R.GOVINDHARAJ vs THE STATE REPRESENTED BY

CRL A.No.49 of 2020
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF MADRAS
Reserved on : 17.09.2026
Pronounced on : 16.10.2026
CORAM:
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE M.NIRMAL KUMAR
CRL.A.No.49 of 2020
CNR: {HCMA010118002020}
R.Govindharaj ... Appellant / Accused

Vs.
The State Represented by
The Inspector of Police,
Vigilance and Anti-Corruption,
Villupuram District,
Cr.No.1/2010 ... Respondent / Complainant

PRAYER: Criminal Appeal is filed under Section 374(2) of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, against the Judgment passed in Special Case
No.47 of 2014, dated 21.01.2020, on the file of the Special Court for
Prevention of Corruption Act Cases, Villupuram.

For Appellant : Mr.V.R.Balasubramaniam

For Respondent : Mr.Leonard Arul Joseph Selvam
Additional Public Prosecutor
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CRL A.No.49 of 2020
JUDGMENT

The appellant is the sole accused in Special Case No.47 of 2014
on the file of the Special Court for Prevention of Corruption Act
Cases, Villupuram. By Judgment dated 21.01.2020, the learned
Special Judge found him guilty and sentenced to undergo four years
Rigorous Imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/-, in default to
undergo six months Simple Imprisonment, for the offence under
Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 ("the Act"), and
to undergo three years Rigorous Imprisonment and to pay a fine of
Rs.5,000/-, in default to undergo six months Simple Imprisonment, for
the offence under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Act.
The sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently.
2. The case of the prosecution is as follows:-
(i). The appellant was working as Commercial Inspector in the
office of the Assistant Engineer, TNEB (North), Kallakurichi,
Kallakurichi Taluk, Villupuram District, from 11.07.2007 to
01.02.2010 and is a public servant within the meaning of Section 2(c)
of the Act. His duty was to inspect the site on an application for a
new service connection and prepare estimate.
(ii) P.W.2, defacto complainant, applied for a domestic service
connection for a house he proposed to construct. On 21.11.2009, the
appellant inspected the site, found that five poles required, prepared
the estimate and collected Rs.50/- as registration fee (Ex.P9). P.W.3,
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CRL A.No.49 of 2020
Assistant Executive Engineer, sanctioned the estimate on 11.12.2009.
P.W.2 remitted the demand notice amount of Rs.1,550/- on 15.12.2009
(Ex.P10). The work order was issued on 06.01.2010 and, according to
the prosecution, received in the Kallakurichi North office only on
25.01.2010.
(iii). P.W.2 deposed that on 29.01.2010, appellant met him in
Kallakurichi market, told him that connection sanctioned and asked
him to come to the office the next day; that on 30.01.2010 the
appellant informed connection can be arranged within a week and
demanded Rs.2,500/- for himself and for the labourers who would
erect the poles.
(iv) Not willing to pay, he lodged a complaint (Ex.P11) to the
Vigilance and Anti-Corruption wing, Villupuram on 01.02.2010. A
trap laid by PW13, Inspector of Police, P.W.2 and the shadow
witness (P.W.12), a Junior Assistant in the Labour Department,
entered the office of the appellant at about 3.25 / 3.30 p.m.
According to the prosecution, the appellant asked whether P.W.2
brought the money he demanded, received the phenolphthalein
smeared notes with his right hand, counted them with both hands,
kept them in the table drawer and assured that connection would be
given within a week. On the pre-arranged signal, the trap party
entered, the sodium carbonate test on both hands of the appellant
turned the solution pink, and the appellant produced the currency
notes from the table drawer, which tallied with the entrustment
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CRL A.No.49 of 2020
mahazar (Ex.P13). Ex.P33 to Ex.P36 are the seizure mahazar,
observation mahazar, rough sketch and house search list.
3. On completion of investigation, P.W.15, the successor
Investigation Officer, after obtaining Ex.P1. Sanction from P.W.1, filed
final report for the offences under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with
13(1)(d) of the Act.

4. The Special Court framed charges under Section 7 and
Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Act. The accused
denied the charges. The prosecution examined fifteen witnesses
(P.W.1 to P.W.15), marked forty-five exhibits (Ex.P1 to Ex.P45) and
produced two material objects, M.O.1 (the trap cash of Rs.2,500/-)
and M.O.2 (the bottle containing the solution in which the fingers
were dipped). When questioned under Section 313 Cr.P.C. the
accused denied the incriminating circumstances. No witness was
examined on the side of the defence.
5. The Special Court held that the sanction (Ex.P1) was valid.
On merits it held that (i) P.W.2, though he departed from his chief
examination in the cross-examination recorded after seven years,
could not be wholly discarded; (ii) P.W.12 and P.W.6 corroborated the
receipt of the money and its production from the table drawer; (iii)
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CRL A.No.49 of 2020
the chronology of events, namely the knowledge of the appellant
about the work order received on 25.01.2010 and his meeting with
P.W.2 on 29.01.2010, showed that the demand was made and that the
testimony of P.W.2 was believable; (iv) once demand, acceptance and
recovery were established the presumption under Section 20 of the
Act arose and the appellant not rebutted it; and (v) the contention
that no official favour was pending with the appellant was not a good
defence. On that basis the appellant was convicted and sentenced as
stated above.

6. Mr.V.R.Balasubramaniam, learned counsel for the appellant,
submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove the foundational
fact of demand, which is the sine qua non for both the offences. He
submitted that P.W.2, the only witness to the alleged demand, has
categorically deposed in his cross-examination that appellant did not
demand any money, that he himself decided to pay the money in the
belief that the work would be done only if a bribe was paid, and that
he lodged the complaint out of a grudge against the appellant, whom
he wrongly blamed for the delay in the service connection. The
shadow witness, P.W.12, stood six to ten feet away and could not hear
what was spoken. P.W.12 deposed that money was recovered from the
shirt pocket of the appellant and that the table had no drawer,
whereas P.W.6 and P.W.13 spoke of the table drawer. The estimate
preparation work of the appellant completed on 21.11.2009, the
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CRL A.No.49 of 2020
estimate was sanctioned and the work order passed by the superior
officers before the complaint, and no official work or favour pending
with him on the date of trap and the trap laying officer admits. The
Special Court, according to the learned counsel, accepted the version
of the complainant in his chief examination, which is on surmises,
and drawn an inference of demand from a chronology which does not
exclude other explanations and wrongly shifted the burden on the
appellant by invoking Section 20 of the Act. Hence, the learned
counsel prayer for acquittal of the accused.
7. Mr.Leonard Arul Joseph Selvam, learned Additional Public
Prosecutor, supported the judgment of the Special Court. He
submitted that P.W.2 and P.W.12 supported the prosecution in their
chief examination; and their cross-examination took place seven and
four years later, hence the the departure, from the earlier version
was expected to happen; the Special Court was right in testing both
versions against the other evidence; P.W.6, an official from the same
office, independently deposed handing over something to the
appellant and production of the money from the table drawer proving
recovery, the positive chemical test are beyond dispute, since the
complainant could have come to know of sanction of the connection
only through the appellant, the chronology establishes the demand.
He added that a hostile witness is not to be rejected in toto and that,
the foundational facts having been proved, the presumption under
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CRL A.No.49 of 2020
Section 20 of the Act operated against the appellant. Hence, he
prayed for dismissal of the appeal
8. I have heard the learned counsel on either side and have
carefully gone through the records, including the evidence of the
witnesses and the exhibits. Being the statutory appeal against a
conviction, this Court is bound to re-appreciate the entire evidence
and to arrive at its own conclusion.
9. The points that arise that for consideration before this Court
are.
(a) whether the prosecution has proved
beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant
demanded illegal gratification from P.W.2;
(b) whether the acceptance and recovery of
the tainted money, as proved, can by themselves
sustain the conviction, and whether the
presumption under Section 20 of the Act arises; and
(c) whether the judgment of the Special Court
calls for interference.
10. In view of the conclusion on merits, this Court does not
consider it necessary to examine the challenge to the validity of the
sanction (Ex.P1) and leaves that question open.
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11. To establish an offence under Section 7, and equally under
Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act, as it stood on the
date of the occurrence, the prosecution has to prove, first, the
demand of illegal gratification and, next, its acceptance. Proof of
demand is indispensable. The mere possession or recovery of
currency notes from the accused, without proof of demand, is not
sufficient to establish the offence, and the presumption under Section
20 of the Act can be drawn only after the foundational facts of
demand and acceptance have been proved.
12. The Constitution Bench in Neeraj Dutta v. State
(Government of NCT of Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC 731 , has clarified
that where the complainant turns hostile or is not available, the
demand and acceptance may be proved by other direct evidence, oral
or documentary, or by circumstantial evidence. At the same time, the
Constitution Bench reiterated that demand and acceptance remain
facts to be proved by the prosecution, that the inference must be a
legally sustainable deduction from proved facts and not a conjecture,
and that mere recovery cannot substitute proof of demand. Where
the bribe-giver is alleged to have made a voluntary offer, which the
public servant accepted knowing it to be a reward for an official act,
the prosecution must prove such offer and the acceptance with
knowledge.
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13. It is equally settled that the evidence of a witness who
resiles from his earlier statement is not to be rejected as a whole
merely for that reason, and the Court may act on that part of the
testimony which is found to be credible and is corroborated.
[Bhagwan Singh v. State of Haryana, (1976) 1 SCC 389. The
Court is, however, bound to consider the whole of the evidence,
including the part that favours the accused. The question is whether,
having regard to all the evidence, the prosecution has proved its case
beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption under Section 20, once
raised, is rebuttable and the accused need discharge the burden only
on the preponderance of probabilities; the accused can do so through
the prosecution evidence itself.
14. Further, direct evidence of demand has to come from P.W.2.
In his chief examination, recorded on 04.06.2012, P.W.2 supported
the prosecution case. He was cross-examined by the defence only on
30.09.2019. In that cross-examination, as recorded in paragraph 17
of the judgment of the Special Court, he deposed that he was not
aware whether seven or eight others were ahead of him in the queue
for service connection; that it was true that the poles standing near
his house had been removed at the instance of the officers and that
there was delay in giving service connection and the delay made him
angry against the appellant; out of that anger, he lodged a complaint.
P.W.2 reiterate and confirm he alone went inside the office and the
shadow witness stood at the entrance; that he enquired the appellant
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CRL A.No.49 of 2020
when his connection would be given and gave the application
together with the money, and that he himself decided to give the
bribe, thinking that the work would be done only if money paid. He
did not remember by which hand appellant took what he gave and
where he kept it.
15. Thus, in the sworn testimony of the very person who set the
law in motion, there is no demand by the appellant at any stage,
whether on 30.01.2010 or on 01.02.2010; on the contrary, there is an
assertion that the complaint was motivated with a grudge, and that
the money was tendered on his own volition. The Special Court did
not disbelieve this version in its content that was inherently
improbable. It rejected the cross-examination on the footing that the
deviation "was not true and not fitted within the facts of the case",
and on the surmise that, in the seven years that passed since the
chief examination, "the accused and the PW2 would have been
settled in friendly manner". There is not an iota of evidence on record
that the complainant and the appellant ever came to terms, or that
cross-examination was a product of any such settlement. A finding
that a witness has been won over cannot rest on speculation.
16. The Special Court considered that it was bound to prefer
the chief examination because the cross-examination was recorded
after several years. Passage of time cannot by itself justify preferring
one version of the same witness over the other; the delay in cross-
examination is, if anything, a circumstance for care in appreciating
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CRL A.No.49 of 2020
the chief examination, which had gone untested for years. The cross-
examination was not shown to be tutored. The grudge spoken to by
P.W.2 is not an invention; it finds support in the prosecution evidence
itself. P.W.5, the Assistant Engineer, deposed that on 15.12.2009 P.W.2
came to her complaining that he was not being informed the status of
his application, that the appellant did not respond properly when
asked, and that she herself had to call the office of the Assistant
Executive Engineer for information. She also deposed that service
connection not given to the complainant in time because no poles
available and allotted to her office. A man who believed, albeit
wrongly, that the delay in his connection attributable to the appellant,
is a witness whose complaint cannot be accepted without searching
scrutiny, and the cross-examination of P.W.2, whatever else may be
said of it, is at the very least consistent with the documentary record.
17. P.W.12, the shadow witness, deposed in the chief
examination of the appellant asking P.W.2 whether he brought
Rs.2,500/- he had demanded. In his cross-examination of 16.09.2019,
he deposed that he followed P.W.2 at a distance of about one metre
and then added that he was standing six to ten feet away and that he
could not hear what was spoken between them; that there were other
persons, including a Government servant, in the room; that the
appellant did not take any money; that the money recovered from the
shirt pocket of the appellant; and that there was no drawer in the
table. A shadow witness is the one who must overhear the demand.
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P.W.12 did not. Giving the prosecution the full benefit of his chief
examination, it is the statement of a witness who stood at some
distance, a Junior Assistant of another department deputed at the
request of the Trap Laying Officer, and it is, in the very same breath,
contradicted by his own later evidence as to what he could hear. The
Special Court castigated P.W.12 as having "partly turned hostile", yet
used his chief examination, which is no more than a repetition of
what P.W.2 had said at the first instance, as independent
corroboration of the demand. Corroboration of the demand cannot
be found in a witness who could not hear the conversation between
PW2 and the appellants.
18. P.W.6, a Helper from the same office, is the only other
person said to have been present. His evidence is that on returning
from lunch at about 3.00 p.m. he saw the complainant and the
appellant talking to each other and heard the complainant say that
something was to be given to the appellant; that thereafter he left;
and that later the appellant took the money out of the table drawer
and produced it to the police. This witness did not hear any demand
either. His evidence goes to the receipt of something and to the later
production of the money, and nothing more. The evidence of P.W.13,
the Trap Laying Officer, and of the Investigating Officers is, as
regards the demand, a hearsay, based on what P.W.2 and P.W.12 told
them after the event. The material before this Court shows, further,
that the narration of P.W.13 in the judgment of the Special Court is
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that the complaint which was lodged on 01.02.2010 spoke of a
demand of Rs.1,500/-, whereas the prosecution case throughout was
a demand of Rs.2,500/-. That discrepancy has gone unexplained and
has not been adverted to by the Special Court.
19. The Special Court, realising that there was no direct
evidence of demand, but chronology of events proved it. The
reasoning is that the work order was received in the Kallakurichi
North office on 25.01.2010; that P.W.2 did not know about it and no
communication was sent to him; that the appellant alone could have
told him on 29.01.2010 of the work sanction; and that the complaint,
therefore, cannot be false. This inference, cannot be sustained, for
the following reasons.
(i) The very first link of the chain, namely that the appellant
met P.W.2 on 29.01.2010 in the market and asked him to come to the
office the next day, rests exclusively on the chief examination of
P.W.2, which he disowned in the cross-examination. A circumstance
that depends entirely on the testimony of a witness whose reliability
is in doubt cannot be used to prove that very witness reliable.
(ii) The finding that P.W.2 could have learnt of work sanction
only from the appellant is contrary to the evidence of the
prosecution. The work sanction estimate is dated 11.12.2009 and
P.W.5 deposed that, on 15.12.2009, she asked the appellant to
prepare the demand notice since work sanction already accorded,
and P.W.2 remitted Rs.1,550/- on the same day (Ex.P10 and Ex.P21).
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CRL A.No.49 of 2020
P.W.2 therefore knew even in December 2009 that his work estimate
sanctioned. The date 25.01.2010, on which the work order was
received in the local office, is the only date on which the Special
Court places reliance and weight. That the accused knew the date of
sanction and might have mentioned it to P.W.2 does not mean that a
demand was made.
(iii) Even if it be taken that the appellant met P.W.2 on
29.01.2010 and informed that the work had advanced is an act that is
consistent with ordinary official courtesy. A circumstance susceptible
of two inferences does not prove the demand beyond reasonable
doubt.
(iv) The Special Court itself found that no official favour was
pending with the appellant. His role stopped with the preparation of
work estimate, as P.W.1 and P.W.5 have said. The work order was
passed by P.W.3 and the poles were to be supplied by a different
office. The Trap Laying Officer (P.W.13) admitted that no official work
or favour, pending on the date of trap. The prosecution case that the
appellant, at that stage, undertook to arrange the connection within a
week and demanded Rs.2,500/- is not supported by any independent
circumstance, and the improbability of a demand by a person who
had nothing left to do is a legitimate circumstance, though not by
itself decisive, for weighing the complainant's later version that he
paid out of his own belief that no work would be done without a
bribe.
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20. The contention of the learned Additional Public Prosecutor
that Section 7, as it then stood, did not require that the accused
should have the authority to do the official act demanded, and that it
is enough that he held himself out as able to do it, is not disputed.
This Court has not decided the case on the footing that the appellant
lacked authority. The point is that even on the widest reading of the
law, the demand itself has to be proved, and the evidence on this is
lacking. It is also not necessary, in the view this Court takes, to
examine the argument that the non-examination of three members of
the public present near the entrance, as admitted by P.W.12, is fatal.
The trial Court's own reasoning three persons present near the
entrance, might not have heared the conversation and demand is its
own observation without materials.
21. The Special Court observed that corruption is an evil which
retards the progress of the nation and that Courts are obliged to find
the truth in the evidence rather than label the witnesses as hostile
and unbelievable. The anxiety is shared by this Court. But the gravity
of the evil cannot lower the standard of proof. A conviction under the
Act carries the loss of livelihood, liberty and reputation of a public
servant, and the Court must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt on
legally admissible evidence that the offence has been committed. The
Court has, in the case on hand, no reliable evidence of demand on
which to rest such a finding.
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22. The Special Court held that the receipt of the money by the
appellant and its production from the table drawer were proved
through P.W.2, P.W.6 and P.W.13, notwithstanding the departure of
P.W.12 on the place of recovery. Even if this finding is accepted in its
entirety, and this Court does not find it necessary to resolve whether
the money was found in the shirt pocket or in the table drawer, the
chemical test and the recovery establish only that the appellant
handled the tainted currency. Handling of currency notes is equally
consistent with the version of P.W.2 that he handed over the money
along with the application on his own volition. The acceptance of
gratification, as an element of the offence, requires that it be
received as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do an
official act, and with knowledge that it is so offered. The testimony of
the witnesses of the trap does not say what the appellant said or
knew at the time. P.W.12 could not hear, P.W.6 does not say that the
appellant understood the money to be a bribe, and P.W.2 deposed
that no demand made. Therefore, the prosecution has not
established acceptance with knowledge, and in any event that was
not the case on which the charge was framed, which was one of
demand and acceptance.
23. As regards the presumption, the Special Court observed
that, when the core facts are proved it is for the accused to explain
how the money came into his possession and discharge the
presumption available under Section 20 of the Act, and that the
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defence of the accused was whittled down by the prosecution
evidence. The presumption under Section 20 is not available unless
the foundational fact of acceptance of gratification, with proof of
demand established. Since the demand not proved, the presumption
never arose. Even otherwise, the explanation emerging from the
prosecution's own witness, that the money given by him on his own
accord out of a mistaken belief for the delay in estimation work is a
probable explanation which tested on the standard of preponderance
of probabilities, is sufficient to rebut the presumption. The approach
of the Special Court, which required the accused to disprove the case
when the prosecution evidence on demand is doubtful, amounts to a
reversal of the burden of proof. Further, it is proved by the
documents that the expected work of the appellant already
completed well before the date of compalint and trap.
24. The evidence regarding the demand, which is the very
foundation of the prosecution, is the uncorroborated chief
examination of the complainant that he himself resiled from,
supported by a shadow witness, who could not hear the conversation,
and by an inference from circumstances that is neither compelled by
nor consistent only with the guilt of the accused. Where the evidence
lead to two reasonable views, the one favourable to the accused must
be accepted. The conviction under Section 7 of the Act cannot be
sustained. As the offence under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section
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13(2) of the Act, as it stood on the date of the occurrence, likewise
requires obtaining of a pecuniary advantage by corrupt or illegal
means or by abuse of position, which in this case is again dependent
on the very same demand, it cannot be sustained. The prosecution
has failed to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt
and the appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt.
25. In the result, this Criminal Appeal is allowed and the
judgment of conviction and sentence dated 21.01.2020 passed in
Special Case No.47 of 2014 by the Special Court for Prevention of
Corruption Act Cases, Villupuram, is set aside. The appellant is
acquitted of all the charges. The fine amount paid by the appellant
shall be refunded to him. The bail bond, if any, executed by the
appellant shall stand cancelled.
16.10.2026
Index : Yes / No
Internet : Yes / No
MPK
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CRL A.No.49 of 2020
To
1. The Special Court for Prevention of Corruption Act Cases,
Villupuram.
2. The Inspector of Police, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption,
Villupuram District.
3. The Public Prosecutor, High Court, Madras.

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CRL A.No.49 of 2020
M.NIRMAL KUMAR, J.
mpk
Pre-Delivery Judgment made in
CRL.A.No.49 of 2020


16.10.2026
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