Tajlnder Pal Singh vs Directorate Of Enforcement
- Court
- Delhi High Court
$~J
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Judgment reserved on: 17.03.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 04.07.2026
+ CRL. M.A. 17144/2025, CRL. M.A. 17145/2025 & CRL. M.A.
17146/2025 IN CRL. REV. P. 1283/2024 (disposed of)
TAJINDER PAL SINGH ....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Rajeev Awasthi, Adv.
versus
DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT ....Respondent
Through: Mr. Zoheb Hossain, Special Counsel
for ED, Mr. Vivek Gurnani & Mr.
Pranjal Tripathi, Advs.
M/S NKG INFRASTRUCTURE LTD. ….Applicant
Through: Mr. Vijay Aggarwal, Adv.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JASMEET SINGH
J U D G M E N T
CRL. M.A. 17145/2025
Exemptions granted, subject to all just exceptions.
Application stands disposed of.
CRL. M.A. 17144/2025
Digitally Signed
By:ANSH SRIVASTAVA
Signing Date:04.07.2026
12:33:19
CRL. REV. P. 1283/2024 Page 1 of 28
1. This is an application filed by M/s NKG Infrastructure Ltd. under Section
528 of Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023/Section 482 of Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“ CrPC ”) read with Article 227 of the
Constitution of India seeking recall of order dated 03.12.2024 passed by
this Court granting the accused Tajinder Pal Singh the status of Approver
and setting aside the order dated 22.08.2024 passed by the Special Judge,
Rouse Avenue Court, New Delhi.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
2. The Directorate of Enforcement (“ ED ”) registered an ECIR dated
06.07.2022 on the basis of alleged predicate offence registered by the
CBI under Section 120 B read with Section 420 of Indian Penal Code and
Section 13 (2) read with Section 13(1) (d) of Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988.
3. As per the said ECIR, the applicant, who is an accused, got a tender for
supply, installation, testing and commissioning of electromagnetic flow
meters and corresponding O&M Operation for five years which was
floated by Delhi Jal Board (“ DJB ”) on the basis of a false performance
certificate. The work was sub-contracted to M/s Integral Screw Industries
Ltd., a proprietorship firm of Sh. Anil Kumar Aggarwal. An amount of
Rs. 24,74,71,376/- was released by DJB to the applicant against the work
awarded to it out of which Rs. 10,62,22,694/- which was generated into
proceeds of crime and shared by the applicant.
4. The petitioner in the main petition, Sh. Tajinder Pal Singh moved an
application under Section 306 and 307 of CrPC before the Rouse Avenue
Court seeking grant of pardon for his alleged role in money laundering.
The applicant herein moved an application for impleadment bearing I.A.
Digitally Signed
By:ANSH SRIVASTAVA
Signing Date:04.07.2026
12:33:19
CRL. REV. P. 1283/2024 Page 2 of 28
No. 14/2024 in C.T. Case No. 12/2024 titled Directorate of Enforcement
v. Jagdish Kumar Arora and Ors. in the application of the petitioner
seeking tender of pardon. The same was rejected by the Special Judge
vide Order dated 30.07.2024. Subsequently, the Special Judge, Rouse
Avenue Court, on 22.08.2024, dismissed the application filed by the
petitioner under Section 306 and 307 seeking pardon.
5. The order of dismissal dated 22.08.2024 was challenged by the petitioner
through the instant Criminal Revision Petition. The petitioner was granted
the status of the approver by this Court vide order dated 03.12.2024 while
setting aside the order dated 22.08.2024 passed by the Special Judge,
Rouse Avenue Court.
6. It is the case of the applicant that order dated 03.12.2024 has been passed
without hearing the applicant herein and grave prejudice has been caused
to the applicant. Hence, the present application.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPLICANT
7. Mr. Vijay Aggarwal, learned counsel for the applicant, states that the
impugned order needs to be recalled as the applicant herein was a
necessary party to the main Revision Petition and thus, has the right to be
heard by virtue of Section 401 (2) of the CrPC, 1973. He emphasises that
Section 401 (2) CrPC, 1973 mandates that no order shall be passed which
may cause prejudice to the accused or any other person, unless an
opportunity of hearing has been afforded. The applicants and other
accused were not made respondents in the present petition thereby
causing violation of principles of natural justice and thus, causing
prejudice to the accused. Therefore, the Order dated 03.12.2024 is void
due to procedural lapses.
Digitally Signed
By:ANSH SRIVASTAVA
Signing Date:04.07.2026
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CRL. REV. P. 1283/2024 Page 3 of 28
8. He states that wherever the necessary parties are not added, such orders
are liable to be recalled as the same are vitiated by procedural lapse. He
1
relies on Parmod Bagga v. State.
9. He further states that this Court has the power to recall orders in cases of
such procedural impropriety and there is no requirement of approaching
the Supreme Court. Thus, the bar of Section 362 CrPC also does not
apply in the present case and review of a procedural defect is permissible.
Moreover, if a judgment has been pronounced without jurisdiction or
without granting the opportunity of being heard by the affected party, it
becomes nullity and the bar of Section 362 CrPC does not operate. He
relies on the following judgments:
2
a. Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal
3
b. State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar
4
c. Ganesh Patel v. Umakant Rajoria
5
d. Budhia Swain v. Gopinath Deb
e. Directorate of Revenue Intelligence v. Mohd. Abaad Ali and
6
Anr.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF ED
10. Mr. Hossain, learned Special Counsel for ED, at the outset assails to
maintainability of the present application. He states that the Trial Judge
vide detailed order dated 30.07.2024 passed in I.A. No. 14/2024 in CT.
Case No. 12/2024 had dismissed the application filed by the applicants
seeking impleadment in the pardon proceedings. The said order was
1
2007 SCC OnLine Del 1219.
2
1980 Supp SCC 420.
3
(2011) 14 SCC 770.
4
2022 SCC OnLine SC 2050.
5
(1999) 4 SCC 396.
6
Crl L.P. 330 of 2013 (Delhi High Court), order dated 17.11.2014.
Digitally Signed
By:ANSH SRIVASTAVA
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never challenged by the applicants. Thus, the judgment of the Trial Court
conclusively decides the dispute between the party. It is well settled that
even if a nullity, the order is required to be challenged in appropriate
proceedings. Thus, the present application is liable to be dismissed on this
preliminary ground. He places reliance on various judgments including:
a. M.P. Housing and Infrastructure Development Board v. K.P.
7
Dwivedi
b. Krishnadevi Malchand Kamathia v. Bombay Environmental
8
Action Group
9
c. Sneh Gupta v. Devi Sarup
11. Learned Special Counsel, on merits, makes two-fold submissions:
11.1 The granting of pardon and making of accused an approver is an
issue between the Court and the applicant accused. The Co-accused
has no right to be heard. He relies on Ashok Kumar Aggarwal v.
10 11 12
CBI ; M.M. Kochar v. State ; Gurvinder Singh Bhatia v. CBI
13
and State of U.P. v. Kailash Nath Agarwal .
11.2 It is a well settled law that a Court shall agree to tendering pardon if
the prosecution makes a fit case that the tender of pardon is in the
interest of successful prosecution of the remaining offenders. He
relies on Lt. Commander Pascal Fernandes v. State of
14
Maharashtra .
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
7
(2022) 3 SCC 783.
8
(2011) 3 SCC 363.
9
(2009) 6 SCC 194.
10
2007 SCC OnLine Del 1113.
11
1968 SCC OnLine Del 6.
12
2015 SCC OnLine Del 13078.
13
(1973) 1 SCC 751.
14
1967 SCC OnLine SC 37.
Digitally Signed
By:ANSH SRIVASTAVA
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12. Mr. Rajiv Awasthi, learned counsel for the petitioner, opposes the
maintainability of the present application. He states that once a final order
is passed by a Court, it becomes functus officio and thus is specifically
barred under Section 362 of CrPC to alter or review the same except to
correct clerical or arithmetical error. The applicant by way of the present
application has sought to set aside three final orders being order dated
03.12.2024 of this Court, Order dated 30.07.2024 dismissing the
application of the applicant seeking impleadment and order dated
15.01.2025 granting pardon to the petitioner in compliance of the order of
this Court. As wide as the powers of Section 482 CrPC are, the same
would be impermissible under Section 362 CrPC. He relies on various
judgments including:
15
a. Vikram Bakshi v. R.P. Khosla and Anr.
16
b. Mostt. Simrikhia v. Smt. Dolley Mukherjee @ Smt.
17
c. Dr Sanjeev Rasaina Vs CBI
13. Further, he points out that a similar application for impleadment was filed
by the accused before the Trial Court and the same was rejected. The
order rejecting the said application has not been challenged by the
applicant. Thus, the judgment of the Trial Court on the said issue has
become final.
14. It is also stated that the co-accused has no right to be heard while the
application for grant of pardon is being considered by the Court. In the
regard reliance has been placed on the following judgments:
18
a. Yadav Singh v. State of U.P.
15
SLP (Crl.) No. 3425/2025.
16
Criminal Appeal No. 128 of 1990 dated on 2 March, 1990.
17
CRL. M. C. 878/2021 dt. 3rd Jan 2022.
Digitally Signed
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19
b. Senthamarai v. S. Krishnaraj
20
c. Pradeep Nirankar Nath Sharma v. State of Gujarat
21
d. Gurvinder Singh Bhatia v. CBI
REJOINDER SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPLICANT
15. Countering the arguments of the ED, learned counsel for the applicant
states that the law of Revision is governed by Section 397 and 401 CrPC
and even a party who was not required to be heard before the Trial Court
is a necessary party in Revision when the rights of that party are affected.
Thus, no order can be passed by the High Court while exercising the
Revisional Jurisdiction under Section 401 CrPC to the prejudice of a co-
accused. He places reliance on Raghu Raj Singh Rousha v. Shivam
22
Sundaram Promoters (P) Ltd. and Manharibhai Muljibhai Kakadia v.
23
Shaileshbhai Mohanbhai Patel .
16. He also states that since the trial court had refused to grant relief to the
petitioner under Section 306 CrPC seeking the status of approver, there
was no reason why the applicant should have challenged the order dated
30.07.2024. Further, the applicant did not have any knowledge with
respect to the instant Revision Petition.
17. He further points out the judgments of Prabhat Ranjan Sarkar v. State of
24 25
Bihar and State v. Sunil Batra where a distinction has been drawn
between the application of Section 306 CrPC prior to the stage of filing of
chargesheet and subsequent to the stage of filing of chargesheet. In the
18
2018 SCC OnLine All 7520.
19
2001 SCC OnLine Mad 894.
20
Crl. Rev. Appn. No. 983/2023.
21
Supra N. 12.
22
(2009) 2 SCC 363.
23
(2012) 10 SCC 517.
24
1973 SCC OnLine Pat 44.
25
1978 SCC OnLine Del 36.
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former there is no requirement to hear the accused, whereas in the latter,
the accused is required to be heard.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
18. There are two aspects which are to be considered:
a. Whether this Court can as per law re-visit and recall the order
dated 03.12.2024?
b. Whether the applicant, being co-accused, has the right to be heard
before the order granting a pardon under Section 306 and Section
307 is passed?
19. With respect to Issue No. 1, it is trite law that as per Section 362 CrPC a
Criminal Court cannot review or alter its final judgment on merits.
However, catena of judgments recognise a distinction between a
substantive review and a procedural review. A substantive review, on one
hand, involves reconsideration of merits of the dispute and on the other
hand a procedural review involves revisiting the final order for the lack of
procedural propriety such as violation of Principles of Natural Justice.
20. The very object of Section 482 CrPC is to secure the ends of justice and
prevent the abuse of process, but certainly, what is prohibited by Section
362 CrPC cannot be done by the Court under the broad jurisdiction of
Section 482 CrPC. At the same time if Section 482 is not being exercised
to correct the judgment on merits rather any other procedural lapse, the
same to my mind shall be permitted.
21. The learned counsel for the applicant has placed reliance on various
26
judgments including Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar which reiterate the
ratio that the Courts have the power to recall any order where there has
26
Supra N. 3.
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been a violation of principles of natural justice or any order has been
passed without granting adequate opportunity to a necessary party to be
heard.
27
The relevant paragraphs of Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar read as under:
“III. Bar to review/alter judgment
44. There is no power of review with the criminal court after
the judgment has been rendered. The High Court can alter
or review its judgment before it is signed. When an order is
passed, it cannot be reviewed. Section 362 CrPC is based
on an acknowledged principle of law that once a matter is
finally disposed of by a court, the said court in the absence
of a specific statutory provision becomes functus officio and
is disentitled to entertain a fresh prayer for any relief unless
the former order of final disposal is set aside by a court of
competent jurisdiction in a manner prescribed by law. The
court becomes functus officio the moment the order for
disposing of a case is signed. Such an order cannot be
altered except to the extent of correcting a clerical or
arithmetical error. There is also no provision for
modification of the judgment. (See Hari Singh Mann v.
Harbhajan Singh Bajwa [(2001) 1 SCC 169 : 2001 SCC
(Cri) 113] and Chhanni v. State of U.P. [(2006) 5 SCC 396
: (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 466] )
45. Moreover, the prohibition contained in Section 362
CrPC is absolute; after the judgment is signed, even the
27
Supra N. 3.
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High Court in exercise of its inherent power under Section
482 CrPC has no authority or jurisdiction to alter/review
the same. (See Moti Lal v. State of M.P. [(2012) 11 SCC 427
: AIR 1994 SC 1544] , Hari Singh Mann [(2001) 1 SCC 169
: 2001 SCC (Cri) 113] and State of Kerala v. M.M.
Manikantan Nair [(2001) 4 SCC 752 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 808]
.)
46. If a judgment has been pronounced without jurisdiction
or in violation of principles of natural justice or where the
order has been pronounced without giving an opportunity of
being heard to a party affected by it or where an order was
obtained by abuse of the process of court which would
really amount to its being without jurisdiction, inherent
powers can be exercised to recall such order for the reason
that in such an eventuality the order becomes a nullity and
the provisions of Section 362 CrPC would not operate. In
such an eventuality, the judgment is manifestly contrary to
the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice. The power
of recall is different from the power of altering/reviewing
the judgment. However, the party seeking recall/alteration
has to establish that it was not at fault. (Vide Chitawan v.
Mahboob Ilahi [1970 Cri LJ 378 (All)] , Deepak
Thanwardas Balwani v. State of Maharashtra [1985 Cri LJ
23 (Bom)] , Habu v. State of Rajasthan [AIR 1987 Raj 83] ,
Swarth Mahto v. Dharmdeo Narain Singh [(1972) 2 SCC
273 : 1972 SCC (Cri) 676] , Makkapati Nagaswara Sastri v.
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S.S. Satyanarayan [(1981) 1 SCC 62 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 111]
, Asit Kumar Kar v. State of W.B. [(2009) 2 SCC 703 :
(2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 851 : (2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 541] and
Vishnu Agarwal v. State of U.P. [(2011) 14 SCC 813] )”
22. Therefore, the argument put forth by the learned counsels for the
petitioner cannot be accepted. Bar under Section 362 CrPC does not
apply in the present case as the recall application has been assailed on the
ground of violation of principles of natural justice and audi alteram
partem . The Court is well within its powers to look into the objections
raised by the applicant and decide as to whether any procedural
impropriety and/or violation of principle of Natural Justice have occurred
in the hearing of the matter. Consequently, the application cannot be
rejected at the threshold, on this ground, as the applicant in crux of the
matter is not seeking to reopen/reargue the matter on merits.
23. Another argument vehemently raised by the learned counsel for ED and
the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the applicant had already
approached the Trial Court praying for the relief of being impleaded as a
party in the proceedings related to pardon. The broader implication of the
prayer made in the instant application, i.e. recall of order dated
03.12.2024 because the applicant has the right to be heard, is the same as
that which was prayed before the Trial Court. The application before the
Trial Court was dismissed on 30.07.2024. The order of dismissal had not
been challenged by the applicant. The applicant has tried his best to
justify and put forth adequate reasoning as to why the order of the Trial
Court rejecting the applicant for impleadment has not been challenged.
The applicant has pointed out that the Trial Court had rejected the
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application of the petitioner under Section 306, thereby satisfying the
grievance of the applicant. Therefore, the applicant did not see the need to
challenge the order of Trial Court rejecting its application.
24. The conduct of the applicant reflects that it had allowed the order dated
30.07.2024 to attain finality. At this stage, the applicant cannot now seek
to pursue something indirectly, which it cannot do directly. The same will
be barred by principle of res judicata . Reliance in this regard is placed on
28
S.C. Garg v. State of U.P. Relevant paragraphs of the same read as
under:
“13. The question as to the applicability of principle of res
judicata in criminal matters have been considered by this
Court in several decisions. In the matters of Pritam Singh v.
The State of Punjab, Bhagat Ram v. State of Rajasthan &
The State of Rajasthan v. Tarachand Jain, this Court has
consistently laid down the principle that the principle of res
judicata is equally applicable in criminal matters. However,
in two later decisions, namely, Devendra v. State of Uttar
Pradesh and Muskan Enterprises v. The State of Punjab in
which one of us was a member (Justice Prashant Kumar
Mishra), this Court observed in the context of
maintainability of second petition under Section 482 Cr.
P.C. that principle of res judicata has no application in a
criminal matter. Considering divergence of opinion, it
would be appropriate for us to have deeper examination
and reading of the law laid down by this Court in the earlier
28
2025 SCC OnLine SC 791.
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decisions.
14. In Pritam Singh (supra), a three Judge Bench of this
Court speaking through Natwarlal Harilal Bhagwati, J.
placing reliance on Sambasivam v. Public Prosecutor,
Federal of Malaya, decided by a Bench of Five Judges of
the Judicial Committee, opined that maxim res judicata is
no less appliable to criminal than to civil proceedings….”
15. In Bhagat Ram (supra), a two Judge Bench of this Court
speaking through H.R. Khanna, J. again applied and
approved Sambasivam (supra) and Pritam Singh (supra).
16. Thereafter in Tarachand Jain (supra), this Court
referred to Bhagat Ram (supra) and Sambasivam (supra) to
hold thus:
“13. ……….The question as to what is the binding
effect of a decision in subsequent proceedings of the
same original matter was considered by this Court in
the case of Bhagat Ram v. State of Rajasthan, [(1972)
2 SCC 466 : 1972 SCC (Cri) 751] and it was held that
the principle of res judicata is also applicable to
criminal proceedings and it is not permissible in the
subsequent stage of the same proceedings to convict a
person for an offence in respect of which an order for
his acquittal has already been recorded. Reliance in
this context was placed upon the observations of the
Judicial Committee in the case of Samba Sivam v.
Public Prosecutor, Federation of Malaya. [[1950]
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A.C. 458] In Bhagat Ram case [(1972) 2 SCC 466 :
1972 SCC (Cri) 751] a Single Judge of the High Court
to whom a limited question had been referred because
of a difference of opinion between two Judges of the
Division Bench, not only decided the question referred
to him, he also interfered with the acquittal of the
accused regarding certain offences in respect of which
an order for acquittal had already been made earlier
by the Division Bench. It was held that it was not
within the competence of the Single Judge to reopen
the matter and pass the above order of conviction in
the face of the earlier order of the Division Bench for
acquittal. Although Bhagat Ram case [(1972) 2 SCC
466 : 1972 SCC (Cri) 751] related to acquittal, the
principle laid down in that case, in our opinion, holds
good in a case like the present wherein the question is
about the binding effect of the earlier Division Bench
judgment regarding the validity of the sanction for the
prosecution of the accused-respondent.”
xxxx
19. Reading three earlier decisions vis-à-vis the two later
decisions parallelly, we do not think that considering the
context and the stage of the proceedings in which the
matters stood and agitated before this Court, there is any
diversion in the applicability of the principle of res judicata.
While three earlier decisions in Pritam Singh (Supra),
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Bhagat Ram (supra) and Tarachand Jain (supra) were
decided basis acquittal in previous trial, the subsequent
decision in Devendra (supra) and Muskan Enterprises
(supra) have been decided at the stage of quashing petition
under Section 482 Cr. P.C., thus, in both the matters, there
was no final adjudication of merits. While in Devendra
(supra), the first petition was for quashing of the FIR and
the second petition was preferred after the Magistrate took
cognizance of the matter; in Muskan (supra), the first
petition was dismissed as withdrawn whereas the second
petition was held not maintainable due to earlier
withdrawal without any liberty. Thus, these two cases are
totally distinguishable.
In addition, it is important to bear that Sambasivam (supra)
was decided by Five Judges of the Judicial Committee and
Pritam Singh (supra) was decided by a three Judge Bench,
whereas all subsequent decisions have been rendered by the
two Judges Bench. Therefore, Pritam Singh (supra) is
binding insofar as the issue concerning the applicability of
principle of res judicata in a criminal proceeding is
concerned.
25. In the present case on 30.07.2024 the Trial Court examined the issue on
merits and gave detailed and categorical findings as to how the applicant
did not have the required locus standi to be heard nor any legal right.
Findings are not merely procedural but have been rendered after a
reasoned adjudication and the operative portion read as under:
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“9. At the outset it is observed that the reliance of the Ld.
Counsel for the applicant company on the orders dated
06/05/2015 and 11/07/2016 of the coordinate benches is not
tenable for the reasons that in those cases there was no
objection by the opposite side that coaccused cannot be
heard in the proceedings. There is nothing contained in the
said orders that the right of co accused to be heard in the
proceedings under sec 306 Cr. P. C has been adjudicated
upon. In fact the same was not even agitated before the Ld.
concerned courts. Just because the submissions made by Ld.
Counsels for co accused persons have been mentioned in
the said orders, when the issue to be adjudicated in the
present application was not an issue therein, in my humble
opinion it has no binding effect.
10. The concern of the applicant Company, as mentioned in
para 4 and 5 of the application are TWO fold , firstly that if
the application moved by accused no. 3 for turning
approver is allowed by the court, then he will become a
person of different class as compared to other co accused
and would be protected by proviso to Sec 132 Indian
Evidence Act ,1872 and secondly that for the plea of
accused no. 3 to be accepted, it would require him to make
a full disclosure of his role. Except this, in the entire
application it is not mentioned as to how the applicant
company, if not the other co accused persons shall be
affected if they are not heard by the court while deciding the
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application of tendering pardon. So far as arguments
concerning changing of „class‟ of an accused if he is
granted pardon is concerned, it is open to any of the
accused to move such application for changing his „class‟
and is not restricted to a particular one. After moving such
application, it is for the court to see if the same is to be
allowed or not provided that the accused making such
application u/s 306 Cr. P.C satisfies the ingredients thereof
i.e. make a full and true disclosure of the whole of the
circumstances within his knowledge related to the offence
and to every other person concerned and that the same is in
order to obtain evidence.
11. It cannot be the case that unless co accused are heard,
the Court is not capable of making the decision whether to
tender pardon to the applicant/accused or not. The interests
of the co accused are well protected by the scheme of things
that he gets an opportunity to cross examine the approver
but a co accused cannot be allowed to say that one should
not be allowed to turn an approver at all. It is for the Court
to decide as per the circumstances of the case after getting
the prosecution join the proceedings. 12. The judgments
relied upon buy the Ld. Counsel for the applicant Company
are not directly on the facts which are before the court in
the present case i.e Right of co accused(s) to be heard
AFTER filing of the chargesheet and taking cognizance
thereof. By relying upon these cases, inferences have been
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sought to be drawn that during investigation the co accused
may not have right to be heard thus he should be heard at
other stages.
xxxx
17. Further, In the case of Ashok Kumar Aggarwal v CBI
and Anr. (Supra) which is interestingly relied upon by
either side, it was categorically held that that the right of co
accused in respect of an approver arises only at the stage of
trial. Relevant para is reproduced as under:
“15………. At the stage of investigation, if the accused
applies for pardon and the prosecution also supports
him, normally the matter is between the Court and the
accused and other co -accused have no right
whatsoever to intervene or ask for the hearing. The
right of a co-accused in respect of an approver arises
only at the stage of trial……………………. ”
In the present case, the stage of trial is yet to come.
18. The order of the Ld. Trial Court that granted pardon to
an accused was assailed before the Hon‟ble High Court in
the case of Gurvinder Singh Bhatia Vs. CBI, 2015 SCC
OnLine Del 13078 . Hon‟ble High Court of Delhi while
relying upon the judgment of Ashok Kumar Aggarwal V.
CBI (supra) observed as under:
“14. After having considered the submissions
advanced, impugned order, the material on record and
the decisions cited, this Court finds that co-accused
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have no legal right to raise any grievance against
order granting pardon.”
19. The said petition was dismissed. Notably, Ld. Counsel
for the applicant company was representing respondent
No.8 in the abovesaid matter.
20. Ld. Counsel for the applicant/company has argued that
the ratio of Gurvinder Singh Bhatia (supra) is not
applicable here since the same deals with the right of
accused to challenge/raise grievance against order granting
pardon and not his right to be heard by the Ld. Trial Court,
at the stage of grant of pardon once charge sheet has been
filed. Similarly, it was argued for the judgment titled CBI
Vs. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal (supra) as well.
21. This Court is of the opinion that if a co-accused cannot
challenge/raise grievance against the order of grant of
pardon then even the question of hearing him during the
consideration of the application of grant of pardon does not
arise.
22. It is for the Court to see while adjudicating whether the
pardon is to be granted to the applicant/accused or not, if
there is anything gainful for the prosecution or not or
whether his evidence is at all required for successful
prosecution. The veracity of the evidence of the accused
turned approver can only be challenged by the co-accused
at the time of trial during his cross-examination.
23. Lastly it is worth noting that the application for
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impleadment has been moved only on behalf of accused no.
4/M/s NKG Infrastructure only and none other including
accused no. 2/Sh. Anil Kumar Aggarwal whom also the Ld.
Counsel for the applicant Company is representing. Mere
presence during the proceedings does not per se make the
applicant eligible for hearing in a matter in which he does
not have locus standi. The proceedings u/s 306 Cr. P. C is
between the court, the accused/applicant (who wish to be an
approver) and the prosecution and none other. If the
application is allowed then the other accused persons shall,
as a matter of procedure gets the right to cross examine the
approver.
24. In view of the above discussions, observations and cited
case laws, I am of the opinion that there is no merits in the
application moved by the applicant Company. The same is
accordingly disposed of as dismissed.”
26. The Trial Court has considered every aspect of the argument posed by the
applicant and has given a well-reasoned order. Significantly, aforesaid
order was never challenged by the applicant and being on merits has
attained finality and is binding on the parties. The same point cannot be
reagitated in a different proceeding. Thus, the applicant is estopped from
again reopening an issue which has been finally decided by a court, under
the guise of present proceedings.
27. Issue No. 2, being the central issue with respect to the controversy at
hand, relates to whether a co-accused has a right to be heard at the stage
of consideration of an application for tender of pardon under Section 306
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of CrPC.
28. Section 306 of CrPC empowers the Court to grant a pardon to any
accused privy to an offence, while imposing a condition of full and true
disclosure of the whole offence within the knowledge of the accused.
29. To my mind, the scheme of Section 306 CrPC does not confer a right to
be heard on every co-accused. The Court at the stage of granting a
pardon, either before the filing of chargesheet or after the chargesheet has
been filed and stage of inquiry has commenced but before the trial, does
not adjudicate upon the guilt of the other co-accused. The grant of pardon
is not an act which itself causes prejudice to the co-accused and does not
by itself lead to their conviction. The approver is rather to be examined at
the stage of trial and then further cross examined, before his/her
testimony can become an admissible evidence. The opportunity at the
stage of trial to cross examine the approver and impeach his/her
credibility is sufficiently afforded to the co-accused. Thus, the only
effective opportunity to the co-accused to question the reliability of the
approver can be granted at the stage of trial.
30. The law in this regard has been considered and settled by this Court. In
29
Ashok Kumar Aggarwal , even though the prayer of the petitioner for
pardon was rejected, the Coordinate Bench of this Court categorically
held that the right of co-accused arises only at the stage of trial and the
co-accused has no right to ask for a hearing in the proceedings of pardon.
The judgment was affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in CBI v.
30
Ashok Kumar Aggarwal. The relevant portion of the judgment of this
29
Supra N. 10.
30
(2013) 15 SCC 222.
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Court reads as under:
“15. Section 307, likewise, gives power to the Court to
direct tender of pardon after committal, but before the
judgment is pronounced. The object underlying these
provisions is to allow pardon in the cases where a grave
offence is alleged to have been committed by several
persons, so that with the aid of the evidence of the person
pardoned, the offence could be brought to home as against
the rest. The basis of tender of pardon is not the extent of
the culpability of the person to whom the pardon is granted.
The principle is to prevent the scape of the offender from
punishment in the heinous offences for lack of evidence. The
principle, which are to govern the cases granting pardon by
the court are well settled. There is no bar in granting
pardon before the stage of charge-sheet. At the stage of
investigation, if the accused applies for pardon and the
prosecution also supports him, normally the matter is
between the Court and the accused and other co-accused
have no right whatsoever to intervene or ask for hearing.
The right of a co-accused in respect of an approver arises
only at the stage of trial. It is also well-settled that once
prosecution agrees to tender of pardon, the Special Judge
would not take upon himself the task of considering the
possible weight of the approver's evidence or to determine
the propriety of tendering pardon. The law is eloquently
explained by the Supreme Court in the case of Lt. Cdr.
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Pascal Fernandes's case (supra) in the following words:
“(11) It follows that the powers of the Special Judge
are not circumscribed by any condition except one,
namely, that the action must be with a view to
obtaining the evidence of any person supposed to have
been directly or indirectly concerned in, or privy to an
offence. The pardon so tendered is also a condition of
his making a full and true disclosure of the whole
circumstances within his knowledge relating to the
offence and to every other person concerned, whether
as principal or abettor. The disclosure must be
complete as to himself and as to any other person
concerned as principal or abettor. There is no
provision for the recording of reasons for so doing, nor
is the Special Judge required to furnish a copy to the
accused. There is no provision for recording a
preliminary statement of the person.
(12) There can be no doubt that the section is enabling
and its terms are wide enough to enable the Special
Judge to tender a pardon to any person who is
supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned
in, or privy to, an offence. This must necessarily
include a person arraigned before him. But it may be
possible to tender pardon to a person not so arraigned.
The power so conferred can also be exercised at any
time after the case is received for trial and before its
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conclusion. There is nothing in the language of the
section to show that the Special Judge must be moved
by the prosecution. He may consider an offence by an
accused as in this case. The offer by an accused as in
this case. The action, therefore, was not outside the
jurisdiction of the Special Judge in this case.”
31
31. Further in Gurvinder Singh Bhatia , Coordinate Bench of this Court
32
while relying on Ashok Kumar Agarwal held that the co-accused has no
legal right against the order granting pardon. The relevant paragraphs
read as under:
“14. After having considered the submissions advanced,
impugned order, the material on record and the decisions
cited, this Court finds that co-accused have no legal right to
raise any grievance against order granting pardon. It has
been so reiterated by Apex Court in C.B.I. v. Ashok Kumar
Aggarwal (2013) 15 SCC 222 with a rider that in exercise
of revisional/inherent powers, correctness, legality or
proprietary of an order granting pardon can nevertheless be
suo moto examined. The grounds of interference with an
order of pardon, as highlighted by Apex Court in C.B.I. v.
Ashok Kumar Aggarwal (supra), are as under : -
“The grounds of interference may be, where the facts
admitted or approved, do not disclose any offence or
the court may interfere where the facts do not disclose
31
Supra N. 12.
32
Supra N. 30.
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any offence or where the material effects of the party
are not considered or where judicial discretion is
exercised arbitrarily or perversely.”
15. In the light of the afore-noted legal position, I have
minutely scrutinized the impugned order and I find that role
of the Approver alone is not the paramount consideration
for deciding as to whether pardon is to be granted or not….
xxxx
17. In this considered opinion of this Court, petitioner or his
co-accused do not suffer any prejudice nor any bias can be
inferred as the evidence of the Approver certainly advances
the prosecution's case. In view of the dictum of the Apex
Court in C.B.I. v. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal (supra), implicit
reliance placed upon Pascal Fernandes (supra) and Ashok
Kumar (supra) is of no avail. It would be premature to say
that no case is made out against petitioner and his co-
accused. Neither it can be said that the discretion has been
arbitrarily or perversely exercised by the trial court because
in the facts of the instant case, petitioner had portrayed
himself to be a victim of circumstance and had not come
forward to give a true disclosure and in any case, second
respondent appears to be best suited to become an
Approver. There is no basis whatsoever to reasonably
conclude that pardon has been granted to second
respondent at the cost of petitioner and his co-accused.”
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33
32. The judgments of other High Courts in Yadav Singh (Supra) ; Central
34 35
Bureau of Investigation v. N K Amin ; Senthamarai (Supra) have
directly considered the issue in controversy and the same have also been
relied upon by the Trial Judge. The judgments have categorically held
that the co-accused has no right to be heard when a Section 306/Section
307 CrPC application is being considered, only arises at the stage of
Trial. His only right is to cross examine the approver at the time of trial.
33. The judgments above also make it clear the co-accused has no right to
oppose the application for granting pardon. He has no legal right to raise
a grievance against an order granting pardon, though the Court may, in an
appropriate case, examine the legality or propriety of such order in
exercise of Revisional or Inherent Jurisdiction. Hence, the apprehensions
raised by the applicant are premature. The applicant and the other co-
accused will have ample opportunity during the trial to challenge and
cross examine the approver, petitioner herein, and shake the credibility of
his testimony.
34. The learned counsel of the applicant has sought to heavily rely upon
36 37
Sunil Batra and P.R. Sarkar to contend that after the filing of
chargesheet the pardon cannot be granted without granting an opportunity
of hearing to the co-accused. The above judgments were based on the
scheme of CrPC, 1898 and the applications for pardon in these judgments
were filed under Section 337 of CrPC, 1898 which is already a repealed
33
Supra N. 18. Refer paragraph Nos. 8-9.
34
2010 SCC OnLine Guj 11728. Refer paragraph No. 55.
35
Supra N. 19. Refer paragraph Nos. 13-15.
36
Supra N. 25.
37
Supra N. 24.
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38
enactment. The judgments of Gurvinder Singh Bhatia and Ashok
39
Kumar Aggarwal , which was affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court,
categorically analyse the scheme under Section 306/307 of CrPC and are
binding upon this Court. Thus, the reliance is misplaced.
35. The applicant pleads that there has been gross violation of Principles of
Natural Justice as he has not been heard before passing the order of
pardon. Principles of Natural Justice cannot be construed as a rigid and
abstract framework that has a straitjacket application in every scenario.
The application of Principles of Natural Justice also has to be in
consonance with the legal statutes. A criminal procedure code permits
locus of different parties to a trial at different stages.
CONCLUSION
36. Section 482 CrPC does not override Section 362 CrPC to revisit its final
judgment on merits, however, the same can be so done if there are any
procedural lapses or violation the Principles of Natural Justice. In the
present case even though, this Court has the power to revisit its judgment
dated 03.12.2024 granting pardon to the petitioner, the application for the
same cannot be allowed as the applicant (co-accused) does not have the
statutory or legal right to be heard at this stage. Hence, there is no
procedural lapse or violation of the Principles of Natural Justice while
passing the impugned Judgment.
37. For the said reasons, the application is dismissed.
CRL. M.A. 17146/2025
38. In view of the order passed in CRL. M.A. 17144/2025, the present
38
Supra N. 12.
39
Supra N. 10.
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application does not survive for consideration and is accordingly
dismissed.
JASMEET SINGH, J.
th
JULY 04 , 2026/(MU)
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