DIPU DAS vs STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ORS.

In the High Court at Calcutta
Civil Appellate Jurisdiction
Appellate Side

The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya
And
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Arjun Ray Mukherjee



MAT No.1917 of 2026
+
CAN 1 of 2026

Dipu Das

Vs.

The State of West Bengal and Others

For the appellant : Mr. Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharya, Sr. Adv.,
Mr. Samim Ahammed,
Ms. Ambiya Khatun,
Mr. Asif Ikbal Baidya,
Ms. Huma Shakil

For the State : Mr. D.N. Roy, Ld. Govt. Pleader,
Ms. Aparna Banerjee, Ld. Addl. Govt. Pleader,
Mr. Anindya Basu, Sr. Adv.,
Mr. Bikash Kumar Sriwastav,
Mr. Vinayak Chaubey

For the KMC : Mr. S.N. Mitra, Ld. Advocate General,
Mr. Debanjan Mukherjee

For the
State Election
Commission, W.B. : Ms. Sonal Sinha,
Mr. Sandipan Das

For the respondent no.8 : Mr. Zohaib Rauf,
Mr. Ajitesh Pandey,
Mr. Andalan Sarkar

For the respondent no.9 : Mr. Biswaroop Bhattacharyya,
Mr. Arka Kr. Nag,
Mr. Neil Basu,
Ms. Shrobana Sengupta,
Mr. Kaushik Bandyapadhyay

2

For the
Respondent nos.10 & 11: Mr. Kallol Basu,
Mr. Tapas Maity

Heard on : 04.11.2026

Reserved on : 04.11.2026

Judgment on : 06.11.2026

Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.:-

1. The present appeal arises out of a writ petition filed by the appellant
against a Notification dated September 11, 2026, whereby Schedule II
of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 (for short, “the KMC
Act”) was substituted to give effect to an exercise of delimitation of the
different wards/constituencies of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation
(hereinafter referred to as “the KMC”). By the impugned order, the
learned Single Judge directed affidavits to be exchanged but refused to
grant any interim protection to the writ petitioner/appellant. Being
aggrieved by such refusal, the instant appeal has been preferred.
2. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant argues that in the
garb of delimitation, the respondents have resorted to gerrymandering
in order to secure partisan advantage to the ruling political party in the
State of West Bengal on the premise of previous electoral results,
without considering relevant circumstances such as geographical
contiguity, compactness and administrative convenience, involving
huge expenses from the public exchequer. The basis of such exercise, it
is alleged, is the electoral rolls rather than the actual population,

3

thereby excluding a large number of residents from the zone of
consideration.
3. Learned senior counsel argues that the power to amend the Schedules
to the KMC Act, including Schedule II which, read with Section 5(2) of
the said Act, delineates the different wards of the KMC (each of which
constitutes a constituency for the purpose of the KMC elections), flows
from Section 601 of the KMC Act. As per Section 601, the State
Government may, of its own, or shall, on the recommendation of the
KMC, add to, amend, or alter any Schedule except Schedule I. By
relying on several documents annexed to the writ petition, which are
also a part of the stay application filed in the present appeal, it is
contended that in the present case, the exercise was undertaken by the
State Government not suo motu but at the behest of the Administrator
appointed by the State upon dissolving the Corporation.
4. However, it is submitted that an Administrator is appointed upon
dissolution of the Corporation under Section 118(1)(b) of the KMC Act
only to discharge temporarily the administrative functions of the
different office-bearers of the Corporation till the next election is held.
Such powers of the Administrator do not include the authority to make
a recommendation under Section 601 of the said Act, which is a quasi-
legislative function to be discharged by the “Corporation” as a whole,
acting as a Corporation, and not individually by its office-bearers.
5. To bolster such argument, learned senior counsel for the appellant
refers to Section 5 of the KMC Act, which provides that the Corporation

4

shall consist of all its elected Councillors and the nominated members
of the State Government.
6. The appellant contends that vide Order dated June 8, 2026, the then
Corporation was prematurely dissolved, appointing the Municipal
Commissioner of the KMC as the Administrator under Section 118(1)(b)
of the KMC Act. Section 14(1)(a) mentions the Municipal Commissioner
as an officer of the Corporation who, as per Section 15(1) of the said
Act, is paid salary and allowances out of the Municipal Fund as
determined from time to time by the State Government. A mere officer
of the Corporation, it is argued, cannot act as the “Corporation” itself
for the purpose of making a recommendation under Section 601.

7. Moreover, since the State Government itself appoints the Administrator,
it would be absurd that such appointee would herself/himself make a
recommendation in the capacity of “Corporation” which then would be
binding on the State Government under Section 601 of the KMC Act,
which would translate into the State making a mandatory
recommendation to itself for the purpose of altering Schedule II of the
Act. Also, under the first proviso to Section 118(1)(b) of the KMC Act, it
is the State Government which allocates the powers and duties to be
exercised/performed by the Administrator, which would accentuate
such absurdity.
8. Learned senior counsel for the appellant further submits that the draft
Schedule II was made available for public inspection from August 5 to
August 13, 2026. However, a notification was issued within only 2 days

5

thereafter, on August 7, 2026 regarding the KMC Amendment Bill to
give effect to such draft.
9. On August 21, 2026, the Special Secretary sent an e mail to the State
Election Commissioner regarding the proposed delimitation, followed by
the Administrator’s letter dated August 22, 2026 to the Additional Chief
Secretary intimating the number of old and new wards. On the self-
same date, that is August 22, 2026, the draft Schedule II was made
available for public inspection from the said date to September 3, 2026.
10. However, even prior thereto, on August 20, 2026, the KMC
(Amendment) Act, 2026 was notified in the Official Gazette, thereby
implementing the increase in number of Councillors as per the draft
amendment to Schedule II.

11. Ultimately on September 11, 2026, the amendment to Schedule II of
the KMC Act was notified.
12. The appellant contends that the entire chronology of the
aforementioned events clearly exhibits malice in law, where the
Executive acted hand-in-glove with the State Legislature, colluding with
the Administrator appointed by the State, to achieve the objective of
gerrymandering.
13. Learned senior counsel for the appellant cites State of Madhya Pradesh
& Ors. -vs- Devilal , reported at (1986) 1 SCC 657 , where the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that if the State Government were to issue a
notification under the concerned Act for redistribution of the
constituencies in a block after the process of election has started, it

6

would necessarily change the whole pattern of voting in the election,
which would plainly be a typical case of gerrymandering, meaning to
arrange election districts so as to give an unfair advantage to the party
in power by means of a redistribution act or to manipulate
constituencies generally.
14. Learned senior counsel next relies on Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam
(DMK) -vs- Secretary, Governor’s Secretariat & Ors. , reported at (2020) 6
SCC 548 , for the proposition that the express constitutional embargos
of Articles 243-O and 243-ZG do not apply if the proceedings are only
to further the expeditious completion of pre-requisites of a fair election.
15. Again, the appellant places reliance on Kishorchandra Chhanganlal
Rathod -vs- Union of India & Ors. , reported at (2024) 13 SCC 237 , in
support of the proposition that nothing precludes constitutional courts
from checking the validity of orders passed by the Delimitation
Commission on the touchstone of the Constitution if an order is found
to be manifestly arbitrary and irreconcilable to constitutional values.
16. Lastly, the appellant relies on Debabrata Bera & Ors. -vs- The State of
West Bengal & Ors. , reported at 2024 SCC OnLine Cal 4861 , to
strengthen the argument that the Board of Administrators of the
Corporation can discharge only the executive functions, as opposed to
the legislative functions, of the Corporation.
17. Learned counsel appearing for respondent nos. 10 and 11 cites State of
Goa & Anr. -vs- Fouziya Imtiaz Shaikh & Anr. , reported at (2021) 8 SCC
401 , to contend that the jurisdiction of the High Courts under

7

Articles 226 and 227 and that of the Supreme Court under Article 136
of the Constitution is not affected as the non obstante clause in Article
243-ZG operates only during the process of election.
18. Learned counsel for respondent no. 9 adds that the mode and manner
of the exercise of delimitation undertaken by the State Government
tantamounts to fraud on power.
19. Learned counsel appearing for respondent nos. 10 and 11, respondent
no. 9 and respondent no. 8 otherwise adopt the arguments of the
appellant in unison.
20. Learned Advocate General, appearing for the KMC, raises a preliminary
objection as to maintainability of the writ petition from which the
present appeal arises, on the ground of bar under Article 243-ZG of the
Constitution of India. By citing State of U.P. & Ors. -vs- Pradhan Sangh
Kshettra Samiti & Ors. , reported at 1995 Supp(2) SCC 305 , it is
contended that it is for the Government to decide, and not for the Court
to dictate, the manner in which the panchayat areas and the
constituencies in each panchayat area will be delimited. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court held in the said report that the approach of the High
Court was objectionable insofar as it went into the question of the
validity of the delimitation of constituencies and also the allotment of
seats to them despite the bar under Article 243-O(a).
21. In Devilal’s Case , it is pointed out, the Hon’ble Supreme Court was
considering a situation where the exercise of delimitation was

8

undertaken after the electoral process had begun, as opposed to the
instant case.
22. The other judgments cited by the appellant are sought to be
distinguished by learned Advocate General on facts.
23. Next relying on the language of Section 118(1)(b) of the KMC Act,
learned Advocate General argues for the KMC that there is no
restriction in the said provision as to who can be appointed as an
Administrator. Thus, it is submitted, the appellant’s arguments based
on the Administrator being necessarily an Officer of the Corporation are
not tenable in the eye of law.
24. Moreover, it is submitted, the objections raised before this Court were
not urged before the writ court, nor did the appellant raise any
objection before the appropriate authorities despite several
opportunities being given the public in general at every stage of the
delimitation process.
25. Learned Advocate General further contends that under Section 601 of
the KMC Act, the State Government itself has ample power to add,
alter, or modify the Schedules of the KMC Act other than Schedule I,
irrespective of whether any recommendation is made by the
Corporation or not. Thus, the appellant’s contentions in that regard are
irrelevant.
26. Learned Government Pleader, representing the State, adopts the last-
aforementioned argument of the KMC and adds that the delimitation
has already been enacted as law by the State Legislature by way of the

9

KMC (Amendment) Act, 2026. In the absence of any challenge thereto
in the writ petition, the arguments advanced on the amendment to
Schedule II of the KMC Act acquire a mere academic character.
27. Having heard learned counsel for the contesting parties, the Court
comes to the following conclusions:
28. The limited conspectus of the present appeal is whether the learned
Single Judge erred in law in refusing to grant any interim protection to
the writ petitioner/appellant. Since the main writ petition is still
pending, we desist from deciding conclusively the merits of the same
and make it clear that the scope of examination in the present appeal is
limited to the prima facie case made out in the writ petition and
whether the writ petitioner/appellant was entitled to any interim order.

29. The first salient feature of the present lis is that the impugned
notification substituting/amending Schedule II has been issued by
virtue of the powers vested in the State Government under Section 601
of the KMC Act. The said Section has two facets.
30. First, the State Government may, by notification, add to, amend, or
alter any Schedule (except Schedule I) of the KMC Act of its own, in
which case the power is discretionary and there is no mandate on it to
do so.
31. Secondly, the State Government shall so add, amend or alter on the
recommendation of the Corporation (KMC), in which case, once a
recommendation is so made, it is mandatory for the State Government
to implement the same.

10


32. This distinction between the two scenarios is borne out by the contrast
in language embodied in the Section itself, which uses the expression
“may” for a suo motu addition/amendment/alteration by the State
whereas employs the term “shall” in case such
amendment/addition/alteration is made on the recommendation of the
Corporation.
33. From the chronology of events, as evidenced by the materials on record,
there cannot be any manner of doubt that the impugned amendment
was made by the State Government not suo motu , but on the
recommendation of the Administrator appointed upon dissolution of the
Corporation.

34. By Order No.1188/MA-15011(22)/22/2026-LS-MA SEC dated June 8,
2026, issued by the Additional Chief Secretary to the Government of
West Bengal on behalf of the Government of West Bengal, Department
of Municipal Affairs, the Corporation was dissolved with immediate
effect under Section 117(1) of the KMC Act.
35. Vide Order No.1189/MA-15011(22)/22/2026-LS-MA SEC of June 8,
2026, immediately thereafter, the erstwhile office-bearers of the
Corporation were directed to vacate office and the then Municipal
Commissioner of the Corporation was designated by the State
Government as the Administrator under Section 118(1)(b) of the KMC
Act to exercise all the powers and duties which may be exercised or
performed by the members or the Mayor-in-Council or any Committee
or the Mayor or the Chairman of the Corporation.

11


36. On August 5, 2026, a Notice was issued by the Joint Secretary to the
State Government, publishing the initial draft of the amended Schedule
II of the KMC Act, purportedly making it available for public inspection
with effect from August 5 to August 13, 2026. Conspicuously, in the
said notice itself, it was categorically mentioned that the said draft
describing the boundaries of the projected wards of the KMC was being
published as per recommendation received from the Kolkata Municipal
Corporation .
37. The next link in the chain of events came on August 22, 2026, when
the Administrator of the KMC sent to the Additional Chief Secretary,
Urban Development and Municipal Affairs Department, Government of
West Bengal a list of the old wards of the KMC, together with the new
ward numbers, electoral part nos. and assembly constituency nos.
pertaining to the KMC.
38. On the self-same date, the Additional Chief Secretary passed an order
publishing the draft amendment to Schedule II of the KMC Act for
“information of persons likely to be affected thereby”, granting public
inspection from that date till September 3, 2026.
39. Thereafter, by the impugned Gazette Notification dated September 11,
2026, the amendment to Schedule II was finally notified.
40. Thus, it is crystal-clear that the said amendment to Schedule II was
made under the powers conferred by the second limb of Section 601 of
the KMC Act, on the purported recommendation of the Corporation.

12


41. The next question which inevitably crops up is whether the
Administrator, appointed by the State Government upon dissolution of
the Corporation, could act as the “Corporation” and issue such
recommendation.
42. The entire scheme of the KMC Act militates against such proposition
and indicates the answer to be in the negative.
43. Section 5 of the KMC Act, in no uncertain terms, defines the
Corporation to consist of all its elected Councillors and the State
Government-nominated members. Conspicuously, the language used in
Section 118(1)(b) is not that the Administrator appointed by the State
Government upon dissolution of the Corporation shall act as the
“Corporation”, but that such person shall exercise or perform the
powers and duties of the members or the named office-bearers of the
Corporation. None of the members or office-bearers of the Corporation
can claim to represent the Corporation by themselves. By necessary
implication, the Administrator can also discharge only the executive
functions of the individual members of the Corporation as delegated by
the State Government and not exercise the legislative functions of the
Corporation as such.
44. The limited ambit of powers of the Administrator is further highlighted
by Section 117(5) of the KMC Act, which mandates that an election to
constitute “the Corporation” shall be completed before the expiry of six
months from the date of its dissolution.

13


45. The consequences of dissolution are enumerated in Section 118, the
different sub-sections of which complement each other. Whereas
Clause (a) of sub-section (1) provides that on dissolution, all the
members of the Corporation, the Mayor-in-Council, Committees, Mayor
and Chairman shall vacate their offices, Clause (b) stipulates that the
State Government shall appoint one or several persons to discharge the
powers and duties of the aforementioned functionaries in the
interregnum. Such appointment, as evident from a conjoint reading of
Sections 117(5) and 118(1), is a stop-gap interim arrangement to
ensure continuity of discharge of the essential functions and duties of
the Corporation functionaries till a new Corporation is elected within
the mandatory period of six months from such dissolution.

46. Although Section 118(1)(b) does not restrict the appointment of
Administrator to the Officers of the Corporation, fact remains that the
ambit of functioning of the Administrator/Administrators is limited to
regular administrative functions and the Administrator cannot
substitute a validly elected Corporation for the purpose of making a
recommendation under Section 601 of the KMC Act. The Administrator
cannot arrogate to herself/himself the legislative / quasi-legislative
function of the Corporation itself to recommend any
addition/alteration/amendment of the Schedules of the KMC Act.
47. Moreover, fact remains that in the present case the Municipal
Commissioner is an Officer of the KMC as per Section 14(1)(a) of the
KMC Act and is paid salary and allowances from the Municipal funds

14

as determined by the State Government. Such Officer cannot be
elevated to act as a duly elected Corporation in the capacity of a
“Corporation” as contemplated in Section 5 of the Act.
48. Another absurdity which would arise if the Administrator exercises
recommendatory power under Section 601 is that whereas the State
Government, acting on its own, has the discretion of amending or not
amending the Schedules of the KMC Act (except Schedule I, of course)
under Section 601, no such discretion is available to it once the
Corporation recommends such amendment or alteration. Taking such
logical thread further, it is the State Government which allocates the
specific powers and duties of the Administrator under the first proviso
to Section 118(1)(b) of the KMC Act. Thus, theoretically the State
Government itself could then empower the Administrator of its own
choice to make a tailor-made recommendation to it under Section 601
of the KMC Act, in which case the mandatory element of such
recommendation would be rendered farcical and meaningless. It would
then be the State Government which would virtually recommend an
amendment to the Schedules to itself and then choose to be bound by
it, denuding the mandatory nature of the recommendation of any
credibility and autonomy whatsoever.
49. Such puppetry cannot be compatible with the scheme of the KMC Act.
The key feature of Section 601 of the KMC Act is the institutional
autonomy vested in the Corporation in making a binding
recommendation to the State Government, which confers authority on

15

the Corporation, an autonomous institution, to decide the delimitation
of its own wards, in other words, its electoral constituencies.
50. In the present case, in view of the Corporation having been dissolved
and the Administrator appointed long back on June 8, 2026, there
could not have been a valid recommendation from the ‘Corporation’
within the contemplation of Section 601 on August 5, 2026, when such
recommendation was cited as the basis of the draft amendment to
Schedule II of the KMC Act. Rather, it was a recommendation by the
Administrator appointed by the State itself, who did not have the
authority in law to arrogate to herself the powers of the Corporation,
acting as the ‘Corporation’.

51. Hence, the very premise and genesis of the draft notification was bad in
law, being violative of Section 601 of the KMC Act. In view of such
genetic defect, the subsequent final publication and consequential
alteration to Schedule II is vitiated by law.
52. The next issue which arises is, whether Article 243-ZG creates an
embargo to the exercise of writ jurisdiction in the instant case. The
answer has to be in the negative because of the following reasons:
53. First, the bar under Clause (1) of Article 243-ZG is confined to any law
relating to the delimitation of constituencies or allotment of seats to
such constituencies “made or purporting to be made under Article 243-
ZA”.
54. However, in the instant case, the alteration to Schedule II was not
made by any law made by the State Legislature but by the State

16

Government, which is the Executive, under Section 601 of the KMC
Act, which is a statute subservient to the Constitution. That apart,
Article 243-ZA does not specifically cover delimitation prior to the
electoral process but relates to superintendence, direction and control
of the preparation of electoral rolls for, and the conduct of, elections
and laws made in connection therewith.
55. Thus, the bar under Article 243-ZG is not attracted at all in the present
case.
1
56. In State of U.P. -vs- Pradhan Sangh (supra) , cited by the KMC, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that so long as the panchayat areas
and the constituencies are delimited in conformity with the
constitutional provisions or without committing a breach thereof, the
courts cannot interfere with the same. Thus, even as per the said
judgment, where there was a breach of the relevant provisions, the
courts could interfere. The bar being considered there was
constitutional, being stipulated in Article 243-O(a), and operated in
respect of delimitation of constituencies and allotment of seats to them
under Article 243-K. However, in the instant case, the amendment to
Schedule II was made under a statutory provision, that is, Section 601
of the KMC Act, which is definitely subject to judicial review under
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

1
State of U.P. & Ors. -vs- Pradhan Sangh Kshettra Samiti & Ors. , reported at 1995
Supp(2) SCC 305

17

2

57. In fact, in State of Goa (supra) , even in case of the constitutional bar
under Article 243-ZG, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that such
bar operates only during the process of election. In the case at hand,
the exercise of delimitation was admittedly not undertaken during any
electoral process or in connection with an election, although it might
have an effect on future elections of the KMC.
58. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Kishorchandra Chhanganlal Rathod
3
(supra) , after taking into consideration the law holding the field and
several earlier judgments, disapproved the view that the order of
delimitation of constituencies, issued in exercise of statutory powers
under the Delimitation Act, is entirely insusceptible to the powers of
judicial review exercisable under Article 226 of the Constitution.
59. In the instant case, the delimitation exercise was undertaken under
Section 601 of the KMC Act, which is a statutory provision subservient
to the Constitution of India and not a Constitutional power. Thus, an
illegal or arbitrary exercise under Section 601 is all the more amenable
to the power of judicial review exercised by the High Court under
Articles 226 and 227, which flows from the Constitution, the Grund
norm of the Indian legal framework, and has been held by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court to be a part of the basic structure of the Constitution.
60. In the present case, the manner in which the Corporation was dissolved
mid-term and an Administrator was appointed and the hasty

2
State of Goa & Anr. -vs- Fouziya Imtiaz Shaikh & Anr. , reported at (2021) 8 SCC
401
3
Kishorchandra Chhanganlal Rathod -vs- Union of India & Ors., reported at (2024)
13 SCC 237

18

chronology of events thereafter lends some substance to the appellant’s
arguments that there might have been a method in the madness.
61. Admittedly, on August 5, 2026, when the draft Schedule II was made
available for public inspection, it was done on the recommendation of
the “Corporation”, despite the Corporation being non-existent, since the
earlier Corporation already stood dissolved mid-term and the next
election mandated under Section 117(5) of the KMC Act had not yet
taken place. Strangely, although public inspection was allowed by the
said notice till August 13, 2026, only two days after, that is, on August
7, 2026, the KMC (Amendment) Bill was tabled and made into an
enactment on August 20, 2026.

62. On the very next day, that is, August 21, 2026, the Special Secretary
wrote to the State Election Commissioner. The Administrator, on the
succeeding date, wrote to the Additional Chief Secretary who, on the
very same day, published the draft Schedule II for public inspection.
63. This apparent complicity between the KMC, which has been conferred a
degree of autonomy by dint of its recommendatory power under Section
601 of the KMC Act, with the State, cannot thus be ruled out
altogether, creating an apprehension of arbitrariness and violation of
the spirit of the law, although it would be premature at this stage to
decide whether there was malice in law or any attempt at
gerrymandering.
64. Yet, in view of the above considerations, the writ petition is
prima facie
maintainable.

19


65. The question of locus standi of the petitioner/appellant is not dented
merely because she did not file any objection to the impugned
notification when public objections were invited. A foundational flaw
hitting at the genesis of an action of the State Government in discharge
of its public functions can very well be assailed by any member of the
electorate by seeking invocation of the power of judicial review of
constitutional courts.
66. The concept of locus standi has undergone much expansion in recent
years and has evolved out of its original restricted conspectus. The
erroneous and unlawful actions of the State and/or failure of the State
to discharge its duties and functions having public ramifications can
always be assailed by a citizen, in the present case an elector and an
ex-Councillor of the very Corporation, the wards of which have been
sought to be subjected to delimitation.
67. The State argues that the statutory amendment brought about to the
KMC Act has not been assailed. However, such amendment is much
more limited than the alteration to Schedule II which has been assailed
in the present writ petition, and absence of challenge to the
Amendment Act per se does not preclude a challenge to the delimitation
exercise.
68. In any event, the writ petition is still pending and it is always open to
the writ petitioner/appellant to challenge the Amending Act as well by
amending the prayers and pleadings of the writ petition. Such statutory
amendment, if construed to give effect to the delimitation process

20

arising out of the alteration in Schedule II, would automatically also be
vitiated if such alteration itself is set aside.
69. In such view of the matter, in the least, it has to be held that the writ
petitioner/appellant has made out a sufficiently strong prima facie case
in the writ petition to be favoured with interim protection in order to
save the writ petition from being rendered infructuous.
70. However, the learned Single Judge presumably overlooked the legal and
factual implications as discussed above in refusing to grant ad interim
protection to the writ petitioner/appellant.
71. Accordingly, MAT No.1917 of 2026 is allowed on contest, thereby
modifying the impugned Order dated October 29, 2026 passed in WPA
No.31433 of 2026 by restraining the respondent no. 6, that is, the West
Bengal State Election Commission, from issuing any notification calling
an election to the Kolkata Municipal Corporation on the basis of the
amended Schedule II of the KMC Act as notified in the Official Gazette
vide Notification No.1728/UDMA-15011(22)/57/2026-LS-MA SEC
dated September 11, 2026 till disposal of WPA No.31433 of 2026. The
rest of the said impugned order is not interfered with.
72. It is made clear that the aforesaid observations are tentative in nature
insofar as the final disposal of the writ petition is concerned.
73. Consequentially, CAN 1 of 2026, filed in the present appeal, stands
disposed of as well.
74. No order as to costs.

21


75. Urgent Photostat certified copies of this judgment, if applied for, be
furnished to the parties upon compliance of due formalities.


(Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.)

I agree.

(Arjun Ray Mukherjee, J.)