THE CHAIRMAN vs R RAVINDRA
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
- 1 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
ND
DATED THIS THE 22 DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR
REVIEW PETITION NO. 248 OF 2025
BETWEEN:
1. THE CHAIRMAN
KARNATAKA SECONDARY EDUCATION BOARD,
TH
6 CROSS, MALLESHWARAM CIRCLE,
BANGALORE – 560 003.
2. THE UNDER SECRETARY
GOVT OF KARNATAKA,
EDUCATION DEPARTMENT,
DR AMBEDKAR VEEDHI,
VIDHANA SOUDHA,
BANGALORE 560 001.
…PETITIONERS
(BY SRI. H.B. KESHAVA MURTHY, ADVOCATE)
AND:
R RAVINDRA
S/O R V RAMAKRISHNA REDDY,
AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NO. 2004,
H I G QUARTERS, IV “B” CROSS,
YELAHANKA NEW TOWN,
BENGALURU 560 064.
…RESPONDENT
(BY SRI.C.H. JADHAV, SENIOR COUNSEL APPEARING FOR
SRI. ADARSH C. JADHAV, ADVOCATE)
Digitally
signed by
VANDANA S
Location:
High Court
of
Karnataka
THIS REVIEW PETITION FILED UNDER ORDER 47 RULE 1 R/W
SEC. 114 OF CPC, PRAYING TO REVIEW THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED
08.06.2022. PASSED BY THIS HONBLE COURT IN RFA NO. 1147/2006 A
COPY OF THE SAME IS PRODUCED AS ANNEXURE A IN THE INTEREST
OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR FURTHER ORDERS, THIS DAY,
ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
- 2 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR
ORAL ORDER
This Review petition takes an exception to the judgment and
decree dated 08.06.2022 passed by this Court in RFA
No.1147/2006, whereby the said appeal preferred by the
respondent – appellant against the review petitioners / respondents
was allowed by this Court. Along with the review petition, the
petitioner has also filed an application I.A.No.1/2025 seeking
condonation of 1075 days in filing the review petition and for other
reliefs.
2. A perusal of the material on record will indicate that the
respondent – plaintiff instituted a suit in O.S.No.6335/1999 against
the petitioners – defendants for mandatory injunction to change his
date of birth from 17.05.1973 to 18.09.1974 in the SSLC Marks
card and for other reliefs. The said suit having been contested by
the petitioners, the Trial court dismissed the suit vide judgment and
decree dated 18.03.2006 which was challenged by the respondent
in RFA No.1147/2006 which came to be allowed by this Court vide
final judgment and decree dated 08.06.2022 which is assailed in
- 3 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
the present review petition filed on 17.06.2025 along with an
application I.A.No.1/2025 for condonation of delay in preferring the
review petition. The respondent has opposed not only the main
review petition but also the application I.A.No.1/2025 to which he
has filed statement of objections.
3. Heard learned AGA for the review petitioner and learned
Senior counsel for the respondent and perused the material on
record.
4. A perusal of the material on record will indicate that it is
an undisputed fact and a matter of record that there is a delay of
1075 days on the part of the review petitioners in filing the present
review petition. In the Affidavit filed in support of the application, it
is contended that in pursuance of the aforesaid judgment and
decree dated 08.06.2022 passed by this Court in RFA
No.1147/2006, the respondent submitted an application dated
11.07.2022 to the Board and also addressed a letter dated
13.07.2022 seeking correction of his date of birth in terms of the
said judgment and decree of this Court. In pursuance of the said
letters written by the respondent, the Deputy Director (A)
- 4 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
Sha.Sh.Department, Bangalore North District addresses a
communication dated 05.01.2023 to the Board to provide
necessary documents regarding request of the State Government
to drop him from the charge of litigation officer to appeal in the said
case. Meanwhile, the Deputy Director School Education
Department having written a letter dated 14.07.2022 to the High
Court Government Advocate seeking advice in the matter, the
Government Advocate gave an opinion on 22.07.2022 to the effect
that the matter was a fit case to file an appeal from the said
judgment and decree of this Court. Subsequently, the Board writes
a letter to the State Government dated 27.01.2023 to make the
concerned Deputy Directors as litigation officers in pursuance of
which, the Board wrote a letter dated 17.04.2023 to the Deputy
Directors directing them to provide documents sought for by the
State Government. In pursuance of the same, the Deputy Director,
Sha.Shi.Sa.E provides documents to the State Government on
18.04.2023 and 08.11.2023.
5. The petitioners have further averred that subsequently on
15.04.2024, the State Government writes a letter dated 15.04.2024
to the Deputy Director to implement the aforesaid judgment and
- 5 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
decree of this Court, in pursuance of which, the Deputy Director
issues an Office Memo dated 19.04.2024 amending the date of
birth of the respondent in the school records and marks card from
17.05.1973 to 18.09.1974 as directed by this Court in RFA
No.1147/2006 dated 08.06.2022. So also, the proposal for
correction of the school records by the school was accepted Online
on 20.05.2024 and a letter dated 23.05.2024 requesting legal
advice was written, to which, a letter dated 20.07.2024 was sent by
the State Government in this regard. Thereafter, one more letter
dated 28.05.2024 was written by the State Government to appoint
a Deputy Director (Administration) as litigation officer to file an
appeal against the aforesaid judgment and decree dated
08.06.2022 passed by this Court in RFA No.1147/2006, in
pursuance of which, the Government writes a letter dated
27.06.2024 deciding not to file an appeal against the same and
once again directs correction of date of birth in terms of the said
judgment.
6. Subsequently, after discussing with the Principal
Secretary to the Government, Sa.Shi Department on 10.07.2024
regarding correction of the date of birth of the respondent in terms
- 6 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
of the said judgment and decree of this Court, the Deputy Director
(A) Sa.Shi Department, Bangalore North District, gets appointed as
litigation officer to file an appeal before the Division Bench of this
Court, in pursuance of which, a decision was taken in the meeting
held on 24.07.2024, by the State Dispute Resolution Board under
the Chairmanship of the Principal Secretary to file an appeal and
pursuant thereto a Government order dated 16.08.2024 was
passed appointing the aforesaid Deputy Director as litigation
officer. Subsequently, the High Court Government addresses a
letter dated 09.12.2024 to the Board informing them that there was
no provision in law to file a further appeal before the High Court
and in pursuance of the said letter, the Board writes a letter dated
30.12.2024 to the State Government to file a review petition before
this Court and to appoint the Secretary of the Board as a litigation
officer, in pursuance of which, the State Government appoints the
said Secretary of the Board as the litigation officer on 24.02.2025,
who preferred the present review petition on 17.06.2025. It is
therefore contended that the delay in filing the review petition was
bonafide and not intentional and the same deserves to be
condoned.
- 7 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
7. Per contra, the respondent filed a detailed statement of
objection pointing out the long and inordinate delay and latches of
more than 3 years on the part of the respondent in filing the present
review petition and contends that there was no merit in the
application as well as in the main review petition and that the same
are liable to be dismissed.
8. A perusal of the material on record will indicate that it is
an undisputed fact that there is a delay of 1075 days in filing the
review petition; in this context, the averments made in the Affidavit
accompanying I.A.1/2025 will clearly indicate that absolutely no
valid or sufficient cause / grounds have been made out by the
review petitioners in support of the application; on the other hand,
even according to the petitioners themselves, there has been
complete / total lack of diligence on their part in taking necessary
steps to challenge the final judgment and decree dated 08.06.2022
passed in RFA No.1147/2006 by this Court; interestingly, even
after the High Court Government Advocate having given an opinion
on 22.07.2022 to the effect that it was a fit case to file an appeal,
the Board as well as the State Government do not take any
decision in this regard and are merely communicating with each
- 8 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
other for almost two years without making any progress and even
the said correspondence is spread without taking any effective
steps for a period of two years; in fact, as noticed supra, on
15.04.2024 itself, the State Government directs the Board to
implement the aforesaid judgment of this Court and the Board
complies with the same and issues an office memo which was
accepted by the school as well as by the Board and the State
Government in May 2024 itself. It is only thereafter, on 28.05.2024,
i.e., almost 2 years after this Court passed the said judgment and
decree dated 08.06.2022 that the petitioners start discussing
among themselves regarding filing of an appeal against the said
judgment and decree; even thereafter, without any proper or
reasonable explanation, the review petitioners dragged the matter
for more than one year and ultimately, filed the review petition only
on 17.06.2025, after a long, inordinate, unexplained and
unreasonable delay and latches of more than 1075 days in filing
the review petition; especially, when the delay during the
intervening periods from 08.06.2022 onwards till 17.06.2025 had
not been sufficiently or satisfactorily explained by the petitioners.
- 9 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
9. The aforesaid facts and circumstances and the averments
made in the Affidavit filed in support of I.A.No.1/2025 is sufficient to
come to the conclusion that neither valid nor sufficient ground has
been made out by the review petitioners to seek condonation of
delay of more than 1075 days in filing the review petition; in the
case of Majji Sannemma @ Sanyasi Rao vs. Reddy Sridevi –
(2021) 18 SCC 384, the Apex Court held as under:-
“
6. At the outset, it is noted that by the impugned
order the High Court has condoned a huge delay of 1011
days in preferring the second appeal by Respondents 1 and
2 herein—original defendants—appellants before the High
Court. While condoning the delay, the High Court has
observed as under 2021 SCC OnLine AP 3977] , SCC
OnLine AP paras 11-14)
“11. In these circumstances, when there
are certain questions, which require a debate in the
second appeal, it is not necessary that this matter be
rejected at this stage, without inviting a decision on
merits. If the delay is condoned though enormous,
what happens at best is to give an opportunity to the
parties to canvass their respective case. Since this
question being of procedure, the attempt of the court
should be to encourage a healthy discussion on merits
than rejecting at threshold.
12. Viewed from such perspective,
accepting the reasons assigned by the petitioner, the
delay in presenting this second appeal should be
condoned.
13. Apparently, there is no wilful
negligence on the part of the petitioners nor this
attempt suffers from want of due diligence. It appears
- 10 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
being a bona fide attempt on the part of the petitioners
to canvass their claim particularly when the trial court
had accepted their plea, which was subjected to
reversal by the appellate court. However, the
petitioners should compensate the respondent by
means of costs for this delay. The contention of the
respondent that valuable rights are accrued to her on
account of inaction of the petitioners in failing to prefer
the second appeal within time, cannot be a significant
factor in the backdrop of the circumstances found in
this case.
14. In the result, this petition is allowed
condoning the delay of 1011 days in filing the second
appeal subject to payment of costs of Rs 2000
(Rupees two thousand only) to the learned counsel for
the respondent on or before 5-10-2021.”
Thus from the aforesaid, it can be seen that the High
Court has not observed that any sufficient cause explaining
the huge delay of 1011 days has been made out.
6.1. The High Court has observed that if the delay is
condoned no prejudice will be caused to the appellant as the
appeal would be heard on merits. The High Court has also
observed that there is no wilful negligence on the part of the
respondents herein nor it suffers from want of due diligence.
However, from the averments in the application for
condonation of delay, we are of the opinion that it was a case
of a gross negligence and/or want of due diligence on the
part of the respondents herein—appellants before the High
Court in filing such a belated appeal.
6.2. We have gone through the averments in the
application for the condonation of delay. There is no
sufficient explanation for the period from 15-3-2017 till the
second appeal was preferred in the year 2021. In the
- 11 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
application seeking condonation of delay it was stated that
she is aged 45 years and was looking after the entire
litigation and that she was suffering from health issues and
she had fallen sick from 1-1-2017 to 15-3-2017 and she was
advised to take bed rest for the said period. However, there
is no explanation for the period after 15-3-2017. Thus, the
period of delay from 15-3-2017 till the second appeal was
filed in the year 2021 has not at all been explained.
Therefore, the High Court has not exercised the discretion
judiciously.
8. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the
aforesaid decisions to the facts of the case on hand and
considering the averments in the application for condonation
of delay, we are of the opinion that as such no explanation
much less a sufficient or a satisfactory explanation had been
offered by Respondents 1 and 2 herein—appellants before
the High Court for condonation of huge delay of 1011 days in
preferring the second appeal. The High Court is not at all
justified in exercising its discretion to condone such a huge
delay. The High Court has not exercised the discretion
judiciously. The reasoning given by the High Court while
condoning huge delay of 1011 days is not germane.
Therefore, the High Court has erred in condoning the huge
delay of 1011 days in preferring the appeal by Respondents
1 and 2 herein—original defendants. Impugned order passed
by the High Court is unsustainable both, on law as well as on
facts.”
- 12 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
10. In the case of Union of India vs. Jahangir Byramji
Jeejeebhoy – 2024 INSC 262, wherein the Apex Court held as
under:-
“ 20. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for
the parties and having gone through the materials on record,
the only question that falls for our consideration is whether
the High Court committed any error in passing the impugned
order?
21. When this matter was heard for the first time by
this Bench, we brought to the notice of the learned Attorney
General something very relevant as observed by the High
Court in para 18 of its impugned order. Para 18 of the
impugned order reads thus:
“18. During the course of hearing, I suggested Mr.
Singh that in case the defendants are ready and willing to
handover possession of the suit property to the respondents,
the Court will consider restoring the Petition to its original
position. The respondents in turn will give undertaking to the
effect that in case the defendants succeed in the Petition,
before approaching the Apex Court, they will handover
possession of the suit property to the defendants. Upon
taking instructions, Mr. Singh submitted that defendants are
not ready and willing to handover possession of the suit
property. In view of the aforesaid discussion, no case is
made out for condoning the delay.”
22. Thus, it appears that the High Court made a
reasonable suggestion to the appellants that if the
possession of the suit property is handed over to the
respondent, then probably the Court may consider restoring
the Petition No. 2307 of 1993 which came to be dismissed
for default on 10.10.2006. The High Court noted as above
- 13 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
that the learned counsel appearing for the appellants
declined to hand over the possession of the suit property to
the respondent herein. We reiterated the very same
suggestion before the learned Attorney General that if the
appellants are ready and willing to hand over the suit
property to the respondent, then, despite there being a long
and inordinate delay, we may consider condoning the same
and remanding the matter back to the High Court so that the
High Court may be in a position to hear the matter on its own
merits. However, the learned Attorney General, after taking
instructions from his clients, regretted his inability to
persuade the appellants to hand over the possession of the
suit property to the respondent.
23. In such circumstances referred to above, we
were left with no other option but to call upon the learned
Attorney General to make submissions as to why we should
look into only the merits of the matter and condone the delay
of 12 years and 158 days.
24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it very
clear that we are not going to look into the merits of the
matter as long as we are not convinced that sufficient cause
has been made out for condonation of such a long and
inordinate delay.
25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private
party or a State or Union of India when it comes to
condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the
litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of
the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law,
then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would
- 14 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This
litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We
are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till
date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of
his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone
the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the
respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal
proceedings.
26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which
the court must take into consideration while considering
whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the
tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they
want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the
proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of
limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to
have the matter considered on merits because of his own
inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-
deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he
cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice
deserves to be preferred as against the technical
considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of
delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main
matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona
fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking
condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the
litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally
balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the
matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.
- 15 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
27. We are of the view that the question of limitation
is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation
are based on the principles of sound public policy and
principles of equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword of
Damocles’ hanging over the head of the respondent for
indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and
fancies of the appellants.
28. At this stage, we would like to quote few
observations made by the High Court in its impugned order
pointing towards lack of bona fides on the part of the
appellants. The observations are as under:—
“9. A perusal of paragraph 4 extracted hereinabove
shows that on oath, solemn statement is made that notice of
Darkhast No. 16 of 2014 for execution of the decree issued
by the executing Court was received by the Department on
25.02.2019. As against this, in paragraph 3 of the additional
affidavit dated 04.07.2019 made by Rajendra Rajaram
Pawar, it is stated that the averments made in paragraph 4
as regards service of Darkhast on 25.02.2019 is factually
incorrect. Notice of Darkhast No. 16 of 2014 was received by
the defendants on 18.03.2016. The error in the application is
out of inadvertence for which he tendered unconditional
apology. It is further stated that inadvertent mistake on facts
as to knowledge of execution proceedings was purely
because of oversight in the light of possibilities of issuance of
possession warrant by the executing court and requirement
of expeditious urgency of moving before this Court to save
the proceeding in litigation since 1981 which otherwise would
have got frustrated. He stated that the same is nothing
beyond human error.
xxxxxxxxx
12. The assertions made in paragraph 4 are bereft of
any particulars and are totally vague. In fact the solemn
statement made in paragraph 4 that notice of Darkhast for
execution of the decree issued by the executing Court was
received by the Department on 25.02.2019, to put it mildly, is
incorrect statement. In view of paragraph 3 of the additional
- 16 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
affidavit dated 04.07.2019 made by Rajendra Rajaram
Pawar, it is evident that notice of Darkhast was received by
the defendants on 18.03.2016. It is material to note that no
particulars are given as to when the Department sought legal
opinion. There is also no explanation as to why Department
did not instruct lawyer in the High Court to apply for
restoration of the Petition and why the Department defended
execution proceedings. It is worthwhile to note that execution
proceedings were filed by the respondents only because Writ
Petition was dismissed. If the Writ Petition was restored,
automatically the execution proceedings would have been
stayed by the executing Court. Instead of adopting
appropriate proceedings, the defendants unnecessarily went
on defending the execution proceedings. In paragraph 4(b)
though it is stated that Department was regularly following up
with its panel lawyer till 2003, this statement is also not
substantiated by producing any document. Even if I accept
that the Department was regularly following up with its panel
lawyer till 2003, there is no explanation worth the name as to
why the Department did not follow up the matter between
2003 and 2006 when the Petition was dismissed in default.
That apart, equally, there is no explanation as to why no
follow up action was taken by the officers between 2006 and
2016 when Department acquired knowledge about dismissal
of Writ Petition on 18.03.2016.
13. It is no doubt true that while considering the
application for condonation of delay, the expression
‘sufficient cause’ has to be liberally construed. It, however,
does not mean that without making any sufficient cause, the
Court will condone the delay regardless of the length of the
delay. In the present case, the delay is of 12 years and 158
days. A perusal of the application as also the additional
affidavit hardly indicates any sufficient cause for condoning
the unpardonable delay of 12 years and 158 days.”
29. In Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Limited v.
Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation, (2010) 5 SCC
459, this Court rejected the application for condonation of
delay of 4 years in filing an application to set aside an
- 17 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
exparte decree on the ground that the explanation offered for
condonation of delay is found to be not satisfied.
34. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached to the
conclusion that the High Court committed no error much less
any error of law in passing the impugned order. Even
otherwise, the High Court was exercising its supervisory
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.”
11. In Pathapati Subbareddy vs. Special Deputy
Collector – 2024 INSC 286, the Apex Court held as under:-
“ 12. In view of the above provision, the appeal which
is preferred after the expiry of the limitation is liable to be
dismissed. The use of the word “shall” in the aforesaid
provision connotes that the dismissal is mandatory subject to
the exceptions. Section 3 of the Act is peremptory and had to
be given effect to even though no objection regarding
limitation is taken by the other side or referred to in the
pleadings. In other words, it casts an obligation upon the court
to dismiss an appeal which is presented beyond limitation.
This is the general law of limitation. The exceptions are
carved out under Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation
Act but we are concerned only with the exception contained in
Section 5 which empowers the courts to admit an appeal
even if it is preferred after the prescribed period provided the
proposed appellant gives “sufficient cause” for not preferring
the appeal within the period prescribed. In other words, the
courts are conferred with discretionary powers to admit an
appeal even after the expiry of the prescribed period provided
- 18 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
the proposed appellant is able to establish “sufficient cause”
for not filing it within time. The said power to condone the
delay or to admit the appeal preferred after the expiry of time
is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if
sufficient cause is shown based upon host of other factors
such as negligence, failure to exercise due diligence, etc.
13. It is very elementary and well understood that
courts should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in
dealing with the applications for condonation of the delay in
filing appeals and rather follow a pragmatic line to advance
substantial justice.
14. It may also be important to point out that though
on one hand, Section 5 of the Limitation Act is to be
construed liberally, but on the other hand, Section 3 of the
Limitation Act, being a substantive law of mandatory nature
has to be interpreted in a strict sense. In Bhag Mal alia Ram
Bux and Ors. Vs. Munshi[Dead] by Lrs. , it has been observed
that different provisions of the Limitation Act may require
different construction, as for example, the court exercises its
power in a given case liberally in condoning the delay in filing
the appeal under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, however, the
same may not be true while construing Section 3 of the
Limitation Act. It, therefore, follows that though liberal
interpretation has to be given in construing Section 5 of the
Limitation Act but not in applying Section 3 of the Limitation
Act, which has to be construed strictly.
15. It is in the light of the public policy upon which law
of limitation is based, the object behind the law of limitation
and the mandatory and the directory nature of Section 3 and
- 19 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
Section 5 of the Limitation Act that we have to examine and
strike a balance between Section 3 and Section 5 of the
Limitation Act in the matters of condoning the delay.
16. Generally, the courts have adopted a very liberal
approach in construing the phrase “sufficient cause” used in
Section 5 of the Limitation Act in order to condone the delay
to enable the courts to do substantial justice and to apply law
in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice.
In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and ors. Vs. Katji
and Ors. this Court in advocating the liberal approach in
condoning the delay for “sufficient cause” held that ordinarily
a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late; it
is not necessary to explain every day's delay in filing the
appeal; and since sometimes refusal to condone delay may
result in throwing out a meritorious matter, it is necessary in
the interest of justice that cause of substantial justice should
be allowed to prevail upon technical considerations and if the
delay is not deliberate, it ought to be condoned.
Notwithstanding the above, howsoever, liberal approach is
adopted in condoning the delay, existence of “sufficient
cause” for not filing the appeal in time, is a condition
precedent for exercising the discretionary power to condone
the delay. The phrases “liberal approach”, “justice-oriented
approach” and cause for the advancement of “substantial
justice” cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so
as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to
be revived and reopened by taking aid of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act.
- 20 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
17. It must always be borne in mind that while
construing “sufficient cause” in deciding application under
Section 5 of the Act, that on the expiry of the period of
limitation prescribed for filing an appeal, substantive right in
favour of a decree-holder accrues and this right ought not to
be lightly disturbed. The decree-holder treats the decree to be
binding with the lapse of time and may proceed on such
assumption creating new rights.
18. This Court as far back in 1962 in Ramlal v. Rewa
Coalfields Ltd. has emphasised that even after sufficient
cause has been shown by a party for not filing an appeal
within time, the said party is not entitled to the condonation of
delay as excusing the delay is the discretionary jurisdiction
vested with the court. The court, despite establishment of a
“sufficient cause” for various reasons, may refuse to condone
the delay depending upon the bona fides of the party.
19. In Maqbul Ahmad v. Pratap Narain Singh and ors.,
it had been held that the court cannot grant an exemption
from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of
hardship. The court has time and again repeated that when
mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not
properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought not
to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone.
20. In this connection, a reference may be made to
Brijesh Kumar v. State of Haryana and Ors wherein while
observing, as above, this Court further laid down that if some
person has obtained a relief approaching the court just or
immediately when the cause of action had arisen, other
persons cannot take the benefit of the same by approaching
- 21 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
the court at a belated stage simply on the ground of parity,
equity, sympathy and compassion.
21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu v. State of Andhra
Pradesh & Ors,, where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory
explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the
applications for condonation of delay, this Court held that the
High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable and
objective manner. The High Court should have exercised the
discretion in a systematic and an informed manner. The
liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay
should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation.
The Court observed that the concepts such as “liberal
approach”, “justice-oriented approach” and “substantial
justice” cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of
limitation.
22. It has also been settled vide State of Jharkhand v.
Ashok Kumar Chokhani & Ors, that the merits of the case
cannot be considered while dealing with the application for
condonation of delay in filing the appeal.
23. In Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer,
this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to
be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and
circumstances of each case. The expression “sufficient
cause” as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot
be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona
fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though
limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to
be applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the statute as
the courts have no choice but to apply the law as it stands
- 22 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
and they have no power to condone the delay on equitable
grounds.
24. It would be beneficial to quote para 12 of the
aforesaid decision in which clinches the issue of the manner
in which equilibrium has to be maintained between adopting
liberal approach and in implementing the statute as it stands.
Para 12 reads as under:
“12. It is a settled legal proposition that
law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party
but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the
statute so prescribes. The court has no power to
extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.
‘A result flowing from a statutory provision is never
an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision
to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from
its operation.’ The statutory provision may cause
hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but
the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full
effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex
which means “the law is hard but it is the law”,
stands attracted in such a situation. It has
consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a
decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a
statute.”
25. This Court in the same breath in the same very
decision vide para 15 went on to observe as under:
“15. The law on the issue can be summarised to
the effect that where a case has been presented in
the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to
explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause”
which means an adequate and enough reason which
prevented him to approach the court within limitation.
In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of
bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances
of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or
remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground
to condone the delay. No court could be justified in
- 23 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any
condition whatsoever. The application is to be
decided only within the parameters laid down by this
Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case
there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to
approach the court on time condoning the delay
without any justification, putting any condition
whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation
of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to
showing utter disregard to the legislature.”
26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions
of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it
is evident that:
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that
there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the
right to remedy rather than the right itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been
exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an
end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be
construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be
construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be
construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though
liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of
substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same
cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of
limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to
condone the delay if sufficient cause had been
explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in
- 24 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient
cause is established for various factors such as, where
there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due
diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar
matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to
the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the
cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be
considered in condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be
decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the
delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the
conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to
disregarding the statutory provision.
32. Moreover, the High Court, in the facts of this
case, has not found it fit to exercise its discretionary
jurisdiction of condoning the delay. There is no occasion for
us to interfere with the discretion so exercised by the High
Court for the reasons recorded. First, the claimants were
negligent in pursuing the reference and then in filing the
proposed appeal. Secondly, most of the claimants have
accepted the decision of the reference court. Thirdly, in the
event the petitioners have not been substituted and made
party to the reference before its decision, they could have
applied for procedural review which they never did. Thus,
there is apparently no due diligence on their part in pursuing
- 25 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
the matter. Accordingly, in our opinion, High Court is justified
in refusing to condone the delay in filing the appeal.
33. In the above situation, we do not deem it proper
and necessary to interfere with the decision of the High court
refusing to condone the inordiate delay in filing the proposed
appeal.”
12. In the case of Hyder vs. State of Kerala – SLP (Cri)
No.14267/2023 dated 10.12.2024, the Apex Court held as under:-
“ 1. Leave granted.
2. Heard Mr. Ritesh Kumar Chowdhary, learned
counsel appearing for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Dileep
Poolakkot, learned counsel appearing for the State of Kerala.
3. The challenge here is to the order (dated
23.06.2023) of the High Court whereunder, the State’s
application for condonation of delay of 1184 days in
presenting the Criminal Appeal was allowed.
The impugned order reads as under:
“This application is filed seeking to condone the
delay of 1184 days in filing the appeal. The appeal is
filed against the judgment by which the trial court
acquitted the respondent based on the decision in
Mohanlal v. State of Punjab [2018 (3) KLT 852 (SC)]
2. Learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the
law laid down as per the decision in Mohanlal (supra)
was held per incuriam and overruled by Mukesh Singh.
v. State Narcotic Branch, Delhi [2020 (10) SCC 120].
3. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted
that a subsequent change in law cannot be a ground
- 26 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
for condoning the delay, particularly when the appeal
was not pending when the subsequent decision was
rendered.
4. As the judgment under appeal is seen rendered
solely based on the dictum in Mohanlal (supra) and the
legal position having changed, the appeal has to be
heard on merits. Being so, the delay is liable to be
condoned.
Hence, the delay in filing the appeal is condoned.”
4. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that
the appellant was acquitted on 10.12.2018 by the learned
Special Court and that the acquittal was based on multiple
reasons including the fact that there is no reliable or cogent
material before the Court to show that the sample which
reached the laboratory, was indeed the sample drawn from
the contraband seized from the possession of the accused.
On the aspect of the acquittal being based on the law
declared by this Court in Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab
reported in (2018) 17 SCC 627, the counsel submits that
under the ratio in the said judgment, it was held that a fair
investigation would postulate that the informant and the
investigator must not be the same person. It is therefore
contended that merely because there is change of law on this
aspect in Mukesh Singh v. State (Narcotic Branch of Delhi)
reported in (2020) 10 SCC 120, the High Court could not have
condoned the inordinate delay in presenting the special
appeal.
5. In Mukesh Singh (supra), the Court said that in a
case where the informant himself is the investigator, that by
itself cannot be sufficient to hold that the investigation is
- 27 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
vitiated on the ground of bias or like factor. The question of
bias or prejudice would depend upon facts and circumstances
of each case.
6. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the
State would argue that when there is a change of law and the
Court subsequently clarified that the informant can also be the
investigator in Mukesh Singh (supra), the condonation of
delay by the High Court on account of the change of law,
cannot be faulted.
7. We have perused the application for condonation of
delay filed by the State before the High Court and notice that
there is hardly any acceptable explanation to condone the
huge delay of 1184 days, in presenting the appeal. Nothing is
mentioned as to why, following the acquittal of the appellant
on 10.12.2018, the State waited for over 3 years, to file the
appeal on 16.09.2022.
8. As earlier noted, the acquittal of the appellant was
not only because of the judgment in Mohan Lal (supra) but it
also was based on the failure of the prosecution to establish
that the sample which was sent to the laboratory, was drawn
from the contraband,seized from the possession of the
accused.
9. On the arguments, we may benefit by adverting to
the decision in Delhi Development Authority v. Tejpal & Ors.
reported in (2024) 7 SCC 433 where the Court held as under:
“47. To sum up, we hold that subsequent change of
law will not be attracted unless a case is pending
before the competent court awaiting its final
adjudication. To say it differently, if a case has already
been decided, it cannot be re-opened and re-decided
- 28 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
solely on the basis of a new interpretation given to that
law.”
10. Having considered the basis for the acquittal and
also the fact that change of law by itself cannot be a ground
for finding fault with the acquittal judgment rendered in favour
of the appellant as far back as on 10.12.2018, the impugned
order dated 23.06.2023 of the High Court in our assessment,
cannot be sustained. Accordingly, by setting aside the order
dated 23.06.2023 in the Crl. M.A. No. 1 of 2022 in Crl. Appeal
No. 762 of 2023, the appeal is allowed.”
13. In Shivamma vs. Karnataka Housing Board – 2025
INSC 1104, the Apex Court held as under:-
“ 40. As such, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for the
purpose of seeking condonation of delay in filing of an
appeal or application, as the case may be, beyond the
stipulated period of limitation, the delay in the filing has to be
explained by demonstrating the existence of a “sufficient
cause” that resulted in such delay for both the prescribed
period of limitation as-well as the period after the expiry of
limitation, up to actual date of filing of such appeal or
application, as the case may be, or to put it simply,
explanation has to be given for the entire duration from the
date when the clock of limitation began to tick, up until the
date of actual filing, for seeking condonation of delay by
recourse to Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
52. This Court in Rewa Coal Fields (supra) observed
that since a party is entitled to take its time and file the
- 29 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
appeal or application, as the case may be, on any day,
during the prescribed period of limitation, it would be
“unreasonable that when delay has been made by the party
in filing the appeal it should be called upon to explain its
conduct during the whole of the period of limitation
prescribed”. Although, it said that such consideration may be
of relevance for the purpose of deciding whether a particular
case is one fit for the court to exercise its discretion to
condone the delay, yet the same would be a question to be
answered, only after sufficient cause is shown, as otherwise
it is of no significance, for the purpose of construing the
period for which delay has to be explained under Section 5 of
the Limitation Act. It further elaborated that the general
considerations of diligence of parties in pursuing their legal
remedies “have very little relevance in construing the
provisions of Section 5” and that there cannot be any
“enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the
time available to it”.
53. It is for this reason, that this Court in Rewa Coal
Fields (supra), hesitated in accepting the contention, that the
period for which explanation has to be given by
demonstrating sufficient cause is the duration from the last
day of expiry of limitation leading up to the actual date of
filing of the appeal or application, as the case may be.
54. We find ourselves, yet again, unable to agree to
the aforesaid reasoning assigned by this Court in Rewa Coal
Fields (supra) for the reasons that we shall assign
hereinafter.
- 30 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
55. First, we must try to understand what was in the
mind of this Court in Rewa Coal Fields (supra) when it made
the aforementioned observations as regards examining into
the diligence of parties for the purpose of condonation of
delay. What has been conveyed in so many words, by Rewa
Coal Fields (supra) is that Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
does not expressly lay down parameters of bona-fides or
diligence of the litigant, as opposed to Section 14 of the self-
same Act, where the legislature has specifically employed
the words “good faith”.
56. What Rewa Coal Fields (supra) is trying to convey
is that, if such parameters which otherwise cannot be culled
out from the text of the provision, can only be read into
“sufficient cause” that too for the limited purpose of deciding
whether the discretion to condone the delay be exercised or
not, then such parameters will be of no significance insofar
as interpreting “within such period” is concerned, for it is
confined only to the “sufficient cause”, and if that be the
case, then the inaction of party for the entire prescribed
period of limitation, will too, be of no significance.
57. Thus, the party would effectively be required to
only come and explain the delay in filing of the appeal or
application, as the case may be, only from the last day on
which the limitation would have expired, till the actual date of
filing of such appeal or application.
58. The law of limitation is founded on public policy.
The object of limitation is to put a quietus on stale and dead
disputes. A person ought not to be allowed to agitate his
claim after a long delay.
- 31 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
59. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the
rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not
resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The
object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage
caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a
lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal
injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would
never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would
sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy
by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for
each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy
may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential
anarchy. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept
alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. The law of
limitation is thus founded on public policy.
60. The bedrock of law on limitation flows from two
age-old Latin maxims; interest reipublicae up sit finis litium
and vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt, which
mean; “it is in the interest of the State that there be an end to
litigation” and “the law assists those who are vigilant, and not
those who sleep over their rights”, respectively. The former
emphasizes that protracted litigation puts a strain on the
judicial system and undermines the law's role in dispute
resolution, and so the public interest requires that disputes
be resolved in some final form rather than continuing
indefinitely to drain the resources of courts and the parties.
While the later connotes that a person who has slept on his
rights may be denied enforcement of the same when the
resulting delay would cause an unfair prejudice.
- 32 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
61. What flows from the aforesaid is that the dominant
objective underlying the law of limitation is that any lis cannot
be kept in a state of flux or uncertainty, doubt or suspense.
Public interest demands that at some point finality be put to
the litigation. It is in this context that the Limitation Act,
prescribes the specific points of time from which the period of
limitation begins to run for the institution of actions or
recourse to litigation. On expiry of such period, no action can
be initiated save and except where the court condones the
delay for a sufficient cause. A party who is insensible to the
value of civil remedies, and who does not assert his claim
with promptitude is denied the ability to enforce even an
otherwise rightful claim. [See: DDA v. Tejpal, (2024) 7 SCC
433]
62. At this stage, it would be apposite to refer to
Section 3 of the Limitation Act, which reads as under:—
“ 3. Bar of limitation.—
(1) Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24
(inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and
application made after the prescribed period shall be
dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a
defence.
(2) For the purposes of this Act,—
(a) a suit is instituted,—
(i) in an ordinary case, when the plaint is presented to the
proper officer;
(ii) in the case of a pauper, when his application for leave to
sue as a pauper is made; and
- 33 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
(iii) in the case of a claim against a company which is being
wound up by the court, when the claimant first sends in his
claim to the official liquidator;
(b) any claim by way of a set off or a counter claim, shall be
treated as a separate suit and shall be deemed to have been
instituted—
(i) in the case of a set off, on the same date as the suit in
which the set off is pleaded;
(ii) in the case of a counter claim, on the date on which the
counter claim is made in court;
(c) an application by notice of motion in a High Court is made
when the application is presented to the proper officer of that
court.”
63. Bare reading of the aforesaid provision leaves no
room for doubt that if a suit is instituted, appeal is preferred
or application is made after the prescribed period, it has to
be dismissed even though no such plea has been raised or
defence has been set up. In other words, even in the
absence of such plea by the defendant, respondent or
opponent, as the case may be, the court or authority must
dismiss such suit, appeal or application, if it is satisfied that
the suit, appeal or application is barred by limitation.
Limitation goes to the root of the matter. If a suit, appeal or
application is barred by limitation, a court or an adjudicating
authority has no jurisdiction, power or authority to entertain
such suit, appeal or application and to decide it on merits.
64. Section 3 sub-section (1) of the Limitation Act
makes every proceeding filed after the prescribed period,
liable to be dismissed, subject however to the provisions in
- 34 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
Section(s) 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act. It mandates that it
would be the duty of the court to dismiss any suit instituted
after the prescribed period of limitation irrespective of the fact
that limitation has not been set up as a defence. If a suit is ex
facie barred by the law of limitation, a court has no choice
but to dismiss the same even if the defendant intentionally
has not raised the plea of limitation. [See: V.M. Salgaocar
and Bros. v. Board of Trustees of Port of Mormugao, (2005)
4 SCC 613]
65. The above exposited fundamental pillars of the
law on limitation, namely, (i) that the sword of prosecution
ought not to be hanging over an individual for an
indeterminate period and (ii) those who have been lethargic
in safeguarding their interests should not expect the law to
come to their rescue, are reflected in Section 3 of the
Limitation Act, more particularly sub-section (1) inasmuch as
it enjoins a duty upon the courts to dismiss any suit
instituted, appeal preferred and application made, after the
period of limitation prescribed therefor by Schedule I
irrespective of the fact whether the opponent had set up the
plea of limitation or not. It is the duty of the court not to
proceed with the application if it is made beyond the period
of limitation prescribed.
66. Thus, the Limitation Act is an embodiment of a
clear legislative policy that litigation must be commenced,
prosecuted, and concluded within a definite timeframe.
Section 3 of the Limitation Act gives effect to this mandate in
categorical terms by obligating courts to dismiss every suit,
appeal, or application instituted beyond the prescribed
- 35 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
period, irrespective of whether limitation is raised as a
defence. This provision is not a matter of discretion but of
duty, for it reflects the underlying public interest in ensuring
certainty, finality, and repose in legal disputes.
67. Section(s) 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act is only an
exception to the aforesaid unexceptionable rule. Likewise,
Section 5 of the Limitation Act is no different. It cannot be
construed in isolation from Section 3 or from the overarching
rationale behind the said provision. When we say, that
Section(s) 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, which includes
Section 5, is only an exception, we do not for a moment say
that it is an exception to the core axioms of ‘interest
reipublicae up sit finis litium’ and ‘vigilantibus non
dormientibus jura subveniunt’ that underline the Limitation
Act. The aforesaid form the very jurisprudential
underpinnings on why we even have prescribed periods of
limitation, and are the very basis for the existence of statutes
on limitation in every civilized country that has ever existed.
68. Section(s) 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act are only an
exception insofar as the mandate enshrined under Section 3
is concerned, which enjoins a duty upon the courts to
dismiss any suit instituted, appeal preferred, or application
made after the prescribed period of limitation. They as a
matter of exception, enable the courts to entertain a suit,
appeal or application, filed even after the prescribed period
of limitation where the delay was owed to factors beyond the
reasonable control of the litigant. But this does not mean,
that delays occasioned or accompanied to some extent by
negligence, inaction, or a lack of care or vigilance of the
- 36 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
litigant would also be liable to be excused, or at the very
least ignored by the court even if the delay in question
happens to formulaically fulfil the statutorily prescribed
parameters for excusing the same.
69. To say otherwise, that Section(s) 4 to 24 of the
Limitation Act and by extension Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, is an exception to the rule requiring litigants to be
vigilant and diligent in their endeavours for pursuing legal
remedies, or that the negligence or inaction of a litigant
during the prescribed period of limitation have no place,
insofar as Section(s) 4 to 24 are concerned, would have a
chilling effect of eradicating every basic tenet for which a
prescribed period of limitation exists and could result in
manifest injustice to those prejudiced by such laches or
delays, if condoned. It would tantamount to reducing
Section(s) 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act to tools for subverting
rather than effectuating the legislative intent to not excuse
negligence, inaction, or lack of diligence on the part of a
litigant except where the delay is occasioned by factors that
lie beyond its reasonable control, and thereby create a very
skewed and distorted understanding of the Limitation Act,
where despite the aforesaid legislative intent being imbued in
every other provision of the Limitation Act, permeating
across the scheme thereof, the same would be discarded for
a select set of provisions i.e., Section(s) 4 to 24, while being
scrupulously enforced for all other provisions.
70. Thus, Section(s) 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act,
including Section 5, must be understood in the broader
framework of the law of limitation. They cannot be construed
- 37 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
as a gateway to overlook or overcome the sound principles
of ‘interest reipublicae up sit finis litium’ and ‘vigilantibus non
dormientibus jura subveniunt’ that are the elementary
constituents of the Limitation Act and all its ideals. It is in the
same breath that we say, that the provision of Section 5 of
the Limitation Act, cannot be read in a manner which is either
derogatory to, or tends to dilute the aforesaid fundamental
edifice of the law of limitation to a mere ad-lib.
71. In this regard we may refer to the decision of this
Court in Hameed Joharan (Dead) v. Abdul Salam (Dead) by
LRs, (2001) 7 SCC 573, wherein it was observed that the
general policy of the law of limitation encapsulated in the
Limitation Act is to favour the use of legal diligence.
Expounding the maxim of ‘vigilantibus et non dormientibus
jura subveniunt’ it was held that a court of law never tolerates
an indolent litigant since delay defeats equity. It further held
that lapse of time is a species for forfeiture of right. The
relevant observations read as under:—
“14. Needless to record that engrossment of
stamped paper would undoubtedly render the decree
executable but that does not mean and imply, however,
that the enforceability of the decree would remain
suspended until furnishing of the stamped paper — this
is opposed to the fundamental principle on which the
statutes of limitation are founded. It cannot but be the
general policy of our law to use the legal diligence and
this has been the consistent legal theory from the
ancient times: even the doctrine of prescription in
Roman law prescribes such a concept of legal diligence
and since its incorporation therein, the doctrine has
always been favoured rather than claiming disfavour.
Law courts never tolerate an indolent litigant since delay
defeats equity — the Latin maxim vigilantibus et non
dormientibus jura subveniunt (the law assists those who
- 38 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
are vigilant and not those who are indolent). As a matter
of fact, lapse of time is a species for forfeiture of right.
Wood, V.C. in Manby v. Bewicke (K&J at p. 352) stated:
(ER p. 1144)
“The legislature has in this, as in every civilized
country that has ever existed, thought fit to prescribe
certain limitations of time after which persons may
suppose themselves to be in peaceful possession of
their property, and capable of transmitting the estates of
which they are in possession, without any apprehension
of the title being impugned by litigation in respect of
transactions which occurred at a distant period, when
evidence in support of their own title may be most
difficult to obtain.””
72. As aptly noted in Hameed Joharan (supra), lapse
of time is a specie for forfeiture of right, which is why where a
litigant allows the limitation to expire for any right or remedy,
due to its own volition, be it in the form of, inaction, lethargy,
negligence or mistake, which could have been avoided, no
indulgence should ordinarily be shown by the courts in
entertaining or enforcing the assertion of such rights, de
hors, the litigant otherwise demonstrating a cause for such
delay, which may as well also fit within any of the parameters
of the exceptions carved out within Section(s) 4 to 24 of the
Limitation Act.
73. Thus, the reasoning of this Court in Rewa Coal
Fields (supra) that the parameters of ‘bona-fides’, ‘diligence’
or ‘inaction’ of the litigant have no bearing on relevance for
the purpose of construing Section 5 of the Limitation Act, in
the absence of any express language in this regard being
couched in the provision is flawed. These parameters flow
directly from the maxim ‘vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura
- 39 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
subveniunt’ enshrined in the Limitation Act, albeit to varying
degrees depending upon the provision in question, but by no
stretch are they excluded from application, wantonly or
otherwise, in any provision thereof. Merely because the
provision does not explicitly lay down any of the aforesaid
parameters cannot be construed to mean that the legislative
intent behind the provision also, was to not allude to the
same.
74. The legislature always speaks through the statute
it enacts, and its intention behind any provision or provisions
thereof, is to be gathered from the language used in the
provision along with the avowed objects with which the same
came to be enacted. In construing or interpreting a provision,
any deviation from the legislative intent that backs the
particular statute containing the said provision cannot be
done casually. Mere omission of few stray words, does not
detract or take away the lofty intent behind enacting the
statute and cannot always be interpreted to impute a
contrary intent unless the same is apparent and supported
by some other salutary object with which such omission may
have been made.
75. In this regard, it could be argued that the
legislature may have intentionally omitted the express
mentioning of any of the aforesaid parameters pertaining to
party diligence in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, to lay stress
on two key components of the law of limitation. First, that a
party has a right to file an appeal or application, as the case
may be on any day within the prescribed period of limitation
and secondly, that the rules of limitation are not meant to
- 40 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
destroy or extinguish rights of litigants but only to curb
deliberate dilatory tactics.
76. If at all such was the intention behind the
legislature, then the same is being adequately subserved by
virtue of the discretion bestowed onto the the courts under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
77. There was no need to exclude the applicability of
these parameters from the expression “within such period” or
the overall provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, if all
that the legislature intended was to ensure that expiry of
limitation should not result in extinguishment of rights of
parties.
78. The legislature in its wisdom, has in order to lay
emphasis that rights of a party ought not to be defeated or
relinquished by the expiry of limitation, conferred the
discretion to courts to condone the same, subject to showing
sufficient cause.
79. But to read this entitlement to file the appeal or
application, on any day of the limitation, as instrument to
construe the import of “within such period”, would run
counter to the object of limitation, which is to enthuse a
sense of responsibility and vigilance upon the litigants and
avoid protraction of the lis. It would, in our opinion, invariably
give the litigants, a ‘free-pass’ to resort to dilatory tactics for
the substantial portion of the prescribed period of limitation,
with little to no consequence.
80. For illustration, any person, who is able to
demonstrate that he or she, began to take some steps
towards preferring the appeal or making the application, on
- 41 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
the very last day of limitation, whereafter, he or she, ran into
some snags which otherwise, was a sufficient cause, for the
subsequent delay, would be entitled to condonation of the
same. The courts in such a scenario, even after being
satisfied about the existence of a ‘sufficient cause’ may
nevertheless have the discretion to choose not to condone
the same, but not for the reasons of prior inaction of such
litigant during the remaining period of limitation if the dictum
of Rewa Coal Fields (supra) is squarely followed. This is
because, Rewa Coal Fields (supra) also deprecates “an
enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the time
available to it” even after sufficient cause is shown to it,
although not as a straitjacket formula, but still nevertheless
very rigidly.
81. On the contrary, recognizing the flip side of the
proposition that rules of limitation are not meant to destroy
the rights of parties into the exercise of discretion by the
courts to admit any assertion of the same, after the
prescribed period of limitation, provided there is no inaction
or negligence, on the part of the litigant, rather than reading
the same into “within such period” or “sufficient cause”, to our
minds, appears to be the least disruptive interpretation of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, that would balance the
salutary object of any statute of limitation, in toto. It would not
only ensure that not even an ounce of dilatory tactics by a
litigant is allowed to pollute the streams of justice, but also
curb the seriously falling standards of diligence that the
litigants today have towards assertion of their rights or
availment of remedies, and a growing tendency to leave
- 42 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
things for the last moment, at the cost of prejudice to other
litigants, and without any modicum of respect for the courts
and judicial resources. At the same time, it will also allow
courts to save those rights and permit their enforcement or
adjudication, by a judicious exercise of their discretion in
justified instances of delays, that are not a byproduct or
result of the litigant's own inaction or negligence.
82. Thus, to our minds, the fixation by Rewa Coal
Fields (supra) that “within such period” covers only the period
from the last day of limitation till the actual date of filing, does
not appear to be supported either by the bare text of the
provision or by the mere omission of an express contextual
concomitant, in the form of any parameters to avert to any
inaction, negligence or lack of diligence of a litigant under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, that could be suggestive of
the legislative intent to avoid applicability of such parameters
for the condonation of delay thereunder.
83. We need not dwell any further on this. We may
only say, that even in the absence of any express mentioning
of any of the aforesaid parameters, the legislature's intent is
very limpid. The use of the prefix “sufficient” in Section 5 of
the Limitation Act, itself for lack of a better word, sufficiently
indicates that the legislature was conscious of its use and
import, and inherently intends to convey the applicability of
these parameters to these provisions. Once it is clear, that
such parameters of diligence or lack of any inaction etc., can
be read into “sufficient cause” it can be no one's case that,
the same would also not include averting to any inaction of
the party during the remaining period of limitation, and only
- 43 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
to the last day of expiry of limitation, as Rewa Coal Fields
(supra) has understood.
84. We say so, because both the expressions
“sufficient cause” and “within such period” are inextricably
linked together. We have already alluded how the expression
“within such period” is to be construed. For the purpose of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the foremost requirement is to
demonstrate existence of a “sufficient cause” for the period
covered by the expression “within such period”, thereby
meaning that, any inaction of the litigant during the remaining
prescribed period of limitation apart from the last day of the
limitation would be equally relevant for determining
sufficiency of cause or to be precise the lack thereof. To put
it simply, if the inaction of a party is relevant for the last day
of the limitation to determine that there was no sufficient
cause as per Rewa Coal Fields (supra), then it would also,
invariably be relevant for the remaining period of the
prescribed limitation, as-well as the period after the expiry of
limitation leading up to the actual filing of the appeal, as the
expression “within such period” used in Section 5, does not
demarcate any difference between these intervals.
85. Rather, the expression “within such period” treats,
‘the prescribed period of limitation’, ‘the last day of expiry of
limitation’ and ‘the period after the expiry of limitation till the
date of filing’, as the same for the purpose of condonation of
delay, which is to say that, as long as there was a “sufficient
cause” continuing between all these three intervals, the court
would have the discretion to condone the same, provided the
- 44 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
sufficient cause is not the result of negligence, inaction or
lack of diligence of the litigant.
86. One another good reason that fortifies our mind to
hold the aforesaid is due to the very nature of the provision
of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The said provision, as
evident from its text, is only applicable in respect of appeals
or applications. Lis that arises from appeals or applications,
more often than not, do not partake the character of original
proceedings. The deliberations and contemplations that a
party undertakes before availing the remedy of the courts, is
much lesser in threshold in case of appeals or applications,
than in proceedings of original nature.
87. The aforesaid unique distinction between the
nature of original and appellate proceedings for the purpose
of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, was recognized by this
Court in University of Delhi v. Union of India, (2020) 13 SCC
745, with the following relevant observations:—
“25. The entire explanation for the inordinate delay of
916 days is twofold i.e. the non-availability of the Vice-
Chancellor due to retirement and subsequent appointment of
new Vice-Chancellor, also that the matter was placed before
the Executive Council and a decision was taken to file the
appeal and the said process had caused the delay. The
reasons as stated do not appear very convincing since the
situation was of availing the appellate remedy and not the
original proceedings requiring such deliberation when it was
a mere continuation of the proceedings which had already
been filed on behalf of the appellant herein, after due
deliberation.
14. In the case of State of Odisha vs. Managing
Committee – 2026 INSC 148, the Apex Court held as under:-
- 45 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
“ 19. Reading Ramegowda (supra) and Amateur
Riders (supra), one after the other, leaves none in doubt that
it did not take much time for this Court to lose hope. It is
absolutely clear that the law was laid down in Ramegowda
(supra), following Katiji (supra), with much optimism that
matters would improve. Their Lordships, however, found no
visible support for such optimism and the Court's patience
having been tested to the extreme limit, held that there is a
point beyond which even the courts cannot help a litigant
even if the litigant labouring under the shackles of
bureaucratic indifference is the Government.
20. We have found the State of Odisha to be utterly
lethargic, tardy and indolent not only before the High Court
but also before this Court. Notwithstanding that its appeal
was dismissed as time-barred by the High Court, this Court
has been approached by the State of Odisha four months
after expiry of the period of limitation.
21. Condonation of delay cannot be claimed as a
matter of right. It is entirely the discretion of the Court
whether or not to condone delay. Despite all the latitude that
is shown to a “State”, we are of the clear opinion that the
cause sought to be shown here by the State of Odisha is not
an explanation but a lame excuse. No case for exercise of
discretion has been set up.
22. The applications for condonation of delay in filing
the special leave petition and condonation of delay in re-filing
the same, thus, stand rejected, with the result that the
special leave petition stands dismissed as time-barred.”
- 46 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
15. In the instant case, as stated supra, the material on
record clearly establishes that the review petitioners were utterly
lethargic, tardy and indolent and it is impermissible in law to lend a
legitimizing effect to administrative lethargy and laxity of State
authorities, especially when the petitioners themselves had taken a
decision in 2024 itself, i.e., more than one year prior to filing the
review petition on 17.06.2025 to give effect to and implement the
judgment and decree of this Court, which they subsequently seek
to challenge in the review petition. Further, there are various
intervening periods during the period of 1075 days when there was
absolutely total and complete lack of diligence on the part of the
review petitioners, which is sufficient to come to the conclusion that
they are not entitled to any indulgence at the hands of this Court
and consequently, I am of the considered opinion that I.A.1/2025 is
devoid of merit and the same is liable to be rejected.
16. Even on merits, I have given my anxious consideration
to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the review
petitioners and perused the material on record including the
impugned order in the light of the decisions of the Apex Court in (i)
Shri Ram Sahu vs. Vinod Kumar Rawat – Civil Appeal
- 47 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
No.3601/2020 dated 03.11.2020, (ii) S.Murali Sundaram vs.
Jothibai Kannan – (2023) SCC Online SC 185 (iii)
S.Madhusudhan Reddy vs. V.Narayana Reddy – Civil Appeal
Nos.5503-04/2022 dated 18.08.2022 and the judgment of the
Apex Court in the case of (iv) Sanjay Kumar Agarwal vs. State
Tax Officer –2023 SCC Online SC 1406, wherein it is held as
under:-
16. The gist of the afore-stated decisions is that:—
(i) A judgment is open to review inter alia if there is a
mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record.
(ii) A judgment pronounced by the Court is final, and
departure from that principle is justified only when
circumstances of a substantial and compelling character
make it necessary to do so.
(iii) An error which is not self-evident and has to be
detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to
be an error apparent on the face of record justifying the
court to exercise its power of review.
(iv) In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule
1 CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be
“reheard and corrected.”
(v) A Review Petition has a limited purpose and
cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise.”
- 48 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52424
RP No. 248 of 2025
CNR: KAHC010392272025
(vi) Under the guise of review, the petitioner cannot be
permitted to reagitate and reargue the questions which
have already been addressed and decided.
(vii) An error on the face of record must be such an
error which, mere looking at the record should strike and it
should not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on
the points where there may conceivably be two opinions.
(viii) Even the change in law or subsequent
decision/judgment of a co-ordinate or larger Bench by itself
cannot be regarded as a ground for review.
17. Upon consideration of the entire material on record, I do
not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned judgment and
decree nor does it suffer from any error apparent on the face of the
record warranting interference by this Court under Section 114 r/w
Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC, as held in the aforesaid judgments of the
Apex Court.
18. In view of the foregoing reasons, both I.A.1/2205 and
the main review petition are devoid of merits and the same are
hereby dismissed.
Sd/-
(S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR)
JUDGE
BMC/SRL