SHRI. VIVEK. B.C. vs THE STATE OF KARNATAKA

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R

Reserved on : 06.08.2026
Pronounced on : 04.11.2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU



TH
DATED THIS THE 04 DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA


CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 10792 OF 2026

C/W

CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 10798 OF 2026

CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 10808 OF 2026



IN CRL.P No. 10792/2026


BETWEEN:

SHRI JAGADEESH B.G.,
S/O LATE GOWDAIAH,
AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS,
R/O BITTANAKURIKE MAJARE,
GOLLARAHATTI,
DEVALAPURA POST, KORA,
TUMAKURU, KARNATAKA
PINCODE 572 128.
…PETITIONER





Digitally
signed by
CHETAN B C
Location:
High Court
of Karnataka

(BY SRI ROHIT V.R., ADVOCATE)
AND:

1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA

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BY GUBBI POLICE STATION,
BY ITS STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
HIGH COURT BUILDING
BENGALURU – 560 001.

2. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
REPRESENTED BY
THE DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE,
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION DIVISION (CID),
CARLTON HOUSE, PALACE ROAD,
BENGALURU – 560 001.

3.
SMT.B.M.SHASHIKALA
W/O LATE B.SATISH,
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS,
WORKING AS A THASILDAR,
GUBBI TALUK
TUMAKURU DISTRICT,
PINCODE - 572 216.

…RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI B.N.JAGADEESHA, SPP-I)

THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S 482 CR.PC (FILED U/S 528 BNSS)
PRAYING TO QUASH THE IMPUGNED NOTICE DATED 13.07.2026
ISSUED TO THE PETITIONER BY THE RESPONDENT NO.2 U/S 41A
OF THE Cr.P.C (ANNEXURE-D) IN CR.NO.157/2022 U/S 406, 408,
409, 420, 465, 468 R/W 34 OF IPC ON THE FILE OF THE SENIOR
CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC GUBBI TUMAKUR DISTRICT.

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IN CRL.P NO. 10798/2026
BETWEEN:
1. SHRI VIVEK B.C.,
S/O LATE CHANDRAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 31 YEARS,
R/O BYCHENAHALLI VILLAGE,
KASABA HOBLI, GUBBI TALUK
TUMAKURU DISTRICT
PINCODE – 572 216.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI ROHIT V.R., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY GUBBI POLICE STATION,
BY ITS STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
HIGH COURT BUILDING
BENGALURU – 560 001.

2. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
REPRESENTED BY
THE DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE,
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION DIVISION (CID),
CARLTON HOUSE, PALACE ROAD,
BENGALURU – 560 001.

3. SMT.B.M.SHASHIKALA
W/O LATE B.SATISH,
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS,
GRADE 2,
WORKING AS A THASILDAR,

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TALUK OFFICE, GUBBI TOWN,
TUMAKURU DISTRICT,
PINCODE 572 216.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI B.N.JAGADEESHA, SPP-I)
THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S 482 CR.PC (FILED U/S 528 BNNS)
PRAYING TO QUASH THE IMPUGNED NOTICE DATED 13.07.2026
ISSUED TO THE PETITIONER BY THE RESPONDENT NO.2 UNDER
SECTION 41A OF THE CR.P.C.., (ANNEUXRE-D) IN THE
CR.NO.157/2022 PENDING BEFORE THE SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND
J.M.F.C GUBBI COURT, TUMAKURU.
IN CRL.P NO. 10808/2026
BETWEEN:
1.
SHRI K.V.NARAYANA
S/O LATE SRI VENKATCHALAIAH,
AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS,
ND
2 CROSS, VIDYA NAGARA
GUBBI TALUK
TUMAKURU DISTRICT
PINCODE – 572 216.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI ROHIT V.R., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1.
THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY GUBBI POLICE STATION,
BY ITS STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
HIGH COURT BUILDING

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BENGALURU – 560 001.

2.
THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
REPRESENTED BY
THE DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE,
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION DIVISION (CID),
CARLTON HOUSE, PALACE ROAD,
BENGALURU – 560 001.
3. SMT.B.M.SHASHIKALA
W/O LATE B.SATISH,
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS,
WORKING AS A THASILDAR,
GUBBI TALUK
TUMAKURU DISTRICT,
PINCODE – 572 216.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI B.N.JAGADEESHA, SPP-I)

THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S 482 CR.P.C (U/S 528 BNSS)
PRAYING TO QUASH THE IMPUGNED NOTICE DATED 13.07.2026
ISSUED TO THE PETITIONER BY THE RESPONDENT NO.2 U/S 41A
OF CR.P.C. (ANNEXURE-D) ARISING IN THE CR.NO.157/2022
(CC.NO.4207/2022) PENDING BEFORE THE SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE
AND JMFC, GUBBI COURT, TUMAKURU.

THESE PETITIONS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR
ORDERS ON 06.08.2026, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS
DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-

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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

CAV ORDER

The petitioners/accused who are public servants are alleged of
tampering of records. They are now before this Court calling in
question notice under Section 41A of the Cr.P.C., issued by the
Crime Investigation Department (‘CID’) which is said to have
undertaken further investigation.

2. Heard Sri Rohit V.R. , learned counsel appearing for the
petitioners and Sri B.N. Jagadeesha , learned State Public
Prosecutor-1 appearing for the respondents.

3. Facts in brief, germane, are as follows: -

3.1. Criminal Petition No.10792 of 2026 is preferred by
accused No.9, Criminal Petition No.10798 of 2026 is preferred by
accused No.8 and Criminal Petition No.10808 of 026 is preferred by
accused No.12.

3.2. On 02-07-2022 a crime comes to be registered in Crime
No.157 of 2022 alleging fabrication and manipulation of

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Government land records which becomes the fulcrum of the crime
for offences punishable under Sections 406, 408, 409, 420, 465 and
468 r/w 34 of the IPC. The allegation was that the accused have
allegedly and illegally manipulated hand written pahanis pertaining
to several years. This was called in question before this Court in
Criminal Petition No.12246 of 2023 and connected cases. The
criminal petitions were allowed in part and the order of taking
cognizance was obliterated. The matter was remitted back to the
concerned Court with several directions. The prosecution was held
to be at liberty to seek and obtain sanction from the hands of the
competent authority and place it before the concerned Court.

3.3. Pursuant to the order passed by this Court, the impugned
notices have emerged from the hands of the ‘CID’. But, in terms of
the notices, the CID is undertaking further investigation. It is this
that has driven the public servants to this Court in the subject
petitions.

4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners,
Sri Rohit V. R. would vehemently contend that the order was clear,
setting aside cognizance and the concerned Court was directed to

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continue proceedings only after obtaining sanction. There is no
sanction obtained now and placed before the Court, but by the
impugned notices, the CID is now wanting to conduct further
investigation. He would submit that there can be no further
investigation without the leave of the concerned Court as obtaining
under Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C. The learned counsel would
further contend that the notices issued under Section 41A of the
Cr.P.C. cannot be issued through WhatsApp or through any
electronic mode. It has to be only physically served upon the
accused. He would submit that the notices are to get over the order
passed by this Court in Criminal Petition No.12246 of 2023 and
connected cases. As per the notices, the investigation is handed
over to the CID. CID is a separate entity and there should be an
order of the concerned Court for further investigation. But, the
concerned Court also has no power to order further investigation by
different investigating agency. That power is vested only with this
Court.

5. Contrariwise , the learned State Public Prosecutor
Sri B.N. Jagadeesha would submit that the CID can take up

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investigation at the direction of a superior Police Officer as
obtaining under Section 36 of the Cr.P.C. He would submit that
there need not be an order directing further investigation, as the
jurisdictional police which had investigated had already reserved its
liberty for further investigation as obtaining under Section 173(8) of
the Cr.P.C. He would seek dismissal of these petitions.

6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions
made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the
material on record. In the light of the submissions and contra
submissions, the following issues would arise for consideration:

(i) Whether further investigation in a given case can
be undertaken without an express order from the
hands of the concerned Court?

(ii) Whether the Crime Investigation Department
(‘CID’) is an independent investigating agency
and further investigation by the CID would
amount to investigation by a different
Investigating Officer?

(iii) Whether the CID can undertake further
investigation without the express direction of the
concerned Court?

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ISSUE NO.1:

(i) Whether further investigation in a given case can be
undertaken without an express order from the hands of the
concerned Court?


7. Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C., reads as follows:

“ 173. Report of police officer on completion of
investigation .—
… … …
(8) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude
further investigation in respect of an offence after a report
under sub-section (2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate
and, where upon such investigation, the officer in charge of the
police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he
shall forward to the Magistrate a further report or reports
regarding such evidence in the form prescribed; and the
provisions of sub-sections (2) to (6) shall, as far as may be,
apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in
relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2).”

Section 173(8) Cr.P.C., mandates that nothing in the Section would
be deemed to preclude further investigation in respect of an offence
after the report under sub-Section (2) has been forwarded to the
Magistrate by the Officer in-charge of the Police Station.

8. The other two provisions that are pressed into service by
the leaned State Public Prosecutor are Section 36 of the Cr.P.C. and
Section 4 of the Karnataka Police Act. Section 36 of the Cr.P.C.,

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empowers that the Police Officers superior in rank to an Officer in-
charge of the Police Station may exercise the same powers
throughout the local area as if they are appointed, as may be
exercised by such other officer within the limits of the station.
Section 4 of the Karnataka Police Act, 1963 reads as follows:

“ 4. Superintendence of Police Force to vest in the
Government . - The superintendence of the Police Force
throughout the State vests in and is exercisable by the
Government and any control, direction or supervision
exercisable by any officer over any member of the Police Force
shall be exercisable subject to such superintendence.”

Section 4 mandates superintendence of Police Force to vest in the
Government. It is with these provisions; further investigation is now
justified at the hands of the CID.

9. The issue that requires a peripheral answer is, whether
further investigation can be done without the express order from
the Court. The jurisprudence earlier was that it can be taken.

9.1. The Apex Court in STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH v.
1
A.S.PETER , has held as follows:
“.... .... ....

1

(2008) 2 SCC 383

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9. Indisputably, the law does not mandate taking of
prior permission from the Magistrate for further
investigation. Carrying out of a further investigation even
after filing of the charge-sheet is a statutory right of the
police . A distinction also exists between further
investigation and reinvestigation. Whereas
reinvestigation without prior permission is necessarily
forbidden, further investigation is not .”


9.2. Again, the Apex Court in STATE THROUGH CENTRAL
2
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION v. HEMENDHRA REDDY , has
held as follows:
“.... .... ....
“Position of law on the subject of “Further Investigation”

56. In King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad [ King
Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad , 1944 SCC OnLine PC 29:
(1943-44) 71 IA 203] the Privy Council delineated the
powers of the police to investigate. It was held thus:
(SCC OnLine PC)

“… Just as it is essential that everyone
accused of a crime should have free access to a
Court of justice, so that he may be duly acquitted
if found not guilty of the offence with which he is
charged, so it is of the utmost importance that the
judiciary should not interfere with the police in
matters which are within their province and into
which the law imposes on them the duty of
inquiry.

In India as has been shown, there is a statutory
right on the part of the police to investigate the
circumstances of an alleged cognizable crime without
requiring any authority from the judicial authorities, and

2

(2023) 16 SCC 779

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it would, as their Lordships think, be an unfortunate
result if it should be held possible to interfere with those
statutory rules by an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction
of the Court. The functions of the judiciary and the
police are complementary, not overlapping, and
the combination of individual liberty with a due
observance of law and order is only to be obtained
by leaving each to exercise its own function,
always, of course, subject to the right of the
Courts to intervene in an appropriate case when
moved under Section 491 of the Criminal Procedure
Code to give directions in the nature of habeas corpus.”

57. In Sri Bhagwan Samardha Sreepada Vallabha Venkata
Vishwanandha Maharaj v. State of A.P. [ Sri Bhagwan Samardha
Sreepada Vallabha Venkata Vishwanandha Maharaj v. State of
A.P. , (1999) 5 SCC 740: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1047: AIR 1999 SC
2332], it was held in paras 10 and 11: (SCC pp. 742-43)

“ 10 . Power of the police to conduct further
investigation, after laying final report, is
recognised under Section 173(8) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. Even after the court took
cognizance of any offence on the strength of the
police report first submitted, it is open to the
police to conduct further investigation. This has
been so stated by this Court in Ram Lal Narang v.
State (UT of Delhi) [ Ram Lal Narang v. State (UT
of Delhi) , (1979) 2 SCC 322 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 479] .
The only rider provided by the aforesaid decision
is that it would be desirable that the police should
inform the court and seek formal permission to
make further investigation.

11 . In such a situation the power of the court to
direct the police to conduct further investigation cannot
have any inhibition. There is nothing in Section 173(8)
to suggest that the court is obliged to hear the accused
before any such direction is made. Casting of any such
obligation on the court would only result in encumbering
the court with the burden of searching for all the
potential accused to be afforded with the opportunity of
being heard. As the law does not require it, we would
not burden the Magistrate with such an obligation.”

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58. In Hemant Dhasmana v. CBI [ Hemant Dhasmana v.
CBI , (2001) 7 SCC 536: 2001 SCC (Cri) 1280], it was held:
(SCC pp. 542-43, paras 15-16)

“ 15 . When the report is filed under the sub-
section the Magistrate (in this case the Special Judge)
has to deal with it by bestowing his judicial
consideration. If the report is to the effect that the
allegations in the original complaint were found true in
the investigation, or that some other accused and/or
some other offences were also detected, the court has to
decide whether cognizance of the offences should be
taken or not on the strength of that report. We do not
think that it is necessary for us to vex our mind, in this
case, regarding that aspect when the report points to
the offences committed by some persons. But when the
report is against the allegations contained in the
complaint and concluded that no offence has been
committed by any person, it is open to the court to
accept the report after hearing the complainant at
whose behest the investigation had commenced. If the
court feels on a perusal of such a report that the alleged
offences have in fact been committed by some persons
the court has the power to ignore the contrary
conclusions made by the investigating officer in the final
report. Then it is open to the court to independently
apply its mind to the facts emerging therefrom and it
can even take cognizance of the offences which appear
to it to have been committed, in exercise of its power
under Section 190(1)( b ) of the Code. The third option is
the one adumbrated in Section 173(8) of the Code. …

16 . Although the said sub-section does not,
in specific terms, mention about the powers of the
court to order further investigation, the power of
the police to conduct further investigation
envisaged therein can be triggered into motion at
the instance of the court. When any such order is
passed by a court which has the jurisdiction to do
so, it would not be a proper exercise of revisional
powers to interfere therewith because the further
investigation would only be for the ends of
justice .”

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59. In UPSC v. S. Papaiah [ UPSC v. S. Papaiah , (1997) 7
SCC 614: 1997 SCC (Cri) 1112], it was held in para 13: (SCC
pp. 620-21)

“ 13 . … The Magistrate could, thus in
exercise of the powers under Section 173(8)CrPC
direct CBI to “further investigate” the case and
collect further evidence keeping in view the
objections raised by the appellant to the
investigation and the “new” report to be
submitted by the investigating officer would be
governed by sub-sections (2) to (6) of Section
173CrPC.”

60. This Court in Hasanbhai [ Hasanbhai Valibhai Qureshi
v. State of Gujarat , (2004) 5 SCC 347: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1603]
held thus: (SCC pp. 350-51, paras 12-13)

“ 12 . Sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the
Code permits further investigation, and even
dehors any direction from the court as such, it is
open to the police to conduct proper investigation,
even after the court took cognizance of any
offence on the strength of a police report earlier
submitted. All the more so, if as in this case, the
Head of the Police Department also was not
satisfied of the propriety or the manner and nature
of investigation already conducted.

13 . In Ram Lal Narang v. State (UT of Delhi)
[ Ram Lal Narang v. State (UT of Delhi) , (1979) 2
SCC 322: 1979 SCC (Cri) 479] it was observed by
this Court that further investigation is not
altogether ruled out merely because cognizance
has been taken by the court. When defective
investigation comes to light during course of trial,
it may be cured by further investigation, if
circumstances so permitted . It would ordinarily be
desirable and all the more so in this case, that the police
should inform the court and seek formal permission to
make further investigation when fresh facts come to
light instead of being silent over the matter keeping in
view only the need for an early trial since an effective
trial for real or actual offences found during course of
proper investigation is as much relevant, desirable and
necessary as an expeditious disposal of the matter by

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the courts. In view of the aforesaid position in law,
if there is necessity for further investigation, the
same can certainly be done as prescribed by law.
The mere fact that there may be further delay in
concluding the trial should not stand in the way of
further investigation if that would help the court in
arriving at the truth and do real and substantial as
well as effective justice .”

61. In Ram Lal Narang v. State (UT of Delhi) [ Ram Lal
Narang v. State (UT of Delhi) , (1979) 2 SCC 322: 1979 SCC
(Cri) 479], this Court held thus: (SCC p. 338, para 21)

“ 21 . As observed by us earlier, there was no
provision in CrPC, 1898 which, expressly or by
necessary implication, barred the right of the police to
further investigate after cognizance of the case had
been taken by the Magistrate. Neither Section 173 nor
Section 190 lead us to hold that the power of the police
to further investigate was exhausted by the Magistrate
taking cognizance of the offence. Practice, convenience
and preponderance of authority, permitted repeated
investigations on discovery of fresh facts. In our view,
notwithstanding that a Magistrate had taken
cognizance of the offence upon a police report
submitted under Section 173 of the 1898 Code,
the right of the police to further investigate was
not exhausted and the police could exercise such
right as often as necessary when fresh
information came to light. Where the police
desired to make a further investigation, the police
could express their regard and respect for the
court by seeking its formal permission to make
further investigation .”

62. In State of A.P. v. A.S. Peter [ State of A.P. v. A.S.
Peter , (2008) 2 SCC 383: (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 427], this Court
held thus: (SCC p. 386, para 9)

“ 9 . Indisputably, the law does not mandate
taking of prior permission from the Magistrate for
further investigation. Carrying out of a further
investigation even after filing of the charge-sheet
is a statutory right of the police. A distinction also
exists between further investigation and

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reinvestigation. Whereas reinvestigation without
prior permission is necessarily forbidden, further
investigation is not.”

63. In Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab [ Nirmal
Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab , (2009) 1 SCC 441: (2009) 1
SCC (Cri) 523], this Court held as follows: (SCC p. 467, para
68)

“ 68 . An order of further investigation in terms of
Section 173(8) of the Code by the State in exercise of
its jurisdiction under Section 36 thereof stands on a
different footing. The power of the investigating
officer to make further investigation in exercise of
its statutory jurisdiction under Section 173(8) of
the Code and at the instance of the State having
regard to Section 36 thereof read with Section 3 of
the Police Act, 1861 should be considered in
different contexts. Section 173(8) of the Code is
an enabling provision. Only when cognizance of an
offence is taken, the learned Magistrate may have
some say. But, the restriction imposed by judicial
legislation is merely for the purpose of upholding the
independence and impartiality of the judiciary. It is one
thing to say that the court will have supervisory
jurisdiction to ensure a fair investigation, as has been
observed by a Bench of this Court in Sakiri Vasu v. State
of U.P. [ Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P. , (2008) 2 SCC 409 :
(2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 440] , correctness whereof is open to
question, but it is another thing to say that the
investigating officer will have no jurisdiction whatsoever
to make any further investigation without the express
permission of the Magistrate.”

64. In Vinay Tyagi [ Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali ,
(2013) 5 SCC 762: (2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 557], it was held
that “ further investigation ” in terms of Section 173(8)
CrPC can be made in a situation where the investigating
officer obtains further oral or documentary evidence after
the final report has been filed before the court. The
report on such further investigation under Section 173(8)
CrPC can be termed as a supplementary report.

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65. In Vinay Tyagi [ Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali , (2013) 5
SCC 762: (2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 557], it was held that: (SCC p.
790, para 40)

“ 40.2 . A Magistrate has the power to direct
“further investigation” after filing of a police
report in terms of Section 173(6) of the Code.
*
40.4 . Neither the scheme of the Code nor
any specific provision therein bars exercise of such
jurisdiction by the Magistrate. The language of
Section 173(2) cannot be construed so
restrictively as to deprive the Magistrate of such
powers particularly in face of the provisions of
Section 156(3) and the language of Section 173(8)
itself. In fact, such power would have to be read
into the language of Section 173(8).

40.5 . The Code is a procedural document,
thus, it must receive a construction which would
advance the cause of justice and legislative object
sought to be achieved. It does not stand to reason
that the legislature provided power of further
investigation to the police even after filing a
report, but intended to curtail the power of the
court to the extent that even where the facts of
the case and the ends of justice demand, the court
can still not direct the investigating agency to
conduct further investigation which it could do on
its own.

40.6 . It has been a procedure of propriety
that the police has to seek permission of the court
to continue “further investigation” and file
supplementary charge-sheet.”

66. In Vinubhai [ Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya v. State of
Gujarat , (2019) 17 SCC 1: (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 228] a three-
Judge Bench of this Court has endeavoured to lay at rest the
controversy enveloping the evasive issue of further investigation
directed by the Magistrate. This Court, speaking through R.F.
Nariman, J. has laid down at para 42 that: (SCC p. 39)

“ 42 . … To say that a fair and just
investigation would lead to the conclusion that the

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police retain the power, subject, of course, to the
Magistrate's nod under Section 173(8) to further
investigate an offence till charges are framed, but
that the supervisory jurisdiction of the Magistrate
suddenly ceases midway through the pre-trial
proceedings, would amount to a travesty of
justice, as certain cases may cry out for further
investigation so that an innocent person is not
wrongly arraigned as an accused or that a prima
facie guilty person is not so left out. There is no
warrant for such a narrow and restrictive view of
the powers of the Magistrate, particularly when
such powers are traceable to Section 156(3) read
with Section 156(1), Section 2( h ) and Section
173(8)CrPC, as has been noticed hereinabove, and
would be available at all stages of the progress of
a criminal case before the trial actually
commences. It would also be in the interest of justice
that this power be exercised suomotu by the Magistrate
himself, depending on the facts of each case. Whether
further investigation should or should not be ordered is
within the discretion of the learned Magistrate who will
exercise such discretion on the facts of each case and in
accordance with law.”

It was also clarified that: ( Vinubhai case [ Vinubhai Haribhai
Malaviya v. State of Gujarat , (2019) 17 SCC 1: (2020) 3 SCC
(Cri) 228], SCC p. 21, para 28)

“ 28 . … The “investigation” spoken of in
Section 156(3) would embrace the entire process,
which begins with the collection of evidence and
continues until charges are framed by the Court, at
which stage the trial can be said to have begun.”

67. Thus, this Court, in conclusion, observed that:
( Vinubhai case [ Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya v. State of Gujarat ,
(2019) 17 SCC 1: (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 228], SCC p. 21, para 27)

“ 27 . … when Section 156(3) states that a
Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order
“such an investigation”, such Magistrate may also order
further investigation under Section 173(8), regard being
had to the definition of “investigation” contained in
Section 2( h ).”

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68. Thus, in view of the law laid down by this Court
in the various decisions cited hereinabove, it is well
settled that sub-section (8) of Section 173CrPC permits
further investigation, and even dehors any direction from
the court, it is open to the police to conduct proper
investigation, even after the court takes cognizance of
any offence on the strength of a police report earlier
submitted. ”

It is these two judgments which had held the field, where it was
observed that sub-section (8) of Section 173 Cr.P.C., permits
further investigation de hors any direction from the Court that it
would be open to the Police to conduct proper investigation, even
after the Court takes cognizance of any offence.

9.3. The judgments delivered at a later point in time would
hold otherwise. The Apex Court while interpreting Section 193(9)
of the BNSS, which is Section 173(8) of the earlier regime Cr.P.C.,
3
observes in PRAMOD KUMAR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH ,
as follows:
Analysis

26. The power of the investigating agency to order
further investigation in any criminal case is derived from
the aegis of Section 173(8) CrPC [also refer to Section
193(9) BNSS], which is reproduced as follows:


3

(2026) 5 SCC 308

- 21 -


“173. (8) Nothing in this section shall be
deemed to preclude further investigation in
respect of an offence after a report under sub-
section (2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate
and, where upon such investigation, the officer in
charge of the police station obtains further
evidence, oral or documentary, he shall forward to
the Magistrate a further report or reports
regarding such evidence in the form prescribed;
and the provisions of sub-sections (2) to (6) shall,
as far as may be, apply in relation to such report
or reports as they apply in relation to a report
forwarded under sub-section (2).”

27. Thus, the powers of the investigating agency
for further investigation are not in dispute herein.
However, what catches attention here and which is also
the crux of the controversy in the present case, is which
authority can pass an order directing investigating
agency to undertake further investigation under Section
173(8)CrPC.

28. The issue regarding the procedure to be followed for
directing further investigation in a case has been dealt with by
this Court in Vinay Tyagi [ Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali , (2013) 5
SCC 762 : (2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 557] , wherein this Court while
dealing with the contours of Section 173(8)CrPC relating to
further investigation, propounded that the police ought to follow
the procedure of seeking permission from the Court to conduct
“further investigation” and file a supplementary charge-sheet.
The relevant paragraphs from the judgment are reproduced as
under: (SCC p. 790, para 40)

“ 40 . Having analysed the provisions of the Code
and the various judgments as aforeindicated, we would
state the following conclusions in regard to the powers
of a Magistrate in terms of Section 173(2) read with
Section 173(8) and Section 156(3) of the Code:

40.1 . The Magistrate has no power to direct
“reinvestigation” or “fresh investigation” (de
novo) in the case initiated on the basis of a police
report.

- 22 -


40.2 . A Magistrate has the power to direct
“further investigation” after filing of a police
report in terms of Section 173(6) of the Code.

40.3 . The view expressed in sub-para 40.2
above is in conformity with the principle of law
stated in Bhagwant Singh case [ Bhagwant Singh v.
Commr. of Police , (1985) 2 SCC 537 : 1985 SCC
(Cri) 267] by a three-Judge Bench and thus in
conformity with the doctrine of precedent.

40.4 . Neither the scheme of the Code nor any
specific provision therein bars exercise of such
jurisdiction by the Magistrate. The language of Section
173(2) cannot be construed so restrictively as to deprive
the Magistrate of such powers particularly in face of the
provisions of Section 156(3) and the language of Section
173(8) itself. In fact, such power would have to be read
into the language of Section 173(8).

40.5 . The Code is a procedural document, thus, it
must receive a construction which would advance the
cause of justice and legislative object sought to be
achieved. It does not stand to reason that the legislature
provided power of further investigation to the police
even after filing a report, but intended to curtail the
power of the court to the extent that even where the
facts of the case and the ends of justice demand, the
court can still not direct the investigating agency to
conduct further investigation which it could do on its
own.

40.6 . It has been a procedure of propriety
that the police has to seek permission of the court
to continue “further investigation” and file
supplementary charge-sheet. This approach has
been approved by this Court in a number of
judgments. This as such would support the view
that we are taking in the present case .”
(emphasis supplied)

29. In this very judgment, this Court while noting
that although there is no explicit mandate under Section
173(8)CrPC to seek leave of the Court before conducting
further investigation, nevertheless, over the time, a
practice has been developed to seek permission of the

- 23 -


Court. Therefore, the practice of seeking the leave of the
Court will have to be read into the provisions of Section
173(8)CrPC, and it is essentially a prerequisite for
directing further investigation. This Court therein held as
follows: ( Vinay Tyagi case [ Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali , (2013) 5
SCC 762: (2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 557] , SCC p. 793, paras 49-50)

“ 49 . Now, we may examine another significant
aspect which is how the provisions of Section 173(8)
have been understood and applied by the courts and
investigating agencies. It is true that though there is no
specific requirement in the provisions of Section 173(8)
of the Code to conduct “further investigation” or file
supplementary report with the leave of the court, the
investigating agencies have not only understood but also
adopted it as a legal practice to seek permission of the
courts to conduct “further investigation” and file
“supplementary report” with the leave of the court. The
courts, in some of the decisions, have also taken a
similar view. The requirement of seeking prior leave
of the court to conduct “further investigation”
and/or to file a “supplementary report” will have
to be read into, and is a necessary implication of
the provisions of Section 173(8) of the Code. The
doctrine of contemporanea expositio will fully
come to the aid of such interpretation as the
matters which are understood and implemented
for a long time, and such practice that is supported
by law should be accepted as part of the
interpretative process .

50 . Such a view can be supported from two
different points of view: firstly, through the
doctrine of precedent, as aforenoticed, since quite
often the courts have taken such a view, and,
secondly, the investigating agencies which have
also so understood and applied the principle. The
matters which are understood and implemented as
a legal practice and are not opposed to the basic
rule of law would be good practice, and such
interpretation would be permissible with the aid of
doctrine of contemporanea expositio. Even
otherwise, to seek such leave of the court would
meet the ends of justice and also provide adequate
safeguard against a suspect/accused .”
(emphasis supplied)

- 24 -


30. The proposition of the law laid down in Vinay
Tyagi [ Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali , (2013) 5 SCC 762:
(2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 557] has been further affirmed by the
three-Judge Bench of this Court in Vinubhai Haribhai
Malaviya v. State of Gujarat [ Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya
v. State of Gujarat , (2019) 17 SCC 1: (2020) 3 SCC (Cri)
228].

31. This Court has dealt with a similar situation in
Peethambaran v. State of Kerala [ Peethambaran v. State of
Kerala , (2024) 16 SCC 65], wherein the District Police Chief i.e.
Superintendent of Police, ordered further investigation. This
Court therein, while quashing the order passed by the District
Police Chief, held that the power to order further investigation
rests either with the Magistrate concerned or a higher court, but
not with the investigating agency. The relevant paragraphs from
the judgment are reproduced as follows: (SCC pp. 74 & 77,
paras 19-20 & 28)

“ 19 . The Chief Police Officer of a district is the
Superintendent of Police who is an officer of the Indian
Police Service. Needless to state, an order from the
District Police Chief is not the same as an order issued
by the Magistrate concerned . Referring to Vinay Tyagi
[ Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali , (2013) 5 SCC 762 : (2013) 4
SCC (Cri) 557] , this Court in Devendra Nath Singh v.
State of Bihar [ Devendra Nath Singh v. State of Bihar ,
(2023) 1 SCC 48 : (2023) 1 SCC (Cri) 270] noted that
there is no specific requirement to seek leave of the
court for further investigation or to file a supplementary
report but the investigating agencies, have not only
understood it to be so but have also adopted the same
as a legal requirement. The doctrine of contemporanea
expositio aids such an interpretation of matters which
have been long understood and implemented in a
particular manner to be accepted into the interpretive
process. In other words, the requirement of
permission for further investigation or to file a
supplementary report is accepted within law and
is therefore required to be complied with .

20 . In the facts at hand, it is clear that such a
permission was never taken, granted or ordered.
Consequently, FR-II is without basis. In FR-I it has been
stated that in the absence of any documents in respect

- 25 -


of the financial transactions, the instant case may be
treated as a false case. This, then would necessarily
imply that after due investigation conducted by a duly
authorised person, the conclusion is that the ingredients
of the section mentioned in the FIR have not been met
and no case is made out.
*

28 . In terms of second question, the above
discussion makes clear that the District Police
Chief, Kottayam could not have ordered further
investigation, as that power rests either with the
Magistrate concerned or with a higher court and
not with an investigating agency.”
(emphasis supplied)

32. In light of the legal position as settled by this
Court through the above judgments, it is safe to say that
the power to direct further investigation in a case rests
solely at the discretion of the Magistrate/Court
concerned. In the event, the police/investigating agency
is of the opinion that further investigation is necessary in
any particular case to cull out complete facts and truth in
the case, it is binding upon them to file an appropriate
application before the Magistrate/Court, without
directing an order for further investigation by
themselves. Once such an application is filed by the
investigating agency, the Magistrate/Court would apply
its judicial mind, in light of the facts and circumstances of
the particular case and the reasons demonstrated by the
investigating agency, in order to exercise its discretion
for exercise of its power to decide whether or not further
investigation is to be ordered under the purview of
Section 173(8)CrPC.

33. In the present case, the Under Secretary to the State
of Uttar Pradesh, vide its Letter dated 6-6-2019, directed that
the investigation in the matter would be conducted by CBCID.
The Under Secretary also recommended that further
investigation under Section 173(8)CrPC be conducted through
its letter addressed to NHRC dated 12-2-2021. Consequently,
the investigating officer of CBCID wrote a letter dated 22-4-
2021 to the Judicial Magistrate, Firozabad, requesting to grant
permission to conduct further investigation under Section

- 26 -


173(8)CrPC and provide a copy of the case diary. However, the
Court did not pass any order to the extent of requisitioning the
investigating officer to conduct further investigation.

34. Further, vide letter dated 26-4-2021, the
Superintendent of Police informed the Additional Superintendent
of Police/Divisional Officer, Crime Branch, AAD, Agra, about the
nomination of the IO in the present case and directed him to
complete the investigation expeditiously, submit monthly
progress reports, and forward the final report upon completion
of the investigation.

35. Thus, it is amply clear that the Superintendent
of Police acted in complete defiance of the procedure laid
down under the law while passing orders directing
further investigation without seeking leave of the Court.
It is an unbecoming conduct from the officer of such a
rank to exercise unfettered powers, in excess of its
jurisdiction, thereby undermining the authority vested in
the court of law.”


9.4. Again, in PALINISWAMY VEERARAJA v. STATE OF
4
KARNATAKA , the Apex Court holds as follows:
“.... .... ....

9. On both these questions, the law is no longer res
integra . True it is that, as held in Rama Chaudhary v.
State of Bihar , the text of Section 173(8) CrPC does not
explicitly mandate seeking of permission from the
Magistrate and neither does 193(9) BNSS. However, the
proviso to the said Section mandates that permission of
the Court is explicitly required once the trial has begun.
Even though the statute does not require express
permission, the law as it has developed, has made
abundantly clear that seeking of permission from the

4

2026 SCC OnLine SC 940

- 27 -


concerned Magistrate has evolved into a requirement. In
Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali , it has been held as follows:

“ 49. Now, we may examine another significant
aspect which is how the provisions of Section 173(8)
have been understood and applied by the courts and
investigating agencies. It is true that though there is no
specific requirement in the provisions of Section 173(8)
of the Code to conduct “further investigation” or file
supplementary report with the leave of the court, the
investigating agencies have not only understood but also
adopted it as a legal practice to seek permission of the
courts to conduct “further investigation” and file
“supplementary report” with the leave of the court. The
courts, in some of the decisions, have also taken a
similar view. The requirement of seeking prior leave
of the court to conduct “further investigation”
and/or to file a “supplementary report” will have
to be read into, and is a necessary implication of
the provisions of Section 173(8) of the Code. The
doctrine of contemporanea expositio will fully
come to the aid of such interpretation as the
matters which are understood and implemented
for a long time, and such practice that is supported
by law should be accepted as part of the
interpretative process.

This proposition was approved in Vinubhai Haribhai
Malaviya v. State of Gujarat and reiterated in Peethambaran v.
State of Kerala . Recently, in Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu v.
State of Bihar , this Bench observed as follows:

“ 21. Before parting with this matter, we deem it
fit to issue the following directions:

(i) In view of Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali , it can be
seen that the ‘ leave of the court ’ to file a
supplementary chargesheet, is a part of Section
173(8) CrPC. That being the position, in our
considered view, the Court is not rendered
functus officio having granted such permission.
Since the further investigation is being
made with the leave of the Court, judicial
stewardship/control thereof, is a function
which the court must perform.

- 28 -


(ii) Reasons are indispensable to the proper
functioning of the machinery of criminal law.
They form the bedrock of fairness, transparency,
and accountability in the justice system. If the
Court finds or the accused alleges
(obviously with proof and reason to
substantiate the allegation) that there is a
large gap between the first information
report and the culminating chargesheet, it is
bound to seek an explanation from the
investigating agency and satisfy itself to the
propriety of the explanation so furnished.

The direction above does not come based
on this case alone. This Court has noticed on
many unfortunate occasions that there is massive
delay in filing chargesheet/taking cognizance etc.
This Court has time and again, in its
pronouncements underscored the necessity of
speedy investigation and trial as being important
for the accused, victim and the society. However,
for a variety of reasons there is still a lag in the
translation of this recognition into a reality.

(iii) While it is well acknowledged and recognised that
the process of investigation has many moving
parts and is therefore impractical to have strict
timelines in place, at the same time, the
discussion made in the earlier part of this
judgment, clearly establishes that investigations
cannot continue endlessly. The accused is not out
of place to expect, after a certain point in time,
certainty- about the charges against him, giving
him ample time to preparing plead his defence.
If investigation into a particular offence has
continued for a period that appears to be
unduly long, that too without adequate
justification, such as in this case, the
accused or the complainant both, shall be at
liberty to approach the High Court under
Section 528 BNSS/482 CrPC, seeking an
update on the investigation or, if the doors
of the High Court have been knocked by the
accused, quashing. It is clarified that delay
in completion of investigation will only
function as one of the grounds, and the
Court, if in its wisdom, decides to entertain

- 29 -


this application, other grounds will also
have to be considered.

(iv) Reasons are not only important in the judicial
sphere, but they are equally essential in
administrative matters particularly in matters
such as sanction for they open the gateway to
greater consequences. Application of mind by the
authorities granting or denying sanction must be
easily visible including consideration of the
evidence placed before it in arriving at the
conclusion.
[emphasis in original ]”

The Apex Court in the judgments rendered in the year 2026 quoted
supra emphasise on the importance of an order from the Magistrate
or the concerned Court for further investigation, despite the
previous judgments being relied upon. Therefore, the judicial tone
today is that further investigation must be brought to the notice of
the concerned Court, particularly after filing the final report before
it. The permission of the concerned Court to conduct further
investigation would be imperative. Therefore, in the case at hand,
the claim for further investigation is contrary to law. In this context
it is necessary to notice the direction issued by this Court in
Crl.P.No.12246 of 2023 and connected cases while obliterating the
order of cognizance. It reads as follows:
“..... ..... .....

12. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:

- 30 -


O R D E R

(i) Criminal Petitions are allowed in part . The order
of taking cognizance in each of the cases stand
obliterated.

(ii) Matters are remitted back to the hands of the
concerned Court for two actions viz.,

(a) Redrawing the order of taking cognizance by
an order which will bear application of mind;

(b) Taking cognizance against public servants
only if an order of sanction is placed before
the Court by the prosecution.

(iii) The prosecution is at liberty to seek and
obtain sanction from the hands of the
Competent Authority and place it before the
concerned Court. Once sanction is obtained
and placed before the concerned Court, the
concerned Court is at liberty to proceed
further from the stage of taking cognizance.
Same goes with private persons who are
accused. The proceedings will continue from
the stage of taking cognizance, bearing in
mind the observations made in the course of
the order.”

This Court only permitted the concerned Court to continue the
proceedings against the accused once there was an order of
sanction. The order of sanction is yet to be obtained. Even before
the order of sanction, the CID has sprung into action in issuing the
impugned notices. This is sans countenance, as there was no
permission either from this Court or from the concerned Court for

- 31 -


further investigation. Therefore, the orders issued in furtherance of
the further investigation is contrary to law. This is the first illegality
in the notices so issued.


ISSUE NOS.2 AND 3:



(ii) Whether the Crime Investigation Department (‘CID’) is an
independent investigating agency and further investigation by
the CID would amount to investigation by a different
Investigating Officer?

(iii) Whether the CID can undertake further investigation without
the express direction of the concerned Court?

10. The learned State Public Prosecutor-I has projected that
the CID is not an independent agency and as such, it would not
amount to further investigation at the hands of the CID. It is only
continuation of investigation as obtaining under Section 173(8) of
the Cr.P.C. I have already answered the aforesaid issue holding
that further investigation suo motu taken up by the CID is contrary
to law. Whether the CID is an independent agency or is just like
any other jurisdictional police station is required to be noticed.

- 32 -


11. It need not detain this Court for long or delve deep into
the matter. The CID/Corps of Detective was established in the year
1974 by the Government of Karnataka in terms of a Government
order dated 15-04-1974. The nomenclature of Corps of Detective
was changed on 03-06-2009 from COD to CID. It is further
reorganized in terms of a Government order dated 12-02-2013.
What does CID comprise of is as follows:

“The Corps of Detectives was established during the year 1974
by the Government of Karnataka vide order No.HD 229/PEO/73
dated 15-04-1974. The nomenclature was changed by the
Government vide Order No.OE/127/COD/2008 dated 03-06-
2009 as Criminal Investigation Department. It was further re-
organized vide Order No. HD 04 POP 2013 dated 12-02-2013.

The Government has established Criminal Investigation
Department to investigate important major cases, economic and
financial offences which would require special knowledge of both
law and investigation and achieve maximum result in detection
of crimes, thereby instilling confidence and good faith among
the public in police administration.

(i) ORGANIZATION:

(i) The Criminal Investigation Department comprises of the
following branches;

1. Criminal Investigation Department.
2. Economic Offences Wing.
3. Cyber Crimes and Narcotics
4. CID-Forest Cell

(ii) The Criminal Investigation Department is headed by an
officer of the rank of Director General of Police who is
assisted by officers of the rank of Additional Director

- 33 -


General of Police/Inspector General of Police, Deputy
Inspector General of Police and Officers of other ranks.
This organization is under the overall administrative
control of the Director General and Inspector General of
Police, Karnataka State.
… … …”

Therefore, by no stretch of imagination CID can be declared
another jurisdictional Police and the Officer of the CID, an Officer
in-charge of the Police Station as obtaining under Section 2(o) of
the Cr.P.C.

12. The High Court OF Andhra Pradesh considers the issue in
great detail as to whether the CID and Law and Order Police are
separate investigative agencies. The High Court OF Andhra Pradesh
in VELAGAPUDI GOWRI VENKATA RAMANA v. STATE OF
5
ANDHRA PRADESH , holds as follows:
“.... .... ....
POINTS FOR DETERMINATION

16. The points arising for determination in these petitions
are:

(1) Whether the CID and the Law & Order Police
are independent investigating agencies under
the control of the Director General of Police,
Andhra Pradesh?


5

2026 SCC OnLine AP 4253

- 34 -


(2) Whether the Additional Director General of
Police, CID, A.P., Mangalagiri, is an “Officer-
in-charge of the police station” as defined
under Section 2( o ) CrPC, or is otherwise
competent to suomotu transfer further
investigation in Crime Nos. 261 and 288 of
2019 on the file of Tuni Rural Police Station?

(3) Even otherwise, whether the impugned exercise, in
any event, amounts to an unauthorised
reinvestigation rather than further investigation,
having regard to the absence of fresh material and
of prior permission of the jurisdictional Magistrate?

DETERMINATION BY THIS COURT

Point No. 1:Whether the CID and the Law & Order Police
are independent investigating agencies under
the control of the Director General of Police,
Andhra Pradesh?

17. The material on record discloses that Crime Nos. 261
of 2019 and 288 of 2019 were originally registered and
investigated by the Tuni Rural Police Station. Investigation in
both crimes was concluded and reports were filed. In Crime No.
261 of 2019, cognizance was taken and the matter was
numbered as S.C. No. 158 of 2021. In Crime No. 288 of 2019,
the final report was also filed, however, cognizance could not be
taken because of the interim orders passed by a coordinate
Bench of this Court in W.P. No. 5613 of 2020.

18. The impugned proceedings reveal that,
subsequent to the withdrawal of W.P. No. 5613 of 2020
on 14-10-2024 and after a change in the political
governance of the State, the Additional Director General
of Police, CID, by proceedings dated 11-11-2024,
directed the Deputy Superintendent of Police, CID,
Rajamahendravaram, to undertake further investigation
in the above crimes.

19. The contention of the Petitioners is that the CID is a
distinct investigating agency and cannot assume jurisdiction
over an investigation already completed by the local police

- 35 -


merely on the basis of administrative instructions. The Andhra
Pradesh Crime Investigation Department is undoubtedly a
specialised investigative wing constituted by State Government.
Though the CID and the Law & Order Police both
function, administratively, under the overall supervision
of the Director General of Police, they are distinct
investigative establishments with separate organisational
hierarchies, jurisdictions and functional responsibilities.
The administrative control exercised by the Director
General of Police over both wings does not erase the
distinction between the investigating agency that
originally investigated the offence and another
specialised agency subsequently entrusted with the
investigation. This distinction assumes significance
because erstwhile Section 173(8) CrPC, which is now
Section 193(9) of the BNSS, 2023, contemplates
continuation of the earlier investigation, not substitution
of one investigating agency by another.

20. In Mekala Madhusudhan Reddy (supra), a
coordinate Bench of this Court elaborately examined the
scope of further investigation after filing of the final
report, and held that further investigation is only a
continuation of the earlier investigation and cannot be
converted into a fresh or de novo investigation by a
different investigating agency through executive
instructions. It was emphasised that the statutory
scheme does not confer unfettered administrative power
on superior police officers to substitute the investigating
agency once investigation has concluded with the filing
of a report before the competent court .

21. The above finding of the coordinate Bench was not
based merely in a general characterisation of the CID as a
specialised wing, but specifically it is based in the Standing
Order 866-1 of Chapter 44 of the Andhra Pradesh Police Manual,
which enumerates the particular classes of cases that the CID
may take up and expressly provides that “without the orders of
Addl. DGP C.I.D or DGP no enquiry or investigation shall be
taken up by C.I.D”, confirming that the CID's jurisdiction to
investigate is specialised, not a general, overriding power
exercisable over any case already under investigation by the
Law & Order Police . It was further noted that this

- 36 -


separateness was reinforced on the facts before it by a
judicial admission in the CID officer's own counter-
affidavit, which described the CID as “an independent
investigating agency”. It was also emphasised that
statutory scheme does not confer unfettered
administrative power on superior police officers to
substitute the investigating agency once investigation
has concluded with the filing of a report before the
competent court.

22. In view of the said ratio, this Court holds that
although both the CID and the Law & Order Police
function under the administrative control of the Director
General of Police, they remain separate investigating
agencies for purposes of criminal investigation, and one
cannot automatically substitute the other merely through
executive instructions. Point No. 1 is answered
accordingly.

Point No. 2:

Whether the Additional Director General of Police,
CID, A.P., Mangalagiri, is an “Officer-in-charge of
the police station” as defined under Section 2(o)
CrPC/ Section 2(p) BNSS, 2023 , or is otherwise
competent to suomotu transfer further
investigation in Crime Nos. 261 and 288 of 2019 on
the file of Tuni Rural Police Station?

23. Section 2(o) CrPC, which is now Section 2(p)
BNSS, 2023, defines an “Officer-in-charge of a police
station” in similar way in the following terms;

“officer in charge of a police station”
includes, when the officer in charge of the police
station is absent from the station-house or unable
from illness or other cause to perform his duties,
the police officer present at the station-house who
is next in rank to such officer and is above the
rank of constable or, when the State Government
so directs, any other police officer so present;

- 37 -


24. It is also relevant to extract Section 36 CrPC
which is now Section 30 BNSS which deals with the
powers of superior officers of police, in similar way in the
following terms;

Powers of superior officers of police.—
police officers superior in rank to an officer in
charge of a police station may exercise the same
powers, throughout the local area to which they
are appointed, as may be exercised by such
officer within the limits of his station .

25. In the instant case, the State contends that the
Additional Director General of Police, being a superior police
officer, can exercise powers under Section 36 CrPC (Section 30
of the BNSS). This contention cannot be accepted on the facts
of the present case. Section 36 CrPC (Section 30 of the BNSS)
merely enables superior officers to exercise powers exercisable
by officers-in-charge of police stations, it does not authorise
such an officer to bypass the statutory framework governing
investigation after submission of the police report, nor does it
permit substitution of one investigating agency by another,
independent, investigating wing. In the present case, the
Additional Director General of Police, CID, is admittedly
not the Officer-in-charge of Tuni Rural Police Station,
where both crimes were registered, nor is he the
successor investigating officer in those crimes. His
authority flows only from the administrative order
transferring the investigation. The expression “Officer-in-
charge of a police station,” occurring in Section 173(8)
CrPC (Section 193(9) of the BNSS, 2023), must be read
with the scheme of Chapter XII CrPC Further
investigation is intended to supplement the earlier
investigation and, therefore, ordinarily has to be
undertaken by the same investigating agency, through its
officer or successor officer.

26. The decision in Mekala Madhusudhan Reddy
(supra) holds that the CID cannot assume jurisdiction as
an Officer-in-charge merely on the strength of
administrative Standing Orders, unless the law
specifically authorises such transfer. This Court also
holds that the Additional Director General of Police, CID,

- 38 -


cannot be treated as the Officer-in-charge of Tuni Rural
Police Station merely because he holds a superior police
rank, nor is he shown to be otherwise competent, under
Section 36 CrPC (Section 30 of the BNSS) or any other
provision, to suomotu transfer further investigation in
Crime Nos. 261 and 288 of 2019. Point 2 is answered
accordingly.

Point (3)

Even otherwise, whether the impugned exercise, in
any event, amounts to an unauthorised
reinvestigation rather than further investigation,
having regard to the absence of fresh material and
of prior permission of the jurisdictional Magistrate?

27. Independently of the finding on Points 1 and 2, and
even assuming the CID could otherwise be treated as
competent to conduct further investigation, this Court proceeds
to examine whether the impugned exercise, on its own facts,
satisfies the statutory requirements of “further investigation”
under Section 173(8) CrPC (Section 193(9) of the BNSS, 2023),
or whether it amounts, in substance, to reinvestigation. For that
purpose, the statutory provisions are extracted below;

CrPC BNSS
Section 173 Report of police
officer on completion of
investigation
Section 193 Report of police
officer on completion of
investigation
(8) Nothing in this section shall be
deemed to preclude further
investigation in respect of an
offence after a report under sub-
section (2) has been forwarded to
the Magistrate and, where upon
such investigation, the officer in
charge of the police station
obtains further evidence, oral or
documentary, he shall forward to
the Magistrate a further report or
reports regarding such evidence in
the form prescribed; and the
provisions of sub-sections (2) to (6)
shall, as far as may be, apply in
(9) Nothing in this section shall
be deemed to preclude further
investigation in respect of an
offence after a report under
sub-section (3) has been
forwarded to the Magistrate
and, where upon such
investigation, the officer in
charge of the police station
obtains further evidence,
oral or documentary , he shall
forward to the Magistrate a
further report or reports
regarding such evidence in the
form as the State Government

- 39 -


relation to such report or reports as
they apply in relation to a report
forwarded under sub-section (2).
may, by rules, provide; and the
provisions of sub-sections (3)
to (8) shall, as far as may be,
apply in relation to such report
or reports as they apply in
relation to a report forwarded
under sub-section (3):
Provided that further
investigation during the
trial may be conducted with
the permission of the Court
trying the case and the
same shall be completed
within a period of ninety
days which may be
extended with the
permission of the Court.

28. “Investigation” as defined in Section 2( l ) of the BNSS
includes all the proceedings under BNSS for the collection of
evidence conducted by a police officer or by any person (other
than a Magistrate) who is authorised by a Magistrate in this
behalf. The Supreme Court in H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi
categorized the steps involved in an investigation as follows;

“….investigation consists generally of the
following steps:(1) Proceeding to the spot (2)
Ascertainment of the facts and circumstances of the
case (3) Discovery and arrest of the suspected offender
(4) Collection of evidence relating to the commission of
the offence which may consist of (a) the examination of
various persons (including the accused) and the
reduction of their statements into writing, if the officer
thinks fit (b) the search of places of seizure of things
considered necessary for the investigation and to be
produced at the trial, and (5) Formation of the opinion
as to whether on the material collected there is a case to
place the accused before a Magistrate for trial and if so
taking the necessary steps for the same by the filing of a
charge-sheet under Section 173.”

29. Section 193 (1) BNSS, corresponding to Sec. 173 (1)
CrPC enjoins that the investigation must be completed without
“unreasonable delay”.

- 40 -


30. In this case, admittedly investigation in both crimes
had already been completed, reports had been filed, and Crime
No. 261 of 2019 is coming up for trial. The writ petition filed by
Respondent 6 seeking reinvestigation was withdrawn with
liberty to pursue remedies available under law. Immediately
thereafter, representations were made to political authorities,
and, consequent thereto, administrative memos were issued
transferring the investigation to the CID. The memo dated 2-12-
2024 itself shows that the transfer was made on the basis of a
representation submitted by the de facto complainant to the
Chief Office. The memo does not disclose discovery of any fresh
evidence or newly discovered material, nor does it mention any
witness coming forward with new facts. The only basis reflected
in the record is dissatisfaction expressed by the de facto
complainant and his family members regarding the earlier
investigation. Mere dissatisfaction of the complainant cannot
constitute the legal foundation for invoking Section 173(8) CrPC
(now Section 193(9) of the BNSS). It is settled principle that
further investigation must arise from discovery of fresh
material, it cannot become an instrument to reopen
completed investigations indefinitely. Nor, on the record
as it stands, was any permission sought from, or granted
by, the jurisdictional Magistrate before the CID
undertook further investigation a safeguard which
assumes particular significance on the facts of this case.
The pleadings disclose allegations that the Petitioners were
called to the police station, shifted to a private lodge,
questioned regarding a particular political leader, compelled to
name him while being video-recorded, and forced to sign blank
papers. Though these allegations are denied, the Respondents
have not filed any substantive counter-affidavit explaining the
circumstances necessitating such interrogation after the charge-
sheet was filed.

31. In Mekala Madhusudhan Reddy (supra), it was
categorically held that executive transfer of investigation
to another agency, under the guise of further
investigation, cannot be sustained as it amounts to
reinvestigation. The present case stands on a stronger
footing, since investigation had already been completed years
earlier and one case had already reached the stage of trial.
Accordingly, and independently of the findings on Points 1 and
2, the impugned proceedings dated 11-11-2024, transferring

- 41 -


investigation to the CID, cannot be sustained on this ground
either. This finding does not preclude the original
investigating agency from seeking appropriate orders
under Section 193(9) of the BNSS before the competent
court, if legally permissible and upon the existence of
genuine fresh material.

32. It is well settled that an administrative order
affecting the rights of parties must disclose the reasons for the
action taken and an order bereft of reasons is liable to be
interfered with in exercise of the power of judicial review under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In Mekala
Madhusudhan Reddy (supra), following the judgments of
the Supreme Court in Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v.
Masood Ahmed Khan , Union of India v. Mohan Lal Capoor
and West Bengal Central School Service Commission v.
Abdul Halim , it was held that an administrative order
transferring investigation from one agency to another, if
it does not disclose the reasons or the material that
prompted the transfer, is vitiated for want of reasons and
cannot be sustained on judicial review. The proceedings
impugned in the present writ petitions suffer from the same
infirmity, the memo dated 1-12-2024 discloses no reason
beyond de facto complainant 's dissatisfaction, and nothing on
the record explains what prompted the exercise of the power at
this stage, years after the final report was filed. This point is
answered accordingly.

33. The principles governing the scope and limitations of
further investigation have been consistently reiterated by the
Supreme Court. The power of further investigation is
undoubtedly available to the investigating agency even
after filing of the charge-sheet, however, that power is
intended to facilitate discovery of truth, not to provide an
opportunity to reopen concluded investigations on mere
dissatisfaction or administrative direction. The distinction
between further investigation and reinvestigation, the
requirement of fresh material, the necessity of
maintaining continuity of the investigating agency, and
the limits on the authority of the Additional Director
General of Police, CID, to conduct further investigation in
a case where the earlier investigation was conducted by
another agency, have been repeatedly emphasised by the

- 42 -


Supreme Court. The relevant principles emerging from
these judgments are discussed below.

34. In Ram Lal Narang (supra), the Supreme Court held
that the filing of a police report under Section 173 CrPC, and the
Magistrate's taking of cognizance, do not bar the police from
conducting further investigation if fresh evidence comes to light.
Such investigation is necessary to ensure that all relevant facts
including the involvement of new accused or the innocence of
existing accused are brought before the Court. While the
investigating agency may conduct further investigation and
submit a supplementary report, the ultimate discretion
regarding further proceedings rests with the Magistrate. It was
also observed that as a matter of judicial propriety, the
police should ordinarily inform the court and seek its
permission before undertaking further investigation after
cognizance has been taken.

35. In Vinay Tyagi (supra), the Supreme Court drew a
clear distinction between further investigation and fresh/de
novo/reinvestigation. Further investigation under Section
173(8) CrPC is a continuation of the original
investigation, undertaken to collect additional evidence,
and results in a supplementary report without affecting
the validity of the earlier investigation. A fresh or de
novo investigation, by contrast, completely displaces the
earlier investigation and can be directed only by the
higher Constitutional Courts in exceptional
circumstances, where the original investigation is shown
to be unfair, tainted, or mala fide. The Court emphasised
that this extraordinary power should be exercised
sparingly, and only to secure a fair investigation and
uphold the ends of justice.

36. In K. Vadivel (supra), the Supreme Court, reiterating
the principles in Hasanbhai Valibhai Qureshi v. State of Gujarat
and Ram Lal Narang (supra), held that further investigation
under Section 173(8) CrPC is permissible even after filing of the
charge-sheet, where fresh material or circumstances emerge
necessitating a complete and fair investigation. It was reiterated
that the object of further investigation is to discover the truth
and ensure effective justice, and that delay in trial cannot, by
itself, be a ground to refuse such investigation. At the same

- 43 -


time, it was clarified that further investigation cannot be
permitted as a fishing or roving enquiry, or merely to fill
lacunae in the prosecution case; there must be a reasonable
basis demonstrating that further investigation is essential to
serve the ends of justice.

37. The Supreme Court, in Hemendhra Reddy (supra),
emphasised that the prime consideration for permitting further
investigation under Section 173(8) CrPC is discovery of the
truth and the advancement of real, substantial, and effective
justice. The Supreme Court, in Chandra Babu (supra),
reiterated that while a Magistrate is empowered to direct
further investigation, he has no jurisdiction to order a
fresh, de novo, or reinvestigation, particularly by a
different investigating agency. Relying on Vinay Tyagi
(supra), it was held that the power to direct fresh, de
novo, or reinvestigation, or to transfer investigation from
one agency to another, is vested exclusively in the
superior Constitutional Courts, in exercise of their powers
under Section 482 CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution,
and is to be exercised sparingly in exceptional cases.

38. In K. Chandrasekhar (supra), the Supreme
Court held that, once a case has been entrusted to the
CBI, further investigation in respect of the same case can
be conducted only by the CBI. The State Government
cannot authorise the State Police to undertake further
investigation by withdrawing consent, as such action
would be contrary to the continuity and lawful control of
an investigation already entrusted to the CBI. The
notification enabling the State Police to investigate
further was accordingly held invalid and unsustainable in
law.

39. In Peethambaran (supra), the Supreme Court
reiterated the principle laid down in Hemant Dhasmana v.
CBI namely, that the power of the police can be set in
motion only upon the order of the Court, and that such
order should not be interfered with even in exercise of
the revisional jurisdiction of a higher Court.

40. In Bohati Devi (supra), the Supreme Court,
while quashing the order directing reinvestigation by the

- 44 -


CBCID, reiterated the distinction between further
investigation and reinvestigation under Section 173(8)
CrPC It was held that, while the investigating officer has
statutory power to conduct further investigation even
after filing of the charge-sheet, that power does not
extend to ordering reinvestigation or transferring
investigation to another agency without the permission
of the competent court. Administrative authorities,
including Secretary (Home), have no jurisdiction to direct
reinvestigation by another agency, since investigation is
governed by the scheme of the CrPC and must be
conducted by the concerned investigating officer under
the supervision of the Superintendent of Police. The
composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Ravikrindi
Ramaswamy (supra), relying on K. Chandrasekhar
(supra), categorically held that further investigation in a
case can be carried out only by the original agency.

41. The High Court of Kerala, in Anish Anand
(supra), relying on Peethambaran and Chandra Babu
(supra), categorically held that the investigating agency
has every right to conduct further investigation under
Section 173(8) CrPC, however, it is well settled that
further investigation must be conducted by the same
agency that conducted the earlier investigation, and not
by a different agency.

42. Even in Balaji Govindappa (supra), which is
relied upon by the learned Advocate General, this Court
categorically held that, Sec. 173(8) CrPC (Section 193(9)
of BNSS) provides further investigation by the same
agency. For holding fresh investigation or reinvestigation, fresh
permission of the Magistrate is required. Section 193(9) of
BNSS is a corresponding version of Section 173(8) of CrPC, but
with a newly added proviso that stipulates that the further
investigation during the trial may be conducted with the
permission of the Court trying the case and it shall be
completed within a period of 90 days, extendable with the
permission of the Court. In such circumstances, this Court is of
the view that the judgment in Balaji Govindappa (supra) has no
application to the facts of the present case, where the impugned
action amounts to an attempt to reopen a concluded

- 45 -


investigation under the guise of further investigation that too by
a different investigating agency.

43. The learned Advocate General relied on the judgment
in A.S. Peter (supra). However, this Court respectfully
distinguishes that decision for the same reasons as given by
coordinate Bench in Mekala Madhusudhan Reddy (supra). As
explained by the coordinate Bench, A.S. Peter (supra) did not
consider (i) the meaning of “superior police” under the Andhra
Pradesh (Andhra Area) District Police Act, 1859 (ii) the meaning
of “Officer-in-charge of a police station” under Section 2(o)
CrPC or (iii) the limited and specific powers given to the CID
under Chapter 44 of the Andhra Pradesh Police Manual. Instead
A.S. Peter (supra) proceeded mainly on the ground that
the Additional Director General of Police, CID, was a
higher-ranking police officer. It did not examine whether
his higher rank gave him the power, under Section 36
CrPC, to transfer an investigation from one independent
investigating agency to another. For this reason, the
coordinate Bench did not follow A.S. Peter (supra) in a
similar matter. It instead relied on the later Supreme
Court decision in Chandra Babu (supra), which did not
refer to A.S. Peter (supra) and on detailed reasoning in
Vinay Tyagi (supra). These decisions indicate that
transferring an investigation from one independent
agency to another is a power that belongs to the superior
Constitutional Courts. Therefore, for the same reasons
given by the coordinate Bench, this Court respectfully
declines to apply A.S. Peter (supra) to the present case.

44. Moreover in A.S. Peter (supra), the Supreme
Court upheld further investigation conducted by the CID
after the local police had already filed a charge-sheet,
and rejected specific objection that further investigation
could not be undertaken by a different investigating
agency. However, the further investigation in that case
was preceded by a memo filed by the CID before the
jurisdictional Magistrate seeking an adjournment, which
the Magistrate allowed so that, even though no express
permission for further investigation appears to have been
separately recorded, the exercise proceeded with the
jurisdictional Court apprised of it. In the present case in
contrast, it is not in dispute that no such intimation was

- 46 -


made to or permission sought from the jurisdictional
Magistrate before the CID commenced further
investigation. This distinction goes to the safeguard of
judicial oversight that the Supreme Court in Ram Lal
Narang (supra) identified as a matter of propriety in the
exercise of the power of further investigation .

45. In view of the foregoing discussion and the facts and
circumstances of the present case, this Court is of the view that
further investigation under Section 173(8) CrPC, now Section
193(9) of BNSS, is only a continuation of the earlier
investigation and cannot be used to substitute the original
investigating agency or to conduct a fresh or de novo
investigation. The present case involves investigation already
completed by the Tuni Rural Police Station, filing of final
reports, and, in one case, commencement of trial. The
impugned proceedings transferring the matter to the CID
do not disclose any fresh material or newly discovered
evidence warranting further investigation, but instead
seek to reopen the concluded investigation through a
different investigating agency. The principles laid down
in the judgments relied upon by the Petitioners,
particularly regarding the distinction between further
investigation and reinvestigation, the necessity of
continuity of the investigating agency, and the limitations
on administrative authorities in transferring
investigations are directly attracted to the facts of the
present case.

46. For the aforesaid reasons, this Court holds that:

( i ) The CID and the Law & Order Police, though
administratively under the Director General of
Police, are distinct investigating agencies

( ii ) The Additional Director General of Police, CID,
cannot be treated as the Officer-in-charge of
Tuni Rural Police Station, nor is he otherwise
shown to be competent, for the purpose of
assuming jurisdiction under Section 173(8)
CrPC, now Section 193(9) of the BNSS

- 47 -


( iii ) Even otherwise, the administrative
proceedings transferring Crime Nos. 261 of
2019 and 288 of 2019 to the CID for “further
investigation” are, on their own facts in the
absence of fresh material and of prior
permission of the jurisdictional Magistrate
beyond the scope of Section 173(8) CrPC,
now Section 193(9) of the BNSS and
substantially amount to an un-authorised
reinvestigation.”

Now, the CID thus cannot mean itself another wing of the police
that can undertake further investigation as obtaining under Section
173(8) of the Cr.P.C. This would undoubtedly amount to
investigation by a different agency, which cannot be without the
direction of this Court

13. The other submission that is projected is under Section 36
of the Cr.P.C. This has borne interpretation in the very judgment
relied on in the case of VELAGAPUDI GOWRI VENKATA
RAMANA ’s case. The same would be applicable to the issue on
hand as well. Earlier to this judgment in MEKALA
6
MADHUSUDHAN REDDY v. DIRECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE ,
the High Court of Andhra Pradesh holds as follows:
“.... .... ....

6

2020 SCC OnLine AP 964

- 48 -


85. No doubt, further investigation can be done by
the ‘officer-in-charge of the police station’, in view of the
power vested on such officer by virtue of Section 173(8)
Cr.P.C even without obtaining permission from the
jurisdictional Magistrate or Sessions Court and file final
report or reports on collection of additional evidence, but
not by any person other than the ‘officer-in-charge of the
police station’. Learned Government Pleader for Home
contended that the Additional Director General of Police
or Deputy Superintendent of Police, C.I.D, Kurnool are
the senior officers of the police department and they are
entitled to conduct further investigation. But, I am
unable to agree with the view of the learned Government
Pleader for Home, for the reason that, the Additional
Director General of Police, C.I.D, A.P and Deputy
Superintendent of Police C.I.D, Kurnool are members of a
different Investigating Agency which is claiming to be a
premier Investigating Agency in the State level under the
control of the State Police Organisation. The claim of the
C.I.D as a premier investigating agency is nothing but
rodomontade, that means boastful or inflated talk or
behaviour of the agency.

86. Section 36 Cr.P.C deals with powers of superior
officers of police. According to it, the Police officers
superior in rank to an officer in charge of a police station
may exercise the same powers, throughout the local area
to which they are appointed, as may be exercised by such
officer within the limits of his station.

87. Though the jurisdiction of the Additional
Director General of Police, C.I.D, A.P is extended
throughout the State, he is not officer-in-charge of the
police station or superior officer of officer-in-charge of
the police station for conducting further investigation
within the meaning of Section 2(o) read with Section
173(8) Cr.P.C as stated above. The power under Section
36 Cr.P.C has to be exercised by District Police Chief who
by virtue of the said section is empowered to appoint an
officer above the rank of an officer in charge of a police
station to exercise the same powers as may be exercised
by an ‘officer-in-charge of the police station’.

- 49 -


…. …. ….

91. By referring various judgments, the Apex Court
subsequent to Peter's case , concluded as follows:

“Whether the Magistrate should direct
“further investigation” or not is again a matter
which will depend upon the facts of a given case.
The learned Magistrate or the higher court of
competent jurisdiction would direct “further
investigation” or “reinvestigation” as the case may
be, on the facts of a given case. Where the
Magistrate can only direct further investigation,
the courts of higher jurisdiction can direct further,
reinvestigation or even investigation de novo
depending on the facts of a given case. It will be
the specific order of the court that would
determine the nature of investigation.”

21. We respectfully concur with the said
view. As we have already indicated, the learned
Chief Judicial Magistrate has basically directed for
further investigation. The said part of the order
cannot be found fault with, but an eloquent one,
he could not have directed another investigating
agency to investigate as that would not be within
the sphere of further investigation and, in any
case, he does not have the jurisdiction to direct
reinvestigation by another agency. Therefore, that
part of the order deserves to be lancinated and
accordingly it is directed that the investigating
agency that had investigated shall carry on the
further investigation and such investigation shall
be supervised by the concerned Superintendent of
Police.

92. The view expressed by the Apex Court in
Chandra Babu alias Moses v. State (referred supra) is
somewhat contrary to the law declared by the Apex Court
in Peter case referred above. But, the judgment in
Chandra Babu alias Moses v. State (referred supra) is
later in point of time and there is no reference about the
judgment in State of A.P. v. A.S. Peter (referred supra) in
the latter judgment. In any view of the matter, it is
relevant to refer certain provisions of Police Act at this

- 50 -


stage, since the powers of different police authorities are
prescribed under the Act.

93. According to Section 5 of Andhra Pradesh (Andhra
Area) District Police Act, 1859, the administration of the Police
throughout the General Police District shall be vested in an
officer to be styled as the Director General for the Andhra area
of the state of Andhra Pradesh and on such superior Police
officers as to the state government shall deem fit.

94. Similarly, Section 6 of the Andhra Pradesh Andhra
Area District Police Act, 1859, deals with the powers of police.
According to it, all Powers not inconsistent with the provisions of
this Act which up to the passing of this Act belonged by law to
the existing police authorities appointed under this Act provided
always that no police authorities appointed shall process or
exercise any judicial or revenue authority.

95. The word “superior police’ is also defined under
Section 1 of the Andhra Pradesh Andhra Area District
Police Act, 1859, which is substituted by A.P Act No. 12 of
1989 w.e.f 10.05.1989 and it is as follows:

“The expression superior police shall mean
the director of the police inspector General of
Police, Commissioner of Police, District
Superintendent of Police, Deputy Commissioner of
Police, Assistant Commissioner of Police, Assistant
Superintendent of Police and Deputy
Superintendent of Police.”

96. The expression “subordinate police” is defined
as under:

“the expression subordinate police shall
mean all police officers of and below the rank of
an inspector.”

97. Thus, the Additional Director General of Police,
C.I.D, A.P falls under the definition of ‘superior police
officer’ but belonging to a different Investigating Agency
of the State. Therefore, an officer of a different
Investigating Agency cannot be said to be Superior Police

- 51 -


Officer to exercise power of further investigation under
the guise of Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. In State of A.P. v. A.S.
Peter (referred supra), the Apex Court did not advert to
the definitions of ‘superior police officer’ under Andhra
Pradesh (Andhra Area) District Police Act, 1859, and
‘officer-in-charge of the police station’ under Section
2(o) of Cr.P.C and also the duties of C.I.D Police
enumerated under Chapter 44 of AP Police Manual, but,
simply concluded that the Additional Director General of
Police, C.I.D is a superior officer in rank.”

(Emphasis supplied at each instance)


I am in respectful agreement with what the High Court of Andhra
Pradesh has held. Therefore, all the issues are to be held in favour
of the petitioners. The notices so issued by the respondent through
WhatsApp again smacks of illegality, which need not be gone into in
the light of their power to issue notices not being permitted in law.


14. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:

O R D E R

(i) Criminal Petitions are allowed .


nd
(ii) Impugned notices dated 13-07-2026 issued by the 2
respondent/CID are all obliterated.

- 52 -


(iii) All other directions in the earlier Criminal Petition Nos.
12246 of 2023 and connected cases decided on 16-06-
2026 would stand in-tact.

Pending applications if any, also stand disposed.


This Court places its appreciation to the able assistance
rendered by Miss. Diya Miria Abraham, Law Clerk cum Research
Assistant attached to this Court.



Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE



BKP