Krishan Kumar Jain & Anr. vs Shri Ram Nath Jain & Ors.
- Court
- Delhi High Court
$~69
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 28.10.2026
# CNR No. DLHC010515972026
+ CM(M) 2344/2026
KRISHAN KUMAR JAIN & ANR. ....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Praveen Agrawal, Mr.
Firoz Khan, Mr. Anish Shrestha
Advocates
versus
SHRI RAM NATH JAIN & ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Shashank Dixit, CGSC
with Mr. Kunal Raj and Ms.
Ojeswita Singh, Advocates for
R-8 & 9
Mr. Shlok Chandra, Adv Ms.
Lolita Crasta,Adv Mr. Parikshit
Singh Bhati, Advs. for R-9
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
% JUDGMENT (Oral)
1. The present Petition, under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India, 1950 ( “Constitution” ), read with Section 151 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 ( “CPC” ), seeks to challenge the Judgment
dated 23.12.2025 ( “Impugned Judgment” ) and the Order dated
30.05.2024 ( “Impugned Order” ) passed by the learned Principal
District & Sessions Judge, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi
( “learned Appellate Court” ) in an Appeal under Section 9 of the
Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971
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BHATIA
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( “PP Act” ), being PPA No.06/2022 ( “PP Act Appeal” ).
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS:
2. Learned counsel for the Petitioners submits that the Impugned
Judgment is unsustainable, inasmuch as the Petitioners’ rights in the
subject premises, bearing No. 83-D/7, Turkman Road, New Delhi
( “Subject Premises” ), have been adversely affected without the
Petitioners being heard. It is contended that the Petitioners are the
legal heirs of late Sh. Jai Kumar Jain, in whose favour the Subject
Premises was regularized. After the demise of late Sh. Jai Kumar Jain
and his wife, late Smt. Soma Jain, the Petitioners have continued in
lawful possession.
3. Learned counsel for the Petitioners further submits that the
eviction proceedings were vitiated at the threshold. The Notice dated
24.11.2018, relied upon by the authorities, was never served upon the
Petitioners. Learned counsel contends that no valid show cause Notice
under Section 4 of the PP Act was ever issued to the Petitioners, so the
order of eviction and the Impugned Judgment affirming it cannot
stand.
4. As regards the Impugned Order, learned counsel for the
Petitioners submits that the learned Appellate Court erred in rejecting
the Impleadment Application filed by the Petitioners herein in the PP
Act Appeal, insofar as the Petitioners were necessary and proper
parties to the PP Act Appeal.
5. Learned counsel for the Petitioners submits that any order
passed in that PP Act Appeal would have directly affected their rights
and possession in the Subject Premises. It is submitted that the
rejection of the Impleadment Application deprived the Petitioners of
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any opportunity to place their case on record, which is in violation of
the principles of natural justice.
6. Per contra , learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondents submits, at the outset, that the challenge to the Impugned
Judgment is not maintainable at the instance of the Petitioners since
they were not participants in the PP Act proceedings, and their
Application seeking impleadment in the Appellate proceedings was
rejected by the Impugned Order. Learned counsel for the Respondents
contends that the Petitioners cannot assail the outcome of a statutory
appeal to which they were never parties, nor raise grievances about the
show cause notice and the eviction proceedings, which were taken
against other persons and in which the Petitioners chose not to
participate.
7. Learned counsel for the Respondents further submits that the
present Petition, including their challenge to the Impugned Order, is
barred by the Petitioners’ own conduct and therefore not maintainable.
It is submitted that their challenge to the Impugned Order in CM(M)
No. 3333/2024 was withdrawn on 21.01.2026; the impleadment
application they moved in W.P.(C) No. 321/2026, pursuant to the
liberty granted in the withdrawal Order, was withdrawn on
24.07.2026; and their own challenge to the Impugned Judgment in
W.P.(C) No. 19824/2025 was withdrawn on the same day, after it had
been argued.
8. Learned counsel for the Respondents further submits that the
liberty granted on 21.01.2026 was only to move an application in the
proceedings challenging the Impugned Judgment, and the liberties
granted on 24.07.2026 were only to avail remedies available in law,
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and none of them permitted the Petitioners to institute a fresh Petition
on the same cause of action and, therefore, the present Petition is
misconceived.
9. Learned counsel for the Respondents submits that the Impugned
Order, even on merits, suffers from no infirmity. It is submitted that
the learned Appellate Court rightly held that an Appeal under Section
9 of the PP Act is confined to the legality of the eviction order passed
against the persons proceeded against and that the Petitioners are
neither a necessary party nor a proper party to those proceedings. It is
further submitted that the Petitioners never sought to participate in the
proceedings before the learned Estate Officer, though those
proceedings remained pending for nearly three years, and offered no
explanation for that failure.
10. Learned counsel for the Respondents lastly submits that the
Petitioners have approached this Court repeatedly on the same
grievance, and that the present Petition is an abuse of the process of
the Court, which also seeks reliefs, such as restoration of possession
and compensation, that are wholly outside the scope of Article 227 of
the Constitution. It is accordingly prayed that the Petition be
dismissed.
11. In rejoinder , controverting the submission advanced on behalf
of the Respondents upon the non-maintainability of the present
Petition, learned counsel for the Petitioners submits that the present
Petition is maintainable, inasmuch as the Petitioners withdrew their
earlier proceedings with liberty, and that the Orders dated 21.01.2026
and 24.07.2026 permitted them to avail the appropriate remedies
available in law, which they have done by instituting the present
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Petition.
12. No other submissions were advanced by the learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the parties.
ANALYSIS:
13. This Court has heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the parties and, with their able assistance, perused the material
available on record.
14. For the sake of clarity and convenience, the ensuing discussion
is arranged under separate headings corresponding to the principal
discussion thereunder. The said headings are merely intended to
facilitate the orderly appreciation of the reasoning and are not to be
construed as creating isolated compartments between the issues. The
Judgment is to be read as a whole, and the findings recorded under
each heading shall be understood in the context of, and in conjunction
with, the findings and reasoning contained in the other parts of the
Judgment.
Successive Proceedings against the Impugned Order and the
Impugned Judgment
15. This Court, at the outset, deems it apposite to notice that the
Petitioners have approached this Court on successive occasions in
relation to the same underlying grievance. The present Petition cannot
be appreciated in isolation and must be considered against the
backdrop of those proceedings, which are discussed in detail in the
ensuing paragraphs.
16. The Petitioners herein never participated in the original PP Act
proceedings. They sought to explain their absence in these
proceedings and thereby to get themselves arrayed in the PP Act
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Appeal. To this effect, the Petitioners moved an Application dated
16.12.2023 under Order I Rule 10 CPC ( “Impleadment Application
in the PP Act Appeal” ), seeking their impleadment as parties thereto.
The learned Appellate Court, by the Impugned Order dated
30.05.2024, rejected the said Application.
17. The Petitioners first challenged the Impugned Order, by way of
a Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution, being CM(M) No.
3333/2024 ( “Petition against the Impugned Order” ). However, upon
the PP Act Appeal being decided by way of the Impugned Judgment,
the Petitioners withdrew this Petition against the Impugned Order on
21.01.2026 stating that they “do not wish to press the present petition,
against the impugned order as it has been passed during the pendency
of the PPA No. 06/2022” and sought liberty of the Court “to move an
appropriate Application before the Co-ordinate Bench” of this Court,
which was in seisin of the challenge to the Impugned Judgment.
Accordingly, the said Petition was dismissed as withdrawn and the
Petitioners were granted “liberty, as prayed for, in accordance with
law”. Meaning thereby, that the Petitioners had elected to eschew the
challenge under Article 227 of the Constitution in favour of moving
an Impleadment Application in the Writ Petition being W.P.(C)
No.321/2026 preferred by the Appellants in the PP Act Appeal.
18. The Petitioners had also instituted a Writ Petition under Articles
226 and 227 of the Constitution, being W.P.(C) No. 19824/2025
( “Writ Petition against the Impugned Judgment by the Petitioners” ),
during the pendency of the aforesaid Petition against the Impugned
Order.
19. The Impugned Judgment was also assailed by the Appellants in
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the PP Act Appeal ( “Original Appellants” ) by way of a Writ Petition
under Article 226 of the Constitution, being W.P.(C) No. 321/2026
( “Writ Petition against the Impugned Judgment by the Original
Appellants” ).
20. The Petitioners, as a consequence of the Order dated
21.01.2026, filed an Application seeking their impleadment as parties,
being CM APPL. 18406/2026 ( “Impleadment Application in Writ
Petition” ), in the Writ Petition against the Impugned Judgment by the
Original Appellants.
21. Ergo , the Impleadment Application in Writ Petition was
founded upon the liberty granted to the Petitioners by the Order dated
21.01.2026, while permitting the withdrawal of the Petition against the
Impugned Order. Paragraph No. 3 of the said Application expressly
records as much.
22. The Impleadment Application in Writ Petition was, therefore,
the very proceeding through which the Petitioners elected to avail of
the liberty of 21.01.2026.
23. On 24.07.2026, both proceedings initiated by the Petitioners
came to an end before this Court. First, the Petitioners withdrew the
Impleadment Application in Writ Petition, and were granted “liberty
to avail such appropriate remedies as are available to him under
law” . Second, the Writ Petition against the Impugned Judgment by the
Petitioners was withdrawn, after learned counsel had argued the
matter for some time, with “liberty to take such appropriate remedies
as are available to him under law” . On the latter occasion, this Court
also recorded its strong exception to the manner in which learned
counsel for the Petitioners sought to impose conditions upon the
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recording of the withdrawal.
24. Thereafter, the Petitioners instituted the present Petition, under
Article 227 of the Constitution, assailing both the Impugned Order
and the Impugned Judgment, together with reliefs of remand,
restoration of possession and compensation.
25. The present Petition thus appears to be the culmination of these
successive proceedings and the “liberties” obtained therein. It seeks
to reopen, in a single proceeding, both challenges, i.e., to the
Impugned Order, refusing the impleadment, and the Impugned
Judgment, each of which the Petitioners had earlier challenged
separately and thereafter given up.
26. In the backdrop of the aforesaid sequence of events, two
questions arise for consideration on the maintainability of the present
Petition. The first is what consequence, in law, follows from the
withdrawal by the Petitioners of their earlier proceedings. The second
is whether the liberties granted to the Petitioners on 21.01.2026 and
24.07.2026, or either of them, or the invocation of Article 227 of the
Constitution in the present Petition, entitle the Petitioners to institute
the present Petition notwithstanding such withdrawal.
Consequence of withdrawal without express liberty
27. Insofar as the first question is concerned, the law is well settled.
Order XXIII Rule 1(4) CPC provides that where a plaintiff abandons a
suit, or withdraws from it without the permission of the Court, he is
precluded from instituting a fresh suit in respect of the same subject
matter. Though the provision, in terms, governs suits, the Supreme
Court has extended the principle underlying it to proceedings under
the writ jurisdiction. It has done so not on the footing of res judicata ,
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but on considerations of public policy.
28. In Sarguja Transport Service v. State Transport Appellate
1
Tribunal , the Supreme Court considered whether a petitioner who
had withdrawn a writ petition without permission to institute a fresh
one could file a fresh writ petition in the High Court on the same
cause of action. The Court held that the principle underlying Rule 1 of
Order XXIII CPC should be extended to such petitions, observing as
follows:
― 9. The point for consideration is whether a petitioner after
withdrawing a writ petition filed by him in the High Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India without the permission to
institute a fresh petition can file a fresh writ petition in the High
Court under that article. On this point the decision in Daryao
case [AIR 1961 SC 1457 : (1962) 1 SCR 574] is of no assistance.
But we are of the view that the principle underlying Rule 1 of
Order XXIII of the Code should be extended in the interests of
administration of justice to cases of withdrawal of writ petition
also, not on the ground of res judicata but on the ground of public
policy as explained above. It would also discourage the litigant
from indulging in bench-hunting tactics. In any event there is no
justifiable reason in such a case to permit a petitioner to invoke the
extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of
the Constitution once again. While the withdrawal of a writ petition
filed in a High Court without permission to file a fresh writ petition
may not bar other remedies like a suit or a petition under Article 32
of the Constitution of India since such withdrawal does not amount
to res judicata, the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India should be deemed to have been abandoned by the petitioner
in respect of the cause of action relied on in the writ petition when
he withdraws it without such permission. In the instant case the
High Court was right in holding that a fresh writ petition was not
maintainable before it in respect of the same subject-matter since
the earlier writ petition had been withdrawn without permission to
file a fresh petition. We, however, make it clear that whatever we
have stated in this order may not be considered as being applicable
to a writ petition involving the personal liberty of an individual in
which the petitioner prays for the issue of a writ in the nature of
habeas corpus or seeks to enforce the fundamental right guaranteed
under Article 21 of the Constitution since such a case stands on a
1
(1987) 1 SCC 5
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different footing altogether. We, however leave this question
open.‖
(Emphasis supplied)
29. The Court explained that the rule is founded on public policy. It
prevents a litigant from abandoning a petition, often when an adverse
outcome appears likely, and then filing another on the same cause of
action, possibly before a different Bench. A petitioner who withdraws
without such permission is to be treated as having abandoned the
remedy under the writ jurisdiction in respect of that cause of action.
30. The principle was reaffirmed and applied in Upadhyay & Co. v.
2
State of U.P. . There the Supreme Court held that a litigant who
withdraws a petition without obtaining liberty to institute a fresh one
cannot thereafter seek the same relief in fresh proceedings:
― 13. The aforesaid ban for filing a fresh suit is based on public
policy. This Court has made the said rule of public policy applicable
to jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution (Sarguja
Transport Service v. STAT [(1987) 1 SCC 5 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 19] ).
The reasoning for adopting it in writ jurisdiction is that very often it
happens, when the petitioner or his counsel finds that the court is not
likely to pass an order admitting the writ petition after it is heard for
some time, that a request is made by the petitioner or his counsel to
permit him to withdraw it without seeking permission to institute a
fresh writ petition. A court which is unwilling to admit the petition
would not ordinarily grant liberty to file a fresh petition while it may
just agree to permit withdrawal of the petition. When once a writ
petition filed in a High Court is withdrawn by the party concerned,
he is precluded from filing an appeal against the order passed in the
writ petition because he cannot be considered as a party aggrieved by
the order passed by the High Court. If so, he cannot file a fresh
petition for the same cause once again.‖
(Emphasis supplied)
3
31. Most recently, in Satheesh V.K. v. Federal Bank Ltd. ,
although that matter arose from a second SLP, the Supreme Court
2
(1999) 1 SCC 81
3
2025 SCC OnLine SC 2046
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reiterated that Upadhyay & Co. (supra) , which rests on Sarguja
Transport Service (supra) , continues to hold the field. The Court held
that a subsequent challenge is barred, as a matter of public policy,
where the earlier challenge to the same order was withdrawn without
liberty. It explained that the bar exists to prevent forum-shopping and
bench-hunting, and to secure finality of litigation:
― 22. Upadhyay and Co. v. State of U.P. [(1999) 1 SCC 81; 1998
SCC OnLine SC 997.], which precedes Kunhayammed v. State of
Kerala [(2000) 245 ITR 360 (SC); (2000) 119 STC 505 (SC);
(2000) 6 SCC 359; 2000 SCC OnLine SC 1008.] in point of time,
is still the law holding the field declaring in no certain terms that
the principle flowing from Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil
Procedure is also applicable to special leave petitions presented
before this court. Reading Upadhyay and Co. v. State of
U.P. together with Sarguja Transport Service v. State Transport
Appellate Tribunal [(1987) 1 SCC 5; 1987 SCC (Cri) 19; 1986
SCC OnLine SC 233.] , which had the occasion to deal with a
subsequently filed writ petition under article 226 of the
Constitution of India after unconditional withdrawal of the first
writ petition under the same article, the position in law seems to be
this-a second special leave petition would not be maintainable at
the instance of a party, who elects not to proceed with the challenge
laid by him in an earlier special leave petition and withdraws such
petition without obtaining leave to file a fresh special leave
petition; if such party applies for a review before the court from
whose order the special leave petition was initially carried and the
review fails, then he can neither challenge the order rejecting the
review nor the order of which review was sought.‖
(Emphasis supplied)
32. The common thread in these decisions is that withdrawal is a
deliberate choice, and it carries legal consequences. A litigant who
chooses not to pursue a challenge, without reserving the right to bring
it again, abandons that challenge. The litigant cannot later revive it by
a fresh proceeding, by recasting the relief, or by combining it with
other challenges. Public policy demands finality, and the process of
the Court cannot be used to keep the same grievance alive through
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successive proceedings.
33. The principles enunciated hereinabove shall now be applied to
the facts of the present case, to answer the second question as
determined herein before, as to whether the challenges laid by the
Petitioners to the Impugned Order and the Impugned Judgment are
maintainable, in light of the withdrawal of their earlier proceedings.
Maintainability of the Challenge to the Impugned Order
34. Applying these principles, as enunciated by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Upadhyay & Co. (supra) and Sarguja Transport
Service (supra), this Court is of the considered view that the challenge
to the Impugned Order cannot be revived and is, therefore, not
maintainable by way of the present Petition.
35. The Petitioners withdrew the Petition under Article 227 of the
Constitution against the Impugned Order on 21.01.2026 without
seeking liberty to institute a fresh petition against it. The only liberty
sought and granted was specific, namely, to move an Application in
the proceedings challenging the Impugned Judgment. The Petitioners
availed of that liberty by way of the Impleadment Application in Writ
Petition and, upon its withdrawal on 24.07.2026, the liberty stood
exhausted.
36. It also bears noting that the Petition against the Impugned Order
was itself instituted under Article 227 of the Constitution, the very
provision invoked in the present Petition. The present challenge to the
Impugned Order is, therefore, a second petition under the same
provision, against the same Order, on the same cause of action.
37. Further, the liberty granted on 24.07.2026, upon the withdrawal
of the Impleadment Application in Writ Petition, does not come to the
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aid of the Petitioners. That liberty was only to avail such appropriate
remedies as are available in law. A liberty so worded preserves a
remedy which the law otherwise permits. It neither creates a remedy
which is otherwise unavailable, nor, in view of the principle
enunciated in Sarguja Transport Service (supra) and Upadhyay &
Co. (supra) , revives a challenge which stood abandoned upon an
unconditional withdrawal. The Petitioners cannot treat such a liberty
as an unrestricted permission to institute a fresh petition, on the same
cause of action, for substantially the same reliefs.
38. Accordingly, the challenge to the Impugned Order is not
maintainable. It seeks to re-agitate a grievance which the Petitioners
have already pursued and abandoned before this Court, and the
liberties granted to them do not permit such a course. To permit it
would be to allow the very abuse of process that the principle in
Upadhyay & Co. (supra) and Sarguja Transport Service (supra) is
intended to prevent.
Maintainability of the Challenge to the Impugned Judgment
39. The same consequence follows, with greater force, for the
challenge to the Impugned Judgment. The Petitioners withdrew the
Writ Petition against the Impugned Judgment by the Petitioners, after
submissions had been advanced, without liberty to institute a fresh
petition on the same cause of action. The liberty granted on that
occasion was, once again, only to take such appropriate remedies as
are available in law.
40. This Court is of the considered view that such a liberty does not
revive a challenge abandoned upon withdrawal. The principle in
Upadhyay & Co. (supra) , which rests on Sarguja Transport Service
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(supra) , squarely applies to the attempt to revive that challenge
through the present Petition, and therefore the challenge to the
Impugned Judgment is not maintainable.
41. It is also necessary to notice the manner in which the
jurisdiction of this Court has been invoked by the Petitioners on each
occasion. The Writ Petition against the Impugned Judgment by the
Petitioners was expressly instituted under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution, as recorded in Paragraph No. 1 of the Order dated
24.07.2026.
42. The present Petition, which assails both the Impugned Order
and the Impugned Judgment, is once again instituted under Article
227 of the Constitution alone. The significance of this lies in the
observation in Sarguja Transport Service (supra) that the withdrawal
of a writ petition without permission to file afresh results in the
abandonment of “the remedy under Article 226” in respect of that
cause of action, while not barring “other remedies like a suit or a
petition under Article 32” .
43. It may be contended that a petition under Article 227 of the
Constitution is one such “other remedy” , the supervisory jurisdiction
of this Court being distinct from its writ jurisdiction under Article 226
of the Constitution. This Court, however, would be unable to accept
any such contention in the facts of the present case.
44. The Petitioners did not merely abandon a remedy under Article
226 of the Constitution. They expressly invoked both Articles 226 and
227 of the Constitution against the Impugned Judgment, argued the
matter, and thereafter withdrew it without liberty to institute a fresh
Petition on the same cause of action. The supervisory jurisdiction of
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this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution, which the Petitioners
now invoke, is therefore the very jurisdiction which they had invoked
earlier and voluntarily given up.
45. The omission of Article 226 of the Constitution from the cause
title of the present Petition does not alter the substance of the
challenge. The order impugned, the cause of action, the grounds urged
and the reliefs claimed are, in substance, the same as in the earlier
proceedings, the present Petition merely seeks to combine the
independent challenges pursued separately to the ―Impugned Order &
the Impugned Judgment‖. It is the substance of the proceeding, and
not the label which a party chooses to give it, that determines its true
character. The ―other remedies‖ left open by Sarguja Transport
Service (supra) cannot be read to include a fresh petition before this
very Court, against the very same order, merely by re-arranging the
constitutional provisions under which its jurisdiction is invoked.
46. If a litigant could escape the consequence of an unconditional
withdrawal by invoking Article 227 of the Constitution after
abandoning a petition under Articles 226 and 227, or vice versa , the
rule of public policy recognised in Sarguja Transport Service (supra)
and Upadhyay & Co. (supra) would be rendered illusory. The litigant
would be able to do indirectly what the law does not permit him to do
directly.
47. Furthermore, the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution is supervisory, equitable and discretionary, and is
exercised sparingly. A litigant who has invoked that very jurisdiction
against the same order and then abandoned it stands on a weaker
footing, and not a stronger one, when he seeks to invoke it a second
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time. The change in the provision invoked is, therefore, of no avail to
the Petitioners. It only reinforces the conclusion that the present
Petition is an attempt to re-agitate, under a different garb, a challenge
which stood abandoned on 24.07.2026.
Challenge to Impugned Order and the Impugned Judgment not
maintainable
48. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the
considered view that the present Petition is not maintainable. The
challenge to the Impugned Order seeks to revive a grievance which
the Petitioners pursued before this Court and voluntarily abandoned,
first by withdrawing the Petition against the Impugned Order and
thereafter by withdrawing the Impleadment Application in Writ
Petition, through which the liberty of 21.01.2026 was availed of.
49. The challenge to the Impugned Judgment likewise stands
abandoned upon the withdrawal, after arguments, of the Writ Petition
against the Impugned Judgment by the Petitioners. The invocation of
Article 227 of the Constitution in the present Petition does not alter
that position. Neither the liberties granted to the Petitioners nor the
change in the provision invoked entitles them to re-agitate these
challenges through the present Petition.
50. Be that as it may, since learned counsel for the Petitioners
advanced submissions at length on the merits of both the Impugned
Order and the Impugned Judgment, this Court deems it appropriate,
for the sake of completeness, to examine the same as well.
Challenge to the Impugned Order: Determination on Merits
51. Insofar as the Impugned Order is concerned, this Court finds no
grounds warranting interference under Article 227 of the Constitution.
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Before undertaking discussion thereupon, this Court deems it apposite
to reproduce the relevant portions of the Impugned Order. The same
read as under:
― 10. The question to be decided before this Court is as to whether
the applicants, who claims to be owner of the property in question
can be impleaded as a party to this appeal.
10.1 The general rule in regard to impleadment of parties is that the
plaintiff in a suit, being dominus litis, may choose the persons
against whom he wishes to litigate and cannot be compelled to sue
a person against whom he does not seek any relief. Consequently, a
person who is not a party to the lis has no right to be impleaded
against the wishes of the plaintiff. But this general rule is subject to
an exception laid down under Order I Rule 10(2) CPC, whereby a
Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without
the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to
the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly
joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the
name, of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as
plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be
necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely
to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit,
be added . Thus, what is to be seen is as to whether the person
sought to be added as a party is necessary and proper party for the
particular suit.
11. A ―necessary party‖ is a person who ought to have been joined
as a party and in whose absence no effective decree could be
passed at all by the court. If a ―necessary party‖ is not impleaded,
the suit itself is liable to be dismissed. A ―proper party‖ is a party
who, though not a necessary party, is a person whose presence
would enable the court to completely, effectively and adequately
adjudicate upon all matters in dispute in the suit, though he need
not be a person in favour of or against whom the decree is to be
made. If a person is not found to be a proper or necessary party, the
court has no jurisdiction to implead him, against the wishes of the
plaintiff. Merely the fact that a person is likely to secure a
right/interest in the suit property, after the suit is decided against
the plaintiff, will not make such person a necessary party or a
proper party to the suit.
12. In the case of Kasturi vs Iyyamperumal: (2005) 6 SCC 733 ,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed thus:
―16. That apart, from a plain reading of an expression
used in subrule (2) Order I Rule 10 CPC “all the
questions involved in the suit” it is abundantly clear
that the legislature clearly meant that the controversies
raised as between the parties to the litigation must be
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gone into only, that is to say, controversies with regard
to the right which is set up and the relief claimed on
one side and denied on the other and not the
controversies which may arise between the plaintiff-
appellant and the defendants inter se or questions
between the parties to the suit and a third party. In our
view, therefore, the Court cannot allow adjudication of
collateral matters so as to convert a suit for specific
performance of contract for sale into a complicated suit for
title between the plaintiff appellant on one hand and
respondents 2 and 3 and respondents 1 and 4 to 11 on the
other. This addition, if allowed, would lead to a
complicated litigation by which the trial and decision of
serious questions which are totally outside the scope of the
suit would have to be gone into.‖
(emphasis supplied)
13. In the case of Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltd. Vs
Regency Convention Centre and Hotels Pvt. Ltd.: (2010) 7 SCC
417 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that Order I Rule 10 (2) CPC
is not about right of a stranger to be impleaded, but about the
judicial discretion of the Court to strike out or add parties and the
Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down certain illustrations regarding
exercise of discretion under the said provision thus:
―24.1 If a plaintiff makes an application for impleading a
person as a defendant on the ground that he is a necessary
party, the Court may implead him having regard to the
provisions of Rules 9 and 10(2) of Order I. If the claim
against such a person is barred by limitation, it may refuse
to add him as a party and even dismissed the suit for non
joinder of a necessary party. …
24.4 If an application is made by a plaintiff for impleading
someone as a proper party, subject to limitation, bona
fides etc., the Court will normally implead him, if he is
found to be a proper party. On the other hand, if a non
party makes an application seeking impleadment as a
proper party and Court finds him to be a proper party, the
Court may direct his addition as a defendant; but if the
Court finds that his addition will alter the nature of the suit
or introduce a new cause of action, it may dismiss the
application even if he is found to be a proper party, if it
does not want to widen the scope of the specific
performance suit; or the Court may direct such applicant
to be impleaded as a proper party either unconditionally or
subject to terms. …‖
(emphasis supplied)
14. Two tests are to be satisfied for determining the question as to
who is the necessary party and these tests are – (a) there must a
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right to some relief against such party in respect of the
controversies involved in the proceedings and (b) no effective
decree can be passed in the absence of such party. Proper party is
one whose presence is necessary for effective and complete
adjudication of all the questions involved in the suit.
15. In this regard, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the
case of J.J. Lal Pvt. Ltd. vs M.R. Murali: AIR 2002 SC 1061,
held that in a simple suit for eviction between the landlord and the
tenant, an application under Order I Rule 10 CPC filed by the
applicants claiming title to the property cannot be considered, as
that would change the complexion of the litigation and raise such
controversies as are beyond the scope of litigation. The Hon’ble
Apex Court held that any decision in the ejectment suit would
govern and bind the parties therein and the impleadment applicants
are free to establish their claims and title, whatever it may be in an
independent proceeding before a competent forum, so the
applicants claiming to be owners in title cannot be permitted to
come on record.
16. In the present case, what is to be seen is as to whether the
applicants seeking impleadment as a party to this appeal is a
necessary and/or proper party. For that, what is to be seen is as to
whether in the absence of the applicants this appeal cannot be
effectively decided by this court or whether his presence would
enable this court to completely, effectively and adequately
adjudicate upon the disputes involved in this appeal. In order to
arrive at a conclusion that the applicants are necessary party, the
tests to be considered are whether there is a right to some relief
against the applicants in respect of the controversies involved in
these proceedings and whether no effective order can be passed in
the absence of the applicant in this appeal.
17. The present proceedings being appeal under Section 9 (2)(c) of
the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act,
1971, the controversy involved in this appeal is as to whether the
appellants are liable to be evicted from the property in question i.e.
D-83, Type IV, Turkman Road, New Delhi. The original
proceedings were conducted by the Estate Officer between the
appellants and the respondents, which proceedings culminated into
the impugned order under Section 5 sub section 1 & 2 of the Public
Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, thereby
directing the appellants to be evicted. It is nobody's case that one of
the occupant of the subject premises is the applicants. In view of
nature of these proceedings, it certainly cannot be said that in the
present appeal no effective final order can be passed in the absence
of the applicants. Therefore, the applicants are certainly not a
necessary party to this appeal.
18. Then comes the question as to whether the applicants are a
proper party to these proceedings, in the sense that their presence is
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necessary for effective and complete adjudication of all questions
involved in this appeal. In that regard, what is to be seen is ―the
questions involved in this appeal‖ which is whether the appellants
are unauthorized occupants.
19. Irrespective of the final outcome of this appeal, the applicants
will neither get resolved the issue regarding their possession of the
subject premises nor get declaration of being owner of the subject
premises, because the former being in the domain of Delhi Rent
Control Act and latter being in the domain of general civil court,
the limited scope of appeals under Section 9 of the Public Premises
(Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act does not confer
jurisdiction on this court while sitting in appeal to grant either of
the said reliefs to the applicants. Further, if the applicants are
allowed to be impleaded in this appeal, scope of this appeal will get
widened and will create complicated questions of property
disputes/possession of subject premises between the parties.
Impleadment of the applicants will thus alter nature of the present
proceedings, which are under Section 9 of the Public Premises
(Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act and a new cause of
action will get introduced.
20. In support of his submissions, the applicants have relied upon
some documents i.e. copy of the receipt of payment dated
13.02.1975 issued by CPWD on the name of Jai Kumar Jain for the
premises 83-D, Turkman Road, New Delhi, copies of other receipts
issued by Directorate of Estates in the name of Jai Kumar Jain till
the year 2001 and copy of electricity bill for the month of June,
2015 in the name of Jai Kumar Jain, 83, Turkman Road, Delhi. The
relevant point to be seen here is that what was the status of the
applicants qua the suit premises and why they did not join the
proceedings before the Estate Officer when other occupants were
heard and impugned order was passed against them. No plausible
explanation has come from the applicants in this regard.
21. In view of above discussion, application under Order I Rule 10
CPC filed by applicants Krishan Kumar Jain and Smt. Sapna Jain
in this appeal is dismissed.‖
(Emphasis supplied)
52. Upon a perusal of the relevant portion of the Impugned Order,
this Court is of the considered view that the learned Appellate Court
has correctly approached the question as one concerning the
Petitioners’ entitlement to be impleaded as necessary or proper parties
in an appeal under Section 9 of the PP Act. The scope of such an
appeal is directed to the legality of the eviction order passed by the
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Estate Officer against the persons proceeded against. The controversy
before the learned Appellate Court concerned whether the appellants
in that appeal were in unauthorized occupation of the public premises
and whether the eviction order against them was sustainable.
53. The Petitioners’ asserted rights in the Subject Premises did not,
by themselves, make them necessary parties to that controversy. The
appellants had sought no relief against the Petitioners, and the legality
of the eviction order could be determined in their absence. Nor were
the Petitioners proper parties merely because they asserted an
independent claim founded on succession to late Sh. Jai Kumar Jain
and on their own alleged title or possession. Their claim would
introduce a distinct controversy into an appeal whose scope was
confined to the legality of the eviction order against the persons
proceeded against.
54. In Kasturi (supra) , the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained that
the expression “all the questions involved in the suit” in Order I Rule
10(2) CPC refers to the controversy between the parties to the lis and
does not extend to an independent claim of title asserted by a stranger.
Further, in Mumbai International Airport (P) Ltd. (supra) , the
Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that impleadment under Order I
Rule 10(2) CPC is governed by judicial discretion and that a person
asserting an interest in the subject matter does not, for that reason
alone, acquire a right to be impleaded. The Court may decline
impleadment where it would alter the nature and scope of the
proceedings or introduce a separate cause of action.
55. This Court is of the considered view that the learned Appellate
Court has also correctly noticed and rightly applied the principles
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enunciated in Kasturi (supra) and Mumbai International Airport (P)
Ltd. (supra) . The relevant portions thereof, having been reproduced in
the Impugned Order extracted herein before, are not being reproduced
again.
56. Further, the learned Appellate Court also took note of the
Petitioners’ failure to explain satisfactorily why they had not sought to
participate in the proceedings before the learned Estate Officer, which
had remained pending for a substantial period. That circumstance was
relevant to the exercise of discretion under Order I Rule 10 CPC. A
person who claims an independent interest in the premises cannot,
merely by asserting that interest at the appellate stage, insist upon
being joined in proceedings whose scope is confined to the legality of
an eviction order against other persons. The question was not whether
the Petitioners could ever assert any rights in the Subject Premises, but
whether their presence was necessary or proper for the adjudication of
the appeal then before the learned Appellate Court. It is necessary to
clarify that the Impugned Order dated 30.05.2024 did not adjudicate
the Petitioners’ asserted rights in the Subject Premises. It is also
apposite to mention that this Application was resisted by the Original
Appellants in the PP Act Appeal, and the same has been recorded by
the learned Appellant Court in the Impugned Order, which reads as
under:
― 9. Per contra, Ld. Counsels for appellants and respondents no.2
have strongly opposed the application filed by the applicants. They
have also argued more or less on the averments as mentioned in
their reply. Ld. Counsel for appellants argued that applicants are
neither necessary nor proper parties to the present appeal and their
presence is not required for deciding the appeal, thus applicants
cannot be impleaded in the appeal. The application is not
maintainable as the applicants have not shown their bonafide and
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due diligence with regard to the matter in issue as they did not put
their appearance before ld. Estate officer before whom the
proceedings were pending for almost three years. Applicants are
seeking Probate/Letters of Administration qua the property in
dispute despite being aware that the property is a government
property.‖
(Emphasis supplied)
57. Insofar as the specific contention advanced on behalf of the
Petitioners that no valid Show Cause Notice under Section 4 of the PP
Act was ever issued or served upon them is concerned, this Court is of
the considered view that the same does not advance their case. The
aforesaid contention proceeds on the premise that the Petitioners were
in occupation of the Subject Premises and were, therefore, the persons
against whom eviction proceedings were instituted. However, as the
learned Appellate Court rightly noted in Paragraph 17 of the
Impugned Order, “it was nobody’s case that the Petitioners were
occupants of the subject premises” . The eviction proceedings under
the PP Act were directed against the persons found to be in occupation
of the Subject Premises, and it was for those persons to assail the
validity, form or service of the notices issued to them.
58. Further, it is pertinent to note that the Petitioners never raised
any objection regarding the non-issuance or non-service of a Show
Cause Notice under Section 4 of the PP Act in their Impleadment
Application filed before the learned Appellate Court. Having failed to
raise the aforesaid ground before the learned Appellate Court, the
Petitioners cannot now seek to challenge the Impugned Order based
on a ground that was not part of their case before that Court.
Therefore, this contention merits no consideration.
59. At this juncture, it is apposite to emphasise that the jurisdiction
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of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is supervisory and
is not to be exercised as an appellate jurisdiction. Interference is
warranted where the subordinate court has acted outside its
jurisdiction, committed a patent error of law, or arrived at a
conclusion that is perverse or otherwise warrants supervisory
correction. It is not enough that another view might have been
possible. Reference may be made to Garment Craft v. Prakash
4
Chand Goel .
― 15. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are clearly of the
view that the impugned order [Prakash Chand Goel v. Garment
Craft, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 11943] is contrary to law and cannot
be sustained for several reasons, but primarily for deviation from
the limited jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article
227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court exercising
supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to
reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the
determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is
not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final
finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to
substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the
inferior court or tribunal. [Celina Coelho Pereira v. Ulhas
Mahabaleshwar Kholkar, (2010) 1 SCC 217 : (2010) 1 SCC (Civ)
69] The jurisdiction exercised is in the nature of correctional
jurisdiction to set right grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse,
violation of fundamental principles of law or justice. The power
under Article 227 is exercised sparingly in appropriate cases, like
when there is no evidence at all to justify, or the finding is so
perverse that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a
conclusion that the court or tribunal has come to. It is axiomatic
that such discretionary relief must be exercised to ensure there is no
miscarriage of justice.
16. Explaining the scope of jurisdiction under Article 227, this
Court in Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd. [Estralla
Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., (2001) 8 SCC 97] has observed :
(SCC pp. 101-102, para 6)
― 6. The scope and ambit of exercise of power and
jurisdiction by a High Court under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India is examined and explained in a
number of decisions of this Court. The exercise of power
4
(2022) 4 SCC 181
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under this article involves a duty on the High Court to
keep inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of
their authority and to see that they do the duty expected or
required of them in a legal manner. The High Court is not
vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds
of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of
the jurisdiction of the subordinate courts or tribunals.
Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of
the courts or tribunals is restricted to cases of serious
dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental
principles of law or justice, where if the High Court does
not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is
also well settled that the High Court while acting under
this Article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court
or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the
subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent
on the face of the record. The High Court can set aside or
ignore the findings of facts of an inferior court or tribunal,
if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so
perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to
such a conclusion, which the court or tribunal has come
to.‖
(Emphasis supplied)
60. In view of the foregoing discussion, and the scope of
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution to
interfere with a judicial order, this Court finds no jurisdictional error,
perversity or patent illegality warranting interference with Impugned
Order.
Challenge to the Impugned Judgment: Determination on Merits
61. Insofar as the Impugned Judgment is concerned, this Court is of
the considered view that the challenge thereto fails at the very outset,
the Petitioners not being persons who can maintain a challenge to it.
This conclusion follows all the more inevitably once the challenge to
the Impugned Order has failed, both on maintainability and on merits.
62. The Petitioners were admittedly not parties to the PP Act
Appeal, in which the Impugned Judgment came to be rendered. Their
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Impleadment Application in the PP Act Appeal stood rejected by the
Impugned Order. The Petitioners were, therefore, not merely absent
from the PP Act Appeal, but were judicially excluded from it, and that
exclusion continues to operate, the Impugned Order having been
found to warrant no interference by this Court.
63. The PP Act Appeal was a statutory appeal under Section 9 of
the PP Act. It was instituted by the persons against whom the learned
Estate Officer had passed the order of eviction, and its scope was
confined to the legality of that order as against them. The grievances
which the Petitioners seek to urge against the Impugned Judgment
concern the validity, form and service of the show cause notice, and
the manner in which the eviction proceedings were conducted before
the learned Estate Officer. Those grievances, however, relate to
proceedings taken against other persons, in which the Petitioners
neither were parties nor sought to participate. Such grievances may be
urged by the persons proceeded against. They cannot, by themselves,
confer upon a stranger to those proceedings a right to assail the final
judgment rendered therein.
64. It follows that the Impugned Order, and that Order alone,
determined the Petitioners’ entitlement to participate in the PP Act
Appeal. The Petitioners could have assailed the Impugned Judgment
only upon first succeeding in setting aside the refusal of their
impleadment. That challenge having failed, the Impugned Order
stands, and with it the Petitioners’ exclusion from the PP Act Appeal.
65. The combined challenge to the Impugned Order as also the
Impugned Judgment appears to be a cleverly drafted attempt to
indirectly do that which is prohibited to be done directly, which is to
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challenge the Impugned Judgment. Consequently, the challenge to the
Impugned Judgment, at the instance of the Petitioners, is devoid of
merit and must fail.
CONCLUSION:
66. The procedural history in the present case must be viewed
cumulatively. The Petitioners first sought to challenge the refusal of
impleadment; they then challenged the final Judgment in a separate
Writ Petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution; they
sought impleadment in a Writ Petition instituted by the persons who
had pursued the statutory appeal; and, after withdrawing those
proceedings, they have instituted the present Petition combining the
earlier challenges under Article 227 of the Constitution.
67. The jurisdiction of this Court, as discussed herein-before,
cannot be invoked repeatedly to obtain another opportunity to pursue a
grievance which has already been raised and thereafter abandoned,
particularly where the successive proceedings substantially overlap in
their object and relief. Such a course burdens the judicial process and
exposes the opposing parties to repeated litigation over the same
controversy.
5
68. In Dnyandeo Sabaji Naik v. Pradnya Prakash Khadekar , the
Hon’ble Supreme Court underscored the heavy burden of litigation
upon the Courts in India and the need for courts to address frivolous
and vexatious litigation, including through realistic costs where
warranted. The relevant observation read as under:
“13. This Court must view with disfavour any attempt by a litigant
to abuse the process. The sanctity of the judicial process will be
seriously eroded if such attempts are not dealt with firmly. A
5
(2017) 5 SCC 496
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litigant who takes liberties with the truth or with the procedures of
the Court should be left in no doubt about the consequences to
follow. Others should not venture along the same path in the hope
or on a misplaced expectation of judicial leniency. Exemplary costs
are inevitable, and even necessary, in order to ensure that in
litigation, as in the law which is practised in our country, there is
no premium on the truth.
14. Courts across the legal system—this Court not being an
exception—are choked with litigation. Frivolous and groundless
filings constitute a serious menace to the administration of justice.
They consume time and clog the infrastructure. Productive
resources which should be deployed in the handling of genuine
causes are dissipated in attending to cases filed only to benefit from
delay, by prolonging dead issues and pursuing worthless causes.
No litigant can have a vested interest in delay. Unfortunately, as the
present case exemplifies, the process of dispensing justice is
misused by the unscrupulous to the detriment of the legitimate. The
present case is an illustration of how a simple issue has occupied
the time of the courts and of how successive applications have been
filed to prolong the inevitable. The person in whose favour the
balance of justice lies has in the process been left in the lurch by
repeated attempts to revive a stale issue. This tendency can be
curbed only if courts across the system adopt an institutional
approach which penalises such behaviour. Liberal access to justice
does not mean access to chaos and indiscipline. A strong message
must be conveyed that courts of justice will not be allowed to be
disrupted by litigative strategies designed to profit from the delays
of the law. Unless remedial action is taken by all courts here and
now our society will breed a legal culture based on evasion instead
of abidance. It is the duty of every court to firmly deal with such
situations. The imposition of exemplary costs is a necessary
instrument which has to be deployed to weed out, as well as to
prevent the filing of frivolous cases. It is only then that the courts
can set apart time to resolve genuine causes and answer the
concerns of those who are in need of justice. Imposition of real
time costs is also necessary to ensure that access to courts is
available to citizens with genuine grievances. Otherwise, the doors
would be shut to legitimate causes simply by the weight of
undeserving cases which flood the system. Such a situation cannot
be allowed to come to pass. Hence it is not merely a matter of
discretion but a duty and obligation cast upon all courts to ensure
that the legal system is not exploited by those who use the forms of
the law to defeat or delay justice. We commend all courts to deal
with frivolous filings in the same manner.‖
(Emphasis supplied )
69. The present case is precisely of the kind contemplated in
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Dnyandeo Sabaji Naik (supra) . Viewed cumulatively, the conduct of
the Petitioners discloses not a bona fide pursuit of a legal remedy, but
a sustained attempt to keep alive, through successive proceedings, a
grievance that they had themselves chosen to abandon. The successive
proceedings, as detailed herein before as well, can be summarized as
under:
S.
No.
Proceeding Relief sought Outcome
1. Application dated
16.12.2023 under Order I
Rule 10 CPC in PPA No.
06/2022
( Defined as
“Impleadment
Application in the PP
Act Appeal” herein)
Impleadment of the
Petitioners in the
Appeal under Section
9 of the PP Act
Dismissed by Order dated
30.05.2024 (Defined as
“Impugned Order” herein).
2. Article 227 Petition,
being CM(M) No.
3333/2024, Krishan
Kumar Jain & Anr. v.
Shri Ram Nath Jain &
Ors.
(Defined as “Petition
against the Impugned
Order” herein)
Setting aside of the
Order dated
30.05.2024
(Defined as
“Impugned Order”
herein).
Withdrawn.
Dismissed as withdrawn on
21.01.2026, with liberty only
to move an appropriate
application before the Bench
seized of the challenge to the
Judgment dated 23.12.2025
(defined as “Impugned
Judgment” herein).
3. Articles 226 and 227
Petition, W.P.(C) No.
19824/2025, Krishan
Kumar Jain & Anr. v.
Land and Development
Office & Ors.
(Defined as “Writ
Petition against the
Impugned Judgment by
the Petitioners” herein)
Setting aside of the
Judgment dated
23.12.2025.
(Defined as
“Impugned
Judgment” herein).
Withdrawn.
After arguing for some time,
learned counsel withdrew the
Petition. Dismissed as
withdrawn on 24.07.2026,
with liberty “to take such
appropriate remedies as are
available to him under law”.
This Court recorded its strong
exception to the manner in
which learned counsel sought
to impose conditions on the
recording of the withdrawal.
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S.
No.
Proceeding Relief sought Outcome
4. CM APPL. 18406/2026
(defined as
“Impleadment
Application in Writ
Petition” herein)
in the Writ Petition,
being W.P.(C) No.
321/2026, Shri Ram Nath
Jain & Ors. v. Land and
Development Office &
Ors. (Defined as “Writ
Petition against the
Impugned Judgment by
the Original Appellants”
herein)
Impleadment of the
Petitioners in the Writ
Petition against the
Impugned Judgment
by the Original
Appellants
Withdrawn.
Dismissed as withdrawn on
24.07.2026, with liberty “to
avail such appropriate
remedies as are available to
him under law”.
5. The present Petition,
CM(M) No. 2344/2026.
Setting aside of both
the Order dated
30.05.2024 and the
Judgment dated
23.12.2025; remand
to the Estate Officer;
restoration of
possession;
compensation.
Considered in the present
Judgment.
70. A perusal of the procedural history, as summarized herein
before, makes it evident that each of these steps has consumed the
time of this Court and of the Courts below, and has kept the
Respondents in litigation over a controversy which, so far as the
Petitioners are concerned, stood concluded. The Petitioners have
thereby taken “liberty” with the procedures of this Court, which
Dnyandeo Sabaji Naik (supra) holds must be dealt with firmly.
71. Allowing such conduct to pass with a mere dismissal would
place a premium on the very litigative strategy that the Hon’ble
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Supreme Court has deprecated. It would signal that a litigant may
withdraw a proceeding whenever the outcome appears unfavorable,
and then return to Court in a new form, at no cost other than the time
of the Court and of the opposite parties. This Court is, therefore, of the
considered view that this is a fit case for the imposition of exemplary
costs. Such costs are meant not merely to compensate, but to deter the
Petitioners and others similarly inclined from abusing the process of
the Court.
DECISION:
72. For the foregoing reasons, the challenge to the Impugned Order
dated 30.05.2024 is not maintainable, having been abandoned by the
Petitioners, and in any event fails on merits. The challenge to the
Impugned Judgment dated 23.12.2025 is barred, the Petitioners having
abandoned their earlier challenge to it under Articles 226 and 227 of
the Constitution, and is, in any case, not maintainable at their instance,
they not being parties to the PP Act Appeal. The Petition is,
accordingly, dismissed.
73. In view of the foregoing discussion, the Petitioners are directed
to pay Costs of ₹1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only) to the Delhi High
Court Legal Services Committee (DHCLSC) within three (03) weeks
from today. Proof of deposit shall be placed on record. In the event of
default, the Registry shall list the matter for appropriate directions.
74. It is clarified that nothing in this Judgment shall be construed as
an expression of opinion on the Petitioners’ asserted rights, if any, in
the Subject Premises. Any such rights may be pursued, if otherwise
permissible, in accordance with law.
75. The present Petition, along with all pending Application(s), if
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BHATIA
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any, stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J
OCTOBER 28, 2026/DJ
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BHATIA
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