Osama @ Ausama vs State Of Haryana

Court
Punjab and Haryana High Court

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226
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CRA-D No.452 of 2026
Osama @ Ausama
….. Appellant
versus
State of Haryana
….. Respondent
CRA-D No.1084 of 2026 (O&M)
Waseem @ Tita
….. Appellant
Versus
State of Haryana
….. Respondent
Date of Decision: 17.11.2026
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH BHARDWAJ
HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE PUJA CHOPRA
*
Present: Mr. Aman Pal, Senior Advocate with
Mr. Sankalp Dhanda, Advocate
for the appellant in both the appeals.
Ms. Shaveta Sanghi, DAG, Haryana.
*
RAJESH BHARDWAJ, J. (ORAL)
CRM-28546-2026 in
CRA-D-1084-2026
Instant application has been filed praying for condonation of
delay of 35 days in filing the present appeal.
After hearing learned counsel for the applicant-appellant and
going through the contents of the application, the same is allowed and the

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delay of 35 days in filing the present appeal is hereby condoned.
Main appeals
1. Both the appeals have been filed praying for setting aside the
orders dated 16.02.2026 and 11.05.2026 passed by the learned Additional
Sessions Judge, Nuh whereby the regular bail applications filed by both the
appellants in a case bearing FIR No.253, dated 01.08.2023, under Sections
148, 149, 332, 353, 186, 427, 455, 435, 436, 395, 397, 307, 216-A, 120-B of
IPC, Sections 25, 54 & 59 of Arms Act and Sections 13(1)(a), 13(1)(b),
15(1)(a), 15(1)(b) and 16 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967,
registered at Police Station City Nuh, District Nuh were dismissed. Further
prayer has been made for the grant of regular bail to the appellants in the
above-mentioned cases.
FACTS OF THE CASE
2. Succinctly the facts of the case are that FIR in the present case
was got registered on the statement of complainant, namely, PSI Suraj. It
was alleged that on 31.07.2023, at about 03:30 P.M., the complainant along
with other police officials of Cyber Cell, Nuh were present at the police
station. In the meantime, a mob of thousands agitated during Mewat
Dharmik Jalabhishek Yatra. All of them in connivance with each other
surrounded the police station from all the four directions and started pelting
stones at police station. They were shouting loudly to burn the police
officials alive. The mob broke the walls and main gate of the police station
Cyber Crime Nuh by hitting it with bus bearing registration No.DL-1PD-
5863. Rioters climbed on the wall and roof of the police station and started
firing gunshots towards the personnel. To control the mob, the police fired

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tear gas shells, however, the rioters continued pelting stones on police
station. They vandalized multiple police vehicles and thereafter, caused
injuries as well to the police officials. Thus, the request was made to take
legal action against all the accused. On registration of the FIR, the
investigation commenced. During the investigation, complicity of the
appellants surfaced and they were arrayed as an accused in the present case.
Resultantly, the appellant, namely, Osama @ Ausama (in CRA-D-452-2026)
was arrested on 27.12.2023 and appellant, namely, Waseem @ Tita (in
CRA-D-1084-2026) was arrested on 03.09.2023. On completion of the
investigation, the supplementary challan was presented and on framing of
charges, the trial commenced. The appellants approached the Court of
learned Additional Sessions Judge, Nuh praying for the grant of regular bail,
however, after hearing both the sides and finding no merit in the same, the
learned Additional Sessions Judge, Nuh, declined the bail applications filed
by both the appellants vide order dated 16.02.2026 and 11.05.2026,
respectively. Hence being aggrieved, the appellants are before this Court by
way of filing the present appeals praying for the grant of regular bail.
ARGUMENTS RAISED BY LEARNED SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
THE APPELLANTS
3. Learned Senior counsel for the appellants has vehemently
contended that the appellants have been falsely and frivolously implicated in
the present case in a premeditated manner. He has submitted that in all, 23
accused have been nominated in the present case, out of which similarly
situated 21 co-accused have already been granted the concession of bail. He
has submitted that admittedly the attack was by the mob and it was not

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possible to identify the present accused among them. He has submitted that
the appellants have not been attributed any specific role and they have been
implicated in the present case on the basis of disclosure statement of co-
accused, which is not even an admissible evidence. He has submitted that in
order to harass the appellants, they have been implicated in multiple FIRs,
which are nearly 48 in number, however, in all of the cases, they have been
granted the concession of bail. He has submitted that the provision of
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act has been added in the FIR by the
Investigating Agency only to make the offence a graver one, however, no
offence under Section 16 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act is
made out against the appellants. He has submitted that the investigation in
the present case is already complete, however, the prosecution has cited
about 66 prosecution witnesses, out of which, 06 witnesses have been
examined so far, thus, the trial would take sufficiently long time. He has
submitted that the appellants are behind bars from last about 03 years. He
has submitted that the case of the appellants is at par with that of the
similarly situated co-accused, who have already been granted the bail. To
buttress his arguments, learned Senior counsel for the appellants has relied
upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in ‘ Athar Parwez
’ 2024 SCC Online SC 3762; ‘
vs. Union of India Union of India vs. K. A.
Najeeb ’ (2021) 3 SCC 713; ‘ Thwaha Fasal vs. Union of India ’ (2022) 14
SCC 766 and ‘ Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh vs. State of Maharashtra and
another ’ (2024) 9 SCC 813, etc. He has, thus, submitted that in the facts and
circumstances of the present case, the appellants deserve to be granted bail.

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ARGUMENTS RAISED BY LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE STATE
4. Per contra , learned State counsel has vehemently opposed the
submissions made by learned Senior counsel for the appellants. She has
already filed separate replies in both the appeals dated 16.05.2026 by way of
an affidavit of Prithvi Singh, HPS, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Nuh
and dated 28.07.2026 by way of an affidavit of Abhimanyu, HPS, Deputy
Superintendent of Police, Tauru on behalf of the respondent-State. She has
drawn the attention of this Court to the replies filed and has submitted that
the complicity of both the appellants have been surfaced in the present case
during the investigation. She has submitted that besides the recovery of
weapon, the call detail records were also collected. She has submitted that
the appellants had actively participated in the riots and they vandalized
multiple vehicles of the police officials and also pelted stones upon the
police officials. She has submitted that during the investigation, the plastic
bag filled with stones, dandas and petrol bottles recovered from the
appellant, namely, Osama @ Ausama whereas from the possession of the
appellant, namely, Waseem @ Tita, a motorcycle without number plate, on
which a plastic bag was tied in which a plastic bottle containing petrol like
substance and a mobile phone in damaged condition were recovered. She
has submitted that complicity of both the appellants is also proved from the
CCTV footage and both the appellants are active members of whatsapp
group 0011 , in which, all the accused persons had planned the riots. She has
submitted that the appellant, namely, Osama @ Ausama is the main accused,
who looted a bus and rammed the same into the wall of the police station
Cyber Crime Nuh to break it. She has submitted that the appellants are

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involved in other cases as well and in case, releasing them on bail, would
adversely affect the ongoing trial. She has further submitted that under
Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, a person
accused of an offence punishable under Chapters IV and VI of the said Act
shall not be released on bail or on his own bond if the Court, upon perusal of
the case diary or the report submitted under Section 173 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the accusations against such person are prima facie true. She
has further submitted that though out of 23 accused, 21 co-accused have
already been granted bail, however, their role is distinguishable from that of
the appellants, thus, they do not deserve the concession of bail on the ground
of parity with that of the co-accused, who have already been granted bail.
She, on instructions, has submitted that out of total 66 prosecution witnesses,
only 06 witnesses have already been examined so far. She has produced
custody certificates of both the appellants today in the Court and the same
are taken on record.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS OF THE COURT
5. The Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
the record with their able assistance.
6. On hearing counsel for the parties and perusing the record, it is
deciphered that the occurrence in the present case has taken place on
31.07.2023. Admittedly, it was a mob, who attacked on the police station.
Complicity of both the appellants surfaced during the investigation. In all
there are 23 accused in the present case, out of which admittedly, 21 co-
accused have already been granted the concession of bail. Though the

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appellants have been prosecuted for the offence under Section 16 of
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act but as per the law settled, if the Court
is satisfied from the facts and circumstances of the case, the grant of bail can
always be considered. As submitted before this Court by learned State
counsel that out of total 66 prosecution witnesses, only 06 witnesses have
been examined so far. Custody certificate produced would show that the
appellant, namely, Osama @ Ausama has undergone the actual sentence of
02 years, 10 months and 20 days and the appellant, namely, Waseem @ Titu
has undergone the actual sentence of 03 years, 02 months and 14 days as on
16.11.2026. It further reflects that the appellant, namely, Osama @ Ausama
is involved in 10 more cases, however in 01 of the cases he is on bail, in 03
cases, he has been acquitted and in 01 case, he has undergone the sentence
awarded to him, whereas the appellant, namely, Waseem @ Tita is involved
in 08 other cases, however in 02 of the cases he is on bail and in 02 cases, he
has been acquitted.
7. For resolving the issue involved in the present case, it would be
apposite to refer Section 43-D of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act,
1967. The same reads as follows:-
“43D. Modified application of certain provisions of the
Code:-
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code or any
other law, every offence punishable under this Act shall be
deemed to be a cognizable offence within the meaning of clause
(c) of section 2 of the Code, and “cognizable case” as defined in
that clause shall be construed accordingly.
(2) Section 167 of the Code shall apply in relation to a case
involving an offence punishable under this Act subject to the

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modification that in sub-section (2),-
(a) the references to “fifteen days”, “ninety days” and
“sixty days”, wherever they occur, shall be construed as
references to “thirty days”, “ninety days” and “ninety
days” respectively; and
(b) after the proviso, the following provisos shall be
inserted, namely:-
“Provided further that if it is not possible to complete the
investigation within the said period of ninety days, the Court
may if it is satisfied with the report of the Public Prosecutor
indicating the progress of the investigation and the specific
reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the said period
of ninety days, extend the said period up to one hundred and
eighty days: Provided also that if the police officer making the
investigation under this Act, requests, for the purposes of
investigation, for police custody from judicial custody of any
person in judicial custody, he shall file an affidavit stating the
reasons for doing so and shall also explain the delay, if any, for
requesting such police custody. (3) Section 268 of the Code
shall apply in relation to a case involving an offence punishable
under this Act subject to the modification that-
(a) the reference in sub-section (1) thereof-
(i) to “the State Government” shall be construed as a
reference to “the Central Government or the State
Government.”;
(ii) (ii)to “order of the State Government” shall be
construed as a reference to “order of the Central
Government or the State Government, as the case may
be”; and
(b) the reference in sub-section (2) thereof, to “the State
Government” shall be construed as a reference to “the
Central Government or the State Government, as the case
may be”.

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(4) Nothing in section 438 of the Code shall apply in relation to
any case involving the arrest of any person accused of having
committed an offence punishable under this Act.
(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person
accused of an offence punishable under Chapters IV and VI of
this Act shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own
bond unless the Public Prosecutor has been given an
opportunity of being heard on the application for such release:
Provided that such accused person shall not be released on bail
or on his own bond if the Court, on a perusal of the case diary
or the report made under section 173 of the Code is of the
opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the
accusation against such person is prima facie true.
(6) The restrictions on granting of bail specified in subsection
(5) is in addition to the restrictions under the Code or any other
law for the time being in force on granting of bail.
(7) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (5) and
(6), no bail shall be granted to a person accused of an offence
punishable under this Act, if he is not an Indian citizen and has
entered the country unauthorisedly or illegally except in very
exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in
writing.”
8. As per Section 43-D (5) of the UAPA, no person accused of an
offence punishable under Chapter IV and VI of the UAPA shall, if in
custody, be released on bail unless the public prosecutor has been given an
opportunity of being heard on the application made by him for such release
and if the Court, on perusing the case diary or the report filed under Section
173 Cr.P.C. is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing
that the accusations against such person are prima facie proved. Section 43-
D (6) further stipulates that restrictions for the grant of bail specified in

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Section 43-D (5) would be in addition to the restrictions provided under the
Cr.P.C. or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail.
9. In the recent judgment passed in ‘ Syed Iftikhar Andrabi vs
National Investigation Agency, Jammu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 512’ , Hon’ble
the Supreme Court of India has held as under:-
‘35. The often invoked phrase ‘bail is the rule and jail is the
exception’ is not merely an empty statutory slogan flowing from the
CrPC as Gurwinder has stated. It is a constitutional principle
flowing from Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution and the
presumption of innocence which is the cornerstone of any civilised
society governed by the rule of law. Statutes may undoubtedly
calibrate the manner in which that principle is applied, particularly
in cases involving national security or terrorist offences for which
the UAP Act is meant, but those cannot altogether invert the
constitutional relationship between liberty and detention. The
statutory embargo of  Section 43-D(5)  must remain a circumscribed
restriction that operates subject to the guarantee of  Articles
21  and  22  of the Constitution. Therefore, we have no manner of
doubt in stating that even under the  UAP Act , ‘bail is the rule and
jail is the exception’;of course, in an appropriate case, bail can be
denied having regard to the facts of that particular case.
36. As we have noted above, several subsequent decisions of this
Court, rendered after Gurwinder, have continued to apply the
approach articulated in Najeeb in granting bail under the  UAP
Act  on grounds of prolonged incarceration, gross delay in
conclusion of trial, and the absence of any realistic possibility of the
trial concluding in the near future.
37. The logic underlying all these judgments traces back to
Najeeb, which is now the law of the land governing the grant of bail
under the  UAP Act  in a situation of prolonged detention. In that
context, it is noteworthy that while Gulfisha Fatima relied on
Gurwinder to adopt a narrower reading of Najeeb, neither Gulfisha
Fatima nor Gurwinder engage with this subsequent line of authority
of case law.

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38. Thus it is clear beyond doubt that the preference for bail, or
the often invoked principle ‘bail is the rule and jail is the
exception’ flows from the constitutional primacy of personal liberty
under Article 21   and, therefore, cannot be displaced by legislation.’
10. Reference can be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in
the case of Union of India versus K.A. Najeeb (supra) wherein it has been
held that long custody would be an essential factor while granting bail under
UAPA. Article 21 of the Constitution of India provides right to speedy trial
and long period of incarceration would be a good ground to grant bail to an
under-trial for an offence punishable under UAPA. It has also been held that
the embargo under Section 43-D of UAPA would not negate the powers of
the Court to give effect to Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The
relevant para of the judgment is reproduced hereunder:-
It is thus clear to us that the presence of statutory
“18.
restrictions like Section 43-D(5) of UAPA per-se does not oust the
ability of Constitutional Courts to grant bail on grounds of violation
of Part III of the Constitution. Indeed, both the restrictions under a
Statue as well as the powers exercisable under Constitutional
Jurisdiction can be well harmonised. Whereas at commencement of
proceedings, Courts are expected to appreciate the legislative policy
against grant of bail but the rigours of such provisions will melt down
where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within a
reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone
has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence. Such an
approach would safeguard against the possibility of provisions like
Section 43-D(5) of UAPA being used as the sole metric for denial of
bail or for wholesale breach of constitutional right to speedy trial.
11. In the case of ‘ Shoma Kanti Sen Vs. The State of Maharashtra
and Another ’ (2024) 6 SCC 591, it was held as under:-
“38 ……. This Court has already accepted right of an accused

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under the said offences of the 1967 Act to be enlarged on bail
founding such right on Article 21 of the Constitution of India. This
was in the case of Najeeb (supra), and in that judgment, long
period of incarceration was held to be a valid 45 ground to enlarge
an accused on bail in spite of the bailrestricting provision of
Section 43D (5) of the 1967 Act. Pre-conviction detention is
necessary to collect evidence (at the investigation stage), to
maintain purity in the course of trial and also to prevent an
accused from being fugitive from justice. Such detention is also
necessary to prevent further commission of offence by the same
accused. Depending on gravity and seriousness of the offence
alleged to have been committed by an accused, detention before
conclusion of trial at the investigation and post-chargesheet stage
has the sanction of law broadly on these reasonings. But any form
of deprival of liberty results in breach of Article 21 of the
Constitution of India and must be justified on the ground of being
reasonable, following a just and fair procedure and such deprival
must be proportionate in the facts of a given case. These would be
the overarching principles which the law Courts would have to
apply while testing prosecution’s plea of pre-trial detention, both
at investigation and post-chargesheet stage.”
12. Further, the Supreme Court in the case of ‘Vernon vs The State
of Maharashtra and another ’, (2023) 15 SCC 56 has held that serious
allegations against accused by itself cannot be a reason to deny bail to the
accused. The relevant para thereof is reproduced hereunder:-
“43. In the case of Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (supra)
reference was made to the judgment of Jayendra Saraswathi
Swamigal -vs- State of Tamil Nadu [(2005) 2 SCC 13) in which,
citing two earlier decisions of this court in the cases of State -vs-
Jagjit Singh (AIR 1962 SC 253) and Gurcharan Singh -vs- State of
(UT of Delhi) [(1978) 1 SCC 118), the factors for granting bail
under normal circumstances were discussed. It was held that the
nature and seriousness of the offences, the character of the

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evidence, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, a
reasonable possibility of the presence of the accused not being
secured at the trial; reasonable apprehension of witnesses being
tempered with; the larger interest of the public or the State would
be relevant factors for granting or rejecting bail. Juxtaposing the
appellants’ case founded on Articles 14 and 21 of the
Constitution of India with the aforesaid allegations and
considering the fact that almost five years have lapsed since they
were taken into custody, we are satisfied that the appellants have
made out a case for granting bail. Allegations against them no
doubt are serious, but for that reason alone bail cannot be denied
to them. While dealing with the offences under Chapters IV and
VI of the 1967 Act, we have referred to the materials available
against them at this stage. These materials cannot justify
continued detention of the appellants, pending final outcome of
the case under the others provisions of the 1860 Code and the 1967
Act.”
13. The veracity of the allegations would be assessed only after
conclusion of the trial and on the appreciation of evidence to be led by both
the parties before the trial Court. The trial of the case will take sufficiently
long time. Thus, keeping in view the overall facts and circumstances of the
case, this Court is of the opinion that learned Senior counsel for the
appellants succeeds in making out a case for grant of regular bail.
14. Accordingly, both the appeals are allowed and the impugned
orders dated 16.02.2026 and 11.05.2026 passed by the learned Additional
Sessions Judge, Nuh are hereby set aside. The appellants are ordered to be
released on bail during trial of present case on their furnishing bail/surety
bonds to the satisfaction of the concerned trial Court/Duty Magistrate.
However, if the appellants do not furnish the bail bonds within seven days
from today, then their further custody period after one week will not be

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counted in this case.
15. Nothing said herein shall be treated as an expression of opinion
on the merits of the case.
(RAJESH BHARDWAJ)
JUDGE
(PUJA CHOPRA)
17.11.2026 JUDGE
rittu Whether Speaking/Reasoned : Yes/No
Whether Reportable : Yes/No