UNION OF INDIA THROUGH THE SECRETARY GOVERNMENT OF INDIA DEPARTMENT OF POSTS vs SHASHI BHUSHAN KUMAR

2026:JHHC:25715-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P.(S) No. 1251 of 2026
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1. Union of India through the Secretary, Government of India, Department of
Posts, Government of India, Sansad Marg, Dak Bhawan, P.O. - Dak Bhawan,
P.S. Sansad Marg, New Delhi.

2. The Director General, Department of Posts, Government of India, Sansad
Marg, Dak Bhawan, P.O. - Dak Bhawan, P.S. - Sansad Marg, New Delhi.

3. The Chief Postmaster General, Jharkhand Circle, Meghdoot Bhawan,
Doranda, P.O. & P.S. Doranda, District-Ranchi, Jharkhand.

4. The Director of Postal Services, Jharkhand Circle, Meghdoot Bhawan,
Doranda, P.O. & P.S. Doranda, District- Ranchi, Jharkhand.

5. The Superintendent of Post Office, Giridih Division, P.O. & P.S. - Giridih,
District - Giridih, Jharkhand.
… … … Petitioners
Versus
Shashi Bhushan Kumar, Son of Sri Ramashish Pandey, Resident of at
Shalimar Puranadih Basti, Post Office-Jealgore, District- Dhanbad, Jharkhand
… … … Respondent
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CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PRASAD
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For the Petitioners : Mr. Abhijeet Kr. Singh, CGC
For the Respondent : Mr. Rishikesh Giri, Advocate
----------
th
Order No.11 / Dated 25 August, 2026
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J:

1. The writ petition is under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
directed against the order dated 18.07.2025 passed in OA/051/00677/2022
by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal, Patna Bench, Circuit Bench
at Ranchi whereby and whereunder the subsequent orders of extension of
suspension passed against the applicant (respondent herein) beyond the first
three months of the original date of suspension that was 27.09.2019, has
been quashed and set aside and direction was passed upon the respondents to
take a decision on the entitlement of the applicant for the first three months of
the suspension in accordance with the relevant provisions of
Fundamental Rule.
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Factual Matrix

2. The brief facts of the case as per the pleading made in the writ petition,
which is being referred herein reads as under :-
(i) The case of the writ petitioners (respondent before tribunal) is
that the applicant (respondent herein) was identified as prime
accused in a fraud exceeding Rs. 26 crores in Giridih Division under
Jharkhand Postal Circle for his period of working as Treasurer,
Giridih Head Post office during the year 2014 to 2018 and as APM
(SB) Counter, Giridih Head Post office w.e.f. 06.08.2018 to
12.07.2019, 15.07.2019 to 02.08.2019 & 05.08.2019 to 31.08.2019.
(ii) He was placed under suspension by SPOs Giridih Division vide
order dated 27.09.2019 in connection with the fraud at Giridih HO
and Giridih Town SO.
(iii) The Respondent /Applicant had filed an appeal dated 08.01.2022
and also an OA No. 122/2022 before the learned Central
Administrative Tribunal against the suspension order.
(iv) The learned Central Administrative Tribunal vide its order dated
17.02.2022 directed to consider and take decision on appeal dated
08.01.2022.
(v) The said appeal was considered and rejected by the competent
authority vide order dated 06.05.2022 as the fraudulent amount was
more than Rs. 26 crores and CBI investigation was pending.
(vi) Prosecution sanctions were issued by SPOS Giridih Division, as
asked by CBI in cases No. RC-02(A)/2021-D and RC-10(A)/2019-D
on 21.11.2022 & 07.02.2023 respectively. Further charge sheets in
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both cases were filed by CBI on 19/12/2022 and 07/04/2023
respectively.
(vii) Further after rejection of appeal against suspension, the
applicant filed an O.A. No. 677/2022 before the learned CAT. The
suspension case of the applicant was reviewed by the suspension
review committee on 17.12.2019, 10.06.2020, 03.12.2020,
27.05.2021, 25.10.2021, 21.02.2022, 11.08.2022, 06.09.2022 and
18.11.2022. On the basis of recommendation of the SRC, the
suspension of the official was revoked vide order dated 18.11.2022.
(viii) The learned CAT vide its order dated 18.07.2025 in O.A.
No. 677/2022, quashed and set aside the subsequent orders of
extension of suspension beyond the first three months of original
date of suspension that was 27.09.2019. The learned CAT further
ordered that the applicant will be entitled to salary after the first
three months of the suspension minus the subsistence allowance
already paid to him. As per orders of learned CAT the effective date
of revocation of suspension will be 27.12.2019.
(ix) In the said order, learned CAT has held that the extension of
suspension beyond three months is against the law settled by Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Ajay Kumar Choudhary Vs. Union of
India 2015 AIR (SC) 2389 and also against DOPT guidelines issued
on 23.08.2016. It has also been held that subsequent issuance of
charge sheet 07.03.2022 does not make the extension any lawful.
(x) It is the case of the writ petitioner that learned CAT failed to
appreciate that the case of the respondent/applicant is totally on
different footing because a criminal case has been registered against
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him which is being investigated by CBI and delay if any in issuance
of charge sheet is there, it is because of pendency of enquiry by CBI.
Further, the charges against the respondent/applicant are of fraud
involving Rs. 15,44,45,972/-.

(xi) Against the said order dated 18.07.2025 passed by the learned
tribunal the present petition has been filed.
3. It is evident from the factual aspect that the petitioner, while
working in the Jharkhand Postal Circle as Treasurer at Giridih, was
suspended with effect from 27.09.2019 in-contemplation of the
departmental proceeding and he remained under suspension. The
departmental proceeding continued, but no decision was taken either to
invoke the order of suspension or recalling it.
4. The applicant (respondent herein) has approached the learned
Central Administrative Tribunal, Patna Bench, Circuit Bench at Ranchi
praying therein for revocation of order of suspension issued against the
applicant by the SPOs Giridih under O/o SPOs Giridih Memo No. B-400
dated 27.09.2019 (Annexure- 1).
5. The learned Central Administrative Tribunal vide its order dated
17.02.2022 directed the respondent (petitioner herein) to consider and
take decision on appeal dated 08.01.2022.
6. The said appeal was considered and rejected by the competent
authority vide order dated 06.05.2022 by taking the ground of the
fraudulent amount which was more than Rs. 26 crores and CBI
investigation was pending.

7. Further after rejection of appeal against suspension, the applicant
filed an O.A. No. 677/2022 before the learned CAT. Meanwhile the
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suspension case of the applicant was reviewed by the suspension review
committee (SRC) on 17.12.2019, 10.06.2020, 03.12.2020, 27.05.2021,
25.10.2021, 21.02.2022, 11.08.2022, 06.09.2022 and 18.11.2022. On the
basis of recommendation of the SRC, the suspension of the official was
revoked vide order dated 18.11.2022.
8. The learned Tribunal has called upon the respondent/writ petitioner
herein. The writ petitioner has filed written statement wherein the stand
inter alia was taken that a fraud involving Rs. 15,44,45,972/- came to
light at Giridih HO/Giridih Town and based upon that the department
proceeding has been decided to be initiated and the memorandum of
charge was served upon the applicant on 07.03.2022.
9. The learned Tribunal has considered the rival submission made on
behalf of the parties particularly on the issue of the propriety of the order
of suspension, which has been allowed to be continued beyond the first
three months of the original date of suspension that was 27.09.2019.
10. The learned Tribunal has considered the judgment passed by the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ajay Kumar Chaudhary Vs. Union
of India (supra) and vide order dated 18.07.2025 passed in O.A. No.
677/2022, quashed and set aside the subsequent orders of extension of
suspension beyond the first three months of original date of suspension
that was 27.09.2019 and further hold that the applicant will be entitled
to salary after the first three months of the suspension minus the
subsistence allowance already paid to him. It has further been directed to
take a decision on the entitlement of the applicant for the first three
months of the suspension in accordance with the relevant provisions of
Fundamental Rule that liberty is there.
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11. The said order dated 18.07.2025 is under challenge in the instant
writ petition.
Submission made on behalf of the Petitioner.
12. Mr. Abhijeet Kumar Singh, learned Central Government Counsel
has taken the following ground in assailing the order passed by the
learned Tribunal.
13. It has been submitted that the learned Tribunal has not appreciated
the fact about the gravity of charge and without any basis, the order of
suspension has been held to be not proper beyond the period of ninety
days.
14. It has further been submitted that holding the respondent entitled for
difference of period of salary beyond the period of three months cannot
be said to be just and proper in an admitted case of non-conclusive of the
departmental proceeding, since, the order of suspension was in
contemplation of the departmental proceeding and as such, the order of
suspension cannot be said to be unjust and improper in a situation, when
the departmental proceeding has not been concluded.
15. Learned Central Government Counsel based upon the aforesaid
ground, has submitted that the impugned order passed by the learned
Tribunal is not sustainable in the eyes of law.
Submission made by learned counsel appearing for the respondent.
16. Mr. Rishikesh Giri, learned counsel appearing for the respondent
herein, applicant before the learned Tribunal has submitted that there is
no error in the impugned order.

17. It has further been submitted that the order of suspension dated
27.09.2019 was in contemplation of the departmental proceeding, but the
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departmental proceeding has been initiated only after the serving of the
memorandum of charged on 07.03.2022, as such, keeping an employee
under suspension for a long period is contrary to the principle of prolong
suspension.

18. It has further been submitted that the learned Tribunal has also
taken note of the observation made in the judgment passed by the
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ajay Kumar Chaudhary Vs. Union
of India (Supra) and based upon that the direction has been passed
holding the applicant, respondent herein, entitled for the difference of
arrears of salary for the period of suspension, which cannot be said to be
unjust and improper.
19. The learned counsel, based upon the aforesaid ground, has
submitted the impugned order, therefore, needs no interference.
Analysis

20. This Court has heard learned counsel for both the parties and gone
through the pleadings made in the writ petition as also the finding
recorded in the impugned order.
21. The issue, which requires consideration, as has been dealt with
before the learned Tribunal as to :
(I) whether the period of suspension beyond the first three months,
which has been held to be not sustainable, is unjust and improper
keeping the facts into consideration that the order of suspension,
which was issued in contemplation of initiation of departmental
proceeding, has not been initiated until the date of service of
memorandum of charge i.e. 07.03.2022,
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(II) whether holding the applicant entitled for the salary after the first
three month of suspension minus the subsistence allowance
already paid to the respondent herein - applicant suffers from an
error.

22. Both the issues are interlinked and as such, being taken into
consideration together, but before answering the aforesaid issues, thinks
it proper to first refer about the jurisdiction which is to be exercised
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as has been held by the
Hon’ble Apex Court in its Constitution Bench judgment rendered in the
case of “ L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and Ors.”, (1997) 3
SCC 261 , relevant paragraph-99 thereof is quoted hereunder as:
"99. In view of the reasoning adopted by us, we hold that clause 2(d)
of Article 323-A and clause 3(d) of Article 323-B, to the extent they
exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court
under Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution, are
unconstitutional. Section 28 of the Act and the "exclusion of
jurisdiction" clauses in all other legislations enacted under the aegis
of Articles 323- A and 323-B would, to the same extent, be
unconstitutional. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts
under Articles 226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32
of the Constitution is a part of the inviolable basic structure of our
Constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other courts
and Tribunals may perform a supplemental role in discharging the
powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution. The
Tribunals created under Article 323-A and Article 323- B of the
Constitution are possessed of the competence to test the constitutional
validity of statutory provisions and rules. All decisions of these
Tribunals will, however, be subject to scrutiny before a Division
Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the Tribunal
concerned falls. The Tribunals will, nevertheless, continue to act like
courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they
have been constituted. It will not, therefore, be open for litigants to
directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question
the vires of statutory legislations (except where the legislation which
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creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned. Section 5(6) of the Act is valid
and constitutional and is to be interpreted in the manner we have
indicated."
23. It is evident from the ratio laid down therein that the power of
judicial review has been deliberated by the Hon'ble Apex Court, which is
to be considered while exercising the said power only to the extent that if
any order is being passed found to be having error on the face of the
order or without jurisdiction or suffers from perversity. The error
apparent on the face of the order means that if the order appears on its
face having with error, then only the power of judicial review is to be
exercised.
24. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of “ West Bengal Central
School Service Commission vs. Abdul Halim”, (2019) 18 SCC 39 , has
held at paragraph-30 that the power of judicial review must be exercised
by the Court after determining that the impugned order is vitiated by an
error apparent on the face of the record and not the same has been
established by a process of reasoning. Paragraph-30 of the aforesaid
judgment is being referred as under:
"30. In exercise of its power of judicial review, the Court is to see
whether the decision impugned is vitiated by an apparent error of law.
The test to determine whether a decision is vitiated by error apparent
on the face of the record is whether the error is self-evident on the
face of the record or whether the error requires examination or
argument to establish it. If an error has to be established by a process
of reasoning, on points where there may reasonably be two opinions,
it cannot be said to be an error on the face of the record, as held by
this Court in Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Millikarjun
Bhavanappa Tirumale [Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v.
Millikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, AIR 1960 SC 137] . ---."
25. In the case of T .C. Basappa vs. T. Nagappa and Anr., (1955) 1
SCR 250, their Lordship have held that the patent error in a decision can
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be corrected by writ of certiorari, when it is manifested by the error
apparent on the face of the proceedings. The relevant portion of the
aforesaid judgment is quoted hereunder:
"11. ... An error in the decision or determination itself may also be
amenable to a writ of certiorari but it must be a manifest error
apparent on the face of the proceedings e.g. when it is based on clear
ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. In other words, it is a
patent error which can be corrected by certiorari but not a mere
wrong decision. ...."
26. This Court is now proceeding to examine as to whether the order
passed by the learned Tribunal either suffers from the element of having
error on the face of the order or suffers from perversity.
27. At this juncture, it needs to refer herein that the interpretation of the
word “perverse” as has been interpreted by the Hon'ble Apex Court
which means that there is no evidence or erroneous consideration of the
evidence. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Arulvelu and Anr. vs. State
[Represented by the Public Prosecutor] and Anr., (2009) 10 SCC 206
while elaborately discussing the word perverse has held that it is, no
doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding
relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if
the finding so outrageously defies logic as so to suffer from the vice of
irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is
rendered infirm in law. Relevant paragraphs, i.e., paras-24, 25, 26 and 27
of the said judgment reads as under:
“24. The expression “perverse” has been dealt with in a number of
cases. In Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [(2001) 1 SCC 501] this
Court observed that the expression “perverse” means that the
findings of the subordinate authority are not supported by the
evidence brought on record or they are against the law or suffer
from the vice of procedural irregularity.
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25. In Parry's (Calcutta) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd.
[AIR 1966 Cal 31] the Court observed that “perverse finding” means
a finding which is not only against the weight of evidence but is
altogether against the evidence itself. In Triveni Rubber & Plastics
v. CCE [1994 Supp (3) SCC 665 : AIR 1994 SC 1341] the Court
observed that this is not a case where it can be said that the findings
of the authorities are based on no evidence or that they are so
perverse that no reasonable person would have arrived at those
findings.
26. In M.S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma [AIR 1977 Kant 58] the
Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of
pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett
v. Gough [(1878) 1 LR 1r 331] the Court observed that a “perverse
verdict” may probably be defined as one that is not only against the
weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey
v. Godfrey [106 NW 814] the Court defined “perverse” as turned the
wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or
deviating from what is right, proper, correct, etc.
27. The expression “perverse” has been defined by various
dictionaries in the following manner:
Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English, 6th
1.
Edn.
“Perverse.—Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way
that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable.”
Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, International
2.
Edn.
Perverse.—Deliberately departing from what is normal and
reasonable.
The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998 Edn.
3.
Perverse.—Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the
direction of the judge on a point of law.
4. The New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of the English
Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edn.)
Perverse.—Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior
or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant.
5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, 4th Edn.
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“Perverse. —A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that
is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the
evidence.”
28. Thus, from the aforesaid it is evident that if any order made in
conscious violation of pleading and law then it will come under the
purview of perverse order. Further “perverse verdict" may probably be
defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is
altogether against the evidence.
29. Thus, “perversity” refers to a finding or decision so unreasonable or
irrational that no reasonable person acting judicially could have reached
it. It signifies a gross and unreasonable assessment of evidence or law by
a court.
30. Further Perversity is a high threshold for intervention,
distinguishing it from a mere error of fact or law. The "safest approach
on perversity is the classic approach on the reasonable man's inference
on the facts but inadequacy of evidence or a different reading of
evidence is not perversity, reference in this regard be made to the
judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Damodar
Lal v. Sohan Devi, (2016) 14 SCC 197.
31. It needs to refer herein that the very purpose of order of
suspension, in a situation where the decision has been taken by the
employer to initiate a departmental proceeding.
32. Admittedly, suspension is not to be construed as a measure of
punishment; rather, it signifies only the temporary deactivation of the
concerned employee from discharging his official functions and duties.
33. It is also settled position of law that during the period of
suspension, the subsistence allowance as admissible under the service
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code applicable to the one or other employee, herein, the Central Civil
Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, applicable to the
delinquent employee, the respondent herein, is to be paid.
34. Under service jurisprudence, subsistence allowance is a legal right
of an employee under suspension pending an inquiry. This grant ensures
the employee can maintain themselves and their family, and effectively
defend themselves during the disciplinary proceedings. Non-payment of
this allowance generally violates the principles of natural justice and
Article 21 of the Constitution (Right to Life).
35. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Surekha Domaji Bele Vs.
Executive Engineer, Testing Division, Msedcl 2026 INSC 63 has
observed that it would be impossible for a civil servant under
suspension, who has no other means of subsistence, to defend himself
effectively without payment of subsistence allowance. The principle is
that the subsistence allowance must be real and meaningful because the
employee is kept away from work and is not permitted to earn a regular
salary during suspension; hence, it ordinarily cannot be denied.
36. Further it is settled position of law that the suspension, being not in
the nature of punishment, nevertheless invites scrutiny as to its
permissible duration. The Hon’ble Apex Court in catena of judgments
while considering the legality of prolonged suspension, has categorically
deprecated the practice of keeping an employee under suspension for an
indefinite period without serving the charge-sheet.
37. In its authoritative pronouncement, the Hon’ble Apex Court has
held that suspension, though preventive, cannot be allowed to operate as
a measure of penalty by reason of its undue prolongation. Reference in
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this regard be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court
in the case of Ajay Kumar Choudhary v. Union of India (supra) . The
relevant passage of the judgment, as referred herein, makes it clear that
continuation of suspension beyond a reasonable period is impermissible
in law, for ready reference the relevant paragraph is being quoted herein
which reads as under:
“21. We, therefore, direct that the currency of a Suspension Order
should not extend beyond three months if within this period the
Memorandum of Charges/Chargesheet is not served on the delinquent
officer/employee; if the Memorandum of Charges/Chargesheet is
served a reasoned order must be passed for the extension of the
suspension.”
38. The prolong suspension while interpreting the said word, the
Hon’ble the Apex Court has been pleased to observe that the purpose of
suspension is that the delinquent employee may not get any access to the
documents available, so that the evidence may not be tampered or the
witnesses may not be gained over.
39. Thus, when a government employee is suspended during a pending
criminal case without concurrent disciplinary action, such suspension
cannot continue indefinitely without just cause and employers do not
continuously take a stand that it is not conducive to revoke suspension
merely due to the pendency of a criminal case. A prolonged suspension,
either without holding any inquiry or in an unreasonably prolonged
inquiry, is neither just nor in the larger public interest and can become
penal. While suspension pending a contemplated inquiry is not a
punishment at the initial stage, it may become punitive or unlawful with
the passage of time if the disciplinary inquiry is unreasonably prolonged
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or not initiated at all, without any fault on the part of the delinquent
employee.
40. The fact about putting the employee under suspension although is
for the basic reason to have the departmental proceeding concluded
fairly and transparently, but is it available for the employer to keep the
employee under suspension indefinitely even without initiating a
departmental proceeding.
41. There is difference between suspension as a preventive measure
and suspension as a punishment. While suspension is intended to prevent
interference with investigations or to maintain discipline, it is not meant
to be a penalty prior to proof of guilt. However, when suspension is
unduly prolonged, it transforms into a punitive action, causing
reputational harm and professional stagnation.
42. There is no dispute upon the settled position of law that the
departmental proceeding is said to be initiated there when the
memorandum of charge is being issued to the delinquent employee.
43. The respondent herein-applicant has been put under suspension on
27.09.2019 and the departmental proceeding was decided to be initiated.
The memorandum of charge was issued only on 07.03.2022 i.e. after a
lapse of two and a half years.
44. Then the question is for what, the applicant (respondent herein) was
put under suspension when there was material available said to be
sufficient for framing of charge, as has been submitted by the learned
Counsel that due to pending of criminal case before the CBI Court, the
document could have only been obtained in the year of 2022, thereafter
the memorandum of charge was formulated and if that was the situation
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then why the Government has not taken a decision to recall the order of
suspension because the subsistence allowance admittedly was being paid
in favour of the delinquent employee, but without rendering any service
then the rightful approach of the Government could have to recall of the
order of suspension, so that the employee concern may be allowed to
discharge his duties and something may be contributed by such
employee, but the other side of the picture in the present case was that
the subsistence allowance was being paid but without any work due to
the effect of order of suspension .
45. The suspension, although is required but vis-a-vis there is need for
the employer to get his departmental proceeding concluded on the
earliest so that the public exchequer may not be allowed to overburden
by making payment of the subsistence allowance without taking any
work from the delinquent employee.

46. In the aforesaid pretext, the Hon’ble Apex Court has made an
observation in the judgment rendered in the case of Ajay Kumar
Chaudhary vs. Union of India (Supra) . The Hon’ble Apex Court has
considered the implication of Section 167 of the Cr.P.C. wherein the
mandatory requirement to submit the charge sheet depending upon the
nature of commission of offence is either within 60 or 90 days, the
maximum period is 90 days. The Hon’ble Apex Court, on the aforesaid
pretext, has made an observation that if Parliament considered it
necessary that a person be released from incarceration after the expiry of
90 days even though accused of commission of the most heinous crimes,
a fortiori suspension should not be continued after the expiry of the
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similar period especially when a Memorandum of Charges/Chargesheet
has not been served on the suspended person .
47. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in this case, primarily dealt with the
legality of the dismissal and the treatment of the suspension period as
punishment. While the Court did not set aside the dismissal, it reinforced
the principle that suspension is not intended to be an indefinite state and
that its continuation beyond a reasonable period requires review. The
Court's observations in this case align with the broader jurisprudence on
the need to avoid unduly prolonged suspension, relevant paragraph is
being referred herein:
“ It will be useful to recall that prior to 1973 an accused could be
detained for continuous and consecutive periods of 15 days, albeit,
after judicial scrutiny and supervision. The Cr.P.C. of 1973 contains a
new proviso which has the effect of circumscribing the power of the
Magistrate to authorise detention of an accused person beyond period
of 90 days where the investigation relates to an offence punishable
with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not
less than 10 years, and beyond a period of 60 days where the
investigation relates to any other offence. Drawing support from the
observations contained of the Division Bench in Raghubir Singh vs.
State of Bihar, 1986 (4) SCC 481, and more so of the Constitution
Bench in Antulay, we are spurred to extrapolate the quintessence of
the proviso of Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. 1973 to moderate
Suspension Orders in cases of departmental/disciplinary inquiries
also. It seems to us that if Parliament considered it necessary that a
person be released from incarceration after the expiry of 90 days even
though accused of commission of the most heinous crimes, a fortiori
suspension should not be continued after the expiry of the similar
period especially when a Memorandum of Charges/Chargesheet has
not been served on the suspended person. It is true that the proviso to
Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. postulates personal freedom, but respect and
preservation of human dignity as well as the right to a speedy trial
should also be placed on the same pedestal.”
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48. The above decisions do not mean that every suspension beyond a
particular period will be automatically void in all cases, but they
underline an important principle that suspension is not to become an
indefinite condition of civil and economic disability.

49. Here the admitted fact is that the respondent was put under
suspension on 27.09.2019, but no proceeding for the period of two and
half years, since the memorandum of charge was not served to the
respondent, which was only served on 07.03.2022 i.e. after a lapse of
two and half years.
50. Thus, extension of suspension beyond three months, without
issuance of charge sheet and without reviewing the order of suspension
which is mandated to be reviewed within three months is against the
order of Hon'ble Supreme Court the case of Ajay Kumar Chaudhary
Vs. Union of India (supra) and also is in violation of the DoPT
guidelines issued on 23.08.2016 pursuant to the said judgement, which
clearly mentions that the order of suspension should not be extended
beyond three months if within this period charge sheet is not served to
the charged officer. For ready reference the DoPT guidelines issued on
23.08.2016 is being referred herein which reads as under:
"The undersigned is directed to refer to DoP&T's O.M. No.
11012/17/2013-Estt.A-III dated 3rd July, 2015 on the above
mentioned subject and to say that in a recent case, Ajay Kumar
Choudhary vs Union of India Civil Appeal No. 1912 of 2015 dated
16/02/2015, the Apex Court has directed as follows:
"14. We, therefore, direct that the currency of a Suspension Order
should not extend beyond three months if within this period the
Memorandum of Charges/Chargesheet is not served on the
delinquent officer/employee; if the Memorandum
Charges/Chargesheet is served a reasoned order must be passed for
the extension of the suspension. As in the case in hand, the
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Government is free to transfer the concerned person to any
Department in any of its offices within or outside the State so as to
sever any local or personal contact that he may have and which he
may misuse for obstructing the investigation against him. The
Government may also prohibit him from contacting any person, or
handling records and documents till the stage of his having to
prepare his defence Furthermore, the direction of the Central
Vigilance Commission that pending a criminal investigation
departmental proceedings are to be held in abeyance stands
superseded in view of the stand adopted by us."
2. In compliance of the above judgement, it has been decided that
where a Government servant: is placed under suspension, the order of
suspension should not extend beyond three months, if within this
period the charge-sheet is not served to the charged officer. As such, it
should be ensured that the charge sheet is issued before expiry of 90
days from the date of suspension. As the suspension will lapse in case
this timeline is not adhered to, a close watch needs to be kept at all
levels to ensure that charge sheets are Issued in time."
51. Thus, in the said notification, which has been promulgated in the
light of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court, it is explicitly
depicted that where a Government servant is placed under suspension,
the order of suspension shall not extend beyond a period of three months
if, within this time, the charge-sheet is not served upon the charged
officer. The principle thereby enshrined is that suspension, being
preventive in nature, cannot be allowed to continue indefinitely in the
absence of formal initiation of departmental proceedings.
52. Further, at this juncture, it would be deemed fit and proper to advert
to Rule 10(6) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control &
Appeal) Rules, 1965 , which stipulates that an order of suspension made
or deemed to have been made shall be reviewed by the competent
authority within ninety days of the effective date of suspension. The
Rule further mandates that upon such review, the authority must either
extend the suspension for a further period not exceeding one hundred
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and eighty days at a time, or revoke the same. Thus, the statutory
framework itself underscores that suspension is not intended to be
indefinite, but subject to periodic scrutiny and justification, for ready
reference Rule 10(6) is being quoted herein which reads as under:.
1 0 . Suspension

"(6) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under
this rule shall be reviewed by the authority competent to modify or
revoke the suspension, before expiry of ninety days from the effective
date of suspension, on the recommendation of the Review Committee
constituted for the purpose and pass orders either extending or
revoking the suspension. Subsequent reviews shall be made before
expiry of the extended period of suspension. Extension of suspension
shall not be for a period exceeding one hundred and eighty days at a
time..”
53. A plain reading of the aforesaid Rule makes it evident that it merely
prescribes the procedure for extension of suspension beyond ninety days
from the effective date thereof. It does not confer upon the Government
authorities any unfettered discretion to prolong suspension at will. Any
extension of suspension must strictly conform to the conditions
stipulated under the Rules themselves and other cognate provisions of
law; otherwise, such extension would be rendered ultra vires and
unsustainable.
54. Thus, the currency of a suspension order should not extend beyond
three months if a charge sheet is not served on the delinquent officer. If a
charge sheet is served, the suspension can be extended, but a review
must be conducted before the expiry of the three months and the
suspension order will not be valid after three months unless a review has
extended it.
55. In the present case, it is manifest that no charge-sheet was served
upon the appellant until 07.03.2022, the same having been served only
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after a lapse of two and a half years from the date of suspension. The
delay in serving of charge-sheet was sought to be justified on the ground
of pendency of criminal proceedings; however, such ground, by itself,
does not constitute a justifiable basis in law in view of the settled
principle that suspension cannot be continued beyond three months in
the absence of service of charge-sheet, thus the extension of suspension
beyond three months without serving charge-sheet to the applicant
(respondent herein) in the instant matter stands vitiated.
56. Further, it is an admitted position that although the memorandum of
charge was served upon the delinquent employee on 07.03.2022, the
departmental proceeding has been concluded only on 06.04.2026, i.e.,
after an inordinate lapse of seven years. No explanation has been
forthcoming as to why such proceeding was permitted to linger for so
protracted a period, nor has any accountability been fixed for the delay.
The Court is thus constrained to observe that the prolongation of the
departmental proceeding for seven years, without justification, raises a
serious question as to whose fault the proceeding was allowed to be so
unduly prolonged.
57. It needs to refer herein that the settled position that the moment
when the departmental proceeding is being decided to be initiated, the
same amounts to the accountability of the concern Disciplinary
Authority and the departmental proceeding is to be initiated with all
sincerity so that it may be concluded within the reasonable period.
58. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani
Singh, 1990 Supp SCC 738 , has deprecated prolonged and
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unexplained delay in serving of charge memo and has held that
such delay causes serious prejudice to the delinquent employee.
59. The Hon’ble Apex Court in State of M.P. v. Bani Singh (supra)
held as follows:
“4. The appeal against the order dated December 16, 1987 has been
filed on the ground that the Tribunal should not have quashed the
proceedings merely on the ground of delay and laches and should
have allowed the enquiry to go on to decide the matter on merits. We
are unable to agree with this contention of the learned counsel. The
irregularities which were the subject matter of the enquiry is said to
have taken place between the years 1975-77. It is not the case of the
department that they were not aware of the said irregularities, if any,
and came to know it only in 1987. According to them even in April
1977 there was doubt about the involvement of the officer in the said
irregularities and the investigations were going on since then. If that
is so, it is unreasonable to think that they would have taken more than
12 years to initiate the disciplinary proceedings as stated by the
Tribunal. There is no satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay
in issuing the charge memo and we are also of the view that it will be
unfair to permit the departmental enquiry to be proceeded with at this
stage. In any case there are no grounds to interfere with the
Tribunal's orders and accordingly we dismiss this appeal.”
60. The Apex Court has reiterated the same view in State of Punjab
and Others v. Chaman Lal Goyal 1995 (2) SCC 570 at para 9, held as
follows:
“Now remains the question of delay. There is undoubtedly a delay of
five and a half years in serving the charges. The question is whether
the said delay warranted the quashing of charges in this case. It is
trite to say that such disciplinary proceeding must be conducted soon
after the irregularities are committed or soon after discovering the
irregularities. They cannot be initiated after lapse of considerable
time. It would not be fair to the delinquent officer. Such delay also
makes the task of proving the charges difficult and is thus not also in
the interest of administration. Delayed initiation of proceedings is
bound to give room for allegations of bias, mala fides and misuse of
power. If the delay is too long and is unexplained, the court may well
interfere and quash the charges. But how long a delay is too long
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always depends upon the facts of the given case. Moreover, if such
delay is likely to cause prejudice to the delinquent officer in defending
himself, the enquiry has to be interdicted. Wherever such a plea is
raised, the court has to weigh the factors appearing for and against
the said plea and take a decision on the totality of circumstances”
.
61. In the case of State of A.P. v. N. Radhakishan (1998) 4 SCC 154
after referring to Chaman Lal Goyal’s case (supra), the Apex Court
held at para 19 that the delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary
proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made
to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are
unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the
proceedings and if there is any unexplained delay in the initiation of
departmental proceeding, then it amounts to dereliction in
duty/misconduct and for that a penalty is also required to be inflicted
against the authority concerned. The relevant paragraph is being referred
herein: -
“19. It is not possible to lay down any predetermined principles
applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in
concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the
disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be
examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. The essence of
the matter is that the court has to take into consideration all the
relevant factors and to balance and weigh them to determine if it is in
the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary
proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly
when the delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay.
The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings
against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to
undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are
unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the
proceedings. In considering whether the delay has vitiated the
disciplinary proceedings the court has to consider the nature of
charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If
the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ
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large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much the
disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its
employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an
officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties
honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates
from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally,
disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take their course as per
relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to
the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the
delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting
the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the court is to balance these
two diverse considerations .”
62. The purpose of laying down the aforesaid proposition in the case of
State of Andhra Pradesh vs. N. Radhakrishna (Supra ) is that the
Hon’ble Apex Court has clarified that the departmental proceeding is to
be concluded without any unnecessary delay that too when the
delinquent employee was put under suspension.
63. This Court after referring the factual aspect as also the legal
position and adverting to the impugned order passed by the learned
Tribunal, has found that in a situation, which has been confronted by the
learned Tribunal that the respondent has been put under suspension on
27.09.2019, but the departmental proceeding was only initiated on
serving the memorandum of charge on 07.03.2022 i.e after delay of more
than two years and concluded on 04.06.2026, although the day when the
learned Tribunal has passed the impugned order, the departmental
proceeding was pending, since the final order of punishment was passed
subsequent to the disposal of the order impugned herein.
64. The learned Tribunal, in the aforesaid circumstances and by
applying the observation made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
Ajay Kumar Chaudhary vs. Union of India (Supra) has considered the
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validity of the order of suspension for a period of three months and as
such, has quashed and set aside the order of suspension beyond the
period of three months, holding the applicant is entitled for difference of
arrears of salary (salary minus subsistence allowance).

65. This Court has also considered the things in different angle that the
matter would have been different, if there is no cooperation on the part
of the delinquent employee, but as the fact is being reflected that it is the
writ petitioner, employer, who, for what reason, has continued with the
departmental proceeding and has not furnished with the reason, as such,
putting an employee under suspension and extended the period of
suspension of sentence beyond three months without serving charge-
sheet to the applicant (respondent herein) cannot be taken as a luxury at
the cost of the delinquent employee.
66. It does mean that by putting an employee under suspension is not to
be done, rather a rational approach is to be taken by putting the
employee under suspension and serving the charge and initiate the
departmental proceeding within a reasonable period.
67. Mr. Singh, learned Central Government Counsel has submitted that
the aid of the Fundamental Rule is to be taken as available in
Fundamental Rule-54.
68. Such liberty has already been granted by the learned Tribunal on
the day when the order was passed, but when the Court has put a query
whether the Appointing Authority has resorted the Rule 54 of the
Fundamental Rule, he has submitted in all fairness that the aid of rule 54
has not been taken.
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69. This Court, in view of the entirety of the facts and circumstances
and taking into consideration in law laid down as referred in para-99 of
the L Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India (supra) referred and quoted
hereinabove and further taking into consideration the ratio rendered by
the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ajay Kumar Choudhary Vs.
Union of India and also taking into consideration the Central Civil
Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965 particularly rule
10 (6 ) is of the view that there are no element of perversity and no error
apparent on the face of the impugned order passed by the learned
tribunal.
70. Accordingly, this Court discerns no infirmity in the impugned order
dated 18.07.2025 passed by the learned Tribunal. The order rests upon
sound reasoning and warrants no interference in exercise of writ
jurisdiction. Consequently, the instant writ petition stands dismissed.

71. Pending I.A(s)., if any, also stands disposed of.
72. Before parting with the order, it is necessary to observe that since
the order of punishment has already been passed on conclusion of the
departmental proceeding and as such, the legality and propriety of the
order of punishment, in case of challenge, will be looked into on its own
merit without being prejudiced by the observation made in this order.

(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)

(Sanjay Prasad, J.)
Date : 25.08.2026
A.F.R
Kamlesh/ Nishant/-
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