Monika Verma vs Central Sanskrit University & Ors.
- Court
- Delhi High Court
$~4
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ W.P.(C) 3521/2025, CM APPL. 16498/2025, CM APPL. 27254/2026
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Date of Decision: 23 July, 2026.
MONIKA VERMA .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Rudra Vikram Singh, Mr.
Ashirvad Kumar Yadav, Mr. Tarshith
Bhardwaj and Ms. Rashmi,
Advocates.
versus
CENTRAL SANSKRIT UNIVERSITY & ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Gyan Prakash, Ms. Neeraj, Mr.
Vaibhav Raj, Advocates for R-1, 2
and 3.
Ms. Arushi Singh, Sr. Panel Counsel
with Mr. Vasuchit Anand, GP and
Ms. Amrisha Kumari & Ms. Manviya
Arun, Advocates for R-6 & 7.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV NARULA
JUDGMENT
SANJEEV NARULA, J. (Oral):
The Dispute
1. The controversy in the present petition lies in a narrow compass. The
question is whether the Central Sanskrit University could lawfully continue
to treat the Petitioner as a probationer for over five years and thereafter
terminate her services for alleged misconduct, without recourse to the
prescribed disciplinary process, despite the maximum permissible probation
period under the governing statutory framework having long expired. While
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some of the allegations against the Petitioner, including those concerning her
conduct towards students, are serious, this Court is not concerned with their
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merits. The challenge is confined to the legality of the office order dated 6
January, 2023 extending probation “till further orders”, the consequential
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actions culminating in the discharge order dated 9 December, 2024 and
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speaking order dated 10 December, 2024.
Factual background
2. Pursuant to Advertisement No. 02/2019, the Petitioner was selected
for appointment to the post of Assistant Librarian in the erstwhile Rashtriya
Sanskrit Sansthan, now the Central Sanskrit University. The offer of
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appointment dated 11 November, 2019 placed her in Academic Pay Level
10 and posted her at the Shri Sadashiv Campus, Puri. She joined the post on
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26 November, 2019.
3. Clause 1 of the offer of appointment prescribed a probationary period
of two years from the date of appointment. It further stipulated that the
period could be extended for a period not exceeding one year. During
probation, the Petitioner was liable to be discharged upon thirty days’ notice
or payment of salary and allowances in lieu thereof. Upon satisfactory
completion of probation, she was to be considered for confirmation.
4. Before joining the University, the Petitioner was holding a permanent
post of Technical Officer with CSIR-NISCAIR, subsequently renamed
CSIR-NIScPR. Her technical resignation was accepted and she was granted
lien over her substantive post for two years. The lien was thereafter extended
up to November, 2022. As the extended period approached expiry, she
repeatedly requested the University to intimate the status of her probation
and confirmation. The record shows communications sent in October and
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November, 2022, in which she specifically pointed out that her lien was
about to expire and that no formal decision concerning her confirmation had
been communicated.
5. The Petitioner initially served at the Puri Campus. A character
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certificate dated 16 December, 2020 recorded that her work in the library
was praiseworthy, that students and faculty members were satisfied with her
proficiency, and that there was nothing adverse against her at that campus.
The record also contains certificates acknowledging her contribution to
library activities at Puri. These documents do not conclude the issue of her
suitability, but they are relevant inasmuch as no contemporaneous adverse
assessment during the original probationary period has been placed before
the Court.
6. On her request, the Petitioner was transferred to the Ganganath Jha
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Campus at Prayagraj in June, 2022. On 14 December, 2022, the Director of
that Campus submitted a report to the Vice-Chancellor alleging that the
Petitioner was uncooperative, rude, inclined to engage in unnecessary
correspondence, and inattentive to the work assigned to her. The report
recommended that she be transferred elsewhere.
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7. Acting upon this report, the University issued an office order dated 6
January, 2023. It stated that the Petitioner’s conduct and performance of
duties had been reported to be unsatisfactory and extended her probation
“till further orders”. The order neither specified the period of extension nor
fixed any date for review. By then, the Petitioner had completed more than
three years of service.
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8. The Petitioner represented against the extension on 11 January,
2023. She asserted that no deficiency had been communicated during her
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service at Puri, that she had repeatedly sought a decision before expiry of
her lien, and that the order extending her probation indefinitely had been
passed after the maximum period permitted by her appointment letter. She
was thereafter transferred to the Bhopal Campus, where she joined in
February, 2023.
9. Complaints were subsequently received at Bhopal from students and
members of the staff concerning the Petitioner’s manner of dealing with
library users and her conduct within the campus. A local committee
examined the complaints and reported adversely against her. The Vice-
Chancellor thereafter constituted a four-member committee chaired by Prof.
Kavita Holey, who was stated to be external to the University.
10. The Petitioner appeared before the Committee in January, 2024. She
requested copies of the complaints and time to file a written response. An
initial set of complaints was supplied and she submitted a detailed reply on
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23 January, 2024.
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11. On 23 January, 2024, the University directed the Petitioner to remain
on “compulsory leave” until receipt of the final report of the Committee or
until further orders, whichever was earlier. The period was directed to be
adjusted against her earned leave. No statutory provision authorising such
compulsory leave was cited in the order.
12. Further complaints and their statements were made available
subsequently, and the Petitioner submitted another detailed response dated
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15 April, 2024. She denied the allegations, relied upon library records,
placed her own complaints on record, alleged that several complaints were
retaliatory, and sought an opportunity to cross-examine the complainants.
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13. The Committee held further meetings on 29 and 30 April, 2024. It
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interacted with students, members of the staff, the Petitioner and the
Director of the Bhopal Campus. Its report concluded that the complaints
were true and that the Petitioner was guilty of the misconduct attributed to
her.
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14. On 5 June, 2024, the University issued a show cause notice calling
upon the Petitioner to explain why appropriate action should not be taken.
The Petitioner sought further documents and submitted a detailed reply on
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3 July, 2024. She denied the findings, challenged the fairness of the
process, and reiterated her request for a proper opportunity to test the
allegations.
15. The matter was placed before the Executive Council in its meeting
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held on 30 August, 2024. The Executive Council resolved to discharge the
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Petitioner from probationary service. By Order No. 360 dated 9 December,
2024, the Petitioner was discharged with immediate effect and granted one
month’s pay in lieu of notice. The order referred to Statute 27 of the Second
Schedule to the Central Sanskrit Universities Act, 2020, the relevant
probation and confirmation rules, and the decision of the Executive Council.
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16. A speaking order followed on 10 December, 2024. It reproduced the
history of the complaints and the Committee’s conclusions. Among other
findings, it recorded that the Petitioner had spoilt the academic atmosphere
of the campus; had failed to improve despite advice; had misbehaved with
students and staff; had engaged in inappropriate conduct towards students;
and had committed misconduct which made her unfit for an educational
institution where minors were studying. The order stated that the Committee
had found her guilty of all the charged misconduct.
17. The speaking order further recorded that the process was neither a
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criminal trial nor an oral inquiry under the Central Civil Services
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. According to the
Executive Council, it was sufficient for the competent authority to satisfy
itself, after affording the Petitioner an opportunity, that the material
established misconduct and unsatisfactory performance. The order
concluded that she had committed grave misconduct and had failed to make
satisfactory progress during her extended period of probation.
18. The Petitioner had earlier instituted W.P.(C) 17153/2024 challenging
the show cause notice. After the notice culminated in the discharge order,
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that petition was withdrawn on 12 December, 2024, with liberty to
challenge both the discharge order and the show cause notice.
19. During the hearing of the present petition, a dispute arose regarding
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the applicable probation regime. By order dated 25 March, 2026, this Court
noted that the Petitioner relied upon Clauses 11.1 to 11.3 of the University
Grants Commission Regulations, 2018, whereas the University treated her as
“other academic staff” governed by Clause 11.5 and the instructions issued
by the Department of Personnel and Training. The University was directed
to file a short affidavit specifically addressing the applicability and effect of
paragraph 27 of the DoPT instructions, including its impact upon the
Petitioner’s status.
20. In the short affidavit filed pursuant to that order, the University
reiterated that an Assistant Librarian is not a “teacher” for the purposes of
Clause 11.1 of the UGC Regulations but falls within the category of “other
academic staff”. It relied upon Clause 11.5 to invoke the Central
Government instructions and asserted that the normal probationary period
was two years, capable of extension up to twice that period. The affidavit
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reproduced paragraphs 10 and 16 of the DoPT instructions, but did not
furnish any substantive answer to the operation of paragraph 27,
notwithstanding the specific direction issued by this Court.
Submissions on behalf of the Petitioner
21. Counsel for the Petitioner submits that Assistant Librarians form part
of the academic cadre and are governed by the UGC Regulations, 2018.
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Reliance is placed upon the UGC communication dated 8 June, 1998
stating that librarians should be treated as academic and non-vocational
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staff, and upon the UGC Public Notice dated 15 November, 2022 clarifying
that the Library Cadre from the level of Assistant Librarian upwards is
governed by the UGC Regulations, 2018.
22. On that basis, it is contended that Clauses 11.1 to 11.3 applied to the
Petitioner. Her probation could therefore continue only for one year,
extendible by one further year through a specific order passed before expiry
of the original period. No such order was passed.
23. In the alternative, counsel submits that even if the Petitioner is treated
as “other academic staff” and the DoPT instructions are applied through
Clause 11.5, the outer limit of probation had expired long before the
discharge. Paragraph 27 expressly provides that no employee may remain on
probation beyond twice the normal period and that, if no order of
confirmation, discharge or reversion is issued within eight weeks thereafter,
the employee shall be deemed to have successfully completed probation.
24. It is further argued that the discharge is punitive and stigmatic. The
allegations were not merely the occasion for evaluating suitability; their
truth was investigated, findings of guilt were recorded, and those findings
were expressly accepted by the Executive Council. The Petitioner could not,
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therefore, have been removed without a disciplinary inquiry.
Submissions on behalf of the University
25. Counsel for the University submits that the Petitioner accepted a two-
year period of probation under the appointment letter and cannot now
contend that the applicable period was one year. The UGC Regulations
consciously distinguish between teachers and other academic staff. A person
appointed as an Assistant Librarian is academic staff, but is not a teacher
unless appointed to teach Library Science. Clause 11.1 is therefore
inapplicable.
26. It is contended that Clause 11.5 attracts the DoPT instructions. Under
paragraph 16, probation could continue up to twice the normal period of two
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years. The order dated 6 January, 2023 was thus within the permissible
period.
27. On the merits, counsel emphasises the seriousness of the allegations.
It is submitted that complaints were received from a substantial number of
students and staff; an independent committee was constituted; the Petitioner
was supplied the complaints; she filed detailed replies; and she was afforded
opportunities to appear personally. The Executive Council considered her
explanations and concluded that she was unsuitable for continuation in an
educational institution.
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28. The University maintains that the order dated 9 December, 2024 is
an innocuous discharge simpliciter. The speaking order was issued only to
demonstrate that the decision was not arbitrary and that adequate
opportunity had been granted. The action was not a penalty and therefore did
not require a disciplinary inquiry.
Questions for determination
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29. The following questions arise for consideration:
i. Whether the Petitioner was governed by Clauses 11.1 to 11.3 of the
UGC Regulations, 2018 or by Clause 11.5 read with the DoPT instructions;
ii. Whether the Petitioner could lawfully be treated as a probationer on
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9 December, 2024;
iii. Whether the impugned discharge was simpliciter or was founded
upon findings of misconduct and was consequently punitive; and
iv. The relief to which the Petitioner is entitled, having regard to the
seriousness of the allegations.
The governing probation regime
30. The UGC Regulations, 2018 apply to university and college teachers,
librarians, Directors of Physical Education and other academic staff. They
prescribe qualifications and service conditions separately for the different
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cadres. The UGC Public Notice dated 15 November, 2022 removes any
possible doubt that Assistant Librarians and the higher Library Cadre are
governed by the UGC Regulations rather than the Model Cadre Recruitment
Rules applicable generally to non-teaching posts.
31. The fact that the post is governed by the UGC Regulations does not,
however, determine whether every provision applicable to a “teacher”
necessarily applies to an Assistant Librarian.
32. Clause 11.1 expressly provides that the minimum period of probation
of a “teacher” shall be one year, extendible by a maximum of one further
year. Clause 11.2 again refers specifically to a “teacher on probation”.
Clause 11.5, on the other hand, makes the other Central Government rules
concerning probation and confirmation applicable mutatis mutandis .
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33. The UGC letter dated 8 June, 1998 was issued on a reference
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concerning the treatment of librarians as teachers for non-vocational
purposes. The operative clarification states that librarians are to be regarded
as academic and non-vocational staff. It establishes their academic character
but does not necessarily equate every librarian with a teacher for every
service condition.
34. The short affidavit filed by the University also draws attention to the
provisions governing career advancement, which distinguish librarians who
do not teach Library Science from teachers in institutions where Library
Science is itself a teaching department. No material has been placed before
the Court to show that the Petitioner was appointed to impart instruction in a
Department of Library Science. Her substantive appointment was to the post
of Assistant Librarian.
35. For purposes of the present case, the University’s classification of the
Petitioner as “other academic staff”, rather than a teacher governed directly
by Clauses 11.1 to 11.3, may therefore be accepted. That conclusion,
however, does not assist the University. It brings Clause 11.5 and the DoPT
instructions squarely into operation.
Effect of the DoPT instructions
36. The relevant Central Government instructions are contained in Office
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Memorandum No. 28020/3/2018-Estt.(C) dated 11 March, 2019 and the
consolidated instructions concerning probation and confirmation. Paragraph
16 permits extension only by a specified period, requires periodic review,
discourages long extensions at one time, and fixes twice the normal
probationary period as the absolute ceiling. Paragraph 19 requires the
decision to confirm or extend probation to be taken within six to eight weeks
of the expiry of the initial period and communicated with reasons. It also
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requires that deficiencies be conveyed sufficiently in advance to afford an
opportunity for improvement.
37. Paragraph 27 is more explicit. It provides that an employee shall not,
in any circumstance, be retained on probation beyond twice the normal
prescribed period. If no order confirming, discharging or reverting the
employee is issued within eight weeks after expiry of that maximum period,
the employee is deemed to have successfully completed probation.
Paragraph 27 reads as under:
“ 27. The date from which confirmation should be given effect is the date
following the date of satisfactory completion of the prescribed period of
probation or the extended period of probation, as the case may be. The
decision to confirm the probationer or to extend the period of probation as
the case may be should be communicated to the probationer normally within
6 to 8 weeks. Probation should not be extended for more than a year and, in
no circumstance, an employee should be kept on probation for more than
double the normal prescribed period of probation. The officer will be
deemed to have successfully completed the probation period if no order
confirming, discharging or reverting the officer is issued within eight weeks
after expiry of double the normal period of prescribed probation.”
38. The scheme thus requires three distinct stages. There is first the
normal probationary period. If the performance requires further assessment,
there may be an extension for a specified period, accompanied by periodic
review. Finally, upon reaching the outer limit, the employer must act within
the stipulated eight weeks. The instructions do not contemplate a state of
perpetual probation dependent entirely upon administrative inaction.
39. Applying even the most favourable interpretation advanced by the
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University, the result is clear. The Petitioner joined on 26 November, 2019.
On the University’s case, the normal probationary period was two years.
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Twice that period expired on 25 November, 2023. Eight weeks thereafter
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expired on 20 January, 2024. By that date, no order had been issued
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confirming, discharging or reverting the Petitioner.
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40. The order dated 23 January, 2024 placing her on compulsory leave
does not answer paragraph 27. It was passed after expiry of the stipulated
period and, in any event, was neither an order of confirmation, discharge nor
reversion.
41. Nor can the pendency of complaints or an inquiry arrest the operation
of paragraph 27. The provision speaks of an “order” passed by the
competent authority. An ongoing administrative process is not a substitute
for one of the three determinations expressly contemplated. Had the
University considered the complaints sufficiently serious, it could have
passed an appropriate order within the permissible probationary period or
invoked the disciplinary power available under the Statutes. What it could
not do was leave the Petitioner’s status unresolved and thereafter revive the
power of probationary discharge at a time of its choosing.
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42. There is a further difficulty with the order dated 6 January, 2023.
The appointment letter permitted extension for a period not exceeding one
year. The order was passed after more than three years of service and
extended probation “till further orders”. Even on the University’s own
reliance upon paragraph 16 of the DoPT instructions, an extension had to be
for a specified period, subject to periodic review, and not for an indefinite
duration.
43. It is unnecessary to finally resolve the conflict between the stricter
condition in the appointment letter, which permitted only one year’s
extension, and the broader four-year limit now claimed by the University.
Even if the University is granted the full benefit of the four-year period,
paragraph 27 had operated by January, 2024. The Petitioner could not
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thereafter be treated as a probationer.
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44. The short affidavit filed pursuant to the order dated 25 March, 2026
does not confront this consequence. It quotes paragraphs 10 and 16 to
establish the normal period and the power of extension, but does not explain
why paragraph 27 would not apply. Once the University invokes the DoPT
instructions through Clause 11.5, it cannot adopt the provision authorising
extension while disregarding the provision which brings probation to an end.
Deemed completion and confirmation
45. The law concerning deemed confirmation depends principally upon
the language of the governing rules. In High Court of Madhya Pradesh v.
1
Satya Narayan Jhavar , the Supreme Court identified three categories of
cases. Where no maximum period is prescribed, continuation beyond the
initial period does not ordinarily result in confirmation. Where a maximum
period is fixed and no contrary condition exists, confirmation may be
deemed to follow upon expiry of that period. In the third category, even
where a maximum period is prescribed, the rules may require a specific act,
such as passing a test or an express assessment, without which confirmation
does not follow. This framework was reiterated in Durgabai Deshmukh
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Memorial Senior Secondary School v. J.A.J. Vasu Sena .
46. The present case does not require confirmation to be inferred merely
from the fixation of a maximum period. Paragraph 27 itself supplies the
consequence. It expressly deems the employee to have successfully
completed probation where the employer fails to pass any of the stipulated
orders within eight weeks after expiry of twice the normal period. The rule
1
(2001) 7 SCC 161
2 st
Civil Appeal No. 5926 of 2019, decided on 21 August, 2019
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is therefore not one of mere administrative expectation. It creates the status
which the employer’s inaction would otherwise indefinitely withhold.
47. Paragraph 24 states that a specific order of confirmation should be
issued once the case is cleared from all angles. That requirement cannot be
used to perpetuate probation after paragraph 27 has operated. The formal
order records and gives administrative effect to the employee’s status; it
does not confer upon the employer a power to nullify the express deeming
consequence by simply declining to issue the document.
48. The decision of the Calcutta High Court in Debrup Hui v. Union of
3
India , concerns the same DoPT instructions. It holds that an employee
cannot be retained on probation beyond twice the normal period together
with the stipulated eight weeks and that a subsequent termination as a
probationer is unsustainable. The reasoning on the operation of paragraph 27
is persuasive. It is not necessary, however, to adopt the broader observation
in that judgment that confirmation must necessarily relate back to the expiry
of the initial period. For the present case, it is sufficient to hold that the
Petitioner was deemed to have successfully completed probation upon
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expiry of the eight-week period following 25 November, 2023.
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49. Accordingly, with effect from 21 January, 2024, the Petitioner
ceased to be a Petitioner. Although the University continued to possess the
power to inquire into allegations of misconduct and take disciplinary action
in accordance with law, it could no longer resort to discharge on the footing
that she remained a probationer.
50. The conclusion would be no different were the Petitioner regarded as
a teacher directly governed by Clauses 11.1 to 11.3. Under that regime,
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probation could continue only for one year, extendible by one further year
through a specific order passed before expiry of the original period. Thus, on
either view of her classification, the Petitioner could not lawfully be treated
as being on probation in December, 2024.
Whether the discharge was simpliciter
51. There is an additional reason why the impugned action cannot be
sustained. Even assuming that the Petitioner could lawfully have been
treated as a probationer, the material on record does not disclose a discharge
simpliciter.
52. It is settled that a probationer may be discharged on the ground of
unsuitability without recourse to a formal disciplinary inquiry. The position
is, however, different where the employer embarks upon an inquiry into
specific allegations, records findings of misconduct and makes those
findings the basis of the order of discharge. In such a case, the allegations
cease to be the mere motive for the action and become its foundation,
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rendering the termination punitive in nature.
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53. In the present case, the discharge order dated 9 December, 2024
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cannot be read in isolation from the speaking order dated 10 December,
2024, which forms part of the same decision. The speaking order records
that the Committee found the Petitioner “guilty of all the charged
misconduct”, accepts findings of harassment, indecent conduct and other
grave misconduct, and concludes that she is unfit for continuation in an
educational institution. The counter affidavit similarly states that the action
was founded upon “substantial issues of grave misconduct while continuing
3
(2025) 2 HCC (Cal) 1
4
Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences , (1999) 3 SCC 60;
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under probation”.
54. The allegations were thus not merely the motive for assessing the
Petitioner’s suitability. They were investigated, held proved, and made the
very basis of her removal. The impugned action was therefore punitive in
nature and could not have been sustained as a discharge simpliciter.
The opportunity afforded to the Petitioner
55. It would not be correct to hold that the Petitioner was afforded no
opportunity at all. She was supplied with the complaints in stages, submitted
detailed written replies, appeared before the Committee, and was thereafter
issued a show cause notice. The University did undertake a process of
hearing her version.
56. The difficulty, however, lies elsewhere. The process adopted was not
a disciplinary inquiry into charges of misconduct. The Petitioner was not
served with a formal memorandum of charges, the evidence of the
complainants was not recorded in her presence, and her request to test the
allegations through cross-examination was declined. More importantly, the
Committee had already returned findings that the complaints were true
before the show cause notice was issued. The notice therefore invited a
response to conclusions that had substantially crystallised, rather than
forming part of the process by which those conclusions were to be reached.
57. The speaking order itself recognises that the University did not
undertake a disciplinary proceeding and proceeded instead on the footing
that such a process was unnecessary. That approach may have been
sufficient had the University merely been assessing the suitability of a
probationer. It could not, however, sustain findings of misconduct carrying
General Manager, Bank of Baroda v. Ashok Kumar Singh , 2026 INSC 589.
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punitive consequences, particularly after the Petitioner had ceased to be a
probationer. If the allegations warranted removal from service, the
University was required to proceed under the applicable disciplinary
framework.
Statute 27 of the Central Sanskrit Universities Act, 2020
58. Statute 27 of the Second Schedule to the Central Sanskrit Universities
Act, 2020 provides a complete framework for action where misconduct is
alleged against a teacher, a member of the academic staff or another
employee.
59. It authorises suspension pending action; vests the power of removal
for misconduct in the Executive Council in respect of teachers and other
academic staff; requires a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the
proposed action; and stipulates the prescribed majority where a regularly
appointed employee is removed.
60. The discharge order refers to Statute 27, but the University did not in
substance exercise the statutory power of removal for misconduct. It treated
the Petitioner as a probationer, paid her one month’s salary in lieu of notice,
disclaimed the penal character of the action, and expressly stated that no oral
disciplinary inquiry was required.
61. Mere citation of Statute 27 cannot alter the true character of the
decision. An action consciously taken as a probationary discharge cannot
retrospectively be sustained as a disciplinary removal of a regular employee.
The two powers rest upon different conditions, procedures and
consequences.
62. Once the Petitioner had successfully completed probation by
operation of paragraph 27 of the DoPT instructions, the University remained
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free to proceed against her under Statute 27. That lawful route was not
followed. Instead, the University conflated the power to assess a probationer
with the power to punish misconduct. The impugned orders are vitiated by
that fundamental error.
The compulsory leave order
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63. The order dated 23 January, 2024 directing the Petitioner to remain
on compulsory leave and debiting the period against her earned leave is also
unsustainable.
64. No rule authorising the University to compel an employee to remain
on leave at the cost of her accumulated leave has been cited. If the
allegations warranted removal of the Petitioner from the workplace pending
inquiry, Statute 27 expressly permitted suspension. The University could not
achieve the same result by directing compulsory leave and reducing the
Petitioner’s earned leave balance.
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65. The order dated 23 January, 2024 must consequently be set aside
and the earned leave debited pursuant thereto restored.
Relief and Directions
66. The setting aside of the impugned orders does not amount to a
declaration that the complaints are false or that the Petitioner is innocent of
the allegations. The Committee’s findings cannot be sustained as concluded
findings of guilt, but the underlying complaints and material remain
available to the University for action in accordance with law.
67. While reinstatement must follow from the setting aside of the
impugned orders, the question of back wages requires separate
consideration. The illegality in the present case concerns both the
Petitioner’s status and the procedure adopted for her removal. The
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allegations themselves remain to be adjudicated. It would therefore be
inappropriate either to deny all monetary relief at this stage or to grant full
back wages before the disciplinary process is concluded. The intervening
period shall be regulated in the manner directed below.
68. For the reasons recorded above, the writ petition is allowed in the
following terms:
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i. The office order dated 6 January, 2023 extending the Petitioner’s
probation is quashed.
ii. The Petitioner was deemed to have successfully completed probation
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upon expiry of eight weeks after 25 November, 2023. She could not be
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treated as a probationer with effect from 21 January, 2024.
iii. The University shall issue a formal order recording the Petitioner’s
successful completion of probation and confirmation in service within four
weeks from the date of this judgment.
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iv. The order dated 23 January, 2024 placing the Petitioner on
compulsory leave is set aside. Any earned leave debited pursuant to that
order shall be restored to her leave account within four weeks.
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v. The show cause notice dated 5 June, 2024, insofar as it proceeds on
the premise that the Committee’s findings had conclusively established guilt
and contemplated action by way of probationary discharge, cannot be
sustained.
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vi. The discharge order dated 9 December, 2024 and the speaking order
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dated 10 December, 2024 are quashed.
vii. The Petitioner shall be reinstated in service with continuity within
four weeks. Reinstatement shall not preclude the University from placing
her under suspension in accordance with Statute 27 or assigning her non-
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W.P.(C) 3521/2025 Page 19 of 21
student-facing duties, if considered necessary by a reasoned order.
viii. The University shall be at liberty to institute fresh disciplinary
proceedings under Statute 27 of the Second Schedule to the Central Sanskrit
Universities Act, 2020, on the basis of the underlying complaints and
material. The findings recorded by the earlier committees and in the
speaking order shall not be treated as binding or conclusive in such
proceedings.
ix. If the University elects to initiate disciplinary proceedings, the
memorandum of charges shall be issued within six weeks. The proceedings
shall, as far as practicable, be concluded within six months thereafter,
subject to the Petitioner’s cooperation.
x. The Petitioner shall be entitled to continuity of service for the period
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between 9 December, 2024 and her reinstatement. Salary from the date of
actual reinstatement, or subsistence allowance in the event of suspension,
shall be paid in accordance with the applicable rules.
xi. The claim for back wages for the period between discharge and
reinstatement shall abide by the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings. If
the Petitioner is exonerated, she shall be entitled to full back wages and
consequential monetary benefits. If a penalty is imposed, the competent
authority shall regulate the period in accordance with law. If no disciplinary
proceedings are initiated within the period stipulated above, the Petitioner
shall be entitled to full back wages for the intervening period.
69. Nothing stated in this judgment shall be construed as an expression
upon the truth or falsity of the allegations against the Petitioner. All issues of
fact are left open for determination in accordance with law.
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W.P.(C) 3521/2025 Page 20 of 21
70. The writ petition is allowed in the above terms. The pending
applications also stand disposed of.
SANJEEV NARULA, J
JULY 23, 2026 /as
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