Phanjoubam Kula Meitei vs State of Manipur and 2 Others
- Court
- Manipur High Court
REPORTABLE
Sl. No. 5
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR
2026:MNHC:205-DB
AT IMPHAL
WP(Crl.) No. 21 of 2026
Shri Phanjoubam Kula Meitei, aged about 58 years, F/o Shri
Phanjoubam Rabi Meitei @ Luwangamba, a resident of
Andro Lapaochum Tampak Leikai, Imphal East District, P.S.
Andro, District – Imphal East, Manipur – 795149.
….. Petitioner
-Versus-
1. The State of Manipur, represented by the Chief Secretary,
Government of Manipur, Babupara, P.O. & P.S. Imphal,
Imphal West District, Manipur, 795001.
2. The District Magistrate, Imphal East District, P.O. & P.S.
Porompat, Manipur – 795005.
3. The Union of India, through the Secretary to the
Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Department
of Internal Security, North Block, New Delhi- 110001.
..... Respondents
BEFORE
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. M. SUNDAR
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE A. GUNESHWAR SHARMA
For Petitioner Mr. Ph. Sanajaoba along with Mr. RK Kulajit
Singh, advocates
For respondent Nos. 1 &
2
Mr. S. Chittaranjan, Additional Advocate
General, State of Manipur along with Mr. A.
Priyokumar Sharma, State Counsel.
For respondent No. 3 Mr. S. Vijayanand Sharma, Sr. PCCG (Senior
Panel Counsel for Central Government)
Date of Judgment and
Order
12.09.2026
Page 1 of 41
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
(ORAL)
[M. Sundar, CJ]
[1] The following abbreviations/short forms are used in this
order for the sake of brevity/convenience and clarity:
Sl.
No.
Abbreviations/
Short Forms
Full Form/Expansion
1. WP Writ Petition
2. NSA National Security Act, 1980 (65 of 1980)
3. COFEPOSA the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and
Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974
(52 of 1974)
4. Act 14 the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous
Activities of Bootleggers, Drug-Offenders,
Forest-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic
Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 1982 (Act 14
of 1982)
5. UAPA Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (37
of 1967)
6. R1 first respondent
7. R2 second respondent
8. R3 third respondent
9. Detenu Phanjoubam Rabi Meitei @ Luwangamba, aged
28 years, S/o Ph. Kula Meitei of Andro
Lapaochum Tampak Leikai, Andro PS, Imphal
East District, Manipur (to be noted, Ph. Kula
Meitei is the writ petitioner and father of
detenu)
10. Impugned
preventive
detention order
order dated 21.04.2026 bearing reference No.
Cril/NSA/No.5 of 2026 made by R2 (detaining
authority)
11. Impugned
approval orders
orders dated (i) 29.04.2026 bearing reference
No. H-14/9/2026-HD-HD and (ii) 01.05.2026
bearing reference No. H-14/9/2026-HD-HD
made by R1
12. Impugned
confirmation
order
order dated 27.05.2026 bearing reference No.
H-14/9/2026-HD-HD made by R1
13. FIR First Information Report
14. FIRs First Information Reports
15. Sr.PCCG Senior Panel Counsel for Central Government
16. Addl.AG Additional Advocate General
Page 2 of 41
[2] Captioned WP has been presented in this Court on
22.06.2026 seeking issue of a writ of habeas corpus assailing
impugned preventive detention order made by R2, impugned approval
orders made by R1 and impugned confirmation order (also) made by
R1.
[3] Short facts (shorn of details and elaboration not
imperative for appreciating instant order) are that the writ petitioner’s
son (detenu) was arrested on 25.03.2026, produced in court and
remanded on 26.03.2026 vide an FIR dated 08.04.2026 bearing No.
18(03)2026 APS on the file of Andro Police Station, Andro; that while
the detenu was in judicial custody, R2 made the impugned preventive
detention order inter-alia under Section 3 (2) of NSA, the same was
served on the detenu the next day i.e., on 22.04.2026; that this was
followed by grounds of detention made by R2 (detaining authority)
being grounds of detention dated 22.04.2026 and the grounds of
detention was served on the detenu on 25.04.2026; that the detention
order was approved by R1 inter-alia under Section 3(4) of NSA in and
by impugned approval orders; that this was followed by confirmation
order made by R1 under Section 12(1) of NSA i.e., impugned
confirmation order; that as already alluded to supra, captioned WP
was presented in this Court on 22.06.2026, notice was issued, R3 has
filed an affidavit-in-opposition dated 07.07.2026, R2 has filed an
affidavit-in-opposition dated 31.08.2026 and this affidavit-in-
opposition has been adopted by R1.
Page 3 of 41
[4] In the hearing today, Mr. Ph. Sanajaoba along with Mr.
RK Kulajit, learned counsel on record for writ petitioner, Mr. S.
Chittaranjan, learned Additional Advocate General for State of Manipur
along with Mr. A. Priyokumar Sharma, learned State Counsel for R1
and R2 and Mr. S. Vijayanand Sharma, learned Sr. PCCG for R3 were
before this Court.
[5] Main WP was taken up and heard out with the consent
of all the afore referred counsel.
[6] Notwithstanding myriad ground raised in the WP,
learned counsel for writ petitioner predicated his campaign against the
impugned preventive detention order, impugned approval orders and
impugned confirmation order on 2 (two) points and these 2 (two)
points are as follows :
(i) The literacy level of detenu is II standard in
school, he is not conversant with English, in
and vide a communication dated 04.05.2026
made to the detaining authority (R2), detenu
sought translation (translation in Manipuri
language in Meitei Mayek script being the only
language which detenu is conversant with) of
the impugned detention order dated
21.04.2026, grounds of detention dated
22.04.2026 and documents adverted to in
Page 4 of 41
grounds making it clear that he studied only
upto II stands in school. Though this request
was made to R2 vide communication dated
04.05.2026, R2 did not furnish copies for some
time and ultimately after being requested to do
so by Central Government (GoI) vide
communication dated 14.05.2026 bearing
reference No. II/15023/07/2026-NSA, under
cover of a letter dated 03.06.2026 (signed by
Joint Secretary (Home), Government of
Manipur) bearing reference No. H-14/9/2026-
HD-HD translated copies of (only) the
impugned preventive detention order dated
21.04.2026 and the grounds of detention dated
22.04.2024 (translation in Manipur Meitei
Mayek script) was furnished but not even a
single copy of the documents adverted to in the
grounds {though as many as 11 (eleven)
documents have been adverted by way of
tabulation vide paragraph 29 of the grounds of
detention} was translated and furnished. This
has severely hampered the right of the detenu
to make a representation much less an
effective representation and has caused
Page 5 of 41
infraction of sanctus right enshrined in Article
22(5) of the Constitution;
(ii) In the grounds of detention, more particularly
in paragraph 35, after making it clear that the
detenu has a right to make a representations
to Government of Manipur as well as Central
Government against the impugned preventive
detention order and after setting out the
addresses to whom it should be sent detaining
authority has fixed a cap with regard to time
for sending the representations and has
mentioned that the representation should be
submitted within 3 (three) weeks from the date
of detention. To be noted, in the instant case,
date of detention (formal detention) pursuant
to impugned preventive detention order was on
22.04.2026 as that is the date on which
impugned preventive detention order was
served on the detenu who remains incarcerated
from 25.03.2026. This has again caused
infraction of the rights of detenu enshrined in
Article 22 (5) is learned counsel’s say. It was
further pointed out that 3 (three) weeks from
the date of detention elapsed on 13.05.2026
Page 6 of 41
but the translated copies of the preventive
detention order and grounds alone (without
documents) was furnished only on 03.06.2026
and therefore, the detenu could not make
representations and he did not make
representations as he very believed that he
cannot make representations after elapsing of
3 (three) weeks from the date of detention i.e.,
after 13.05.2026 owing to the cap fixed in the
grounds of detention.
[7] In response to the afore referred 2 (two) points, learned
Addl. AG made submissions to the contrary and the same are as
follows :
(i) The impugned preventive detention order
and the grounds together with the
documents were explained in a language
known to the detenu and served on him on
22.04.2026 and 25.04.2026. Therefore, it
cannot be gainsaid that there is infraction of
Article 22(5);
(ii) As regards the second point, it was
submitted that it was open to the detenu to
Page 7 of 41
make a representation even after 3 (three)
weeks.
[8] This Court carefully considered the afore referred 2 (two)
points i.e., the rival submissions. As regards the first point turning on
translation/furnishing copies in regional language which alone detenu
is conversant with (having studied only upto II standard) the same
have been articulated in paragraphs 10 and 15 of the writ petition
which read as follows :
Page 8 of 41
[9] The aforesaid 2 (two) points have been met by R1 and
R2 in the affidavit-in-opposition in paragraphs 9 and 17 which read as
follows :
Page 9 of 41
[10] A careful perusal of the above paragraphs/pleadings
makes it clear that the stand of State is that the translated copies i.e.,
copies translated in Manipuri Meitei Mayek script was furnished by the
detaining authority, only impugned preventive detention order, is not
the case of State that the documents adverted to in the grounds of
detention more particularly, the 11 (eleven) documents adverted to in
paragraph 29 thereat in the form of a tabulation. To put it differently,
translated copies of none of the 11 (eleven) documents were
furnished. As translation of none of the documents were furnished,
this Court deems it appropriate to write that it is not embarking upon
the drill of examining which of the 11 (eleven) documents are ‘relied
upon documents’ and which are ‘referred to documents’. To be noted,
it is nobody’s case that all 11 (eleven) are only ‘referred to’ documents
and not ‘relied upon’ documents. Only if some of the documents had
not been furnished in the regional language the question of whether
they are relied upon documents or merely referred to documents
would arise. This is the reason why we are not embarking upon in this
legal drill in instant order.
Page 10 of 41
[11] As regards the literacy level of the detenu, there is
absolutely no disputation or contestation at all as the grounds of
detention, in the first page itself under the caption ‘Brief Background’
makes it clear that the grounds were translated and furnished and
detenu has studied only upto II standard and gave up further
schooling owing to financial circumstances. This paragraph of the
grounds of detention to the extent relevant reads as follows :
‘……………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………
Brief Background :
1. That you were born and brought up at Moirang Andro
Lapaochum Tampak Leikai, Andro PS, IE district,
Manipur. Your father is a cultivator and mother is a
brewer. You have one younger brother and four younger
sisters. You read up to class II standard and gave up
further study due to lack of financial assistance. Then,
you started engaging in cultivation of food crops and
later worked as a construction worker till joining the
outfit RPF/PLA.
……………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………’
[12] As regards furnishing preventive detention order,
grounds and relied upon documents i.e., documents relied on qua the
grounds by the detaining authority in a language known to the detenu
when the detenu is not conversant with the language in which the
detention order, grounds and the documents are, the law is well
settled. Learned counsel for writ petitioner pressed into service
Jogibhai Patel case being judgment reported in (1981) 2 SCC 427
{Shri Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel -Versus- Union of India and
others} . On facts, Jogibhai Patel is a case which arose under
Page 11 of 41
COFEPOSA. A COFEPOSA detenu raised several points including the
point that the grounds served on him were in English, he does not
know English and he knows only Gujarati but no translation of the
grounds and documents in Gujarati were given to him in spite of he
asking for the same. This argument was resisted by the State by
pleading and arguing that the detention order and documents were
fully explained in Gujarati to the detenu at the time of serving it on
him but this argument of the State was repelled by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court and Hon’ble Supreme Court made it clear that the
mandate of Article 22(5) of the Constitution uses the expression
, is a very strong expression and that
‘ communicated’ ‘ communicate ’
verbally explaining to a detenu without giving it in writing in a
language known to the detenu or the language in which detenu
understands is clearly an infraction of Article 22 (5), most relevant
paragraphs in Jogibhai Patel are paragraphs 15 and 20. Paragraphs
15 and 20 (to the extent relevant) of Jogibhai Patel read as follows :
‘ 1. ……………………………………………………..
2 .……………………………………………………..
………………………………………………………..
15. The additional grounds which have been pressed into
arguments by Shri Ram Jethmalani, are:
(1) The respondents failed to supply despite the
request of the detenu, all the documents which were relied
upon by the detaining authority while passing the order of
his detention, that the detaining authority purported to give
him 460 documents, but later on, the detenu discovered that
their number was less and many of them were either
Page 12 of 41
incomplete or had been wholly withheld; that in particular
236 documents covering 236 pages were not supplied.
This is alleged in ground No. 13 of the present
petition. In reply to this, in para 17 of the counter- affidavit
filed on behalf of the respondents, it is admitted that all the
documents had not been given to the detenu, and he had
been supplied enough documents which were thought to be
sufficient to enable him to make an effective representation.
The petitioner came to know about the non-supply
of these documents from the copy of the judgment, dated
May 13, 1980, of the Gujarat High Court passed in the allied
writ petitions filed on behalf of other detenus who were
alleged to be the associates of the present petitioner.
(2) On July 17, 1980, a representation was made on
behalf of the detenu with a request that the same be
forwarded to the Central Government for exercise of its
power of revocation of the detention under Section 11 of the
Act. The Jailor forwarded that representation to the Central
Government on July 18, 1980, but the same has not yet been
disposed of. This plea is the subject of grounds 16, 17 and
26 of the Writ Petition.
A reply to these allegations is to be found in
paragraphs 20 and 21 of the counter filed on behalf of the
respondents, wherein it is admitted that the jailor has sent
the representation at the detenu's request to the Central
Govt.
(3) The grounds served on the detenu were in
English. The detenu does not know English. It is stated in
the affidavit of the person who served the 'grounds' that they
were explained to the detenu in Gujarati which is the
mother-tongue of the detenu. Admittedly, no translation
into Gujarati of the grounds of detention was given to the
detenu on March 11, 1980. This being the case there was a
breach of the constitutional imperative which requires that
the grounds should be communicated to the detenu. It can
be spelled out therefrom that the grounds must be
Page 13 of 41
communicated in a language which the detenu understands.
In support of this contention, reference has been made to
Haribandhu Das v. District Magistrate, Cuttack & Anr. and
the judgment dated June 23, 1980 in Bakshi's case.
16. …………………………………………………………………
17. …………………………………………………………………
18. …………………………………………………………………
19. …………………………………………………………………
20. It is an admitted position that the detenu does not know
English. The grounds of detention, which were served on
the detenu, have been drawn up in English. It is true that
Shri C. L. Antali, Police Inspector, who served the grounds
of detention on the detenu, has filed an affidavit stating that
he had fully explained the grounds of detention in Gujarati
to the detenu. But, that is not a sufficient compliance with
the mandate of Article 22(5) of the Constitution, which
requires that the grounds of detention must be
"communicated" to the detenu. "Communicate" is a strong
word. It means that sufficient knowledge of the basic facts
constituting the 'grounds' should be imparted effectively and
fully to the detenu in writing in a language which he
understands. The whole purpose of communicating the
'ground' to the detenu is to enable him to make a purposeful
and effective representation. If the 'grounds' are only
verbally explained to the detenu and nothing in writing is
left with him, in a language which he understands, then that
purpose is not served, and the constitutional mandate in
Article 22(5) is infringed. If any authority is needed on this
point, which is so obvious from Article 22(5), reference may
be made to the decisions of this Court in Harikishan v. State
of Maharashtra and Haribandhu Das. v. District
Magistrate . ’
…………………………………………………………………….’
Paragraph 13 of Jogibhai Patel which lays down the
ratio reads as follows :
Page 14 of 41
‘ 13. The position that emerges from a survey of the above
decisions is that the application of the doctrine of constructive
res judicata is confined to civil actions and civil proceedings.
This principle of public policy is entirely inapplicable to
illegal detention and does not bar a subsequent petition for a
writ of habeas corpus under Article 32 of the Constitution on
fresh grounds, which were not taken in the earlier petition for
the same relief.’
[13] Besides Jogibhai Patel, this Court respectfully reminds
itself of the oft quoted Powanammal case law i.e., Powanammal
v. State of Tamil Nadu and Another reported in (1999) 2 SCC
413 . Powanammal , is a case in which the writ petitioner’s son was
detained vide a preventive detention order made under Act 14 of 1982
and in Powanammal , the point raised was that the detenu is
conversant only with Tamil but Tamil version of the documents had
not been supplied, this has hampered the right of the detenu to make
an effective representation and has resulted in infraction of Article
22(5). In Powanammal also, the plea that the detention order,
grounds and documents were explained in Tamil to the detenu at the
time of the same being served on the detenu was brought up by State
but this was repelled by Hon’ble Supreme Court by making it clear that
the amplitude of safeguard embodied in Article 22(5) extends to not
merely oral explanation of the grounds of detentions and the material
in support thereof in a language understood by the detenu but it also
extends to supplying the translated script or language which is
Page 15 of 41
understandable to the detenu. This is vide paragraph 8 of
Powanammal and paragraph 8 of Powanammal reads as follows:
‘8 . The law relating to preventive detention has been
crystalized and the principles are well-nigh settled. The
amplitude of the safeguard embodied in Article 22(5)
extends not merely to oral explanation of the grounds
of detention and the material in support thereof in the
language understood by the detenu but also to
supplying their translation in script or language which
is understandable to the detenu. Failure to do so would
amount to denial of the right of being communicated
the grounds and of being afforded the opportunity of
making a representation against the order.’
[14] This Court, respectfully follows Lallubhai Jogibhai
Patel , Powanammal principles and comes to the conclusion that in
the case at hand as none of the documents adverted to in the grounds
(11 documents set out in a tabulation in paragraph 29 of the grounds)
were supplied in the lone language known to the detenu/lone
language which the detenu understands viz., Manipuri (Meitei Mayek
script) and therefore there is a clear infraction of Article 22(5) of the
Constitution vitiating the impugned preventive detention order,
approval and confirmation of the same and making it necessary to
dislodge the same.
[15] In the normal circumstances, in a habeas corpus legal
drill assailing a preventive detention order, if the petitioner succeeds
on one point the other points may not be necessary to be examined,
however, as two points have been raised, this Court considers it
nd nd
necessary to examine the 2 point also. The 2 point, as would be
evident from the allusion supra turns on the detaining authority fixing
Page 16 of 41
3(three) weeks time cap for sending representations. This Court, in
multiple decisions, by respectfully following the ratio laid down by
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Prem Lata Sharma v. District
Magistrate, Mathura and Ors. reported in (1998) 4 SCC 260 held
that fixing of a cap in terms of time frame for sending representations
qua preventive detention orders and grounds is impermissible. To be
noted, in Prem Lata Sharma case law law laid down by Hon’ble
Supreme Court is to the effect that as long as a preventive detention
order operates a detenu who remains incarcerated pursuant to the
preventive detention order has a right to make a representation. One
of the cases in which this Court relied on Prem Lata Sharma principle
and dislodged a preventive detention order is the case of Philip
Khaikholal reported in 2026: MNHC: 151-DB (Manipur High Court
Neutral Citation). In Philip ’s case, this Court respectfully adverted to
Prem Lata principle in paragraph No. 10 and the same reads as
follows:
‘ [10] Notwithstanding myriad grounds raised in the WP,
learned counsel for writ petitioner predicated his campaign
against impugned preventive detention order, impugned
approval and confirmation orders on one ground and that one
ground is, in the grounds of detention, time frame has been
fixed by the detaining authority for detenu to make
representations to R-2 and R-3. Adverting to paragraph No. 12
of grounds of detention, learned counsel for writ petitioner, Mr.
Md. Fakharuddin contended that the detaining authority in and
vide impugned preventive order and grounds thereat has fixed
a time frame of three weeks for the detenu to make
representations to R-2 and R-3. As already alluded to supra, it
was submitted by learned counsel for writ petitioner that the
impugned preventive detention order and grounds were served
on the detenu on 04.04.2026 (same day) and therefore three
weeks therefrom (from date of detention pursuant to impugned
preventive detention order) elapsed on 25.04.2026. Literacy
level of the detenu being only Grade – X in school could not
Page 17 of 41
make representations immediately and by the time, he could get
his act together in this regard, the three weeks time frame had
elapsed. Therefore, he did not make representations to R-2 and
R-3 is learned petitioner counsel’s say. This fixing time
cap/time frame for detenu to make representations to R-2 and
R-3 is clear infraction of Article 22(5) is learned petitioner
counsel’s further say. To buttress this submission, learned
counsel for writ petitioner placed reliance on an order of this
Court in Yambem Manichandra Singh -vs- State of Manipur
& 2 Ors. (W.P.(CRL) No. 10 of 2026, order dated 09.06.2026)
reported in Manipur High Court Neutral Citation being
2026:MNHC:100-DB . In Manichandra this Court had
respectfully followed ratio laid down by Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Prem Lata Sharma v. District Magistrate, Mathura
and Ors. reported in (1998) 4 SCC 260 . To be noted, as
regards ratio in Prem Lata, Hon’ble Supreme Court made it
clear that right of a detenu to make representations subsists as
long as the preventive detention order operates. It is also to be
noted that prior to Manichandra case, this Court had
respectfully followed Prem Lata principle in another habeas
corpus petition i.e., W.P.(CRL) No. 34 of 2025 being Mutum
Ranjan Meitei @ Lamjingba -vs- District Magistrate,
Thoubal, Thoubal District & Ors. vide order dated
11.02.2026. ’
[16] This Court had followed Prem Lata principle in an
earlier case i.e., Manichandra case reported in 2026:MNHC:100-
DB (High Court of Manipur, neutral citation). This Court deems it
appropriate to reproduce entire Manichandra case and the same is
as follows:
REPORTABLE
Item No. 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR
AT IMPHAL
W.P.(CRL.) No. 10 of 2026
Yambem Manichandra Singh, aged about 52 years, F/o Shri
Yambem Lalit Singh @ Tompok, a resident of Charangpat
Mamang Leikai, P.S. Thoubal, District – Thoubal, Manipur –
795138.
… Petitioner
- Versus -
Page 18 of 41
1. The State of Manipur represented by Chief Secretary,
Government of Manipur, Babupara P.O. & P.S. Imphal,
Imphal West District, Manipur – 795001.
2. The District Magistrate, Imphal East, District, P.O. &
P.S. Porompat, Manipur – 795005.
3. The Union of India through the Secretary to the
Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs,
Department of Internal Security, North Block, New
Delhi-110001.
… Respondents
B E F O R E
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. M. SUNDAR
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE AHANTHEM BIMOL SINGH
For the petitioner: Mr. Ph. Sanajaoba, Advocate.
For the respondents: Mr. Th. Vashum, Deputy Government
Advocate for respondent Nos. 1 and 2.
Mr. W. Darakeshwar, Senior Panel
Counsel for Central Government for
respondent No. 3.
Date of Judgment & Order : 09.06.2026
JUDGMENT & ORDER
(ORAL)
[M. Sundar, CJ]
[1] The following abbreviations/short
forms/references have been used in the order:
Sl. No. Abbreviation/short
forms/references for the
sake of
brevity/convenience and
clarity
Full
form/Expansion
1. NSA National Security
Act, 1980 (65 of
1980)
2. COFEPOSA Conservation of
Foreign Exchange
and Prevention of
Smuggling
Activities Act, 1974
3. R-1 State of Manipur
represented by Chief
Secretary,
Government of
Manipur, Babupara
P.O. & P.S. Imphal,
Imphal West
District, Manipur
Page 19 of 41
4. R-2 District Magistrate,
Imphal East,
Manipur / Detaining
Authority
5. R-3 Union of India
through the
Secretary to the
Government of
India, Ministry of
Home Affairs,
Department of
Internal Security,
North Block, New
Delhi-110001
6. WP Writ Petition
7. Detenu Shri Yambem Lalit
Singh @ Tompok,
S/o Yambem
Manichandra Singh,
aged about 22
years, a resident of
Charangpat
Mamang Leikai,
P.S. Thoubal,
Thoubal District,
Manipur – 795138.
8. Father of detenu Shri Yambem
Manichandra Singh,
a resident of
Charangpat
Mamang Leikai,
P.S. Thoubal,
Thoubal District,
Manipur – 795138.
9. FIR First Information
Report
10. UAPA Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act,
1967 (37 of 1967)
11. BNSS Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita,
2023 (46 of 2023)
12. BNS Bharatiya Nyaya
Sanhita, 2023 (45 of
2023)
13. Impugned preventive
detention order
Order dated
08.03.2026 bearing
reference No.
Cril./NSA/No.1 of
2026/315 made by
R-2
Page 20 of 41
14. Impugned approval order Order dated
16.03.2026 bearing
reference No. H-
14/3/2026-HD-HD
made by R-1
15. Impugned confirmation
order
Order dated
08.04.2026 bearing
reference No. H-
14/3/2026-HD-HD
made by R-1
16. Sr. PCCG Senior Panel
Counsel for Central
Government
[2] Captioned WP has been filed with a habeas
corpus plea qua detenu who is now incarcerated in Manipur
Central Jail, Sajiwa, Imphal East, Manipur inter alia owing to a
preventive detention order dated 08.03.2026 bearing reference
No. Cril/NSA/No.1 of 2026/315 made by detaining authority i.e.,
R-2.
[3] In the hearing, Mr. Ph. Sanajaoba, learned
counsel on record for writ petitioner, Mr. Th. Vashum, learned
State counsel for R-1 and R-2 and Mr. W. Darakeshwar, learned
Sr. PCCG are before this Court (Physical Court). R-1 has filed
an affidavit-in-opposition dated 30.05.2026 (wrongly mentioned
as 30.05.2025 in the affidavit-in-opposition), R-2 has filed an
affidavit-in-opposition dated 29.05.2026 (wrongly mentioned as
29.05.2025 in the affidavit-in-opposition) and R-3 has filed an
affidavit-in-opposition dated 16.05.2026. To be noted, R-2 is
detaining authority.
[4] The afore-referred impugned preventive
detention order made by R-2 was approved by R-1 vide order
dated 16.03.2026 bearing reference No. H-14/3/2026-HD-HD
made by R-1 in exercise of power under Section 3(4) of NSA Act
(impugned approval order) and it was subsequently confirmed by
R-1 in and vide order dated 08.04.2026 bearing reference No. H-
14/3/2026-HD-HD made by R-1 in exercise of power under
Section 12(1) of NSA Act (impugned confirmation order).
[5] Learned counsel for writ petitioner, in his
campaign against the afore-referred impugned preventive
detention order made by R-2 (detaining authority) which was
subsequently approved and confirmed by R-1 vide impugned
approval and confirmation orders, notwithstanding myriad
grounds in the WP, predicated his challenge on one point and that
one point is, in the grounds of detention dated 09.03.2026 (served
on the detenu on 11.03.2026 at 06:15 p.m.) the detaining
authority vide paragraph 10 threat has prescribed a time limit of
3 (three) weeks {from the date of detention} for making
representation to the Government of Manipur as well as Central
Government. Learned counsel submits that such fixing of time
frame for the detenu to make representations to State
Government (appropriate Government as well as Central
Government) is a clear infraction of rights enshrined in Article
Page 21 of 41
22(5) of the Constitution of India. In support of his contention,
learned counsel for writ petitioner pressed into service two case
laws namely, Mutum Ranjan Meitei’s case reported in 2026 (1)
MNLJ 126 : 2026 Legal Eagle 6 and Smt. Laishram Nilajit
Shija’s case reported in 2026:MNHC:43-DB (Manipur High
Court neutral citation) . To be noted, further details of these two
cases are Mutum Ranjan Meitei @ Lamjingba -vs- District
Magistrate, Thoubal, Thoubal District & Ors. being order dated
11.02.2026 made in W.P.(Crl.) No. 34 of 2025 and Smt.
Laishram Nilajit Shija -vs- State of Manipur & Ors. being order
dated 12.03.2026 made in W.P.(Crl.) No. 1 of 2026. In Laishram
Nilajit Shija , Mutum Ranjan Meitei has been followed and both
judgments have been rendered by this Division Bench by
respectfully following Prem Lata Sharma rendered by Hon’ble
Supreme Court i.e., Prem Lata Sharma [(1998) 4 SCC 260] . To
be noted, in Prem Lata Sharma , the principle laid down by
Hon’ble Supreme Court is, right of a detenu to make
representations subsists as long as preventive detention order
operates. To be noted, there will be a little more elaboration on
these case laws elsewhere infra in this order.
[6] Learned counsel for writ petitioner, submitted
that 3 (three) weeks time from the date of detention elapsed on
30.03.2026 and detenu did not make any representation either to
State Government or to the Central Government as he was under
the firm belief that he cannot make the representation after 3
(three) weeks from the date of detention had elapsed. It was
submitted that this has been clearly articulated in the WP, more
particularly in paragraph 10 and ground (e) thereat which read as
follows :
’10. That, it is humbly submitted that in
paragraph No. 10 of the grounds of detention
under Section 8 of the NSA, 1980 [Annexure –
N/2], it has been informed by the Respondent
No. 2 that the detenu have a right to make a
representation to Respondent No. 1 & 3
against the impugned order of detention order
and he is given the earliest opportunity for
making such representation and these
representation should be submitted within 3
(three) weeks time from the date of detention,
i.e. 08-03-2026. However, since the detenu has
been incarcerated in Manipur Central Jail,
Sajiwa in pursuance of the impugned detention
order he could not make the said
representations to the concerned authorities
within the stipulated time period or thereafter.
In other words, the detenu is under the firm
itself belief that he cannot make any
representation after three weeks owing to the
time period being fixed in the grounds of
detention [Annexure -N/2]. The relevant
paragraph No. 10 of the said grounds of
detention [Annexure – N/2] is reproduced
herein below:
Page 22 of 41
“That, you are hereby informed that
your have a right to make
representation to the Government of
Manipur as well as to the Central
Government against this order of
detention passed against you and you
are hereby given the earliest
opportunity for making such
representation. If you wish to do so,
your representation is to be sent
through the Superintendent of
Manipur Central Jail, Sajiwa to the
Chief Secretary, Government of
Manipur”, Manipur Secretariat, South
Block, Imphal, Manipur – 795001 in
respect of representation to the
Government of Manipur and to the
“Secretary to the Government of India,
Ministry of Home Affairs”
(Department of Internal Security),
North Block, New Delhi – 110001 in
respect of representation to the
Central Government and should be
submitted within 3 weeks time from the
date of detention. Further, you are
hereby informed that you have the
right to make representation to the
detaining authority within 12 days
from the date of detention or until the
order is approved by the State
Government whichever is earlier. The
representation is to be sent to the
District Magistrate, Imphal East
District, Porompat, Manipur – 795005
though Superintendent, Manipur
Central Jail, Sajiwa. The
representation if any would be placed
before the Advisory Board within 3
weeks time from the date of your
detention as the Government is bound
under law to produce before the board
for its consideration.”
GROUNDS
a) ……………………………………
………………………………….
……………………………………
………………………………….
Page 23 of 41
……………………………………
…………………………………..
d) …………………………………………
e) For that, that fixing of time
period by the Respondent No. 2
in the grounds of detention
[Annexure-N/2] for submitting
representations to the
Respondent No. 1 and 3 has
infringed the right of the detenu
enshrined under Article 22(5)
of the Constitution of India.’
[7] It was further pointed out that in response to the
afore-referred grounds raised with clarity and specificity, R- 1
and R-3 in their counter affidavits dated 30.05.2025 and
16.05.2026 respectively have merely said that this is in the
domain of R-2 (detaining authority) and it is for R-2 (detaining
authority) to respond to this. It was further pointed out that R-2
(detaining authority) in her affidavit-in-opposition dated
29.05.2026 has merely referred to Section 10 of NSA Act and
averred that it prescribes three weeks time frame. Relevant
paragraphs in the counter affidavit of R-1 are paragraphs 7 and
10 and the same read as follows:
‘7. That, with reference to para Nos. 10 and 11
of the writ petition, the deponents begs to submit
that the content in these paras are closely related
to District Magistrate, Imphal East, Manipur.
Hence, District Magistrate, Imphal East,
Manipur may offer comment.
10. That, with reference to Para Nos. 16(d) and
16(e) of the Writ Petition, the deponent has no
comment to offer as the same may be replied by
the District Magistrate, Imphal East, Manipur.’
R-3 has merely submitted that there is no
allegation against R-3 and has left it to detaining authority to
respond, this is vide paragraph 3 and the same reads as follows:
‘3. That, none of para of the petition is related to
action taken by the Respondent No.3 i.e., the
Ministry of Home Affairs. All averments are
related to the other respondents and as such no
Page 24 of 41
reply is being given for these in this affidavit by
the answering respondent.’
[8] Thereafter, it was pointed out that counter
affidavit of R-2 (detaining authority) is significant, relevant
paragraphs are paragraphs 9 and 13 and the same read as follows:
‘9. That, with reference to Para No.10 of the
Writ Petition, the deponent begs to submit that
the detenu was provided the prescribed timeline
as admissible U/S 10 of the said Act, and
representation through Superintendent of
Police, Manipur Central Jail, was permitted for
placing the same before the Advisory
Board/Committee.
13. That, with reference to Para No.11(e) of the
Writ Petition, the deponent denied the
allegations made therein as the period for
submission of representation is specifically
provided under the Act.’
[9] It was reiterated that R-2 has merely taken
umbrage under Section 10 of NSA Act but Section 10 of NSA
Act merely prescribes 3 (three) weeks time frame for the
appropriate Government to place the grounds before the
Advisory Board and it merely says that the grounds should be
placed before the Advisory Board by the appropriate
Government within 3 (three) weeks together with representation
‘ if any’ .
[10] In response to the afore-referred point, learned
counsel for R-1 and R-2, drew our attention to afore-referred
paragraphs 9 and 13 of the affidavit-in-opposition of R-2 dated
29.05.2026 (wrongly mentioned as 29.05.2025) and submitted
that the intention qua paragraph 10 of the grounds of detention
is merely to let the detenu know that if he makes a representation
within 3 (three) weeks, the same will be placed before the
Advisory Board though it has not been articulated well. In this
regard, it is deemed appropriate to extract and reproduce
paragraph 10 of grounds of detention, this Court does so and the
same reads as follows:
‘10. That, you are hereby informed that you have
a right to make representation to the
Government of Manipur as well as to the Central
Government against this order of detention
passed against you and you are hereby given the
earliest opportunity for making such
representation. If you wish to do so, your
representation is to be sent through the
Superintendent, Manipur Central Jail, Sajiwa to
the "Chief Secretary, Government of Manipur",
Manipur Secretariat, South Block, Imphal,
Page 25 of 41
Manipur-795001 in respect of representation to
the Government of Manipur and to the
"Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry
of Home affairs" (Department of Internal
Security), North Block, New Delhi-110001 in
respect of representation to the Central
Government and should be submitted within 3
weeks time from the date of detention. Further,
you are hereby informed that you have the right
to make representation to the detaining
authority within 12 days from the date of
detention or till the order is approved by the
State Government whichever is earlier. The
representation is to be sent to the District
Magistrate, Imphal East District, Porompat,
Manipur-795005 through Superintendent,
Manipur Central Jail, Sajiwa. The
representation if any would be placed before the
Advisory Board within 3 weeks time from the
date of your detention as the Government is
bound under law to produce before the board for
its consideration.’
It was submitted that it is not happily worded but
the intention is only to make the detenu know that if he makes a
representation within 3 (three) weeks, the same will be placed
before the Advisory Board. Besides this argument, learned
counsel placed reliance on a case law namely, Union of India -
vs- Paul Manickam & Anr. [(2003) 8 SCC 342] and submitted
that a detenu who does not make any representation cannot be
heard to contend that fixing of time fame is infraction of Article
22(5) of Constitution of India.
[11] As regards learned Sr. PCCG for R-3, learned
State counsel for Central Government very fairly submits that R-
3 is more in the nature of a formal party, R-3 has not received
representation but there is no allegation whatsoever against R-3
in the WP. Therefore, a short counter affidavit has been filed and
R-3 really does not have a say with regard to afore-referred
contestation turning on fixing of time limits for making
representations.
[12] This Court now embarks upon the legal drill of
discussion and setting out its dispositive reasoning.
[13] In the afore-referred Mutum Ranjan Meitei , this
Court respectfully followed Ameena Begum rendered by
Hon’ble Supreme Court and wrote that a preventive detention
order is justiciable at least on 7 (seven) different grounds in a
judicial review and adumbration of these 7 (seven) grounds has
been set out in paragraph 7. The relevant paragraph in Mutum
Ranjan Meitei’ s case in this regard is paragraph 7 and the same
reads as follows:
‘[7] This Court, carefully examined the rival
contentions. At the outset, it is to be noted that
the question of justiciability of subjective
satisfaction of a detaining authority in
Page 26 of 41
preventive detention matters came up for
consideration before Hon’ble Supreme Court in
several cases and we respectfully refer to a
recent judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court
being ‘ Ameena Begum vs. State of Telangana
& Ors.’ reported in (2023) 9 SCC 587 . In
Ameena Begum, after a survey of various case
laws on preventive detention including case laws
on preventive detentions under NSA, Hon’ble
Supreme Court made it clear that areas within
which validity of subjective satisfaction can be
tested have been carved out and an adumbration
of the carved out areas is as follows:
(a) When the detaining authority
has not applied its mind at all;
(b) When there is dishonest
exercise of power by detaining
authority;
(c) Exercise of power of detaining
authority for improper purpose;
(d) Detaining authority acting
under dictation of another body;
(e) When the subjective
satisfaction recorded by detaining
authority is based on application of
wrong test or misconception of a statute;
(f) When the detaining authority
has arrived at and recorded subjective
satisfaction without the same being
grounded on materials which are
rationally probative value.
(Underlining made by this Court for
ease of reference.)
To be noted, adumbration supra has
been set out by this Court by respectfully
following paragraph No. 16 of Ameena Begum
[paragraph No. 16 as in SCC report being
(2023) 9 SCC 587] wherein Hon’ble Supreme
Court relied on paragraph Nos. 8 & 9 of
‘ Khudiram Das vs. State of West Bengal’
reported in (1975) 2 SCC 81 which was
rendered by a Hon’ble four Judges Bench.’
[14] Instant case is one of detaining authority not
applying its mind i.e., not applying mind in fixing 3 (three) weeks
time frame for the detenu for making representations to State and
Central Governments by misreading Section 10 of NSA Act
which prescribes 3 (three) weeks time frame for the State
Government to place grounds of detention before Advisory
Board and merely adds that State Government while doing so
shall also place representation ‘if any’ from the detenu. Be that
as it may, in Mutum Ranjan Meitei , this Court respectfully
following Prem Lata Sharma rendered by Hon’ble Supreme
Page 27 of 41
Court, made it clear that fixing of time frames by detaining
authority in the grounds, for the detenu for making
representations is clearly an infraction of Article 22(5) of the
Constitution of India. To be noted, on facts, Mutum Ranjan
Meitei was also a case of preventive detention order under NSA
Act and that was also a case where time frame was fixed by
detaining authority for the detenu to make representations.
Subsequently, in Laishram Nilajit Shija , this Court reiterated
Mutum Ranjan Meitei . To be noted, on facts, Laishram Nilajit
Shija is also a case where the detaining authority had fixed time
frames for the detenu to make representations. Relevant
paragraph in Laishram Nilajit Shija is paragraph 16 and the
same reads as follows:
[16] As would be evident from paragraphs 5
and 6 of grounds of detention (extracted and
reproduced supra), the detaining authority has
fixed time frames for sending representations
to the detaining authority, State Government
as well as the Central Government. This is the
nd
reason why the detenu has sent the 2
representation i.e., representation dated
08.12.2025 to the Hon'ble Advisory Board.
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Premlata Sharma
(Smt.) vs. District Magistrate, Mathura &
Ors.’ reported in (1998) 4 SCC 260 held that
there can be no period of limitation regarding
exercise of the right of a detenu to make a
representation and corresponding obligation
of the Central Government to consider the
same for deciding upon the question of order
of detention as such a right of a detenu and
corresponding/axiomatic obligation of State
subsists so long as the preventive detention
order continues to operate. This Court,
respectfully following Premlata principle laid
down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in order
dated 11.02.2026 in W.P. (Crl.) No. 34 of 2025
(Mutum Ranjan Meitei @ Lamjingba vs
District Magistrate, Thoubal District & Ors.)
reported in 2026 (2) MNLJ0 : 2026 Legal
Eagle 6 which is a case of preventive detention
order couched in a language akin to the
impugned preventive detention order as
regards paragraph 5 & 6, held that fixing of
timeframes for sending representations is a
clear infraction of sacrosanct Constitutional
right enshrined in Article 22(5). This Court is
informed that this 11.02.2026 order in W.P.
(Crl.) No. 34 of 2025 has since been given
effect to and the detenu has since been
enlarged. Most relevant portionss of Mutum
Ranjan Meitei case are contained in
paragraph 10 & 11 and relevant portions
reads as follows:
Page 28 of 41
‘[10] … It has also been made clear that
a detenu qua a impugned preventive
detention order is entitled to have his
representation considered as
expeditiously/at the earliest. The
significant clincher is, neither the
Constitution nor the long line of
authorities have either provided for or
justified fixing of time frames for
making such representations. It comes
to light that in ‘ Premlata Sharma
(Smt.) vs. District Magistrate, Mathura
& Ors.’ reported in (1998) 4 SCC 260 ,
Hon’ble Supreme Court has made it
clear that there can be no period of
limitation regarding exercise of right of
the detenu to make a representation and
corresponding obligation of the Central
Government to consider the same for
deciding upon the question of order of
detention as such a right of a detenu and
obligation of State subsist so long as the
preventive detention order continues.
To be noted, on facts, Premlata also
arose under NSA, a preventive
detention order made under NSA was
assailed and the issue that fell for
consideration is refusal to send detenu’s
representation to Central Government
on the ground that the power of the
revocation of a detention order is vested
only in the State Government under
Section 14 of NSA. It is in this context
that in Premlata , Hon’ble Supreme
Court laid down the ratio that the right
of detenu to make a representation and
corresponding obligation of the
Government to consider the same
expeditiously (at the earliest) subsist so
long as the preventive detention order
operates/detention continues. In the
case on hand, therefore, fixing of twelve
days time frame qua representation to
the detaining authority and fixing of
three weeks time frame for
representations to the State and Central
Governments is clearly flawed and
unacceptable. On an extreme demurer,
even if the argument of learned State
counsel that the time frames were fixed
as impugned preventive detention order
will be valid only for twelve days unless
approved by the State Government and
the State Government has a
Page 29 of 41
responsibility to place the
representation before the Advisory
Board within three weeks is accepted,
the same does not come to the aid of
learned State counsel in his effort to
defend the impugned preventive
detention order. The reasons are, as
regards twelve days, though there may
be some semblance of justification,
there is absolutely no justification as
regards fixing three weeks time frame
for representation to the State
Government. The reason is, Section 10
of NSA captioned ‘Reference to
Advisory Board’ makes it clear that the
appropriate Government shall within 3
weeks from the date of detention of a
person place before the Advisory
Board, the grounds on which order has
been made and representation, if any .
Section 10 of NSA reads as follows :
‘10. Reference to Advisory
Board.—
Save as otherwise expressly
provided in this Act, in every
case where a detention order
has been made under this Act,
the appropriate Government
shall, within three weeks from
the date of detention of a person
under the order, place before
the Advisory Board constituted
by it under section 9, the
grounds on which the order has
been made and the
representation, if any , made by
the person affected by the
order, and in case where the
order has been made by an
officer mentioned in sub-
section (3) of section 3, also the
report by such officer under
sub-section (4) of that section.’
( underlining and bold font
made /used by this Court for
ease of reference ).
[11] The above makes it clear that the
statute i.e. Section 10 of NSA is clear as
daylight that a State Government is
under obligation to place the
representation of the detenu before the
Page 30 of 41
Advisory Board only if the detenu
chooses to send a representation. To put
it differently, it is axiomatic that if the
detenu does not send a representation
within three weeks from the date of
detention, State Government will be
under no obligation much less a
statutory obligation to place it before
the Advisory Board and the State
Government cannot be found fault with
in this regard. Therefore, the argument
that three weeks time frame for
representation to State Government was
fixed in grounds of detention to ensure
that the representation is placed before
the Advisory Board does not hold water.
The buttressing factor is, if State
Government receives a representation
after three weeks from the date of
detention, it has a sacrosanct duty to
consider the same for revocation under
Section 14 of NSA. To be noted, this is a
indefeasible analogy that flaws from
Premlata principle i.e., principle that
detenu’s right to make a representation
and obligation/duty of State to consider
the same at the earliest subsist as long
as the preventive detention order
operates/detention continues. As
regards the representation to the
Central Government this three weeks
phenomenon does not exist at all and
therefore the argument is a non starter.’
To be noted, in afore-referred paragraph 16 of
Laishram Nilajit Shija , relevant paragraph of Mutum Ranjan
Meitei had been extracted and reproduced.
[15] This Court carefully considered the submissions
of learned State counsel for R-1 & R-2 i.e., the submissions that
the intention of the detaining authority in fixing 3 (three) weeks
time frame for the detenu to make representations is only to let
the detenu know that if he makes representation within 3 (three)
weeks, the same will be placed before the Advisory Board
though it has neither been clearly articulated in the grounds nor
are the grounds happily worded. Even on a demurer, this
argument does not pass muster and it does cut ice with this Court
for two clear reasons. The first reason is, 3 (three) weeks time
frame has been fixed by the detaining authority vide paragraph
10 of the grounds of detention not merely for the representation
to be made by the detenu to State Government but it has been
fixed for the representation to be made by the detenu to Central
Government also. If the intention of the detaining authority was
merely to ensure representation is made and the same is placed
before the Advisory Board within 3 (three) weeks, 3 (three)
Page 31 of 41
weeks time frame (if at all) should have been fixed for the
representation to be sent to the State Government alone. To be
noted, this Court makes it clear that time frame cannot be fixed
and this is only a test on a demurer. Therefore, it is not mandatory
that the detenu should make representation within 3 (three)
weeks. A detenu can make a representation to the State
Government even after 3 (three) weeks as the State Government
has the power to revoke a detention order at any time by resorting
to Section 14 of NSA Act. The second reason as to why the
argument does not cut ice with this Court is the clear language in
which Section 10 of NSA Act is couched and Section 10 of NSA
Act reads as follows:
‘10. Reference to Advisory Board.- Save as
otherwise expressly provided in this Act, in every
case where a detention order has been made
under this Act, the appropriate Government
shall, within three weeks from the date of
detention of a person under the order, place
before the Advisory Board constituted by it
under section 9, the grounds on which the order
has been made and the representation, if any,
made by the person affected by the order, and in
case where the order has been made by an
officer mentioned in sub-section (3) of section 3,
also the report by such officer under sub-section
(4) of that section.’
[16] A plain reading of afore-referred Section 10 of
NSA Act makes it clear that 3 (three) weeks time frame fixed
thereat applies only to the appropriate Government namely R-1
(State Government) and not the detenu. Moreover, Section 10 of
NSA Act makes it clear that R-1 shall place the grounds of
detention before the Advisory Board along with representation
‘if any’ meaning that if there is a representation from the detenu,
the same shall also be placed before the Advisory Board. It is
axiomatic that if there is no representation from the detenu within
3 (three) weeks, it will suffice if the State Government places the
grounds of detention before the Advisory Board and it is not
mandatory or compulsory qua State Government to place the
representation of the detenu. Any representation made to State
Government post three weeks from the date of detention will be
considered (expeditiously, without delay) by the State
Government inter-alia in the light of Section 14 of NSA Act.
These two reasons, even on a demurer, flattens the argument of
learned State counsel for R1 and R2 does not cut ice with this
Court. In any event, it is made clear that time frames cannot be
fixed in the light of Prem Lata principle i.e., time frame cannot
be fixed even for a representation to be made to State
Government as sanctus right of the detenu in this regard subsists
as long as the preventive detention order operates.
[17] This takes this Court to Paul Manickam which
was pressed into service by learned State counsel. Paul
Manickam is a case which arose under COFEPOSA. A
preventive detention order was made on 26.04.2000 and on
Page 32 of 41
11.05.2000 detenu’s father addressed a representation to the
Hon’ble President of India and thereafter within 4 (four) days
i.e., on 15.05.2000 a habeas corpus petition was filed before
Madras High Court and in this habeas corpus petition, the writ
petitioner had averred that one representation had been sent to
the State of Tamil Nadu and another representation had been sent
to Union of India. This was clearly incorrect as representation
had been sent to Hon’ble President of India. Be that as it may, 3
(three) different points were raised in the legal drill of habeas
corpus and the habeas corpus writ petition was dismissed and
thereafter, a review application was filed on 08.12.2000 and in
the review application, citing the representation sent to the
Hon’ble President of India, the preventive detention order was
interfered with by the High Court. It is in this context that
Hon’ble Supreme Court, made it clear that the writ petitioner had
not come to Court with clean hands, had not made correct
averments and had for all practical purposes misled the Court
and therefore, the writ petitioner does not deserve any relief in
the hands of Court. Hon’ble Supreme Court made it clear that
sending a representation to Hon’ble President of India thereafter
deflecting the course of justice by letting loose red herrings is an
unclean approach which is unacceptable. The facts of Paul
Manickam are clearly distinguishable.
[18] This Court in writing that the facts of Paul
Manickam are distinguishable, respectfully follows the
declaration of law made by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Padma
Sundara Rao (Dead) v. State of Tamil Nadu reported in (2002)
3 SCC 533 . As regards Padma Sundara Rao , this Court chooses
to use the expression ‘ declaration of law’ rather than ‘ratio ’ as
Padma Sundara Rao was rendered by a Constitution Bench of
Hon’ble Supreme Court. On facts, Padma Sundara Rao arose
under Central Land Acquisition Act i.e. ‘Land Acquisition Act,
1894’. The question in Padma Sundara Rao was whether after
quashing of Section 6 declaration, will State get a fresh period of
one year to make another declaration under Section 6. In this
factual matrix, the Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Supreme
Court went into the question of how case laws should be cited
and relied upon. It was made clear that case laws should be cited
and relied upon only after setting out the facts and one factual
difference can make a world of difference. This principle was
declared as law by the Constitution Bench inter alia by referring
to Lord Morris in Herrington v. British Railways Board .
Relevant paragraph in Padma Sundara Rao is paragraph 9 and
the same reads as follows:
‘9. Courts should not place reliance on
decisions without discussing as to how the
factual situation fits in with the fact situation of
the decision on which reliance is placed. There
is always peril in treating the words of a speech
or judgement as though they are words in a
legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered
that judicial utterances are made in the setting
of the facts of a particular case, said Lord
Morris in Herrington V. British Railways Board.
Page 33 of 41
Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or
different fact may make a world of difference
between conclusions in two cases.’
[19] Respectfully following Padma Sundara Rao
declaration, this Court has no hesitation in coming to the
conclusion that Paul Manickam is clearly distinguishable on
facts and does not come to the aid of the learned State counsel
for R-1 and R-2. The reason is, unlike Paul Manickam , this is
not a case of misleading the Court or incorrectly averring in the
WP that the detenu has sent a representation to a particular
authority after having sent it to another authority who is the
highest authority in the Country namely Hon’ble President of
India. Suffice to write that Paul Manickam does not come to the
aid of learned State counsel for this reason and also because the
principle is different. Principle has been set out in paragraph 19
of Paul Manickam and the same reads as follows:
‘19 . As noted supra, for the first time in the
review application it was disclosed that the
representation was made to the President of
India and no representation was made to the
State of Tamil Nadu or the Union of India
who were arrayed in the writ petition as
parties. This appears to be a deliberate
attempt to create confusion and reap an
undeserved benefit by adopting such dubious
device. The High Court also transgressed its
jurisdiction in entertaining the review
petition with an entirely new substratum of
issues. Considering the limited scope for
review, the High Court ought not to have
taken into account factual aspects which
were not disclosed or were concealed in the
writ petition. While dealing with a habeas
corpus application undue importance is not
to be attached to technicalities, but at the
same time where the court is satisfied that an
attempt has been made to deflect the course
of justice by letting loose red herrings the
court has to take serious note of unclean
approach. Whenever a representation is
made to the President and the Governor
instead of the indicated authorities, it is but
natural that the representation should
indicate as to why the representation was
made to the President or the Governor and
not the indicated authorities. It should also
be clearly indicated as to whom the
representation has been made specifically,
and not in the manner done in the case at
hand. The President as well as the Governor,
no doubt are constitutional Heads of the
respective Governments but the day-to-day
Page 34 of 41
administration at respective levels is carried
on by the Heads of the
Departments/Ministries concerned and the
designated officers who alone are ultimately
responsible and accountable for the action
taken or to be taken in a given case. If really
the citizen concerned genuinely and honestly
felt or was interested in getting an
expeditious consideration or disposal of his
grievance, he would and should honestly
approach the real authorities concerned and
would not adopt any dubious devices with the
sole aim of deliberately creating a situation
for delay in consideration and cry for relief
on his own manipulated ground, by directing
his representation to an authority which is
not directly immediately concerned with such
consideration. ’
Therefore, the principle is, a manipulated
ground flowing from dubious deliberate deflection should not aid
a detenu.
[20] Learned State counsel, made a faint attempt to
submit that the facts in Prem Lata are slightly different. This
Court carefully considered this argument. Prem Lata also arose
under NSA Act. In Prem Lata , representation to State
Government was made and the same was rejected and a copy of
the said representation along with para wise comments was
forwarded to Government of India and Central Government also
rejected the representation. Thereafter, the detenu made another
representation to the Government of India but the representation
given to Superintendent of Jail in which the detenu was
incarcerated was not sent to the Central Government on the
ground that it had been sent after an extraordinary delay. It is in
this context that Hon’ble Supreme Court went into the question
as to whether time frame can be fixed for sending representations
and whether the concept of delay in sending representations by
the detenu can be countenanced in preventive detentions. It was
made clear that delay on part of State in disposing of the
representation can be infraction of binding with rights enshrined
in Article 22(5) of Constitution of India but the detenu has to be
given earliest opportunity to make an effective representation
and the right of the detenu to make a representation vide Article
22(5) qua a preventive detention order subsists as long as the
preventive detention order operates. Therefore, Prem Lata is not
distinguishable on facts and the principle applies squarely to
instant case. This principle laid down in Prem Lata has been
respectfully followed by this Court in Mutum Ranjan Meitei and
Laishram Nilajit Shija. To be noted, as regards Mutum Ranjan
Meitei and Laishram Nilajit Shija , this Court is informed
without any disputation by the learned State counsel that the
State has released the detenus accepting the orders of this Court.
To put it differently, Mutum Ranjan Meitei and Laishram
Nilajit Shija have been given legal quietus by State and have
attained finality. In any event, both these judgments viz., Mutum
Page 35 of 41
Ranjan Meitei and Laishram Nilajit Shija were rendered by this
Court by respectfully following Hon’ble Supreme Court vide
Prem Lata and Ameena Begum .
[21] Before concluding, this court deems it
appropriate to write/record (only for the purposes of completion
of facts) that the impugned preventive detention order is
predicated on a lone FIR i.e., FIR dated 26.12.2025 on the file of
LLI Police Station (this Court is informed that LLI stands for
Lamlai) being FIR No. 111(12)2025 LLI-PS for alleged offences
under Sections 109(1)/111(2)/310(6)/329(3) BNS and 25(1-C)
Arms Act added 20 UAPA.
[22] This Court is acutely conscious that a preventive
detention order can be made even on the basis of a lone FIR but
the point is, pursuant to this lone FIR, the detenu was arrested on
26.12.2025 at 08:30 p.m. 90 (ninety) days therefrom elapsed on
05.04.2026. Learned counsel for writ petitioner, on instructions,
asserts that State has neither filed final report nor filed for
extension of time for filing final report or for extension of remand
by resorting to Section 43D(2) of UAPA. To be noted, final
report is to be filed within 90 (ninety) days from the date of arrest
and as regards UA(P)A Act, offences vide Section 43D(2) there
is a provision for prosecution to seek extension of time and
extension of remand up to 180 (one hundred and eighty) days.
Though 90 (ninety) days from the date of arrest elapsed on
05.04.2026, until this day (09.06.2026) State has neither filed
final report (charge sheet) nor resorted to Section 43D (2) of
UAPA and filed an application for extension of time for filing
final report / extension of remand. This in effect means that the
detenu is entitled to seek default bail. This Court makes it clear
that this Court is not interfering with the impugned preventive
detention order now on this ground but this is being recorded
only for completely and comprehensively capturing facts and
making it clear that as regards regular prosecution after letting
the matter slip away in regular Trial Court. State which has not
even sought extension of remand / extension of time for filing
final report is now detaining the detenu solely on the basis of
impugned preventive detention order which has been
subsequently approved and confirmed by R-1 on 16.03.2026 and
08.04.2026 respectively.
[23] In the light of narration, discussion and
dispositive reasoning set out thus far, this Court has no hesitation
in writing that the impugned preventive detention order made by
R-2 on 08.03.2026 approved and confirmed by R-1 on
16.03.2026 and 08.04.2026 deserve to be dislodged/set aside on
the ground that there is clear infraction of sanctus rights
enshrined in Article 22(5) and vested in the detenu.
[24] Ergo, the sequitur is, captioned WP is allowed.
The impugned detention order dated 08.03.2026 bearing
reference No. Cril/NSA/No.1 of 2026/315 made by R-2
(detaining authority), approval order dated 16.03.2026 bearing
reference No. H-14/3/2026-HD-HD and confirmation order
dated 08.04.2026 bearing reference No. H-14/3/2026-HD-HD
made by R-1 are all set aside and Shri Yambem Lalit Singh @
Tompok, S/o Y. Manichandra Singh of Charangpat Mamang
Page 36 of 41
Leikai, P.S. Thoubal, Thoubal District, Manipur aged about 22
years now lodged in Central Jail Sajiwa, Imphal East, Manipur
is directed to be set at liberty forthwith, if not required in any
other case/s. There shall be no order as to costs.
JUDGE CHIEF JUSTICE
FR/NFR
Bipin
P.S. I : Upload forthwith.
P.S. II : All concerned will stand bound by web copy
uploaded in High Court website inter alia as
the same is QR coded . ’
[17] This court is informed that in both cases i.e.,
Manichandra and Philip , the detenus were since released complying
with the orders of this Court. Therefore, Manichandra and Philip
hold the field and they continue to operate. Manichandra and Philip
having been rendered by respectfully following Prem Lata principle
laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court, we have no hesitation in writing
that in the instant case the sanctus rights of detenu enshrined in Article
22(5) have been infringed owing to the timeline cap fixed i.e., 3(three)
weeks timeline/cap for sending representation. The reason is, in
instant case, on facts, the detenu had not sent any representation at
all. To be noted, the detenu has not sent any representation until this
day. The argument of the learned counsel for petitioner that the
detenu could not send representations within 3(three) weeks from the
date of detention as 3(three) weeks from the date of detention elapsed
on 13.05.2026 but the translated copies i.e., copy of the preventive
detention order and the grounds (without translation of documents)
Page 37 of 41
were furnished only under cover of a letter dated 03.06.2026 is clearly
acceptable and is an indefeasible argument.
[18] However, for the sake of making this order
comprehensive this court deems it appropriate to capture the position
nd
that as regards this 2 point, the same has been articulated in the
writ petition vide ground ( l ) (in paragraph No. 21) which reads as
follows:
‘ l) For that, fixing of time period by the Respondent No. 2
in the grounds of detention [Annexure-N/2] for submitting
representations to the Respondent No. 1 and 3 has
infringed the right of the detenu enshrined under Article
22(5) of the Constitution of India. ’
[19] Afore-referred ground l) raised by the writ petitioner has
been met by R1 & R2 in the affidavit-in-opposition vide paragraph No.
29 and the same read as follows:
‘[29] That, with reference to para no. 21 (l) of the present
petition, the answering deponent humbly submits that the
petitioner has neither pleaded nor established that any
representation submitted by the detenu was refused,
ignored, or rejected solely on the ground that it was filed
beyond the indicated period. In the absence of any actual
prejudice or denial of consideration, the allegation of
violation of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution is
unsustainable and liable to be rejected following on the
grounds that:-
i) The time limit was directory not mandatory;
ii) The Constitutional Right to make a representation
remained intact;
iii) No prejudice was caused; and
iv) There was substantial compliance with Article of
the Constitution.’
[20] A careful perusal of the stated position of State makes it
clear that the timeline/time limit/cap prescribed by State is only
directory and mandatory and the constitutional right to make a
Page 38 of 41
representation remains intact. This argument is a non-starter as the
detenu whose literacy level is II standard in school would certainly not
be able to appreciate the distinction between a timeline which is
directory and not mandatory. Be that as it may, State has fairly averred
that the constitutional right is intact but the argument that no
prejudice was caused to detenu is unacceptable as the detenu has not
sent any representation at all much less effective representation.
Hon’ble Supreme Court, elucidating on representation has made it
clear that the right of a detenu to make a representation more
particularly vide Article 22(5) is not only ‘ representation ’ but
‘ effective representation ’. In this view of the matter, we have no
hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the argument that no
prejudice was caused to the detenu owing to timeline being fixed is
unacceptable.
[21] The entire files i.e., State files were produced in Court
and this Court had the benefit of perusing the files pertaining to the
impugned preventive detention order. In the grounds of detention, as
already alluded to supra, in paragraph No. 29 thereat, there is a
tabulation of the list of documents (11 documents) that have been
adverted to. One of the 11 documents shown as document No. viii is
a copy of notification bearing reference No. S.O. 4899 (E) dated
13.11.2023 made by MHA(GoI) (to be noted, ‘MHA’ denotes ‘Ministry
of Home Affairs’ and ‘GOI’ denotes ‘Government of India’). This
notification is available in the file and the detaining authority has
Page 39 of 41
obviously adverted to the same. This notification makes it clear that
the organization which the detenu is alleged to be part of viz., People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) has been declared as an ‘unlawful association’
and vide proviso to sub-Section (3) of Section 3 of UAPA the
notification has been given immediate effect making it clear that the
notification was subject to order to be made under Section 4 of UAPA.
Though it is submitted at the Bar that Tribunal had in fact passed a
confirmation order on 06.05.2024 qua this 13.11.2023 notification the
same was not before the detaining authority. It is not adverted to
anywhere in the grounds. However, as the petitioner has succeeded
on both the points canvassed we deemed it appropriate to not to enter
upon a legal drill on this aspect and examine the subjective satisfaction
arrived at by the detaining authority though subjective satisfaction,
(though) subjective, has been held to be justiciable by Hon’ble
Supreme Court on certain grounds. We make it clear that this is not
one of the grounds on which we are dislodging the impugned
preventive detention order, impugned approval orders and impugned
confirmation orders. To be noted, this is not the petitioner’s plea but
as we have noticed this point, the same is being recorded to highlight
that there are other infirmities too.
[22] Ergo, sequitur is, captioned WP is allowed. The
impugned preventive detention order dated 21.04.2026 bearing
reference No. Cril/NSA/No.5 of 2026 made by R2/detaining authority,
2(two) approval orders, one dated 29.04.2026 bearing reference No.
Page 40 of 41
H-14/9/2026-HD-HD and another dated 01.05.2026 bearing reference
No. H-14/9/2026-HD-HD made by R1 and impugned confirmation
order dated 27.05.2026 bearing No. H-14/9/2026-HD-HD made by R1
are all set-aside and Mr. Phanjoubam Rabi Meitei @ Luwangngamba
28 years, son of Ph. Kulla Meitei of Andro Lapaochum Tampak Leikai
Andro P.S. Police Station jurisdiction, Imphal East District, now lodged
in Manipur Central Jail, Sajiwa is directed to be set at liberty forthwith
if not required in any other case/s. There shall be no order as to costs.
JUDGE CHIEF JUSTICE
FR/NFR
Sushil/Indrajeet
P.S. I : Upload forthwith
P.S. II : All concerned will stand bound by instant order vide
web copy uploaded in High Court website inter-alia as
the same is QR coded.
Digitally signed by
SHAMURAILATPA
M SUSHIL SHARMA
Date: 2026.09.14
10:48:02 +05'30'
SHAMURAILA
TPAM SUSHIL
SHARMA
Page 41 of 41