NEERAJ JAIN vs STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

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CGHC010178732022 2026:CGHC:39114
NAFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPC No. 2476 of 2022
Order Reserved on 10. 8 .2026
Order Delivered on 07.09.2026
SHYNA
AJAY
Digitally signed
by SHYNA
AJAY
Date:
2026.09.07
18:36:14
+0530
1 - Neeraj Jain S/o Shri Kantilal Jain Aged About 43 Years R/o Ward No.
1, Shankar Nagar, Mahasamund, Tehsil and P.S. Mahasamund, District-
Mahasamund (C.G.)
2 - Vikas Chopra S/o Late Shri Prakashchand Chopra, Aged About 41
Years R/o Station Road, Mahasamund, Tehsil & P.S. Mahasamund,
District- Mahasamund (C.G.)
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Collector Mahasamund, Revenue
and Civil District- Mahasamund (C.G.)
2 - Sub-Divisional Magistrate and Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue)
Mahasamund, Revenue and Civil District- Mahasamund (C.G.)

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3 - Tehsildar Mahasamund, Revenue and Civil District- Mahasamund
(C.G.)
4 - Jagdish Prasad Agrawal S/o Late Shri Sukhdev Prasad Agrawal
Aged About 75 Years R/o Ward No. 30, Main Road, Near Sitli,
Mahasamund, Tehsil and P.S. Mahasamund, District- Mahasamund
(C.G.)
... Respondent(s)
(Cause Title downloaded from CIS Periphery)
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Surfuraj Khan, Advocate
For Respondent
:
Dr. Arham Siddique, Panel Lawyer
/State
For Respondent
:
Mr. Prakash Tiwari, Advocate
No.4

SB: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad
C A V Order
1. The present petition has been filed challenging the proceedings
and the order dated 25.4.2022, passed by the Tehsildar,
Mahasamund in Revenue Case No.202112120600051/B-
121/2021-22, whereby an application filed by respondent No.4
seeking an injunction against construction over the suit land
belonging to the petitioners was allowed. According to the
petitioners, such relief of injunction can only be granted by a Civil
Court of competent jurisdiction under Section 34 & 37 of the
Specific Relief Act, 1963 read with Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 of the
CPC. The revenue authorities do not possess the statutory power

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or jurisdiction to grant an injunction. Matter involving disputes of
title and claims of injunction fall exclusively within the domain of
the Civil Court and cannot be adjudicated by the Revenue Courts.
2. By way of this petition, the petitioners have prayed for the
following reliefs :
10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to
issue a Suitable Writ (s), Order (s), Direction (S), by
quashing the entire proceeding (Annexure P/1 & P/2)
and also the order dated 25/04/2022 (Annexure P-1)
passed in Revenue Case No. 202112120600051/B-
121/2021-22, (Jagdish Prasad Agrawal V/s. Neeraj Jain
& Another), by the respondent no. 3 and to issue a
suitable writ in the nature of prohibition for preventing
an order or decision being made which if made would
be subject to certiorari.
10.2 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to
call the entire records from the court below for its kind
perusal.
10.3 Any other relief, which may be suitable in the facts
and circumstances of the case, may also be granted.
3. The facts of the case, as pleaded by the petitioners, are that they
are the owner and possession holder of land bearing Khasra
No.2052/1, admeasuring area 0.131 hectare and Khasra
No.2052/2, admeasuring area 0.198 hectare situated at Village
Mahasamund, Tehsil and District Mahasamund. The petitioners
derived ownership and title to the subject land by virtue of a
registered sale-deed dated 27.8.2021, on the basis of which
Bhumiswami rights accrued in their favour over the said land.
Thereafter, respondent No.4 filed an application dated 9.12.2021

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before respondent No.3 (Tehsildar), seeking an injunction to
restrain the petitioners from raising further construction and to
stop the ongoing construction over the subject land. The
concerned Tehsildar entertained the application in separate
proceedings and issued notice to the petitioners. Upon
appearance, the petitioners filed preliminary objections
challenging the maintainability of the application, stating that the
Revenue Courts lacks jurisdiction to grant an injunction or restrain
construction. It was specifically contended that disputes involving
title and injunctive relief fall within the domain of the Civil Courts.
Such statutory powers are exclusively vested in the Civil Court
under Sections 34 and 37 of the Specific Relief Act read with
Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of the CPC, thereby ousting the jurisdiction
of the Revenue Courts to grant injunctions. It was further
contended that respondent No.4 had already instituted Civil Suit
No.27-A/2009, before the Second Civil Judge Class-I,
Mahasamund, however, the said suit was dismissed. In the said
preliminary objection, the petitioners pleaded that the subject land
is non-agricultural in nature and contains a residential house.
Hence, the Revenue Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the
application and further, any dispute pertaining thereto can
exclusively be adjudicated by a Civil Court of competent
jurisdiction. It was further contended that respondent No.4 has no
interest in the suit property, as he owns no land or structure
adjacent to the land in dispute. However, when the preliminary
objection was not decided by the concerned Tehsildar, the

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petitioner/s approached this Court by filing WPC No.649/2022,
wherein vide order dated 4.2.2022, ithe concerned Tehsildar was
directed to consider and decide the said objection in accordance
with law. However, as the preliminary objection was still not
decided by the Tehsildar despite the directions of this Court, the
petitioners were compelled to file Contempt Case No.400/2022,
wherein notices were issued to the concerned Tehsildar.
Prompted by the issuance of the contempt notice, the Tehsildar
hurriedly passed the impugned order dated 25.4.2022 against the
petitioners, granting an injunction and restraining construction
over the suit land. Hence, this Petition.
4.
Mr. Surfuraj Khan, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that
the power to grant temporary/permanent injunction is governed
by Section 37/39 of the Specific Relief Act read with Order 39
Rule 1& 2 of the CPC, which is exclusively vested in a competent
Civil Court. A Revenue Court possesses no jurisdiction to
entertain an application seeking temporary injunction. He submits
that respondent No.4, being fully aware of the legal position, had
previously instituted a civil suit for permanent injunction in respect
of the subject matter, which came to be dismissed. Hence, the
present application filed before the Tehsildar is an attempt to
somehow restrain the petitioners from raising construction and is
non-maintainable on its face. He also submits that since the
subject property is non-agricultural residential land upon which the
petitioners were raising construction, the Revenue Court did not
have jurisdiction to entertain the application. Therefore, the entire

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proceedings including the impugned order granting stay on
construction, are liable to be quashed. He further submits that
considering the aforesaid aspects of the matter, this Court vide
order dated 14.6.2022, stayed the further proceedings before the
Tehsildar in the subject Revenue Case. In support of these
contentions, learned counsel places reliance upon the orders
passed by the Coordinate Benches of this Court in the matters of
Ram Niwas Sahu Vs. State of Chhattisgarh and others
(WP227 No.800 of 2015 {decided on 19.7.2018}) and Bisahu
Ram (Died) Through LRs. Smt. Ganga Devi and others Vs.
Khelavan Singh and others (WP227 No.771/2013 {decided on
24.7.2017}), wherein it has been categorically held that the
Revenue Courts lack statutory authority and jurisdiction to grant
orders of injunction, such power being exclusively vested in the
competent Civil Court. In view of the above, the present petition
deserves to be allowed and the entire proceedings as well as the
impugned order passed by the Tehsildar, are liable to be quashed.
5. Per contra, Mr. Prakash Tiwari, learned counsel for respondent
No.4 submits that initiation of the proceeding is well within the
jurisdiction of the concerned Revenue Courts. He further submits
that respondent No.4 is the owner and possession holder of the
land bearing Khasra No.2052/3, admeasuring 0.0680 hectare,
situated in Tehsil and District of Mahasamund, having purchased
the property vide the sale dated 22.10.1988 from one Chhedi Lal
Nishad. After the death of Chhedi Lal Nishad, the adjacent land
bearing Khasra No.2052/1 admeasuring 0.131 hectare and

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Khasra No.2052/2 admeasuring 0.198 hectare was sold by legal
heirs of the deceased to the petitioners. However, the petitioners
could not trace their own land and is now, illegally claiming rights
in respect of Khasra No.2052/3 as their individual property. The
land bearing Khasra No.2052/3 was neither purchased by the
petitioners from Chhedi Lal Nishad or any other person. When the
petitioners arbitrarily began felling trees on the said land through
muscle power, an application was filed by respondent No.4
seeking appropriate action to restrain the petitioners from doing so
and to prevent them from erecting any construction thereon.
Accordingly, the Tehsildar initiated the revenue proceedings and
rightly passed the impugned order, which cannot be said to be
contrary to law. He further submits that since there exists a
dispute in respect of the position of the land, the subject case was
registered upon the objection filed by the petitioners and has not
yet been finally decided. The initiation of the impugned
proceedings and the impugned order passed by the concerned
Tehsildar are well within the four corners of the law and cannot be
termed as being without jurisdiction. The concerned Tehsildar has
complied the order passed by this Court and there is no ambiguity
in it.
6.
Dr. Arham Siddique, learned counsel for the State/respondents 1
to 3 submits that the order was passed within the jurisdiction of
the concerned Tehsildar. There is no illegality either in the initiation
of the proceedings or in the impugned order. Hence, the petition is
bereft of merit and is liable to be dismissed.

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7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and also perused the
documents annexed with the petition with utmost circumspection.
8. The primary questions that arise for determination of this Court
are as follows :
(i) Whether the Tehsildar can entertain an application
seeking an injunction, as provided under Section 37
and Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act?;
(ii) Whether an order under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of
the CPC can be passed by a revenue authority in the
garb of a stay order?
9. This Court would now answer the aforesaid points/questions in
detail.
10. Evidently, respondent No.4 had earlier filed a suit for permanent
injunction against Chhedi Lal Nishad, Santosh Kumar and Toshan
Lal arising out of the same land dispute and allegations. Chhedi
Lal Nishad is the father, whereas Santosh Kumar and Toshan Lal
are his sons. According to the petitioners, they purchased the
subject property i.e. land bearing Khasra No.2052/1 (area 0.131
hectare) and Khasra No.2052/2 (area 0.198 hectare), situated at
Village Mahasamund from the legal heirs of late Chhedi Lal. A
perusal of the application filed by respondent No.4 shows that the
present petitioners are allegedly attempting to illegally take
possession of land bearing Khasra No.2052/3 belonging to
respondent No.4. It is further alleged that the petitioners have
illegally commenced felling standing trees and are attempting to

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dispossess respondent No.4, in respect of which complaints were
also lodged with the police. By way of the said application,
respondent No.4 prayed for an order restraining the petitioners
from interfering with or taking possession of the subject land.
Meanwhile, in the parallel civil suit, the competent Civil Court has
framed issues, observing that the land bearing Khasra No.2052/3
is not open land. The plaintiff i.e. respondent No.4 is in
possession of the said land. Further, in a separate issue, the trial
Court held that the defendants therein i.e. the sellers who sold
the land to the petitioners were not interfering with the possession
of respondent No.4. The trial Court categorically held vide issue
No.6 that respondent No.4/plaintiff constructed a boundary wall
and a pucca residential house wherein he currently resides
covering an area excess of the land purchased by him. This
finding under issue No.6 has remained unchallenged and has
attained finality. Hence, the suit land is no longer agricultural land
or open vacant land over which revenue authorities possess
jurisdiction, but is rather a residential property constructed
thereon.
11. It is trite law that Revenue Courts lack jurisdiction to entertain any
application or to initiate proceedings or to grant interim injunctions
with respect to a house constructed over a residential land. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court has time and again held that the
jurisdiction of Revenue Courts is confined to agricultural or
revenue assessed land and does not extend to residential land
over which constructions have been erected. Once the property

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in dispute includes a permanent structure or built up area, the
jurisdiction of the Revenue Court is ousted. The Civil Court alone
possesses exclusive jurisdiction to determine title under Section
34 of the Specific Relief Act as well as to grant temporary and
permanent injunctions under Sections 37 and 39 of the said Act
read with Order 39 Rule 1& 2 of the CPC. A Coordinate Bench of
this Court has affirmed this view in WP227 No.800/2015 {decided
on 19.07.2018}, relying upon the principle laid down in Maya
Lalchandani (Mrs) and others Vs. Board of Revenue and
others reported in (2009) 3 MPLJ 660 . In light of this settled legal
position, the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the
petitioners that the Tahsildar has acted in excess of jurisdiction
are well founded and the contention raised by respondent No.4 is
not in accordance with law.
12. This Court in Seraj Ahmad Vs. State of Chhattisgarh & others
2017 (4) C.G.L.J. 559 has held that the order to grant injunction is
surely vested in the jurisdictional Civil Court and the Revenue
Courts cannot grant the order of injunction and it was held that the
revenue order granting temporary injunction restraining the
transfer would be without jurisdiction and without authority of law.
The said judgment was based on Maya Lalchandani (supra) .
Relevant part of the decision is reproduced herein below:
“2 Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits
that the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue) has
passed order on 10.03.2016 granting temporary
injunction for which he has no jurisdiction,
therefore, the order passed by the Sub-
Divisional Officer (Revenue) is without

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jurisdiction and without authority of law. He
relies upon a decision of the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh in the matter of Maya
Lalchandani (Mrs.) and others Vs. Board of
Revenue and others in which the M.P. High
Court has held as under:
4. After going through the order passed by
the learned President, Board of
Revenue and taking into consideration
the legal provisions, we are of the
opinion that the directions sisued in
paragraph 7 of the order passed by the
Board of Revenue cannot be allowed to
stand. Section 32 of the Land Revenue
Code talks of the inherent powers of the
Revenue Authorities while Section 43
talks of applicability of the Code of Civil
Procedure. It is to be seen from Section
32 that nothing in the Land Revenue
Code shall be deemed to limit or
otherwise affect the inherent power of
the Revenue Court to make such orders
as may be necessary to meet the ends
of justice or as may be necessary to
prevent the abuse of the process of
Court. Section 43 simply provides that
unless otherwise expressly provided in
the Code, the procedure laid down in the
Code of Civil Procedure shall, so far as
may be, followed in all proceedings
under the Code. Section 43 in no case
would authorise a Revenue Authority to
grant an injunction. Section 43 simply
provides that the procedure laid down in
the Code of Civil Procedure so far as
may be followed in all proceedings
under the Code. It is also to be seen
from the provision of the Code of Civil
Procedure that an injunction can be
granted only by civil Court and by none
else. Section 32 of the M.P. Land
Revenue Code only talks of the inherent
powers of the Revenue Courts where
they are required to make such order as
may be necessary for the ends of justice
or to prevent the abuse of the process of
the Court. The powers under Section 32
can be exercised within the Code itself
and not beyond the Code. If the
Revenue Authority does not have the
power to grant injunction then the Board
of Revenue also could not grant
injunction.
3. The order to grant injunction is surely vested
in the jurisdictional civil court, revenue courts
cannot grant order of injunction. Therefore, the
order passed by the revenue authority granting
temporary injunction restraining transfer
following the principle of law laid down in Maya
Lalchandani (Supra) is without jurisdiction and

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without authority of law. It is accordingly set
aside. However, the Sub-Divisional officer
(Revenue) is directed to take decision on merits
after hearing the parties in accordance with law,
expeditiously, within three months from the date
of receipt of a copy of this order.
13. The aforementioned decision was referred with approval in the
case of Vandana Gupta & Ors. Vs. State of Chhattisgarh &
Ors. in WPC No. 235/2020 and has observed thus:-
“9. Considering the nature of stay order,
certainly it would show that the Tahsildar has
exceeded its jurisdiction which is vested under
the Land Revenue Code and therefore, the
order of the nature would be without jurisdiction
and without authority of law. Since the order is
without jurisdiction, as such, the petitioner even
if has not availed the remedy of appeal, this
Court in exercise of power under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India can look into such
issue when jurisdictional issue is involved in
view of the decision of the Supreme Court
rendered in Whirlpool Corporation Vs. Registrar
of Trade Marks, Mumbai (1998) 8 SCC 1
wherein, it has been held as under:
14. The power to issue prerogative writs
under Article 226 of the Constitution is
plenary in nature and is not limited by
any other provisions of the Constitution.
This power can be exercised by the High
Court not only for issuing writs in the
nature of habeas corpus, mandamus,
prohibition, quo quarranto and certiorari
for the enforcement of any of the
Fundamental Rights contained in Part III
of the Constitution but also for "any other
purpose”.
15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution
the High Court, having regard to the
facts of the case, has a discretion to
entertain or not to entertain a writ
petition.But the High Court has imposed
upon itself certain restrictions one of
which is that if an effective and
efficacious remedy is available, the High
Court would not normally exercise its
jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy
has been consistently held by this Court
not to operate as a bar in at least three
contingencies, namely, where the writ
petition has been filed for the
enforcement of any of the Fundamental
Rights or where there has been a

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violation of the principle of natural justice
or where the order or proceedings are
wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of
an Act is challenged. There is a plethora
of case law on this point but to cut down
this circle of forensic whirlpool, we would
rely on some old decisions of the
evolutionary era of the constitutional law
as they still hold the field.
16. Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board
Kairana AIR 1950 SC 163 laid down that
existence of an adequate legal remedy
was a factor to be taken into
consideration in the matter of granting
writs. This was followed by another
Rashid case, namely, K.S. Rashid & Son
V. Income Tax Investigation Commission
AIR 1954 SC 207 which reiterated the
above proposition and held that where
alternative remedy existed, it would be a
sound exercise of discretion to refuse or
to interfere in a petition under Article
226. This proposition was, however
qualified by the significant words,
“unless there are good grounds
therefor”, which indicated that alternative
remedy would not operate as an
absolute bar and that writ petition under
Article 226 could still be entertained
in exceptional cases.
14. Coming to the facts of the present case, in light of the principles
laid down in the aforesaid judgments and further in light of the
findings recorded by the competent Civil Court in Civil Suit No.27-
A/2009 {judgment dated 26.4.2016 passed by the Second Civil
Judge Class-I, Mahasamund (CG)} filed by respondent No.4
(plaintiff therein), wherein the prayer for permanent injunction was
refused and the finding under issue No.6 establishing the
existence of a permanent structure on the suit land attained
finality, this Court is of the firm view that the Tehsildar possessed
no power or jurisdiction to entertain an application for injunction in
any manner whatsoever. Such disputes fall exclusively within the
domain of the Civil Court and are non-amenable to the jurisdiction

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of the Revenue Courts.
15.
As a result, the Petition is Allowed . The entire subject
proceedings pending before the concerned Tehsildar together with
the impugned interim order dated 25.4.2022, are hereby quashed.
Sd/-
( Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge
Shyna Ajay