TAFIJUL HOQUE vs MOBARAK HOSSAIN AND ORS
- Court
- Calcutta High Court
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
BEFORE :-
THE HON’BLE JUSTICE SHAMPA SARKAR
&
THE HON’BLE JUSTICE ARJUN RAY MUKHERJEE
MAT 1105 of 2026
CAN 1 of 2026
Tafijul Hoque
vs.
Mobarak Hossain & Ors.
With
MAT 1106 of 2026
CAN 1 of 2026
Tafijul Hoque
vs.
State of West Bengal & Ors.
For the Appellant : Mr. Chitta Ranjan Chakraborty, Adv.
Mr. Sumit Banerjee, Adv.
Ms. Puspa Rani Jaiswara, Adv.
For the Respondent Nos. : Mr. Sabyasachi Chatterjee, Adv.
1 to 5 Mr. Badrul Karim, Adv.
Mr. Kiron Sk., Adv.
Mr. Aritra Ghosh, Adv.
For the State : Ms. Susmita Saha Dutta, AGP.
Ms. Tanusree Ghosh, Adv.
Mr. Sourav Halder, Adv.
Mr. Niladri Saha, Adv.
Judgment reserved on : 14.08.2026
Judgment pronounced on : 01.09.2026
Judgment uploaded on : 01.09.2026
Arjun Ray Mukherjee, J.
1. MAT 1105 of 2026 and MAT 1106 of 2026 involved a similar question
of law and as such, were heard analogously.
2. These two intra-Court writ appeals are directed against a common
order dated June 22, 2026 passed by a learned Single Judge of this
Court in W.P.A. 12941 of 2026 and WPA 13361 of 2026.
3. In WPA 12941 of 2026, the appellant in MAT 1105 of 2026 was the
respondent no. 9, Pradhan of Jalalpur Gram Panchayat [hereinafter
referred to as ‘the said Gram Panchayat’] and the respondent nos. 1
to 15 were the writ petitioners, being the members of the said Gram
Panchayat, before the learned Single Judge. In WPA 13361 of 2026,
the appellant in MAT 1106 of 2026 was the writ petitioner, being the
Pradhan of the said Gram Panchayat and the respondent nos. 10 to
24, members of the said Gram Panchayat, were the respondents
before the learned Single Judge.
4. By a common judgment and order dated 22.06.2026, the learned
Single Judge, having found the issues involved in both the writ
petitions to be interrelated, disposed of both the writ petitions.
5. The operative portion of the said judgment, by which WPA 13361 of
2026 was disposed of, is as follows:
“ In so far as the representation submitted against
Bilkishtara Bibi and Suman Bibi is concerned, the
Prescribed Authority and Sub-Divisional Officer, Chanchal,
being the 6th respondent herein, is directed to consider and
dispose of the same within four weeks from the date of
communication of this order upon granting reasonable
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opportunity of hearing to all concerned including the
petitioners and the private respondents, in accordance with
law. The decision taken by the authority shall be
communicated to the parties within a week thereof. ”
6. The operative portion of the said judgment, by which WPA 12941 of
2026 was disposed of, is as follows:
“ Upon consideration of the submission made on behalf of
the parties, this Court is of the view that since the
requisition notice has been signed by 15 out of 28 members
of the Panchayat, even if the names of three members are
struck out, the notice shall still remain valid since it shall
contain the signatures of 1/3rd of the 4 existing members
subject to the minimum of three members. In view of the
time frame contemplated in Section 12 of the Act, the
Prescribed Authority and Block Development Officer,
Chanchal II Development Block, being the 5th respondent
herein, is directed to convene the meeting within 10 days
from the date of communication of this order and take the
proceeding to its logical conclusion within the stipulated
time frame laid down in the Act. The Officer in charge of
Chanchal Police Station, being the 7th respondent herein, is
directed to render necessary assistance to the 5th
respondent so that the meeting can be held peacefully and
without any disturbance from any corner whatsoever. The
writ petitions are disposed of. ”
7. 28 members in the said Gram Panchayat were elected in the 2023
Panchayat elections.
8. The respondent nos. 1 to 15 in MAT 1105 of 2026 / writ petitioners in
WPA 12941 of 2026 / members of the said Gram Panchayat
[hereinafter referred to as ‘the requsitionists’] vide letter dated
22.05.2026, addressed to the Block Development Officer, Chanchal –
II [hereinafter referred to as ‘the Prescribed Authority’] within the
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meaning of the West Bengal Panchayat Act, 1973 [hereinafter referred
to as ‘the Panchayat Act’], brought a ‘no confidence motion’ under
Section 12[2] thereof for removal of the appellant in MAT 1105 of
2026 / the Pradhan of the said Gram Panchayat [hereinafter referred
to as ‘the Pradhan’].
9. The Prescribed Authority issued a notice dated 29.05.2026 fixing the
date of the meeting for removal of the Pradhan on 09.06.2026.
10. Subsequently, the Prescribed Authority issued another notice
dated 08.06.2026, whereby the meeting was postponed until further
order on the basis of the information furnished by the Inspector – in –
Charge, Chanchal Police Station, informing that adequate police force
could not be made available on 09.06.2026.
11. In WPA 13361 of 2026, the Pradhan alleged that two members had
not attended three consecutive meetings of the Panchayat despite
service of notice upon them, for which they were required to be
removed from their membership in terms of Section 11 of the
Panchayat Act. The learned Single Judge, as already stated in the
foregoing paragraph, directed the Sub-Divisional Officer to consider
and dispose of the representation of the Pradhan, made in this behalf,
in accordance with law, within the specified time mentioned therein.
12. In WPA 12941 of 2026, the requisitionists sought for a direction
upon the Prescribed Authority to fix the date of the meeting in terms
of Section 12[2] of the Panchayat Act and to conclude the proceeding
within the stipulated time-frame. The learned Single Judge, as stated
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in the preceding paragraph, directed the Prescribed Authority to
convene the meeting within 10 days from the date of communication
of the order and further directed to take the proceeding to its logical
conclusion within the stipulated time frame laid down in the
Panchayat Act.
13. Pursuant to the order dated 22.06.2026, passed by the learned
Single Judge in connection with the writ petition WPA 12941 of 2026,
the Prescribed Authority issued a notice dated 24.06.2026 fixing the
meeting on 03.07.2026. The meeting for removal of the Pradhan was
finally held on 03.07.2026 i.e. after a lapse of 42 days from the date of
notice of motion dated 22.05.2026.
14. Both the appeals were taken up for consideration on 13.07.2026
and by an order, the Bench, inter alia, passed the following
directions:
“ 1 . As we are informed that the meeting has been held
pursuant to the order of the learned Single Judge which is
impugned before us, we are not inclined to interfere with
the result of the meeting at this stage. However, we find
from the order impugned dated June 22, 2026, passed in
WPA 12941 of 2026, and WPA 13361 of 2026 that, the
order of Her Lordship directing the prescribed authority to
hold the meeting within 10 days from the date of
communication of the order impugned, is contrary to the
provisions of the statute.
2. In our, prima facie, view the Court could not have
extended the time. Although, Her Lordship records that,
upon considering the provisions of the statute, the time to
hold the meeting is extended by 10 days from the date of
communication of the order by the writ
petitioners/requisitionists, the provisions of the statute are
contrary to the findings of Her Lordship.
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3. Under such circumstances, even if a new Pradhan is
elected in the teeth of this proceeding, which is pending
before us, such election shall abide by the result of the
appeal.
4. It is made clear that, the newly elected Pradhan shall not
take major financial and policy decisions, but will only take
care of the day-to-day affairs of the gram panchayat.
5. List this appeal on 3rd August, 2026.
6. Affidavit-in-opposition shall be filed within a week from
date. Reply thereto, if any, shall be filed within a week
thereafter.
7. The prescribed authority shall also file affidavit-in-
opposition or file the records. ”
15. Pursuant to the above direction, the requisitionists / respondents
filed an affidavit in opposition in connection with the stay application.
The following paragraphs of the said affidavit are relevant for
adjudication:
“ a) That the private respondents herein collectively
represent 15 out of 28 members of the Jalalpur Gram
Panchayat. Having lost confidence in the Pradhan of the
said Panchayat, a representation for "no-confidence motion"
u/s 12 of Panchayat Act was made to the Prescribed
Authority by the private respondents herein on 22.05.2026.
b) That on 29.05.2026, the Prescribed Authority issued a
notice thereby conveying a meeting on 09.06.2026 for
consideration of the motion for removal of the Pradhan on
the ground of loss of confidence, in accordance with Sec
12(3) of the Panchayat Act.
c) That the Prescribed Authority issued a memo vide no.
1435/1(33)/Chl-II dated 08.06.2026, thereby adjourning
the meeting scheduled on 09.06.2026, on the ground of
non-availability of police force.
d) That the Prescribed Authority is empowered u/s 12(4) of
the Panchayat Act, to postpone or cancel meeting of no-
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confidence, only if the following conditions are satisfied:-
i) There exists an order or direction of competent Court for
adjournment or cancellation of meeting referred to in Sec
12(3) of the Act; or
ii) There exists a situation beyond the control of the
Prescribed Authority.
e) That in the instant case, there is no specific direction or
order from any competent court for adjournment of the
meeting of no-confidence. The meeting had been adjourned
vide the notice dated 08.06.2026, which records that the
Prescribed Authority, through a letter dated 02.06.2026,
had requested the Chanchal Police Station for deployment
of police force, which was refused by the concerned police
authorities vide a letter dated 07.06.2026 on the ground
that adequate police force could not be spared on
09.06.2026 due to administrative and law & order
arrangement.
f) That in view of the circumstances and the reasons
recorded by the Prescribed Authority for adjourning the
meeting of no-confidence motion, can conclusively held to be
"reasons beyond his control" as contemplated u/s 12(4) of
the Act, since no other orders or directions of any competent
court exists permitting such act. ”
16. Now, the question which falls for our consideration is, whether the
learned Single Judge erred in directing the Prescribed Authority to
hold the meeting beyond the statutory time limit prescribed, and
whether the ground for postponement fell within the exceptions under
Section 12(4).
17. Before we proceed further, it is necessary to state the provisions of
Section 12 of the Panchayat Act:
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“[12. Motion of no confidence or removal of Pradhan
or Upa-Pradhan.] ---
(1)Subject to other provisions of this section, the Pradhan or
the Upa-Pradhan of a Gram Panchayat may, at any time, be
removed from his office by the majority of the existing
members of the Gram Panchayat, referred to in clause (i) of
sub-section (2A) of section 4, expressing their lack of
confidence against the Pradhan or the Upa-Pradhan or
recording their decision to remove the Pradhan or the Upa-
Pradhan, at a meeting specially convened for the purpose.
(2)For the purpose of removal of the Pradhan or the Upa-
Pradhan, one-third of the existing members referred to in
sub-section (1) subject to a minimum of three members shall
sign a motion in writing expressing their lack of confidence
against the Pradhan or the Upa-Pradhan or recording their
intention to remove the Pradhan or the Upa-Pradhan,
indicating party affiliation or independent status of each of
such members and either deliver the motion in person
through any of the members or send it by registered post to
the prescribed authority; one copy of the motion shall be
delivered to the concerned office bearer either by hand or by
registered post at the Gram Panchayat office and another
copy shall be sent by registered post at his residential
address.
(3)The prescribed authority on receipt of the motion shall
satisfy himself that it conforms to the requirements of sub-
section (2) and on his satisfaction shall specially convene,
by issue of notice, within five working days of the receipt of
the motion, a meeting of the Gram Panchayat to be held in
its office fixing date and hour of the meeting and sending
such notice at least before clear seven days to each of its
existing members for consideration of the motion and for
taking a decision on it.
(4)The meeting referred to in sub-section (3) shall be held on
a working day which shall not be later than fifteen working
days from the date of receipt of the motion by the
prescribed authority and the meeting so convened shall not
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be adjourned or cancelled except in pursuance of an order
or direction of a competent court or for any other reason
beyond control of the prescribed authority.
(5)Such meeting shall be presided over by an officer, as
may be authorized by the prescribed authority, in the
manner as may be directed by order by the State
Government or as may be prescribed and the presiding
officer before commencement of the meeting shall ensure
that notice has been duly served to every member in the
manner laid down in this behalf; quorum required for such
meeting shall be more than fifty percent of the existing
members referred to in sub-section (1) and the presiding
officer shall not be entitled to vote at the meeting although
he may advise on one or more points of law without
expressing his own views.
(6)If there is no consensus decision in the meeting, voting
shall be held by open ballot wherein each participating
member shall put his full signature or his left thumb
impression to be attested by the leader, referred to in
section 213A, of the same political party to which the
member belongs or by the said presiding officer on the
reverse side of the ballot paper.
(7)The minutes of the meeting shall be written by the
Secretary or in his absence, by any other official as
authorized by the presiding officer. Such minutes shall
record in brief names of the members present, the
procedure followed, names of the members who voted for or
against the motion and the decision adopted unanimously
or by the majority of its existing members and shall be
signed by him as well as by the presiding officer
(8)After the minutes of the meeting is signed by the
presiding officer, it shall be read over to all the attending
members who shall thereafter put their signatures or left
thumb impressions, as the case may be, on the minutes in
confirmation of the proceedings recorded. Then the
presiding officer shall again put his signature on the same
document after recording the names of members, if any,
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who have declined to sign or left earlier and thereafter he
shall collect a copy of the minutes before leaving the
premises.
(9)(a)The Executive Assistant or in his absence the
Secretary of the Gram Panchayat shall, within three
working days of the meeting, forward a copy of the minutes
of the meeting to the prescribed authority.
(b)The presiding officer shall also submit a separate report
in writing along with a copy of the minutes of the meeting
within the aforesaid time to the prescribed authority.
(10) On receipt of the minutes of the meeting and the report
under sub-section (9), the prescribed authority shall, within
next five working days, take such action as he may deem fit
and the entire process commencing from submission of
motion to the prescribed authority upto the action finally
taken by him shall be completed within thirty days.
(11)If the motion is not carried by the majority of its existing
members or the meeting cannot be held for want of quorum,
no notice of any subsequent motion for the removal of the
same office bearer shall be taken into cognizance within a
period of one year from the date appointed for such
meeting.
(12)Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1),
no meeting for removal of the Pradhan or the Upa-Pradhan
under this section shall be convened within a period of one
year from the date of election of the Pradhan or the Upa-
Pradhan either at the first meeting following reconstitution
of Gram Panchayat or for filling casual vacancy in the said
office.]”
18. Section 12[4] of the Panchayat Act has two parts – the first part
clearly mandates a mandatory time limit for holding a meeting, which
shall not be later than ‘fifteen working days’ from the date of receipt of
the motion by the Prescribed Authority. We shall discuss in the
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succeeding paragraphs, the intention of the legislature in using the
expression ‘shall not be later than’, in the first part of Section 12[4] of
the Panchayat Act. The latter part of Section 12[4] speaks about two
contingencies i.e. the meeting so convened shall not be either
adjourned or cancelled except [i] in pursuance of an order or direction
of a competent court or [ii] for any other reason beyond the control of
the Prescribed Authority.
19. The principles as to whether the provisions of a statute is
mandatory or directory are well settled. The intention of the
legislature and not the language in which such intent is clothed, is
the relevant factor.
20. In Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of U.P . , reported in (2007)
8 SCC 338 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court, inter alia, observed as
follows:
“36. We are unable to subscribe to the above view. In our
judgment, mere use of word “may” or “shall” is not
conclusive. The question whether a particular provision of a
statute is directory or mandatory cannot be resolved by
laying down any general rule of universal application. Such
controversy has to be decided by ascertaining the intention
of the legislature and not by looking at the language in
which the provision is clothed. And for finding out the
legislative intent, the court must examine the scheme of the
Act, purpose and object underlying the provision,
consequences likely to ensue or inconvenience likely to
result if the provision is read one way or the other and
many more considerations relevant to the issue.”
21. In State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjay, reported in (2014) 9 SCC 772 ,
the Hon’ble Apex Court, inter alia , held the following:
Page 11 of 27
“66. The question is whether a statute is mandatory or
directory depends upon the intent of the legislature and not
upon the language in which the intent is clothed. The
meaning and intention of the legislature must govern, and
these are to be ascertained, not only from the phraseology
of the provision, but also by considering its nature, its
design, and the consequences which would follow from
construing it the one way or the other.”
22. Keeping in mind the aforesaid observations of the Hon’ble Apex
Court, let us now examine the provisions of Section 12[4] of the
Panchayat Act, to ascertain whether such provision is mandatory or
directory.
23. As soon as a notice of motion is issued to remove a Pradhan, the
clock starts ticking, inasmuch as, on the one hand the sword of
Damocles starts hanging over the Pradhan, who had been elected
democratically and would naturally want to complete his term, and on
the other hand, the majority members who lost confidence in the
Pradhan for whatever reason, sign a motion in terms of Section 12[2]
of the Panchayat Act, expressing their lack of confidence in him and
desire to remove him. Therefore, the fate of the Pradhan is to be
tested in a meeting which is required to be held upon being convened
by the Prescribed Authority. It is needless to mention here that, those
members who signed the motion /the requsitionists, having lost
confidence in the Pradhan, also started to fervently wait for their
desired object of removing the Pradhan, who, according to them,
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ought to be removed for the better functioning of the gram panchayat,
or for any other reason.
24. In these circumstances, the Pradhan will try to prove his majority
in order to avoid removal, whereas, the requisitionists will try to prove
that the majority wants to remove the Pradhan who, according to
them, is unfit to lead the gram panchayat. Therefore, we must be
mindful of the fact that the respective substantive rights of the
Pradhan and requsitionists under the statute will be affected, if a
speedy and proper mechanism is not followed. Here, ‘time’ becomes
the most important and decisive factor. The answer to the question as
to why ‘time’ is germane, lies in the fact that delay in holding the
meeting within the time prescribed by the statute, may give an undue
advantage to the Pradhan or cause disadvantage to the
requisitionists, depending on the situation. If the meeting is delayed,
the endeavour of the Pradhan to regain confidence of the members
may be fulfilled with the passage of time. He may have adequate room
to solicit their support and lure them to vote for him and support him
at the meeting. The requisitionists having majority wanted to carry
through the motion. Thus, delay may frustrate their unity. We must,
in this connection, keep in mind that once a race has started between
two racers, meant to be completed within a fixed time limit, changing
the time period afterwards, not only gives an undue advantage to one
of the racers, but as a whole, it vitiates the entire race. Moreover, if
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the motion is brought and the meeting is not held, the working of the
gram panchayat comes to a standstill. Without support of the
members, no work can be accomplished by the gram panchayat.
25. There is another aspect of the matter. The people (voters) have not
been mentioned in these provisions, but their rights are also
substantially affected in such circumstances. Those residents, within
the territorial jurisdiction of the said Panchayat in respect of which
the motion to remove the Pradhan is pending, have a right to have a
suitable Pradhan, duly elected under Section 9 of the Panchayat Act
by their elected representatives. They have a hope that under the
Pradhan’s leadership, the Panchayat will work effectively and within
the framework of the Panchayat Act, for betterment of the locality.
Once the members lose confidence in the Pradhan, he does not have a
right to continue in office. All that remains, is a removal in a meeting
usually by raising of hands. The gram panchayat suffers in the midst
of creation of rival groups. Thus, the motion has to be tested at the
earliest, and positively within the statutory period prescribed in this
regard.
26. Moreover, the time frames under Sections 12(2) to 12(4) have to be
read harmoniously with Section 12(10). The entire process from
receipt of the requisition and up to the removal, must be completed
within 30 days from the motion.
27. Therefore, the legislature has fixed the time limit to do certain
things within certain time frames and neither the Court nor the
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Executive is empowered to extend such time, thereby, rewriting the
statute. Such a course is not permissible in law. Once the legislature
in Section 12[4] of the Panchayat Act has couched the time frame
with a negative word, ie, ‘which shall not be later than’ fifteen
working days from the date of receipt of the motion by the prescribed
authority’, the intention must be declared to be ‘mandatory’
[ emphasized by us ].
28. In M. Pentiah v. Muddala Veeramalappa reported in [1961] 2
SCR 295 , the Supreme Court held that “negative words are clearly
prohibitory and are ordinarily used as a legislative device to make a
statute imperative.”
29. In Lachmi Narain v. Union of India reported in AIR 1976 SC
714 , the Supreme Court observed that, if a provision is couched in
prohibitive or negative language, it can rarely be directory and the use
of peremptory language in a negative form is per se indicative of the
intent that the provision is to be mandatory.
30. The Supreme Court in its decision in Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram
Agarwal reported in (2003) 2 SCC 577 , had the occasion to reiterate
that when negative words are used, the Courts will presume that the
intention of the legislature was that the provisions are mandatory in
character.
31. Therefore, if we look at the aforesaid provisions under the statute,
keeping in mind the rights of the Pradhan vis-à-vis the requsitionists,
any delay in concluding the meeting would have a cascading effect not
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only on the opposing groups, but also on the people who elected them
with the expectation of better administration. In other words, the
purpose and object of Section 12[4] would be defeated and the
intention of the legislature would be unfulfilled, if the time for holding
the meeting is extended by court, except under the two specific
contingencies mentioned in the statute itself.
32. Therefore, in our view, the time limit under Section 12[4] is
mandatory, unless one of the two exceptions can be imported to the
act of postponement.
33. Now, let us examine the latter provision of Section 12[4] of the
Panchayat Act. This provision contains two contingencies, under
which the meeting can be either adjourned or cancelled, namely:-
“[i] ‘in pursuance of an order or direction of a competent
court or [ii] for any other reason beyond control of the
prescribed authority’.”
34. The first part of the latter provisions of Section 12[4] does not
require any elaborate explanation. The legislature, by this provision,
has empowered the Court to adjourn or cancel a meeting in an
appropriate case.
35. The second part of the latter provision of Section 12[4] requires
examination in order to ascertain under what circumstances and to
what extent the Prescribed Authority may adjourn or cancel the
meeting citing ‘reason beyond his control’.
36. Therefore, the Prescribed Authority must not exercise his power for
an ‘ unauthorised purpose’ . It means that the exercise of statutory
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power cannot be for a purpose foreign to that for which it is intended
in law. Any action taken by the Prescribed Authority in conscious
violation of the law, to the prejudice of another or any depraved
inclination to disregard the rights of others, is liable to be set aside.
[emphasized by us]
37. Before we proceed further, we must be mindful that passing an
order for an ‘unauthorised purpose’ constitutes ‘malice in law’. What
is ‘malice in law’ has been explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania ,
reported in (2010) 9 SCC 437 :
25. The State is under obligation to act fairly without ill will
or malice— in fact or in law. “Legal malice” or “malice in
law” means something done without lawful excuse. It is an
act done wrongfully and wilfully without reasonable or
probable cause, and not necessarily an act done from ill
feeling and spite. It is a deliberate act in disregard to the
rights of others. Where malice is attributed to the State, it
can never be a case of personal ill will or spite on the part of
the State. It is an act which is taken with an oblique or
indirect object. It means exercise of statutory power for
“purposes foreign to those for which it is in law intended”. It
means conscious violation of the law to the prejudice of
another, a depraved inclination on the part of the authority
to disregard the rights of others, which intent is manifested
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by its injurious acts. (Vide ADM, Jabalpur v. Shivakant
Shukla [(1976) 2 SCC 521 : AIR 1976 SC 1207] , S.R.
Venkataraman v. Union of India [(1979) 2 SCC 491 : 1979
SCC (L&S) 216 : AIR 1979 SC 49], State of
A.P. v. Goverdhanlal Pitti [(2003) 4 SCC 739 : AIR 2003 SC
1941], BPL Ltd. v. S.P. Gururaja [(2003) 8 SCC 567]
and W.B. SEB v. Dilip Kumar Ray [(2007) 14 SCC 568 :
(2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 860].)
38. The right to remove a Pradhan by a vote of no confidence is a
statutorily recognised right and it is based on democratic principles.
Non-compliance of such provisions by the Prescribed Authority,
violates such democratic process.
39. The State respondents, namely, the Prescribed Authority as also
the Officer-in-Charge, Chanchal Police Station, were parties to the
appeal. While the appeal was admitted and an interim order was
granted, we had afforded the respondents an opportunity to file
affidavits. Neither the Prescribed Authority nor the Officer-in-Charge,
Chanchal Police Station have come up with any affidavit-in-opposition
disclosing that the ground reality and the law-and-order situation,
necessitated police protection during the meeting. Thus, an inference
can be drawn that no such situation existed. There is nothing on
record to show that, either the Prescribed Authority or the Chanchal
Police Station had reasons to substantiate that the situation was
beyond the control of the Prescribed Authority and postponement of
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the meeting was imperative and covered by the second contingency
under Section 12(4) of the Panchayat Act.
40. The issue as to whether the provisions of Section 12(4) of the
Panchayat Act are mandatory or not is longer res integra . A
Coordinate Bench of this Court [where one of us was a member] in
Pradhan, Nurpur Gram Panchayat and Another vs. Gobinda
Ghosh and Others reported in 2026 SCC OnLine Cal 8718 , had
occasioned to deal with an identical issue. It was, inter alia, held:
8. “It is the democratic right of the requisitionists to bring a
motion of no confidence against the Pradhan, but such
right has to be exercised in terms of Section 12(2) of the
said Act. The Prescribed Authority thereafter, has to act
upon compliance of Sections 12(3) to 12(10). In this case,
the Prescribed Authority initially scheduled the meeting
on 12-6-2026 and just a day before the meeting, the
Prescribed Authority postponed the same for an indefinite
period by citing the reasons beyond his control. Along
with the said notice of postponement, the e-mail received
from the Inspector-in-Charge of the concerned Police
Station was attached.
9. In our view, if the Prescribed Authority felt that the
situation was beyond his control and he was not in a
position to hold the meeting, the specific reasons as to
why he was of the view that, without adequate police
force the meeting could not be held, and whether he was
apprehensive of law and order problems and/or violence,
should have been reflected in the notice of postponement.
Secondly, there is nothing on record which would show
that the Prescribed Authority had serious intention of
holding the meeting on any subsequent date. The time
limit prescribed under Section 12(4) to hold the meeting of
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no confidence is 15 working days from the date of receipt
of the notice.
10. Admittedly, the notice of motion was received on 2-6-
2026 and the meeting was first fixed on 12-6-2026.
However, the Prescribed Authority could have decided on
the date within the time limit prescribed under Section
12(10), which provides that the entire process of issuing
notices, holding the meeting and communicating the
result of the meeting to the appropriate authority has to
be completed within 30 days from the date of receipt of
the notice of motion.
11. We do not find any honest intention of the Prescribed
Authority to take such steps within the statutory period.
Thus, the writ court could not have extended the time
beyond the period of 30 days. Such direction would
amount to rewriting the statute. Extension of the time
limit prescribed by law is not within the power of a writ
court, in exercise of power of judicial review.
12. Under such circumstances, we are not in agreement
with Mr Islam to the extent that the requisition which was
brought forth by the requisitionists should be treated as
valid and alive. The requisition had lost its force, the
moment the time limit prescribed by law had expired.
13. The contention of Mr Bhattacharya that Section 12(11)
bars further requisition is not accepted. Section 12(11)
comes into operation only when the notice of no
confidence brought against the Pradhan, fails on account
of lack of quorum or the motion is not carried through.
14. We are also surprised to find that the Prescribed
Authority had adopted a method of ignoring the
requisition and not holding the meeting, on the ground
that adequate police force was not available. The law
does not prescribe that such meetings have to be held in
the presence of the police authorities. Thus, such a plea
of the Prescribed Authority is not in conformity with the
expression “reason beyond the control”.
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15. Unless there are specific instances to demonstrate that
non-availability of the police force would result in a
chaotic or unsafe situation, the postponement of the
meeting deserves to be set aside. Section 12(10) of the
said Act provides that the entire process from the receipt
of the requisition till the completion of the meeting, should
be concluded within 30 days. By the order impugned, the
time has been extended by further 10 days from the date
of communication of the order of Her Lordship dated 1-7-
2026.
16. Mr Islam informs us that the meeting has been
scheduled on 15-7-2026. In our view, the notice by which
the meeting has been fixed on 15-7-2026 is also set
aside.
41. Unfortunately, the decision in Pradhan, Nurpur Gram
Panchayat and Another [supra] was not brought to the notice of the
learned Single Judge.
42. It does not appear that the decision of the learned Single Judge
passes the twin tests of ‘why’ and ‘what’. A judicial decision must
meet, the ‘why’ connoting the ‘reason’ for sustaining the ‘what’, which
is the ‘conclusion’. Reference may be made in this regard to the
decision reported in 2024 [4] SCC 696 [Asma Lateef & Anr. Vs.
Shabbir Ahmad & Ors.] .
43. The decision of the learned Single Judge is also not in consonance
with Section 12[4] of the Panchayat Act. The learned Single Judge
has completely misconstrued the law and failed to appreciate the
legislative intent behind the incorporation of the expression that the
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meeting shall not be held later than ‘fifteen working days’ from the
date of receipt of the motion by the Prescribed Authority.
44. The judgments passed by a coordinate Bench of this Court in MAT
653 of 2021 [ Selina Bibi Vs. The State of West Bengal & Ors. ]
and MAT 992 of 2022 [ Pravati Murmu &Anr. Vs. Sabina Hasda &
Ors. ] also do not come to the aid of the requisitionists.
45. In Selina Bibi [supra], the meeting was adjourned due to the
restrictions imposed by the State in view of the Covid–19 pandemic
situation. This, in our view, certainly amounts to ‘reasons beyond
control’ for which a meeting can be adjourned by the Prescribed
Authority.
46. In Pravati Murmu [supra], no ratio has been laid down and
therefore, the said judgment cannot be treated as a binding
precedent. The facts are also not available. We are unable to consider
the circumstances under which the court allowed the meeting which
was held at an extended date.
47. In the instant case, as it appears from the notice dated 08.06.2026
and also from the affidavit filed by the requisitionists, the Prescribed
Authority, who is also the Block Development Officer, Chanchal-II
Development Block, could not hold the meeting since adequate police
force was not made available. In the present determination allotted to
us, we have found that in other appeals also, identical pleas were
taken by the Prescribed Authority to either cancel or postpone the
meeting.
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48. The Prescribed Authority is the Block Development Officer and he
is the administrative head of his Block. It is unfortunate that an
administrative head of a Block is unable to perform his statutory duty
for lack of police assistance. This cannot be an excuse for not
performing statutory duties. The apprehension of the Prescribed
Authority of law-and-order problems at the time of the meeting or
afterwards, must be based on some materials on record. ‘Police
assistance’ is not a pre-condition for holding a meeting under Section
12(4). The Prescribed Authority can neither rewrite the statutory
provision and nor can he choose not to perform his / her statutory
duties on flimsy grounds. If it is found that there is an apprehension
of law-and-order problem in the block, an inference may be drawn
that the administration of the Block is not running well. The statute
also does not provide for police assistance. Unless, subjective
satisfaction of the Prescribed Authority that, the situation at the
meeting will lead to violence and he will be unable to hold the meeting
in fear of violence, are available from the records, we cannot hold that
inability of the police to provide assistance, is a valid ground,
available in law, to postpone the meeting.
49. It is also surprising to note that the Officer-in-charge of the
concerned police station refused to accede to the request of the Block
Development Officer. We express our displeasure and anguish to that
effect. The entire action/decision of the police authority as well as the
Prescribed Authority / Block Development Officer are highly
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reprehensible. The intention of the legislature cannot be defeated in
the casual manner adopted by the Prescribed Authority.
50. It is to be remembered that, the legislature has empowered the
Prescribed Authority to cancel or adjourn the meeting for ‘any other
reason beyond his control’. That does not mean that the Prescribed
Authority can use such power as a device to adjourn or cancel a
meeting in every case. Since, the first part of Section 12(4) is
mandatory in nature the Prescribed Authority must keep in mind that
all endeavours are required to be taken by him to conclude the
meeting within the time frame given by the statute. The latter part of
Section 12(4) of the Panchayat Act, can be invoked only in exceptional
circumstances, such as flood or covid pandemic, other natural
calamities, violence or other circumstances of like nature, which are
beyond the control of the Prescribed Authority. The Prescribed
Authority must substantiate existence of such reasons either in his
cancellation or adjournment order or from contemporaneous records,
demonstrably disclosing the genuine reason(s) which forced him to
postpone the meeting. Moreover, the postponement in this case, was
until further orders. i.e. indefinitely, without fixing another
convenient date.
51. In view of the above, we declare that the first part of Section 12(4)
to be mandatory, ie, if the two contingencies, contained in the latter
part of Section 12(4) do not arise. The same provision is directory, if
any of the contingencies as stipulated in the latter part of Section
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12(4) arises, provided the Prescribed Authority, before cancelling or
adjourning the meeting, satisfies himself that there exists a genuine
reason, which according to him is beyond his control. In such event,
he is permitted to adjourn or cancel the meeting. It is made clear that
absence of police assistance cannot be a ground to cancel or adjourn
a meeting. The Prescribed Authority is bound by law and he cannot
raise vague issues like law-and-order problem to justify non-
compliance of the statutory provisions, without recording with
corroborative evidence that the law-and-order situation is beyond his
control, likely to cause bloodbath.
52. It is needless to mention here that the requisitionists have a right
to remove the Pradhan. In case the meeting is cancelled at the
instance of the Prescribed Authority, they have a right to bring
another motion in accordance with law and in such event, the
Prescribed Authority is under a bounden duty to comply with the
provisions of the Panchayat Act within the statutory period and
without delaying the situation for no cogent reason.
53. Before we conclude, we would like to remind ourselves of the
proposition laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of UP
Vs. Johri Mal reported in 2004 (4) SCC 714 on the scope of judicial
review of an administrative decision.
Paragraph 28[iii] of the said judgment is reproduced herein below:
“28. ........................................................................................
................................................................................................
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[i] ............................................................................................
[ii] ...........................................................................................
[iii]An order passed by an administrative authority
exercising discretion vested in it, cannot be interfered in
judicial review unless it is shown that exercise of discretion
itself is perverse or illegal.
[iv] ........................................................................................
[v].............................................................................................”
54. In the instant case, the power exercised by the Prescribed
Authority was for an unauthorised purpose, and therefore, the notice
dated 08.06.2026 issued by the Prescribed Authority, whereby the
meeting was postponed, is illegal for the reasons stated hereinabove.
Hence, the notice dated 08.06.2026 is quashed. The order impugned
is also set aside. The consequential steps taken pursuant to the
order impugned are set aside. The election of the new Pradhan is set
aside. The appellant will be reinstated as Pradhan.
55. We grant liberty to the requisitionists to bring another motion in
accordance with law and it is directed that the Prescribed Authority
shall strictly comply with the provisions of law and convene the
meeting within the time fixed by the statute.
56. We direct the Registrar General of this Court to send a copy of this
judgment to the Principal Secretary, Panchayat and Rural
Development, Government of West Bengal, all the District Magistrates
and the Director General of Police, West Bengal to take necessary
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steps and to ensure strict adherence to the provisions of Section 12(4)
of the Panchayat Act by the Prescribed Authority.
57. The appeals stand disposed of.
58. No order as to costs.
59. Urgent photostat certified copies of this judgment, if applied for, be
supplied to the parties on compliance of all necessary formalities.
I Agree.
( Arjun Ray Mukherjee, J. ) ( Shampa Sarkar, J. )
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