Santosh Verma vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh
- Court
- Madhya Pradesh High Court
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE RAJESH KUMAR GUPTA
th
ON THE 29 OF JULY, 2026
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 23019 of 2026
RAJESH SINGH CHANDEL
Versus
MR ANOOP RANA AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri M. P. S. Raghuvanshi, learned Senior Advocate with Shri Vijay
Kumar Jha- Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Chetan Kanungo with Shri Nischal Raje- Advocate for the
respondent No.1.
Shri Vivek Khedkar - Additional Advocate General for the
respondent/State.
WITH
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 23024 of 2026
SURENDRA NATH SINGH YADAV
Versus
MR. ANOOP RANA AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri M. P. S. Raghuvanshi, learned Senior Advocate with Shri B.
K. Sharma and Shri Vijay Kumar Jha- Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Chetan Kanungo with Shri Nischal Raje- Advocate for the
respondent No.1.
Shri Vivek Khedkar - Additional Advocate General for the
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respondent/State.
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 24578 of 2026
AJAY SINGH SIKARWAR
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Prashant Sharma- Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Chetan Kanungo with Shri Nischal Raje- Advocate for the
respondent No.1.
Shri Vivek Khedkar - Additional Advocate General for the
respondent/State.
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 26742 of 2026
SANTOSH VERMA
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Atul Gupta- Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Chetan Kanungo with Shri Nischal Raje- Advocate for the
respondent No.1.
Shri Vivek Khedkar - Additional Advocate General for the
respondent/State.
ORDER
Since all the above petitions arise out of one and the same private
complaint instituted by respondent No.2, challenge the common order dated
11.05.2026 passed by the Special Judge under the Madhya Pradesh Dakaiti
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Evam Vyapharan Prabhavit Kshetra Adhiniyam, 1981, Gwalior, whereby
cognizance has been taken against the present petitioners for offences
punishable under Sections 392, 201, and 120 of IPC read with Section 11/13
MPDVPK Act, and involve identical questions of fact and law, they were
heard analogously and are being decided by this common order.
2. The present petitions present a significant question concerning the
permissible limits of criminal prosecution against police officers acting in
discharge of investigative functions and the scope of judicial scrutiny while
taking cognizance upon a private complaint under Sections 200 and 202 of
the Cr.P.C. The controversy essentially arises out of a private complaint filed
by respondent No.2 stating that while investigating Crime No.787/2023
registered at Police Station Thatipur, District Gwalior, the petitioners
illegally extorted huge sums of money from the complainant and his family
members by threatening false implication and police encounter. Acting upon
the complaint, the Special Judge, after recording preliminary statements
under Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C., passed the impugned order dated
11.05.2026, taking cognizance against all four petitioners. Aggrieved
thereby, the petitioners have filed these petitions seeking quashment of the
complaint proceedings as well as the order taking cognizance.
2. The aforesaid cognizance order has been passed in consequence of
some prior proceedings in other case in which the present complainant
happened to be the accused, therefore, the facts of the earlier proceedings are
also necessary to be discussed.
3. Crime No.787/2023 came to be registered at Police Station Thatipur
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for offences punishable under Sections 420 and 34 of IPC. During
investigation, offences under Sections 467, 468, 471 and 120-B IPC along
with Sections 66-D and 74 of the I.T. Act were added. The prosecution case
in the said crime was that several unemployed persons were induced to pay
substantial amounts of money on the false promise that government
employment in the Railways would be procured for them. During
investigation, the investigating agency allegedly discovered that the
fraudulent activity was not confined to one or two complainants but extended
to numerous victims, involving a financial fraud running into several crores
of rupees. Investigation further revealed digital evidence, forged appointment
letters, fabricated identity documents, electronic communications and
financial transactions connecting various accused persons. The brother of
respondent No.2, namely Vikram Rana, was one of the principal accused in
the said crime. Subsequently, respondent No.2 himself also came to be
implicated during investigation on the basis of material collected by the
investigating agency. Respondent No.2 was arrested and later he was
enlarged on bail.
4. Now, the private complaint proceeds substantially on the allegations
that the investigating officer Ajay Singh Sikarwar demanded illegal
gratification for extending favour during investigation. Several installments
of money amounting to approximately Rs.5,80,000/- were allegedly paid on
different dates. On 24.12.2023 respondent No.2, his brother and certain
relatives were taken to Police Station Thatipur where they were allegedly
illegally detained.Respondent No.2 was thereafter compelled to bring
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Rs.9,75,000/- from his residence through police constable Santosh Verma.
Another sum of Rs.15,00,000/- arranged by Chandralekha Jain was allegedly
received by petitioner No.3 herein. Threats were allegedly extended to the
complainant and others that unless another Rs.30,00,000/- was paid, the
entire family would be falsely implicated and they were also given threats of
Police encounter. The written complaints were submitted before the
concerned Superintendent of Police but no action was taken. It is also alleged
that CCTV footage of the police station was subsequently not preserved and
was intentionally destroyed. Such destruction of CCTV footage established
conspiracy between all police officials including the Superintendent of
Police. Upon these allegations, offences under Sections 392, 120-B and
Sections 11/13 of the MPDVPK Act were alleged. Initially, respondent No.2
filed an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. praying for registration of
an FIR. The Special Judge, by order dated 31.10.2024, rejected to direct
police investigation and observed that the accused persons were known, the
occurrence was based upon direct evidence, recovery of any material article
was not indispensable and the controversy could appropriately be examined
under Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. Accordingly, the application under
Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was rejected and the complaint was directed to
proceed as a private complaint.
5. Subsequently, the complainant examined himself. His father was
examined and one independent witness Shishupal Singh was also examined.
Certain documents including complaints addressed to superior police
authorities, loan documents, alleged audio recordings and certain electronic
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material were produced. The Special Judge, also summoned records of
Sessions Trial No.172/2024 arising out of Crime No.787/2023. Thereafter,
correspondence was made with Police Station Thatipur regarding
preservation of CCTV footage. Upon receipt of replies from police
authorities, the Special Judge recorded various findings regarding alleged
non-preservation of CCTV recordings and ultimately, by the impugned order
dated 11.05.2026, cognizance was taken against all petitioners.
6. In the aforesaid impugned order of the cognizance the Special Judge
principally held that statements under Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. inspire
confidence against the present petitioners and non -preservation of CCTV
footage corroborates the complainant. It was also believed by the Special
Court that failure of superior officers to take action indicates conspiracy
and sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. is unnecessary and accordingly,
observed that prima facie offences under Sections 392, 201, 120-B IPC and
Sections 11/13 MPDVPK Act are made out. Accordingly, process was
directed to be issued.
7. The petitioners challenge the aforesaid order primarily on the
grounds that the Special Judge has travelled far beyond the permissible
jurisdiction of enquiry under Sections 200 and 202 of Cr.P.C.. A detailed
appreciation of defence material and investigation record has been
undertaken without jurisdiction. The findings have virtually been recorded as
though a full-fledged trial had already concluded which is totally
impermissible. Further grounds raised in the petitions are that essential
ingredients of robbery under Section 392 IPC are totally absent and there no
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material exists attracting Section 201 IPC. The essential ingredients of
criminal conspiracy are wholly missing. The proceedings are manifestly
actuated by mala fide as respondent No.2 himself is an accused in Crime
No.787/2023, therefore, continuation of criminal proceedings would amount
to abuse of the process of Court.
8. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners, assisted by
learned counsel appearing in the connected petitions, assailed the impugned
order on facts as well as on law and submitted that the order dated
11.05.2026 is wholly without jurisdiction, contrary to the settled principles
governing cognizance upon a private complaint and suffers from manifest
legal infirmities warranting interference under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure/528 of BNSS. According to the learned counsel, the
Special Judge has completely misdirected himself in law by conducting a
virtual mini-trial at the stage of Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. and by
recording findings which could have been rendered only after appreciation of
evidence during trial. It is submitted that the impugned order runs into
several pages and records categorical conclusions regarding the truthfulness
of the complainant, alleged destruction of evidence, existence of conspiracy
and culpability of each petitioner. Such findings, according to the petitioners,
are wholly impermissible at the pre-process stage.
9. Learned counsel further submitted that respondent No.2 is not an
independent complainant but himself an accused in Crime No.787/2023
registered at Police Station Thatipur for offences punishable under Sections
420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B IPC along with provisions of the I.T. Act. The
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investigation, according to the petitioners, disclosed a large-scale
employment scam wherein numerous unemployed persons were allegedly
cheated on the false promise of securing appointments in Government
service. Initially, the complainant was not named in the FIR. However,
during investigation, digital evidence, documentary material, statements of
witnesses and financial transactions revealed his involvement, thereafter he
came to be arrayed as an accused. It is argued that immediately after being
implicated and arrested, the complainant initiated multiple proceedings
against the investigating officials with the sole object of intimidating the
investigating agency and derailing the criminal prosecution. The complaint,
therefore, is an example of a retaliatory prosecution instituted by an accused
against police officers investigating him.
10. Learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on the
judgement passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v.
Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein it was held that proceedings
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance or with a view to
spite the accused deserve to be quashed in exercise of inherent jurisdiction,
in the case of R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab , AIR 1960 SC 866, wherein the
Supreme Court recognized abuse of process as one of the settled grounds for
exercise of inherent powers.
11. It is further argued by learned counsel that the entire scheme of
Chapter XV of the Cr.P.C. contemplates only a limited enquiry. The object
of Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. is merely to ascertain whether sufficient
grounds exist for proceeding. The Court is not expected to determine guilt.
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Nor can it record findings regarding reliability of witnesses. Eve it can not
pronounce upon disputed questions of fact. The Special Judge, however, has
discussed in great detail regarding investigation records, CCTV
preservation, replies received from police authorities, conduct of superior
officers, alleged conspiracy, credibility of witnesses, admissibility of
electronic material, and even probable defence. Such an exercise, according
to the petitioners, completely destroys the distinction between a preliminary
enquiry and a criminal trial.
12. Learned counsel for the petitioners further relied on Chandra Deo
Singh v. Prokash Chandra Bose, AIR 1963 SC 1430. wherein the Supreme
Court held that at the stage of Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C., the Magistrate
has only to determine whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding and
not whether there is sufficient ground for conviction.
13. Petitioners further rely upon the judgement passed in the case of
Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi , (1976) 3 SCC 736 and
submitted that at the stage of issuing process the Magistrate cannot undertake
meticulous appreciation of evidence.
14. It is further argued that as per the judgement passed in the case
of Mehmood Ul Rehman v. Khazir Mohammad Tunda , (2015) 12 SCC 42,
the Supreme Court emphasized that although reasons are necessary while
issuing process, those reasons cannot amount to adjudication of disputed
questions of fact.
15. Learned counsel further contend that the Special Judge has
virtually decided several disputed factual issues. Illustratively, the impugned
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order records findings that complainant's version stands corroborated, CCTV
footage was intentionally destroyed, Superintendent of Police was part of
conspiracy, police officers deliberately concealed evidence
and complainant's allegations inspire confidence. It is argued that none of
these conclusions could have been recorded without trial. The Supreme
Court has repeatedly deprecated such exercise.
16. Learned counsel for petitioners further relied upon the judgement
passed in the case of Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate, (1998)
5 SCC 749 in the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that summoning an
accused is a serious matter and the Magistrate must not act as a mere post
office, yet cannot convert the pre-process stage into a full-fledged
adjudication.
17. Further argument on behalf of the petitioners is that in the case
o f GHCL Employees Stock Option Trust v. India Infoline Ltd. , (2013) 4
SCC 505, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that although reasons must exist, the
Magistrate cannot evaluate evidence as if deciding guilt. In the similar lines,
in the case of Birla Corporation Ltd. v. Adventz Investments , (2019) 16 SCC
610, the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that while sufficient grounds must
exist, appreciation of disputed evidence belongs exclusively to trial.
18. Additionally, learned counsel for the petitioners shifted the
arguments towards that fact that even assuming every allegation made in the
complaint to be true in its entirety, no offence under Section 392 IPC is made
out. In this regard, it is submitted that robbery under Sections 390 and 392
IPC requires dishonest intention, commission of theft or
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extortion, immediate fear of death, hurt or wrongful restraint, delivery of
property under such fear, but the complaint itself states that money was
allegedly arranged voluntarily for settlement of the criminal case and also
there is no seizure supporting the allegation of aforesaid offence. It is further
argued that no independent documentary proof of alleged payment is there.
Even no bank trail, no forensic verification, no recovery memo, no
contemporaneous complaint before any judicial authority has been produced
before the Special Court, therefore, allegations are inherently improbable. It
is further argued that whether the alleged payments were voluntary, coerced
or altogether fictitious are matters requiring strict proof during trial. The
Special Judge, however, has presumed robbery merely because allegations
have been made. Such presumption, according to learned counsel, is legally
unsustainable.
19. It is further argued that that the Special Judge has invoked Section
201 IPC solely because CCTV footage could not be produced. This finding,
according to the petitioners, is wholly speculative. There is no material
showing the necessary ingredients establishing aforesaid offence as there is
no concrete evidence regarding who deleted the footage, when it was
deleted, whether deletion was automatic, whether the footage ever
existed, whether the petitioners had custody of servers, whether destruction
was intentional, whether any accused caused disappearance of evidence but,
entire finding rests on conjecture. Mere non-availability of CCTV footage
cannot ipso facto constitute an offence under Section 201 IPC. Reliance is
placed upon the settled principle that criminal intent cannot be presumed
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merely because evidence subsequently becomes unavailable.
20. Learned counsel further submitted that Section 120-B IPC has
been invoked in a wholly mechanical manner. Except bald assertions that the
Superintendent of Police and Station House Officer "must have known",
there is absolutely no material indicating prior meeting of their minds or
common intention in this regard. Also the complaint as well as the Special
court failed to show any agreement, concert, overt act, any communication
or any circumstance constituting conspiracy. It is argued that suspicion,
however strong, cannot substitute proof even at the stage of cognizance
where foundational facts are absent.
21. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioners in all four
petitions have placed reliance on the judgements passed in the case of State
(NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600 and Kehar Singh v.
State (Delhi Administration), (1988) 3 SCC 609, and contended that in these
cases the Hon'ble Supreme Court explained that conspiracy must be founded
upon material showing agreement and cannot be inferred merely because
several persons were associated with one investigation.
22. Learned counsel further pointed out that all alleged acts arise out
of investigation of Crime No.787/2023. The petitioners were admittedly
police officials discharging statutory investigative functions. Even assuming
excesses are alleged, the acts complained of possess an undeniable nexus
with discharge of official duty. Therefore, previous sanction under Section
197 Cr.P.C. was mandatory before taking cognizance. But, the learned
Special Judge has erroneously held otherwise.
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23. In support of their submissions, learned counsel for placed heavy
reliance on the judgements passed in the cases of Matajog Dobey v. H.C.
Bhari, AIR 1956 SC 44; P.K. Pradhan v. State of Sikkim , (2001) 6 SCC
704; Devinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2016) 12 SCC 87; D. Devaraja v.
Owais Sabeer Hussain, (2020) 7 SCC 695, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court
held that whenever there exists a reasonable nexus between the act
complained of and official duty, sanction becomes a jurisdictional
prerequisite.
24. And lastly, it is submitted that continuation of the impugned
proceedings would amount to abuse of the process of Court. The complaint
is a retaliatory measure instituted by an accused facing serious criminal
charges. The Special Judge has exceeded the permissible limits of
jurisdiction. The impugned order is founded on presumptions, conjectures
and premature findings. No prudent judicial mind, properly instructed in law,
could have arrived at the conclusions recorded therein at the stage of
cognizance. The case, according to learned counsel, squarely falls within the
categories enumerated in R.P. Kapur (Supra), Bhajan Lal (Supra) , Amit
Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460, and Neeharika Infrastructure
Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401, warranting exercise of
inherent jurisdiction to secure the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of the
process of Court.
25. However, It is further vehemently contended by learned counsel
for the petitioners that the Special Judge has committed a manifest
jurisdictional error in proceeding to take cognizance against the petitioners
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without adhering to the mandatory procedure prescribed under the BNSS,
2023. It is submitted that the petitioners are public servants and the
allegations contained in the complaint arise out of acts allegedly performed
by them while discharging their official functions in connection with
investigation of Crime No.787/2023. Learned counsel submits that Section
223 of the BNSS has introduced a substantive procedural safeguard in
respect of complaints against public servants by mandating that, before
issuance of process, the Magistrate shall call for a report from the officer
superior to the concerned public servant and shall also afford an opportunity
of hearing to the proposed accused before deciding whether sufficient
grounds exist for issuance of process. According to the petitioners, although
the Special Judge called for reports from the departmental authorities and
extensively relied upon such reports as well as other materials collected
during the preliminary inquiry, the petitioners were never afforded any
opportunity of hearing before the impugned order dated 11.05.2026 was
passed. It is, therefore, submitted that the entire exercise undertaken by the
Special Judge stands vitiated for non-compliance with the mandatory
statutory safeguards embodied in Section 223 of the BNSS. It is further
contended that the finding recorded by the Special Judge that the provisions
of the Cr.P.C. would continue to govern the present complaint by virtue of
Section 531 of the BNSS is wholly misconceived and legally unsustainable,
inasmuch as the present complaint constitutes an independent criminal
proceeding seeking prosecution of police officials for distinct offences and
cannot be treated as a continuation of the investigation in Crime
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No.787/2023. Consequently, the impugned order, having been passed in
complete disregard of the mandatory procedure prescribed by law, deserves
to be quashed on this ground alone. In support of this contention, learned
counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on the judgement passed in the
case of Mahendra Kumar Jain Vs. State of U.P. [1986 All L.J. 719], Ajit
Kumar Palit Vs. State [AIR 1961 Cal 560 (Full Bench)], Parvinder Singh
Khurana Vs. Directorate of Enforcement [2026 SCC OnLine SC 903].
26. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State, as
well as learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2/complainant, opposed
all the petitions and submitted that the impugned order does not suffer from
any legal infirmity warranting interference in exercise of inherent
jurisdiction. It is contended that the learned Special Judge has not convicted
the petitioners nor recorded any final finding of guilt but has merely taken
cognizance after conducting an enquiry contemplated under Sections 200 and
202 of the Cr.P.C.. According to the respondents, the learned Special Judge
was only required to examine whether sufficient grounds existed for
proceeding against the accused persons and not whether the prosecution was
ultimately bound to succeed. It is submitted that once prima facie material
was available, the learned Special Judge rightly issued process.
27. Learned counsel ( as both the respondents opposed the petitions on
the same line of arguments, therefore herein after shall be read as for State as
well as respondent No.2) submitted that the jurisdiction under Section 482
Cr.P.C. is extraordinary in nature and must be exercised sparingly.
According to the learned counsel, the High Court, while exercising inherent
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jurisdiction, is not expected to undertake appreciation of evidence or
adjudicate disputed questions of fact. The complaint, statements recorded
under Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C., documentary material and surrounding
circumstances collectively disclose commission of cognizable offences.
Therefore, at this preliminary stage, interference would amount to stifling a
legitimate prosecution.
28. In support of their submissions, learned counsel placed reliance on
the judgements passed in the cases of State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma , 1992
Supp (1) SCC 222; Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful
Haque, (2005) 1 SCC 122; Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of
Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401 and submitted that the High Court ought
not to substitute its own opinion for that of the Magistrate merely because
another view is possible.
29. It is further argued by Learned counsel that the complaint is not
founded upon vague allegations but contains specific dates, specific
amounts, names of individual police officers and the role attributed to each
of them. According to the respondents illegal demand of money was made
and several installments were also paid. Complainant was illegally detained
by the petitioner and even to exert pressure, the police personnel
accompanied him to his residence and from there cash was brought. It is
further evident from record that another substantial amount was received
from Chandralekha Jain also. Repeated threats of false implication and
encounter killing were extended to the complainant and the complainant was
totally trapped. It is further argued that the complaints were immediately and
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promptly submitted before superior authorities but as has been expressed in
the complaint, no action was taken over them. It is argued that these
allegations, if accepted at face value, unmistakably constitute offences
punishable under Sections 392 and 120-B IPC. Learned counsels themselves
conceded that whether those allegations are ultimately proved is a matter of
trial.
30. Learned counsel further submitted that during enquiry under
Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C., the complainant examined himself along with
his father and one independent witness namely Shishupal Singh. According
to the respondents, all three witnesses have consistently narrated the
sequence of events and materially corroborate each other. It is argued that at
the stage of issuance of process, only such corroboration is sufficient. Minor
discrepancies or contradictions cannot be examined by the High Court while
exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
31. In support of their submissions, learned counsel placed reliance on
the judgements passed in the cases of Sonu Gupta v. Deepak Gupta, (2015) 3
SCC 424, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that at the stage of
summoning, meticulous appreciation of evidence is impermissible. They also
placed reliance on the judgements passed in the case of U.P. Pollution
Control Board v. Mohan Meakins Ltd., (2000) 3 SCC 745, and contended
that defence material cannot ordinarily be looked into while considering
validity of summoning order.
32. Now, learned counsel shifted their arguments to the fact that one of
the most significant circumstances considered by the learned Special Judge is
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the disappearance of CCTV footage and argued that repeated directions were
issued by the learned Special Judge and information was sought from police
authorities regarding CCTV footage and replies received from the police
themselves disclosed that CCTV registers had not been maintained and reply
also revealed that no officer could explain destruction of data and no material
was produced showing compliance with the Standard Operating Procedure
issued by Police Headquarters. Therefore, according to respondent No.2, the
learned Special Judge was fully justified in drawing a prima facie inference
regarding deliberate disappearance of relevant electronic evidence.
33. In this regard, learned counsels placed reliance on the judgements
passed in the cases of Paramvir Singh Saini v. Baljit Singh, (2021) 1 SCC
184, wherein mandatory directions were issued regarding installation,
maintenance and preservation of CCTV footage in police stations and
regarding preservation of CCTV recordings were reiterated in the case
of Akhilesh Pandey v. State of Madhya Pradesh. According to the
respondents, non-compliance with those directions lends assurance to the
complainant's allegations.
34. It is further argued by learned counsel that the alleged acts
attributed to the petitioners are wholly outside the scope of official duty. As
demanding illegal gratification, extorting money, criminal
intimidation, wrongful confinement, robbery, and destruction of
evidence can never constitute discharge of official functions. It is therefore
argued that sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. is wholly unnecessary. In
support of their submissions, learned counsel for the respondents placed
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reliance on the judgements passed in the cases of Prakash Singh Badal v.
State of Punjab, (2007) 1 SCC 1 and Inspector of Police v. Battenapatla
Venkata Ratnam, (2015) 13 SCC 87. wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court
held that criminal misconduct or illegal acts having no nexus with official
duty do not attract Section 197 and It has been observed in these judgments
that protection under Section 197 cannot become a shield for commission of
offences.
35. It is further contended by learned counsel that the learned Special
Judge has passed a detailed speaking order after considering the material
of complaint, statements recorded under Sections 200 and 202
Cr.P.C., documentary material, investigation records, replies received from
police authorities and surrounding circumstances, therefore, once reasons
have been assigned, then this Court ought to exercise restraint before
interfering. Further reliance has been placed on the judgements passed in the
case of Bhushan Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 5 SCC 424,
wherein the Supreme Court observed that detailed discussion of evidence is
not required while issuing summons. It is submitted that the impugned order
merely satisfies the judicial requirement of recording reasons.
36. It is further argued that almost the entire challenge raised by the
petitioners rests upon disputed facts. Whether money was actually
paid, complainant was falsely implicated, investigation was bona fide, CCTV
footage existed, deletion of the CCTV was intentional, conspiracy existed, all
these facts are the matters requiring evidence and such disputed questions
cannot be adjudicated under Section 482 Cr.P.C. In support of their
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contentions, learned counsel placed reliance on the judgement passed in the
cases of State of Tamil Nadu v. Thirukkural Perumal , (1995) 2 SCC 449,
and M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh , (2001) 8 SCC 645, wherein the Hon'ble
Apex Court observed that defence pleas ordinarily cannot be considered
while examining validity of criminal proceedings at the threshold.
37. Further arguments of the learned counsel is that the petitions
virtually invite this Court to conduct a mini trial wherein the petitioners seek
examination of of the facts like admissibility of documents, credibility of
witnesses, correctness of investigation, reliability of electronic
evidence, legality of seizure and sufficiency of proof. All these matters, lie
exclusively within the province of the Trial Court. At the present stage, the
Court is only required to see whether the complaint discloses commission of
an offence. The respondents therefore pray that all the petitions deserve
dismissal.
38. Heard counsel for the rival parties and perused the entire material
available herein with due care and diligence and upon hearing learned
counsel for the parties at considerable length and after perusal of the record,
the following questions arise before this Court for determination:
(i) Whether the Special Judge exceeded the permissible
jurisdiction while exercising powers under Sections 200
and 202 Cr.P.C.?
(ii) Whether the impugned order dated 11.05.2026
records findings which could legally be rendered only
after a full-fledged criminal trial?
(iii) Whether the materials produced during enquiry
disclose the essential ingredients of offences punishable
under Sections 392, 201 and 120-B IPC and Sections 11
and 13 of the MPDVPK Act?
(iv) Whether previous sanction under Section 197
Cr.P.C. was a condition precedent for taking cognizance
against the petitioners?
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(v) Whether continuation of the complaint proceedings
would amount to abuse of the process of Court within
the meaning of the principles laid down in R.P. Kapur
(supra), Bhajan Lal(supra), Amit Kapoor(supra),
Neeharika Infrastructure (supra) and other binding
precedents?
(vi) Whether the inherent jurisdiction of this Court
deserves to be exercised for securing the ends of
justice?
39. The first and foremost issue which falls for consideration is
whether the Special Judge, while exercising jurisdiction under Sections 200
and 202 of the Cr.P.C., remained within the statutory contours of the said
provisions or transgressed into the realm reserved exclusively for trial. This
question assumes considerable significance because the legality of the entire
cognizance order substantially depends upon the answer thereto.
40. Chapter XV of the Cr.P.C. comprising Sections 200 to 203
provides a complete mechanism for dealing with private complaints. The
legislative object behind these provisions is neither to conduct a trial nor to
adjudicate the truthfulness of rival versions. The object is only to enable the
Magistrate to ascertain whether sufficient grounds exist for
proceeding against the proposed accused. The enquiry contemplated by
Section 202 Cr.P.C. is thus of an extremely limited nature. It is intended
merely to filter out frivolous, vexatious and groundless complaints. The
enquiry is not intended to determine guilt nor is it intended to weigh the
evidence as would be done after recording evidence during trial. The
Magistrate merely forms a tentative judicial opinion as to whether process
deserves to be issued.
41. The scope of Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. is no longer res
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integra. In Chandra Deo Singh v. Prokash Chandra Bose, AIR 1963 SC
1430, the learned Constitution Bench of Hon'ble Apex Court authoritatively
explained the scope of enquiry under Section 202 and observed that the
Magistrate is only required to determine whether sufficient grounds exist for
proceeding and not whether the evidence is sufficient for conviction. The
Hon'ble Supreme Court held that even if there are apparent inconsistencies in
the statements of witnesses, such inconsistencies cannot ordinarily justify
dismissal of the complaint at the threshold. Equally, the Magistrate cannot
evaluate the evidence as if finally deciding the guilt of the accused. The
learned Constitution Bench observed in substance that the enquiry under
Section 202 is merely for deciding whether process should issue and not
whether the accused is likely to be convicted.
42. The above principle was reiterated in the case of Nagawwa v.
Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi, (1976) 3 SCC 736, wherein the Hon'ble
Apex Court held that the Magistrate is concerned only with the existence of a
prima facie case. The Court specifically cautioned that the Magistrate should
not embark upon meticulous appreciation of evidence. The decision further
identifies the limited circumstances in which interference with issuance of
process is justified, namely where allegations do not constitute any offence
or allegations are inherently improbable and where proceedings are barred by
law and complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects. These principles
continue to govern the field.
43. In the case of Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate,
(1998) 5 SCC 749, the Hon'ble Supreme Court emphasized that summoning
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an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. The Court observed that
criminal law cannot be set in motion as a matter of course and the Magistrate
is required to apply judicial mind before issuing process. However,
application of judicial mind does not mean adjudication upon disputed
facts. The Court explained that while reasons are undoubtedly necessary,
those reasons must only indicate prima facie satisfaction and the Magistrate
cannot assume the role of a trial Judge.
44. Similarly, in Mehmood Ul Rehman v. Khazir Mohammad Tunda ,
(2015) 12 SCC 420, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the order issuing
process must disclose application of mind but cannot record findings
amounting to determination of disputed questions. The Court observed
that "The Magistrate has to examine the nature of allegations made in the
complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and
determine whether sufficient grounds exist for proceeding." The emphasis
throughout remains on proceeding, not convicting.
45. Again, in Birla Corporation Ltd. v. Adventz Investments , (2019)
16 SCC 610, the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that although reasons
must exist for issuance of summons, the Magistrate cannot evaluate the
evidentiary value of materials as if recording findings after trial. The
distinction between prima facie satisfaction and adjudication of guilt was
once again emphasized in this case.
46. After carefully going through all these judgements, this Court finds
that the impugned order unfortunately departs from the well-settled limits
governing enquiry under Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. A careful reading of
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the order dated 11.05.2026 reveals that the Special Judge has not merely
examined whether sufficient grounds existed for issuance of process. Instead,
the Judge has undertaken an elaborate appreciation of evidence extending
over several pages. The impugned order evidently discusses
regarding credibility of witnesses, corroborative value of documentary
material, investigation records, replies furnished by police authorities
and significance of CCTV footage along with legal effect of alleged non-
preservation of electronic evidence, culpability of superior police
officers, existence of criminal conspiracy, admissibility of surrounding
circumstances, applicability of Section 197 Cr.P.C. and ultimately records
categorical findings that the complainant's version stands corroborated. Such
an exercise clearly transcends the jurisdiction contemplated by Chapter XV
of the Code.
47. What particularly concerns this Court is that the Special Judge has
repeatedly employed expressions indicating final conclusions rather than
tentative satisfaction and the impugned order records findings to the effect
that the complainant's allegations stand corroborated by surrounding
circumstances, destruction of CCTV footage establishes complicity of
superior officers, failure of the S.P. to preserve electronic evidence
demonstrates participation in conspiracy, conduct of police officials supports
the prosecution version and each of these observations involves adjudication
of disputed questions of fact.
48. But, whether CCTV footage was intentionally destroyed, whether
data was automatically overwritten, whether any petitioners had custody of
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the server, whether there existed conspiracy, whether superior officers
possessed knowledge, whether money was actually paid, whether the
complainant is truthful, whether witnesses are reliable, all these questions
necessarily require appreciation of evidence during trial. None could legally
have been concluded at the stage of Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C.
49. The impugned order further reveals that the Special Judge
summoned records of the criminal case pending against the complainant,
examined the investigation papers and proceeded to draw substantive
inferences therefrom. While the Court conducting enquiry may undoubtedly
look into materials produced before it for the limited purpose of deciding
whether process should issue, such materials cannot become the basis for
recording findings virtually determining culpability. The distinction between
looking into a document and adjudicating upon its evidentiary value appears
to have been overlooked.
50. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned against
converting the stage of cognizance into a "mini trial". In GHCL Employees
Stock Option Trust v. India Infoline Ltd., (2013) 4 SCC 505, it was held that
detailed evaluation of evidence at the stage of issuance of process is legally
impermissible. Similarly, in Sunil Bharti Mittal v. CBI, (2015) 4 SCC 609,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that criminal courts must refrain from
entering into questions reserved for trial while considering issuance of
process. The same principle has been reiterated in Sonu Gupta v. Deepak
Gupta, (2015) 3 SCC 424.
51. One of the principal reasons assigned in the impugned order is that
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CCTV footage of Police Station Thatipur was not preserved despite judicial
directions and, therefore, an adverse inference deserves to be drawn against
the petitioners. The Special Judge has proceeded further to hold that such
non-preservation itself lends assurance to the complainant's allegations. At
this stage, this Court is unable to approve such reasoning. because it requires
evidence and cannot constitute the sole basis for recording a judicial finding
corroborating allegations of robbery and conspiracy even before
commencement of trial.
52. It is trite that an order issuing process need not be elaborate.
Equally, it should not become an adjudicatory judgment. The impugned
order unfortunately falls into the latter category. Instead of recording prima
facie satisfaction, it virtually adjudicates
upon credibility, corroboration, conspiracy, destruction of evidence and
culpability of each proposed accused. Such findings have the tendency of
prejudging the issues which properly fall for determination by the Trial Court
after recording evidence. Criminal jurisprudence does not countenance such
premature adjudication.
53. Consequently, this Court is constrained to hold that the Special
Judge travelled substantially beyond the limited jurisdiction contemplated
under Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. The enquiry ceased to remain a
preliminary judicial scrutiny and assumed the character of an adjudicatory
exercise akin to a trial. The impugned order, therefore, suffers from a
manifest jurisdictional error inasmuch as it records definitive findings on
disputed factual issues which could legally be determined only after parties
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had an opportunity to adduce evidence during trial.
54. However, before examining the legality of the impugned orders, it
is necessary to recapitulate the settled legal principles governing the exercise
of inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS.
55. The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court is not an appellate
jurisdiction. Equally, it is not so narrow that the Court must remain a silent
spectator where continuation of criminal proceedings itself amounts to abuse
of the process of law. The inherent power exists to prevent miscarriage of
justice, to secure the ends of justice, and to ensure that criminal law is not
employed as an instrument of harassment.
56. The learned Constitution Bench and subsequent decisions of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court have consistently held that where the complaint, the
material placed before the Magistrate, or the order taking cognizance suffers
from patent legal infirmity, jurisdictional error, non-application of mind, or
abuse of criminal process, the High Court is duty bound to interfere.
57. In R.P. Kapur (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court recognized that
criminal proceedings deserve to be quashed where continuation of
prosecution would amount to abuse of process or where the allegations, even
if accepted, do not disclose commission of an offence.
58. The judgement passed in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan
Lal catalogued illustrative categories where interference is justified,
including cases where the allegations do not constitute any offence, where
proceedings are manifestly attended with mala fides, or where the criminal
process has been maliciously instituted.
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59. Subsequently, Amit Kapoor it is emphasized that though the High
Court ordinarily does not appreciate evidence at the initial stage, it is fully
empowered to examine whether the order of cognizance itself is legally
sustainable. Likewise, Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. clarified that while
investigation ordinarily should not be interdicted, the inherent jurisdiction
remains available where continuation of proceedings itself constitutes abuse
of process. The same principle runs through Pepsi Foods Ltd., Zandu
Pharmaceutical Works Ltd., Indian Oil Corporation, Madhavrao Jiwajirao
Scindia, and Anand Kumar Mohatta.
60. Hence, the High Court is competent to examine whether the
Magistrate has exercised jurisdiction in accordance with law. A criminal
complaint cannot be permitted to proceed merely because allegations have
been levelled, the Court must examine whether the essential ingredients of
the alleged offences are disclosed. An order issuing process must
demonstrate judicial application of mind and cannot be founded upon
conjectures or assumptions. Criminal law cannot be permitted to become a
weapon for wreaking vengeance or exerting pressure in collateral disputes.
These principles constitute the legal framework within which the present
petitions are required to be examined.
61. Having examined the impugned orders in their entirety, this Court
finds that the Special Judge travelled far beyond the limited jurisdiction
available at the stage of taking cognizance. The statutory scheme under
Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. is well settled. At the pre-process stage, the
Magistrate is required only to determine whether sufficient grounds exist for
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proceeding against the proposed accused. The inquiry contemplated under
Section 202 is limited in nature. It is neither a trial nor a substitute for
investigation. The Magistrate is not expected to record findings on disputed
questions of fact or to adjudicate upon the truthfulness of rival versions.
Contrary to these settled principles, the impugned order demonstrates that the
Special Judge embarked upon an elaborate adjudicatory exercise wholly
alien to the jurisdiction vested at the stage of cognizance.
62. The record reveals that the Court summoned the records of
Sessions Trial No.172/2024 and examined materials collected during police
investigation in an entirely different criminal case. The Special court relied
upon recovery memos prepared during investigation and referred to
documents collected by the investigating agency, examined correspondence
regarding CCTV footage, drew adverse inferences from alleged non-
preservation of CCTV recordings, returned findings suggestive of criminal
conspiracy on the part of senior police officers; and virtually accepted the
complainant's allegations as established facts. Such an exercise is legally
impermissible.
63. The Supreme Court in Pepsi Foods Ltd. observed that summoning
an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter and the Magistrate must
carefully scrutinize the material placed before him. However, such scrutiny
does not authorize the Magistrate to conduct a mini trial. Similarly,
Mehmood Ul Rehman held that the order issuing process must disclose
application of judicial mind to the allegations in the complaint itself and not
to disputed matters requiring trial.
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64. In Sunil Bharti Mittal, the Supreme Court reiterated that criminal
liability cannot be inferred merely because the Court entertains suspicion.
There must exist legally admissible material satisfying the statutory
requirements. Likewise, Birla Corporation Ltd. held that the Magistrate
cannot travel beyond the permissible scope of Sections 200 and 202 by
undertaking an adjudicatory appreciation of disputed evidence. The
impugned order, however, repeatedly records conclusions such as the
allegations of the complainant "stand corroborated"; the role of the
Superintendent of Police "clearly indicates complicity"; destruction of CCTV
footage "establishes involvement"; non-action by superior officers "shows
conspiracy". These are findings which can arise only after a full-fledged trial
based on legally admissible evidence subjected to cross-examination.
Recording such conclusions at the threshold amounts to prejudging the entire
controversy.
65. The Special Judge also relied extensively upon records pertaining
to the investigation of Crime No.787/2023 and treated those investigative
materials as corroborative evidence against the present petitioners. Such an
approach fundamentally overlooks that investigation records collected in
another criminal case cannot be treated as substantive evidence while
considering issuance of process in an independent private complaint. The
jurisdiction under Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. does not authorize the
Magistrate to convert himself into an investigating agency or a trial court.
The exercise undertaken in the impugned order is therefore wholly beyond
jurisdiction.
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66. Another glaring illegality is the reliance placed by the Special
Judge upon the records of Sessions Trial No.172/2024 arising out of Crime
No.787/2023. The impugned order repeatedly refers to the investigation
conducted in that case, recoveries allegedly made therein, statements
recorded during investigation, seizure memos, and other materials forming
part of the police papers. It is trite law that a Magistrate, while deciding
whether process should issue in a private complaint, cannot import evidence
from another pending criminal proceeding and employ the same as
corroborative material. The criminal trial arising from Crime No.787/2023 is
still pending. The evidence therein has not attained finality. The accused
therein continue to enjoy the presumption of innocence. The materials
collected during investigation are yet to be tested by cross-examination. By
relying upon those untested investigative materials, the learned Special
Judge effectively prejudged issues which are directly in issue before another
competent criminal court. Such an exercise not only exceeds jurisdiction but
also has the potential to prejudice the pending sessions trial itself. The
Hon'ble Supreme Court has consistently held that investigative materials
cannot be elevated to the status of substantive evidence before trial. They
merely form the basis upon which investigation proceeds. The truthfulness of
such material is a matter to be determined during trial and not while issuing
process in another complaint. The reliance upon the pending sessions record,
therefore, vitiates the impugned order and constitutes a jurisdictional error
warranting interference under Section 528 BNSS.
67. This court further finds that having examined the complaint, the
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statements recorded under Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C., the documents
produced before the Special Judge, and the reasoning assigned in the
impugned order, this Court is of the considered opinion that the Court below
has proceeded on assumptions rather than on the legal ingredients
constituting the offences alleged.
68. At the stage of taking cognizance, although meticulous
appreciation of evidence is neither expected nor permissible, the Court is
nevertheless duty-bound to satisfy itself that the factual allegations, if
accepted at their face value, disclose the essential ingredients of the offences
alleged. Mere suspicion, conjecture or moral conviction cannot substitute the
statutory requirements constituting a criminal offence.
69. The Supreme Court in Mohd. Ibrahim has held that before criminal
process is issued, the Court must ascertain whether the basic ingredients of
the alleged offence exist. Similarly, in Vesa Holdings Pvt. Ltd. , it was
reiterated that criminal prosecution cannot continue merely because
allegations have been levelled; the ingredients of the penal provision invoked
must be demonstrably satisfied.
70. Robbery is defined by reading Sections 390 and 392 IPC together.
To constitute robbery, there must be dishonest removal of movable property
from the possession of another by voluntarily causing or attempting to cause
death, hurt, wrongful restraint, or fear of instant death, instant hurt or instant
wrongful restraint. The gravamen of the complaint is that the complainant
allegedly handed over money while under pressure and threats extended by
the investigating officer during investigation of another criminal case.
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71. Even assuming these allegations to be true solely for the purpose
of examination under Section 528 BNSS, the complaint itself indicates that
the alleged payments were made over a period of time, on different dates,
and in connection with settlement discussions arising from Crime No.
787/2023. The allegations do not depict a single contemporaneous act of
violent dispossession or forcible removal of property, which is the hallmark
of robbery. Whether such allegations ultimately constitute extortion, criminal
intimidation, abuse of official position, corruption, or any other offence is
not the question presently before this Court. The question is whether the
foundational ingredients of robbery, as understood in criminal jurisprudence,
are prima facie disclosed in the complaint so as to justify issuance of process
under Section 392 IPC. The Special Judge has not undertaken any such
analysis. The impugned order merely reproduces the allegations and
proceeds directly to record satisfaction regarding commission of robbery
without discussing how the statutory ingredients stand fulfilled. Such an
approach falls short of the legal standard expected while exercising criminal
jurisdiction.
72. Equally unsustainable is the finding regarding criminal
conspiracy. Conspiracy is an independent substantive offence. The sine qua
non of Section 120-B IPC is an agreement between two or more persons to
commit an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means. The agreement itself is
the gravamen of the offence.
73. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kehar Singh, State (NCT of Delhi)
v. Navjot Sandhu, and Esher Singh has repeatedly held that conspiracy
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cannot be presumed merely because several persons are alleged to have
acted in proximity. There must exist material indicating a meeting of minds.
In the present complaint, the allegation against the Superintendent of Police
and the Station House Officer essentially rests upon the assertion that despite
receipt of complaints, no action was taken against the investigating officer.
From such omission, the learned Special Judge has inferred criminal
conspiracy. Such reasoning is legally impermissible.
74. Administrative inaction, negligence, delay in acting upon a
complaint, or even erroneous exercise of supervisory powers cannot, by
themselves, constitute proof of a criminal conspiracy. To accept such a
proposition would expose every supervisory authority to criminal
prosecution whenever disciplinary action is not initiated against a
subordinate officer. The complaint contains no allegation of any meeting,
communication, prior arrangement, sharing of alleged illegal gratification, or
concerted design between the petitioners. In the absence of such
foundational allegations, invocation of Section 120-B IPC is wholly
unsustainable.
75. The Special Judge has further taken cognizance under Section 201
IPC on the premise that CCTV footage was not preserved. This reasoning is
equally flawed. Section 201 IPC is attracted only where there exists
deliberate causing of disappearance of evidence of an offence with the
intention of screening the offender from legal punishment. The provision
contains three indispensable components that are (i) commission of an
offence, (ii) knowledge or reason to believe that such offence has been
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committed; and (iii) intentional disappearance of evidence with the object of
screening the offender. The impugned order records no finding whatsoever
regarding these statutory ingredients. There is no material indicating
deletion, possession or preservation of the CCTV footate. Instead, the
Special Judge has drawn an adverse inference solely because CCTV footage
was unavailable. Such inference may at best constitute a matter for
appreciation during trial if supported by legally admissible evidence. It
cannot itself become the foundation for prosecuting persons for an
independent offence under Section 201 IPC. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has
consistently held that criminal intent cannot be presumed merely because
evidence is unavailable. Mens rea must be established by legally admissible
material and cannot arise from conjecture.
76. One of the principal questions argued before this Court concerns
the applicability of Section 197 Cr.P.C. The Special Judge has held that
sanction is unnecessary because the allegations disclose commission of
criminal acts outside the scope of official duty. The proposition of law is
unexceptionable. However, its application to the facts of the present case is
legally unsustainable.
77. The law governing Section 197 Cr.P.C. stands authoritatively
settled by the Constitution Bench in Matajog Dobey, followed in P.K.
Pradhan, Sankaran Moitra, Devinder Singh, D. Devaraja, and D.T.
Virupakshappa. These authorities uniformly hold that the test is whether the
act complained of bears a reasonable nexus with discharge of official
functions. The Court must examine the substance of the allegations rather
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than the language employed by the complainant. In the present case, every
allegation arises from investigation of Crime No. 787/2023. The alleged
threats, interrogations, detention, summoning of witnesses, recovery
proceedings and interaction with the complainant are all stated to have
occurred during investigation of the said criminal case. Whether the officers
exceeded their authority, abused their position, or committed criminal
misconduct are questions requiring adjudication after evidence. However, it
cannot be ignored that the acts alleged are inseparably connected with
performance of investigative functions entrusted to police officers. The
Special Judge has effectively concluded, even before trial, that the acts were
wholly dehors official duty. Such conclusion itself requires appreciation of
evidence and determination of disputed facts. The Supreme Court in D.
Devaraja has categorically held that where there exists a reasonable nexus
between the alleged act and official functions, the issue of sanction cannot be
brushed aside merely because the allegations are serious. Consequently, the
finding recorded in the impugned order that sanction is wholly unnecessary
is premature and legally unsustainable.
78. A substantial portion of the impugned order proceeds on the
assumption that non-preservation of CCTV footage itself establishes
complicity of the petitioners.
79. This Court is unable to subscribe to such reasoning. The learned
Special Judge has referred to the decisions in Paramvir Singh Saini and the
decision of this Court in Akhilesh Pandey v. State of Madhya Pradesh to
conclude that since CCTV footage was not preserved, the petitioners must
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have intentionally destroyed evidence. The reliance is misplaced. The
directions issued in Paramvir Singh Saini are administrative and procedural
safeguards intended to improve transparency in police functioning. Non-
compliance with those directions may, in an appropriate case, invite
departmental action, administrative accountability or other legal
consequences. However, mere non-preservation of footage does not
automatically establish the commission of an offence under Section 201 IPC
nor does it prove participation in the substantive offences alleged in the
complaint. The Special Judge has, in effect, converted an adverse factual
inference into conclusive proof of criminality. Such an approach reverses the
settled burden of criminal jurisprudence and cannot be sustained.
80. This Court finds considerable substance in the arguments that the
Special Judge has not adhered to the provision of Section 531 of the BNSS.
A careful perusal of the impugned order reveals that the Special Judge did
not confine the inquiry to the averments contained in the complaint and the
statements recorded during the preliminary inquiry but proceeded to summon
departmental records, call for reports from police authorities, examine the
issue relating to preservation of CCTV footage, and thereafter recorded
elaborate findings touching upon the alleged complicity of the petitioners
before directing issuance of process against them. Once the Court chose to
proceed under the framework contemplated by the BNSS 2023 in relation to
complaints against public servants, strict adherence to the safeguards
incorporated under Section 223 of the BNSS thereof became imperative. The
record unmistakably demonstrates that although reports from superior police
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: VISHAL
UPADHYAY
Signing time: 8/4/2026
3:46:48 PM
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authorities were called for and considered, no notice was issued to the
petitioners and no opportunity whatsoever was afforded to them to explain
the circumstances emerging from the materials so collected before the order
of cognizance came to be passed. The statutory requirement of hearing is not
an empty formality but constitutes a valuable procedural safeguard intended
by the legislature to protect public servants from unwarranted criminal
prosecution arising out of acts alleged to have been committed in discharge
of official duties. The Special Judge, in the considered opinion of this Court,
fell in error in invoking the saving clause contained in Section 531 of the
BNSS without examining whether the present complaint was an independent
proceeding attracting the newly enacted procedural safeguards under the
BNSS. The omission to follow the mandatory procedure prescribed under
Section 223 of the BNSS has caused serious prejudice to the petitioners and
has rendered the impugned order procedurally unsustainable.
81. This court carefully gone into the judgements passed in the case of
Mahendra Kumar Jain (Supra), Ajit Kumar Palit (supra), Parvinder Singh
Khurana (supra) and is of the considered opinion that this infirmity, when
considered together with the other jurisdictional and legal defects already
noticed hereinabove, furnishes an additional and independent ground
warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction.
82. After viewing the aforesaid illegalities cumulatively, this court
finds that the impugned orders suffer from multiple jurisdictional infirmities
such as the Special Judge exceeded the limited jurisdiction under Sections
200 and 202 Cr.P.C, the Court relied upon materials collected in an entirely
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UPADHYAY
Signing time: 8/4/2026
3:46:48 PM
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different pending criminal case, The order records findings on disputed facts
which could arise only after a full-fledged trial, essential ingredients of
Sections 392, 201 and 120-B IPC have not been analysed in accordance with
law, the issue of sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. has been decided
prematurely without applying the settled tests laid down by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court. For all these reasons, this Court is satisfied that the
impugned orders do not disclose the degree of judicial application of mind
mandated by law and therefore cannot be permitted to stand.
83. Consequently, all the petitions succeed and are hereby allowed and
accordingly, it is directed as under:
(1). The common order dated 11.05.2026 passed by the Special
Judge, Gwalior, whereby cognizance has been taken against the
present petitioners for the offences punishable under Sections 392,
201 and 120-B IPC and Sections 11/13 of the MPDVPK Act, is
hereby quashed and set aside.
(2). Consequently, the complaint case registered pursuant to the
said order, together with all consequential proceedings including
issuance of process/summons against the petitioners, stands
quashed.
(3). It is clarified that this Court has not examined the truthfulness
or otherwise of the allegations levelled by the complainant, nor
has it expressed any opinion upon the merits of the allegations
contained in Crime No.787/2023 or Sessions Trial No.172/2024,
which shall proceed independently in accordance with law and
shall remain uninfluenced by any observations contained either in
the impugned order or in this judgment.
(4). It is further clarified that the present judgment is confined
solely to examining the legality of the cognizance order dated
11.05.2026 and the complaint proceedings arising therefrom.
Pending interlocutory applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.
84. No order as to costs.
85. Before parting, this Court considers it appropriate to observe that
criminal law cannot be permitted to become a weapon either for shielding
official misconduct or for retaliating against investigating officers. Courts are
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UPADHYAY
Signing time: 8/4/2026
3:46:48 PM
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duty-bound to protect honest public servants from vexatious prosecutions
while simultaneously ensuring that genuine allegations of abuse of authority
are investigated strictly in accordance with law. The criminal process must
remain a vehicle for the administration of justice and not an instrument of
oppression. Where jurisdictional limits are transgressed at the very threshold,
constitutional courts are not merely empowered but obligated to intervene to
preserve the sanctity of the criminal justice system.
(RAJESH KUMAR GUPTA )
JUDGE
Vishal
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: VISHAL
UPADHYAY
Signing time: 8/4/2026
3:46:48 PM