Atul Shrestha vs State Of Bihar and Anr

Court
Patna High Court

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
CRIMINAL MISCELLANEOUS No.21559 of 2017
CNR No. BRHC010508352017
Arising Out of PS. Case No.-415 Year-2016 Thana- PATNA COMPLAINT CASE District-
Patna
======================================================
Atul Shrestha, S/o- Late Murari Mohan Prasad, a resident of Diwan Mohalla,
T.P. Lane, P.S. - Khaje Kalan, Patna City, District Patna.
... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. The State of Bihar
2. Manish Ranjan Kumar, Son of Sri Yugal Kishore Prasad, a resident of
Ambedkar Chowk, Anuradha Niwas, Hanuman Nagar, P.S. - Patrakar Nagar,
District - Patna, at present residing at Kanti Factory Road, Mahatma Gandhi
Nagar, P.S.- Patrakar Nagar, District - Patna.
... ... Opposite Party/s
======================================================
Appearance :
For the Petitioner/s : Mr. Rajni Kant Jha, Adv.
For the Opposite Party/s : Mrs. Pronati Singh, APP
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RANA VIKRAM SINGH
C.A.V. JUDGMENT
Date : 06-11-2026
The present application has been filed under
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ( in short
Cr.P.C. ) seeking quashing of the order dated 23.11.2016 passed
by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-XV, Patna in

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Complaint Case No. 415(C) of 2016, whereby cognizance has
been taken for the offences punishable under Sections 406, 420
and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code ( in short I.P.C. ) and
summons have been directed to be issued against the petitioner
and other accused persons.
2. The prosecution case as emerges from the
complaint petition is that complainant/opposite party no. 2,
Manish Ranjan Kumar, claims to have been associated with
Samadhan Seva Samiti, a society registered under the Societies
Registration Act, 1860, and to have functioned as its Secretary.
The society is stated to have been engaged in activities relating
to social welfare and community development.
According to the complaint, on account of an
injury suffered by the complainant, the keys of the office
almirah were handed over jointly to the Chairman and the
Treasurer of the society on 18.08.2011. It is alleged that when
the complainant subsequently visited the community Sauchalaya
at Transport Nagar on 16.09.2011 to supervise its maintenance
and sought the relevant accounts, he was informed that the
accounts had already been furnished to the Chairman on the
direction of the Treasurer.
The complainant further alleged that disputes arose

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regarding the functioning of the society, the convening of its
meetings and the return of the keys of the office almirah. He
alleged that the office-bearers had conspired against him and
had committed acts of cheating, forgery, criminal breach of trust
and misappropriation of the funds of the society.
3. On the basis of the allegations, the complainant
initially instituted Complaint Case No. 19(C) of 2012 which was
forwarded to the police under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C.,
pursuant to which Patliputra P.S. Case No. 25 of 2014 came to
be registered for offences under Sections 406, 420, 120-B, 467,
468, 471 and 477-A/34 of the I.P.C.
4. Upon investigation, the police submitted Final
Report No. 332/14 dated 31.10.2014, stating that no criminal
offence had been made out and that the dispute was civil in
nature. The final report was accepted by the learned Magistrate
on 21.11.2015. However, the protest petition filed by the
complainant was treated as a complaint case, which came to be
registered as Complaint Case No. 415(C) of 2016.
5. After conducting an inquiry and recording the
statement of the complainant and his witnesses, the learned
Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate- XV, Patna by the
impugned order dated 23.11.2016, took cognizance of the

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offences punishable under Sections 406, 420 and 120-B of the
I.P.C. and directed issuance of summons against six persons,
including the present petitioner.
6. Mr. Rajni Kant Jha, learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the petitioner submits that the impugned order is
unsustainable in law, as the learned Magistrate has failed to
appreciate the nature of the dispute and the absence of the
essential ingredients of the offences alleged.
7. It is submitted that the allegations arise out of
disputes concerning the management and administration of
Samadhan Seva Samiti, particularly the appointment and
removal of its office-bearers, the custody of the office keys and
the maintenance of accounts. Such disputes, according to the
petitioner, are essentially internal and civil in nature and cannot,
without the necessary criminal ingredients, be converted into
criminal proceedings.
8. Learned counsel further submits that the police,
after investigation, found no criminal offence to have been
committed and submitted a final report categorising the matter
as civil in nature. It is contended that although the learned
Magistrate was competent to proceed on the basis of a protest
petition, the materials available on record did not justify taking

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cognizance against the petitioner.
9. It is further contended that the complaint does
not disclose any specific act of entrustment of property to the
petitioner followed by dishonest misappropriation or conversion
thereof. Similarly, the essential ingredients of cheating and
criminal conspiracy are stated to be absent. The petitioner
accordingly submits that continuation of the criminal
proceeding would amount to an abuse of the process of the
Court and prays for quashing of the impugned order and the
consequential proceeding.
10. None appears on behalf of opposite party No.
2, despite having already filed the counter-affidavit on behalf of
opposite party No. 2. In the counter-affidavit, opposite party no.
2 has opposed the prayer for quashing and supported the
impugned order taking cognizance, reiterating the averments
made in the complaint case.
11. From the counter-affidavit filed on the behalf
of opposite party No. 2, it transpires that the opposite party No.
2 was the Secretary of the Samadhan Seva Samiti and that
disputes arose when he sought access to the accounts and
records of the society. The petitioner and other office-bearers
acted in concert, withheld the keys of the office almirah and

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were involved in financial irregularities and misuse of the funds
of the society.
12. It is also evident from the counter-affidavit that
the police report does not conclude the controversy so as to
prevent the competent criminal court from proceeding on the
basis of the complaint and the evidence recorded during the
inquiry. It is stated that the learned Magistrate considered the
materials placed before the Court and found sufficient grounds
for proceeding against the accused persons.
13. The counter-affidavit refers to correspondence
concerning the status of the office-bearers of the society, bank
statements and agreements relating to the work undertaken by
the society. According to opposite party no. 2, these materials
support the allegations of financial irregularities and
demonstrate the necessity of a proper adjudication of the matter
in accordance with law.
14. Lastly, it is contended in the counter-affidavit
that the disputed questions concerning the accounts, the custody
of records and the respective roles of the persons concerned
cannot appropriately be determined in an application seeking
quashing of criminal proceedings. The application is
accordingly opposed.

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15. Mrs. Pronati Singh, learned Additional Public
Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the State submits that the
learned Magistrate, upon consideration of the complaint and the
inquiry evidence, has taken cognizance of the offences under
Sections 406, 420 and 120-B of the I.P.C. It is contended that
the police final report is not conclusive and does not preclude
the learned Magistrate from proceeding in accordance with law.
16. Thus, it has been stated that the allegations and
the materials on record do not warrant interference by this Court
in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
Accordingly, the State opposes the application seeking quashing
of the impugned order.
17. This Court has heard learned counsel for the
petitioner and learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State
and have perused the materials available on record. Despite
service, none has appeared on behalf of opposite party no. 2,
though a counter-affidavit filed on his behalf, is available on
record and the same has also been considered.
18. Before proceeding further, it would be apposite
to reiterate that the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482
Cr.P.C. is intended to prevent abuse of the process of any Court
and to secure the ends of justice. Although such power is to be

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exercised sparingly and with circumspection, the High Court
would not hesitate to interfere where the allegations, even if
taken at their face value, fail to constitute any offence.
19. The principal issue which falls for
consideration is whether the allegations made in the complaint,
even if accepted in its entirety, disclose the essential ingredients
of the offences punishable under Sections 406, 420 and 120-B
of the I.P.C. so as to justify continuation of the criminal
proceeding against the petitioner.
20. At this stage, this Court considers it appropriate
to examine whether the offences punishable under Sections 406
and 420 of the I.P.C. can simultaneously be attracted on the
basis of the same set of allegations. So, it would be germane to
consider the ingredients of Section 406 and 420 of the I.P.C.
21. Section 405 of the I.P.C. defines the offence of
‘criminal breach of trust’ which stipulates that:-
“ 405. Criminal breach of trust .—
Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with
property, or with any dominion over property,
dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his
own use that property, or dishonestly uses or
disposes of that property in violation of any
direction of law prescribing the mode in which
such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal
contract, express or implied, which he has made

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touching the discharge of such trust, or willfully
suffers any other person so to do, commits
“criminal breach of trust”.”
(Note:- Explanation 1 & 2 of Section 405 is not
relevant for the purpose of this case.)
22. The offence under Section 405 of the I.P.C. is
made punishable under Section 406 which reads as follows:-
“ 406. Punishment for criminal breach
of trust .— Whoever commits criminal breach of
trust shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend
to three years, or with fine, or with both.”
Thus, for Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code to
get attracted, there must be a criminal breach of trust in terms of
Section 405 of the I.P.C. The essential ingredients for invoking
Section 405 of the I.P.C. are enumerated hereunder:-
“(a) the accused was entrusted with
property, or entrusted with dominion over
property;
(b) the accused had dishonestly
misappropriated or converted to their own use
that property, or dishonestly used or disposed of
that property or wilfully suffer any other person
to do so; and
(c) such misappropriation, conversion,
use or disposal should be in violation of any
direction of law prescribing the mode in which
such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal

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contract which the person had made, touching
the discharge of such trust.
In other words, for the invocation of the
offence of criminal breach of trust, it is
expedient that the use of disposal of the property
is made by a persons entrusted with or who has
dominion over the property.
Furthermore, such an act must not only
be done dishonestly but also in violation of any
direction of law or any contract, express or
implied, relating to carrying out the trust.”
23. The offence of cheating has been defined under
Section 415 read with Section 420 of the I.P.C. and the
‘ingredients constituting an offence’ is evident from the bare
perusal of the aforesaid Sections itself:-
“(i) Fraudulent or dishonest inducement
of a person by deceiving him,
(ii) The person so induced should be
intentionally induced to deliver any property, or
(iii) Person so induced shall be
intentionally induced to do so or to omit to do
anything which he would not do or omit if he
was not so deceived,
(iv) The aforesaid acts or omissions
should be one which causes or likely to cause
damage or harm to the person so induced in
body, mind, reputation or property,
(v) A fraudulent and dishonest
inducement is an essential ingredient of
cheating.”

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24. In essence, the ingredients of the two offences
are intrinsically contradictory and mutually exclusive in nature
and as such, cannot co-exist. Consequently, their simultaneous
application would be legally impermissible.
25. In this regard, reliance may be placed upon the
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Arshad Neyaz Khan
v. State of Jharkhand & Anr. , reported in 2025 SCC OnLine
SC 2060 , in which the Hon’ble Supreme Court has already
considered the proposition of law laid down in the case of Delhi
Race Club (1940) Ltd. & Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh &
Anr. , reported in (2024) 10 SCC 690 and having considered the
same, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that:-
“Furthermore, it is pertinent to mention
that if it is the case of the
complainant/respondent No.2 that the offence of
criminal breach of trust as defined under
Section 405 IPC, punishable under Section 406
IPC, is committed by the accused, then in the
same breath it cannot be said that the accused
has also committed the offence of cheating as
defined in Section 415, punishable under
Section 420 IPC. This Court in Delhi Race Club
(1940) Limited vs. State of Uttar Pradesh,
(2024) 10 SCC 690 observed that there is a
distinction between criminal breach of trust and
cheating. For cheating, criminal intention is

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necessary at the time of making false or
misleading representation i.e. since inception. In
criminal breach of trust, mere proof of
entrustment is sufficient. Thus, in case of
criminal breach of trust, the offender is lawfully
entrusted with the property, and he dishonestly
misappropriates the same. Whereas, in case of
cheating, the offender fraudulently or
dishonestly induces a person by deceiving him
to deliver a property. In such a situation, both
offences cannot co-exist simultaneously.
Consequently, the complaint can not contain
both the offences that are independent and
distinct. The said offences cannot co-exist
simultaneously in the same set of facts as they
are antithetical to each other.”
Thus, while cheating proceeds on the basis of
dishonest intention at the inception of the transaction, criminal
breach of trust pre-supposes lawful entrustment followed by
subsequent dishonest misappropriation.
26. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the
offence of cheating involves dishonest intention at the inception,
whereas criminal breach of trust presupposes lawful entrustment
of property, which is subsequently dishonestly misappropriated.
The two offences are antithetical in nature and cannot coexist
simultaneously on the same set of allegations.
27. In the case of Delhi Race Club (supra), the

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Hon’ble Supreme Court has very strongly deprecated the
practice of invoking these two Sections viz. , 406 and 420 of the
I.P.C. simultaneously by investigating agency or by the Court
and has laid down that :-
“42. When dealing with a private
complaint, the law enjoins upon the magistrate
a duty to meticulously examine the contents of
the complaint so as to determine whether the
offence of cheating or criminal breach of trust
as the case may be is made out from the
averments made in the complaint. The
magistrate must carefully apply its mind to
ascertain whether the allegations, as stated,
genuinely constitute these specific offences. In
contrast, when a case arises from a FIR, this
responsibility is of the police - to thoroughly
ascertain whether the allegations levelled by the
informant indeed falls under the category of
cheating or criminal breach of trust.
Unfortunately, it has become a common practice
for the police officers to routinely and
mechanically proceed to register an FIR for
both the offences i.e. criminal breach of trust
and cheating on a mere allegation of some
dishonesty or fraud, without any proper
application of mind.
43. It is high time that the police officers
across the country are imparted proper training
in law so as to understand the fine distinction
between the offence of cheating viz-a-viz
criminal breach of trust. Both offences are
independent and distinct. The two offences
cannot coexist simultaneously in the same set of
facts. They are antithetical to each other. The
two provisions of the IPC (now BNS, 2023) are
not twins that they cannot survive without each
other.”

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28. In the present case, the allegations regarding the
custody of the office keys and the alleged subsequent financial
irregularities are sought to be brought within the ambit of both
Sections 406 and 420 I.P.C. However, the complaint does not
disclose the necessary particulars constituting either dishonest
inducement at the inception or subsequent dishonest
misappropriation of specifically entrusted property.
29. However, certain facts of the case at hand needs
to be succinctly described hereunder in order to have proper
appreciation as to whether offence under Sections 406 and 420
of the I.P.C. is made out or not :-
i) The plain reading of the complaint petition,
solemn affirmation of the complainant and the
documents brought on record on behalf of the
petitioner disclose the true nature of dispute between
the parties, which appears to be dispute with respect
to the removal of complainant from the post of
Secretary and nomination of new Secretary in his
place thereof.
ii) The complainant initially filed an
application before the Assistant Registration
Inspector General regarding enquiry of Samadhan
Seva Samiti of which the complainant was Secretary.
iii) The Assistant Registration Inspector
General conducted an enquiry and submitted its
report vide letter no. 997, dated 02.09.2013, pointing

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out that on 28.07.2007 new Executive Committee for
running the aforesaid Samadhan Seva Samiti was
constituted, of which the complainant was nominated
as Secretary.
iv) Thereafter on 13.10.2011, the petitioner
and other members of the NGO gave a notice for no
confidence motion. Thereafter on 16.10.2011, a
meeting of the general body was convened, in which
all twenty members participated.
v) In the aforesaid general body meeting, the
complainant, Manish Ranjan Kumar, was removed
from the post of Secretary and in his place the
petitioner was nominated as the Secretary and other
new members were also nominated in the Executive
Committee.
vi) Thereafter, in the meeting of the General
Body of the Society dated 17.11.2011, the resolution
taken on 16.10.2011, whereby the complainant was
removed from the post of Secretary, was affirmed.
vii) The report dated 02.09.2013 of the
Assistant Registrar Inspector General states that the
complainant, Manish Ranjan Kumar, is interested in
getting himself dissociated from the Society, so that he
could not be made answerable for any of the
unwanted and undesirable act which may be
committed by society in times to come.
viii) Thereafter the Complaint Case No. 19(C)
of 2012 was filed by complainant on 03.01.2012, i.e.,
after two months of his removal from the post of
Secretary of the Samadhan Seva Samiti which was

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sent to the police for registration of the FIR under
Section 153 of the Cr.P.C. upon which the Pataliputra
P.S. Case No. 25/2014 dated 10.01.2014 was
registered in which after investigation police
submitted final form, holding the case to be of civil
nature.
30. The facts described hereinabove does not leave
an iota of doubt with respect to the true nature of dispute
between the complainant and the petitioner. There is absolutely
no allegation of any entrustment of any kind of property,
movable or immovable of any valuation which thereafter has
been misappropriated by the petitioner.
On the contrary, the petitioner replaced the
complainant as Secretary of the Samadhan Seva Smiti which
seems to have irked the complainant who in order to wreak
vengeance of the petitioner initially filed the complainant case,
after two months of his removal from the post of Secretary of
the Samiti upon which a police case was instituted and when
police submitted final form holding the case to be of civil in
nature, the complainant filed a protest application upon which
the instant criminal prosecution has been initiated against the
petitioner and anothers.
31. The real nature of dispute with respect to the

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holding of the position of authority in the Samadhan Seva Smiti
also becomes manifestly evident from the report of the Assistant
Registration Inspector General which throws ample light on the
exact nature of dispute between the parties. No chit of paper nor
any shred of evidence has been brought on record in order to
evince that the petitioner has committed any of the offences as
alleged against him.
32. Thus, in this conspectus of the factual
backgound which on proper analysis and close scrutiny does not
affect that any of the ingredients of Sections 406 and 420 of the
I.P.C. is attracted or satisfied in the case at hand so as to allow
the instant prosecution under the aforesaid penal provisions to
continue.
33. Therefore, in the light of the principles laid
down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Delhi Race Club
(supra) and Arshad Neyaz Khan (supra) , continuation of the
prosecution for the offences under Sections 406 and 420 I.P.C.
against the petitioner would not be justified in the absence of the
requisite foundational ingredients.
34. So far as the offence under Section 120-B of the
I.P.C. is concerned, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sanjeev vs.
State of Kerala reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1470 , while

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referring to State through Superintendent of Police , CBI/SIT
vs. Nalini & Others, (1999) 5 SCC 253 , has laid the ingredients
of criminal conspiracy under section 120-B of the I.P.C. which
reads as follow:-
“i. Conspiracy is when two or more
persons agree to do or cause to be done an
illegal act or legal act by illegal means.
ii. The offence of criminal conspiracy is
an exception to the general law, where intent
alone does not constitute crime. It is the
intention to commit a crime and join hands with
persons having the same intention.
iii. Conspiracy is hatched in private or in
secrecy. It is rarely possible to establish a
conspiracy by direct evidence. Usually, the
existence of the conspiracy and its objects have
to be inferred from the circumstances and the
conduct of the accused.
iv. Where in pursuance of the agreement,
the conspirators commit offenses individually or
adopt illegal means to do a legal act that has a
nexus to the object of the conspiracy, all of them
will be liable for such offenses even if some of
them have not actively participated in the
commission of those offenses.”
35. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that criminal
conspiracy is constituted when two or more persons agree to do
or cause to be done an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means.
It was further observed that mere intention to commit an offence

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is not sufficient; there must also be an agreement between
persons sharing such intention to carry out the unlawful object.
Conspiracy is generally hatched in secrecy and, therefore, its
existence and objects are ordinarily required to be inferred from
the surrounding circumstances and the conduct of the accused.
36. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of
the present case, this Court finds that the allegations primarily
relate to disputes concerning the management and functioning
of Samadhan Seva Samiti, custody of its office keys and
maintenance of accounts. Although allegations of conspiracy
have been levelled against the petitioner and other office-
bearers, no specific material has been brought to demonstrate an
agreement or meeting of minds between them to commit an
illegal act or to achieve any unlawful object by illegal means.
37. The mere fact that the petitioner and other
accused persons were associated with the management of the
Samiti or that disputes arose amongst them concerning its
functioning would not, by itself, constitute criminal conspiracy.
In the absence of circumstances indicating a common agreement
to commit an illegal act, the essential ingredients of Section
120-B of the I.P.C. remain unfulfilled.
38. Consequently, this Court finds that the

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allegations made in the complaint, even if taken at its face
value, do not disclose the commission of an offence punishable
under Section 120-B of the I.P.C. against the petitioner.
39. In view of the discussions made hereinabove
and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Arshad
Neyaz Khan vs. State of Jharkhand & Anr. (supra) and
Sanjeev ( supra ), this Court is of the considered opinion that the
continuation of the criminal proceeding against the petitioner
would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court.
40. In the present case, the manner in which, the
learned Trial Court has proceeded to take cognizance of the
offences shocks the conscience of the Court. It appears that the
learned Magistrate without applying his judicial mind to the
given set of facts, took cognizance of offences and allowed the
criminal prosecution against the petitioner to set in motion in the
most mechanical manner.
41. The concept of constituting the Trial Court is
with the solemn object in view that the Court will act
independently, of the influence of the police authority and will
apply its judicial mind to the given set of facts in order to allow
any criminal prosecution to be initiated against any person while
protecting the innocent at the same time. If this power of

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initiation of criminal prosecution is exercised so carelessly,
without properly appreciating and examining as to whether the
ingredients of the offences alleged are made out or not, the
entire edifice of the criminal justice system would crumble and
fail to live upto the expectations for which it has been created.
42. At this stage, it would be apposite to quote the
stringent warning given by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of Vishal Noble Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and
Another , reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1680 , wherein it
was observed that:-
“….in recent years the machinery of
criminal justice is being misused by certain
persons for their vested interests and for
achieving their oblique motives and agenda.
Courts have therefore to be vigilant against such
tendencies and ensure that acts of omission and
commission having an adverse impact on the
fabric of our society must be nipped in the
bud….”
The aforesaid observation of the Hon’ble Supreme
court has recently been approved by the Hon’ble Court in the
case of Delhi Race Club (supra) .
43. Ex-consequenti , the order dated 23.11.2016
passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-XV,
1st Class, Patna, in Complaint Case No. 415(C) of 2016,

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whereby cognizance has been taken against the petitioner for the
offences punishable under Sections 406, 420 and 120-B of the
I.P.C., along with all consequential criminal proceedings, insofar
as they relate to the present petitioner, are hereby quashed and
set aside.
44. Accordingly, this application is allowed.
45. All pending interlocutory application(s), if any,
also stand disposed of.


(Rana Vikram Singh, J)
Rakesh/-
AFR/NAFR AFR
CAV DATE 14.08.2026
Uploading Date 10.11.2026
Transmission Date 10.11.2026