Sain Mahasabha Naraini Dham Delhi (Regd.) Through Its President Kuldeep Singh vs Narayan Dass

Court
Delhi High Court

$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on: 05.10.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 18.11.2026


# CNR No. DLHC010479172026
+ RC.REV. 378/2026, CM APPL. 68878/2026 (Dir.), CM APPL.
68879/2026 (Placing on record addl. documents), CM APPL.
68880/2026 (Ex.) & CM APPL. 68881/2026 (Delay 17 days in
refilling of the petition)

SAIN MAHASABHA NARAINI DHAM DELHI (REGD.)
THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT KULDEEP SINGH
....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Avinash Sharma and
Ms. Akanksha Kapoor,
Advocates.
versus

NARAYAN DASS .....Respondent
Through:


# CNR No. DLHC010479202026
+ RC.REV. 379/2026, CM APPL. 68883/2026 (Dir.), CM APPL.
68884/2026 (Placing on record addl. Documents), CM APPL.
68885/2026 (Ex.) & CM APPL. 68886/2026 (Delay 17 days in
refilling of the petition)

SAIN MAHASABHA NARAINI DHAM DELHI REGD.
THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT KULDEEP SINGH
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Avinash Sharma and
Ms. Akanksha Kapoor,
Advocates.
versus

NANDU SAIN @ NAND LAL (DECEASED) THROUGH
LRS .....Respondent
Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 378/2026 and connected matters Page 1 of 53
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:30:03

Through:

# CNR No. DLHC010479232026
+ RC.REV. 380/2026, CM APPL. 68891/2026 (Dir.), CM APPL.
68892/2026 (Placing on record addl. Documents), CM APPL.
68893/2026 (Ex.) & CM APPL. 68894/2026 (Delay 17 days in
refilling of the petition)
SAIN MAHASABHA NARAINI DHAM DELHI REGD.
THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT KULDEEP SINGH
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Avinash Sharma and
Ms. Akanksha Kapoor,
Advocates.
versus

MANISH AGGARWAL .....Respondent
Through:


# CNR No. DLHC010479262026
+ RC.REV. 381/2026, CM APPL. 68899/2026 (Dir.), CM APPL.
68900/2026 (Placing on record addl. Documents), CM APPL.
68901/2026 (Ex.) & CM APPL. 68902/2026 (Delay 17 days in
refilling of the petition)

SAIN MAHASABHA NARAINI DHAM DELHI REGD.
THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT KULDEEP SINGH
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Avinash Sharma and
Ms. Akanksha Kapoor,
Advocates.
versus

DAYANAND RITHALIA (DECEASED) THROUGH LRS
.....Respondent
Through:

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR

Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 378/2026 and connected matters Page 2 of 53
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:30:03

J U D G M E N T
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
1. The present matters comprise of a batch of four connected
Revision Petitions filed under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the
1
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 , assailing the Orders dated
2
02.07.2026 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge-cum-Rent
3
Controller, West District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi , whereby the
respective Eviction Petitions instituted by the Petitioner Society under
Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25-B of the DRC Act came to be
dismissed. Since the four Revision Petitions arise out of the same
proceedings concerning adjoining shops situated within the premises
of the Petitioner Society and involve substantially common questions
of fact and law, they are being disposed of by way of the present
common Judgment.

2. For the sake of convenience, the particulars of the connected
Revision Petitions and the corresponding eviction proceedings are set
out hereinbelow:
(i) RC.REV. 378/2026 , arising out of Eviction Petition
bearing RC/ARC No. 26155/2016, titled Sain Mahasabha
Naraini Dham Delhi (Regd.) v. Narayan Dass , concerning Shop
No. 1, measuring approximately 10 ft. × 20 ft., situated on the
ground floor of the premises at Sain Bhaghat Shiv Mandir,
Naraini Dham, F Block, Hari Nagar, Ghanta Ghar (Tilak
4
Nagar), New Delhi – 110064 ;

1
DRC Act
2
Impugned Orders
3
Learned Rent Controller
4
Shop No. 1
Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 378/2026 and connected matters Page 3 of 53
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:30:03

(ii) RC.REV. 379/2026 , arising out of Eviction Petition
bearing RC/ARC No. 26154/2016, titled Sain Mahasabha
Naraini Dham Delhi (Regd.) v. Nandu Sain @ Nand Lal
(Deceased) through LRs , concerning Shop No. 4, at Sain
Bhaghat Shiv Mandir, Naraini Dham, F Block, Hari Nagar,
5
Ghanta Ghar (Tilak Nagar), New Delhi – 110064 ;
(iii) RC.REV. 380/2026 , arising out of Eviction Petition
bearing RC/ARC No. 26153/2016, titled Sain Mahasabha
Naraini Dham Delhi (Regd.) v. Manish Aggarwal , concerning
Shop No. 2, at Sain Bhaghat Shiv Mandir, Naraini Dham, F
Block, Hari Nagar, Ghanta Ghar (Tilak Nagar), New Delhi –
6
110064 ; and
(iv) RC.REV. 381/2026 , arising out of Eviction Petition
bearing RC/ARC No. 26152/2016, titled Sain Mahasabha
Naraini Dham Delhi (Regd.) v. Dayanand Rithalia (Deceased)
through LRs , concerning Shop No. 3, at Sain Bhaghat Shiv
Mandir, Naraini Dham, F Block, Hari Nagar, Ghanta Ghar
7
(Tilak Nagar), New Delhi – 110064 .
BRIEF FACTS:
3. The Petitioner herein is a registered society, namely, Sain
8
Mahasabha Naraini Dham Delhi (Regd.) , functioning for religious
and charitable purposes in relation to Sain Bhagat Shiv Mandir,
Naraini Dham, F Block, Hari Nagar, Ghanta Ghar, Delhi. The Society
claims to be in possession of the temple premises, including the

5
Shop No. 4
6
Shop No. 2
7
Shop No. 3
8
Petitioner Society
Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 378/2026 and connected matters Page 4 of 53
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:30:03

adjoining construction and four shops situated on the ground floor of
the premises, as mentioned above.
4. The Petitioner Society instituted four separate Eviction Petitions
under Section 14(1)(e), read with Section 25-B of the DRC Act, in
respect of the aforesaid four shops, claiming that the premises had
been let out to the respective Respondents or their predecessors-in-
interest for commercial purposes.
5. Insofar as the individual tenancies are concerned, the case of the
Petitioner Society, as pleaded in the respective Eviction Petitions, was
that Shop No. 1 had been let out to Narayan Dass at a monthly rent of
Rs.1,320/-; Shop No. 2 had originally been let out to the father of
Manish Aggarwal, namely, Jagdish Aggarwal, at a monthly rent of
Rs.1,450/-; Shop No. 3 had originally been let out to Santosh Rithalia,
wife of Dayanand Rithalia, at a monthly rent of Rs.1,450/-; and Shop
No. 4 had been let out to Nandu Sain @ Nand Lal at a monthly rent of
Rs.1,320/-, excluding electricity and water charges.
6. The common case set up by the Petitioner Society was that it
regularly conducts religious functions and gatherings, including Mata
Ki Chowki, Jagran, Shrimad Bhagwat Katha, Sain Jayanti, Krishna
Janmashtami, Maha Shivratri and Holi, for the benefit of devotees and
the general public. It was contended that the existing hall adjoining
the tenanted shops was insufficient to accommodate the increasing
number of devotees visiting the temple from different parts of the
country. Accordingly, the Petitioner Society claimed that the tenanted
shops were required bona fide for expansion of the existing hall by
removing the intervening structure and integrating the adjoining area
with the temple premises.
Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 378/2026 and connected matters Page 5 of 53
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:30:03

7. The Respondents, upon obtaining leave to defend, contested the
eviction proceedings by filing their respective Written Statements and
leading evidence. Inter alia , they disputed the status of the Petitioner
Society as landlord, questioned its entitlement over the underlying
land, relied upon documents pertaining to the acquisition and
9
ownership of the land by the Delhi Development Authority and
contended that the amounts paid by them were contributions or
donations towards the temple and not rent. The Respondents also
disputed the alleged bona fide requirement and asserted that sufficient
accommodation was already available with the Petitioner Society.
8. The parties were permitted to lead evidence. The Petitioner
Society examined its witnesses, who were subjected to cross-
examination, while the Respondents also led evidence, including
documentary evidence and evidence of official witnesses in relation to
the land status of the premises. Upon consideration of the pleadings
and the evidence led by the parties, the learned Rent Controller, vide
the respective Orders dated 02.07.2026, dismissed the aforesaid
Eviction Petitions.
9. Aggrieved thereby, the Petitioner Society has approached this
Court by way of the present Revision Petitions.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
10. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner Society
assails the Impugned Orders primarily on the ground that the learned
Rent Controller has devoted disproportionate consideration to the
question of ownership of the underlying land and has failed to

9
DDA
Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 378/2026 and connected matters Page 6 of 53
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:30:03

appreciate the limited nature of the inquiry contemplated under
Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act.
11. It is contended that the Petitioner Society was not required to
establish absolute or indefeasible ownership of the entire land against
the whole world. It was sufficient to demonstrate that it possessed a
title or right superior to that of the Respondents in the context of the
landlord-tenant relationship. Reliance is also placed upon the settled
principle that the landlord is the best judge of his own requirement
and that a tenant cannot dictate the manner in which the landlord
ought to utilise his premises.
12. Learned counsel further submits that the learned Rent
Controller failed to appreciate the documentary evidence
demonstrating the pre-existing landlord-tenant relationship between
the parties. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the Reply dated
25.02.2016 sent on behalf of the shopkeepers in response to the Legal
Notice dated 03.02.2016, wherein, according to the Petitioner Society,
the Respondents acknowledged their status as tenants of the Society
since the year 1980 and admitted payment of rent through one Sh.
Sarvottam Kumar.
13. Reliance is also placed upon the rent receipts issued in respect
of the respective shops, which bear descriptions such as “Kiraya”, the
concerned shop numbers, inter alia, Dukaan No. 1 and Dukaan No. 2,
and the corresponding months for which the payments were made. It
is contended that the aforesaid documents, particularly being
contemporaneous to the institution of the eviction proceedings, could
not have been discarded merely because a formal written Rent
Agreement was not available in every case.
Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 378/2026 and connected matters Page 7 of 53
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:30:03

14. It is, therefore, contended that the learned Rent Controller has
mis-appreciated the evidence, applied an incorrect legal standard
while examining the Petitioner's entitlement and returned findings
which are contrary to the settled principles governing eviction
proceedings under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act. On the aforesaid
grounds, learned counsel seeks interference of this Court for setting
aside of the Impugned Orders.
ANALYSIS:
15. This Court has considered the submissions advanced on behalf
of the Petitioner and perused the material available on record,
including the Impugned Orders passed by the learned Rent Controller.
16. At the outset, it is necessary to bear in mind the limited scope of
interference available to this Court while exercising jurisdiction under
the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act. The provision does
not confer an appellate jurisdiction upon the High Court to undertake
a fresh adjudication of the entire dispute or to substitute its own
appreciation of evidence merely because another view may also be
possible.
17. The scope of the aforesaid jurisdiction has been authoritatively
explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder
10
Sain Dua ,wherein it has been reiterated that the jurisdiction
exercised by the High Court under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) is
supervisory in nature. The High Court is required to examine the
decision-making process adopted by the Rent Controller and satisfy
itself that the order is according to law. The power is not intended to
enable the High Court to substitute or supplant its own view in place

10
(2022) 6 SCC 30
Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 378/2026 and connected matters Page 8 of 53
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:30:03

of that of the fact-finding Court. The relevant portion of the aforesaid
Judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:
“ 23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court
exclusive power of revision against an order of the learned Rent
Controller, being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior
court on the decision-making process, inclusive of procedural
compliance. Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and
supplant its views with that of the trial court by exercising the
appellate jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process
adopted. The scope of interference by the High Court is very
restrictive and except in cases where there is an error apparent on
the face of the record, which would only mean that in the absence
of any adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to
disturb such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving
inquiry in such matters which would otherwise amount to
converting the power of superintendence into that of a regular first
appeal, an act, totally forbidden by the legislature.”

18. It is in the aforesaid legal framework that the grounds raised by
the Petitioner require examination.
19. At this juncture, it would be apposite to reproduce the relevant
portion of the Impugned Order in RC ARC No. 26155/2016, which
encapsulates the findings of the learned Rent Controller on the issues
arising for consideration in the present Petitions:
“ (I) OWNERSHIP AS WELL AS (II) EXISTENCE OF
LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONSHIP
38. It has been held in the case of Bharat Bhushan v. Arti
Techchandani , 2008 (153) DLT 247 , that the concept of ownership
in a landlordtenant litigation as governed by the DRC Act has to be
distinguished from the one in title suit. In the case of M.R.
Sawhney Vs. Dories Randhawa AIR 2008 Delhi 110, it was held
that once a tenant always a tenant, unless his status changes by
contract or by operation of law which is not so in the present
petition .
39. It is settled law, that respondent/tenant is estopped under
Section 116 of the Evidence Act from disputing the ownership of
the petitioner over the tenanted premises. The eviction petition
cannot be treated at par with a title suit. The petitioners have to
prove only that he is something more than a tenant. In T.C. Rekhi
v. Usha Gujral , ILD 1969 Delhi 9 , and in Shanti Sharma v. Ved
Prabha 1987 AIR SC 2028 discussing on the point what is meant
Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 378/2026 and connected matters Page 9 of 53
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:30:03

by the word “Owner”, it is held that the general rule is to the effect
that the petitioners have to have a better title than the respondent
and is not required to show that he has the best of all possible titles
and that the purpose behind requirement of ownership in Section
14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, 1958 as amended is to avoid misuse of
the provision. It need not be proved in the absolute sense of the
term of ownership as laid down in Parvati Devi v. Mahinder
Singh , 1996 (1) AD (Del) 819, B. Banerjee v. Romesh Mahajan ,
1996 (63) DLT 930, Milk Food Ltd. v. Kiran Khanna , 1993 (51)
DLT 141, Sushil Kanta Chakravarty v. Rajeshwari Kumar , AIR
2000 Del 413, Ujjagar Singh v. Iqbal Kaur , 2002 (97) DLT 646 ,
that the petitioner to an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of
the DRC Act, 1958 as amended need not show that he was the
absolute owner in the strict sense and has to show a better and
superior title only to the tenant. The same is reiterated in Sheela v.
Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
reported in AIR 2002 SC 1264.
40. In case titled as Jiwan Lal Vs. Gurdial Kaur & Ors ., 1995 RLR
162 , a Bench of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi while dealing with
the concept of ownership in a pending eviction petition under
Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act had noted as follows:
"There is a tendency on the part of tenants to deny
ownership in cases under Section 14(1)(e). To test the
substance of such a plea on the part of the tenants the
Courts have insisted that they should state who else is the
owner of the premises if not the petitioner. In the present
case it is not said as to who else is the owner. Further
these cases under Section 14(1)(e) are not title cases
involving disputes of title to the property. Ownership is
not to be proved in absolute terms. The respondent does
not claim the owner of the premises."
41. Further, in the case titled as Smt. Shanti Sharma & Ors. Vs.
Smt. Ved Prabha & Ors., 1987 AIR 2028 , the Hon'ble Supreme
Court observed:
"That the meaning of term 'owner' is vis a vis the tenant
i.e. the owner should be something more than the
tenant."

"It is also well settled that the petitioner should be
something more than the tenant and the petitioner need
not prove his ownership in absolute terms. It is sufficient
for the petitioner to prove or to show that he is something
more than a tenant."
42. In Ramesh Chand vs. Uganti Devi , 157 (2009) DLT 450 , this
Court has specifically held that:-
"It is settled proposition of law that in order to consider
the concept of ownership under Delhi Rent Control Act,
the Court has to see the title and right of the landlord qua
the tenant. The only thing to be seen by the Court is that
Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 378/2026 and connected matters Page 10 of 53
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:30:03

the landlord had been receiving rent for his own benefit
and not for and on behalf of someone else. If the landlord
was receiving rent for himself and not on behalf of
someone else, he is to be considered as the owner,
howsoever imperfect his title over the premises may be.
The imperfectness of the title of the premises cannot stand
in the way of an eviction petition under Section 14 (1) (e)
of the D.R.C. Act, neither the tenant can be allowed to
raise the plea of imperfect title or title not vesting in the
landlord and that too when the tenant has been paying
rent to the landlord. Section 116 of the Evidence Act
creates estoppel against such tenant. A tenant can
challenge the title of landlord only after vacating the
premises and not when he is occupying the premises. In
fact, such a tenant who denies the title of the landlord qua
the premises, when he is paying rent, acts dishonestly. I,
therefore, find that there was no infirmity in the order of
learned ARC in this respect."
43. It is settled law, that under Delhi Rent Control Act, the tenant
has no right to challenge the ownership of the landlord neither is
the landlord required to prove his/her absolute ownership.
Moreover, law of estoppel also bars the respondent herein from
challenging the landlordship of the petitioners. It has been held by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Smt. Shanti Sharma v. Ved Prabha
& Ors., AIR 1987 Supreme Court 2028 that for the purpose of
Section 14(1)(e) of DRC Act, the ownership is not to be construed
as absolute ownership but only as a title better than the tenant. So,
what has to be seen is whether on the basis of the facts stated by
the tenant it can be said that the landlord does not have title to the
property or a title better than him. The above view was reiterated
by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Rajinder Kumar Sharma &
Ors.Vs. Leelawati & Ors. (155) (2008) DLT 383.
44. Now, in light of the law reproduced as above, coming to the
facts of the case in hand.
(I) RELATIONSHIP OF LANDLORD AND TENANT AS
WELL AS OWNERSHIP
45. The foremost issue which arises for consideration is whether
the petitioner has been able to establish the existence of
relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and whether
the petitioner has proved its ownership in the sense of having a
better title over the tenanted premises. Upon a careful appreciation
of the evidence on record, this Court is of the considered opinion,
that the petitioner has failed to discharge the burden cast upon it.
LEGAL EXISTENCE AND FUNCTIONING OF
PETITIONER SOCIETY.
46. It is pertinent to note, that the certificate of registration of the
petitioner society has merely been marked as Mark-B and the same
has not been duly proved in accordance with law. No original
record or competent witness from the office of Registrar of
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:30:03

Societies was produced by the petitioner to substantiate the said
document. Thus, the very existence, legal status and functioning of
the petitioner society remains shrouded in doubt. The said
deficiency assumes greater significance particularly when the
petitioner seeks eviction on behalf of the alleged society and
claims rights over the suit premises.
47. PW-1 further deposed in his cross-examination, that no audit
reports were ever filed by the executive committee of the petitioner
society before the office of Registrar of Societies. The relevant
excerpts of his cross-examination to this effect are reproduced as
under:-
"I do not know whether the audit report of the society was
filed before the registrar of the society for the year 2018-
2019, 2019-2020 and 2020-2021."
From the aforesaid admission of PW-1, it clearly emerges that the
petitioner society has not complied with the mandatory statutory
requirements regarding maintenance and filing of financial and
audit records before the Registrar of Societies. Non-filing of audit
reports materially affects the transparency and credibility of the
functioning of the petitioner society and creates serious doubt
regarding its lawful administration and financial affairs. Such
conduct adversely impacts the reliability of the petitioner's version
and weakens its claim of being a duly functional and properly
administered society. The said omission also assumes significance
in view of the fact that the petitioner seeks relief from the Court
while itself failing to maintain statutory compliance.
48. Further, PW-2 though has claimed himself to be the President
and the member of the petitioner's society since the year 2008 but
has miserably failed to place on record any cogent documentary
evidence to substantiate either his membership or his
election/appointment as President. Thus, even the authority and
status of PW-2 remains unproved.
49. PW-2 further admitted in his cross-examination, that no
elections have been held in the petitioner society from the year
2008 till 2018. The relevant excerpts of his cross-examination to
this effect are reproduced as under:-
"It is correct that since the year 2008 till 2018 no election
was held."
Such prolonged absence of elections creates serious doubt
regarding democratic functioning and legality of the executive
committee of the petitioner society and materially affects the
transparency and credibility of the functioning of the petitioner
society and creates serious doubt regarding its lawful
administration and per se upon the locus of the petitioner as an
alleged society.
50. Further, during cross examination, PW-2 deposed, that it is
incorrect to suggest, that Mr. Naresh Kumar has resigned from the
committee of the petitioner society in 2019 and further stated, that
he had give letter of his resignation to Mr. Satvir Singh, who was
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:30:03

working as president of petitioner society. The relevant excerpts of
his cross examination to this effect are reproduced as under:-
"It is incorrect to suggest that in the year 2019, Mr.
Naresh Kumar has resigned from the committee of the
petitioner society. It is correct that he has given letter of
his resignation to Mr. Satvir Singh who was working as
president of petitioner society."
However, no material whatsoever has been placed on record of the
Court to establish, that the said Satbir Singh was ever duly elected
or authorized as President of the petitioner society. In absence of
any election record, resolution, constitution, bye-laws or
proceedings of the society, the issuance of membership receipts by
the said person remains wholly unsubstantiated. The petitioner has
therefore failed to establish the authenticity and legality of the
internal functioning of the society. Consequently, the documents
allegedly issued under the authority of such person lose evidentiary
value and cannot be safely relied upon by this Court.
51. It is further pertinent to note, that no specific rules,
memorandum or governing documents have been placed on record
to show the manner in which the Vice-President could be elevated
as President. No rules governing duration of elections or procedure
of appointment/election of office bearers have been proved on
record. Such admissions reflect complete absence of transparency
and procedural irregularity in functioning of the petitioner‟s
society.
52. Significantly, PW-2 himself disputed the correctness of
document Mark-C relied upon by the petitioner. The relevant
excerpts of his cross-examination to this effect are reproduced as
under:-
"At this stage, the witness is shown the document Mark-C
and a question is put that the same was filed by Chander
Mohan Saini and he was not the president those time of
the petitioner and thus the said document is forged and
fabricate. The witness replied that the document Mark C is
wrong."
Once the petitioner‟s own witness disowns the very document
relied upon by the petitioner society, the authenticity and
credibility of the said document stands seriously impeached.
53. From the aforesaid evidence, it clearly emerges that the
petitioner has failed to establish its lawful constitution, democratic
functioning and procedural regularity of the petitioner society. No
cogent evidence regarding elections, appointment of office bearers,
governing rules, audit compliance or authorisation procedures has
been placed on record. The documentary evidence relied upon by
the petitioner thus fails to inspire confidence and materially affects
the credibility of the petitioner's case. A further inconsistency
emerges from the testimonies of PW-1 and PW-2 regarding the
office of President of the petitioner society. During their respective
cross-examinations, different individuals were referred to as
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RC.REV. 378/2026 and connected matters Page 13 of 53
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:30:03

having held the office of President of the petitioner society at
different points of time, including Sh. Satbir Singh, the alleged
Vice-President who was stated to have been elevated as President
after the demise of Sh. Satbir Singh, and Sh. Chander Mohan Sain,
who admittedly instituted the present petition. However, the
petitioner has failed to place on record any election record,
proceedings book, memorandum, bye-laws, list of office bearers,
resolution or any other contemporaneous document to establish as
to who was the duly elected President of the society during the
relevant period or the manner in which such persons were elected,
appointed or authorised.
The testimonies of PW-1 and PW-2 are not in unanimity regarding
the identity, tenure and authority of the alleged Presidents. Rather,
the evidence reveals uncertainty and inconsistency with respect to
the very persons who purportedly represented and managed the
affairs of the petitioner society. Significantly, no documentary
material has been produced to establish the election or appointment
of any of the said individuals as President. In these circumstances,
the Court is unable to place reliance upon the oral assertions of the
petitioner witnesses regarding the organizational structure and
management of the society. The aforesaid contradictions and inter
se inconsistencies cast a serious cloud over the authenticity of the
internal administration, democratic functioning and legal status of
the petitioner society.
AUTHORIZATION AND COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES
54. Though not a statutory ingredient of Section 14(1)(e), the issue
of authorization goes to the root of the maintainability of the
present petition. In the present case, it has come on record through
the testimony of PW-2, that the eviction petition was filed by one
Chander Mohan Sain, who was neither the President nor an
authorised office bearer of the petitioner society at the time of
filing of the petition. PW-2 has further admitted, that no document
has been placed on record, that the said person was duly authorised
to institute the present proceedings. The relevant excerpts of his
cross examination to this effect are reproduced as under:-
"It is correct that Chander Mohan Sain was not the
president in the year 2016 or even office bearer of the
petitioner society thus he was not capable to send any
notice on behalf of the petitioner society."
The aforesaid admissions goes to the very root of the
maintainability of the present petition and clearly establish, that the
eviction proceedings were instituted by a person having no lawful
authority, status or competence to represent the petitioner society.
The petitioner has failed to place on record any resolution,
authorization letter or governing document empowering
saidChander Mohan Sain to institute the present
proceedings/petition. Institution of proceedings by an unauthorized
person renders the very foundation of the petition defective and
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RC.REV. 378/2026 and connected matters Page 14 of 53
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:30:03

unsustainable in law. Consequently, the present petition suffers
from a fundamental legal infirmity.
55. Even the legal notice was issued by the said person, whose
authority remains unsubstantiated. PW-2 has also admitted, that the
document Mark-C, which is purported to be a resolution, is
incorrect and does not bear his name. The relevant excerpts of his
cross-examination to this effect are reproduced as under:-
"At this stage witness is shown the document Mark C and
a question is put that the same was filed by Chander
Mohan Sain and he was not the president those time of the
petitioner and thus the said document is forged and
fabricated. The witness replied that the document Mark C
is wrong. It is correct that Chander Mohan Sain was not
the president in the year 2016 or even office bearer of the
petitioner society thus he was not capable to send any
notice on behalf of petitioner society."
The aforesaid admissions further establish, that even the legal
notice preceding the institution of the present petition was issued
by a person lacking lawful authority to act on behalf of the
petitioner society. Once the petitioner‟s own witness admits that
Chander Mohan Sain was neither President nor office bearer at the
relevant time and further disowns the alleged resolution Mark-C,
the very basis of authorization stands demolished. The said
admissions materially affect the legality and validity of the
proceedings initiated against the respondent. The present petition
therefore suffers from incurable defects relating to authorization
and maintainability.
56. PW-1 further deposed in his cross-examination, that he is a
member of the petitioner society, however, except an alleged
membership receipt no cogent material has been placed on record
to prove his membership. The relevant excerpts of his cross-
examination to this effect are reproduced as under:-
"I am the member of the petitioner society since the year
2018 till date. I have not filed any list of membership
before this Hon'ble Court. Vol. I have receipt about the
membership. However, I have also not file the receipt of
membership."
From the aforesaid admissions and material on record, it stands
established that PW-1 has failed to substantiate his alleged
membership of the petitioner society through any cogent, reliable
or legally admissible evidence. Mere production of an alleged
membership receipt, without proving its execution, issuance or the
authority of the person issuing the same, does not inspire
confidence. The petitioner has failed to examine the issuer of the
receipt or place any official record of the society to corroborate the
said claim. In absence of any documentary proof regarding
authorization of the issuer, maintenance of membership register or
resolution authorizing issuance of such receipts, the alleged
membership of PW-1 remains unproved. Consequently, the
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RC.REV. 378/2026 and connected matters Page 15 of 53
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:30:03

competency and credibility of PW-1 to depose on behalf of the
petitioner Society becomes highly doubtful and his testimony
cannot be safely relied upon.
57. PW-1 has further claimed himself to be an office
bearer/executive committee member of the petitioner society,
however, admittedly no document whatsoever has been placed on
record to establish that he ever held any official position in the
petitioner Society. Even the alleged resignation of PW-1 in the
year 2020 has not been substantiated through any documentary
material. Thus, the testimony of PW-1 regarding the affairs and
management of the society lacks credibility.
58. It is noteworthy to mention, that PW-1 himself admitted during
cross-examination that he had no knowledge regarding the affairs,
functioning or activities of the petitioner society prior to the year
2018.
Such admission strikes at the root of the petitioner's case,
particularly when the present petition was instituted in the year
2016. The witness therefore lacks personal knowledge regarding
material facts and his testimony becomes hearsay in nature qua the
relevant period.
59. PW-1 has also admitted in his cross-examination, that he is not
aware whether any NOC or authorization was obtained from Sh.
Chander Mohan Sain, who had initially instituted the present
petition. The relevant excerpts of his cross-examination to this
effect are reproduced as under:-
"I do not know whether any NOC was obtained by the
subsequent committee by Sh. Chander Mohan Sain."
The aforesaid admission further weakens the petitioner's case
regarding continuity and lawful prosecution of the present
proceedings. PW-1 admittedly lacked knowledge regarding
existence of any NOC or authorization from the original person
who instituted the petition. In absence of any document showing
lawful transfer, ratification or continuation of authority, the
proceedings suffer from procedural irregularity and lack of proper
authorization. The petitioner has thus failed to establish due
compliance with legal requirements governing institution and
continuation of the present petition.
60. It is further pertinent to note, that despite availability of best
possible evidence including membership registers, election
records, authorization letters, resolutions and statutory documents,
the petitioner failed to produce the same before the Court.
Moreover, PW-1 admittedly lacked personal knowledge regarding
material facts prior to year 2018 and therefore his testimony, to
that extent, is hearsay in nature and cannot be safely relied upon.
Accordingly, PW-1 cannot be regarded as a competent witness
possessing personal knowledge of the material facts constituting
the cause of action. His testimony, to a substantial extentremains
hearsay and incapable of proving the foundational facts pleaded by
the petitioner.
Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 378/2026 and connected matters Page 16 of 53
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:30:03

LANDLORD TENANT RELATIONSHIP
61. PW-1, in his cross-examination, has categorically admitted,
that he became a member of the petitioner society only in the year
2018 and had no knowledge about the affairs of the society prior
thereto, thereby rendering his testimony devoid of personal
knowledge on material aspects. He has further admitted, that he is
not aware whether any rent agreement was ever executed between
the petitioner and the respondent. PW-2, who claims to be the
President of the petitioner society, has also admitted, that no rent
agreement was ever executed between the parties. The relevant
excerpts of cross-examination of PW-1 and PW-2 to this effect are
reproduced as under:-
"PW-1 I am the member of the petitioner society since the
year 2018 till date.
"PW-2 It is correct that no agreement was executed
between the petitioner society with the respondent."
From the said admissions/excerpts, it clearly emerges, that the
petitioner has failed to establish the existence of any contractual
tenancy between the parties. The absence of a rent agreement and
lack of personal knowledge on material aspects renders the
testimony unreliable. Thus, the rent receipts relied upon by the
petitioner have not been proved in accordance with law and have
been disputed as donation receipts. In the absence of any cogent
documentary evidence establishing tenancy, the relationship of
landlord and tenant remains unproved. Mere absence of a written
rent agreement may not by itself negate tenancy; however, in the
present case, the petitioner has also failed to produce any
independent and reliable evidence establishing creation and
continuation of tenancy.
62. It is also relevant to note, that although the respondent has on
one occasion, made payment of rent before the Court, he has
categorically clarified during his cross-examination, that such
payment was made under a mistaken belief due to
misrepresentation by his counsel. Therefore, the said act cannot be
construed as an admission of tenancy or acknowledgment of
landlord-tenant relationship.
63. The rent receipts relied upon by the petitioner have also not
been proved in accordance with law. No rent register, ledger
account, counterfoil record or independent documentary evidence
has been produced to establish payment of rent by the respondent.
The defence of the respondent that the alleged receipts were
donation/subscription receiptstherefore appears probable.
64. Further, the respondent has brought on record land status
documents through official witnesses namely RW-2 Ms. Preeti
Kumari, designation Senior Assistant at DM West, Rajouri Garden
and RW-4 Sh. Sunil Chikara, Patwari, Land Management, West
Zone, DDA and placed documents on record exhibited as Ex. RW-
4/1. Perusal of the said documents indicate, that as per the record
of DDA, khasra no. 2103min(0-08) was acquired vide award no.
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:30:03

1916 supp. Formal possession of the same has been handed over to
DDA on 23.08.1968 by LAC/L&B. Further, Khasra no. 2104(3-18)
and 2105 (4-06) were acquired vide award no. 1916 and physical
possession of the same was handed over to DDA on 03.04.1967 by
LAC/L&B.
65. Further RW-3 namely Amit Rithalia, son of respondent has
filed land status report exhibited as Ex. RW-3/2. Perusal of the said
document reveals that the land in dispute ad-measuring 2000sq.
Yds. approx. having a Shiv Temple (area measuring 400 sq. yds. as
religious) and 2 hall and 4 shops ad-measuring (1600 sq. yds. as
commercial) old encroachments on govt. DDA's land falls in
khasra no. 2103min, 2104 min and 2105 min of village Tihar.
Thus, after perusal of the above-mentioned documents, i.e. Ex.
RW-2/1, RW-3/2 and RW-4/1, it duly stands established at least
from the documents prima facie, that the land pertains to DDA
thereby casting a serious doubt on the ownership of the petitioner.
The documents relied upon by the respondent create a serious
cloud over the title claimed by the petitioner. Moreover, no
plausible explanation or counter evidence has been led by the
petitioner to rebut the claim of the DDA with respect to the
property in question. In the absence of any cogent evidence
showing the legal right of the petitioner society to manage, possess
or let out the premises, the petitioner has failed to prove both the
relationship of landlord and tenant as well as ownership of the
premises in question.
66. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the
considered opinion, that the petitioner has failed to establish:
(i) lawful constitution and functioning of the petitioner society;
(ii) due authorization to institute and prosecute the present
petition;
(iii) existence of landlord-tenant relationship between the parties;
and
(iv) ownership or better title over the suit premises.
Accordingly, the petitioner has failed to satisfy the foundational
ingredients required for grant of an eviction order under Section
14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act.
(II) BONA FIDE REQUIREMENT
*
74. On the basis of the law as above, returning to the facts of the
case in hand, the principal averment made by the petitioner via
present petition, is that the premises are required for expansion of
the hall for conducting religious functions. This Court proceeds
with the appreciation of the evidence adduced by the petitioner on
this aspect as underin order to arrive at a finding as to if the said
fact/averment stands duly established by the petitioner.
75. To begin with, the onus was upon the petitioner to prove in the
first place, that the petitioner has been regularly and continuously
organizing religious functions over a period of years and it is
pursuant to the said proof being brought forth on record of this
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:30:03

Court, that the genuine bona fide need as alleged by the petitioner
could have been claimed. In addition, it was also incumbent upon
the petitioner to have establish through cogent evidence the nature
of the religious functions held, their frequency, the footfall of those
functions etc.
In the above backdrop, this Court proceeds with appreciation of
evidence of PW-1 on this aspect. PW-1 has admitted in his cross-
examination, that no documentary evidence has been placed on
record to show that such religious functions are being organized by
the petitioner's society. He has further admitted, that no
photographs or other material has been filed to demonstrate
insufficiency of space and he has also been unable to specify the
exact requirement of area as per the measurement for organizing
the alleged religious functions. The relevant excerpts of his cross-
examination to this effect are reproduced as under:-
"I have not filed any document to show about the
organizing religious functions in the society."
From the aforesaid admissions, it becomes clear that the petitioner
has failed to produce any independent, documentary or
corroborative evidence to substantiate the alleged
holding/organizing of religious activities or the insufficiency of
accommodation for organizing the same. No photographs, videos,
invitations, records of functions, attendance details or any other
material stands filed on record of the Court to even prima facie
lend credence to the claim of organizing religious functions from
time to time. In the absence of no evidence at all being brought
forth on record with respect to organization of such function in the
first place, the question of insufficiency of space cannot be
adjudged as that is the subset to the establishment of principal fact
that the functions are being regularly organized.
Thus, the alleged need on the face of it appears vague, bald and
unsupported by any evidence. The burden to establish bona fide
requirement squarely lies upon the petitioner. Mere assertions in
the pleadings, unsupported by documentary or reliable oral
evidence cannot substitute proof of a genuine need contemplated
under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act.
76. It is further pertinent to note, that the alleged requirement of
the petitioner lacks specificity and certainty with respect to the
measurement in context of the site plan. The site plan placed on the
record of the Court and relied upon by the petitioner is without any
measurement with respect to the available space and therefore in
the absence of any details and specification with respect to the
available area and the required area, this Court is unable to cut
much ice with the petitioner with respect to the claim made
regarding the paucity of space as the said fact can be effectively
adjudged only once it clearly stands surfaced on record of the
Court as to what is the exact nature of the function that is being
conducted, the exact footfall that takes place and the actual
available space for organizing such functions and how the said
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RC.REV. 378/2026 and connected matters Page 19 of 53
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:30:03

space falls short in context to functions organized and footfall that
takes place.
At the cost of repetition, it is being stated, that there is no layout
plan proposed or placed on record by the petitioner thereby
detailing the exact extent of additional space required, the nature of
proposed construction, or any plan proposed for expansion. In
absence of such particulars, the plea of bona fide requirement
appears vague and unsubstantiated.
77. On the contrary, it has come on record through the admissions
of the petitioner's own witnesses, that the premises already
comprise of a large hall, open area and rooms on the first floor and
that such available space is being utilized for conducting functions.
PW-2 has further admitted, that approximately 150 persons can be
accommodated in the existing structure.The relevant excerpts of
his cross-examination to this effect are reproduced as under:-
"It is correct that approximately 150 persons may
accommodate at the time in all of the rooms/halls situated
in the petitioner temple."
From the said admissions, it is clear that sufficient space is already
availablewith the petitioner for conducting activities, which per se
stands not proved on record of the court. It is again being stated, at
the cost of repetition, that the onus was primarily upon the
petitioner to have prove that the functions are firstly being
organized on regular basis, secondly, the said functions are
resulting in a footfall of more than 150 persons and thirdly that the
available space is inadequate. However, none of these aspects
stands proved by the petitioner society. Therefore, the alleged bona
fide requirement is neither genuine nor pressing. The petitioner has
failed to establish any real, sincere or bona fide need for the
tenanted premises.
78. It is further not out of place to mention, that during cross-
examination, PW-1 admitted that an open area exists beside the
worship place inside the Mandir premises and one hall area is also
situated adjacent thereto. He further admitted that two visitor
rooms are available at the first floor and other spaces are lying
vacant. Significantly, PW-1 also admitted that the open area of the
Mandir is being utilized for organizing religious functions after
accepting subscription charges but he has nowhere deposed that
how and in what manner the available space is inadequate and
insufficient. The relevant excerpts of his cross-examination to this
effect are reproduced as under:-
"It is correct that at first floor of the mandir there is some
open area, although I am not aware about the
measurement of the said area about 1184 Sq. Feet. It is
correct that at first floor of the mandir there is some open
area, although not aware about the measurement area of
3135 Sq. Feet. As per my understanding about 50 to 60
persons may adjust together within the hall of the mandir
situated at ground floor. It is also correct that about 80 to
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:30:03

100 persons may adjust in the open area beside the pooja
ghar of the mandir at a time."

The aforesaid admissions clearly establish, that substantial
accommodation already exists within the premises of the petitioner
society, including open spaces, halls, visitor rooms and other
vacant areas. It has further come on record, that such space is being
utilised for organising religious functions and related activities,
thereby no assertion is being made by PW-2 with respect to
insufficiency of available space.
It is further interesting to note, that repeatedly petitioner's
witnesses have stated, that petitioner society has been taking
subscription charges for organizing the functions but neither any of
those receipts regarding the charges being accepted/collected have
been placed on record nor any of those witnesses have been
examined with requisite cogent documents who had paid those
charges, thereby establishing that the alleged subscription charges
have been accepted or collected for the purpose of organizing the
alleged religious functions, thereby further putting a dent into the
petitioner story.
The petitioner has therefore miserably failed to establish any
genuine scarcity of accommodation warranting eviction of the
respondent. Rather, the evidence demonstrates availability of
adequate and suitable space within the petitioner society.
In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the considered
opinion, that the admitted capacity of the existing premises to
accommodate a considerable number of persons contradicts the
plea of insufficiency of space. Thus, the alleged bona fide
requirement appears neither natural nor genuine, but remains a
mere assertion unsupported by reliable evidence. Consequently, the
petitioner has failed to satisfy the essential ingredient of bona fide
requirement as contemplated under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi
Rent Control Act.
(III) NON-AVAILABILITY OF REASONABLY SUITABLE
ALTERNATIVE ACCOMMODATION
79. The burden to establish non-availability of any other
reasonably suitable accommodation squarely rests upon the
petitioner. However, the petitioner's own witnesses have admitted
the existence of sufficient space within the premises, including a
hall, open area and rooms on the first floor. The admitted capacity
of accommodating a considerable number of persons in the
existing structure clearly demonstrates that adequate
accommodation is already available with the petitioner. The
relevant excerpts of cross examination of PW-2 to this effect are
reproduced as under:-
"Two rooms are available at the first floor of the mandir.
As per my understanding, 50-60 persons may
accommodate in the open area situated at ground floor.
Approximately 40 to 50 persons may also accommodate in
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RC.REV. 378/2026 and connected matters Page 21 of 53
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:30:03

the hall area at first floor. It is correct that approximately
150 persons may accommodate at the time in all of the
room/halls situated in the petitioner temple."
From the aforesaid deposition, it stands clearly established, that the
petitioner is already in possession of sufficient and reasonably
suitable accommodation for carrying out its alleged religious and
social activities. The availability of multiple rooms, halls and open
areas, capable of accommodating a substantial number of persons
completely demolishes the plea regarding non-availability of
alternative accommodation. The petitioner has thus failed to satisfy
the essential ingredients of reasonably suitable accommodation
under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act.
80. It is further established from the site plan exhibited as Ex. PW-
1/A on record of the Court, that the tenanted premises is situated
outside the periphery of the temple structure. PW-1 has further
admitted in his cross examination, that the shop of the respondent
is situated as reflected in the site plan exhibited as Ex. RW-3/1
filed by the respondent i.e. outside the premises of the temple. The
relevant excerpts of his cross examination to this effect are
reproduced as under:-
"It is correct that the shop in question is situated outside
of the mandir."
The said deposition corroborates the respondents version, that the
tenanted premises is situated outside the periphery of the Mandir
complex. Therefore, the plea that the suit premises is essentially
required for expansion of religious activities appears to be wholly
unsubstantiated and improbable. Therefore, the alleged
requirement for expansion of the temple hall does not logically
arise, as the said premises does not form an integral part of the
temple complex. This fact further falsifies the plea of bona fide
requirement and indicates that the eviction petition is based on
misconceived grounds.
Significantly, the petitioner has neither produced any site plan
depicting shortage of accommodation nor disclosed the precise
extent of additional space allegedly required. No material has been
placed on record to establish, that the existing accommodation
cannot be reasonably rearranged, utilized or optimized for the
activities sought to be undertaken by the petitioner. On the
contrary, the admissions of PW-1 and PW-2 reveal, that
approximately 150 persons can easily be accommodated within the
existing structure. These admissions completely contradict the plea
regarding non-availability of reasonably suitable alternative
accommodation.
81. The reliability of the petitioner's case is further shaken by the
discrepancies in the site plan filed on record. PW-2 has admitted in
his cross-examination, that the site plan filed by the petitioner does
not depict correct measurements and does not reflect the complete
structure of the premises. He has further admitted that the site plan
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:30:03

filed by the respondent is correct. The relevant excerpts of his
cross examination to this effect are reproduced as under:-
"It is correct that the site plan Ex. PW-1/A has nowhere
mentioned about the exact area of satsung bhawan, office
area, open area and other space. It is correct that the site
plan Ex. PW-1/A does not show that the temple has two
story, ground and first floor.
It is correct that the site plan filed by the respondents
showed the correct space of the temple."
From the said admissions, it is evident that the site plan filed by the
petitioner is incorrect and incomplete, thereby affecting the
credibility of the petitioner's case. This admission goes to the root
of the matter and renders the version of the petitioner unreliable.
Moreover, the testimonies of the petitioner's witnesses suffer from
inconsistencies and lack of knowledge on material aspects, thereby
further weakening the case of the petitioner. The documentary
evidence led by the petitioner is also insufficient and unreliable.
82. Thus, from the cumulative effect of the aforesaid admissions
and evidence on record, this Court is of the considered opinion,
that the petitioner has failed to establish any genuine, honest or
pressing requirement for the tenanted premises. The material on
record clearly demonstrates availability of sufficient
accommodation with the petitioner society. The alleged
requirement appears vague, unsupported and lacking in bona fides.
83. Another major conflict that surfaces with respect to locus of the
petitioner and the authority being possessed by one Chander
Mohan Sain i.e. the person who had filed the present petition on
behalf of the petitioner's society as the petitioner's own witnesses
i.e. PW-2 has deposed, that Sh. Chander Mohan Sain had wrongly
claimed personal ownership over the shop in question whereas
subsequently it was asserted that the petitioner society is the owner
thereof. Such contradictory stands materially affects the authority
of Chander Mohan Sain to file the present eviction petition on
behalf of the petitioner's society as it is deposed by PW-2 that at
one point of time Sh. Chander Mohan Sain had claimed himself to
be the owner of the suit premises and so being the case it had to be
elucidated and established vide cogent evidence that Sh. Chander
Mohan Sain was duly and legally authorized to institute the present
petition on behalf of petitioner's society with respect to the suit
property in question merely in capacity of being a representative
and not the owner as Sh. Chander Mohan Sain himself never
stepped into the witness box on account of his demise.
84. Another line of arguments harped upon by the petitioner is that
the landlord is the best judge of his requirement and to elucidate on
this point, this Court deems it fit to discuss the law laid down vide
plethora of judgments by the Hon'ble Apex Court in determining,
this aspect that landlord is the best judge of his requirement and he
is at complete liberty to take this call. Law is well settled that it is
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:30:03

the landlord who has to decide as to how and in what manner, he
should live and that he is the best judge of his requirement.
85. In the case of Om Prakash Singhal Vs. Shri Roshan Lal, 1969
RCR 391 , it has been held that as a broad workable rule, the
landlord must left to assess his requirement in the background of
his possession, circumstance, status and life and social and other
responsibilities, and other relevant factors.
86. In Parvati Devi Vs. P. V. Krishna, JT 1987 (1) SC 764 , it has
been held as under:-
"The landlord is the best judge of his requirement. He
has complete freedom in the matter. It is no concern of
the courts to dictate to the landlord how and in what
manner he should live and prescribe for him a standard
of their own. There is no law that deprives the landlord
of the beneficial enjoyment of his property."
87. In Anil Bajaj Vs. Vinod Ahuja, MANU/SC/0435/2014 : (2014)
15 SCC 610 , it has been held as under:-
"It would hardly require any reiteration of the settled
principle of law that it is not for the tenant to dictate to
the landlord as to how the property ALR 1999 SC 100
(1990) 5 SCC 353 (2014) 15 SCC 610, Neutral Citation
Number : 2023 : DHC : 3199 belonging to the landlord
should be utilized by him for the purpose of his
business."
88. In Balwant Singh Vs. Sudarshan Kumar,
MANU/SC/0087/2021 , it has been held as under:-
"It is not for the tenant to dictate how much space is
adequate for the proposed business venture or to suggest
that the available space with the landlord will be
adequate."
89. In Shiv Sarup Gupta Vs. Mahesh Chand Gupta (Dr)
MANU/SC/0432/1999 : (1999) 6 SCC 222 , it has been held as
under:-
"Once the Court is satisfied of the bona fides of the need
of the landlord for the premises by applying objective
standards then in the matter of choosing out of more than
one accommodation available to the landlord his
subjective choice shall be respected by the Court."
90. There can be no qualm with the settled proposition, that the
landlord is the best judge of his requirement. However, the said
principle comes into operation only after the landlord is able to
establish a genuine and bona fide need. In the present case, the
petitioner has failed to establish the foundational facts constituting
such bona fide requirement. Therefore, the aforesaid judgments do
not advance the case of the petitioner.
91. In such circumstances, the petitioner has failed to prove the
non-availability of alternative suitable accommodation, which is a
mandatory requirement under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act.
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RC.REV. 378/2026 and connected matters Page 24 of 53
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:30:03

92. In view of the above detailed discussion and findings, this
Court is of the considered opinion, that the petitioner has failed to
establish the essential ingredients required under Section 14(1)(e)
of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The petitioner has failed to prove
the existence of landlord-tenant relationship, has not been able to
establish ownership or a better title over the suit premises, has
failed to substantiate bona fide requirement and has also not
proved the absence of alternative accommodation. The petition
further suffers from lack of proper authorization and is based on
unreliable and insufficient evidence. Accordingly, the present
eviction petition is liable to be dismissed.”

20. The principal grievance of the Petitioner is that the learned Rent
Controller has placed excessive emphasis upon the question of
ownership and has failed to appreciate the legal position that a
landlord is not required to establish absolute title over the premises.

21. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that the concept of
ownership under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act is not to be equated
with absolute ownership against the entire world. In Smt. Shanti
11
Sharma v. Smt. Ved Prabha , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held
that the expression “owner” occurring in Section 14(1)(e) is required
to be understood in the context of the relationship between the
landlord and the tenant. The landlord is required to establish a right
superior to that of the tenant and is not required to establish an
indefeasible title as would be necessary in a comprehensive title suit.
The relevant portion of the aforesaid Judgment is reproduced
hereinbelow:
“ 14. The word “owner” has not been defined in this Act and the
word „owner‟ has also not been defined in the Transfer of Property
Act. The contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant
appears to be that ownership means absolute ownership in the land
as well as of the structure standing thereupon. Ordinarily, the
concept of ownership may be what is contended by the counsel for
the appellant but in the modern context where it is more or less

11
(1987) 4 SCC 193
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admitted that all lands belong to the State, the persons who hold
properties will only be lessees or the persons holding the land on
some term from the government or the authorities constituted by
the State and in this view of the matter it could not be thought of
that the legislature when it used the term “owner” in the provision
of Section 14(1)( e ) it thought of ownership as absolute ownership.
It must be presumed that the concept of ownership only will be as
it is understood at present. It could not be doubted that the term
“owner” has to be understood in the context of the background of
the law and what is contemplated in the scheme of the Act. This
Act has been enacted for protection of the tenants. But at the same
time it has provided that the landlord under certain circumstances
will be entitled to eviction and bona fide requirement is one of
such grounds on the basis of which landlords have been permitted
to have eviction of a tenant. In this context, the phrase “owner”
thereof has to be understood, and it is clear that what is
contemplated is that where the person builds up his property and
lets out to the tenant and subsequently needs it for his own use, he
should be entitled to an order or decree for eviction the only thing
necessary for him to prove is bona fide requirement and that he is
the owner thereof. In this context, what appears to be the meaning
of the term “owner” is vis-a-vis the tenant i.e. the owner should be
something more than the tenant. Admittedly in these cases where
the plot of land is taken on lease the structure is built by the
landlord and admittedly he is the owner of the structure. So far as
the land is concerned he holds a long lease and in this view of the
matter as against the tenant it could not be doubted that he will fall
within the ambit of the meaning of the term “owner” as is
contemplated under this section. This term came up for
consideration before the Delhi High Court and it was also in
reference to Section 14(1)( e ) and it was held by the Delhi High
Court in T.C. Rekhi v. Smt Usha Gujral [1971 RCJ 322, 326 (Del
HC)] as under:
“The word „owner‟ as used in this clause, has to be
construed in the background of the purpose and object of
enacting it. The use of the word „owner‟ in this clause
seems to me to have been inspired by the definition of the
word „landlord‟ as contained in Section 2( e ) of the Act
which is wide enough to include a person receiving or
entitled to receive the rent of any premises on account of
or on behalf of or for the benefit of any other person.
Construed in the context in which the word “owner” is
used in clause ( e ), it seems to me to include all persons in
the position of Smt Usha Gujral who have taken a long
lease of sites from the government for the purpose of
building houses thereon. The concept of ownership seems
now to be eclipsed by its social and political significance
and the idea of ownership, in case like the present is one
of the better right to be in possession and to obtain it. To
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accede to the contention raised by Shri Kapur would
virtually nullify the effect of clause ( e ) and would render
all such landlords remediless against tenants however
badly they may need the premises for their own personal
residence. I do not think such a result was intended by the
legislature and I repel the appellant's contention. I consider
it proper before passing on to the next challenge to point
out that the word „owner‟ as used in clause ( e ) in Section
14(1) does not postulate absolute ownership in the sense
that he has an absolutely unrestricted right to deal with the
property as he likes. To describe someone as owner, and
perhaps even as an absolute owner, of property is to say
two things: it is to assert that his title to the property is
indisputable and that he has all the rights of ownership
allowed by the legal system in question. Rights of
ownership may, therefore, be limited by special provisions
of law and include in those provisions such as are in force
in New Delhi according to which citizens are granted long
leases of sites for constructing buildings thereon. Now, the
words of a statute, though normally construed in their
ordinary meaning, may contain inherent restrictions due to
their subject matter and object and the occasion on which
the circumstances with reference to which they are used.
They call for construction in the light of their context
rather than in what may be either their strict etymological
sense or their popular meaning apart from the context (see
Halsbury's Laws of England , Third Edn., Vol. 36 para 893
p. 394). The meaning of the word “owner” in clause ( e ) is
influenced and controlled by its context and the appellant's
construction is unacceptable because it seems to be quite
clearly contrary to the reasonable operation of the
statutory provision.”

22. The aforesaid principle, however, cannot be construed to mean
that the establishment of a landlord-tenant relationship, by itself,
entitles a landlord to an order of eviction under Section 14(1)(e) of the
DRC Act. The statutory requirements contemplated under the said
provision are distinct and have to be satisfied cumulatively. The
essential requirements are that the Petitioner must establish the
requisite status of owner and landlord vis-à-vis the tenant; that the
premises are required bona fide for the purpose pleaded; and that no
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other reasonably suitable accommodation is available to the landlord
for satisfying such requirement.
23. The aforesaid position has also been reiterated by this Court in
12
Rajiv Mehra & Anr. v. Ravi Bhushan , wherein it was held that the
landlord is required to establish the existence of landlord-tenant
relationship, the bona fide requirement of the tenanted premises and
the absence of any other reasonably suitable accommodation. These
requirements are to be examined in the facts and circumstances of
each case. The relevant portion of the aforesaid Judgment is
reproduced hereinbelow:
“ 40. In order to succeed in the eviction petition filed under Section
14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, the landlord has to satisfy the three
essential ingredients which are reproduced below:—
a) Landlord - tenant relationship
b) Landlord requires the premises bonafidely for use for
themselves or for family members dependent upon them;
c) They have no other reasonable suitable accommodation. ”

24. The aforesaid requirements are not interchangeable. The failure
to establish any one of the essential ingredients would be sufficient to
defeat an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act.
Thus, even assuming that the Petitioner succeeds in establishing the
landlord-tenant relationship, the same would not dispense with the
independent obligation of establishing a genuine and bona fide
requirement and the absence of reasonably suitable alternative
accommodation.
I. Landlord-Tenant Relationship
25. The Petitioner has contended that the learned Rent Controller
has placed undue emphasis upon the question of ownership of the

12
2023 SCC OnLine Del 6433
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underlying land, despite the settled legal position that, for the
purposes of Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, the landlord is not
required to establish absolute ownership and it would suffice if a title
superior to that of the tenant is established. The aforesaid proposition,
as a matter of law, is not in dispute. However, a perusal of the
Impugned Orders does not support the Petitioner's contention that the
learned Rent Controller has confined its examination merely to the
question of ownership or has overlooked the issue of landlord-tenant
relationship between the parties.
26. The learned Rent Controller has independently examined the
existence of the alleged landlord-tenant relationship on the basis of the
oral and documentary evidence led by the parties. In this regard, the
cross-examination of PW-1 and PW-2 assumes significance. PW-1
admitted that he became a member of the Petitioner Society only in
the year 2018 and had no personal knowledge of its affairs and
activities prior thereto. He also expressed lack of knowledge regarding
the execution of any rent agreement between the parties. The
testimony of PW-2, who claimed to be the President of the Petitioner
Society, was also examined in the context of the absence of any
written rent agreement. The learned Rent Controller, therefore,
assessed the evidentiary value of their testimony in light of their
personal knowledge of the alleged inception and continuation of the
tenancies.
27. The learned Rent Controller has further examined the rent
receipts relied upon by the Petitioner Society, which are undoubtedly
relevant to the determination of the relationship between the parties
and cannot be disregarded merely on account of the absence of a
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formal written rent agreement. At the same time, the evidentiary value
of the rent receipts is required to be assessed in the context of their
execution, the authority of the person issuing them and the
surrounding documentary material. The said receipts were considered
alongside the explanation furnished by the Respondents that the
payments represented donations or contributions towards the temple.
The learned Rent Controller noticed that the receipts were not
supported by rent registers, ledger accounts, counterfoils or any other
independent documentary record establishing the receipt of rent from
the Respondents. The explanation regarding the nature of the
payments was, therefore, examined in the context of the entire
evidence and not merely on the basis of the description appearing on
the receipts.
28. It is also pertinent to note that the Petitioner has raised certain
matter-specific pleas in the connected Revision Petitions. In RC.REV.
379/2026, the Petitioner has additionally referred to an alleged written
rent agreement and rent receipts in the name of Nandu Sain. In
RC.REV. 380/2026 and RC.REV. 381/2026, reliance is placed upon
receipts stated to have been issued in the names of the predecessors or
family members of the respective Respondents, namely, Jagdish
Aggarwal and Santosh Rithalia. The aforesaid documents have to be
examined in the context of the evidence recorded in the respective
eviction proceedings. The mere assertion of their existence does not,
by itself, establish that the findings returned by the learned Rent
Controller are perverse.
29. The Reply dated 25.02.2016 to the Legal Notice dated
03.02.2016, upon which considerable reliance has been placed by the
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Petitioner, also requires consideration in its entirety. It is correct that
the opening portion of the said Reply contains an assertion that the
shopkeepers were tenants of the Petitioner Society since the year 1980
and had been continuously making payments to the Society through
Sh. Sarvottam Kumar. However, the subsequent paragraphs of the
very same Reply contain a contrary assertion. In particular, Paragraph
2 thereof states that the shopkeepers were not tenants but members of
the Petitioner Society and that the amounts paid by them towards the
temple were in the nature of donations or contributions. The Reply
further questions the authority of the person issuing the legal notice
and disputes the Petitioner's entitlement to seek possession of the
shops. The relevant portion of the aforesaid Reply dated 25.02.2016 is
reproduced hereinbelow:
“At the very outset the Noticee herein denies your authority to
issue the present legal notice to we as we are tenant of Sain
Mahasabha Naraini Dham Delhi (Regd.) since 1980 and are
continuously paid the rent to Sain Mahasabha Naraini Dham Delhi
(Regd.) by depositing the rent with Shri Sarvottam Kumar who is
in charge of affairs of the Sain Mahasabha Naraini Dham Delhi
(Regd.) from the year 2013 and the rent/donation receipts had been
issued by him to we and the rent/donation is being paid up to date.
*
2. That we all are shopkeeper of the temple premises are not the
tenant but also are the members of Sain Mahasabha Naraini Dham
Delhi (Regd.) and are also paying donations to the temple the
receipts which are available with me and being the members of the
Sain Mahasabha Naraini Dham Delhi (Regd.) we are very well
aware about the fraudulent activates being conducted by you in
order grab the management said temple premises.”

30. Thus, the Reply, when read as a whole, contains assertions
which are not entirely consistent with one another. The opening
statement cannot be treated in isolation as an unequivocal and
conclusive admission of tenancy while disregarding the subsequent
stand taken in the same document. The evidentiary value of the Reply
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was required to be examined in the context of the entire documentary
record and the conduct of the parties.
31. The learned Rent Controller has also taken note of the
explanation furnished by the Respondents that a particular payment
had been made under a mistaken belief, and held that such payment, in
the absence of other cogent evidence, could not by itself constitute an
unequivocal acknowledgment of the landlord-tenant relationship.
32. The learned Rent Controller has also considered the official
land-status documents produced through the witnesses examined by
the Respondents, which disclosed acquisition of the underlying land
and handing over of possession to the DDA. The aforesaid material
was considered alongside the Petitioner's failure to produce cogent
documentary evidence establishing its claimed right or interest in the
premises. Thus, the findings of the learned Rent Controller on the
question of landlord-tenant relationship emerge from a cumulative
assessment of the oral testimony, rent receipts, reply to the legal
notice and the official land-status documents.
33. The learned Rent Controller has also examined the authority of
the person who instituted the eviction proceedings on behalf of the
Petitioner Society. In this regard, the admissions of PW-1 regarding
his lack of knowledge as to whether any NOC or authorisation had
been obtained from Sh. Chander Mohan Sain, coupled with the
absence of any cogent documentary material demonstrating due
authorisation, were also taken into consideration. The learned Rent
Controller, therefore, examined not merely the alleged tenancy but
also the authority under which the proceedings had been instituted on
behalf of the Society.
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34. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the contention of the
Petitioner that the learned Rent Controller has predominantly
proceeded on the question of ownership, while overlooking the
landlord-tenant relationship, is not borne out from a reading of the
Impugned Orders. The learned Rent Controller has examined the said
issue independently and has returned findings upon consideration of
the evidence brought on record. Merely because the findings have
ultimately gone against the Petitioner cannot be a ground to contend
that the relevant evidence was not considered or that the issue was not
adjudicated in its proper perspective.
35. The Petitioner has failed to demonstrate any material evidence
having been ignored or any perversity or material irregularity in the
appreciation undertaken by the learned Rent Controller. The aforesaid
contention, therefore, essentially seeks a re-appreciation of the
evidence and substitution of the findings returned by the learned Rent
Controller, which cannot be permitted in the limited revisional
jurisdiction under Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act.
36. In any event, even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the
Petitioner succeeds in establishing the landlord-tenant relationship and
its superior title vis-à-vis the Respondents, the same would not, by
itself, entitle it to an order of eviction under Section 14(1)(e) of the
DRC Act. The requirement of bona fide need and the non-availability
of reasonably suitable alternative accommodation constitute
independent statutory ingredients, which are required to be established
cumulatively. The findings of the learned Rent Controller on these
aspects, therefore, warrant independent examination.
II. Bona fide requirement
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37. The requirement of bona fide need is not a mere formality or a
matter of subjective assertion. The expression contemplates a genuine,
honest and sincere requirement, as distinguished from a mere desire or
wish to obtain possession of the tenanted premises.
13
38. In Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta , the
Hon'ble Supreme Court explained that the requirement of the landlord
must be natural, real, sincere and honest. The Court is required to
examine the claim by applying objective standards and by considering
the facts and circumstances placed on record. It was further held that
once the Court is satisfied about the bona fides of the requirement, the
subjective choice of the landlord in selecting the premises ought
ordinarily to be respected. The relevant portion of the aforesaid
Judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:
“ 12. A perusal of Section 14 of the Act shows that the law has
imposed restrictions on the recovery of possession of any premises
by a landlord from a tenant notwithstanding any law or contract to
the contrary. However, an order for recovery of possession is
permissible on one or more of the specified grounds. One such
ground is the premises let for residential purposes being required
bona fide by the landlord for occupation as residence for himself or
for any member of his family dependent on him. What is a bona
fide requirement is not defined in the Act. The words “need” and
“require” both denote a certain degree of want with a thrust within
demanding fulfilment. “Need” or “requirement” qualified by the
word “bona fide” or “genuine” preceding as an adjective — is an
expression often used in rent control laws. “Bona fide or genuine
need” of the landlord or that the landlord “genuinely requires” or
“requires bona fide” an accommodation for occupation by or use
for himself is an accepted ground for eviction and such expression
is often employed by rent control legislation draftsman. The two
expressions are interchangeable in practice and carry the same
meaning.
13. Chambers 20th Century Dictionary defines bona fide to mean
“in good faith : genuine”. The word “genuine” means “natural : not
spurious : real : pure : sincere”. In Law Dictionary , Mozley and
Whitley define bona fide to mean “good faith, without fraud or

13
(1999) 6 SCC 222
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deceit”. Thus the term bona fide or genuinely refers to a state of
mind. Requirement is not a mere desire. The degree of intensity
contemplated by “requires” is much more higher than in mere
desire. The phrase “required bona fide” is suggestive of legislative
intent that a mere desire which is the outcome of whim or fancy is
not taken note of by the rent control legislation. A requirement in
the sense of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere, honest
desire, in contradistinction with a mere pretence or pretext to evict
a tenant, on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the
premises for himself or for any member of the family would entitle
him to seek ejectment of the tenant. Looked at from this angle, any
setting of the facts and circumstances protruding the need of the
landlord and its bona fides would be capable of successfully
withstanding the test of objective determination by the court. The
judge of facts should place himself in the armchair of the landlord
and then ask the question to himself — whether in the given facts
substantiated by the landlord the need to occupy the premises can
be said to be natural, real, sincere, honest. If the answer be in the
positive, the need is bona fide. The failure on the part of the
landlord to substantiate the pleaded need, or, in a given case,
positive material brought on record by the tenant enabling the court
drawing an inference that the reality was to the contrary and the
landlord was merely attempting at finding out a pretence or pretext
for getting rid of the tenant, would be enough to persuade the court
certainly to deny its judicial assistance to the landlord. Once the
court is satisfied of the bona fides of the need of the landlord for
the premises or additional premises by applying objective
standards then in the matter of choosing out of more than one
accommodation available to the landlord his subjective choice
shall be respected by the court. The court would permit the
landlord to satisfy the proven need by choosing the
accommodation which the landlord feels would be most suited for
the purpose; the court would not in such a case thrust its own
wisdom upon the choice of the landlord by holding that not one but
the other accommodation must be accepted by the landlord to
satisfy his such need. In short, the concept of bona fide need or
genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by the
realities of life. An approach either too liberal or too conservative
or pedantic must be guarded against.”

39. The principle that the landlord is the best judge of his
requirement has also been reiterated in Prativa Devi v. T.V.
14 15
Krishnan , and Anil Bajaj v. Vinod Ahuja . However, the aforesaid
principle does not dispense with the foundational requirement of

14
(1996) 5 SCC 353
15
(2014) 15 SCC 610
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establishing that the need itself is genuine and bona fide . The freedom
of choice available to the landlord operates after the existence of such
need has been established on the basis of the material on record.
40. In this regard, the distinction between a mere desire and a
genuine requirement assumes significance. In Deena Nath v. Pooran
16
Lal , the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that the requirement must
be genuine and bona fide and that the Court is required to examine the
availability of other suitable accommodation while adjudicating the
claim of the landlord. Although Deena Nath (supra), arose under the
Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, the principles
enunciated therein with respect to the assessment of bona fide
requirement and the availability of alternative accommodation are
equally relevant to the interpretation and application of Section
14(1)(e) of the DRC Act. The relevant portion of the aforesaid
Judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:
“ 15. From the discussions in the foregoing paragraphs, the question
that arises for determination is whether in the facts and
circumstances of the case, the High Court was justified in
interfering with the concurrent judgments of the courts below in
holding that the plaintiff required the premises bona fide for use of
his son. Section 12(1)( f ) of the Act under which the eviction of the
tenant was sought and granted by the lower courts, reads as
follows:
“12. Restriction on eviction of tenants .—(1) Notwithstanding
anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no
suit shall be filed in any civil court against a tenant for his eviction
from any accommodation except on one or more of the following
grounds only, namely:
( a )-( e )*
( f ) that the accommodation let for non-residential purposes is
required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of continuing or
starting his business or that of any of his major sons or unmarried
daughters if he is the owner thereof or for any person for whose
benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such

16
(2001) 5 SCC 705
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person has no other reasonably suitable non-residential
accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town
concerned;”
The section, on a plain reading, is clear and specific. The criteria to
be fulfilled for an order of eviction under the provision are:
( i ) that the non-residential accommodation is required bona fide by
the landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting his business
or that of any of his major sons; and
( ii ) that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably
suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his
occupation in the city or town concerned .
(emphasis supplied)
The legislature in enacting the provision has taken ample care to
avoid any arbitrary or whimsical action of a landlord to evict his
tenant. The statutory mandate is that there must be first a
requirement by the landlord which means that it is not a mere
whim or a fanciful desire by him; further, such requirement must
be bona fide which is intended to avoid a mere whim or desire. The
“bona fide requirement” must be in praesenti and must be
manifested in actual need which would evidence the court that it is
not a mere fanciful or whimsical desire. The legislative intent is
made further clear by making the provision that the landlord has no
other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in
his occupation in the city or town concerned. This requirement lays
stress that the need is pressing and there is no reasonably suitable
alternative for the landlord but to get the tenant evicted from the
accommodation. Similar statutory provision is made in clause ( e )
of Section 12(1) of the Act in respect of accommodation let for
residential purposes. Thus, the legislative mandate being clear and
unambiguous, the court is duty-bound to examine not merely the
requirement of the landlord as pleaded in the eviction petition but
also whether any other reasonably suitable non-residential
accommodation in his occupation in the city/town is available. The
judgment/order of the court/authority for eviction of a tenant which
does not show that the court/authority has applied its mind to these
statutory requirements cannot be sustained and the superior court
will be justified in upsetting such judgment/order in appeal/second
appeal/revision. Bona fide requirement, on a first look, appears to
be a question of fact. But in recording a finding on the question the
court has to bear in mind the statutory mandate incorporated in
Section 12(1)( f ). If it is found that the court has not applied the
statutory provisions to the evidence on record in its proper
perspective then the finding regarding bona fide requirement
would cease to be a mere finding of fact, for such erroneous
finding illegally arrived at would vitiate the entire judgment. In
such case the High Court cannot be faulted for interfering with the
finding in exercise of its second appellate jurisdiction under
Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
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16. In this connection, we may refer to the decision of this Court in
the case of Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr Mahesh Chand Gupta [(1999)
6 SCC 222] in which it was held, inter alia, that: (SCC Headnote)
“The term bona fide or genuinely refers to a state of mind.
Requirement is not a mere desire. The degree of intensity
contemplated by „requires‟ is much higher than in mere desire. The
phrase „required bona fide‟ is suggestive of legislative intent that a
mere desire which is the outcome of a whim or fancy is not taken
note of by the rent control legislation. A requirement in the sense
of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere, honest desire, in
contradistinction with a mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant,
on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for
himself or for any member of the family would entitle him to seek
ejectment of the tenant.”
Therein it was further held: (SCC p. 231, para 11)
“[T]he High Court (in revision) is obliged to test the order of the
Rent Controller on the touchstone of „whether it is according to
law‟. For that limited purpose it may enter into reappraisal of
evidence, that is, for the purpose of ascertaining whether the
conclusion arrived at by the Rent Controller is wholly
unreasonable or is one that no reasonable person acting with
objectivity could have reached on the material available.”

41. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the landlord to first place
adequate pleadings and prima facie material demonstrating the
existence of a bona fide requirement. It is only upon such foundational
satisfaction that the question of availability of reasonably suitable
alternative accommodation assumes significance, the two
requirements being interlinked and cumulative in nature. Reliance in
this regard is placed upon Abid-Ul-Islam (supra).The relevant portion
is reproduced hereinbelow:
“ Requirement under Section 14(1)(e)
15. Section 14(1)( e ) carves out an exception to the regular mode of
eviction. Thus, in a case where a landlord makes an application
seeking possession of the tenanted premises for his bona fide
requirement, the learned Rent Controller may dispense with the
protection prescribed under the Act and then grant an order of
eviction. Requirement is the existence of bona fide need, when
there is no other “reasonably suitable accommodation”. Therefore,
there has to be satisfaction on two grounds, namely, ( i ) the
requirement being bona fide, and ( ii ) the non-availability of a
reasonably suitable residential accommodation. Such
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reasonableness along with suitability is to be seen from the
perspective of the landlord and not the tenant. When the learned
Rent Controller comes to the conclusion that there exists a bona
fide need coupled with the satisfaction that there is no reasonably
suitable residential accommodation, the twin conditions mandated
under Section 14(1)( e ) stand satisfied.
16. We may usefully refer to the decision of this Court in Inderjeet
Kaur v. Nirpal Singh [ Inderjeet Kaur v. Nirpal Singh , (2001) 1
SCC 706] : (SCC pp. 711-13, paras 9-13)
“ 9 . Chapter III-A deals with summary trial of certain
applications expressly stating that every application by a
landlord for recovery of possession on the ground
specified in clause ( e ) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of
Section 14 of the Act, or under Section 14-A or 14-B or
14-C or 14-D shall be dealt with in accordance with the
special provisions prescribed in Section 25-B of the Act.
As per the broad scheme of this Chapter a tenant is
precluded from contesting an application filed for eviction
on the grounds mentioned in the aforementioned
provisions unless he obtains leave from the Controller to
contest the eviction petition. In default of obtaining leave
to defend or leave is refused to him an order of eviction
follows. It appears recourse to summary trial is adopted
having due regard to nature of the grounds on which the
eviction is sought with a view to avoid delay so that the
landlord should not be deprived or denied of his right to
immediate possession of premises for his bona fide use.
10 . At the same time, it is well settled and accepted
position in law that no one shall be subjected to suffer a
civil consequence like eviction from a premises resulting
in hardship to him without providing adequate and
effective opportunity to disprove the case against him and
establish his case as pleaded.
11 . As is evident from Sections 25-B(4) and (5) of the Act,
burden placed on a tenant is light and limited in that if the
affidavit filed by him discloses such facts as would
disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the
recovery of the possession of the premises on the ground
specified in clause ( e ) of the proviso to Section 14(1) of
the Act, with which we are concerned in this case, are
good enough to grant leave to defend.
12 . A landlord, who bona fide requires a premises for his
residence and occupation should not suffer for long,
waiting for eviction of a tenant. At the same time a tenant
cannot be thrown out from a premises summarily, even
though prima facie he is able to say that the claim of the
landlord is not bona fide or untenable and as such not
entitled to obtain an order of eviction. Hence the approach
has to be cautious and judicious in granting or refusing
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leave to defend to a tenant to contest an eviction petition
within the broad scheme of Chapter III-A and in particular
having regard to the clear terms and language of Section
25-B(5).
13 . We are of the considered view that at a stage when the
tenant seeks leave to defend, it is enough if he prima facie
makes out a case by disclosing such facts as would
disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order of eviction.
It would not be a right approach to say that unless the
tenant at that stage itself establishes a strong case as would
non-suit the landlord, leave to defend should not be
granted when it is not the requirement of Section 25-B(5).
A leave to defend sought for cannot also be granted for
mere asking or in a routine manner which will defeat the
very object of the special provisions contained in Chapter
III-A of the Act. Leave to defend cannot be refused where
an eviction petition is filed on a mere design or desire of a
landlord to recover possession of the premises from a
tenant under clause ( e ) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of
Section 14, when as a matter of fact the requirement may
not be bona fide. Refusing to grant leave in such a case
leads to eviction of a tenant summarily resulting in great
hardship to him and his family members, if any, although
he could establish if only leave is granted that a landlord
would be disentitled for an order of eviction. At the stage
of granting leave to defend, parties rely on affidavits in
support of the rival contentions. Assertions and counter-
assertions made in affidavits may not afford safe and
acceptable evidence so as to arrive at an affirmative
conclusion one way or the other unless there is a strong
and acceptable evidence available to show that the facts
disclosed in the application filed by the tenant seeking
leave to defend were either frivolous, untenable or most
unreasonable. Take a case when possession is sought on
the ground of personal requirement, a landlord has to
establish his need and not his mere desire. The ground
under clause ( e ) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of
Section 14 enables a landlord to recover possession of the
tenanted premises on the ground of his bona fide
requirement. This being an enabling provision, essentially
the burden is on the landlord to establish his case
affirmatively. In short and substance, a wholly frivolous
and totally untenable defence may not entitle a tenant to
leave to defend, but when a triable issue is raised a duty is
placed on the Rent Controller by the statute itself to grant
leave. At the stage of granting leave the real test should be
whether facts disclosed in the affidavit filed seeking leave
to defend prima facie show that the landlord would be
disentitled from obtaining an order of eviction and not
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whether at the end defence may fail. It is well to
remember that when leave to defend is refused, serious
consequences of eviction shall follow and the party
seeking leave is denied an opportunity to test the truth of
the averments made in the eviction petition by cross-
examination. It may also be noticed that even in cases
where leave is granted provisions are made in this very
Chapter for expeditious disposal of eviction petitions.
Section 25-B(6) states that where leave is granted to a
tenant to contest the eviction application, the Controller
shall commence the hearing of the application as early as
practicable. Section 25-B(7) speaks of the procedure to be
followed in such cases. Section 25-B(8) bars the appeals
against an order of recovery of possession except a
provision of revision to the High Court. Thus a combined
effect of Sections 25-B(6),(7) and (8) would lead to
expeditious disposal of eviction petitions so that a landlord
need not wait and suffer for a long time. On the other
hand, when a tenant is denied leave to defend although he
had fair chance to prove his defence, will suffer great
hardship. In this view a balanced view is to be taken
having regard to competing claims.”
*
18. For availing the leave to defend as envisaged under Section 25-
B(5), a mere assertion per se would not suffice as Section 14(1)( e )
creates a presumption subject to the satisfaction of the learned Rent
Controller qua bona fide need in favour of the landlord which is
obviously rebuttable with some material of substance to the extent
of raising a triable issue. The satisfaction of the Rent Controller in
deciding on an application seeking leave to defend is obviously
subjective. The degree of probability is one of preponderance
forming the subjective satisfaction of the Rent Controller. Thus,
the quality of adjudication is between a mere moonshine and
adequate material and evidence meant for the rejection of a normal
application for eviction.
19. Before a presumption is drawn, the landlord is duty-bound to
place prima facie material supported by the adequate averments. It
is only thereafter, the presumption gets attracted and the onus shifts
on the tenant. The object of Section 14(1)( e ) vis-à-vis Section 25-B
has to be seen in the light of yet another provision contained under
Section 19. Section 19 gives a right to the dispossessed tenant for
repossession if there is a non-compliance on the part of the
landlord albeit after eviction, to put the premises to use for the
intended purpose. Such a right is available only to a tenant who
stood dispossessed on the application filed by the landlord
invoking Section 14(1)( e ) being allowed. Thus, Section 19 inter
alia throws more light on the legislative objective facilitating a
speedy possession. The object is also reflected in the proviso to
Section 25-B(8), denying a right of appeal.
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20. Dealing with a pari materia provision, this Court in Baldev
Singh Bajwa v. Monish Saini [ Baldev Singh Bajwa v. Monish
Saini , (2005) 12 SCC 778] , was pleased to clarify the aforesaid
position holding the procedure as summary. In such a case, the
tenant is expected to put in adequate and reasonable materials in
support of the facts pleaded in the form of a declaration sufficient
to raise a triable issue. One cannot lose sight of the object behind
Section 25-B in facilitating not only the expeditious but effective
remedy for a class of landlords, sans the normal procedural route.
In this regard, we wish to quote the decision of this Court in
Baldev Singh [ Baldev Singh Bajwa v. Monish Saini , (2005) 12
SCC 778] : (SCC pp. 790-93, paras 14-17 & 19)
“ 14 . The phrase “bona fide requirement” or “bona fide
need” or “required reasonably in good faith” or
“required”, occurs in almost all Rent Control Acts with the
underlying legislative intent which has been considered
and demonstrated innumerable times by various High
Courts as also by this Court, some of which we would like
to refer to. In Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander [ Ram Dass v.
Ishwar Chander , (1988) 3 SCC 131] it is said that the
bona fide need should be genuine and honest, conceived in
good faith. It was also indicated that the landlord's desire
for possession, however honest it might otherwise be, has
inevitably a subjective element in it, and that desire, to
become a “requirement” in law must have the objective
element of a “need”, which can be decided only by taking
all the relevant circumstances into consideration so that
the protection afforded to a tenant is not rendered illusory
or whittled down.
15 . In Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan [ Bega Begum v.
Abdul Ahad Khan , (1979) 1 SCC 273] it was held by this
Court that the words “reasonable requirement”
undoubtedly postulate that there must be an element of
need as opposed to a mere desire or wish. The distinction
between desire and need should doubtless be kept in mind
but not so as to make even the genuine need as nothing but
a desire.
16 . In Surjit Singh Kalra v. Union of India [ Surjit Singh
Kalra v. Union of India , (1991) 2 SCC 87] a three-Judge
Bench of this Court has held as under : (SCC p. 99, para
20)
„ 20 . The tenant of course is entitled to raise all
relevant contentions as against the claim of the
classified landlords. The fact that there is no
reference to the word bona fide requirement in
Sections 14-B to 14-D does not absolve the
landlord from proving that his requirement is
bona fide or the tenant from showing that it is
not bona fide. In fact every claim for eviction
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against a tenant must be a bona fide one. There
is also enough indication in support of this
construction from the title of Section 25-B
which states „special procedure for the
disposal of applications for eviction on the
ground of bona fide requirement‟.‟
17 . In Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Mahesh Chand Gupta [ Shiv
Sarup Gupta v. Mahesh Chand Gupta , (1999) 6 SCC 222]
this Court while dealing with the aspect of bona fide
requirement has said that the sense of felt need which is an
outcome of a sincere, honest desire, in contradistinction
with a mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant, refers to a
state of mind prevailing with the landlord. The only way
of peeping into the mind of the landlord is an exercise
undertaken by the Judge of facts by placing himself in the
armchair of the landlord and then posing a question to
himself — whether in the given facts, substantiated by the
landlord, the need to occupy the premises can be said to be
natural, real, sincere and honest.
*
19 . … In our view there are inbuilt protections in the
relevant provisions for the tenants that whenever the
landlord would approach the court he would approach
when his need is genuine and bona fide. It is, of course,
subject to the tenant's right to rebut it but with strong and
cogent evidence. In our view, in the proceeding taken up
under Section 13-B by the NRI landlords for the ejectment
of the tenant, the court shall presume that the landlord's
need pleaded in the petition is genuine and bona fide. But
this would not disentitle the tenant from proving that in
fact and in law the requirement of the landlord is not
genuine. A heavy burden would lie on the tenant to prove
that the requirement of the landlord is not genuine. To
prove this fact the tenant will be called upon to give all the
necessary facts and particulars supported by documentary
evidence, if available, to support his plea in the affidavit
itself so that the Controller will be in a position to
adjudicate and decide the question of genuine or bona fide
requirement of the landlord. A mere assertion on the part
of the tenant would not be sufficient to rebut the strong
presumption in the landlord's favour that his requirement
of occupation of the premises is real and genuine.”

42. In the present batch, the principal requirement pleaded by the
Petitioner Society was that the adjoining shops were required for
expansion of the existing temple hall so as to facilitate the
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organisation of religious functions and accommodate the increasing
number of devotees. The requirement, therefore, was not pleaded as
an ordinary commercial requirement but as one arising out of the
religious and charitable activities allegedly being conducted by the
Society.
43. There can be no doubt that the conduct of religious functions
and the need to accommodate devotees may constitute a genuine
requirement, provided the same is established on the basis of the
material placed on record. The Court is not concerned with
questioning the nature of the activities of a religious institution or
prescribing the manner in which such institution ought to conduct its
functions. However, the fact that the Petitioner is a religious society
does not, by itself, dispense with the statutory obligation of
establishing a genuine requirement for the particular premises sought
to be recovered.
44. The learned Rent Controller has examined the evidence led by
the Petitioner Society on this aspect in considerable detail. The
Impugned Orders record that the Petitioner failed to produce cogent
documentary or corroborative material demonstrating the nature and
frequency of the religious functions allegedly being organised by the
Society, the number of devotees attending such functions and the
actual extent of the shortage of space.
45. The Petitioner's witnesses were unable to specify the precise
additional space required, and no adequate corroborative material was
placed on record to substantiate the alleged insufficiency of the
existing accommodation.
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46. At the same time, the evidence disclosed the availability of an
open area, an existing hall and rooms on the first floor within the
temple premises. Notably, the Petitioner's own witness admitted that
approximately 150 persons could be accommodated in the existing
rooms and halls. Despite the aforesaid admissions, no cogent material
was produced to establish that the available accommodation was
inadequate for the activities sought to be undertaken by the Petitioner
Society.
47. The Petitioner Society also failed to place on record any
definite layout or proposal indicating how the tenanted shops, which
were situated outside the periphery of the existing temple structure,
were proposed to be integrated with the hall or how such expansion
would address the alleged shortage of space.
48. The learned Rent Controller has also noticed that the Petitioner
had not placed on record any reliable material demonstrating the
actual footfall during the alleged religious functions or the extent to
which the existing accommodation fell short of the requirement. The
absence of any specific particulars regarding the additional space
required, when considered alongside the admissions concerning the
existing accommodation, was found to materially weaken the
Petitioner's claim.
49. The learned Rent Controller also considered the deficiencies in
the site plan furnished by the Petitioner, including its failure to depict
the complete structure and accurately reflect the measurements of the
existing accommodation, as well as the evidence concerning the
correctness of the Respondents' site plan. These circumstances, taken
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together, formed the basis for the finding that the alleged requirement
had not been sufficiently substantiated.
50. This Court is of the considered opinion that the aforesaid
findings cannot be characterised as perverse or as having been arrived
at without consideration of the material on record. The learned Rent
Controller has not merely proceeded on the basis of an assumption
that the Petitioner Society was required to accommodate a certain
number of devotees. Rather, the evidence led by the Petitioner itself
was examined to ascertain whether the alleged shortage of space was
genuine and whether the tenanted shops were, in fact, required for the
purpose pleaded.
51. In the present matters, the learned Rent Controller has
considered the cumulative effect of the absence of supporting
material, the inability of the Petitioner's witnesses to specify the
precise requirement, the admissions regarding the existing
accommodation and the deficiencies in the site plan. The findings are,
therefore, founded upon an assessment of the evidence as a whole and
not upon the absence of any single document.
52. The contention of the Petitioner that the landlord is the best
judge of his requirement does not, in the facts of the present case,
advance its case. The principle is well settled, but its application
presupposes that a genuine and bona fide need has first been
established. It does not authorise the Court to presume the existence of
such need merely because the landlord has expressed a desire to
recover possession.
53. In fact, Shiv Sarup Gupta (supra) itself makes it clear that the
subjective choice of the landlord is to be respected after the Court,
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applying objective standards, is satisfied about the bona fides of the
requirement. The same judgment recognises that a claim would fail
where the evidence of the alleged need is unreliable or where the
landlord has failed to substantiate the pleaded requirement. The
relevant portion of the aforesaid Judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:
“ 13. Chambers 20th Century Dictionary defines bona fide to mean
“in good faith : genuine”. The word “genuine” means “natural : not
spurious : real : pure : sincere”. In Law Dictionary , Mozley and
Whitley define bona fide to mean “good faith, without fraud or
deceit”. Thus the term bona fide or genuinely refers to a state of
mind. Requirement is not a mere desire. The degree of intensity
contemplated by “requires” is much more higher than in mere
desire. The phrase “required bona fide” is suggestive of legislative
intent that a mere desire which is the outcome of whim or fancy is
not taken note of by the rent control legislation. A requirement in
the sense of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere, honest
desire, in contradistinction with a mere pretence or pretext to evict
a tenant, on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the
premises for himself or for any member of the family would entitle
him to seek ejectment of the tenant. Looked at from this angle, any
setting of the facts and circumstances protruding the need of the
landlord and its bona fides would be capable of successfully
withstanding the test of objective determination by the court. The
judge of facts should place himself in the armchair of the landlord
and then ask the question to himself — whether in the given facts
substantiated by the landlord the need to occupy the premises can
be said to be natural, real, sincere, honest. If the answer be in the
positive, the need is bona fide. The failure on the part of the
landlord to substantiate the pleaded need, or, in a given case,
positive material brought on record by the tenant enabling the court
drawing an inference that the reality was to the contrary and the
landlord was merely attempting at finding out a pretence or pretext
for getting rid of the tenant, would be enough to persuade the court
certainly to deny its judicial assistance to the landlord. Once the
court is satisfied of the bona fides of the need of the landlord for
the premises or additional premises by applying objective
standards then in the matter of choosing out of more than one
accommodation available to the landlord his subjective choice
shall be respected by the court. The court would permit the
landlord to satisfy the proven need by choosing the
accommodation which the landlord feels would be most suited for
the purpose; the court would not in such a case thrust its own
wisdom upon the choice of the landlord by holding that not one but
the other accommodation must be accepted by the landlord to
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satisfy his such need. In short, the concept of bona fide need or
genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by the
realities of life. An approach either too liberal or too conservative
or pedantic must be guarded against.”

54. Thus, the proposition that the tenant cannot dictate to the
landlord how the premises ought to be utilised cannot be read in
isolation from the statutory requirement of bona fide need. The
learned Rent Controller has not substituted its own choice of
accommodation for that of the Petitioner Society. It has examined
whether the need pleaded by the Society was genuine in the first place
and whether the evidence supported the assertion that the existing
premises were insufficient.
III. Availability of reasonably suitable alternative accommodation
55. The requirement of bona fide need under Section 14(1)(e) of the
DRC Act is intrinsically connected with the further requirement that
the landlord should not have any other reasonably suitable
accommodation available for satisfying the pleaded need. Both
requirements have to be established by the landlord.
56. In Shiv Sarup Gupta (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has
explained that the availability of alternative accommodation has a dual
relevance. It may bear upon the genuineness of the landlord's alleged
requirement and may also independently defeat the claim where
another reasonably suitable accommodation is available. The question
of suitability is required to be examined in the context of the particular
need pleaded by the landlord. The relevant portion of the aforesaid
Judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:
“14. The availability of an alternative accommodation with the
landlord i.e. an accommodation other than the one in occupation of
the tenant wherefrom he is sought to be evicted has a dual
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relevancy. Firstly, the availability of another accommodation,
suitable and convenient in all respects as the suit accommodation,
may have an adverse bearing on the finding as to the bona fides of
the landlord if he unreasonably refuses to occupy the available
premises to satisfy his alleged need. Availability of such
circumstance would enable the court drawing an inference that the
need of the landlord was not a felt need or the state of mind of the
landlord was not honest, sincere, and natural. Secondly, another
principal ingredient of clause ( e ) of sub-section (1) of Section 14,
which speaks of non-availability of any other reasonably suitable
residential accommodation to the landlord, would not be satisfied.
Wherever another residential accommodation is shown to exist as
available then the court has to ask the landlord why he is not
occupying such other available accommodation to satisfy his need.
The landlord may convince the court that the alternative residential
accommodation though available is still of no consequence as the
same is not reasonably suitable to satisfy the felt need which the
landlord has succeeded in demonstrating objectively to exist.
Needless to say that an alternative accommodation, to entail denial
of the claim of the landlord, must be reasonably suitable, obviously
in comparison with the suit accommodation wherefrom the
landlord is seeking eviction. Convenience and safety of the
landlord and his family members would be relevant factors. While
considering the totality of the circumstances, the court may keep in
view the profession or vocation of the landlord and his family
members, their style of living, their habits and the background
wherefrom they come.”
57. In the present matters, the evidence led by the Petitioner Society
itself disclosed the availability of an existing hall, open areas, rooms
on the first floor and other spaces within the temple premises. The
Petitioner's witnesses also admitted the capacity of the existing
accommodation to accommodate a substantial number of persons.
58. The Petitioner has not been able to demonstrate, either through
the evidence led before the learned Rent Controller or by pointing out
any material irregularity in the Impugned Orders, why the existing
accommodation was not reasonably suitable for conducting the
activities pleaded by it. No comparative or functional assessment was
placed on record to establish that the existing hall and other available
spaces were incapable of accommodating the devotees or that the
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proposed expansion through the tenanted shops was indispensable for
the purpose pleaded.
59. It is true that the suitability of alternative accommodation
cannot be determined merely by mechanically calculating the number
of persons who may be accommodated in the existing premises. The
nature of the requirement and the purpose for which the
accommodation is sought must also be considered. Nevertheless, the
Petitioner Society was required to place some cogent material before
the learned Rent Controller demonstrating why the existing
accommodation was insufficient or unsuitable for the alleged
requirement.
60. The learned Rent Controller has examined this aspect with
reference to the admissions of the Petitioner's own witnesses and the
site plans placed on record. The conclusion that the Petitioner Society
had failed to establish the non-availability of reasonably suitable
alternative accommodation is, therefore, supported by the evidence
and cannot be said to be wholly unreasonable.
61. The submissions advanced on behalf of the Petitioner, when
considered in their entirety, essentially seek a fresh appreciation of the
documentary and oral evidence led before the learned Rent Controller.
The Petitioner seeks to place greater weight upon the Reply to the
legal notice, the rent receipts, the alleged historical functioning of the
Petitioner Society and the principle that the landlord is the best judge
of his requirement.
62. However, the Impugned Orders demonstrate that the learned
Rent Controller has undertaken a detailed examination of the evidence
led by both sides. The proceedings were not terminated at the stage of
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consideration of an Application for leave to defend. Leave to defend
had been granted, Written Statements were filed, documentary
evidence was produced and the witnesses were subjected to cross-
examination. The eviction proceedings, instituted in the year 2016,
culminated in the Impugned Orders after several years and after
consideration of the evidence available on record.
63. In such circumstances, the Petitioner was required to
demonstrate a specific illegality, perversity or material irregularity in
the approach adopted by the learned Rent Controller. A general
assertion that the evidence ought to have been appreciated differently
or that greater weight ought to have been attached to certain
documents would not, by itself, furnish a ground for interference
under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act.
64. It is also significant that the Petitioner Society has not been able
to demonstrate how the findings concerning the absence of cogent
material establishing the alleged religious functions, the insufficiency
of the existing accommodation, the lack of a definite expansion plan
and the availability of existing spaces are contrary to the evidence led
before the learned Rent Controller.
65. Even if the Petitioner's contention regarding the landlord-tenant
relationship is accepted for the sake of argument, the same would
establish, at best, one of the statutory requirements. It would not
answer the independent question as to whether the Petitioner Society
had established a genuine and b ona fide requirement for the particular
shops or whether reasonably suitable alternative accommodation was
unavailable.
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66. The findings of the learned Rent Controller on these latter
requirements are independently sufficient to sustain the dismissal of
the Eviction Petitions. Consequently, even assuming that the
observations of the learned Rent Controller concerning the Petitioner's
title or the landlord-tenant relationship warrant a different
appreciation, such an aspect would not, by itself, justify setting aside
the ultimate orders of dismissal.
67. In this view of the matter, this Court does not consider it
necessary to undertake a further examination of the disputes
concerning the underlying title of the land, the internal functioning of
the Petitioner Society or the alleged authorisation for institution of the
eviction proceedings. The issue before this Court is whether the
Impugned Orders warrant interference in the limited revisional
jurisdiction under Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act. The discussion
and reasoning contained in the Impugned Orders, particularly with
respect to the statutory requirements of Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC
Act, sufficiently answers the said question.
68. The Impugned Orders, when examined in their entirety,
disclose a detailed consideration of the pleadings, the documentary
evidence, the admissions made during cross-examination and the rival
stands taken by the parties. The Petitioner has failed to point out any
material evidence which has been completely overlooked or any
finding which is so unreasonable that no reasonable judicial authority
could have arrived at the same.
69. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no
perversity, illegality or material irregularity in the approach adopted
by the learned Rent Controller warranting interference in the exercise
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of revisional jurisdiction. The Petitioner has essentially sought to
invite this Court to undertake a fresh appreciation of the evidence,
which is impermissible in the absence of any demonstrable error in the
decision-making process.
CONCLUSION:
70. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered opinion that the
Petitioner Society has failed to make out a case for interference with
the Impugned Orders dated 02.07.2026 passed by the learned Senior
Civil Judge-cum-Rent Controller, West District, Tis Hazari Courts,
Delhi and the present batch of Revision Petitions, being devoid of
merit, is hereby dismissed.
71. The present Revision Petitions, along with pending
Application(s), if any, stand disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
72. A photocopy of the Judgment passed today be kept in the
connected matters.

HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
NOVEMBER 18, 2026/ma


Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 378/2026 and connected matters Page 53 of 53
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:30:03