VANI RAM BUNKAR vs STATE AND ORS.

[2026:RJ-JD:49161]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
AT JODHPUR
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 7166/2006
CNR: RJHC010298192006 | URN: CW / 16694U / 2006
Vani Ram Bunkar S/o Shri Peeru Bunkar, aged about 32 years,
R/o Bhamakhera, Post Sadari, Teshil Relmagra Dist. Rajsamand
(Raj).
VERSUS
1. State of Rajasthan, through the Director cum Special
Secretary, Rural Development & Panchayati Raj Department
Govt. of Rajasthan, Jaipur.
2. The Director, Secondary Education, Rajasthan, Bikaner.
3. The Chief Executive Officer cum Secretary, Zila Parishad,
Rajsamand.
4. District Education Officer (Elementary Education), Rajsamand.
5. Ratan Lal Rager S/o Shri Gokul Chand Rager, Teacher Grade-
III, C/o Zila Parishad Rajsamand.
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Vikram Singh Choudhary
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Parvat Singh Panwar, Dy. G.C.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BIPIN GUPTA
Judgment/Order
Reportable
Date of hearing and conclusion of arguments 07.10.2026
Date on which the judgment was reserved 07.10.2026
Whether the full judgment or only the operative
Full Judgment
part is pronounced
Date of pronouncement 16.10.2026
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1. The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner
contending, inter alia , that he had applied pursuant to the
advertisement issued in 1998 for the post of Teacher Grade-III,
but was not selected on the ground that he possessed a Senior
Secondary School (Vocational) qualification, which was not
considered equivalent to Senior Secondary (Academic), and that
he was, therefore, required to undergo a bridge course before
being considered eligible for appointment.
2. The petitioner had stated in his writ petition that the
petitioner had obtained the marks to the tune of 71.56%;
however, he was not given appointment for the reason that the
petitioner was holding a Senior Secondary School (Vocational)
Examination which was not equivalent to Senior Secondary
(Academic), and, therefore, he had to undergo a bridge course. It
is further stated in the writ petition that the petitioner underwent
a bridge course in the year 2000 and thus, became entitled for
appointment on the post of Teacher Grade-III.
2.1 It is also stated in the writ petition that the Hon'ble High Court
in Dinesh Chand Khatik v. State of Rajasthan ; S.B. Civil Writ
Petition No. 507 of 2002 (Decided on: 10.10.2003), has directed
to consider the marks obtained by a petitioner in the case of
Senior Secondary (Vocational) Examination treating it to be the
equivalent qualification of Senior Secondary (Academic)
Examination. Furthermore, a person less meritorious than the
petitioner, namely, Ratan Lal Raigar, son of Gopal Chand Raigar,
has been granted appointment to the post of Teacher Grade-III.
2.2 It was also stated that several requests were made by the
petitioner to the respondents for granting him appointment and
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even several writ petitions were decided wherein it has been held
that the Senior Secondary (Vocational) Examination is equivalent
to Senior Secondary (Academic) Examination. Relying upon the
said judgments, the petitioner approached the respondents
several times; however, he was not granted appointment.
Consequently, he preferred a notice for demand of justice on
23.02.2005.
2.3 It was also stated in the writ petition that in the reply to the
said notice, a factual report was sent to him on 19.07.2005,
wherein it was stated that 164 posts had been advertised for the
post of Teacher Grade-III and the same have been filled pursuant
to advertisement No. 06/1998, and appointment could be given to
the petitioner, only if the State so deem fit.
2.4 Accordingly, it has been prayed that the writ petition may be
allowed and the petitioner may be granted appointment on the
post of Teacher Grade-III in SC category with all consequential
benefits, from the date on when a person less meritorious than
the petitioner has been granted appointment. It has also been
prayed in the writ petition that if necessary, the appointment of
respondent No. 5 may be quashed and the petitioner may be
granted appointment in his place.
2.5 Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the petitioner
had applied for appointment but was wrongly denied appointment
merely on ground that the petitioner did not possess the Senior
Secondary (Academic) qualification and had only Senior
Secondary (Vocational) qualification. Therefore, the denial is
wrong, as the Hon'ble Apex Court, in the case Sunita Sharma vs
State of Rajasthan in Civil Appeal No. 5554/1998 and other
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connected matters (Decided on 31.12.2001), has held that the
qualification of Senior Secondary (Vocational) is equivalent to
Senior Secondary (Academic) of the Board. Therefore, he
submitted that once it has already been held by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the year 2001 itself, there remains no impediment for the
respondents to have denied the appointment to the petitioner for
the post of Teacher Grade-III merely on the ground that the
petitioner does not possess the Senior Secondary (Academic)
qualification and possesses Senior Secondary (Vocational)
qualification.
2.6 Learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon the
following judgments to buttress his arguments:
(i) Tej Prakash Pathak & Ors. v. Rajasthan High
Court and Ors. ; 2024 INSC 847.
(ii) Gopal Lal Suthar vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. ;
2005 (3) RDD 204 (Raj.) (DB).
(iii) Gaurav Sankhala v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. ;
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5851/2004 (Decided on
25.05.2005).
(iv) Panna Lal Joshi v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. ;
D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 28/2005 (Decided on
21.04.2006).
2.7 Learned counsel for the petitioner, lastly, submitted that the
petitioner was not required to have the qualification of Senior
Secondary (Academic), and his qualification of Senior Secondary
(Vocational) is sufficient, as the same stands on the same
pedestal, as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sunita
Sharma (Supra) . Learned counsel for the petitioner, on the other
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hand, also submitted that even otherwise, if they are to be treated
as different, then also the petitioner had passed the bridge course
in the year 2000, and, therefore, having passed the bridge course,
the denial of appointment by the respondents is illegal and such
action of the respondents is liable to be quashed and set aside.
3. Per contra , learned counsel for the respondents submitted
that the petitioner was not holding the qualification required under
the advertisement, which was Senior Secondary (Academic). He
further submitted that persons, who were holding Senior
Secondary (Vocational) were to be granted appointment only if
they had completed the bridge course in the year 1999. Learned
counsel for the respondents further submitted that the petitioner
had appeared in the examination which was conducted by the
Board as a special examination, but the petitioner did not succeed
in the examination in the year 1999, and, therefore, the
appointment was not given to him.
3.1 Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that post-
1999, even if the petitioner completed his bridge course in the
year 2000, then also it would not create any right in favor of the
petitioner, as the petitioner has not passed the bridge course as
required to be passed in the year 1999. Learned counsel for the
respondents also submitted that the writ petition has been filed by
gross delay. The advertisement was issued in the year 1998 and
the result was declared thereafter. Immediately, thereafter, the
petitioner, on coming to know that he has not been given
appointment in spite of obtaining marks to the tune of 71.56% in
the year 1998–99 itself, kept silent. The petitioner woke up only
when certain orders came to be passed by this Court either in the
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year 2002, 2003 and 2004; and thereafter, after a delay of almost
5 years from the date of declaration of the result, the notice for
Demand of Justice was given by him.
3.2 Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that a person
who is sleeping over his rights cannot be granted any benefit if he
wakes up from slumber, and, therefore, on the sole ground of
delay and laches, the present writ petition is liable to be
dismissed.
3.3 Learned counsel for the respondents also placed reliance upon
the judgments to contend that the judgment of Sunita Sharma
(Supra) was a judgment which was not to be treated as a
precedent, and subsequently, the Courts have categorically held
and which has been upheld by the Hon'ble Apex Court also that
the qualification of Senior Secondary (Vocational) is not equivalent
to the qualification of Senior Secondary (Academic) :
(i) Virendra Singh vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.,
in Civil Appeal No. 9505–9506/2019, (Decided on
18.12.2019).
(ii) Sumitra & Others v. State of Rajasthan; 2023
Supreme (Raj) 1754.
3.4 Learned counsel for the respondent therefore submitted that
once the issue is settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court, no right
remains with the petitioner to claim that the Senior Secondary
(Vocational) is equivalent to Senior Secondary (Academic) and to
seek appointment.
4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
material available on record.
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5. This Court finds that the advertisement for the post of
Teacher Grade-III was issued in the year 1998. Admittedly, the
petitioner did not possess the requisite qualifications at the
relevant time and did not challenge the action of the respondent
within a reasonable period. It was only in the year 2006, after a
lapse of more than 7 years, the petitioner woke up from the
slumber and approached this Court by filing the present writ
petition, contending therein that a similar situated person had
been granted the benefit in Dinesh Chand Khatik (Supra) . It is
further evident from the record that, despite the aforesaid
judgment having been delivered on 10.10.2003, the petitioner
waited for almost another three years before instituting the
present proceedings. No satisfactory explanation per se has been
furnished for such prolonged inaction.
5.1 This Court further finds that the explanation offered by the
petitioner, namely, that he had been approaching the respondent
authorities from time to time for consideration of his case in the
light of various judicial pronouncements, is insufficient to justify
the inordinate delay in approaching this Court. It is a settled
principle of law that mere submission of representations does not
extend the period of limitation or revive a stale claim. Repeated
representations, in the absence of a fresh and legally sustainable
cause of action, cannot provide a justification for approaching this
Court after an unreasonable lapse of time. The petitioner was
required to challenge the action of the respondent with due
diligence and cannot seek to overcome the consequences of his
own inaction merely by relying upon representations allegedly
submitted to the authorities.
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5.2 It is well settled that the jurisdiction of this Court under Article
226 of the Constitution of India is discretionary in nature and that
the grant of relief may be declined where a litigant approaches the
Court after an inordinate and unexplained delay. Although no fixed
period of limitation ordinarily governs the institution of a writ
petition, the petitioner is nevertheless required to approach the
Court within a reasonable time. In determining whether relief
should be granted, the Court must consider the length of the
delay, the explanation offered therefor, the nature of the relief
sought, and the circumstances of the case. In the present matter,
the petitioner remained inactive for several years after the
issuance of the advertisement in 1998. The petitioner has not
demonstrated any exceptional circumstance warranting the
exercise of discretionary jurisdiction in his favour despite such
delay and laches.
5.3 The reliance placed by the petitioner on judgments delivered
by different Co-ordinate Benches of this Court, which, according to
him, followed the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case
of Sunita Sharma (Supra) , also does not advance his case.
Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that, in Sunita
Sharma (Supra) , the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the
qualification of Senior Secondary (Vocational) was equivalent to
Senior Secondary (Academic) and, consequently, the petitioner
could not have been denied appointment in 1998 on the ground
that he had not completed the bridge course. However, the said
contention cannot be accepted in view of the specific observations
made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Sunita Sharma (Supra) ,
wherein the decision was expressly stated not to be treated as a
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precedent. The fact that the said judgment was subsequently
relied upon in certain proceedings cannot, by itself, confer an
enforceable right upon the petitioner contrary to the legal position
subsequently clarified by the Hon'ble Apex Court. This Court
further takes note of the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in
Virendra Singh (Supra) , wherein it was categorically held that
the decision in Sunita Sharma (Supra) could not be treated as
precedent for establishing the equivalence of Senior Secondary
(Vocational) with Senior Secondary (Academic). The subsequent
judgment of this High Court, which relied upon the judgments in
the case of Rajpal Singh & Ors. v. Director, Gramin Vikas &
Panchayati Raj Vibhag, Jaipur & Ors. ; D.B. Civil Appeal Writ
No. 857/1997 and State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Mukesh
Kumar ; RLW 1999 (2) Rajasthan 1305 , has held that Senior
Secondary (Vocational) is not equivalent to Senior Secondary
(Academic).
5.4 In Virendra Singh (Supra) , the Hon’ble Supreme Court
upheld the High Court’s view that Senior Secondary (Vocational) is
not equivalent to Senior Secondary (Academic). It further held
that the decision in Sunita Sharma (Supra) was inapplicable, as
it was expressly confined to the peculiar facts and circumstances
of those appeals and was not to be treated as a precedent. The
relevant paragraph of the judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:-
“5 The review petitions were filed both by the State of
Rajasthan and the respondent. The review petition filed
by the State has been allowed by the impugned
judgment and order of the High Court dated 31 July
2018. The High Court on a careful evaluation has come
to the conclusion that the Senior Secondary
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(Vocational) is not equivalent to Senior Secondary
(Academic) and, in coming to the conclusion, has relied
on the decisions of the High Court in Rajpal Singh & Ors
v Director, Gramin Vikas & Panchayati Raj Vibhag,
Jaipur & Ors and State of Rajasthan & Anr. v Mukesh
Kumar Jhajharia & Anr.
6. We find no reason to differ with the view which has
been taken by the High Court. The decision of this Court
in Sunita Sharma (supra), which was relied on by the
learned Single Judge in the original order dated 23 July
2013, would not be of any assistance to the case of the
respondent for the simple reason that in paragraph 8 of
the judgment, this Court held that:
“It is made clear that we have passed this order
in the peculiar circumstances arising in these
appeals and the same shall not be treated as a
precedent.”
5.5 In view of the aforesaid legal position, the petitioner cannot
claim that his qualification of Senior Secondary (Vocational) must
be treated as equivalent to Senior Secondary (Academic) so as to
dispense with the requirement of the bridge course. The petitioner
has failed to establish any legal basis for such equivalence in the
absence of the prescribed bridge course qualification.
5.6 This Court also finds that the petitioner, without challenging
the action of the respondent in the year 1998, accepted the
circular and undertook the bridge course. However, as stated in
the reply filed by the respondent, the petitioner appeared in the
bridge course examination in 1999 but failed to qualify. He
subsequently passed the bridge course only in the year 2000. The
respondent has specifically stated that, under the circular, only
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those candidates who had passed the bridge course in 1999 were
eligible for consideration.
5.7 The aforesaid circumstances are material because eligibility
for appointment must ordinarily be determined with reference to
the applicable recruitment rules and the conditions prescribed for
the selection in question. A candidate who fails to fulfill an
essential eligibility condition within the prescribed period cannot
ordinarily claim consideration on the basis of a qualification
acquired subsequently, unless the governing rules or the terms of
recruitment permit such consideration. In the present case, the
petitioner has not demonstrated any provision under which
passing the bridge course in 2000 could retrospectively cure his
failure to qualify in 1999 or render him eligible under the
advertisement in question.
5.8 Consequently, the subsequent acquisition of the bridge
course qualification by the petitioner in the year 2000 does not
assist his case. The relevant question is not merely whether the
petitioner eventually acquired the qualification, but whether he
satisfied the applicable eligibility conditions within the prescribed
period for the recruitment in question. In view of the respondent's
specific stand regarding the requirement to pass the bridge course
in 1999, the petitioner has failed to establish that he fulfilled the
requisite conditions within the stipulated period.
5.9 This Court further observes that the claim of parity with
another candidate cannot be considered in isolation from the
applicable eligibility requirements and the circumstances in which
relief was granted in the other proceedings. The grant of relief to
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one candidate does not automatically entitle every other person to
identical relief, irrespective of the applicable rules, the facts of the
individual case, or the delay in approaching the Court. Each claim
must be examined on its own merits and in accordance with the
governing legal principles. The petitioner must independently
establish an enforceable legal right to the relief sought and cannot
rely solely upon the relief granted in another cases to overcome
the deficiencies in his own claim.
5.10 It is also pertinent to observe that the grant of relief under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India must be founded upon an
established legal right and a corresponding legal obligation on the
part of the respondent. The discretionary jurisdiction of this Court
cannot be exercised merely on equitable considerations when the
petitioner has failed to establish fulfillment of the prescribed
eligibility conditions and has approached the Court after an
unexplained and substantial delay. In the present case, the
petitioner has neither established that his vocational qualification
was equivalent to the prescribed academic qualification without
completion of the bridge course nor demonstrated that he passed
the bridge course within the period stated to be applicable to the
recruitment.
5.11 On an overall consideration of the facts and circumstances of
the case, this Court finds that the petitioner has failed to establish
any ground warranting interference with the action of the
respondent. The inordinate delay in instituting the writ petition,
the absence of a satisfactory explanation for the delay, the failure
to establish the requisite eligibility within the prescribed period,
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and the legal position concerning the equivalence of the
qualifications cumulatively weigh against the grant of relief. This
Court, therefore, finds no justification for exercising its
discretionary jurisdiction in favour of the petitioner or for granting
any benefit in the present proceedings.
6. For the reasons stated herein above, the present writ petition
is dismissed .
7. All pending applications, if any, also stand dismissed.
(BIPIN GUPTA),J
211/Amit Kumar
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