additional pleadings and determine
what opportunity, if any, is necessary to ensure that neither party is
prejudiced.
Principles emerging from the statutory framework and authorities
54. The legal position emerging from the statutory provisions and the
authorities discussed above may be summarised thus: The power to
permit amendment of a memorandum of appeal is available to the
appellate forum and is not exhausted merely because an earlier
amendment has been allowed or the appeal has once been adjudicated.
Nor does an order of remand, even when accompanied by a direction for
time-bound disposal, operate as an absolute bar against a subsequent
amendment. The exercise of that power, however, is governed by
considerations of necessity, relevance, bona fides, procedural fairness
and the proper scope of the pending proceedings. A party cannot claim
an unrestricted right to introduce, by successive amendments, factual
pleas relating to circumstances which were already within its knowledge
and could reasonably have been incorporated at an earlier stage. The fact
that a proposed amendment relates to the same broad subject matter does

25
WQPL No. - 20 of 2026
not, by itself, establish its necessity for adjudication of the pending
appeal. The decisive consideration is whether the existing pleadings and
material on record are sufficient to enable determination of the issues
which properly fall for adjudication, including those arising from the
remand. Where the existing pleadings already disclose the material
factual foundation of an issue, omission to frame or appropriately
formulate that issue does not, by itself, justify a further amendment.
Equally, refusal to incorporate a legal proposition by way of amendment
does not preclude a party from advancing a pure question of law arising
from the existing pleadings and record, provided its consideration does
not require investigation into an unpleaded factual case. The appellate
forum must, therefore, distinguish between an amendment genuinely
required to facilitate effective adjudication and one which merely seeks
to enlarge or recast the controversy at a belated stage.
Legal principles governing appellate interference
55. The question whether the order of the Tribunal warrants
interference must be examined in the light of the jurisdiction exercised
by this Court under Section 83(9) of the Act of 1995. The present
proceedings arise from an order passed by the Tribunal in a pending
Waqf appeal, rejecting an application for amendment of the
memorandum of appeal. The decision of the Tribunal is, therefore,
subject to scrutiny in the exercise of the statutory appellate jurisdiction
conferred upon this Court. The question is whether, on an examination of
the applicable legal principles and the material on record, the Tribunal
was justified in declining the proposed amendments.
56. An order passed on an application for amendment involves the
exercise of judicial discretion. Such discretion must be exercised in
accordance with the governing statutory provisions and the principles
laid down by the courts. The appellate court must examine whether the
Tribunal applied the correct legal standard, took into account the
material circumstances, assessed the necessity and relevance of the
proposed amendments and considered the effect of the amendments
upon the existing controversy and the procedural rights of the opposite

26
WQPL No. - 20 of 2026
party. Where the discretion has been exercised on an erroneous
understanding of the law or the pleadings, or upon considerations which
do not sustain the conclusion reached, the appellate court is competent to
correct the error. Equally, the mere fact that another view may be
possible does not, by itself, establish that the order is legally
unsustainable. The scrutiny must be directed to the correctness and
propriety of the decision in the light of the statutory framework and the
facts of the case.
57. The impugned order must, therefore, be examined not merely by
reference to the conclusion reached by the Tribunal, but also by
reference to the reasoning adopted in arriving at that conclusion. In
particular, it must be ascertained whether the Tribunal considered the
proposed amendments in the context of the earlier amendment allowed
on 29.12.2022, the existing pleadings and grounds of appeal, the nature
of the additional pleas sought to be introduced through Paper No.
ka-104, the explanation furnished for their omission at the earlier stage,
and the terms and purpose of the remand order dated 17.02.2025. It must
also be examined whether the Tribunal appropriately distinguished
between additional factual averments requiring a fresh inquiry and legal
grounds which could be urged on the basis of the existing pleadings and
record. The assessment of these considerations would determine whether
the refusal to permit the proposed amendments calls for interference in
the present appeal.
APPLICATION OF THE ABOVE PRINCIPLES TO THE FACTS OF
THE PRESENT CASE
58. The record reveals that application Paper No. ka-121 was allowed
by the Tribunal on 29.12.2022, after the appointment of respondent No.
3 as Mutawalli on 18.05.2022. Through the said application, the
appellant sought to bring the subsequent appointment and the
consequential facts on record, questioned the appointment with reference
to the registered Waqf deed dated 04.08.1931, raised objections
concerning the eligibility of respondent No. 3 and sought his
impleadment in the appeal. The earlier amendment, therefore, had

27
WQPL No. - 20 of 2026
already brought the subsequent appointment and the appellant’s
challenge thereto within the ambit of the pending proceedings. The
precise extent to which the statutory and factual grounds now sought to
be introduced through Paper No. ka-104 were covered by the earlier
amendment, however, requires separate examination.
59. The subsequent application, Paper No. ka-104, filed on
30.07.2026, sought to introduce further averments concerning the
alleged non-service of show-cause notices dated 04.10.2017 and
15.11.2017, the competence of the Chairman to appoint respondent No.
3 with reference to Sections 32 (2)(d) and 32 (2)(g) and Section 63 of the
Act of 1995, the notice dated 16.10.2019 issued under Section 54 of the
Act, and consequential modifications to the pleadings and prayer clause.
The appellant maintains that the application furnished reasons for not
incorporating these averments at an earlier stage. The relevant
consideration, however, is not merely whether an explanation was stated
in the application, but whether it satisfactorily accounts for the omission,
particularly when the appointment of respondent No. 3 and the
appellant’s objections concerning that appointment had already been
brought on record through Paper No. ka-121. The appellant was required
to demonstrate both the necessity of the additional averments and the
reason why they could not reasonably have been incorporated in the
earlier amendment. The delay, though not conclusive by itself, is a
material circumstance to be considered alongside the nature and effect of
the proposed amendments.
60. The appellant’s contention that the Tribunal failed to frame
specific issues concerning the appointment and eligibility of respondent
No. 3 does not, by itself, establish the necessity of a further amendment.
The original appeal challenged the order dated 04.04.2018 on grounds
which included non-service of notice and violation of the principles of
natural justice. The subsequent appointment of respondent No. 3,
together with the appellant’s objections concerning his lineage and
eligibility under the registered Waqf deed, was also brought on record
through Paper No. ka-121, which was allowed on 29.12.2022. The

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WQPL No. - 20 of 2026
question, therefore, was whether the existing amended memorandum
disclosed the factual foundation and grounds necessary for determination
of the controversy which the appellant sought to have adjudicated. To the
extent that such foundation was already available in the pleadings,
omission to frame an appropriate issue could be addressed by the
Tribunal by considering the formulation or reformulation of issues in
accordance with law. A further amendment would be necessary only to
the extent that an essential factual foundation or ground was absent from
the existing pleadings. The omission to frame an issue cannot
automatically be treated as justification for introducing further pleadings,
just as the power to frame issues cannot dispense with the requirement of
pleadings where a distinct factual case is sought to be introduced.
61. The appellant’s submission that the proposed amendments do not
alter the fundamental nature of the proceedings must also be examined in
the context of the controversy actually pending before the Tribunal. The
appeal is directed against the order dated 04.04.2018 removing the
appellant from the office of Mutawalli. The subsequent appointment of
respondent No. 3 on 18.05.2022 may have a bearing upon the
controversy or the consequential relief claimed by the appellant. Indeed,
that appointment and the appellant’s objections concerning the lineage
and eligibility of respondent No. 3 had already been brought on record
through the earlier amendment. However, the validity of that
appointment does not, merely because it concerns the same office,
automatically become an unrestricted and independent subject of
adjudication in the appeal against the appellant’s removal. The
connection between the challenge to the removal and the subsequent
appointment must be established with reference to the existing
pleadings, the relief claimed and the questions which the Tribunal is
required to determine. The proposed amendments could, therefore, be
permitted only to the extent that they were necessary for adjudication of
the controversy properly arising in the pending appeal and did not
introduce an independent dispute beyond its permissible scope.

29
WQPL No. - 20 of 2026
62. The proposed grounds concerning the competence of the
Chairman to make the appointment under Sections 32 (2)(d) and 32 (2)
(g) and Section 63 of the Act of 1995 require consideration distinct from
the challenge to the appointment already raised through Paper No.
ka-121. The earlier amendment brought the appointment of respondent
No. 3 and the appellant’s objections thereto on record. It does not
necessarily follow that every statutory ground now sought to be urged
was also expressly pleaded. The question, however, is whether
incorporation of those grounds by way of amendment was necessary for
adjudication of the pending appeal. To the extent that the challenge
raises a pure question of law concerning the authority competent to make
the appointment, founded upon the statutory provisions and the order
already forming part of the record, the appellant would not necessarily
be precluded from advancing that contention merely because a formal
amendment has been refused. The position would be different if the
proposed ground depended upon additional factual averments requiring
investigation. The distinction is between an additional legal contention
arising from the existing record and the introduction of a new factual
foundation requiring adjudication.
63. The proposed amendments concerning the show-cause notices
dated 04.10.2017 and 15.11.2017 must be examined with reference to
the grounds already taken in the memorandum of appeal concerning
non-service of notice and violation of the principles of natural justice.
The original challenge to the removal order itself included an objection
founded upon non-service of notice and non-supply of the inquiry report.
The proposed references to the particular notices, including the alleged
publication of the notice dated 15.11.2017, were required to be examined
to determine whether they supplied particulars of the existing challenge
or introduced an additional factual plea. The mere addition of particulars
concerning the notices would not, by itself, establish the necessity of a
further amendment if the existing pleadings already enabled the Tribunal
to examine the alleged denial of notice and opportunity of hearing. The
appellant was required to demonstrate what material deficiency in the

30
WQPL No. - 20 of 2026
existing pleadings those additional averments sought to cure and why
their incorporation was necessary for adjudication of the appeal.
64. The proposed averment concerning the notice dated 16.10.2019
issued under Section 54 of the Act of 1995 stands on a different footing.
The said notice was issued after the removal order dated 04.04.2018. Its
relevance to the challenge against that order, or to any question arising
within the scope of the pending appeal and the remand, was required to
be specifically demonstrated. The mere fact that the notice related to the
same waqf or to a person connected with the proceedings did not, by
itself, make it a necessary part of the controversy. Similarly, the
proposed changes to the prayer clause could be considered if they were
consequential and served to clarify the relief already arising from the
existing pleadings. They could not, however, be employed to introduce
an independent challenge to a separate order without satisfying the
requirements governing such an amendment and demonstrating that the
challenge properly fell within the scope of the pending proceedings.
65. The appellant’s contention that the remand order dated 17.02.2025
required fresh adjudication and did not prohibit further amendments is
correct to the extent that the direction for time-bound disposal did not,
by itself, extinguish the Tribunal’s power to permit an amendment
necessary for effective adjudication. The remand required the Tribunal to
undertake fresh adjudication in accordance with law, taking into
consideration Sections 14, 22 and 64(3) of the Act of 1995 and returning
a decision on Issue No. 6 framed in its earlier judgment. The Tribunal
was, therefore, required to exercise its procedural powers consistently
with those directions. Equally, the appellant’s allegation that effective
steps towards compliance with the remand directions were not taken
within the prescribed period does not, by itself, establish the necessity or
bona fides of the proposed amendments. Their permissibility had to be
determined on their own merits, with reference to the existing pleadings,
the explanation for the omission, the nature of the additional averments
sought to be introduced and the scope and purpose of the remand.

31
WQPL No. - 20 of 2026
66. The appellant’s reliance upon the order dated 06.07.2026, whereby
respondent No. 3 was permitted to file fresh written objections, also
requires consideration. Such permission did not automatically confer a
corresponding or unrestricted right upon the appellant to amend the
memorandum of appeal. The application for amendment was required to
be examined independently. Nevertheless, procedural fairness required
the Tribunal to ensure that the appellant was afforded an appropriate
opportunity to meet any new plea introduced through the additional
objections, to the extent that such plea was relevant to the adjudication.
The nature and scope of those objections, and whether they introduced a
factual or legal case beyond the existing pleadings, were therefore
relevant considerations. The question was not whether the appellant was
entitled to an amendment merely because respondent No. 3 had been
permitted to file additional objections, but whether the contents of those
objections made any particular amendment necessary to afford the
appellant a fair opportunity of meeting the case set up against him.
67. The aforesaid analysis shows that application Paper No. ka-104
could not be determined merely on the ground that an earlier amendment
had already been allowed, nor could it be allowed merely because the
proceedings had been remitted for fresh adjudication and respondent
No.3 had been permitted to file additional objections. The Tribunal was
required to examine the nature and necessity of the proposed
amendments in the context of the pleadings already on record, the
appellant’s knowledge of the relevant facts, the explanation for their
omission from the earlier amendment, the scope of the pending appeal
and the directions contained in the remand order. In particular, it was
necessary to distinguish between grounds already forming part of the
controversy, additional legal grounds capable of being urged on the
existing record, and new factual averments which would enlarge the
dispute or require a fresh inquiry. The earlier amendment bringing the
appointment of respondent No. 3 and the challenge thereto on record
was a relevant circumstance, but could not, by itself, justify rejection of
every additional ground. Equally, the appellant could not claim that

32
WQPL No. - 20 of 2026
every further averment concerning the same office was necessary merely
because it related to the broader dispute concerning the Mutawalliship.
68. On an examination of the impugned order in the light of the
aforesaid considerations, this Court finds that the Tribunal declined the
application not merely on the ground that an earlier amendment had been
allowed or that the proceedings had been remitted for fresh adjudication.
It took into account that the amended memorandum of appeal already
contained the factual averments and grounds necessary to examine the
challenge to the removal order and that the subsequent appointment of
respondent No. 3, together with the appellant’s objections concerning his
lineage and eligibility, had already been brought on record through Paper
No. ka-121. The proposed amendments, insofar as they sought to
introduce further factual averments concerning the notices and additional
grounds relating to the subsequent appointment, were not shown to be
indispensable for determination of the controversy falling within the
scope of the remand. The Tribunal’s conclusion that the existing
pleadings were adequate for adjudication of the pending appeal and that
the proposed amendments were not necessary for that purpose cannot, in
the circumstances, be regarded as an erroneous exercise of discretion.
The circumstances relied upon by the appellant have also been
considered by this Court. They do not establish that refusal of the
proposed amendments would occasion prejudice or impede effective
adjudication of the controversy properly arising before the Tribunal.
69. The proposition that refusal of an amendment does not necessarily
preclude a party from raising a pure question of law at the stage of final
hearing has also been recognised by this Court in Asif Ansari (supra).
Where the proposed amendment merely reiterates a legal plea capable of
being urged on the basis of the existing pleadings and grounds of appeal,
its incorporation by way of amendment may be declined as unnecessary.
Such refusal does not, by itself, deprive the party of the opportunity to
advance a pure question of law arising from the existing pleadings and
material on record, provided its consideration does not require
investigation into facts which are not already part of the record. The

33
WQPL No. - 20 of 2026
relevant consideration is whether the proposed amendment is necessary
for effective adjudication of the controversy and whether its refusal
would result in prejudice or failure of justice.
70. Applying the aforesaid principle to the present case, rejection of
the application for amendment would not, by itself, preclude the
appellant from advancing such legal submissions as are available to him
on the basis of the existing pleadings and material on record. Any such
submission shall, however, be considered by the Tribunal at the stage of
fresh adjudication in accordance with law, subject to its relevance to the
controversy involved and the directions contained in the remand order
dated 17.02.2025. This would not confer upon the appellant any liberty
to introduce a new factual case or travel beyond the pleadings already on
record. The Tribunal shall remain at liberty to examine the admissibility
and merits of such legal submissions at the appropriate stage, without
treating the rejection of the amendment application, by itself, as a bar to
consideration of a pure question of law arising from the existing record.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
71. For the reasons discussed above, this Court finds that the appellant
has failed to demonstrate that the amendments proposed through
application Paper No. ka-104 were necessary for the effective
adjudication of the controversy in the pending appeal. Nor has it been
shown that the Tribunal, in rejecting the application by order dated
31.08.2026, committed any error warranting interference in the exercise
of appellate jurisdiction under Section 83(9) of the Act of 1995. No
ground for interference is, therefore, made out.
72. The present appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. The order dated
31.08.2026 passed by the U.P. Waqf Tribunal, Lucknow, in Waqf Appeal
No. 05 of 2018, rejecting application Paper No. ka-104, is left
undisturbed. It is, however, clarified that rejection of the amendment
application shall not preclude the appellant from advancing such
submissions, including pure questions of law, as may legitimately arise
from the existing pleadings and the material available on record. The

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Tribunal shall consider such submissions in accordance with law, subject
to the scope of the remand.
73. It is further clarified that where the factual foundation and the
grounds giving rise to a controversy are already disclosed in the existing
pleadings, omission to frame an appropriate issue shall not, by itself,
preclude the Tribunal from considering whether an issue, or an
appropriately reformulated issue, is required for effective adjudication of
the pending appeal. Any such course shall remain subject to the
applicable procedural law, the scope of the remand order dated
17.02.2025 and the requirement of affording the parties an adequate
opportunity of hearing. This clarification shall not be construed as
permitting the introduction of a fresh factual case beyond the existing
pleadings or enlargement of the controversy beyond the scope of the
remand.
74. This Court, by order dated 17.02.2025 passed in Civil Revision
No.36 of 2025, had directed the Tribunal to decide the pending Waqf
appeal within a period of two months. The said period having elapsed
and the appeal still being pending, the Tribunal is directed to make every
endeavour to conclude the proceedings expeditiously and, preferably,
within a further period of three months from the date of production of a
certified copy of this judgment. This direction is issued in continuation
of the directions contained in the order dated 17.02.2025. The Tribunal
shall undertake the adjudication on the basis of the pleadings and
material properly forming part of the record and consider the rival
submissions in accordance with law. Nothing contained in this judgment
shall be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the
dispute concerning the appellant’s removal from the office of Mutawalli
or the subsequent appointment of respondent No.3.
75. There shall be no order as to costs.
(Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava, J.)
November 06, 2026
RKK/-
Digitally signed by :-
RAJ KUMAR KANNAUJIA
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad