Rajesh Bansal vs Koninklijke Philips Electronics N V

$~34 & 35
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ RFA(OS)(COMM) 17/2018
K K BANSAL .....Appellant
Through: Ms. Swathi Sukumar, Sr. Adv.
with Mr. S. Santanam Swaminadhan, Mr.
Naveen Nagarjuna, Mr. Ritik Raghuwanshi,
Mr. Kartik Malhotra, Ms. Shreya Mansi
James, Mr. Rishika Aggarwal and Mr.
Anshu Tulsyan, Advs.
versus
KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS ELECTRONICS NV
.....Respondent
Through: Mr. C M Lall, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. Pravin Anand, Ms. Vaishali Mittal, Mr.
Siddhant Chamola and Mr. Gursimran Singh
Narula, Advs.
+ RFA(OS)(COMM) 18/2018
RAJESH BANSAL .....Appellant
Through: Ms. Swathi Sukumar, Sr. Adv.
with Mr. S. Santanam Swaminadhan, Mr.
Naveen Nagarjuna, Mr. Ritik Raghuwanshi,
Mr. Kartik Malhotra, Ms. Shreya Mansi
James, Mr. Rishika Aggarwal and Mr.
Anshu Tulsyan, Advs.
versus
KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS ELECTRONICS N V .....Respondent
Through: Mr. C M Lall, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. Pravin Anand, Ms. Vaishali Mittal, Mr.
Siddhant Chamola and Mr. Gursimran Singh
Narula, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA
ORDER (ORAL)
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:29.05.2026
18:03:32
RFA(OS)(COMM) 17/2018 & RFA(OS)(COMM) 18/2018 Page 1 of 11

% 26.05.2026
CM APPL. 36039/2026 ( Directions ) in RFA(OS)(COMM) 17/2018
1. This application seeks a prayer which is foreign to the
procedural law known to this Court.
2. The respondent, against whom RFA (OS) (Comm) 17/2018 and
RFA (OS) (Comm) 18/2018 have been decided, seeks a decision from
this Court to keep the judgment dated 18 May 2026 passed by this
Court in abeyance for eight weeks.
3. We are unaware of any provision of law under which the court
can pronounce an appellate judgment and decree and thereafter place
its own judgment and decree in abeyance, though we are conscious
that some Courts have been doing so in the past.
4. It is well settled that, on disposing of an appeal, the appellate
court become functus officio . Its province thereafter is restricted only
to re-examining the matter in review under Section 114 read with
Order XLVII, or to correct clerical or arithmetic mistakes under
Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
1
5. In Dwaraka Das v. State of Madhya Pradesh , the Supreme
Court clarified the position apropos Section 152 of the CPC thus:
“6. Section 152 CPC provides for correction of clerical or
arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decrees or orders of errors
arising therein from any accidental slip or omission. The exercise
1
(1999) 3 SCC 500
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:29.05.2026
18:03:32
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of this power contemplates the correction of mistakes by the court
of its ministerial actions and does not contemplate of passing
effective judicial orders after the judgment, decree or order. The
settled position of law is that after the passing of the judgment,
decree or order, the court or the tribunal becomes functus officio
and thus being not entitled to vary the terms of the judgments,
decrees and orders earlier passed. The corrections contemplated
are of correcting only accidental omissions or mistakes and not all
omissions and mistakes which might have been committed by the
court while passing the judgment, decree or order. The omission
sought to be corrected which goes to the merits of the case is
beyond the scope of Section 152 for which the proper remedy for
the aggrieved party is to file appeal or review application. It
implies that the section cannot be pressed into service to correct an
omission which is intentional, however erroneous that may be. It
has been noticed that the courts below have been liberally
construing and applying the provisions of Sections 151 and 152 of
the CPC even after passing of effective orders in the lis pending
before them. No court can, under the cover of the aforesaid
sections, modify, alter or add to the terms of its original judgment,
decree or order.”
The Supreme Court has, therefore, clarified that, after passing of a
judgement, decree or order, the Court, under the CPC, becomes
functus officio , and that its province thereafter is restricted to
reviewing the judgment, if the parameters of review jurisdiction are
satisfied, or correcting clerical or arithmetical errors or omissions.
Indiscriminate use of Section 151 of the CPC by Courts to tinker with
judgments rendered by them, and in respect of which they have
become functus officio , has been seriously criticized.
6. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “ functus officio ” as “having
fulfilled the function, discharged the office, or accomplished the
purpose, and therefore of no further force or authority ”. This
definition has approvingly been cited, by the Supreme Court, in State
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:29.05.2026
18:03:32
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2
Bank of India v. S.N. Goyal in which, apropos the stage at which a
judicial authority becomes functus officio , it was held thus:
“28. We may first refer to the position with reference to civil
courts. Order 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with
judgment and decree. Rule 1 explains when a judgment is
pronounced. Sub-rule (1) provides that the court, after the case has
been heard, shall pronounce judgment in an open court either at
once, or as soon thereafter as may be practicable, and when the
judgment is to be pronounced on some future day, the court shall
fix a day for that purpose of which due notice shall be given to the
parties or their pleaders. Sub-rule (3) provides that the judgment
may be pronounced by dictation in an open court to a shorthand
writer [if the Judge is specially empowered in this behalf]. The
proviso thereto provides that where the judgment is pronounced by
dictation in open court, the transcript of the judgment so
pronounced shall, after making such corrections as may be
necessary, be signed by the Judge, bear the date on which it was
pronounced and form a part of the record. Rule 3 provides that the
judgment shall be dated and signed by the Judge in open court at
the time of pronouncing it and when once signed, shall not
afterwards be altered or added to save as provided by Section 152
or on review. Thus, where a judgment is reserved, mere dictation
does not amount to pronouncement, but where the judgment is
dictated in open court, that itself amounts to pronouncement. But
even after such pronouncement by open court dictation, the Judge
can make corrections before signing and dating the judgment.
Therefore, a Judge becomes functus officio when he pronounces,
signs and dates the judgment (subject to Section 152 and power of
review). ”
(Emphasis supplied)
Save and except for reviewing the decision, or correcting clerical or
arithmetical errors, a judicial decision, once rendered, is no man’s land
for the Court which renders it. The Court can do nothing with the
judgment, including postponing the date from which it would take
effect.
7. The functus officio principle, and the definition of the
2
(2008) 8 SCC 92
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Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:29.05.2026
18:03:32
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expression in Black’s Law Dictionary, were also cited by the Supreme
Court in Orissa Administrative Tribunal Bar Assn. v. Union of
3
India , in which it was held:
“104. P. Ramanatha Aiyar's The Law Lexicon (1997 Edn.)
defines the term functus officio as:
“A term applied to something which once has had a life and
power, but which has become of no virtue whatsoever …
One who has fulfilled his office or is out of office; an
authority who has performed the act authorised so that the
authority is exhausted.”
105. Black's Law Dictionary (5th Edn.) defines the term as
follows:
“Having fulfilled the function, discharged the office, or
accomplished the purpose, and therefore of no further force
or authority. … an instrument, power, agency, etc. which
has fulfilled the purpose of its creation, and is therefore of
no further virtue or effect.”
106. The doctrine of functus officio gives effect to the principle
of finality. Once a Judge or a quasi-judicial authority has
rendered a decision, it is not open to her to revisit the decision and
amend, correct, clarify, or reverse it (except in the exercise of the
power of review, conferred by law). Once a judicial or quasi-
judicial decision attains finality, it is subject to change only in
proceedings before the appellate court.
*
4
108. In Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa , this
Court recognised that Section 362 was based on the doctrine
of functus officio : (SCC p. 175, para 10)
“10. … The section is based on an acknowledged principle
of law that once a matter is finally disposed of by a court,
the said court in the absence of a specific statutory
provision becomes functus officio and disentitled to
entertain a fresh prayer for the same relief unless the former
order of final disposal is set aside by a court of competent
jurisdiction in a manner prescribed by law. The court
3
(2023) 18 SCC 1
4
(2001) 1 SCC 169
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:29.05.2026
18:03:32
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becomes functus officio the moment the official order
disposing of a case is signed. Such an order cannot be
altered except to the extent of correcting a clerical or an
arithmetical error .”
109. The doctrine of functus officio exists to provide a clear
point where the adjudicative process ends and to bring quietus to
the dispute. Without it, decision-making bodies such as courts
could endlessly revisit their decisions. With a definitive endpoint
to a case before a court or quasi-judicial authority, parties are free
to seek judicial review or to prefer an appeal. Alternatively, their
rights are determined with finality. Similar considerations do not
apply to decisions by the State which are based entirely on policy
or expediency.”
(Emphasis supplied)
8. At the very least, what the applicant seeks is a clarification that
our judgment would take effect from a later date. Such a clarification
cannot be provided by us, in the light of the law declared by the
Supreme Court in the decisions cited supra .
9. The matter may be viewed from an even more empirical angle.
The applicant, effectively, is calling upon us to stay the operation of
our own judgment for a particular period. This is completely
impermissible. A Court cannot stay the operation of its own order.
That power vests only with an Appellate Court, and is usually
exercised only when the troika considerations of existence of a prima
facie case, balance of convenience and the possibility or irreparable
prejudice are cumulatively satisfied. It would be obviously
paradoxical for a Court to hold that its own judgment is prima facie
illegal.
10. Apparently aware that there is no provision of the CPC which
permits it, this application, predictably, purports to have been filed
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:29.05.2026
18:03:32
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under Section 151 of the CPC. Apropos Section 151, the Supreme
5
Court has held in Tecnimont (P) Ltd. v. State of Punjab , that Section
151 is not to be treated as a provision under which the Court can, even
ex debito justitiae , fashion reliefs which are alien to the CPC:
“24 . Similar limitation has always been read into the width of
inherent powers acknowledged by provisions like Section 151 CPC
(Civil Procedure Code, 1908) and Section 482 CrPC (Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973) In Vinod Seth v. Devinder Bajaj [Vinod
6
Seth v. Devinder Bajaj , the discussion was as under:
“28. As the provisions of the Code are not exhaustive,
Section 151 is intended to apply where the Code does not
cover any particular procedural aspect, and interests of
justice require the exercise of power to cover a particular
situation. Section 151 is not a provision of law conferring
power to grant any kind of substantive relief. It is a
procedural provision saving the inherent power of the court
to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of
justice and to prevent abuse of the process of the court. It
cannot be invoked with reference to a matter which is
covered by a specific provision in the Code. It cannot be
exercised in conflict with the general scheme and intent of
the Code. It cannot be used either to create or recognise
rights, or to create liabilities and obligations not
contemplated by any law.
29. Considering the scope of Section 151, in Padam
7
Sen v. State of U.P. , this Court observed:
‘8. … The inherent powers of the court are in
addition to the powers specifically conferred on the
court by the Code. They are complementary to
those powers and therefore it must be held that the
court is free to exercise them for the purposes
mentioned in Section 151 of the Code when the
exercise of those powers is not in any way in
conflict with what has been expressly provided in
the Code or against the intentions of the legislature .
…
9. … The inherent powers saved by Section 151 of
5
(2021) 12 SCC 477
6
(2010) 8 SCC 1
7
AIR 1961 SC 218
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:29.05.2026
18:03:32
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the Code are with respect to the procedure to be
followed by the court in deciding the cause before
it. These powers are not powers over the
substantive rights which any litigant possesses.
Specific powers have to be conferred on the courts
for passing such orders which would affect such
rights of a party .’
8
30. In Manohar Lal Chopra v. Seth Hiralal , this
Court held:
‘21. … that the inherent powers are not in any way
controlled by the provisions of the Code as has been
specifically stated in Section 151 itself. But those
powers are not to be exercised when their exercise
may be in conflict with what had been expressly
provided in the Code or against the intentions of the
legislature.’
31. In Ram Chand & Sons Sugar Mills (P)
9
Ltd. v. Kanhayalal Bhargava this Court reiterated that the
inherent power of the court is in addition to and
complementary to the powers expressly conferred under the
Code but that power will not be exercised if its exercise is
inconsistent with, or comes into conflict with any of the
powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred by
the other provisions of the Code. Section 151 however is
not intended to create a new procedure or any new right or
obligation.
10
32. In Nain Singh v. Koonwarjee this Court
observed:
‘4. … Under the inherent power of courts
recognised by Section 151CPC, a court has no
power to do that which is prohibited by the Code.
Inherent jurisdiction of the court must be exercised
subject to the rule that if the Code does contain
specific provisions which would meet the
necessities of the case, such provisions should be
followed and inherent jurisdiction should not be
invoked. In other words the court cannot make use
of the special provisions of Section 151 of the Code
where a party had his remedy provided elsewhere in
the Code….’
8
AIR 1962 SC 527
9
AIR 1966 SC 1899
10
(1970) 1 SCC 732
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Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:29.05.2026
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(emphasis supplied)”
11. Thus, where the CPC contains a provision which occupies the
field, Section 151 cannot be employed to trespass outside the field so
occupied. Order XLI of the CPC envisages stay of a judgment
rendered by a Court only in appeal. There is no provision in the CPC,
empowering a Court which has passed an appeal or a decree to stay its
own order. Any stay, by the Court which passes the judgment or
decree, of its own order, for any period of time, would amount to
judicial usurpation of the jurisdiction of the Court, higher in the
judicial hierarchy, before whom the judgment or decree may come up
for examination.
12. We are, therefore, of the view that the reliance on Section 151
of the CPC is completely misconceived.
13. Mr. Lall has sought to place reliance on the judgment of the
Supreme Court in South Eastern Coalfields Ltd v. Gujarat Ambuja
11
Cement Ltd . .
14. This judgment is completely alien to the controversy at hand as
it holds that an Appellate Court, while exercising LPA jurisdiction,
should stay the order under challenge while admitting the appeal. In
fact, if anything, this judgment would militate against the stand that
Mr. Lall seeks to canvass as it recognises the fact that the power to
stay vests in an Appellate Court, and not in the court which passes the
judgment or decree of which stay is sought.
11
(2002)10 SCC 493
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Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:29.05.2026
18:03:32
RFA(OS)(COMM) 17/2018 & RFA(OS)(COMM) 18/2018 Page 9 of 11

15. We also note, significantly, that the impugned judgment does
not even remotely seek to aver that there is any error apparent on the
face of the record of our decision as would even make out a case for
review thereof.
16. The application is, therefore, dismissed as not maintainable in
law.
CM APPL. 36038/2026 ( Corrections ) in RFA(OS)(COMM)
17/2018
CM APPL. 36040/2026 ( Corrections ) in RFA(OS)(COMM)
18/2018
17. The appellant made deposit of ₹ 4.5 crores consequent to order
dated 20 September 2010 passed by the learned Single Judge in
CS(Comm) 24/2016 and CS(Comm) 436/2017.
18. At the time of issuing notice in these appeals, this Court
directed the respondent to withdraw the aforesaid amounts deposited
by the appellant together with interest accrued thereon subject to the
respondent furnishing an appropriate bank guarantee, for the said
amount subject to the satisfaction of the Registrar of this Court.
19. Against bank guarantees, therefore, the respondent withdrew an
amount of ₹ 4.5 crores from the Registry of this Court.
20. By these applications, the appellant seeks refund of the amount
in view of the fact that they have succeeded in the appeals.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:29.05.2026
18:03:32
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21. Mr. Lall, on instructions, prays for eight weeks’ time to return
the amounts to the appellant.
22. In that view of the matter, we allow these applications to the
extent that the amounts withdrawn by the respondent against the bank
guarantees would be returned to the appellant within a period of eight
weeks from today.
23. On such return being taking place, the bank guarantee would be
returned to the respondents.
24. The applications are disposed of.
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J.
MAY 26, 2026
dsn
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:AJIT
KUMAR
Signing Date:29.05.2026
18:03:32
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