State Of Madhya Pradesh vs Surendra Singh Chauhan

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:33555
1 WA-3750-2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR

BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
&
HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE ANURADHA SHUKLA
nd
ON THE 2 OF NOVEMBER, 2026
WRIT APPEAL No. 3750 of 2026
CNR No.: MPHC030287482026
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Versus
SURENDRA SINGH CHAUHAN
Appearance:
Shri Manish Saxena - Government Advocate for appellants/State.
ORDER
Per: Justice Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
This writ appeal under Section 2(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha
Nyayalaya (Khand Nyayapeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005, has been filed
against the order dated 06.11.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in
W.P. No.199/2021.
2. Heard on I.A. No.14702/2026, an application seeking condonation
of delay of 247 days in filing the present writ appeal.
3. It is stated in the application that the impugned order dated
06.11.2025 was uploaded on the website on 20.11.2025. Thereafter, the
opinion for taking further course of action was sought vide letter dated
10.12.2025. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Gwalior, was directed by
Superintendent of Police, Gwalior for obtaining legal opinion vide letter
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMAN TIWARI
Signing time: 04-11-2026
06:19:27 PM

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:33555
2 WA-3750-2026
dated 07.01.2026. The opinion from the Office of the Additional Advocate

General, Gwalior, was obtained on 09.02.2026, and the proposal for filing
the writ appeal was forwarded to the Department of Law and Legislative
Affairs on 09.03.2026. Thereafter, the reminder letter was also forwarded on
31.07.2026, and sanction for filing the appeal was obtained by the
department on 31.07.2026, which was received vide letter on 07.08.2026.
The Office of the Additional Advocate General was contacted for
preparation of appeal on 07.09.2026, and the relevant enquiry records were
supplied to the concerned Government Advocate on 30.09.2026. Thereafter,
the appeal was prepared. This appeal was filed on 09.10.2026.
4. Counsel for the appellants/State submits that the delay occurred due
to administrative procedures, obtaining legal opinion, securing sanction from
the competent authority and collection of relevant records. The State has to
function through its various Authorities. It is, therefore, prayed that the delay
may be condoned.
5. Heard learned counsel for the appellants.
6. The Supreme Court in the case of State of M.P. Vs. Ramkumar
Choudhary decided on 29/11/2024 i n SLP (C) Diary No. 48636/2024 has
held as under:-
"6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush aside the delay
occurred in preferring the second appeal, due to callous and
lackadaisical attitude on the part of the officials functioning in the
State machinery. Though the Government adopts systematic
approach in handling the legal issues and preferring the petitions/
applications/ appeals well within the time, due to the fault on the
part of the officials in merely communicating the information on
time, huge revenue loss will be caused to the Government
exchequer. The present case is one such case, wherein, enormous
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMAN TIWARI
Signing time: 04-11-2026
06:19:27 PM

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:33555
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delay of 1788 days occasioned in preferring the second appeal due
to the lapses on the part of the officials functioning under the
State, though valuable Government lands were involved.
Therefore, we direct the State to streamline the machinery
touching the legal issues, offering legal opinion, filing of cases
before the Tribunal / Courts, etc., fix the responsibility on the
officer(s) concerned, and penalize the officer(s), who is/are
responsible for delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if any, to the value of
the loss caused to the Government. Such direction will have to be
followed by all the States scrupulously."

(Emphasis supplied)

7. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Odisha and Others Vs.
Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School, reported in 2026 SCC
OnLine SC 191, has held as under:
"13. However, since there is a long line of decisions of this Court
propounding the law that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ employed by
the legislature in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is adequately
elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which
subserves the ends of justice and in view of the submission of Ms.
Sanjana, we have considered it appropriate to consider the matter in some
depth.
14. Almost four decades back, in Collector, Land Acquisition,
Anantnag v. Mst Katiji9, a coordinate Bench noting that the justifiably
liberal approach which this Court has been adopting in matters instituted
before it is not being followed by the courts lower in the hierarchy,
mandated that a justice oriented approach is indeed called for when a
‘State’ seeks condonation of delay as distinguished from ‘a private party’.
15. Close on the heels of Katiji (supra), Hon'ble Justice M.N.
Venkatachaliah speaking for the coordinate Bench in G. Ramegowda v.
Land Acquisition Officer10 had referred to Katiji (supra) in paragraph 14
and quoted the following passage therefrom:
“When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted
against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be
preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in
injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay …
It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its
power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is
capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.”
Immediately thereafter, in paragraphs 15 to 17, it was held as under:
15. In litigations to which Government is a party there is yet another
aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by
Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually
affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest.
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMAN TIWARI
Signing time: 04-11-2026
06:19:27 PM

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:33555
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The decisions of Government are collective and institutional
decisions and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private
individuals.
16. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen
as for governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant
must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of its officers. But
a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where
Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to
have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its
officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-
purposes with it.
17. Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes
“sufficient cause” for purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps, be
somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into
the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and
characteristic of the functioning of the government. Governmental
decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a
considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process of their
making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not
impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of
Government must have “a little play at the joints”. Due recognition
of these limitations on governmental functioning — of course,
within reasonable limits — is necessary if the judicial approach is
not to be rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and
unrealistic to put government and private parties on the same footing
in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of
governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the
decision-making process. In the opinion of the High Court, the
conduct of the law officers of the Government placed the
Government in a predicament and that it was one of those cases
where the mala fides of the officers should not be imputed to
Government. It relied upon and trusted its law officers. …
16. Katiji (supra) and Ramegowda (supra) were consistently followed
by this Court until adoption of a different and seemingly strict approach
while dealing with applications for condonation of delay during the last
decade and a half became discernible starting with the decision in
Postmaster General v. Living Media India Limited11, where a delay of
427 days in filing the relevant special leave petition was not condoned.
University of Delhi v. Union of India12 is another decision (of a three-
Judge Bench of this Court) where delay of 916 days was not condoned.
While upholding the decision of the relevant high court under challenge
refusing to condone the delay of 5659 days in presentation of an appeal
under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by the heirs of a
deceased landowner, a coordinate Bench in Pathapati Subba Reddy v.
Collector(LA)13 very recently reiterated that the law of limitation is
founded on public policy, the object is that a legal remedy is put to an end
so that no litigation remains pending for an indefinite period. It was also
held, departing from the earlier view, that the merits of the case cannot be
considered at the stage of considering the application for condonation of
delay.
17. Indeed, one of us [Dipankar Datta] in Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMAN TIWARI
Signing time: 04-11-2026
06:19:27 PM

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:33555
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India14 authoring the judgment for a coordinate Bench adopted the view
taken in Katiji (supra), Ramegowda (supra) and a host of other decisions
following the same while not interfering with an order of condonation of
delay passed by the relevant high court. However, it was observed that a
distinction ought to be drawn between an ‘explanation’ and an ‘excuse’
that is proffered as cause for condonation of delay. It was also emphasized
that a different approach has to be adopted while this Court is considering
an application for condonation of delay in presentation of an
appeal/application and when it sits in appeal over a discretionary order of
the high court granting the prayer for condonation of delay. In the case of
the former, whether to condone or not would be the only question whereas
in the latter, whether there has been proper exercise of discretion in favour
of grant of the prayer for condonation has to be examined.
18. However, what perhaps remained unnoticed in any of the decisions
post Katiji (supra) and Ramegowda (supra) adopting a liberal approach is
the exasperation and consequent lament expressed by none other than
Hon'ble M.N. Venkatachaliah, CJI. in course of authoring a brief order in
Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay v. Amateur Riders Club,
Bombay15 and admonishing officers of the “revenue” in not acting with
promptitude. This order was made within six years of the decision in
Ramegowda (supra). We can do no better than quoting the same in its
entirety hereunder:

1. We have heard Shri S.C. Manchanda, learned senior counsel for
the Revenue.
2. This special leave petition filed on November 16, 1993 is delayed
by 264 days. For quite some time in the past, this Court has been
making observations as to the grave prejudice caused to public
interest by appeals brought on behalf of the Government being lost
on the point of limitation. Such observations have been made for
over a few years in the past. But there seems to be no conspicuous
improvement as is apparent in the present petition which is filed in
November 1993. The explanation for the delay, had better be set out
in petitioner's own words:
“(g) The Advocate-on-Record got the special leave petition
drafted from the drafting Advocate and sent the same for
approval to the Board on June 24, 1993 along with the case
file. (h) The Board returned the case file to the Advocate-on-
Record on July 9, 1993 who re-sent the same to the Board on
September 20, 1993 requesting that draft SLP was not
approved by the Board. The Board after approving the draft
SLP sent this file to CAS on October 1, 1993.”
3. This explanation is incapable of furnishing a judicially acceptable
ground for condonation of delay. After the earlier observations of
this Court made in several cases in the past, we hoped that the
matters might improve. There seems to be no visible support for this
optimism. There is a point beyond which even the courts cannot
help a litigant even if the litigant is Government which is itself under
the shackles of bureaucratic indifference. Having regard to the law
of limitation which binds everybody, we cannot find any way of
granting relief. It is true that Government should not be treated as
any other private litigant as, indeed, in the case of the former the
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMAN TIWARI
Signing time: 04-11-2026
06:19:27 PM

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:33555
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decisions to present and prosecute appeals are not individual but are
institutional decisions necessarily bogged down by the proverbial
red-tape. But there are limits to this also. Even with all this latitude,
the explanation offered for the delay in this case merely serves to
aggravate the attitude of indifference of the Revenue in protecting its
common interests. The affidavit is again one of the stereotyped
affidavits making it susceptible to the criticism that the Revenue
does not seem to attach any importance to the need for promptitude
even where it affects its own interest.
4. The application for condonation of delay is, accordingly,
dismissed. The special leave petition is, therefore, dismissed as
barred by time.

(emphasis in original)
19. Reading Ramegowda (supra) and Amateur Riders (supra), one after
the other, leaves none in doubt that it did not take much time for this Court
to lose hope. It is absolutely clear that the law was laid down in
Ramegowda (supra), following Katiji (supra), with much optimism that
matters would improve. Their Lordships, however, found no visible
support for such optimism and the Court's patience having been tested to
the extreme limit, held that there is a point beyond which even the courts
cannot help a litigant even if the litigant labouring under the shackles of
bureaucratic indifference is the Government."
8. In the present case, the impugned order was passed on 06.11.2025,
whereas the proposal for filing the appeal was forwarded to Department of
Law & Legislative Affairs only on 09.03.2026. Even thereafter, no
satisfactory explanation has been furnished for the period between
09.03.2026 and 31.07.2026, when the sanction was granted.
9 . Mere movement of files between different departmental
Authorities, administrative procedures and collection of records cannot, by
themselves, constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay, particularly
when the delay during the material periods has not been satisfactorily
explained and no action has been taken against erring officers. The State
cannot be treated as a privileged litigant.
10. Under these circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion
that the appellants have failed to furnish a plausible and satisfactory
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMAN TIWARI
Signing time: 04-11-2026
06:19:27 PM

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:33555
7 WA-3750-2026
explanation for the delay of 247 days in filing the present writ appeal.

11. Accordingly, I.A. No.14702/2026 is rejected.
12. Consequently, the writ appeal is also dismissed as barred by
limitation.
(G. S. AHLUWALIA)
(ANURADHA SHUKLA)
JUDGE
JUDGE
Aman

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMAN TIWARI
Signing time: 04-11-2026
06:19:27 PM