Shiv Kumar Yadav vs State Of Chhattisgarh

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CGHC010022652016 2026:CGHC:38771-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Digitally
signed by
BABLU
RAJENDRA
BHANARKAR
Date:
2026.09.02
17:15:38
+0530
BABLU
RAJENDRA
BHANARKAR
WA No. 371 of 2016
Shiv Kumar Yadav S/o Dewari Lal Yadav, Aged About 45 Years R/o
Village Parsada Post Bharni, Tahsil, Takhatpur, P.S. Chakarbhata,
District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh
... Appellant
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Water Resources
Department, Mahanadi Bhawan Naya Mantralaya, Naya Raipur, P.S.
Mandir Hasaud Raipur Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh
2 - Chief Engineer, Hasdeo Bango Pariyojana Bilaspur Chhattisgarh,
District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh
3 - Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Bilapsur Chhattisgarh, District :
Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh
... Respondent(s)
For Appellant : Mr.S.P. Kale, Advocate
For Respondents
: Mr.P.K.Bhaduri, Deputy Advocate General
No.1 and 2/State
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Judgment on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice
2.9.2026
1. Heard Mr.S.P.Kale, learned counsel for the appellant as well as

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Mr.P.K.Bhaduri, learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for
respondents No.1 and 2/State.
2. The present writ appeal has been preferred by the appellant
challenging the order dated 20.06.2016 passed by the learned
Single Judge in WPL No.169/2012, whereby the writ petition filed
by the State authorities against the award dated 15.03.2012
passed by the learned Labour Court, Bilaspur, was partly allowed
and, instead of reinstatement granted by the Labour Court,
monetary compensation was directed to be paid to the appellant.
3. Facts of the case, in brief, are that the appellant was engaged by
the Water Resources Department as a labour. He was initially
engaged in the year 1993 and continued to work until his services
were discontinued in the year 1997. According to the appellant, he
had continuously worked for more than 240 days during the period
preceding his termination. His services were discontinued without
compliance with the mandatory provisions of Section 25-F of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, 'the ID Act').
4. Aggrieved by his termination, the appellant approached the
competent authority/conciliation officer under the provisions of the
ID Act. As the dispute could not be settled during conciliation
proceedings, a failure report was submitted to the appropriate
Government. The State Government thereafter referred the
industrial dispute raised by the appellant to the learned Labour
Court, Bilaspur, for adjudication.

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5. Upon receipt of the reference, the learned Labour Court registered
the matter and issued notice to the parties. The appellant filed his
statement of claim, specifically pleading that he had been
continuously working as a daily-wage employee; that he had
completed more than 240 days of service in the twelve months
preceding his termination; and that his services had been
terminated without complying with the mandatory requirements of
Sections 25-F and 25-G of the ID Act.
6. The respondent-authorities appeared before the learned Labour
Court and filed their reply denying the allegations made by the
appellant. The parties led their respective evidence and placed the
relevant material before the Labour Court.
7. After considering the pleadings, evidence and material available
on record, the learned Labour Court, vide award dated
15.03.2012, recorded a categorical finding that the appellant had
continuously worked and had completed more than 240 days of
service during the preceding twelve months before his termination.
The Labour Court further found that before terminating the
services of the appellant, the respondent-authorities had not
complied with the mandatory requirements of Section 25-F of the
ID Act and had also failed to follow the principle embodied in
Section 25-G of the ID Act.
8. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Labour Court held the
termination of the appellant to be illegal and directed his

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reinstatement in service, though without back-wages.
9. The State authorities challenged the said award by filing WPL
No.169/2012 before the learned Single Judge of this Court. The
learned Single Judge, vide order dated 20.06.2016, considered
the fact that the appellant was a daily-wage employee and, relying
upon the judgments then holding the field, came to the conclusion
that instead of reinstatement, monetary compensation would meet
the ends of justice. Accordingly, the award of reinstatement was
modified and the State authorities were directed to pay
compensation to the appellant at the rate of Rs.25,000/- per
annum for the period for which he had worked as a daily wager.
10.The appellant has assailed the aforesaid order principally on the
ground that the learned Single Judge exceeded the limited scope
of jurisdiction available under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India by interfering with the findings of fact recorded
by the learned Labour Court. It is submitted that the Labour Court,
upon appreciation of the evidence, had categorically recorded a
finding that the appellant had completed more than 240 days of
service and that the mandatory provisions of Sections 25-F and
25-G of the ID Act had not been complied with. There was,
therefore, no justification for interfering with the award of
reinstatement.
11.Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that the learned
Single Judge erred in proceeding on the assumption that

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reinstatement of a daily-wage employee is impermissible or that
compensation must invariably be substituted for reinstatement.
According to learned counsel, the question of relief has to be
decided upon the facts and circumstances of each individual case.
The Labour Court had exercised its discretion after considering the
material before it and had already denied back-wages to the
appellant. Therefore, there was no justification for further modifying
the relief. He also submits that the subsequent decision of the Full
Bench of this Court in WA No.355/2014 and connected matters ,
decided on 29.08.2025, has now authoritatively answered the very
questions which arise for consideration in the present appeal,
including the scope of interference under Articles 226 and 227, the
question whether reinstatement is automatic, the circumstances in
which compensation can be substituted for reinstatement and the
effect of delay.
12.Per contra, learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the
State/respondents No.1 and 2 supports the order passed by the
learned Single Judge. He submits that the appellant was engaged
only as a daily-wage employee and had no right to hold any
sanctioned or substantive post. According to him, the learned
Single Judge rightly considered the nature of engagement and the
fact that considerable time had elapsed since the appellant's
termination. It is submitted that, in view of the settled legal position
concerning daily-wage employees, compensation in lieu of
reinstatement would meet the ends of justice. He, therefore, prays

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for dismissal of the appeal.
13.We have considered the rival submissions advanced by learned
counsel for the parties and have perused the record of the case,
including the award dated 15.03.2012 passed by the learned
Labour Court, Bilaspur and the order dated 20.06.2016 passed by
the learned Single Judge in WPL No.169/2012.
14.Before considering the individual claim of the appellant, it would be
appropriate to notice that the questions concerning the scope of
judicial review in matters arising from awards of Labour Courts, the
nature of relief to be granted upon finding the termination to be
illegal, the circumstances in which reinstatement or compensation
should be granted, the entitlement to back-wages and the effect of
delay were subsequently considered by a Full Bench of this Court
in WA No.355/2014, Surit Ram and connected matters , decided
on 29.08.2025.
15.The Full Bench, after considering the various judgments of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court, answered the reference and held that the
jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution is wide, but it is not an appellate jurisdiction. The High
Court does not ordinarily re-appreciate evidence as if it were sitting
in appeal over the decision of the Labour Court or Industrial
Tribunal. Interference is justified in cases of jurisdictional error,
perversity, error apparent on the face of the record, violation of
principles of natural justice, arbitrariness or other circumstances

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showing that the Tribunal or Labour Court has acted beyond the
bounds of its authority.
16.The Full Bench further held that when retrenchment is found to be
violative of the provisions of the ID Act, reinstatement is not an
automatic consequence in every case. At the same time, there can
also be no inflexible rule that every daily-wage or casual employee
must necessarily be denied reinstatement and granted monetary
compensation. The relief has to be determined on the basis of the
facts and circumstances of the particular case.
17.The Full Bench has indicated relevant factors for determining the
appropriate relief, including the nature of employment, length of
service, delay in raising the dispute, conduct of the workman,
feasibility of reinstatement, availability of the post, closure or
reorganisation of the establishment and the overall balance of
equities.
18.The aforesaid principles have to be applied to the case of the
present appellant. The learned Labour Court, after recording
evidence and considering the material placed before it, specifically
found that the appellant had completed more than 240 days of
service during the twelve months preceding his termination and
that the mandatory provisions of Section 25-F of the ID Act had not
been complied with by the respondent-authorities. The said finding
of the learned Labour Court has not been shown to be perverse or
based on no evidence.

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19.The learned Single Judge has also not recorded any specific
finding demonstrating that the conclusion reached by the Labour
Court regarding completion of 240 days of service or non-
compliance with Section 25-F was contrary to the evidence on
record. Thus, the foundational findings recorded by the Labour
Court remained undisturbed.
20.It is also significant that the learned Labour Court, while finding the
termination illegal, did not grant the appellant full back-wages. The
relief was confined to reinstatement without back-wages. Thus, the
Labour Court had already moulded the relief after considering the
circumstances of the case.
21.The question before us, therefore, is not whether the appellant's
termination was illegal. That finding had already been recorded by
the competent Labour Court on the basis of the evidence before it
and has not been demonstrated to suffer from perversity or
jurisdictional error. The question is whether, in the facts of the
appellant's individual case, the learned Single Judge was justified
in substituting the relief of reinstatement granted by the Labour
Court with monetary compensation.
22.In our considered opinion, the answer has to be in the negative.
The mere fact that the appellant was engaged on daily-wage basis
could not, by itself, be treated as an absolute bar against
reinstatement. The Full Bench has specifically held that there is no
straitjacket formula governing the grant of reinstatement or

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compensation and that each case has to be considered on its own
facts.
23.In the present case, the appellant had worked continuously for
about four years. His termination was found to be illegal by the
learned Labour Court on account of non-compliance with the
mandatory statutory requirements. There is no finding of
misconduct against the appellant. There is also no material noticed
in the impugned order demonstrating that the establishment had
closed down, that the work for which the appellant had been
engaged had ceased to exist, or that reinstatement of the appellant
had become wholly impracticable.
24.The learned Single Judge principally proceeded on the basis that
the appellant was a daily-wage employee and, therefore,
compensation would be an appropriate substitute for
reinstatement. In view of the subsequent authoritative
pronouncement of the Full Bench, such approach cannot be
sustained as an inflexible proposition of law. The nature of
employment is undoubtedly a relevant factor, but it is only one of
the factors to be considered while determining the appropriate
relief.
25.It is also necessary to keep in view the distinction between the
existence of a right to reinstatement and the question of
regularization. The fact that the appellant was a daily-wage
employee and had no vested right to regularization does not, by

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itself, mean that the Labour Court was precluded from granting
reinstatement after finding his retrenchment to be illegal. The relief
of reinstatement and the question of regularization operate in
different fields.
26.The State has also not been able to demonstrate before us any
exceptional circumstance warranting interference with the
discretionary relief granted by the learned Labour Court. The
Labour Court was the primary fact-finding forum. It considered the
evidence and concluded that reinstatement without back-wages
would meet the ends of justice. In the absence of perversity or any
jurisdictional error, the said discretion ought not to have been
lightly interfered with in exercise of writ jurisdiction.
27.We are conscious of the principle that reinstatement is not an
automatic consequence of every illegal retrenchment, particularly
in cases involving daily-wage employees. However, that principle
does not mean that compensation must invariably be substituted
for reinstatement. The Full Bench has made it clear that the Court
has to examine the overall facts, including the length of service,
the circumstances of termination, delay, feasibility of reinstatement,
conduct of the workman and balance of equities.
28.Applying those principles to the facts of the present case, we find
that the Labour Court's direction for reinstatement without back-
wages was a permissible and reasoned exercise of discretion. No
sufficient ground has been demonstrated warranting its substitution

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by a monetary compensation of Rs.25,000/- per annum.
29.We, therefore, find merit in the present appeal. The order dated
20.06.2016 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPL
No.169/2012, insofar as it relates to the present appellant Shiv
Kumar Yadav , cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside.
30.Consequently, the writ appeal is allowed . The order dated
20.06.2016 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPL
No.169/2012 is hereby set aside . The award dated 15.03.2012
passed by the learned Labour Court, Bilaspur, directing
reinstatement of the appellant without back-wages, is restored.
The respondents shall take consequential steps for implementation
of the award dated 15.03.2012 in respect of the present appellant
in accordance with law.
31.The present judgment is confined exclusively to the individual case
of Shiv Kumar Yadav , appellant in WA No.371/2016, arising out of
WPL No.169/2012. No opinion is expressed herein with regard to
the entitlement or relief of any other workman.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Bablu