Gabriel India Ltd vs New India Assurance Co. Ltd

Court
Punjab and Haryana High Court

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

RSA-586-2023 (O&M)
GABRIEL INDIA LTD.
. . . . Appellant
Vs.
New India Assurance Co. Ltd.
. . . . Respondent

Reserved on:04.011.2026
Pronounced on: 05.11.2026
Pronounced Fully/Operative Part: Fully

CORAM: HON’BLE MR JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA

Present: - Mr.T.K.A. Padmanabham, Advocate, for the appellant.

Mr.Abhimanyu Kalsy, Advocate, for the respondent.



DEEPAK GUPTA, J.
The appellant-plaintiff has filed the present regular second appeal
under Section 100 CPC, assailing the judgment & decree dated 03.09.2022 passed
by learned District Judge, Chandigarh, whereby its first appeal against the
judgment & decree dated 15.09.2018 passed by learned Civil Judge (Senior
Division), Chandigarh, dismissing its suit for recovery of ₹28,33,537/- along with
interest, has been dismissed.
2. Briefly, the appellant, a company engaged in the manufacture and sale
of auto-mobile components, obtained a Fire Floater Insurance Policy from the
respondent-insurance company covering its finished goods stock lying at various
warehouses across India. The policy was effective from 01.04.2012 to 31.03.2013,
with a total sum insured of ₹5 crore. On 05.08.2012, a fire broke out in a
warehouse situated at C/o Sayees, Survey No.215, opposite Karthika Foods Private
Limited, Boduppal, Nacharam, Hyderabad, resulting in damage to the appellant's
stock. The respondent appointed a surveyor, who assessed the net loss at
₹26,34,860/-. However, the insurance claim was repudiated vide letter dated
28.03.2014 on the ground that the warehouse, where the fire occurred was not
covered under the policy, the appellant having failed to intimate the change of
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location. The appellant instituted a suit for recovery of ₹28,33,537/- along with
interest.
3. The respondent contested the suit, asserting that the policy covered
stock at specifically declared locations and that shifting the stock to another
warehouse without communicating the change did not extend the insurance
coverage to the new premises.
4. Upon appreciation of the evidence, learned trial Court held that the
appellant had failed to establish its entitlement to the insurance claim and
dismissed the suit. The first Appellate Court independently examined the policy
conditions and affirmed the findings, holding that the respondent was justified in
repudiating the claim.
5.1 Assailing the concurrent findings, learned counsel for the appellant
contends that both Courts below have failed to appreciate the true nature of a Fire
Floater Policy. It is submitted that the subject matter of insurance was the finished
goods stock and not the warehouse building. The stock continued to belong to the
appellant and the risk insured against was fire, which admittedly occurred during
the currency of the policy.
5.2 It is further contended that the respondent appointed a surveyor,
assessed the loss, and called upon the appellant to furnish documents, including a
letter of subrogation and a pre-receipt. Such conduct, according to learned
counsel, establishes acceptance of the claim and precludes the insurer from
subsequently denying liability merely because the stock had been shifted to
another warehouse.
5.3 Attention has particularly been invited to the Floater Clause and
accompanying schedule stipulated in the Policy. Ld. Counsel has relied on GALADA
Power and Telecommunication Ltd. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (2016) 14
SCC 161.
6.1 On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent-insurance
company has supported the concurrent judgments of the Courts below. He has
specifically drawn the attention of this Court to Clause 13 of the insurance policy,

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which excludes loss or damage to the insured property, if it is removed to any
building or place other than the location specified in the policy, subject to certain
exceptions, which are not attracted in the present case. It is submitted that
although the policy was a Fire Floater Policy covering movable stocks at different
warehouses, such coverage was confined to the locations specified in the policy
schedule.
6.2 It is urged that the Floater Clause itself required the insured to
communicate any change in the addresses of the locations declared at the
inception of the policy. Admittedly, the fire occurred at a warehouse situated at an
address different from the declared location, and no intimation regarding such
change had been furnished to the respondent.
6.3 Learned counsel further submits that the appointment of a surveyor
and assessment of the loss did not amount to acceptance of liability or waiver of
the express terms of the policy.
6.4 Distinguishing the judgment in GALADA Power and
Telecommunication Ltd. (supra), it is contended that the respondent had
specifically invoked the non-coverage of the changed warehouse in its repudiation
letter dated 28.03.2014 and has not sought to introduce any new ground during
the litigation.
6.5 It is, therefore, urged that the concurrent findings suffer from no
perversity or legal infirmity warranting interference under Section 100 CPC. Prayer
is accordingly made for dismissal of the appeal.
7. Having considered the submissions and examined the judgments of
both Courts below as well as the relevant trial Court record, this Court finds no
ground warranting interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC.
8. The existence of the insurance policy, occurrence of fire and damage
to the appellant's stock are not in dispute. The controversy is confined to whether
the stock, admittedly shifted to a warehouse not specified in the policy schedule,
continued to enjoy insurance coverage notwithstanding the absence of prior
intimation or endorsement.

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9. A perusal of the policy conditions reveals that Clause 13, appearing
under the heading Exclusions—Fire Floater, specifically excludes loss or damage to
insured property removed to a building or place other than the one in which it is
stated to be insured. The exception relates to machinery and equipment
temporarily removed for repairs, cleaning, renovation or similar purposes for a
period not exceeding 60 days. Admittedly, the present case concerns finished
goods stock shifted to another warehouse and not machinery or equipment
temporarily removed for any such purpose. Consequently, the aforesaid exception
has no application.
10. More importantly, the Floater Clause expressly provides that the
aggregate sum insured is available for any one, more or all of the locations
specified in respect of movable property. It further requires the insured to
maintain proper internal audit and accounting procedures so that the total amount
at risk and the locations can be established at any particular time. The clause also
stipulates that changes in the addresses of locations specifically declared at
inception should be communicated.
11. Thus, the Floater Clause does not confer unrestricted geographical
coverage upon the insured merely because the subject matter of insurance
consists of movable goods. Its purpose is to permit the aggregate sum insured to
operate across the declared locations, without requiring an independent fixed sum
insured for each such location. The flexibility afforded by a floater arrangement
cannot be construed as dispensing with the requirement of identifying the
premises, where the insured stock is kept.
12. The schedule accompanying the policy contains the particulars of
warehouses and their respective stock values as on 31.03.2012. The
Hyderabad/Secunderabad warehouse declared therein was situated at Sayees, Plot
Nos.8B and 4, Rasool Pura, near Usha Divisional Office, Secunderabad–500003.
However, the fire occurred at C/o Sayees, Survey No.215, opposite Karthika Foods
Private Limited, Boduppal, Nacharam, Hyderabad–500078. These are two distinct
locations. The appellant has neither established that the latter premises formed
part of the declared locations nor produced any communication addressed to the

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respondent before the occurrence of fire intimating the shifting of stock to the new
warehouse.
13. The contention that insurance was obtained in respect of stock and
not the warehouse building is factually correct but legally insufficient to sustain the
appellant's claim. There is a clear distinction between the subject matter insured
and the location at which the insured risk is covered. Although the property
insured was movable stock, the contract expressly identified the locations at which
such stock was covered. The place where insured goods are stored is relevant to
the assessment of fire risk, having regard to the nature of the premises,
surrounding conditions, fire-safety arrangements and other underwriting
considerations. Therefore, the appellant cannot claim that the location of the
warehouse was wholly immaterial to the contract of insurance.
14. It is well settled that an insurance policy constitutes a contract
between the parties and its terms must ordinarily be construed as written. In
General Assurance Society Ltd. v. Chandmull Jain, AIR 1966 SC 1644, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court explained that the rights and obligations of the parties are
governed by the terms of the insurance contract. Likewise, in Oriental Insurance
Co. Ltd. v. Sony Cheriyan, (1999) 6 SCC 451, it was held that the insured cannot
claim anything beyond what is covered by the policy. In Export Credit Guarantee
Corporation of India Ltd. v. M/s Garg Sons International, (2014) 1 SCC 686, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that the terms of an insurance contract must be
strictly construed and that the Court cannot substitute a different bargain for the
one entered into by the parties.
15. Applying these principles, the express exclusion contained in Clause
13, read with the Floater Clause and the schedule of declared locations, leaves no
ambiguity regarding the extent of insurance coverage. The policy covered stock at
the specified locations, subject to its terms. Shifting the stock to an undeclared
warehouse without communicating the change to the insurer could not, by itself,
enlarge the scope of the contract. The requirement concerning location was not an
inconsequential procedural formality but formed part of the contractual
description of the insured risk.

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16. The appellant's further contention that the respondent, having
appointed a surveyor and processed the claim, must be deemed to have accepted
the change of location, is equally untenable. Appointment of a surveyor upon
receipt of intimation of loss is part of the ordinary process of investigating an
insurance claim. The surveyor's function is to ascertain the cause, nature and
extent of the loss. Such assessment does not, by itself, determine the insurer's
contractual liability. Similarly, calling for documents or obtaining a letter of
subrogation and pre-receipt cannot amount to an amendment of the insurance
contract or waiver of an express exclusion, particularly when no unequivocal
representation accepting coverage of the changed location has been established.
17. The surveyor's assessment of loss at ₹26,34,860/- is, therefore, not
decisive of the appellant's entitlement. The assessment of quantum becomes
relevant only when the loss is otherwise covered under the policy. Where the
insured event occurs at a location outside the contractual coverage, quantification
of the loss does not independently create liability against the insurer.
18. Learned counsel for the appellant has placed considerable reliance
upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in GALADA Power and
Telecommunication Ltd. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and another, (2016) 14
SCC 161, to contend that once the respondent-insurance company appointed a
surveyor, assessed the loss and proceeded to process the claim, it must be deemed
to have waived the objection regarding change of warehouse location.
19. In GALADA Power (supra), the dispute concerned a marine transit
insurance policy containing a duration clause requiring intimation of loss within the
prescribed period. Although the insurer appointed a surveyor and investigated the
claim, the subsequent repudiation letter did not invoke any breach of the duration
clause. It was only during the adjudicatory proceedings that the insurer sought to
rely upon the said condition. In these circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
held that the insurer, having omitted to invoke the duration clause in its
repudiation letter and having proceeded to investigate the claim, had waived its
right to subsequently rely upon that condition. The Court reiterated that waiver
involves voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right, which may be
inferred from conduct inconsistent with the continued assertion of that right.

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20. The factual and contractual position in the present case is materially
different. Here, the respondent specifically repudiated the claim vide letter dated
28.03.2014 on the ground that the warehouse, where the fire occurred was not
covered under the policy, as the appellant had failed to intimate the change of
location. Thus, unlike GALADA Power (supra), the ground on which the insurer
seeks to resist liability was expressly communicated to the insured at the time of
repudiation itself. The respondent has not sought to introduce any new or
additional ground during the course of litigation.
21. Furthermore, the objection in the present case does not merely
concern delayed intimation of an otherwise covered loss. It relates to the very
extent of the risk undertaken under the insurance contract. Clause 13 of the policy,
read with the Floater Clause and the schedule of declared warehouses, expressly
restricts coverage to the specified locations. The appellant has failed to establish
that the warehouse where the fire occurred had been brought within the ambit of
the policy before the occurrence of loss. The mere appointment of a surveyor to
ascertain the cause and quantum of damage, or calling for documents in
connection with processing the claim, cannot, in the absence of any unequivocal
conduct indicating acceptance of the changed location, be construed as waiver of
the contractual restriction.
22. The principle laid down in GALADA Power (supra) is not in dispute.
However, its application necessarily depends upon the nature of the contractual
condition, the ground actually taken in the repudiation letter and the conduct of
the insurer. In the present case, there is neither any abandonment of the ground of
repudiation nor any established representation by the respondent that the
changed warehouse had been accepted as an insured location. Consequently, the
aforesaid judgment does not advance the appellant's case.
23. The judgments of both Courts below reveal that the relevant policy
conditions, the schedule of warehouses and the evidence led by the parties have
been considered. The appellant's witness acknowledged the list of godowns
forming part of the policy, while no documentary evidence of prior intimation of
the changed warehouse was produced. The concurrent conclusion that the
affected warehouse was not covered by the insurance policy is, therefore, founded

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upon the contractual documents and evidence available on record. It cannot be
characterised as perverse or contrary to any material evidence.
24. It is equally well settled that the jurisdiction of the High Court under
Section 100 CPC is confined to substantial questions of law. In Hero Vinoth (Minor)
v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court explained that
interference with concurrent findings of fact is permissible where such findings are
perverse, based on no evidence, or arrived at by ignoring material evidence or
applying an erroneous legal principle. Merely because another interpretation of
the evidence may be possible does not furnish a ground for interference in second
appeal.
25. In the present case, the interpretation placed by both Courts below
upon the relevant insurance clauses is consistent with their plain language. The
findings are neither based upon a misreading of the documents nor suffer from any
legal infirmity warranting interference. No substantial question of law arises for
consideration.
26. Consequently, the present regular second appeal, being devoid of
merit, is dismissed. The judgments and decrees passed by both Courts below are
affirmed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.


(DEEPAK GUPTA)
05.11.2026 JUDGE
Vivek
Whether Speaking/reasoned Yes
Whether reportable No

Uploaded on:05.11.2026



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