Satish @ Sonu vs State Of U.P.
- Court
- Allahabad High Court
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
Criminal Appeal No.- 54 of 2018
Satish @ Sonu …..Appellant(s)
Versus
State of U.P. …..Respondents(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s) : Nagendra Mohan, Abhinav Srivastava,
Ajay Veer Singh, Ashok Kumar Singh,
Neha Dhanwani, R.B.S. Rathaur, Salil
Mohan
Counsel for Respondent(s) : Govt. Advocate, Brij Mohan Sahai
Along with:
Criminal Appeal No. 47 of 2018
Pankaj Singh & Anr. …..Appellant(s)
Versus
State of U.P. …..Respondents(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s) : Nagendra Mohan, Neha Dhanwani, Salil
Mohan
Counsel for Respondent(s) : Govt. Advocate, Brij Mohan Sahai
AFR
Court No. – 09 Reserved On: 31.07.2026
Delivered On: 30.10.2026
HON’BLE RAJESH SINGH CHAUHAN, J.
HON’BLE ZAFEER AHMAD, J.
1. Heard Shri Nagendra Mohan, learned counsel assisted by Shri
Salil Mohan, learned counsel for the appellants, Shri Anurag
Verma, learned Additional Government Advocate-1 for the State
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and Shri Brij Mohan Sahai, learned counsel assisted by Ms. Shaila
Zubair, learned counsel for the complainant. Perused the record.
2. The aforesaid criminal appeals arise out of the judgment and order
dated 23.12.2017, passed by the learned Additional Sessions
Judge/F.T.C.-2, Sultanpur in S.T. No. 322 of 2012 (S tate v. Pankaj
Singh and others ) and S.T. No. 323 of 2012 ( State v. Satish @
Sonu Singh ), arising out of Case Crime No. 182 of 2012 and Case
Crime No. 216 of 2012, respectively, registered at Police Station
Lambhuwa, District Sultanpur, whereby all the accused
-appellants have been convicted and sentenced to undergo
imprisonment for life along with a fine of Rs. 50,000/- under
Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short, ‘IPC’),
one year’s imprisonment along with a fine of Rs. 2,000/- under
Section 504 IPC, and one year’s imprisonment along with a fine
of Rs. 2,000/- under Section 506 IPC. In default of payment of all
fine imposed, all the accused-appellants shall undergo further
imprisonment for six months’. The accused-appellant namely
Satish @ Sonu has also been sentenced to undergo two years’
imprisonment along with a fine of Rs. 2,000/- under Section 3/25
of the Arms Act, 1959, and in default of payment of the said fine,
he shall undergo further imprisonment for a period of one month.
It was further directed that all the sentences shall run concurrently.
3. For convenience and clarity, the accused-respondents shall
hereinafter be referred to, as per their array before the Trial Court,
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namely: A1- Pankaj Singh; A2- Brijesh Singh and A3-Satish @
Sonu Singh.
4. Furthermore, accused-appellant Ritesh Singh had escaped from
custody during the pendency of the trial. Consequently, his case
was separated, and the trial in respect of the remaining accused
continued before the learned Trial Court. Accordingly, the present
appeal does not concern accused-appellant Ritesh Singh.
Prosecution Story in Nutshell:
5. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 11.06.2012, the
complainant, Jag Jeevan Singh, submitted a written report stating
therein that on 09.06.2012, his brother, Bhanu Pratap Singh, had
gone to village Radhaipur for getting his land irrigated and, at
about 6:00 P.M., while he was returning, at Chana Talab situated
near Parvatpur, Anil Singh came in front of him on a red Pulsar
motorcycle, along with Ritesh Singh, who was riding pillion, and
pushed Bhanu Pratap Singh. Thereafter, Bhanu Pratap Singh
informed the complainant about the incident, whereupon the
complainant, along with his younger brother Dharmendra Singh,
went to Raj Bahadur Singh, grandfather of Anil Singh, to apprise
him of the conduct of Anil Singh and to get him reprimanded.
When the complainant and Dharmendra Singh reached the house
of Raj Bahadur Singh on a motorcycle and narrated the entire
incident to him, Raj Bahadur Singh called Anil Singh and
reprimanded him. Thereafter, Anil Singh ran towards his old house
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while grumbling, and Dharmendra Singh tried to apprehend him
by running after him. At that time, A1, A2, A3 and Ritesh Singh,
who were coming from the opposite direction while waving katta
(country-made pistol), ran towards Dharmendra Singh. A-1
exhorted the other accused-appellants by stating that because of
Dharmendra Singh, the post of Pradhan had been lost from their
family and because of him, the quota had also been cancelled, and
that they had got a good opportunity to kill him. Upon such
exhortation, all the four accused allegedly opened fire at
Dharmendra Singh with an intention to kill him, due to which
Dharmendra Singh became frightened, his leg slipped in a drain
and he fell down. At the same time, A3 allegedly fired a shot in
the head of Dharmendra Singh, with a country-made pistol ( katta ).
Thereafter, all the accused allegedly fled from the spot while
firing in the air, abusing and extending threats to kill everyone.
The incident is stated to have occurred on 09.06.2012 at around
8:00 P.M. The incident was allegedly witnessed by persons who
were already present at the door of Raj Bahadur Singh, namely,
Shiv Prasad Singh and Sandeep Singh. The complainant, with the
help of Sandeep Singh and Shiv Prasad Singh, lifted Dharmendra
Singh, who was in a bleeding condition, and brought him to his
(complainant) house. Thereafter, he was taken to the District
Hospital, Sultanpur, for treatment, where, considering his serious
condition, the doctors referred him to the Trauma Centre,
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Lucknow. While undergoing treatment at the Trauma Centre,
Dharmendra Singh succumbed to his injuries on 10.06.2012.
6. Thereafter, on 11.06.2012, at around 07:35 A.M., on the basis of
the written report, an FIR. No. 77 of 2012 was registered against
all the accused-appellants under Sections 302, 504 and 506 of IPC
The investigation was entrusted to S.I. Deena Nath Mishra, who
proceeded to the house of the complainant on the same day and
conducted the inquest proceedings. On 27.06.2012, A3 was taken
into police custody, and he was thereafter taken to Village Khasde
for the recovery of the pistol allegedly used in the commission of
the offence. Pursuant to the recovery, F.I.R. No. 93 of 2012 was
registered against A3 under Section 3/25 of the Arms Act. Upon
completion of the investigation, the Investigating Officer
submitted Charge-sheet No. 112/2012, in Case Crime No.
182/2012, against A1, A2 and A3 under Sections 302, 504 and
506 IPC, and Charge-sheet No. 99 of 2012, in Case Crime No.216
of 2012 against A3 under Section 3/25 of the Arms Act.
Thereafter, the Court of Session framed charges against all the
accused-appellants under Sections 302, 504 and 506 IPC in Case
Crime No. 182 of 2012, and against A-3 under Section 3/25 of the
Arms Act in Case Crime No. 216 of 2012. All the accused denied
the charges, pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
7. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined Jag Jeevan
Singh (PW-1), Shiv Prasad Singh (PW-2), Rahul Singh (PW-3),
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Vipin Bihari Singh (PW-4), Dr. R.K. Gautam (PW-5) and Deena
Nath Mishra (PW-6), Sunil Kumar Yadav (PW-7), Shiva Pujan
Yadav(PW-8), Neeraj Singh (PW-9), Jai Prakash Singh (PW-10)
Dr. A.K. Yadav (PW-11), and Dr. Mohd. Shahjad Naiyar (PW-12).
In support of its defence, the accused-appellants examined Anil
Kumar Singh (DW-1), Fateh Bahadur Singh (DW-2) and Suresh
Kumar Chaurasia (DW-3).
8. The following exhibits were produced and proved before the Trial
Court:
Ext. No. Particulars
Ext. Ka-1 Written Report
Ext. Ka-2 FIR of Case Crime No. 182 of 2012
Ext. Ka-3 FIR of Case Crime No. 216 of 2012
Ext. Ka-4 Post-Mortem Report
Ext. Ka-5 Charge-Sheet in Case Crime No. 182 of 2012
Ext. Ka-6 Site-plan of the place of recovery
Ext. Ka-7 Site-plan of the place of occurrence
Ext. Ka-8 to 10 Letters addressed to the CHC
Ext. Ka-11 Recovery memo of 7.65 mm pistol
Ext. Ka-12 Photocopy of GD in Case Crime No. 182 of 2012
Ext. Ka-13 Carbon copy of FIR in Case Crime No. 216 of 2012
Ext. Ka-14 Carbon copy of GD in Case Crime No. 216 of 2012
Ext. Ka-15 Charge-Sheet in Case Crime No. 216 of 2012
Ext. Ka-16 Application by Rahul Singh, PW-3, for medical
examination
Ext. Ka-17 Operation Note of deceased
9. The statements of all the accused-appellants were recorded under
Section 313 Cr.P.C., wherein they denied the incriminating
circumstances appearing against them in the prosecution evidence
and pleaded false implication. A1,A2 and A3 stated that PW-7 had
deposed falsely against them due to enmity and that PW-11, in
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collusion with the injured witness, had fabricated false papers;
they further stated that the present case had been instituted due to
village party-bandi and enmity. They further accepted the election
rivalry between the accused and victim party. They further stated
that on the date of the incident A1 was at his maternal home in
village Manapur, whereas A2 and A3 were at their shops in Hata
Bazaar, which is around two and a half kilometers away from the
village. Additionally, A3, in his statement under Section 313
Cr.P.C. recorded in S.T. No. 323 of 2012, stated that PW-1 had
deposed falsely and his name had been wrongly introduced in the
present case, the case had been registered on wrong facts and the
charge-sheet had been wrongly submitted; he further stated that
PW-9 and PW-10 had deposed against him due to enmity and that
the present case was the result of enmity.
Submissions made by learned counsel for the accused-appellants:
10.Learned counsel for the accused-appellants submitted that the
prosecution had failed to establish the guilt of the appellants
beyond reasonable doubt and that the impugned judgment of
conviction is unsustainable in law. It was contended that the
prosecution case arose out of admitted village and political enmity
between the parties, particularly in relation to the Gram Pradhan
election and the alleged cancellation of the ration quota. Such
hostility, it was argued, furnished a possibility of false implication
and necessitated careful scrutiny of the prosecution evidence. It
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was further submitted that the circumstances surrounding the
registration of the FIR, when considered alongside the prior police
communication regarding the occurrence and the presence of a
substantial police force at the complainant’s house after the dead
body was brought back to the village, raised questions regarding
the sequence in which the prosecution version was formally
recorded. Learned counsel further assailed the reliability of the
alleged eyewitness account by drawing attention to the material
omissions in the earliest version of the occurrence, the
discrepancies concerning the weapons allegedly used and the
specific acts attributed to the accused, and the inconsistency
between the ocular account and the medical evidence regarding
the alleged additional firearm injury. It was submitted that the
medical evidence established a fatal firearm injury to the
deceased’ s head, but did not corroborate the entire sequence of
firing narrated by the prosecution witnesses. The testimony of
Rahul Singh, PW-3, projected as an injured eyewitness, was also
challenged. Learned counsel submitted that his presence and
alleged injuries at the place of occurrence were not satisfactorily
established by contemporaneous evidence, his statement was
recorded after a considerable delay, and the circumstances
surrounding his subsequent medical examination did not reliably
connect the injuries with the alleged occurrence. It was further
contended that the investigating agency had failed to secure
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material evidence that could have independently corroborated the
prosecution version, including relevant bloodstained articles and a
reliable forensic link between the alleged weapon and the bullet
recovered from the deceased.
Submissions made by learned A.G.A and learned counsel for
Complainant:
11. Per contra , learned AGA opposed the appeals and supported the
impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence. It was
submitted that the prosecution had established the death of
Dharmendra Singh as a result of a firearm injury and that the
medical evidence substantially supported the prosecution case
regarding the fatal injury. It was further contended that the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses, particularly the account of
the occurrence given by the eyewitnesses, established the
participation of the appellants in the assault upon the deceased. It
was submitted that the presence of prior political rivalry between
the parties could not, by itself, justify an inference of false
implication; rather, the motive attributed to the accused provided
an explanation for the occurrence. The mere fact that the witnesses
were related to the deceased or belonged to the same village
would not render their testimony unreliable in the absence of
sufficient grounds to reject their evidence. It was further submitted
that discrepancies in the testimony of witnesses and lapses in the
investigation, unless shown to affect the substratum of the
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prosecution case, could not be made the basis for discarding
otherwise credible evidence. It was urged that the medical
evidence was required to be considered alongside the ocular
testimony and that every variation between the two would not
necessarily discredit the prosecution version. The absence of a
forensic report or other corroborative material, if any, was also not
sufficient by itself to demolish the prosecution case where the oral
evidence otherwise established the guilt of the accused.
Oral Testimonies:
In order to appreciate the issues arising in the present appeal, it is
appropriate to examine, in brief, the oral evidence adduced by the
prosecution.
12. PW-1, Jag Jeevan Singh, the complainant and real brother of the
deceased, deposed that the occurrence arose against the
background of political rivalry relating to the Gram Pradhan
election and the cancellation of the village ration quota. He further
deposed that on 09.06.2012, at around 8:00 P.M., he and his
younger brother, Dharmendra Singh, went to the house of Raj
Bahadur Singh to complain about the conduct of Anil Singh, who
along with Ritesh Singh had allegedly threatened their brother
Bhanu Pratap Singh, near Chana Talab at Parkatpur. When Anil
Singh ran towards his old house and that of A1 after being
reprimanded, Dharmendra Singh chased him. He further deposed
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the accused-appellants, along with Ritesh Singh, then arrived
armed with country-made pistols and lathis-dandas . A1 allegedly
exhorted the others by referring to the loss of the Pradhan election
and cancellation of the ration quota. A2 and Ritesh Singh
assaulted the deceased, while A1 and Ritesh Singh allegedly
assaulted Rahul Singh, PW-3, when he intervened. After the
deceased fell, A3 allegedly fired at his head, followed by further
firing attributed to A1 and A3, one shot grazing the right side of
the deceased’s waist. He further deposed that the occurrence was
witnessed by him, Shiv Prasad Singh, PW-2, and Sandeep Singh
in the light of an inverter bulb and a torch. The injured deceased
was first brought to his house and thereafter taken to the District
Hospital, Sultanpur, from where he was referred to the Trauma
Centre, Lucknow, where he died on 10.06.2012. After receiving
the dead body and returning to the village at around 4:00 A.M. on
11.06.2012, he went to Police Station Lambhua and lodged the
written report, which was proved as Exhibit Ka-1.
13. During cross-examination , he admitted that the deceased had
been residing at Sultanpur since 2009 and that his own house was
approximately one kilometre from the place of occurrence. He
deposed that the deceased was transported initially on a
motorcycle and thereafter in a Maruti car and a Bolero vehicle,
and that blood had dripped along the route and accumulated at the
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place of occurrence and the doorway of his house. He further
deposed that he had travelled to Sultanpur and Lucknow in the
same bloodstained clothes but changed them after returning to the
village before lodging the report. He admitted that more than 50
police personnel were present when he returned with the dead
body, but no police officer spoke to him about the occurrence at
that time, and the Investigating Officer did not record his
statement that day. He also admitted that the FIR did not contain
the details of the alleged assault upon PW-3 or the source of light
at the place of occurrence. He further deposed that he could not
specify the number of shots fired by each accused and had not
seen any accused fire a second shot after firing once, though he
subsequently deposed that A3 fired at the deceased after he had
fallen, followed by further firing attributed to A1 and Ritesh
Singh. He denied the defence suggestions that he was not present
at the occurrence and that the appellants had been falsely
implicated on account of enmity.
14. PW-2, Shiv Prasad Singh, deposed that he knew the
complainant, and all the accused. He further deposed that on
09.06.2012, at around 7:00 P.M., he was present at the house of
Raj Bahadur Singh, where PW-1 and the deceased arrived to
complain about Anil Singh. After Raj Bahadur Singh reprimanded
Anil Singh, the latter allegedly ran away towards his old house
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and the house of A1. The deceased chased him, whereupon the
accused persons arrived from the opposite direction, armed with
country-made pistols and lathi-dandas . He further deposed that
A1 and Ritesh Singh assaulted the deceased with lathi-dandas ,
and when Rahul Singh, PW-3, intervened, he sustained a head
injury. After the deceased fell when his foot became entangled in a
drain, A3 allegedly fired at his head from close range. He further
attributed another round of firing at the deceased to A1 and A3,
stating that the bullet pierced his stomach and exited from the
other side. He claimed to have witnessed the occurrence in the
light of a bulb installed at the temple of A1 and deposed that the
accused fled while firing and threatening those present. He further
deposed that the deceased was initially taken to PW-1’s residence
and thereafter transported to the District Hospital, Sultanpur, from
where he was referred to Lucknow Medical College and died
during treatment on 10.06.2012.
15. During cross-examination he admitted that he is related to the
deceased as a cousin and had supported and voted for Sunita
Singh, wife of the deceased, in the Gram Pradhan election. He
further deposed that he had reached the house of Raj Bahadur
Singh between 7:00 and 7:45 P.M. and that PW-1 and the deceased
arrived 10– 15 minutes later. He admitted that he had not
personally witnessed the earlier incident involving Bhanu Pratap
Singh and had learnt about it from others. He further deposed that,
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to his knowledge, the first information at the police station was
given on 11.06.2012 at around 7:00 A.M., and that he could not
say whether anyone had informed the police through Dial 100. He
maintained that all four accused fired at the deceased from a
distance of approximately two to three feet, but deposed that,
owing to darkness, he could not discern the build or barrel
thickness of the country-made pistols. He also acknowledged that
certain details regarding the assault by lathi-dandas, which he
claimed to have disclosed to the Investigating Officer, had not
been recorded in his statement under Section 161 CrPC. He denied
the suggestions that he had not witnessed the occurrence, that
Rahul Singh was not present at the spot, or that he was falsely
deposing on account of his relationship with the complainant.
16. PW-3, Rahul Singh , deposed that the deceased was his uncle and
PW-1 is his elder paternal uncle. He claimed to be an eyewitness
to the occurrence dated 09.06.2012 at around 8:00 P.M. and
deposed that he had heard the accused abusing and threatening to
kill the deceased. He further deposed that the wife of the deceased,
Sunita Singh, had contested the election for the post of Gram
Pradhan against the wife of A1 and had won. He attributed the
accused’ s alleged grudge against the deceased to the election
rivalry and an inquiry into complaints regarding the ration quota
of the Gram Sabha, which was in the name of Kaushalendra
Singh, a member of A1’s family. He further deposed that after his
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father, Bhanu Pratap Singh, informed the family about an incident
involving Anil Singh and Ritesh Singh, he, PW-1 and the
deceased went to the house of Raj Bahadur Singh to complain.
Upon Raj Bahadur Singh reprimanding Anil Singh, the latter
allegedly proceeded towards A1’ s house, followed by the
deceased and PW-3, who was carrying a torch. He stated that
bulbs were lit at Raj Bahadur Singh’s house and the temple. When
they reached near the eastern drain of Anil’s house, all the accused
allegedly appeared armed with lathis and country-made pistols
and assaulted the deceased with lathis. He further deposed that A3
fired at the deceased, striking him on the head and causing him to
fall, whereafter A1 fired another shot that struck the deceased in
the stomach and exited after grazing it. He further claimed that he
sustained injuries to his chest, head, back and stomach during the
assault, when he was trying to intervene. The deceased was taken
to the District Hospital, Sultanpur, and thereafter referred to the
Trauma Centre, Lucknow, where he died during treatment on
10.06.2012 at around 4:00 P.M. He further deposed that his
clothes had become bloodstained during the assault and while
lifting the deceased, and that he had handed them over to the
Police Inspector, who did not take them into custody. He
subsequently produced a pant with belt and a vest before the Court
and identified them as the clothes worn by him at the time of the
occurrence.
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17. During cross-examination, he admitted that he had not witnessed
the alleged incident involving his father and had learnt about it
subsequently. He further deposed that he did not know who had
complained about the ration quota and had only heard from
villagers that a complaint had been made. As regards his arrival at
the place of occurrence, he deposed that he reached Raj Bahadur
Singh’s house at around 7:00 P.M., five to ten minutes after PW-1
and the deceased had left on a Bullet motorcycle, and also
deposed that he had followed them along with Ritesh, his paternal
aunt’s son. He further deposed that he alone was carrying a torch
and that the others were empty-handed. He further deposed that all
the accused assaulted him with lathis, inflicting three or four
blows before he fell and another three or four blows thereafter. He
further deposed that the deceased was brought to PW-1’s house
and that the motorcycle used to transport the deceased bore
bloodstains on its seat, leg-guard and silencer. He further deposed
that he did not accompany the deceased to the District Hospital in
the same vehicle but followed in another vehicle and reached there
at around 10:30 P.M. with family members. He further deposed
that his injuries were examined at the District Hospital, Sultanpur,
and a bandage was applied, he subsequently obtained a second
medical examination on 15.06.2012, stating that he had sought it
five to six days after the occurrence because his pain had
increased. He denied the suggestion that he had procured a false
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medical examination in collusion with the doctor to portray
himself as an injured witness. He was unable to state the
dimensions of the weapons allegedly used and could not specify
where the inverters supplying electricity to the house and temple
were located. He also deposed that the Police Inspector had not
visited the place of occurrence in his presence and that he returned
to the spot on 12.06.2012 with his cousin Ritesh. He denied the
suggestions that the occurrence had not taken place in the manner
alleged, that he was absent from the place of occurrence, or that he
had falsely deposed after being tutored.
18. PW-4, Vipin Bihari Singh , Constable, Police Station Ashiyana,
District Lucknow, deposed that during the period from 2011 to
July, 2012, he was posted as Head Constable at Police Station
Lambhua. He further deposed that upon receiving information
regarding the incident on 11.06.2012, through the complaint of
PW-1, he registered a Case Crime No. 182 of 2012 under Sections
302,504 and 506 IPC against A1 and four other accused. The said
FIR was proved by him and marked as Ext. Ka-2. He further
deposed that on 27.06.2012 at around 15:50 hours, he registered a
Case Crime No. 216 of 2012 under Section 3/25 of the Arms Act
in S.T. No. 323 of 2012, State v. Satish Singh @ Son u. The said
FIR was proved and marked as Ext. Ka-3.
19. During cross-examination , he admitted that the FIR in Case
Crime No. 182 of 2012 was registered three days after the
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occurrence and that, prior thereto, he had not registered any
information or complaint concerning the incident. He further
deposed that the check copy of the FIR was sent to the office of
the Circle Officer either on the same day or the following day. He
denied the suggestions that the incident had been caused by
unknown persons, that the report had been lodged falsely in
collusion with the Station House Officer, or that it had been ante-
timed.
20. PW-5, Dr. R.K. Gautam , Senior Consultant, Shyama Prasad
Mukherjee Civil Hospital, Lucknow, deposed that on 10.06.2012
he was posted on the same post and the dead body of Dharmendra
Singh was brought and identified by constable no. 1641, Police
Station Lucknow. He estimated the age of the deceased to be
around 40 years and deposed that he passed away on 10.06.2012
at around 4:05 P.M. in KGMU Hospital,Lucknow. He further
deposed that the post-mortem staining was present on the back
side of the deceased and rigour mortis had started to begin in
eyelid and muscle of the neck. He further deposed that hospital
bandage was present and that the trauma for insertion of breathing
tube was present in the front of the neck. The following pre-
mortem injuries were found on the body of the deceased:
Injury No. 1: Fire-arm entry wound measuring 2cm X 2cm on the
right side of the head, 10 cm above left ear with torn edges and
sunken inwards. Deep upto brain. Blackness was present all around
the wound. Upon opening, the brain and its overlying membrane
were found torn and blood was present inside the brain. Gelfom
tracing was found inside the brain.
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Injury No. 2: Stitched wound measuring 28 cm, semi-circular in
shape with 28 stich, on the right side of the head, 2 cm above the
right ear.
Injury No. 3 : Stitched wound measuring 12 cm with 12 stitches
were found on the right side of the stomach, 5 cm outside the
umbilicus.
Injury No. 4: An operative mark was found on the right side of the
skull, and the excised portion of the skull bone was preserved in the
abdominal cavity.
Injury No. 5: Contusion mark measuring 3 cm X 2 cm, on the inner
side of the left arm in the middle.
Injury No. 6: Scratched contusion mark measuring 3 cm X 2 cm, on
the left palm.
Injury No. 7: Scratched contusion mark measuring 3 cm X 2 cm, on
the inside of the right ankle.
On internal examination, skull and membranes were found to be
ruptured. The brain membranes were congested and blood was
found inside the brain. Both lungs and their outer membranes were
congested. The liver, both kidneys and spleen were also
congested, 150ml of fluid was found in the stomach. In his
opinion, deceased died from a fire arm injury to the head and the
resulting injuries and coma. He deposed that the post-mortem was
done by him on 10.06.2012 at around 6:00 P.M.. He verified and
proved the post-mortem report which was marked as Ext. Ka-4.
21. During cross-examination , he deposed that the initial medical
examiner can tell how old the injuries on the deceased’ s body
were. He further deposed that apart from the firearm injury on the
head of the deceased, the stitched wounds found are likely to have
occurred during the course of the operation. He further deposed
that he did not find any marks of firearm injury like blackening on
injury no. 3. The stitch was made to protect the skull bone inside
the right side of the stomach. In this entire post mortem, only one
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injury i.e. injury no. 1 was to due to fire arm and no other injury
was due to fire arms. During the post-mortem, no pellets of any
kind were found on the body of the deceased. He further deposed
that injuries no. 5, 6, 7 could have been caused by falling and the
shape of all these injuries is almost round.
22. PW-6, Dinanath Mishra , SHO, Police Station Hariyanwa,
District Hardoi, deposed that from May to December 2012, he was
posted as Station House Officer at Police Station Lambhua,
District Sultanpur. He further deposed that Case Crime No. 182 of
2012 under Sections 302, 504 and 506 IPC was registered on
11.06.2012 in his absence and that the papers relating to the
investigation were handed over to him at village Khasde by
Constable Deepak Singh Yadav. He proved the relevant case-diary
papers and deposed regarding the investigation, including
recording the statements of the complainant and witnesses,
preparation of the site plan, seizure of bloodstained and plain earth
and empty cartridges, arrest and search proceedings, collection of
post-mortem and medical documents, and subsequent steps
towards forensic examination and filing of the charge-sheet. He
further deposed that A3 surrendered before the Court and, during
his statement recorded after obtaining permission, disclosed that
he had fired at the deceased with a 7.65 mm pistol concealed in a
bamboo grove. He further deposed that pursuant to the disclosure,
A3 was taken on police remand and, in the presence of public
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witnesses, Neeraj Singh and Vijay Prakash Singh, allegedly
pointed out the place of concealment and produced a wrapped
pistol from the bamboo grove. The weapon was seized, sealed and
deposited at the police station, and a separate case, Case Crime
No. 216 of 2012 under Section 3/25 of the Arms Act, was
registered. He proved the charge-sheet as Exhibit Ka-5, the site
plan of the place of recovery as Exhibit Ka-6, the site plan of the
place of occurrence as Exhibit Ka-7, the letters addressed to the
CHC as Exhibits Ka-8 and Ka-9, and the recovery memo as
Exhibit Ka-11.
23. During cross-examination , he proved the carbon copy of the
general diary entry, marked as Exhibit Ka-12. He admitted that on
09.06.2012 at around 8:05 P.M., he had received telephonic
information from local residents regarding a fight between the
deceased and A1 at village Khasde and a firing incident. He
communicated the information to the police station, where an
entry was made in the general diary. He could not identify the
particular villager who had conveyed the information and deposed
that several villagers had called through mobile phones. He further
deposed that he reached the village approximately one hour after
receiving the information and that senior police personnel arrived
thereafter. He further deposed that the family members of the
deceased were not present at the place of occurrence when he
reached there, though some relatives were present at the
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deceased’ s house. He further deposed that he did not find the
deceased at the place of occurrence and learnt from the deceased’s
house that he had been taken to the District Hospital, Sultanpur,
and subsequently referred to Lucknow. He neither visited the
District Hospital to meet the deceased nor obtained any injury-
related documents. He admitted that, before registration of the
case on 11.06.2012, neither he nor anyone at the police station had
received a written complaint and that investigation commenced
after PW-1 lodged the report. He further admitted that, although
the witnesses claimed to have seen the occurrence in the light of a
torch and an inverter bulb, he had prepared no memo regarding
the sources of light. He also did not prepare any memo regarding
the vehicles used to transport the deceased or inspect them for
bloodstains. He did not receive the deceased’s clothes, as the post-
mortem doctor had not kept them in safe custody. He
acknowledged that the site plan did not specifically indicate the
positions of the accused;, the place of assault was marked as point
“ B” , and the alleged place where PW-3 was assaulted was not
separately shown. He did not find any trail of blood between the
place of occurrence and the house of the deceased. He was
unaware of a drain to the west of Raj Bahadur Singh’ s house,
which was not depicted in the site plan. He further deposed that
the site plan was prepared on the pointing out of PW-1 and PW-2,
but the signatures of those witnesses did not appear on it. He
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further deposed that PW-3’s presence at the place of occurrence
was not mentioned in the FIR or in PW-1’ s statement under
Section 161 CrPC. He recorded PW-3’s statement on 06.07.2012,
approximately 25– 26 days after registration of the FIR, and
deposed that he learnt on that date that PW-3 claimed to have
sustained injuries during the assault. He further admitted that
PW-3 had not handed over his clothes to him and, consequently,
no recovery memo was prepared. He had neither recorded the
statement of the doctor who initially treated PW-3 nor included
that doctor’s name in the list of witnesses. He further deposed that
Constable Prem Prakash Pandey had brought the bullet removed
from the deceased’ s body from Gandhi Memorial Hospital and
had been sent to obtain the bullet, X-ray plates and medical
reports. He further deposed that written letter issued to the
constable was not included in the case diary, and he had not
recorded the statement of any doctor from Gandhi Memorial
Hospital or ascertained the identity of the doctor who had operated
upon the deceased and removed the bullet. He further deposed that
the bullet removed from the deceased’ s body was sent to the
Forensic Science Laboratory along with the recovered pistol and
two empty cartridges. He further deposed that since no
fingerprints were found on the weapon, it was not sent for
fingerprint examination. He further deposed that the magazine of
the recovered pistol contained no bullet. He further deposed that
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the bloodstained and plain earth samples and the two empty
cartridges recovered during the investigation were kept in the
police station’s evidence room before being sent to the Forensic
Science Laboratory. He further deposed that PW-1 had not told
him that Anil Singh, while murmuring, ran towards A1’s house,
that the accused used lathi-dandas, or that two shots were fired,
one hitting the deceased’ s head and the other his stomach. He
further deposed that PW-1 had instead stated that the accused fired
at the deceased, causing him to become panicked and fall into the
drain, whereafter A3 fired at him. He further deposed that PW-1
had also not specifically mentioned a torch and an inverter bulb as
sources of light, had not shown him the inverter bulb or a torch,
and had not disclosed the injuries allegedly sustained by PW-3. He
further deposed that PW-1 had not identified specific positions of
the individual accused, and the site plan consequently marked
only point “ B” as the place of assault. He further deposed that
PW-2 had said that Anil Singh ran towards his old house, but had
not stated that Anil ran towards A1’s house. He further deposed
that PW-2 had also not stated that Ritesh Singh and A2 assaulted
the deceased with lathi-dandas or that PW-3 intervened. He denied
the suggestions that the investigation was illegal, that no recovery
had been made, that the recovery memo was forged, that the FIR
had been ante-timed, or that false evidence had been collected and
an incorrect charge-sheet filed.
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24. PW-7 Sunil Kumar Yadav , Constable, Police Station Bazar
Shukul, District Amethi, deposed that on 27.06.2012, while posted
as Constable at Police Station Lambhua, District Sultanpur, he
accompanied the then Station House Officer, Dinanath Mishra,
pursuant to an order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sultanpur, to
take A3 from District Jail, Sultanpur, into police custody for
recovery of the alleged pistol used in the occurrence. He further
deposed that they departed at around 10:45 A.M. and, near the
Primary Pathshala turn in village Khasre, met the public
witnesses, Neeraj Singh and Jai Prakash Singh, who joined them
in the government jeep along with other police personnel. He
further deposed that near the house of village watchman Kanhai
Yadav, A3 signalled the vehicle to stop and led the police party
and witnesses along a pathway to Lohra Bagh. He allegedly took
them to bamboo trees in the middle of the grove, removed the
bamboo leaves and produced a polythene-wrapped parcel
containing a 7.65 mm pistol, stating that it was the weapon used to
kill Dharmendra Singh on 09.06.2012. He further deposed that the
SHO dictated the recovery memo, which Constable Ram Kishor
wrote and the pistol was sealed and stamped, and the witnesses
signed the memo. He further deposed that when the SHO handed a
copy of the recovery memo to A3, the latter read and tore it. Upon
their return to the police station, the SHO got the case registered,
and his statement was recorded by the Investigating Officer.
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25. During cross-examination he admitted that the General Diary
relating to the alleged recovery was not available to him, that he
did not remember its entry number, and that a copy of the entry
was not on record. He was unable to state the distance between
Lohra Bagh and the place of occurrence. He further deposed that
A3 himself took out the pistol along with the polythene and
handed it to the SHO, and that the recovery memo had been
written by Constable Ram Kishor Mishra at the SHO’s dictation.
He admitted that the torn copy of the recovery memo was neither
taken into possession nor was the fact of its being torn recorded in
the General Diary upon their return to the police station. He
denied the suggestions that the recovery was fabricated, that the
pistol had been planted by the police, or that the recovery had
been effected under pressure from the complainant.
26. PW-8 Shiv Pujan Yadav, deposed that in 2012, he was posted as
Sub-Inspector at Police Station Lambhua, District Sultanpur, and
that the investigation of Case Crime No. 216 of 2012 under
Section 3/25 of the Arms Act and Case Crime No. 182 of 2012
under Sections 302, 504 and 506 IPC was entrusted to him. He
further deposed that on 27.06.2012, he received copies of the FIR
and General Diary and recorded the statement of A3. On
28.06.2012, he recorded the statements of PW-6 and other police
personnel, as well as public witnesses Neeraj Singh and Jai
Prakash Singh, and prepared the site plan. He further deposed that
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he recorded the statements of Dinesh Prajapati and Mahendra
Yadav near the place of occurrence. On 16.07.2012, he submitted
the alleged confession of A3 regarding recovery of the weapon,
along with the case diary, to the office of the District Magistrate
for sanction, however, sanction could not be obtained as the
District Magistrate was on leave. He proved the site plan as
Exhibit Ka-12, the carbon copies of the FIR and General Diary as
Exhibits Ka-13 and Ka-14, respectively, and the charge-sheet as
Exhibit Ka-15.
27. During cross-examination , he deposed that the proceedings
conducted by him were submitted through the SHO, Dinanath
Mishra. He admitted that neither the General Diary nor the Case
Diary contained any entry regarding the movement of the
evidence into or out of the police station. He denied the suggestion
that, being subordinate to the SHO, he had conducted the
investigation unlawfully under his pressure, merely performed it
as a paper exercise, or submitted a false and fabricated charge-
sheet.
28. PW-9 Neeraj Singh, deposed that on 27.06.2012, he and Jai
Prakash Singh had gone towards the Primary School, by chance,
for a stroll between 12:00 noon and 1:00 P.M., when a police jeep
from Police Station Lambhua arrived and stopped near them. He
further deposed that the police inspector enquired about their
names and addresses and informed them that accused A3 had been
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brought along with them, and asked them to accompany him.He
further deposed that after proceeding for some distance, the jeep
was stopped at the instance of A3 near the village, whereafter they
proceeded on foot along with A3 towards Lohra Bagh. He further
deposed that upon reaching near the bamboo trees in the Bagh, A3
removed the bamboo leaves and took out a polythene-wrapped
parcel, from which a pistol was recovered. He further deposed that
A3 then confirmed that the said pistol was the one with which
they had murdered Dharmendra Singh. He further deposed that he
did not remember the make or markings of the pistol. He further
deposed that the SHO got the recovered pistol sealed and stamped
and obtained his signature on the recovery memo.
29. During cross-examination , he deposed that he had been engaged
in property dealing in Lucknow since 2011 and was unaware that
the police would arrive in the village on 27.06.2012. He admitted
that he and the deceased belonged to the same lineage and that,
prior to the alleged recovery, he had neither seen a pistol nor
closely observed one. He further deposed that the SHO had
informed him that the recovered article was a pistol, but had not
opened it in his presence, consequently, he could not say whether
it contained a bullet. He further deposed that his statement was
recorded at the place where the SHO obtained his signature. He
further deposed that the complainant was not present at the time of
the alleged recovery and that the police had not visited the
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complainant’s house. According to him, when the police officer
met them, only he and Jai Prakash Singh were present, and no
other person was there.
30. PW-10, Jai Prakash Singh, deposed that on 27.06.2012, between
12:00 noon and 1:00 P.M., he and Neeraj Singh had gone for a
walk and met the police personnel from Police Station Lambhua
near the turn by the Primary School, Khakhade. He futher deposed
that the police informed them that a weapon was to be recovered
at the instance of A3 and took them along in the police jeep. Upon
reaching near the house of Kanhai Yadav, the village watchman,
the jeep stopped, and A3 led them towards Lohra Bagh. On
reaching the bamboo trees, A3 allegedly removed the leaves and
produced a polythene-wrapped article. He further deposed that,
when the Inspector opened the parcel, a pistol was recovered and
A3 stated that it was the pistol used to murder Dharmendra Singh
on 09.06.2012. He stated that the Inspector prepared the recovery
memo at the spot and obtained his signature thereon.
31. During cross-examination, he deposed that he did not know how
many persons were present in the jeep, although he subsequently
estimated that there were three to four persons. He reiterated that
he had gone for a walk with Neeraj Singh and found the police
jeep near the school turn. He further deposed that neither he nor
any member of his family possessed a firearm licence. He further
deposed that the Inspector had neither prepared the site plan in his
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presence nor obtained his signature on it. He also admitted that he
had cordial relations with the deceased and his family. He denied
the suggestion that, owing to his relationship with the deceased, he
had gone to the police station and signed the recovery memo
there.
32. PW-11 Dr. A.K. Yadav , Medical Officer, Cardiologist, Hon’ble
High Court Dispensary, Lucknow, deposed that on 15.06.2012 he
was posted as cardiologist at District Hospital Sultanpur and on
the said date he was on duty as EMO and at around 1:30 P.M.,
Rahul Singh himself came to the district hospital. He further
deposed that he did his examination and found the following
injuries:
Injury No. 1: A 5 cm long stitched wound, 9 cm above the left ear.
Injury No. 2: Abrasion with dried scab measuring 10 cm X 2 cm,
below the collar bone on the right side.
Injury No.3: Abrasion with dried scab measuring 2 cm X 2 cm over
back at level of L4 vertebra.
Injury No. 4: Complain of pain of left thigh, however, no visible
signs of injury were found.
He further deposed that in his opinion all these injuries must have
occurred four to five days ago and all were minor in nature. He
further deposed that injury no. 2, 3 and 4 could have been caused
by blunt force and the type of the object used to inflict injury no. 1
could not be determined. He proved and verified the injury report,
which was marked as Ext. Ka-16.
33. During cross-examination , he deposed that the Inspector had not
recorded his statement. He further deposed that the medical
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examination of Rahul Singh was conducted at his personal request
and not on the orders of any authority. He further deposed that the
application submitted by Rahul did not specify the date on which,
or the person by whom, he had sustained the injuries, how he had
sustained them, the nature of the assault that had resulted in the
injuries, or whether any FIR had been lodged. He further deposed
that he had not informed any police officer either before or after
the medical examination of the injured person, as the injuries were
not serious in nature. He further deposed that the depth of any
injury had not been mentioned in the injury report and that injuries
nos. 2 and 3 were covered with scabs. He further deposed that,
according to medical jurisprudence, an injury sustained by a
person remains fresh and reddish for around 24 hours, after which
it gradually turns brownish. He further deposed that it takes
around four to seven days for an injury to turn completely
brownish. He further deposed that he had not mentioned in the
injury report whether the injuries were brownish or not. He further
deposed that the injuries sustained by the injured were not one
week old but were around five to six days old. He further deposed
that the exact date of an injury cannot be determined on the basis
of the injuries and that it can only be estimated. He further
deposed that, according to Rahul Singh's application, he had
walked alone to the hospital emergency room for medical
attention and that it was possible that the injuries sustained by him
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had been caused by a fall. He denied the suggestion that no
injuries had been caused to Rahul Singh and that, under his
influence, he had exaggerated the injuries.
34. PW- 12, Dr. Mohammad Shahzad Nayyar , deposed that on
10.06.2012 he was posted as neurosurgeon at KGMU/ CSMMU
Hospital Lucknow and on the said he operated on the head of
Dharmendra Singh and found the following findings during
operation:
Finding No. 1: An entry wound was found on the left side of the
brain, in the middle region of the left cerebral cortex, just behind the
coronal suture, from which brain matter was protruding. No exit
wound was found.
Finding No. 2 : The right parietal bone was fractured.
Finding No. 3: The right temporal bone was fractured, and brain
matter was protruding from the fractured area.
Finding No. 4: A metallic foreign body, identified as a bullet, was
found near the right temporal region.
He further deposed that the fracture on the head was due to
firearm injury. He further deposed that the surgery on Dhamendra
Singh were performed by his team, including him. He verifred and
proved the operation note, which was marked as Ext. Ka-17.
35. During cross-examination , he deposed that the operation
commenced at 8:30 A.M. and continued until 12:30 P.M. He
further deposed that the medical report did not mention the date
and time of admission of the patient. He further deposed that
Dharmendra was alive before the operation. He further deposed
that during the operation, he found a bullet lodged in the right
temporal region. He further deposed that the bullet had entered
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through the vertex of the head and was lodged beneath the skin
near the right temporal bone, and that there was no exit wound on
the skin. He further deposed that the patient died only after 12:30
P.M. When asked whether the patient would have survived had the
operation been successful, he replied that the same could not be
stated with certainty.
36. DW-1, Anil Kumar Singh , deposed that he and his family had
supported Sunita Singh in the Gram Pradhan election and that his
family had longstanding enmity with the family of A1 over a land
dispute dating back to the time of his grandfather. He further
deposed that, on 09.06.2012, at around 2:00– 3:00 P.M., an
exchange of words took place between him and Bhanu Pratap
Singh in front of the latter’s house, which angered Bhanu Pratap
Singh. He further deposed that at around 8:00–9:00 P.M. on the
same day, the deceased arrived at his door on a motorcycle
accompanied by two unknown persons and began abusing and
threatening him. He claimed that, when he protested, the deceased
and his companions assaulted him and fled towards the west. He
further deposed that, while pursuing him, the deceased exhorted
his companions to shoot him, whereupon one of the unknown
persons fired a shot from behind which struck the deceased
instead. Apprehending danger, he continued running and returned
home thereafter. He further deposed that his grandfather, Raj
Bahadur Singh, was sitting at the door at the relevant time, that his
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house had no electricity connection, and that a lantern was burning
at the door.
37. During cross-examination , he admitted that he had come to
depose at the instance of A1. He further deposed that the wife of
A1 had contested the Gram Pradhan election but secured third
position, while Sunita Singh had won. He further deposed that
Kaushalendra Singh, A1’ s father, had been running the ration
quota shop for a considerable period and that the quota had been
cancelled during Sunita Singh’s tenure, though he was unaware of
the circumstances or the persons who had sought its cancellation.
He further deposed that the altercation with Bhanu Pratap Singh
had never been resolved and that Bhanu Pratap Singh was
aggrieved on account of their quarrel. He further deposed that,
when the shot was fired at the deceased, he was running away,
was unarmed and carried neither a torch nor a lathi-danda. He
described the area as very dark at around 8:00– 9:00 P.M. He
further deposed that he had made no statement or affidavit before
any competent authority during the period between the occurrence
in 2012 and his deposition in Court in 2017. He reiterated that he
had deposed at the instance of the accused but maintained that his
testimony was truthful. He further admitted that the deceased,
accompanied by two persons, had come to his door at around 8:00
P.M. and that only he and his grandfather were present there,
neither Shiv Prasad Singh nor Sandeep Singh was present. He
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further deposed that a conversation had taken place between the
deceased and his grandfather, though the deceased had not come
to lodge a complaint. He claimed that the deceased and his
companions had assaulted him, but admitted that he had neither
undergone a medical examination nor lodged any report
concerning the alleged assault. He denied that he had run towards
the temple east of his house with the deceased pursuing him or
that blood had fallen on the chakroad east of his house. He
acknowledged that lights were ordinarily lit in houses and at the
temple in the evening, and that a lamp was burning before the
temple idol on the night of the occurrence, but expressed
ignorance as to whether a light had been switched on in the house
of A1 situated behind his own. He denied the suggestions that he
and Ritesh Singh had jostled Bhanu Pratap Singh near the pond,
that he had supported Soni Singh in the election, or that he had
conspired with the accused to murder the deceased near the
chakroad. He also denied that he was a tutored witness deposing
falsely to extend an undue advantage to the accused.
38. DW-2, Fateh Bahadur Singh , deposed that he was a cousin of
A1, A2 and A3 and shared cordial relations with their family. He
further deposed that A1 had been staying at his house since the
preceding day and, upon receiving information about the murder
of Dharmendra Kumar Singh on his mobile phone, A1 left for his
own house. He further deposed that he subsequently learnt that
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A1, A2 and A3 had been falsely implicated due to enmity arising
from a quarrel between DW-1 and the deceased. He stated that he
regularly visited A1’s house for work and was acquainted with the
Thakur families of the village. According to him, the family of A1
had long ceased to maintain social relations with the families of
DW-1 and Raj Bahadur Singh due to a pending land dispute.
39. During cross-examination , During cross-examination, he
clarified that he was the maternal cousin of A1, A2 and A3. He
admitted that, although the incident occurred in 2012, he deposed
before the Court for the first time in 2017 and had neither made
any statement nor submitted any affidavit before a competent
authority during the intervening period. He further admitted that
he was deposing five years after the incident at the request of the
accused. He denied the suggestion that, being related to the
accused, he was giving false testimony to secure an undue benefit
for them. He further deposed that the houses of the accused were
approximately twenty kilometres from his own and that he could
not say with certainty how long A1 would take to travel by
motorcycle between the two places. He further deposed that the
house of Ravindra Bahadur Singh, A1’s maternal uncle, was about
fifty metres from his own house and that A1 had stopped at his
maternal uncle’s house at the time of the incident. DW-2 admitted
that, on the day of the occurrence, he had heard about a quarrel
between DW-1 and Bhanu Pratap Singh, as well as between DW-1
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and the deceased. He reiterated that DW-1, the grandson of the
former Pradhan, had quarrelled with the deceased, while denying
the suggestion that he was falsely deposing under the influence of
the accused to save them.
40. DW-3, Suresh Kumar Chaurasia , deposed that A2 and A3
operated a grocery shop and a mobile shop, respectively, in the
same building at Hata Bazar and had been carrying on their
businesses there for approximately ten years. He further deposed
that on 09.06.2012, at around 9:00 P.M., he visited A3’s mobile
shop to recharge his mobile phone. As he did not receive the
confirmation message despite the recharge being processed, he
remained at the shop awaiting confirmation. During that time,
some customers informed him that a quarrel had taken place
between Dharmendra, the newly elected Pradhan, and Raj
Bahadur, the former Pradhan of village Khasre, and that a shot had
been fired. According to him, A2, A3, their father and seven to
eight customers were present at the shop when this information
was received.
41. During cross-examination , he deposed that he had known A2 for
two to four years before the shop was opened and regularly
recharged his mobile phone for approximately 200 – 300 per
₹
month. He admitted that A2 had personally asked him to depose
before the Court. He clarified that he had not witnessed the firing
and that the place of occurrence was approximately two to two-
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and-a-half kilometres from Hata Bazar, a distance that could be
covered by motorcycle in five to ten minutes. He further deposed
that he had himself been an accused in the murder of his wife on
09.05.2007, had been convicted by the District Court and
subsequently acquitted by the High Court in appeal, and had
remained in jail for about two years. He admitted that A3 had also
remained in jail for approximately five years, but denied that they
had formed an unlawful gang during their incarceration. He also
denied the suggestions that the shops were not situated in the same
building, that no mobile shop was operated by A3, or that the
market ordinarily closed by 7:00 P.M. He admitted that the
occurrence took place in 2012 and that he was deposing for the
first time in 2017, without having made any statement or
submitted any affidavit concerning the incident before any
authority during the intervening period. He further admitted that
he was deposing at the request of the accused. He denied the
suggestions that his testimony was false, tutored or given on legal
advice to secure an undue benefit for the accused. He stated that
he could not recall when he had recharged his mobile phone in
May 2012, but denied the suggestion that he had not visited the
alleged mobile shop of A2 and A3 at Hata Bazar on 09.06.2012.
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Court Analysis:
Delay in Lodging the FIR and the Alleged Omissions Therein :
42.The first question which arises for consideration is whether the
delay in lodging the FIR, considered in the light of the
circumstances attending the occurrence and the subsequent
conduct of the complainant, is sufficient to cast doubt upon the
prosecution case. The connected contention regarding omission of
certain particulars from the FIR is also required to be examined in
this context, bearing in mind the settled distinction between a
material omission affecting the substratum of the prosecution case
and an omission of a mere detail or particular.
43.The objection regarding delay in lodging the FIR and the further
submission that material particulars were subsequently introduced
during the course of investigation and impugned judgment in this
regard are all required to be considered in their proper perspective.
It is well settled that mere delay in lodging the FIR does not, by
itself, render the prosecution case doubtful. In Harbans Kaur v.
State of Haryana , (2005) 9 SCC , the Supreme Court held that
whether the delay is such as to cast a cloud of suspicion over the
prosecution case depends upon the facts of each case and that even
a long delay can be accepted where a plausible explanation is
forthcoming. The Court specifically observed that where the
witnesses first attend to the injured and seek medical treatment,
such conduct cannot be regarded as unnatural merely because the
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formal report is lodged thereafter. The principle stated therein is
that delay is not to be examined in the abstract, but in the setting
of the circumstances which occasioned it. The same principle was
reiterated in Ashok Kumar Chaudhary v. State of Bihar , (2008)
12 SCC 173 , where, the Supreme Court held:
“ 16. It is trite that mere delay in lodging the first
information report is not by itself fatal to the case of the
prosecution. Nevertheless, it is a relevant factor of which
the court is obliged to take notice and examine whether any
explanation for the delay has been offered and if offered,
whether it is satisfactory or not. If no satisfactory
explanation is forthcoming, an adverse inference may be
drawn against the prosecution. However, in the event, the
delay is properly and satisfactorily explained; the
prosecution case cannot be thrown out merely on the ground
of delay in lodging the FIR. Obviously, the explanation has
to be considered in the light of the totality of the facts and
circumstances of the case .”
44.The aforesaid principle squarely applies here. In the present case,
the explanation for the interval between the occurrence and the
lodging of the written report is borne out from the evidence itself.
The prosecution evidence shows that the deceased, after sustaining
a serious firearm injury, was first taken for medical treatment at
District Hospital, Sultanpur, thereafter referred to the Trauma
Centre, Lucknow and remained under treatment until his death.
Thereafter, the inquest and post-mortem formalities were
completed and the dead body was received by the complainant
only in the evening of 10.06.2012. PW-1 has stated that he
reached his house with the dead body in the early hours of
11.06.2012 and thereafter proceeded to the police station without
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even performing the last rites. The Investigating Officer has also
stated that no written complaint had been received at the police
station before the written report of PW-1 and that the report was
prepared at the police station on 11.06.2012 at about 7:30 A.M.
45.The aforesaid circumstances, considered cumulatively, provide a
natural and satisfactory explanation for the delay. The conduct of
the complainant cannot be examined as though he was expected to
abandon the injured/deceased immediately after the occurrence
and proceed to the police station merely to secure the earliest
possible registration of the case. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has
repeatedly cautioned that whether a delay is sufficient to cast a
cloud upon the prosecution case depends upon the facts and
circumstances of each case and that even a substantial delay may
be accepted where a plausible explanation is forthcoming. The
explanation available on the present record, therefore, cannot be
characterized as either artificial or inherently improbable.
46.The next contention concerns the alleged omissions in the FIR.
Here again, the nature of an FIR has to be kept in view. An FIR is
not an encyclopedia of the prosecution case and is not required to
contain every minute detail of the occurrence. Its principal object
is to set the criminal law in motion and to place before the police
the basic facts constituting the cognizable offence. As held in
State of M.P. v. Mansingh, (2003) 10 SCC 414 , there can be no
hard-and-fast rule that the names of all witnesses, particularly
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eyewitnesses, must necessarily find mention in the FIR. Similarly,
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kunwarpal v. State of Uttarakhand ,
(2014) 16 SCC 560 , reiterated that there is no requirement of law
that the names of all witnesses should be mentioned in the FIR.
47.In the present case, the omission of certain particulars from the
FIR cannot be equated with the absence of the basic prosecution
case. PW-1, in his cross-examination, specifically stated that the
fact that the accused had rushed towards the deceased while
brandishing country-made pistols was correctly recorded in the
FIR and that the fact that all the accused had fired at the deceased
was also stated in his written report. The fact that the source of
light, the precise manner in which PW-3 received injuries, or the
exact number of shots fired individually by each accused was not
set out in the FIR is not, by itself, sufficient to transform those
omissions into material contradictions.
48.There is, in particular, no legal requirement that the FIR should
contain the names of every person who may subsequently figure
as a prosecution witness. The evidentiary worth of a witness
cannot be rejected merely because his or her name does not find
place in the FIR. At the same time, the Court is not required to
disregard every omission merely by invoking the expression that
an FIR is not an encyclopedia. The real test is whether the
omission is of such a nature that the substratum of the prosecution
case is materially altered or whether the evidence subsequently
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introduced amounts to an afterthought. This distinction was
emphasized in Prabhu Dayal v. State of Rajasthan , (2018) 8 SCC
127 , where the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that some
omission in the FIR does not necessarily require rejection of the
testimony of a witness, the evidence has to be tested on its own
strength or weakness, while the materiality of the omitted fact is
borne in mind in assessing credibility.
49.Similarly, Jitender Kumar v. State of Haryana , (2012) 6 SCC
204 , makes it clear that even non-mention of the name of an
accused in the FIR does not necessarily result in his acquittal. The
Court has to examine, inter alia, whether a definite role is
subsequently attributed to such accused, whether that role is
established by cogent and reliable evidence, whether the omission
could have arisen from the circumstances in which the FIR was
lodged, and whether the subsequent introduction of the accused
appears to be an afterthought. The mere fact of omission,
therefore, cannot be elevated into an inflexible rule of acquittal.
50.Tested on the aforesaid principles, the omissions relied upon by
the appellants do not strike at the substratum of the prosecution
case. The FIR disclosed the occurrence of the armed assault and
the participation of the accused in the firing, while the evidence at
trial furnished further particulars regarding the respective acts of
the accused. The subsequent elaboration of the occurrence, in
itself, cannot be treated as an improvement of such magnitude as
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to render the entire prosecution case unreliable. The FIR was
lodged for setting the criminal law in motion, it was not required
to anticipate and record, with forensic precision, every detail
which might subsequently emerge during investigation and trial.
51.Thus, the delay stands satisfactorily explained by the attending
circumstances, while the omissions pointed out by the appellants
are predominantly omissions of particulars and not a substitution
of the basic occurrence by an altogether different version. The
FIR, when read as a whole, does not furnish a foundation for
holding that the prosecution case was subsequently fabricated. The
said grounds, therefore, do not create such a doubt in the
prosecution case as would warrant interference with the
conviction recorded by the learned Trial Court.
Presence of the Injured Eyewitness , PW-3 :
52.The presence and testimony of PW-3, Rahul Singh, have been
assailed principally on the ground that the injuries attributed to
him are not consistent with the manner of assault alleged by the
prosecution and that his medical examination was not conducted
contemporaneously with the occurrence. It has also been
contended that the nature of the injuries recorded by PW-11,
particularly the abrasions, does not support the allegation that
PW-3 was assaulted with lathis and dandas . These submissions
require examination in the light of the ocular account, the conduct
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of PW-3 immediately after the occurrence and the medical
evidence on record.
53.The prosecution has relied upon PW-3, Rahul Singh, not merely as
an eyewitness to the occurrence but also as an injured witness. It is
well settled that the testimony of an injured witness carries
considerable evidentiary value, since the fact of him/her having
sustained injuries furnishes an assurance of his/her presence at the
place of occurrence. In State of U.P. v. Naresh, (2011) 4 SCC
324 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the testimony of an
injured witness ordinarily deserves due weight and should not be
discarded unless there are substantial grounds, such as major
contradictions or discrepancies, rendering the evidence unreliable.
The Court has also cautioned that minor inconsistencies or
variations which do not affect the core of the prosecution case
cannot, by themselves, furnish a basis for rejecting the testimony.
54.The question, therefore, is whether the injuries found upon PW-3,
read with his conduct immediately after the occurrence and the
medical evidence, furnish such assurance in the present case.
PW-3 stated that, when he intervened to save the deceased, he was
assaulted with lathis and sustained injuries on his head, chest,
back and stomach. He further stated that he received three or four
blows, fell down and was again assaulted. He also stated that his
clothes were stained with blood, both on account of the assault
upon him and while lifting the deceased. He specifically deposed
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that, after the occurrence, he was taken to the District Hospital,
Sultanpur, where his injuries were attended to by applying
bandage and other treatment, and that he thereafter accompanied
the deceased to Lucknow. He stated that he remained at the
District Hospital only for about five to ten minutes before
proceeding with the deceased for further treatment.
55.This conduct assumes significance. The deceased, who was his
uncle, had suffered a firearm injury to the head and was in a
critical condition. In such circumstances, the fact that PW-3 did
not remain at the hospital for a prolonged period for the
preparation of a formal injury report, but instead proceeded with
the injured deceased to Lucknow, cannot by itself be treated as
unnatural. His own injuries were described by him as having been
attended to before he continued with the deceased. The subsequent
medical examination on 15.06.2012 was stated to have been
undertaken by him on account of continuing or increased pain.
Thus, the later examination cannot, without more, be characterized
as an attempt to create an injured witness.
56.The medical evidence also requires to be appreciated in its
entirety. PW-11, examined PW-3 on 15.06.2012 and found a
stitched wound, two scabbed abrasions and a complaint of pain in
the left thigh without any visible external injury. The doctor
opined that the injuries were four to five days old and minor in
nature. Significantly, he stated that injuries Nos. 2, 3 and 4 could
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have been caused by blunt force, while the nature of the object
causing injury No. 1 could not be determined.
57.The submission that an assault with lathi and danda ought
necessarily to have resulted in contusions, and that the presence of
abrasions therefore excludes the assault alleged by PW-3, cannot
be accepted as an absolute proposition. The nature of an injury
depends upon the manner, force, angle and surface of impact and
the circumstances in which the blow is received. There is no rule
of universal application that a blow by a blunt weapon such as a
lathi must invariably produce a contusion and nothing else.
58.More importantly, the medical evidence in the present case does
not positively exclude the prosecution version. On the contrary,
the doctor expressly accepted the possibility of blunt-force
causation in respect of injuries Nos. 2, 3 and 4. The opinion that
the injuries were approximately four to five days old, recorded on
15.06.2012, is also broadly consistent with the date of occurrence,
namely 09.06.2012. It is true that the doctor stated that the exact
date of an injury cannot be determined merely from its appearance
and can only be estimated. That limitation affects the precision of
the medical opinion, it does not, however, convert an otherwise
compatible medical finding into evidence destructive of the
prosecution case.
59.It is also significant that PW-3 did not introduce himself as an
injured witness only after a substantial lapse of time. His presence
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at the occurrence is consistently spoken to by PW-1 and PW-2.
PW-1 specifically stated that PW-3 intervened to save the
deceased and was assaulted with lathis and dandas , though the
fact of his injuries was not incorporated in the FIR. PW-2 also
stated that PW-3 came to the rescue of the deceased and sustained
injuries to his head. Thus, the assertion of PW-3 regarding his
presence and his intervention is not an isolated assertion emerging
for the first time from his own testimony.
60.It is true that the medical evidence by itself does not establish that
the injuries were necessarily caused by the appellants on
09.06.2012. That, however, is not the correct test. The medical
evidence is required to be considered along with the ocular
account and the surrounding circumstances. In the present case,
PW-3's presence is spoken to by the other prosecution witnesses,
his intervention on behalf of the deceased forms part of the
prosecution account, his presence during the immediate
transportation of the deceased is also supported by the evidence
and the medical examination subsequently found injuries which, at
least in part, were medically capable of having been caused by
blunt force and whose estimated duration was broadly consistent
with the occurrence.
61.The contention, therefore, that the nature of the injuries recorded
by PW-11 is wholly inconsistent with the allegation of lathi and
danda assault cannot be accepted. At the highest, the medical
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evidence calls for cautious appreciation of the precise manner in
which the injuries were caused, it does not displace the presence
of PW-3 at the scene or render his testimony inherently
improbable. His evidence has, accordingly, to be tested on its
intrinsic consistency and its conformity with the material
circumstances, rather than rejected merely because the later
medical examination recorded abrasions and minor injuries.
Corroboration of Ocular Testimony and Medical Evidence
regarding the Firearm Injuries Sustained by the Deceased :
62.The ocular account has also been assailed on the ground that the
description given by the witnesses regarding the second firearm
shot allegedly fired at the deceased's stomach is not borne out by
the medical evidence. It has been pointed out that PW-3 stated that
the second shot struck the stomach and thereafter exited after
grazing the stomach, whereas PW-2 described the same firing by
stating that the bullet pierced through the stomach and exited from
the other side. It is submitted that no corresponding firearm injury,
in the manner so described by the witnesses, was found during the
post-mortem examination. The submission requires consideration
in the context of the entire ocular and medical evidence.
63.PW-3 stated that after the deceased had fallen, A3 fired at his head
and the bullet struck him on the head. He further stated that
thereafter A1 fired a second shot which struck the deceased in the
stomach and exited after grazing the stomach. PW-2, while
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describing the same occurrence, stated that after A3 had fired at
the head of the deceased, A1 and A3 fired again and the bullet
pierced through the deceased's stomach and exited from the other
side. Thus, there is some variation in the manner in which the two
witnesses described the trajectory or effect of the second shot.
64.The medical evidence, however, has to be considered with some
care. PW-5, who conducted the post-mortem examination, found a
firearm entry wound on the head, deep up to the brain, along with
a stitched wound measuring 12 cm on the right side of the pant,
five centimeters outside the umbilicus. The post-mortem also
recorded other operative and contusion injuries. The cause of
death was opined to be firearm injury to the head and the resulting
injuries and coma. PW-12, who had operated upon the deceased,
similarly found an entry wound in the brain, fracture of the
parietal and temporal bones and a metallic foreign body near the
right temporal region, he specifically stated that he found no exit
wound in the brain.
65.It is, therefore, evident that the medical evidence conclusively
establishes the serious firearm injury sustained by the deceased on
the head. The principal ocular account with regard to A3 firing at
the head of the deceased thus finds substantial corroboration from
the medical evidence. The mere fact that the witnesses have
described the second shot in somewhat different terms cannot, by
itself, result in rejection of their entire testimony.
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66.The distinction between an exaggeration and a falsehood is of
some importance in this regard. In Achhar Singh v. State of H.P. ,
(2021) 5 SCC 543 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained that an
exaggerated version contains an element of truth with an
embellishment superadded to it, and that the duty of the Court is to
separate the truth from the exaggeration. The Court further
reiterated that, even where a portion of the testimony is found
deficient, the acceptable part may be relied upon if it is
corroborated by the other evidence on record. The maxim falsus in
uno, falsus in omnibus has no application in criminal trials and the
Court is required to sift the grain from the chaff.
67.Viewed in that light, the difference between the statement of PW-2
that the bullet pierced through the stomach and exited from the
other side and the statement of PW-3 that the shot exited after
grazing the stomach is not of such a character as to destroy the
substratum of the prosecution case. Their evidence was being
given with reference to an incident which occurred suddenly and
in which several shots were fired in quick succession. The
witnesses could reasonably perceive that a firearm shot had been
fired at the deceased and could describe its apparent effect, but the
precise trajectory of the projectile, particularly whether it passed
through the body or merely grazed a particular portion, is a matter
on which a lay witness cannot be expected to speak with medical
or anatomical precision.
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68.This aspect assumes greater significance when the evidence is
appreciated in the setting in which the occurrence took place. The
witnesses were ordinary rural persons who witnessed a sudden and
violent firearm assault. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Prabhu Dayal (supra) , witnesses may be rustic and may, in the
course of narration, develop a tendency to exaggerate. Such
circumstance does not mean that their entire testimony is false.
The Court has emphasised that minor discrepancies,
inconsistencies and variations which do not touch the core of the
prosecution case should not ordinarily result in rejection of the
evidence as a whole. It has also been observed that even truthful
witnesses may differ in details because their powers of
observation, retention and reproduction are not identical.
69.The present variation falls within that permissible area. The
witnesses are consistent about the occurrence of firing, the firearm
injury to the head and the fact that the deceased was shot during
the assault. Their difference concerns the precise description of the
second shot and its trajectory. That portion of their testimony may,
at the highest, be regarded as an embellishment or an
approximation in the narration of a rapidly unfolding occurrence.
It does not follow that because the precise manner of exit of the
bullet from the stomach has not been medically established, the
entire ocular account regarding the firing becomes unreliable.
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70.Consequently, the absence of a medical finding corresponding
exactly to the description given by PW-2 and PW-3 regarding the
trajectory of the second shot cannot be treated as a material
contradiction. The said portion of the evidence may properly be
regarded as an exaggeration or imprecise description of the precise
effect of the firing. Once that limited embellishment is separated,
the remaining ocular account retains sufficient coherence and is
materially corroborated by the medical evidence regarding the
firearm injury to the head. The Court is not required to accept
every detail of the ocular account as literally or scientifically
exact, what is required is to determine whether the evidence, read
as a whole and tested against the medical and surrounding
circumstances, inspires confidence. In the present case, the core of
the prosecution version concerning the firearm assault upon the
deceased and the fatal injury sustained by him stands substantially
corroborated by the medical evidence.
71.The testimony of the prosecution witnesses has been assailed on
the ground that there are several omissions, contradictions and
inconsistencies in their respective depositions, particularly with
regard to the time and manner of occurrence, the presence and
movement of PW-3 Rahul Singh, the attribution of the lathi
assault, the sequence of firing, the position of the deceased at the
time of firing, the source of light and the manner in which the
written report came to be prepared. It has further been contended
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that material facts subsequently introduced in the deposition of the
witnesses were not stated either in the FIR or in their statements
recorded during investigation. We have carefully examined the
evidence of the prosecution witnesses in this regard.
Alleged Omission in Testimony of Prosecution Witnesses
72.The first and foremost circumstance emerging from the evidence
is that there is consistency among PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 on the
essential features of the occurrence. All three witnesses place the
incident at the house-side locality of Raj Bahadur Singh, speak of
the altercation preceding the assault, attribute the armed assault to
the accused persons, specifically attribute the firearm injury to the
head of the deceased to A3, and consistently state that the
deceased was thereafter taken for medical treatment and
ultimately succumbed to the firearm injury. Their evidence is
further supported, in its material particulars, by the medical
evidence. PW-5 found a firearm entry wound on the head of the
deceased and opined that the cause of death was firearm injury to
the head and the resultant injuries and coma. PW-12, who
operated upon the deceased, found a firearm entry wound in the
brain, fracture of the right parietal and temporal bones and a bullet
lodged near the right temporal region, with no exit wound. Thus,
the central feature of the ocular account, namely, that the deceased
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sustained a close-range firearm injury to the head which proved
fatal, stands firmly corroborated by the medical evidence.
73.The variations in the approximate time of occurrence, namely,
around 8:00 P.M. according to PW-1 and PW-3 and around 7:00
P.M. according to PW-2, do not affect the identity of the
occurrence or the participation of the accused. PW-2 himself
stated that the assault took place between 7:00 and 7:30 P.M.,
whereas PW-1 and PW-3 placed it at around 8:00 P.M. The
occurrence admittedly took place in the evening and was a sudden
and violent incident. A witness cannot reasonably be expected to
remember the precise minute of an unexpected occurrence which
had taken place several years before his deposition. The Supreme
Court in Prithu v. State of H.P., (2009) 11 SCC 588 and State of
U.P. v. M.K. Anthony, 1985) 1 SCC 505 , has reiterated that undue
importance should not be attached to omissions, contradictions
and discrepancies which do not go to the root of the matter or
shake the basic version of the prosecution witnesses. A witness
cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory or
reproduce every detail verbatim. Minor variations arising from
differences in observation and recollection are, therefore, natural.
74.The criticism regarding the presence of PW-3 also does not, on a
careful reading of the entire evidence, dislodge his presence at the
occurrence. PW-1 stated that PW-3 arrived shortly before the
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incident, whereas PW-3 gave a somewhat different account of his
movement towards the place of occurrence and stated that he
followed the deceased carrying a torch. PW-2 initially stated that
PW-3 was not present at the house of Raj Bahadur Singh when
PW-1 and the deceased arrived, but consistently placed PW-3 at
the spot when the assault upon the deceased commenced and
stated that PW-3 intervened to save him and sustained injuries.
Thus, the witnesses may differ regarding the precise stage at
which PW-3 arrived, but they are consistent in placing him at the
scene when the assault took place. Such variation in the route or
immediate movement of a witness cannot be elevated into a
contradiction going to the root of the prosecution case.
75.The discrepancy concerning the attribution of the lathi assault is
also not sufficient to discard the prosecution version. PW-1
attributed the assault upon the deceased to A2 and Ritesh Singh,
while PW-2 attributed it to A1 and Ritesh Singh and PW-3 stated
that the accused assaulted the deceased with lathis before A3 fired
at him. The witnesses were describing a rapidly unfolding assault
in which several persons were armed and moving simultaneously.
Their failure to maintain identical attribution of every blow cannot
be treated as destructive of the prosecution case when the
principal and consistent allegation remains that the accused
persons collectively participated in the assault and that A3 fired
the fatal shot at the head of the deceased. More importantly, the
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medical evidence establishes the fatal firearm injury and the
remaining injuries are not the basis upon which the conviction
under Section 302 IPC rests.
76.Similarly, the differences in the description of the subsequent
firing do not affect the proved fatal act. PW-1 stated that after A3
fired at the head, A1 and A3 also fired, PW-2 stated that A1 and
A3 fired again and described a shot as passing through the
stomach, whereas PW-3 attributed the second shot to A1 and
stated that it grazed the stomach. The post-mortem evidence does
not support the description of a separate firearm injury to the
stomach in the precise manner narrated by PW-2 or PW-3. PW-5
specifically stated in cross-examination that, apart from the
firearm injury to the head, no other injury found during post-
mortem was a firearm injury. The evidence, therefore, makes it
appropriate to treat the description of the subsequent shot with
caution. But the existence of an exaggerated or inaccurate
description of an additional shot does not erase the consistent and
medically corroborated evidence that A3 fired the fatal shot at the
head of the deceased. The Court is required to separate the reliable
core from the embellishment rather than reject the entire
testimony.
77.The same principle applies to the variation regarding the position
of the deceased after he fell. PW-1 described the deceased as
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having fallen with his back towards the ground and face upwards,
whereas PW-2 described his head as towards the ground and
stomach downwards. The witnesses were observing a sudden
firing incident at night, involving several persons, and were not
expected to make a precise anatomical description of the posture
of the deceased. This discrepancy does not affect the fact that the
deceased fell and immediately thereafter sustained the firearm
injury to his head. The medical evidence independently establishes
the nature and location of that injury.
78.The criticism regarding the source of light also does not materially
affect the prosecution case. PW-1 spoke of inverter bulb and torch
light, PW-2 referred to the inverter light at the temple, and PW-3
stated that he was carrying a torch and that lights were available at
the relevant places. The Investigating Officer admitted that no
separate memo regarding the source of light was prepared and that
PW-1 had not specifically stated in his statement under Section
161 Cr.P.C. all the particulars of the torch and inverter lighting.
This is plainly an investigative omission. It does not establish that
the witnesses were unable to see the occurrence, particularly when
PW-2 specifically described the 100-watt bulb at the temple and
PW-3 stated that he was himself carrying a torch. The evidence
has to be appreciated as a whole and not rendered suspect merely
because the Investigating Officer failed to prepare a separate
memo regarding the source of light.
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79.The omissions pointed out in the statements under Section 161
Cr.P.C. also have to be appreciated in their proper perspective.
PW-6 stated that PW-1 had not specifically disclosed in his
statement that Anil Singh, while murmuring, ran towards the
house of A1, that he had not narrated the use of lathi-danda in the
precise manner subsequently stated in Court, that he had not stated
that he had seen the occurrence specifically in torch and inverter
light, and that he had not narrated the injuries allegedly sustained
by PW-3. PW-6 similarly stated that PW-2 had not stated during
investigation that A1 and Ritesh Singh had assaulted the deceased
with lathi-danda or that PW-3 had intervened. These omissions
are relevant for assessing the weight of the particular portions of
testimony, but they do not amount to a complete destruction of the
prosecution case. The witnesses had consistently disclosed the
occurrence involving the accused and the firearm assault upon the
deceased. The later elaboration of peripheral details cannot be
equated with an entirely new prosecution story.
80.The Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Chhaakki Lal , (2019) 12
SCC 326 , has specifically cautioned that undue importance should
not be attached to omissions and contradictions which do not
shake the basic version of the prosecution witnesses. The test is
whether the evidence has a ring of truth and whether it is cogent,
credible and trustworthy. The Court has further reiterated that
evidence has to be weighed and not counted. Thus, the mere
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existence of several discrepancies cannot furnish a ground for
acquittal unless those discrepancies render the core prosecution
version inherently improbable or unreliable.
81.The fact that PW-1 and PW-2 are related to the deceased or that
they supported the election of the deceased's wife also does not
make their evidence liable to be discarded. In Gulab v. State of
U.P. , (2022) 12 SCC 677 , the Supreme Court reiterated that a
related witness cannot be treated as an interested witness merely
by reason of relationship and that the evidence of a relative can be
relied upon where it is otherwise inherently reliable, probable,
cogent and consistent. The Court also reiterated that it is the
quality, and not the number, of witnesses which matters.
82.In the present case, the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 is not being
relied upon merely because they are related to or acquainted with
the deceased. Their account receives substantial corroboration
from the objective circumstances. The deceased admittedly
sustained a firearm injury to the head at the relevant time, PW-5
medically established the fatal head injury, PW-12, the
neurosurgeon who operated upon the deceased, found a bullet
lodged inside the head and opined that the fracture was due to
firearm injury. The medical evidence, therefore, lends assurance to
the central part of the ocular version rather than contradicting it.
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83.The defence has also sought to derive advantage from the
omissions and contradictions emerging from the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses. However, the Court cannot lose sight of the
fact that the occurrence took place in 2012 and the witnesses
entered the witness box several years thereafter. The possibility of
some variation in the recollection of peripheral details is natural.
What is material is that the core narrative has remained
substantially intact i.e. the deceased was involved in the incident
preceding the assault, the accused persons came armed, an armed
assault followed, A3 fired at the head of the deceased, the
deceased sustained a grievous firearm injury, he was taken for
treatment and died during treatment and the medical evidence
conclusively establishes firearm injury to the head as the cause of
death.
84. T he principle stated in Chhaakki Lal (supra) is particularly
apposite that a witness cannot be expected to possess a
photographic memory and that a witness overtaken by events
cannot be expected to absorb and reproduce every detail with
mathematical precision. The Court is required to distinguish
between discrepancies which arise from normal human fallibility
and those which destroy the credibility of the testimony.
85.On an overall assessment, therefore, the omissions and
contradictions relied upon by the appellants do not affect the
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substratum of the prosecution case. Some of the witnesses have
undoubtedly exaggerated or supplied details which are not fully
borne out by the contemporaneous record or medical evidence,
particularly with regard to the additional firing and the exact
manner of the lathi assault. Those portions cannot be accepted
mechanically. Nevertheless, the presence of such embellishments
does not render the entire prosecution case false. The reliable
portion of the testimony, remains intact and receives material
corroboration from the medical evidence and the surrounding
circumstances.
86.It is a settled principle that the Court is required to separate the
grain from the chaff and to act upon the trustworthy residue of the
evidence. The present case is not one where the contradictions
create two wholly irreconcilable versions of the occurrence or
render the prosecution story inherently improbable. They
represent, in substantial part, variations in the narration of a
sudden and violent incident, together with certain investigative
omissions and subsequent elaborations. Such discrepancies, when
tested against the entire evidentiary record, do not create a
reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused-appellants.
Defect in Investigation Should Not Enure to the Benefit of the
Accused
87.Learned counsel for the accused-appellants argued that the
investigation suffered from material lapses and deficiencies,
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including failure to collect the bloodstained clothes, properly
investigate the place of assault, and record the statement of PW-3
in a timely manner. He further submits that the site plan did not
bear the signatures of PW-1 and PW-2. However, this Court is of
the opinion that mere defects or omissions in the investigation, in
the absence of any prejudice to the accused-appellants or material
contradiction affecting the credibility of the prosecution evidence,
cannot, by themselves, be a ground to extend the benefit of doubt
to the accused-appellants, particularly when the prosecution case
is otherwise supported by reliable and cogent evidence.
88.The duty of an Investigating Officer is not merely to collect
material supporting the prosecution. He is required to conduct a
fair, impartial and complete investigation and to bring before the
Court all material circumstances bearing upon the occurrence. In
Arvind Kumar v. State of Rajasthan , (2022) 16 SCC 732 , the
Hon'ble Supreme Court has emphasised that an Investigating
Officer is an officer of the Court and is expected to investigate the
offence fairly, without taking sides either with the victim or with
the accused. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has also drawn a
distinction between a defective investigation and an investigation
which is deliberately designed to suppress material facts. A mere
defect in investigation does not, by itself, enure to the benefit of
the accused unless the defect goes to the root of the prosecution
case and is fundamental in nature. The Court is required to sift the
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evidence available on record and ascertain the truth rather than
allow an otherwise proved offence to fail merely because the
investigation was inept or perfunctory.
89.In the present case, the investigation conducted by PW-6 cannot
be described as satisfactory. The omissions noted above disclose a
degree of procedural negligence which the Court cannot ignore. In
particular, the failure to collect the bloodstained clothes, the
failure to investigate the alleged trail of blood, the delayed
recording of PW-3's statement, and the failure to properly
document several aspects of the scene of occurrence were
avoidable lapses. The investigation ought to have been more
careful and comprehensive. However, the Court has to distinguish
between a deficiency in the investigation and a deficiency in the
substantive proof of the offence. The former cannot automatically
result in the latter.
90.In State of M.P. v. Mansingh , (2003) 10 SCC 414 , the Hon'ble
Supreme Court held that even where deficiencies in investigation
are established, such deficiencies cannot constitute a ground to
discard a prosecution version which is otherwise authentic,
credible and cogent. Similarly, in Dhanaj Singh v. State of
Punjab , (2004) 3 SCC 654 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court cautioned
that although the Court must be circumspect while evaluating
evidence in a case of defective investigation, it would not be
proper to acquit an accused solely on account of such defect. To
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do so may amount to permitting the lapses of the Investigating
Officer to defeat the administration of justice. The Court is
required to examine the prosecution evidence dehors the
omissions attributable to the investigating agency and determine
whether that evidence, independently assessed, inspires
confidence.
91.The principle is of particular significance in the present case. The
deficiencies noticed in the investigation do not render the
occurrence itself, nor does it rule out the fatal firearm injury
sustained by the deceased. PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 have given
ocular accounts of the assault. Their evidence, notwithstanding the
discrepancies already discussed, consistently establishes the
presence of an armed assault and, in particular, the firearm assault
upon the head of the deceased, which is also corroborated with the
medical evidence. Thus, the fundamental fact that the deceased
suffered a fatal firearm injury during the occurrence is not
dependent upon the manner in which the Investigating Officer
performed his duties.
92.The absence of a separate memo regarding the source of light,
non-collection of the clothes of the deceased, failure to take
sample of blood-trail or failure to examine certain witnesses may
affect the completeness of the investigation, but none of these
lapses demonstrates that the occurrence did not take place or that
the ocular witnesses could not have witnessed it. The same is true
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of the delayed recording of the statement of PW-3. The delay is a
circumstance requiring the Court to scrutinise his evidence with
greater care, and his testimony has accordingly been examined in
the light of the other evidence. But the delay in recording his
statement is attributable to the investigating process and cannot,
by itself, erase the occurrence otherwise established by the
evidence on record.
93.The appellants have further placed considerable reliance upon the
fact that no FSL report or ballistic expert report has been brought
on record connecting the recovered firearm with the projectile or
with the fatal injury and it is argued that this omission must also
be regarded as a lapse in investigation. Where a firearm and the
relevant projectile or cartridge are available, the prudent course
for the investigating agency is to send the material for forensic
examination and place the resulting expert opinion before the
Court. Such scientific examination could have provided additional
link evidence and would undoubtedly have strengthened the
prosecution case. The Investigating Officer has not offered any
satisfactory explanation for the absence of such scientific evidence
on the record.
94.Nevertheless, the absence of a ballistic report does not lay down
an inflexible rule that the prosecution case must fail in every case
involving the use of a firearm. In Gurucharan Singh v. State of
Punjab , AIR 1963 SC 340 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court made it
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clear that examination of a ballistic expert is not an indispensable
requirement in every prosecution alleging murder by a firearm.
Whether such evidence is essential depends upon the facts and
circumstances of the particular case. Where the direct evidence is
cogent and unimpeachable and the medical evidence is consistent
with the ocular account, the absence of ballistic evidence does not
necessarily destroy the prosecution case.
95.The same principle has subsequently been noticed and applied in
Gulab (supra). The Hon'ble Supreme Court, while recognising the
importance of ballistic evidence particularly where both the
firearm and the crime cartridge are recovered, reiterated that there
is no inflexible rule requiring examination of a ballistic expert in
every firearm case. Similarly, in State of Punjab v. Jugraj Singh ,
(2002) 3 SCC 234 , the Apex Court held that where there is
convincing eyewitness evidence and the attending circumstances
otherwise establish the prosecution version, non-examination of a
ballistic expert does not, by itself, affect the creditworthiness of
the eyewitnesses. The question, therefore, is not whether a
ballistic report would have been desirable, it undoubtedly would
have been, but whether its absence creates a reasonable doubt in
the evidence which is otherwise available before the Court.
96.In the present case, it does not. The prosecution does not rest
solely upon the alleged recovery of the firearm from A3 or empty
cartridges from the place of the occurrence. The recovery
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evidence is only one part of the evidentiary chain. The principal
evidence consists of the ocular account of the occurrence, which
has been examined at length and found reliable in its material
particulars, coupled with the medical evidence establishing that
the deceased sustained a firearm injury to the head which proved
fatal. The medical evidence does not merely establish an
unexplained firearm injury, it materially corroborates the central
feature of the ocular account that the deceased was shot in the
head. PW-12 further found the bullet lodged inside the head,
thereby confirming that the injury was caused by a firearm
projectile. Thus, the absence of a ballistic comparison does not
leave the Court without evidence regarding the homicidal firearm
injury.
97.It is also significant that the defence has not been able to
demonstrate that the absence of the FSL report has resulted in any
positive inconsistency between the recovered firearm and the
medical evidence. There is no material on record establishing that
the fatal injury could not have been caused by a country-made
pistol of the nature alleged by the eyewitnesses. The absence of
expert linkage may deprive the prosecution of one corroborative
circumstance, but it does not retrospectively render the direct
ocular evidence unreliable.
98.The distinction between a defective investigation and a false
prosecution case is therefore important. A defective investigation
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may justify closer scrutiny of the prosecution evidence, it does not
justify rejection of credible evidence merely as a matter of
consequence. As held in Dhanaj Singh (supra), if the lapses are
attributable to negligence of the investigating agency, the Court
must examine the evidence independently of such omissions and
determine whether the evidence itself is reliable. Otherwise, the
consequence of the Investigating Officer's negligence would be to
confer an unintended advantage upon the accused even where the
substantive evidence establishes their guilt.
99.At the same time, the Court is conscious that the principle cannot
be applied mechanically. If an investigative lapse goes to the
foundation of the prosecution case, results in suppression of
material facts, or creates a genuine and reasonable doubt regarding
the occurrence or identity of the assailants, the accused cannot be
denied the benefit arising from such doubt. Arvind Kumar (supra)
makes it clear that a calculated or deliberate suppression stands on
a different footing from an ordinary defective investigation. The
present case, however, does not disclose such a foundational
failure. The lapses of PW-6 are principally procedural and
investigative in character. They do not destroy the substantive
evidence regarding the occurrence, the participation of the
accused, or the fatal firearm injury sustained by the deceased.
100. The Court would, therefore, record its disapproval of the
manner in which the investigation was conducted, particularly the
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failure to collect relevant physical evidence, to examine material
medical witnesses, to properly document aspects of the scene and
to bring the available forensic evidence on record. Such
deficiencies ought not to be repeated. But the Court cannot permit
these investigative lapses to overshadow reliable substantive
evidence or to create an artificial doubt where the evidence as a
whole does not warrant one.
101. Viewed in this manner, the investigation in the present case
was undoubtedly defective, but the defect is not fundamental to
the prosecution case. It does not demolish the ocular account, it
does not neutralise the medical evidence, and the absence of an
FSL or ballistic report does not, in the facts of the present case,
create a reasonable doubt regarding the fatal firearm assault. The
appellants are, therefore, not entitled to the benefit of the
investigative lapses. The defects in investigation may call for
criticism of the Investigating Officer, but they do not furnish a
ground for disturbing the conviction otherwise supported by
credible ocular and medical evidence.
Motive and Common Intention under Section 34 IPC
102. The appellants have also challenged the prosecution case on
the ground that the alleged motive has not been established in a
manner sufficient to sustain the conviction and that there is no
satisfactory evidence of any prior meeting of minds so as to attract
the provisions of Section 34 IPC. It has been argued that the
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background of election rivalry and the alleged dispute regarding
the post of Pradhan and cancellation of reservation/quota could
equally provide a reason for false implication and, therefore,
cannot safely be treated as a circumstance pointing towards the
guilt of the appellants. The submission requires consideration in
the light of the evidence on record as well as the settled principles
governing motive and common intention.
103. So far as motive is concerned, the prosecution evidence
discloses a definite background of hostility. PW-1 has stated that
there was election-related rivalry and that the accused persons
were aggrieved on account of the deceased's role in the election of
the Pradhan and the cancellation of the ration quota. The witnesses
have further attributed to A1, immediately before the assault, an
exhortation referring specifically to the loss of the Pradhan's post
and the cancellation of the quota and stating, in substance, that
because of the deceased the situation had arisen and that he should
be killed. Thus, the motive suggested by the prosecution is not an
afterthought wholly unconnected with the occurrence, it forms
part of the immediate circumstances in which the assault is alleged
to have taken place.
104. It is true that motive, by itself, cannot establish the
commission of an offence. It is equally true that previous enmity
may furnish a reason for false implication and that enmity is a
double-edged sword. In Kunwarpal v. State of Uttarakhand ,
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(2014) 16 SCC 560 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court recognised that
animosity may constitute a basis for false implication, but it may
equally furnish a basis for the commission of the crime. The
proper approach, therefore, is not to reject the prosecution case
merely because there was previous hostility, but to examine
whether the evidence of the occurrence independently inspires
confidence and whether the alleged motive is consistent with the
proved circumstances.
105. In the present case, the existence of election rivalry cannot
be treated as a circumstance operating exclusively in favour of the
defence. On the contrary, it provides a plausible background for
the occurrence alleged by the prosecution. Moreover, the
prosecution case does not rest upon motive alone. The motive is
relied upon only as a circumstance lending context to the ocular
evidence of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3. Their testimony regarding the
armed assault and the fatal firearm injury is required to be
assessed independently, and as already discussed, the core of that
evidence finds material corroboration from the medical evidence.
Consequently, the fact that the same circumstance could
theoretically also furnish a reason for false implication does not, in
the present case, create a reasonable doubt when the ocular
account is otherwise found trustworthy.
106. It is also necessary to bear in mind that motive assumes a
different degree of significance in a case based substantially upon
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direct evidence than in a case resting entirely upon circumstantial
evidence. Where reliable eyewitnesses give a direct account of the
occurrence, failure to establish an elaborate or independent motive
cannot by itself destroy the prosecution case. Conversely, where
motive is established, it may provide assurance to the ocular
account but cannot substitute for proof of participation. The Court,
therefore, proceeds to examine the question of common intention
on the basis of the conduct of the accused persons at and
immediately before the occurrence, rather than treating motive as
a substitute for proof.
107. Section 34 IPC does not create a distinct substantive
offence. It embodies a principle of constructive liability whereby,
when a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of
the common intention of all, each is liable for that act as if it had
been done by him alone. The essential requirement is, therefore,
the existence of common intention and participation in the
criminal act. In Jai Bhagwan v. State of Haryana , (1999) 3 SCC
102 and Suresh Sakharam Nangare v. State of Maharashtra ,
(2012) 9 SCC 249 , the Apex Court has reiterated that two factors
are required to attract Section 34 i.e. common intention and
participation of the accused in the commission of the offence.
Common intention may be inferred from the facts and
circumstances of each case.
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108. The requirement of common intention does not necessarily
mean that the prosecution must produce direct evidence of an
earlier meeting in a formal or elaborate manner. In P andurang v.
State of Hyderabad , AIR 1955 SC 216 , the Hon'ble Supreme
Court explained that the plan need not be elaborate and that no
long interval is required between formation of the intention and
commission of the crime. The common intention may be formed
suddenly. What is necessary is that there must be a meeting of
minds, and the criminal act must be done pursuant to that common
intention. The distinction between merely having the same
intention independently and acting pursuant to a common
intention is real and substantial.
109. The principle has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Virendra Singh v. State of M.P. , (2010) 8 SCC 407 and
Chhota Ahirwar v. State of M.P. ,(2020) 4 SCC 126 , wherein it
was held that common intention may develop on the spot, but it
must be anterior in point of time to the commission of the criminal
act and there must be clear evidence justifying the inference of
concert. The existence of a prearranged plan may be inferred from
the conduct of the accused, the surrounding circumstances and
other incriminating facts. No particular overt act is indispensable
on the part of every accused if the evidence establishes that they
shared the common intention in respect of the ultimate criminal
act.
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110. The present case has to be examined in the light of these
principles. The evidence does not disclose a situation where the
appellants were merely present at the place of occurrence without
any connection with the assault. According to the consistent core
of the prosecution evidence, the accused persons came together,
were armed, participated in the assault upon the deceased and
remained together during the occurrence. The exhortation
attributed to A1 immediately before the firing is particularly
significant. It is alleged that A1 referred to the dispute concerning
the Pradhan's post and the cancellation of the quota and exhorted
the others to kill the deceased. Thereafter, the assault was carried
out by the accused persons acting in concert and A3 fired the fatal
shot at the head of the deceased.
111. The exhortation of A1 cannot be considered in isolation. It
has to be read along with the conduct of the accused persons
immediately thereafter. The prosecution evidence indicates that
the accused did not merely happen to be present at the scene, they
were armed and participated in the assault which culminated in the
shooting of the deceased. The sequence of events, taken as a
whole, permits an inference that the accused persons were acting
pursuant to a common design directed against the deceased. The
participation of A1 in the assault and exhortation, the participation
attributed to A2 in the armed assault, and the firing of the fatal
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shot by A3 are not isolated acts occurring independently of one
another; they form part of one continuous transaction.
112. The fact that the fatal shot was specifically attributed to A3
does not, therefore, exonerate A1 and A2 from the operation of
Section 34. Section 34 is precisely intended to meet a situation
where several persons participate in a criminal act pursuant to a
common intention, though the ultimate act may be physically
committed by only one of them. In Chhota Ahirwar (supra), the
Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that no overt act is necessary on
the part of every accused if common intention with respect to the
ultimate criminal act is established. What is required is
participation coupled with the requisite common intention.
113. The submission on behalf of the appellants that there is no
direct evidence of a prior meeting of minds also cannot be
accepted as a proposition requiring acquittal. Common intention is
ordinarily a matter of inference because persons acting together in
a crime do not ordinarily announce their agreement in advance. In
Vijendra Singh (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the
existence of prior concert may be inferred from circumstances
which necessarily lead to that conclusion. The manner in which
the accused came armed, the exhortation attributed to A1, their
simultaneous participation in the assault and the ensuing firearm
attack are circumstances which, when considered cumulatively,
provide the necessary basis for such an inference.
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114. The circumstances preceding the fatal shot are also relevant.
The occurrence was not a case where, without any preceding
interaction or concert, one accused suddenly fired a shot while the
others remained passive spectators. The prosecution evidence
depicts a sequence beginning with the altercation, followed by the
arrival of the armed accused, the exhortation concerning the
deceased's role in the election dispute, the assault upon the
deceased, intervention by PW-3 and thereafter the firearm attack.
Even if the precise attribution of individual lathi blows or
subsequent firing is not accepted in every detail, the broad course
of conduct remains sufficiently established to infer concerted
action.
115. The exhortation attributed to A1 immediately before the
fatal firing is of particular relevance in this context. The Supreme
Court in Sandeep v. State of Haryana , (2022) 14 SCC 812 ,
upheld the conviction under Sections 302 and 34 IPC where an
exhortation was given by one accused immediately before a co-
accused fired the fatal shot. The evidentiary value of the
exhortation in the present case has, therefore, to be considered
along with the subsequent conduct of the participants and not as
an isolated utterance.
116. The evidence, therefore, does not warrant the contention
that A3 alone can be held responsible for the fatal firearm injury
merely because he is specifically attributed the head shot. Once
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the participation of A1 and A2 in the concerted armed assault and
the existence of the common intention are established, the
principle of constructive liability under Section 34 operates. The
criminal act culminating in the death of Dharmendra Singh was
not an isolated act of A3 divorced from the conduct of the other
accused, rather, it formed part of the concerted action attributed to
all the participants.
117. The motive and Section 34, however, must not be conflated.
The motive arising from election rivalry and the dispute regarding
the Pradhan's post provides the background and a plausible reason
for the occurrence. The application of Section 34 rests upon the
conduct of the accused and the inference of common intention
from the totality of circumstances. The prosecution succeeds not
because motive alone establishes common intention, but because
the motive is consistent with, and lends context to, the direct
evidence showing that the accused persons came armed,
participated in the assault and acted together immediately before
the fatal firing.
118. On a cumulative assessment, therefore, the prosecution has
established a credible motive for the occurrence and, more
importantly, has proved the circumstances from which the
common intention of A1, A2 and A3 can safely be inferred. The
evidence demonstrates participation in the criminal transaction
and concerted action directed against the deceased. The fact that
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the fatal shot was fired by A3 does not absolve the other
participants where the requirements of Section 34 are otherwise
satisfied. The conviction of the appellants under Section 302 read
with Section 34 IPC is, accordingly, not rendered infirm either by
the nature of the motive or by the attribution of the fatal shot
specifically to A3.
Plea of Alibi:
119. The appellants have also relied upon the plea of alibi,
particularly in respect of the alleged presence of A1 at the house
of his maternal relative and the presence of the other accused at
their respective places of business. The plea, however, does not
inspire confidence when tested against the prosecution evidence
and the defence evidence brought on record.
120. In Vijay Pal v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) , (2015) 4
SCC 749 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that alibi is a rule of
evidence and not an exception under the Penal Code. Once the
prosecution satisfactorily establishes the presence of an accused at
the place of occurrence through reliable evidence, the burden lies
upon the accused who takes the plea of alibi to establish it by
cogent and positive evidence so as to exclude the possibility of his
presence at the scene. The plea succeeds only where the evidence
is of such quality as to make the presence of the accused at the
place of occurrence physically improbable or impossible.
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121. In the present case, the prosecution evidence has already
been found sufficient to establish the presence and participation of
the accused persons in the occurrence. The defence evidence does
not create any reasonable doubt in that regard. DW-2 Fateh
Bahadur Singh, who sought to establish the presence of A1 at his
house, is admittedly a relative of the accused and came forward to
depose after several years at the request of the accused. No
contemporaneous document, independent witness or other reliable
material has been produced to substantiate the alleged presence of
A1 at that place at the relevant time. Likewise, the evidence of
DW-3 regarding the presence of A2 and A3 at the shops is not that
of an eyewitness to the occurrence and, by itself, does not exclude
their presence at the place of occurrence. The distance suggested
between the shops and the place of occurrence also does not make
their presence there physically impossible.
122. The principle stated in Jitender Kumar v. State of Haryana ,
(2012) 6 SCC 204 , is also apposite that once the testimony
establishing the presence of the accused at the place of occurrence
is found trustworthy, the plea of alibi loses its significance unless
the accused produces evidence which, at least on reasonable
probability and ultimately with requisite certainty, excludes the
possibility of his presence at the scene.
123. In the present case, the defence evidence falls considerably
short of that standard. The plea of alibi is essentially a bare
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assertion unsupported by reliable contemporaneous material and
does not render the prosecution evidence regarding the presence
and participation of the appellants doubtful. The plea of alibi is,
therefore, rejected.
Conclusion:
124. In view of the foregoing discussion and upon a
comprehensive appraisal of the entire evidence on record, we are
of the considered opinion that the prosecution has succeeded in
establishing the occurrence as alleged and the participation of the
accused-appellants therein beyond reasonable doubt. The ocular
testimony of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3, insofar as it relates to the
core of the occurrence and the fatal firearm assault upon the
deceased, inspires confidence and receives material corroboration
from the medical evidence. The discrepancies and omissions
pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants, as discussed
hereinabove, relate substantially to peripheral details and do not
demolish the substratum of the prosecution case.
125. Upon consideration of the entire evidence, we find no
perversity, illegality or infirmity in the findings recorded by the
learned trial Court. The conviction of the accused-appellants under
Sections 302/34, 504 and 506 IPC and of A3 is concerned, under
Section 3/25 of the Arms Act, is based upon a proper appreciation
of the evidence and does not call for interference by this Court.
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126. Accordingly, both the appeals being devoid of merit are
hereby rejected . The judgment and order of the trial court is
hereby affirmed .
127. All the accused-appellants are stated to be in jail. They shall
continue to remain in custody and shall serve out the sentences
awarded by the learned trial court.
128. Pending applications, if any, stands disposed of.
129. Let a copy of this judgment, along with the trial court
record, be transmitted forthwith to the court concerned for
information and necessary compliance.
(Zafeer Ahmad,J.) (Rajesh Singh Chauhan,J.)
October 30,2026
Shahnaz
Digitally signed by :-
SHAHNAZ BANO
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,
Lucknow Bench