HARI KRUSHNA MAHANTY vs STATE OF ODISHA
- Court
- Odisha High Court
CRLREV/212/2024
ODHC010271992024
2024:OHC:4
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
AFR
CRLREV No.212 of 2024
(CNR No. ODHC010271992024)
Hari Krushna Mahanty …. Petitioner
Mr. Dharanidhar Nayak, Senior Advocate
& Mr. A. Bhuyan, Advocate
-Versus -
State of Odisha …. Opposite Party
Mr. S.K. Brahma, ASC
CORAM:
JUSTICE R.K. PATTANAIK
DATE OF HEARING:04.08.2026
DATE OF JUDGMENT:13.11.2026
1. Instant revision under Section 401 read with Section
397 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (in short
‘the Cr.P.C.’) is at the behest of the petitioner assailing
the correctness, legality and judicial propriety of the
th
impugned order dated 15 November, 2023 as at
Annexure-3 passed in connection with C.T. Case No.07
of 2023 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-cum-
Special Judge, Koraput, whereby, an application under
Section 227 Cr.P.C. seeking discharge vis-a-vis the
alleged offences was rejected on the grounds inter alia
that such decision in the absence of materials on record
especially with regard to his marital relationship with
the informant found to be absent, hence, such decision
is liable to be interfered with and set aside.
Page 1 of 21
th
2. The informant lodged the FIR on 13 March, 2016
registered as Koraput Town P.S. Case No.48 of 2016
under Sections 498-A, 313, 323 & 506 IPC. The said
report revealed the details of the allegations against the
petitioner and another accused, who is responsible for
having committed the offence under Section 506 IPC.
According to the informant, she is a widow having a
10-year-old daughter and the petitioner, after having
developed physical relationship, had a marriage with
her at a temple. The circumstances under which the
alleged marriage took place have also been described
in the FIR. It is further alleged therein that after such
marriage, the petitioner committed such other
mischiefs, the details of which, are also narrated in the
FIR. The manner in which the informant was treated by
th
the petitioner after the alleged marriage on 12
December, 2011 is divulged in the report. According to
the informant, she was ill-treated, abused and assaulted
by the petitioner, who finally drove her out, hence, the
FIR was lodged.
3. A copy of the FIR is at Annexure-1 and the record
th
reveals that the petitioner was arrested on 19 March,
2016 and thereafter, was released on bail. Upon
i.e.
closure of investigation, the chargesheet Annexure-2
was filed against the petitioner and the other accused.
Subsequent to the chargesheet filed, the learned
S.D.J.M., Koraput took cognizance of the alleged
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offences and proceeded with the enquiry. At the stage
of framing of charge, the petitioner filed the
application under Section 227 Cr.P.C. seeking discharge
on the plea that there is no valid marriage between
him and the informant and other offences are prima
facie not made out but the learned court below was
th
pleased to reject the same vide order dated 15
November, 2023 at Annexure-3.
4. Consequent to the rejection of the plea of discharge
of the petitioner, the revision is filed on the following
grounds, such as, (i) the order declining discharge is
otherwise illegal, perverse and bad in the eyes of law;
(ii) the allegations made in the FIR about marriage
having taken place between the parties is not
established as there is no any material about such
marriage, inasmuch as, no scrap of paper has been
produced to substantiate the same; (iii) the marriage
between the petitioner and the informant was never
solemnized, hence, there is no question of any mental
cruelty and torture attributed to the former against the
latter and mere allegations in that regard without more
does not constitute an offence under Section 498-A
IPC; (iv) the allegation about abortion more than once
is also not established as neither in the FIR nor
anywhere details of such abortions have been disclosed
and therefore, it is quite improbable to believe the
prosecution story; (v) the allegations in the FIR and the
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statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and
Section 164 Cr.P.C. are concocted and a conspiracy
hatched by the informant in connivance with the
person named, who is the Secretary of a College and
professionally, an adversary of the petitioner, hence, he
has been entangled and falsely framed; (vi) there is no
medical report or any other evidence to substantiate
the allegation of abortions of the informant at the
instance of the petitioner, hence, no offence under
Section 313 IPC is prima facie made out; (vii) similarly
the offence under Section 323 IPC is not proved from
the materials on record in absence of any evidence of
assault and injury received by the informant for the
alleged mischief attributed to the petitioner; (viii) the
learned court below has adopted a straitjacket formula
to frame charges against the petitioner in absence of
any prima facie material and only by considering the
gravity of the allegations made; (ix) the petitioner did
not commit any such mischief but the learned court
below failed to evaluate the materials to find out
whether the ingredients of the offences exist to make
out a case for trial against him even for an offence
under Section 506 IPC; and (x) the petitioner had filed
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CRLMC No.662 of 2018 disposed of on 10 February,
2023 granting him liberty to renew demanding
exoneration at the appropriate stage, hence, the
application under Section 227 Cr.P.C., however, the
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learned court below did not consider and appreciate
the materials on record in proper perspective, hence,
the impugned order at Annexure-3 deserves to be set
aside in the interest of justice.
5. Heard Mr. Nayak, learned Senior Advocate
appearing for the petitioner and Mr. Brahma, learned
ASC for the State.
6. In support of discharge referring to the FIR and
other materials filed along with the chargesheet, Mr.
Nayak, learned Senior Advocate would submit that the
marriage between the petitioner and the informant has
not taken place, inasmuch as, there has been no
marriage at all and hence, an offence under Section
498-A IPC is prima facie not made out. It is also argued
that no any case under Section 313 IPC is established in
absence of any evidence filed along with the
chargesheet. Since the marriage is not established
between the parties, according to Mr. Nayak, learned
Senior Advocate, there is no cruelty committed by the
petitioner, hence, declining discharge for the offence
under Section 498-A is an erroneous decision of the
learned court below. While advancing such an
argument, Mr. Nayak, learned Senior Advocate refers
to the following case laws, such as, U. Suvetha Vrs.
State By Inspector of Police and another (2009) 6 SCC
757; Santi Deb Berma Vrs. Kanchan Prava Devi (Smt.)
1991 Supp (2) SCC 616; Dr. Aswin V Nair Vrs. State of
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Kerala Represented by Public Prosecutor & others
(CRL.MC No.2654 of 2024 of High Court of Kerala
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decided on 8 July, 2024); Subhash Hazarika @ Dhan
Hazarika Vrs. State of Assam Represented by Additional
P.P., Assam (Crl. Rev.P./89/2013) of the Gauhati High
rd
Court dated 3 June, 2025; Ankita Jain Vrs. State &
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Others of High Court of Delhi dated 20 July, 2023 in
Cr. Rev.P. 754 of 2023; Suku Hansda Vrs. The State of
th
Jharkhand in Cr. Appeal (SJ) No. 05 of 2004 dated 18
June, 2018; Rajesh Bhardwaj Vrs. State 2008(101) DRJ
380; and finally, Karan Talwar Vrs. State of Tamil
th
Nadu in SLP(Crl.) No.10736 of 2022 dated 19
December, 2024.
7. On the contrary, Mr. Brahma, learned ASC for the
State submits that the learned court below did not err
in denying discharge of the petitioner considering the
chargesheet and connected materials which prima facie
established the commission of the alleged offences by
the petitioner. The submission is that the FIR and the
evidence collected during investigation do reveal that a
marriage has taken place between the parties and
thereafter, while staying together, the petitioner
committed the alleged mischiefs and hence, claiming
that the informant has been subjected to cruelty, the
FIR was lodged and it has been finally proved on the
filling of the chargesheet. Not only the allegation of
mental and physical cruelty is prima facie established
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on the filing of the chargesheet, but also the other
allegations clearly borne out of the record and
therefore, the learned court below did not commit any
grave error in rejecting the application under Section
227 Cr.P.C. demanding discharge by the petitioner and
therefore, the impugned order at Annexure-3 calls for
no interference.
8. Referring to the decision in U. Suvetha (supra), it is
contended by Mr. Nayak, learned Senior Advocate that
the petitioner cannot be said to have committed an
offence under Section 498-A IPC even assuming for the
sake of argument that a relationship between him and
the informant existed at one point of time. In the
decision (supra), the Apex Court while considering a
case alleging cruelty and whether any such offence
under Section 498-A IPC has been committed or
otherwise was dealing with a case where the
prosecution was directed against persons, who are not
related to the husband by blood or marriage or
adoption and the question therein was if at all a girl
friend or concubine can be criminally prosecuted. In
the above decision, it has also been held that living
with another woman may be an act of cruelty for the
purpose of judicial separation or dissolution of
marriage, but it cannot be stretched to such an extent
to allege cruelty under Section 498-A IPC. Such a
question is not a subject matter herein. Rather, the
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petitioner denied any such marital relationship with the
informant alleging that there is no valid marriage
between them. The primary ground of challenge to the
offence under Section 498-A IPC is on the premise that
there is no marriage since no any evidence has been
collected during investigation to prove the same. In the
considered view of the Court, the decision (supra) is
not directly applicable to the case at hand as it is based
on different set of facts, hence, renders no assistance to
Mr. Nayak, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner.
9. In Santi Deb Berma (supra), the offence is of bigamy
punishable under Section 494 IPC and therein, the
validity of the second marriage was in question to
prove whether any such offence has been committed
and in that, the Apex Court concluded that in absence
of any cogent evidence of a valid marriage, the accused
husband cannot be convicted thereunder. Referring to
the above decision, Mr. Nayak, learned Senior
Advocate is to suggest that for any such relationship, a
valid marriage must exist and in absence of the same
between the parties, no prima facie case under Section
498-A IPC would be established, the fact which was
completely lost sight of by the learned court below.
Again, this Court considers the said decision to be
inapplicable for the fact that therein the offence is of
bigamy under Section 494 IPC and to establish that it
has been committed, a valid marriage was required to
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be proved so as to criminally prosecute the accused
husband. In the instant case, the marriage is alleged by
the informant but denied by the petitioner, an issue
which is not yet a subject of trial. Whether any such
marriage had taken place between the parties claimed
by one and denied by the other is a matter of debate
and the question is whether at the stage of framing of
charge, it can be examined. According to Mr. Nayak,
learned Senior Advocate, evidence on record must
reveal about a valid marriage between the parties. But
as earlier stated, the decision in Santi Deb Berma
(supra) is of no help to claim that a valid marriage must
exist to prosecute the petitioner for offence under
Section 498-A IPC.
10. In Dr. Aswin V Nair (supra), the Kerala High Court,
while exercising inherent power under Section 482
Cr.P.C., quashed the proceeding for an offence under
Section 498-A IPC with a conclusion that for
prosecution for the alleged offence, there must be valid
marital relationship between the accused and the
victim. In the case (supra), in absence of legal marriage
between the parties, exercising jurisdiction under
Section 482 Cr.P.C., the criminal prosecution under
Section 498-A IPC was quashed. But, according to the
Court, denial of discharge is questioned by the
petitioner invoking its revisional jurisdiction and
therefore, having regard to the chargesheet and other
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material evidence, a demand for discharge is to be
examined.
11. In the peculiar fact situation, the Gauhati High
Court in Subhash Hazarika @ Dhan Hazarika (supra)
concluded that an offence under Section 498-A IPC is
not made out since the victim was not considered
legally wedded wife of the accused. In Ankita Jain
(supra), in absence of medical documents on record,
the allegation of miscarriage and an offence under
Section 313 IPC was disbelieved and it was upheld in
revision. In Suku Hansda (supra), the charge under
Section 313 IPC could not be established, hence, it was
followed by an acquittal order. The above decision was
while considering an appeal against the order of
conviction and sentence and not at the stage of framing
of charge or while considering the plea of discharge of
the accused. Similarly, in Rajesh Bhardwaj (supra), the
conviction was under Section 313 IPC and therein the
sentence was suspended pending disposal of the appeal
on a satisfaction arrived at that there is no evidence on
record to prove miscarriage or anything related to
medical termination of pregnancy. In Karan Talwar
(supra), however the decision was while considering
discharge and it was for an offence under Section 27(b)
of the NDPS Act. In the said case, in absence of any
other material except confessional statement of the co-
accused, discharge was demanded and considering the
Page 10 of 21
same, the Apex Court held and observed that any such
confession cannot translate into admissible evidence at
the stage of trial and therefore, standing the trial for
the accused could be an ordeal and under such
circumstances, set aside the order declining discharge by
the Madras High Court. The above decision is a case of
discharge for an offence under Section 27(b) of the
NDPS Act in absence of any other materials except the
confessional statement of the co-accused.
12. The question is whether anyone can be dragged
into a criminal prosecution under Section 498-A IPC
having no marriage proved with the informant, who
claims otherwise. For considering the discharge, this
Court is of the view that the chargesheet and
connected materials are to be looked into to find out
and ascertain whether a case for trial is made out. In
State of Tamil Nadu by Inspector of Police Vigilance &
Anti-Corruption Vrs. N. Suresh Rajan & others
MANU/SC/0011/2014, the Apex Court held and
observed as to in what manner a Court is to evaluate
the materials on record while considering discharge or
in framing of charge against an accused and concluded
that at such a stage, the probative value of the
materials cannot be gone into. It is further held therein
that at the time of consideration of discharge, a Court
cannot act as a mouthpiece of the prosecution or a Post
Office and may sift evidence in order to find out
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whether or not the allegations made are groundless. It
is also held further that at the stage of considering
discharge, the Court has to proceed with an assumption
that the materials brought on record by the prosecution
are true and evaluate the same with a view to ascertain
whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their
face value disclosed existence of all the ingredients
constituting the alleged offence. It has been observed
therein that the probative value of the materials may
have to be examined, but the Court is not expected to
go deep into the matter and hold that the materials
would not warrant a conviction. It has been concluded
by the Apex Court in the decision (supra) that what
needs to be considered is whether there is ground for
presuming that the offence has been committed and
not whether a ground for convicting the accused has
been made out. To put it differently, if the Court thinks
that the accused might have committed the offence on
the basis of the materials on record, it can frame the
charge, though for conviction, a conclusion must have
to be reached that he committed the offence, inasmuch
as, law does not permit a mini-trial at such stage while
considering discharge or framing of charge.
13. In Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat & others Vrs. State of
Uttar Pradesh and another (2013) 11 SCC 476, the
Apex Court endorsed the view taken in Onkar Nath
Mishra and others Vrs. State (NCT of Delhi) and
Page 12 of 21
another (2008]) 2 SCC 561 and concluded that at the
stage of framing of charge, the Court is required to
evaluate the materials and documents on record with a
view to finding out the existence of the ingredients of
the offences alleged. The Apex Court in Union of India
Vrs. Prafulla Kumar Samal and another (1979) 3 SCC 4
laid down the following principles, such as, (i) while
considering framing of charge or discharge under
Section 227 Cr.P.C., a Court is having the power to sift
and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of
finding out, whether or not, a prima facie case against
the accused has been made out; (ii) whether the
materials placed before the Court disclosed grave
suspicion against the accused and the same has not
been properly explained and in such a situation, the
Court would be fully justified in framing the charge and
proceeding with the trial; (iii) the test to determine a
prima facie case would naturally depend upon the
evidence collected and it is difficult to lay down a rule
of universal application but by and large, if two views
are equally possible, the Court is satisfied that evidence
produced while giving rise to some suspicion but not
grave suspicion against the accused, it would be within
its power to discharge the accused; (iv) while exercising
power under Section 227 Cr.P.C., a Court cannot
merely act as a Post Office of the prosecution but has
to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total
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effect of the evidence and the documents produced,
any basic infirmities in the case so on and so forth,
however, it does not mean that a roving enquiry is to
be held to weigh the evidence as if conducting a trial.
14. Keeping in view the law laid down by the Apex
Court discussed hereinabove, this Court is to examine
as to whether denial of discharge of the petitioner for
the alleged offences is justified. According to this Court,
the prosecution under Section 498-A IPC has been
challenged based on the absence of valid marriage, but
the success depends heavily on the specific nature of
the relationship. Historically, a legally valid marriage
was considered as a requirement for criminal
prosecution for an offence under Section 498-A IPC. In
conventional cases, a valid marriage is a pre-requisite
for a prosecution under Section 498-A IPC. If a
relationship is purely a temporary live-in arrangement
or if the marriage is found legally null and void, the
accused may claim discharge not being the husband of
the woman, who alleged cruelty against him. But in the
recent past, the legal position received a transformation
with the Apex Court’s ruling in Dr. Lokesh B.H. &
others Vrs. State of Karnataka & another 2026 INSC
784, wherein, a prosecution under Section 498-A IPC is
held to include long term live-in relationships that are
in the nature of marriage provided there was shared
intention to marry the woman. In other words, if a
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couple stays for a long period like spouses, a challenge
against the prosecution under Section 498-A IPC might
fail if a woman can establish that the relationship was
entered into with an intention to marry or that, the
accused actively induced her to believe that they were
legally married or where the parties voluntarily and
continuously cohabited, shared a household,
maintained domestic arrangements and publicly
represented themselves as a couple. It is also to be
taken judicial notice of the fact that merely walking out
of or abandoning a non-marital relationship or a
relationship in the nature of marriage does not fulfill
the statutory definition of cruelty where without a
formal marriage, a civil remedy lies and not a criminal
prosecution under Section 498-A IPC.
15. In Dr. Lokesh B.H. (supra), the Apex Court
expanded the definition of husband in so far as Section
498-A IPC is concerned and held and observed that it is
not confined to someone who is in a legally valid
marital life but extends to one, who enters into a
marital relationship which is void or voidable as also to
a live-in relationship, which bears the attributes of
marriage so long as the essential ingredients of cruelty
as defined under Section 498-A IPC are satisfied. The
conclusion has been summarized therein by the Apex
Court to the effect that Section 498-A IPC is held to be
applicable even to live-in relationships that qualify as
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relationship in the nature of marriage with intent to
marry being established as an intrinsic part thereof; live
in relationships are protected by Section 498-A IPC and
it is stated for clarity that such relationships are related
to consenting adults; the proposition of law laid down
shall be limited to Section 498-A IPC only and such
extended interpretation shall not affect any other
provision and at the end, outlined the safeguards
against arrest and other factors laid down in Arnesh
Kumar Vrs. State of Bihar & another AIR 2014 SC 2756
to be strictly applied further clarifying that no person in
a relationship in the nature of marriage having been
accused of committing cruelty against a woman being
either the live-in partner in the nature of marriage shall
be arrested without preliminary enquiry.
16. With the above discussions referring to the case
laws, this Court is to take cognizance of the broad
parameters for consideration while dealing with the
demand of discharge of an accused. Turning to the facts
of the case, on a reading of the FIR, this Court finds
that the petitioner developed intimacy with the
informant and thereafter, allegedly had a marriage with
th
her on 12 December, 2011. The FIR further discloses
that the informant lived along with the petitioner as
spouses and such a relationship continued for nearly 4
to 5 years. It is also disclosed that the informant had
become pregnant not once but a couple of times and
Page 16 of 21
had allegedly undergone abortion of the same under
the circumstances narrated therein. The manner in
which the informant was subjected to abuse and assault
is also described in the FIR. The claim of the informant
is about the marriage and living together and
thereafter, the petitioner committed the alleged
mischief and even maintaining relationships with other
women. Whether there was a valid marriage in the
eyes of law is not to be examined threadbare at the
stage of enquiry when it is claimed by the informant. If
the uncontroverted allegations do make out a case
with the claim that the marriage had taken place in the
year 2011, the truthfulness or otherwise of the claim is
to be considered during trial. Accepting the version of
the petitioner at the stage of charge with a plea that
there has been no valid marriage is not permissible
under law and that too when, the Apex Court in Dr.
Lokesh B.H. (supra) held that even a live-in relation in
the nature of marriage between the parties would
invite a criminal prosecution for an offence punishable
under Section 498-A IPC. It is not that the parties were
in a temporary relationship and parted ways, rather,
the informant alleges their marriage and it was
preceded by an assurance by the petitioner and after
the marriage having taken place at a temple, both lived
together under one roof. Having regard to the
allegations in the FIR, this Court is of the view that
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with any such plea of having no legal marriage, the
petitioner cannot escape prosecution under Section
498-A IPC when he and the informant allegedly had a
marriage and claimed to have stayed together for quite
some time like spouses.
17. As regards the offence under Section 313 IPC, the
allegation in the FIR about miscarriage is revealed. An
accused can plead for discharge, if there is a total lack
of medical evidence or corroboration linking the
alleged miscarriage to the actions of the accused. In
charges relating to causing a miscarriage, it is not
enough to simply allege that a miscarriage took place.
The prosecution must establish a direct causal link
showing that the miscarriage was the specific result of
an injury or act committed by the accused. For a bsence
of corroborative documents, the Courts have
repeatedly held that due to want of crucial medical
records, such as, ultrasound reports, Medico-Legal
Certificates (MLCs), or a doctor's opinion connecting
the termination/expulsion of the fetus to an assault,
renders a charge of miscarriage groundless. An accused
can plead discharge if the Court finds that the charge is
baseless or that there is no sufficient ground to proceed
against him. Mere oral allegation without medical
corroboration often fail to make out a prima facie case.
In charges involving a miscarriage or forced termination
punishable under Section 313 of the IPC, the law is
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clear that prosecution must prove a direct causal link
between the accused's overt act and the loss of
pregnancy. In Ankita Jain (supra), it is held that mere
allegations of a miscarriage without supporting medical
documents establishing causation thereby failing to
make out a prima facie case can justify a discharge. If
the prosecution relies solely on vague oral accusations
without any medical corroboration or prescriptions
showing a medico-legal implication, the defense can
argue that a prima facie case is not made out. At the
discharge stage, it is to reiterate that a Court does not
conduct a full trial or weigh the evidence with
mathematical precision; it only checks if the material on
record generally accepted reasonably connects the
accused to the crime. If the prosecution has strong
independent ocular testimony, statements from
witnesses, or circumstantial evidence pointing to the
commission of the offence (even if direct medical
records of the fetus are missing or contested), the Court
may still reject the plea of discharge and choose to
frame charges. In the case at hand, considering the
chargesheet and connected materials, it is not
forthcoming as to circumstances leading to the
miscarriage with bare minimum evidence. No
corroborative medical evidence on miscarriage is on
record. No direct materials, ocular or documentary,
evidencing miscarriage is revealed except the claim of
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the informant. Some foundation shall have to be laid
to show that the petitioner was in a way responsible
for the alleged miscarriage to frame a charge under
Section 313 IPC. Just a casual claim with an allegation
of miscarriage is not sufficient to go for a trial for an
offence of miscarriage when there is no any evidence
except an uncorroborated claim of the victim. This
Court is, therefore, inclined to hold that the petitioner’s
plea for discharge for the offence under Section 313 IPC
is justified.
18. The other offences alleged against the petitioner
are, however, revealed from the chargesheet and some
materials are there to suggest that the petitioner
deserves a trial for the charges levelled except for the
alleged miscarriage. Even the statement of the
informant under Section 164 Cr.P.C. corroborates
certain allegations in the FIR. This Court is not inclined
to consider additional evidence at the stage of framing
of charge and hence, discharge of the accused can only
be considered referring to the chargesheet and the
connected materials. In fact, the petitioner had moved
an application under Section 91 Cr.P.C. before the
learned court below for production of some
documents and it was declined and the said order was
not challenged. On consideration of the materials on
record, this Court finally reaches at a logical conclusion
that the marriage is alleged by the informant claiming
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that it was held in a temple and that she lived with the
petitioner under one roof till such time subjected to ill-
treatment and desertion and having regard to such
allegations clearly revealed from the FIR and the
materials filed along with the chargesheet, the demand
for discharge cannot be entertained except for the
offence under Section 313 IPC. In other words, this
Court finds the materials for considering trial of the
petitioner for the alleged offences excluding the one of
miscarriage and hence, it is ultimately concluded that
the learned court below committed error in declining
discharge for the offence under Section 313 IPC and not
for the other offences, which is, therefore, liable to be
interfered with thereby exonerating the petitioner on
the charge of miscarriage.
19. Accordingly, it is ordered.
20. In the result, the revision stands partly allowed. As
th
a necessary corollary, the impugned order dated 15
November, 2023 as at Annexure-3 passed in
connection with C.T. Case No.07 of 2023 by the
learned Additional Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge,
Koraput is hereby set aside to the extent as aforesaid.
(R.K. Pattanaik)
Judge
Alok
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: ALOK RANJAN SETHY
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT
Date: 17-Nov-2026 17:22:33
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