Shekh Hussain @ Lekhmuddin vs Delhi Development Authority & Ors
- Court
- Delhi High Court
$~J
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Judgment reserved on: 13.08.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 18.11.2026
+ W.P.(C) 284/2016
SHEKH HUSSAIN @ LEKHMUDDIN .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Siddharth, Adv.
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Vaibhav Agnihotri, ASC with
Mr. Vidit Pratap Singh, Mr. Ankit
Singh, Advs. for Rl/ DDA
Dr. Monika Arora, Mr. Subhrdeep
Saha, Ms. Anamika Thakur, Mr.
Abhinav Verma, Mr. Aradhya, Mr.
Bhasker, Advs. for MCD
+ W.P.(C) 317/2016
KALYANI .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Siddharth, Adv.
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS .....Respondents
Signed By:ANSH
SRIVASTAVA
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Through: Mr. Vaibhav Agnihotri, ASC with
Mr. Vidit Pratap Singh, Mr. Ankit
Singh, Advs. for Rl/ DDA
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JASMEET SINGH
J U D G M E N T
1. By way of these writ petitions, the petitioners have approached this
Court seeking directions against the respondents for payment of
damages/compensation, along with interest and cost of litigation, on
account of loss of life of Master Robiyal (W.P.(C) 284/2016) and
Master Arjun (W.P.(C) 317/2016) in an unfortunate incident that
occurred on 16.04.2010, wherein as a result of gross negligence on the
part of respondent Nos. 1-3, both of them lost their lives after slipping
into an open sewer/manhole.
FACTUAL MATRIX AS PER THE PETITIONERS
2. The petitioner in W.P. (C) 284/2016 is the father of Master Robiyal
(aged about 11 and a half years at the time of the incident) and the
petitioner in W.P. (C) 317/2016 is the mother of Master Arjun (aged
about 12 years and 9 months at the time of the incident). Master
Robiyal and Master Arjun lost their precious lives on 16.04.2010 by
slipping into an open sewer/manhole situated at SU Block, DDA Park,
near Double Tanki, Pitampura, Delhi (“Park”) .
3. The Park was maintained by the respondent No. 1, i.e., Delhi
Development Authority and the sewer work was being undertaken by
the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 namely, Delhi Jal Board and Municipal
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Corporation of Delhi. Respondent No. 4 is the Investigating officer
responsible for the investigation into the incident, working directly
under the supervision of respondent No. 5, i.e., Commissioner of
Police. Further, respondent No. 6 is the Ministry of Home Affairs
through its Secretary.
4. On 16.04.2010, a PCR at PS-Maurya Enclave received a call vide DD
No. 42B informing the police about the incident and FIR bearing No.
142/2010 was registered.
5. Sub-Inspector Surendra Kumar, predecessor of the respondent No.
4/Investigating officer, addressed a request dated 26.04.2010 to the
respondent No. 3 i.e., Chief Engineer, MCD Rohini Zone, Delhi, vide
letter bearing No. 1582/SHO/ME, seeking information regarding
liability for the open sewer/manhole and requesting the department to
cover the hole of the sewer at the park.
6. In response to the said letter, the respondent No. 3 stated that the open
sewer/manhole in the Park is not falling within their jurisdiction.
7. Similar communications were also made by the respondent No. 4 to the
respondent No. 2/DJB, who denied their liability on the same ground
that the Park does not fall within their jurisdiction.
8. On 30.08.2010, a notice under Section 91 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, (“CrPC”) was issued by respondent No. 4 to the
respondent No. 1 seeking answers to the seven questions in relation to
the open sewer/manhole in the Park. The said notice also specified that
both DJB and MCD have denied their liability on the ground of the
Park not falling within their jurisdiction.
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9. On 28.01.2011, a notice under Section 91 of CrPC was also issued by
the respondent No. 4 to the respondent No. 2 seeking information
regarding the open sewer/manhole in the Park.
10. Another notice under Section 91 was issued by the respondent No. 4 on
02.02.2011, to the respondent No. 2/DJB seeking answer to some
queries pertaining to the open sewer/manhole in the Park.
11. In response to the said notice, respondent No. 2 vide its reply dated
22.06.2011 stated that “the site of accident is not an open manhole, this
is a RCC structure of chamber with raised wall of 4-5 feet…”. The said
reply was contrary to the statement of PW-Shri Niwas (E&M), SDM
IX, Rithala.
12. On 31.01.2015, the petitioners moved an application calling for a status
report from the police department regarding the action taken pursuant
to the registered FIR. In response to this application, the petitioners
came to know that the police department had already filed its
cancellation report.
13. On 15.04.2015, the petitioners through their counsel addressed demand
notices under Section 80 of CPC by way of registered AD to the
respondent Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 6 seeking Rs. 10,00,000/- as compensation.
14. After dispatch of the said notice, a person approached the petitioners
offering financial help of Rs. 1,00,000/- which was declined by them.
15. Respondent No. 6 in its reply dated 30.04.2015 to the said notice, while
forwarding the notices to respondent Nos. 1 and 2, informed the
petitioners that it has no role in these cases and had been impleaded
unnecessarily.
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16. Since no action has been taken by any of the respondents to address the
grievance of the petitioners, the present petitions have been filed.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
17. Mr. Siddharth, learned counsel for the petitioners, states that the
children of the petitioners lost their precious lives due to gross
negligence and patent violation of law on the part of officials of the
respondents, which makes the respondents vicariously liable for gross
negligence.
18. He also submits that the petitioners are the legal heirs of their children
and they are severely affected by the pain, agony, mental torture and
shock due to the untimely death of their sons.
19. The children of the petitioners lost their lives untimely only because of
negligence attributable to the officials of the respondents and their
blatant disregard for the safety norms.
20. He has also placed reliance on the judgment of A.S. Mittal v. State of
1
U.P. to submit that in cases where safety norms are violated by the
state or any person acting on its behalf, compensatory relief can be
granted under writ jurisdiction. Reliance is also placed on the judgment
2 3
of Bhim Singh v. State of J & K , Lata Wadhwa v. State of Bihar , DDA
4
v. Bhagwan. .
Quantum of Compensation
1
(1989) 3 SCC 223.
2
(1985) 4 SCC 677.
3
(2001) 8 SCC 197.
4
2013 SCC OnLine Del 6521.
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21. Lastly, learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on the
5
judgment of Chob Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) , State of H.P. v.
6 7
Naval Kumar and Rajesh v. Delhi Jal Board in support of the
calculation for the following quantum of compensation:
Head Amount
Income Rs. 3,60,000/- p.a.
Future prospects (@ 50%) Rs. 1,80,000/-
Deduction towards personal expenses (25%) (-) Rs. 1,35,000/-
Annual loss of dependency Rs. 4,05,000/-
Multiplier of 15 Rs. 60,75,000/-
Rs. 10,00,000/-
Standard damages (loss of companionship,
amenities and happiness)
Total Rs. 70,75,000/-
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NO.
1/DDA
22. At the outset, Mr. Agnihotri, learned counsel on behalf of the
respondent No. 1/DDA, objects to the maintainability of the present
petition and submits that the compensation as sought by the petitioners
should be adjudicated by way of a civil suit and the writ jurisdiction of
this Court is wrongly invoked by the petitioner.
23. He further submits that even though the Park falls under the jurisdiction
of DDA, the civil work was being executed under the supervision of
respondent No. 2, thus, no negligence can be attributed to the
respondent No. 1.
5
2012 SCC OnLine Del 1983.
6
(2017) 3 SCC 115.
7
2018 SCC OnLine Del 7497.
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24. It was solely the responsibility of the agency undertaking civil works
i.e., the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 to adopt safety measures in accordance
with law.
25. He has also denied receipt of any demand notice issued under Section
80 of CPC.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NO.
2/DJB
26. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2/DJB objects to the
maintainability of the present petition on the ground that the matter
involves disputed questions of facts, which cannot be decided under
writ jurisdiction. Reliance is placed on SDO, Grid Corpn. of Orissa
8
Ltd. v. Timudu Oram.
27. It is also submitted that the open sewer/manhole situated in the Park
was duly protected by the RCC walls of about 4 to 5 feet in height,
thus, no negligence can be attributed to the respondent No. 2.
28. The Investigating Officer has duly carried out the investigation in order
to prove negligence on part of the respondent No. 2 and has thereafter
filed a cancellation report, which could only have been filed by the
officer when there is no proven negligence on part of the respondent
No. 2.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NO.
3/MCD
29. Dr. Arora, learned counsel for the respondent No. 3/MCD, submits that
the Park falls within the jurisdiction of the respondent No. 1/DDA and
8
2005(6) SCC 156.
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is exclusively maintained by it, thus, the respondent No. 3 had no role
in the control of maintenance activities in this Park.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NOS. 4
AND 5
30. Learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 submits that the
respondent Nos. 4 and 5 are not necessary parties as the petitioners
have sought compensation/damages from the respondent Nos. 1-3.
31. It is further submitted that the petitioners have not only concealed
material facts but have also made wrong averments.
32. On 16.04.2010, information was received from the PCR that two
children had fallen in the water tank at the Park, upon receipt of which
SI Surendra Kumar reached the spot and the children were found lying
in the sewer. They were then sent to BSA Hospital.
33. Both the children were declared dead in the hospital and an FIR No.
142/10 was registered under Section 304A of the Indian Penal Code,
1860.
34. During the course of investigation, the respondent No. 4 recorded
statements of witnesses, collected evidence, and issued notices to the
respondent Nos. 1-3, in order to ascertain the authority responsible for
maintenance of the sewer and negligence by the authority in
performing its duties.
35. At the time of investigation, the respondent No. 2/DJB informed that it
had taken all precautionary measures and the site of the accident was
duly protected by a 4-5 feet high wall, thus, leaving no scope for the
children to accidentally fall into it.
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36. Since no negligence was found on part of the other respondents during
the investigation, a cancellation report was prepared and the same was
duly accepted by the learned ACMM, Rohini Courts, Delhi on
05.08.2013.
37. In any case, the petitioners cannot be allowed to challenge the
cancellation report and its acceptance without following the appropriate
mechanism as the same cannot be done in these proceedings.
38. The allegation that the cancellation report was prepared in collusion
with the respondents is absolutely denied as the report was based on
evidence and material collected during investigation.
39. Lastly, reliance is placed on the judgment of Radhey Shyam v. State
9
(NCT of Delhi) , to state that the Court in the circumstances of that case
held the principle of res ipsa loquitur to be inapplicable and
emphasized upon the need to establish negligence on part of the
respondent in order to claim any compensation.
REJOINDER SUBMISSIONS
40. Mr. Siddharth, learned counsel, by placing reliance on paragraph No. 1
of the counter affidavit filed by the respondent No. 1, submits that the
respondent No. 1/DDA has admitted the fact that although the Park
falls under its jurisdiction, the civil work was being executed under the
supervision and control of the respondent No. 2/DJB. Respondent No.
1 has also in paragraph No. 11 of its counter affidavit clearly stated that
it was the liability of the respondent No. 2 to adopt the safety measures.
41. Respondent No. 2/DJB on the other hand, has filed a vague reply
without controverting the factual averments made by the petitioner. It
9
2015 SCC OnLine Del 8730.
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has neither placed any documentary evidence in support of its
contentions nor disputed the occurrence of the incident or factum of
death of the children by falling into the open sewer/manhole.
42. He further states that the respondent No. 3 has also filed a reply vague
in its nature without denying the facts and without supporting
documents. In paragraph No. 3 of the reply, respondent No. 3 has
denied its role in control of the maintenance of the Park, as it is stated
to be under the sole control and jurisdiction of the respondent No.
1/DDA.
43. Learned counsel for the petitioners states that the Park was a general
park open to the public and the respondents owed a duty of care to the
general public to maintain it. It is also stated that the sewer/manhole
was open/uncovered, thereby attracting the principle of strict liability,
and making respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 liable to compensate the
petitioners.
10
44. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment of MCD v. Subhagwanti
applied the principle of strict liability in awarding compensation to the
victim by holding that as per the principle of res ipsa loquitur the fact
that a clock tower fell on the victim itself raises an inference of
negligence to establish a prima facie case.
45. Reliance is also placed on Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi v. Ranjit
11 12
Ginning & Pressing Co. (P) Ltd. , Santu Ram v. State , Ishiqa @
13
Yashika v. State of Haryana and Ors. , and Union of India v.
10
1966 SCC OnLine SC 22.
11
(1977) 2 SCC 745.
12
2012 SCC OnLine Del 748.
13
CWP No. 20325/2018(O&M), Punjab and Haryana High Court.
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SRIVASTAVA
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14
Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar , in order to support the application of the
principles of strict liability and res ipsa loquitur on the factual matrix
of the present case.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
46. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties and perused the
documents placed on record.
WHETHER THE PRESENT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE ?
47. The respondents have objected to the maintainability of the present writ
petitions on the ground that there are disputed questions of facts which
cannot be ascertained by this Court under its writ jurisdiction and the
same form a matter of trial to be adjudicated by way of civil suits.
48. The law qua maintainability of writ petitions in such cases where
disputed questions of facts are alleged to be involved, has been
expounded by the Courts time and again and the same is no longer res
integra.
49. Generally, it is a rule of prudence to refrain from awarding
compensation under writ jurisdiction as it is primarily the domain of
civil law, however, it is not an inviolable rule when the
foundational/material facts are undisputed.
50. Whenever in such cases the material/foundational facts are undisputed
and negligence is evident on the face of it, the alleged existence of
disputed questions of facts or presence of alternate remedy will not bar
the amenability of the matter to writ jurisdiction. The same has also
been held by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in the judgment of
14
(2008) 9 SCC 527.
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Mohd. Neejam and Anr. v. The State, Govt. of NCT of Delhi and
15
Ors. and the relevant paragraphs of the same read as under:
“30 . In this regard, it is to be noted that the aspect of
disputed questions of facts does not take away the
jurisdiction of this Court to entertain a writ petition, in
cases where the material and foundational facts of the
case are undisputed. Further, only because there exists an
alternate remedy to a party, does not obligate a writ court
to not exercise its jurisdiction. It is for this Court to decide
that if the material/foundational facts are not disputed, then
the Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution.
31. Thus, the Supreme Court in the case of A.P. Electrical
Equipment Corporation v. Tahsildar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC
447, has held that mere existence of disputed questions of
fact, does not take away the jurisdiction of High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution. Thus, it was held as
under:
“xxx xxx xxx
48. Normally, the disputed questions of fact are not
investigated or adjudicated by a writ court while
exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India. But the mere existence of the disputed
question of fact, by itself, does not take away the
jurisdiction of this writ court in granting appropriate
relief to the petitioner. In a case where the Court is
satisfied, like the one on hand, that the facts are
disputed by the State merely to create a ground for the
15
2026 SCC OnLine Del 5492.
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rejection of the writ petition on the ground of disputed
questions of fact, it is the duty of the writ court to reject
such contention and to investigate the disputed facts
and record its finding if the particular facts of the case,
like the one at hand, was required in the interest of
justice.
49. There is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution
to indicate that the High Court in the proceedings, like
the one on hand, is debarred from holding such an
inquiry. The proposition that a petition under Article
226 must be rejected simply on the ground that it
cannot be decided without determining the disputed
question of fact is not warranted by any provisions of
law nor by any decision of this Court. A rigid
application of such proposition or to treat such
proposition as an inflexible Rule of Law or of
discretion will necessarily make the provisions of
Article 226 wholly illusory and ineffective more
particularly Section 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act, 1976
respectively. Obviously, the High Court must avoid
such consequences.
50. In the aforesaid context, we may look into the
decision of this Court in the case of State of Orissa v.
Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei, 1967 SCC OnLine SC 15 :
AIR 1967 SC 1269. In para 6 at p. 1270 of the said
judgment, this Court has been pleased to hold as
follows:—
“Under Art. 226 of the Constitution the High Court is
not precluded from entering upon a decision on
questions of fact raised by the petition. Where an
enquiry into complicated questions of fact arises in a
petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution before the
right of an aggrieved party to obtain relief claimed
may be determined. The High Court may in
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appropriate cases decline to enter upon that enquiry
and may refer the party claiming relief to a suit. But
the question is one of discretion and not of jurisdiction
of the Court.”
(Emphasis supplied)
51. This Court in the case of Gunwant Kaur v.
Bhatinda Municipality, (1969) 3 SCC 769 : AIR 1970
SC 802 observed as follows:—
“The High Court observed that they will not determine
disputed question of fact in a writ petition. But what
facts were in dispute and what were admitted could
only be determined after an affidavit in reply was filed
by the State. The High Court, however, proceeded to
dismiss the petition in limine. The High Court is not
deprived of its jurisdiction to entertain a petition under
Art. 226 merely because in considering the petitioner's
right to relief questions of fact may fall to be
determined. In a petition under Art. 226 the High
Court has jurisdiction to try issues both of fact and
law. Exercise of jurisdiction is, it is true, discretionary,
but the discretion must be exercised on sound judicial
principles. When the petition raises questions of fact of
a complex nature, which may for their determination
require oral evidence to be taken, and on that account
the High Court is of the view that the dispute may not
appropriately be tried in a writ petition, the High
Court may decline to try a petition. Rejection of a
petition in limine will normally be justified, where the
High Court is of the view that the petition is frivolous
or because of the nature of the claim made, dispute
sought to be agitated, or that the petition against the
party against whom relief is claimed is not
maintainable or that the dispute raised thereby is such
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that it would be inappropriate to try it in the writ
jurisdiction, or for analogous reasons.”
(Emphasis supplied)
52. In one of the recent pronouncements of this Court
in State of U.P. v. Ehsan, 2023 INSC 906, this Court
observed that:—
“28. We are conscious of the law that existence of an
alternative remedy is not an absolute bar on exercise
of writ jurisdiction. More so, when a writ petition has
been entertained, parties have exchanged their
pleadings/affidavits and the matter has remained
pending for long. In such a situation there must be a
sincere effort to decide the matter on merits and not
relegate the writ petitioner to the alternative remedy,
unless there are compelling reasons for doing so. One
such compelling reason may arise where there is a
serious dispute between the parties on a question of
fact and materials/evidence(s) available on record are
insufficient/inconclusive to enable the Court to come to
a definite conclusion…….
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)
32. Likewise, the Supreme Court in the case of Tamil
Nadu Electricity Board v. Sumathi, (2000) 4 SCC 543, has
held that when there is negligence on the face of it and
infringement of Article 21 of the Constitution is there, in
relation to disputed questions of facts, it cannot be said
that there is a bar for remedy under Article 226 of the
Constitution . Thus, the Supreme Court held as follows:
“xxx xxx xxx
10. In view of the clear proposition of law laid by this
Court in Sukamani Das case [(1999) 7 SCC 298] when
a disputed question of fact arises and there is clear
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denial of any tortious liability remedy under Article
226 of the Constitution may not be proper. However,
it cannot be understood as laying a law that in every
case of tortious liability recourse must be had to a
suit. When there is negligence on the face of it and
infringement of Article 21 is there it cannot be said
that there will be any bar to proceed under Article
226 of the Constitution . Right of life is one of the basic
human rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the
Constitution. In U.P. State Coop. Land Development
Bank Ltd. v. Chandra Bhan Dubey [(1999) 1 SCC 741
: 1999 SCC (L&S) 389] where one of us (Wadhwa, J.)
was a party, this Court after examining various
decisions of the courts on the power of the High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution observed that the
language of Article 226 of the Constitution does not
admit of any limitation on the powers of the High
Court for the exercise of jurisdiction thereunder
though by various decisions of this Court with varying
and divergent views, it has been held that jurisdiction
under Article 226 can be exercised only when a body
or authority, the decision of which is complained, was
exercising its power in the discharge of public duty and
that writ is a public law remedy. This Court then
observed : (SCC pp. 758-59, para 27)
“[I]t may not be necessary to examine any further the
question if Article 226 makes a divide between public
law and private law. Prima facie from the language of
Article 226, there does not appear to exist such a
divide. To understand the explicit language of the
article, it is not necessary for us to rely on the decision
of English courts as rightly cautioned by the earlier
Benches of this Court. It does appear to us that Article
226 while empowering the High Court for issue of
orders or directions to any authority or person, does
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not make any such difference between public functions
and private functions. It is not necessary for us in this
case to go into this question as to what is the nature,
scope and amplitude of the writs of habeas corpus,
mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari.
They are certainly founded on the English system of
jurisprudence. Article 226 of the Constitution also
speaks of directions and orders which can be issued to
any person or authority including, in appropriate
cases, any Government. Under clause (1) of Article
367, unless the context otherwise requires, the General
Clauses Act, 1897, shall, subject to any adaptations
and modifications that may be made therein under
Article 372, apply for the interpretation of the
Constitution as it applies for the interpretation of an
Act of the legislature of the Dominion of India.
„Person‟ under Section 2(42) of the General Clauses
Act shall include any company, or association or body
of individuals, whether incorporated or not. The
Constitution is not a statute. It is a fountainhead of all
the statutes. When the language of Article 226 is clear,
we cannot put shackles on the High Courts to limit
their jurisdiction by putting an interpretation on the
words which would limit their jurisdiction. When any
citizen or person is wronged, the High Court will step
in to protect him, be that wrong be done by the State,
an instrumentality of the State, a company or a
cooperative society or association or body of
individuals, whether incorporated or not, or even an
individual. Right that is infringed may be under Part
III of the Constitution or any other right which the law
validly made might confer upon him. But then the
power conferred upon the High Courts under Article
226 of the Constitution is so vast, this Court has laid
down certain guidelines and self-imposed limitations
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have been put there subject to which the High Courts
would exercise jurisdiction, but those guidelines
cannot be mandatory in all circumstances. The High
Court does not interfere when an equally efficacious
alternative remedy is available or when there is an
established procedure to remedy a wrong or enforce a
right. A party may not be allowed to bypass the normal
channel of civil and criminal litigation. The High
Court does not act like a proverbial „bull in a china
shop‟ in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article
226.”
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)
34. Accordingly, despite there being inter se disputed
questions of facts between the respondents, this Court, to
satisfy the maintainability of the petition, has to look at the
foundational facts that are material . When material facts
are not disputed and a case can be made out with the facts
on record, a petition is maintainable under Article 226 of
the Constitution.
(Emphasis Supplied)
51. In the present case, the following foundational/material facts remain
undisputed:
A. Two children namely Master Robiyal and Master Arjun, lost their
lives on 16.04.2010.
B. The unfortunate incident occurred at a Park.
C. The Park falls under the jurisdiction of the respondent No. 1/DDA.
D. The relevant civil work concerning open sewer/manhole was being
done by the respondent No. 2/DJB.
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E. The children fell in the open sewer/manhole and consequently lost
their lives.
F. The writ petition has been pending in this Court since 2016.
52. It is settled and also reiterated by the judgment of this Court in the case
16
of Shagufta Ali v. GNCTD & Ors. that although the Court should
refrain from awarding compensation under writ jurisdiction as the same
is essentially a remedy in the civil domain but that applies only when
there are disputed questions of facts and not when the liability of State
for the wrongful act is undisputed. In such cases the absence of proof of
attribution of liability to State cannot be a ground of defence as long as
reasonable inference can be drawn with respect to the same. The
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can be applied by the Courts. The relevant
paragraph of Shagufta Ali (Supra) reads as under:
“43. Upon consideration of the aforementioned judicial
precedents, it is evident that the High Court, ordinarily
while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, should refrain from awarding
compensation, a remedy primarily available within the civil
law domain, when the case involves disputed questions of
fact. However, if the State‟s liability for a tortuous act,
committed by itself or its servants, is undisputed, the maxim
res ipsa loquitur may be applied to overcome any factual
controversy. The absence of concrete proof does not
preclude the claimant from recovering compensation,
provided a reasonable inference can be drawn from the
16
Judgment pronounced on 05.09.2024, W.P.(C) No. 4291/2020, Delhi High Court.
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known facts that the harm was caused by the negligence of
the State or its servants. In such circumstances, the facts
must enable the Court to draw an unequivocal inference
and must speak for themselves.”
53. In view of the aforesaid undisputed facts, it is clear that negligence is
writ large on the acts of respondent Nos. 1 and 2. The respondent Nos.
1 and 2 being public authorities performing public functions owe a duty
of care and responsibility to the citizens of this Country. The subject
Park is a public park and all citizens have a right to visit the park and
corollary to the said right of citizens of Delhi, the respondent Nos. 1
and 2 are under an obligation to ensure the visitors are safe during their
visits.
54. The sewer maintenance work being carried out without taking adequate
care and precautions, which is reasonably expected from respondent
Nos. 1 and 2, has resulted in the death of two children aged about 11
and 12 years respectively.
55. The very fact that the death occurred due to the children falling in the
sewer shows that the care, responsibility and precaution required of
respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were inadequate and deficient. The principle
of res ipsa loquitur , hence, is squarely applicable to the above said
facts.
56. The judgment of SDO, Grid Corpn. of Orissa Ltd. (Supra) relied upon
by the respondent No. 2/DJB to state that the petition in view of the
disputed questions of facts is not maintainable, also does not advance
the case of the respondent No. 2. The said judgment pertains to cases of
persons coming in contact with wires of electric transmission lines. In
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the said judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court relied upon Chairman,
17
Grid Corpn. of Orissa Ltd. (Gridco) v. Sukamani Das , to hold that
the High Court failed to record finding of negligence in its judgments
and the same could not have been decided on the basis of affidavits
only. In the present case, the foundational facts remain undisputed. The
relevant paragraphs of SDO, Grid Corpn. of Orissa Ltd. (Supra) read
as under:
“6. In Chairman, Grid Corpn. of Orissa Ltd. (GRIDCO)
[(1999) 7 SCC 298] with which case these appeals were
listed for hearing but could not be heard for want of service,
this Court took the view that the High Court committed an
error in entertaining the writ petitions under Article 226 of
the Constitution and were not fit cases for exercising the
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was
held that actions in tort and negligence were required to be
established initially by the claimants. The mere fact that the
wire of electric transmission line belonging to the
appellants had snapped and the deceased had come into
contact with it and died by itself was not sufficient for
awarding compensation. The Court was required to
examine as to whether the wire had snapped as a result of
any negligence on the part of the appellants, as a result of
which the deceased had come in contact with the wire. In
view of the defence raised and the denial by the appellants
in each of the cases, the appellants deserved an opportunity
17
(1999) 7 SCC 298.
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to prove that proper care and precautions were taken in
maintaining the transmission line and yet the wires had
snapped because of the circumstances beyond their control
or unauthorised intervention of third parties. Such disputed
questions of fact could not be decided in exercise of
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. That the
High Court could not come to the conclusion that the
defence raised by the appellants had been raised only for
the sake of it and there was no substance in it. In para 6 it
was observed thus: (SCC pp. 301-02)
“6. In our opinion, the High Court committed an error
in entertaining the writ petitions even though they were
not fit cases for exercising power under Article 226 of
the Constitution. The High Court went wrong in
proceeding on the basis that as the deaths had taken
place because of electrocution as a result of the
deceased coming into contact with snapped live wires
of the electric transmission lines of the appellants, that
„admittedly/prima facie amounted to negligence on the
part of the appellants‟. The High Court failed to
appreciate that all these cases were actions in tort and
negligence was required to be established firstly by the
claimants. The mere fact that the wire of the electric
transmission line belonging to Appellant 1 had
snapped and the deceased had come in contact with it
and had died was not by itself sufficient for awarding
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compensation. It also required to be examined whether
the wire had snapped as a result of any negligence of
the appellants and under which circumstances the
deceased had come in contact with the wire. In view of
the specific defences raised by the appellants in each of
these cases they deserved an opportunity to prove that
proper care and precautions were taken in maintaining
the transmission lines and yet the wires had snapped
because of circumstances beyond their control or
unauthorised intervention of third parties or that the
deceased had not died in the manner stated by the
petitioners. These questions could not have been
decided properly on the basis of affidavits only. It is
the settled legal position that where disputed questions
of facts are involved a petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution is not a proper remedy. The High Court
has not and could not have held that the disputes in
these cases were raised for the sake of raising them
and that there was no substance therein. The High
Court should have directed the writ petitioners to
approach the civil court as it was done in OJC No.
5229 of 1995.”
9. In the present case, the appellants had disputed the
negligence attributed to it and no finding has been recorded
by the High Court that GRIDCO was in any way negligent
in the performance of its duty. The present case is squarely
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covered by the decision of this Court in Chairman, Grid
Corpn. of Orissa Ltd. (GRIDCO) [(1999) 7 SCC 298] . The
High Court has also erred in awarding compensation in
Civil Appeal No. 4552 of 2005 [@ SLP (C) No. 9788 of
1998]. The subsequent suit or writ petition would not be
maintainable in view of the dismissal of the suit. The writ
petition was filed after a lapse of 10 years. No reasons have
been given for such an inordinate delay. The High Court
erred in entertaining the writ petition after a lapse of 10
years. In such a case, awarding of compensation in exercise
of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution
cannot be justified.”
57. The aforesaid judgment is distinguishable from the present cases on the
ground that the Hon’ble Supreme Court primarily interfered because
the impugned judgments were passed in the absence of any finding by
the High Court that the electricity department was guilty of
“negligence”.
58. Additionally, the unfortunate incident occurred on 16.04.2010,
pursuant thereto the parents of the children filed the writ petitions in the
year 2016 and after completion of pleadings the same have been
pending in this Court for more than 10 years. In this view of the matter
the decision to relegate the parties to civil suit remedy would be a
travesty of justice. Hence, for the said reasons, the petition is
entertainable and is being entertained.
WHETHER THERE IS ANY NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF
THE RESPONDENTS ?
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59. The next question is whether there has been negligence attributable to
any/all of the respondents in their conduct i.e., essentially a breach of
duty of due care by the respondents.
60. It is the case of the petitioners that the respondent authorities
responsible for maintaining the Park have failed in their duty to take
safety and precautionary measures leading to the untimely demise of
two children.
61. Per contra, it is the defence of the respondent No. 2/DJB that it had
taken sufficient precautionary/safety measures and the site was
adequately protected.
62. The unfortunate accident leading to loss of lives of two innocent
children occurred on 16.04.2010 and initially all the authorities denied
their responsibility in connection with the maintenance of the park. It
was only in the reply dated 22.06.2011 that the respondent No. 2/DJB
acknowledged its jurisdiction and provided an explanation with regard
to the open sewer/manhole by stating that the same is an RCC structure
and is adequately protected by 4-5 feet walls. The letter dated
22.06.2011 reads as under:
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63. The only ground of defence which is put forth by the respondent No.
2/DJB is the construction of 4-5 feet walls surrounding the open
sewer/manhole and the same was considered substantial compliance
with precautionary measures required to be adopted by the respondent
No. 2.
64. The said submission is also supported by the site plans prepared by the
Investigating officer and the same are reproduced as under:
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65. Even for the sake of argument if it is accepted that the open
sewer/manhole was protected by a 4-5 feet wall, the same cannot be a
defence to show that proper care and caution was adopted by the
respondent No. 2/DJB. When any open sewer/manhole is situated in a
public park, the maintaining authority owes a greater duty of care than
required in ordinary cases. In the subject Park which was open to the
public for visitation and recreation, children of young age (11/12 years)
cannot be presumed to possess the foresight/prudence of an adult to
anticipate the hidden dangers which are behind 4-5 feet walls. Children
often perceive inadequately secured pits/areas as curious spaces and not
as lethal dangers because owing to their age they lack foresight to
protect themselves and they cannot be blamed for the same.
66. It was incumbent upon the responsible authority (respondent No. 2) to
make sure the Park was protected from all kind of untoward incidents,
which they have failed to ensure.
67. Additionally, as the park fell under the jurisdiction of the respondent
No. 1, it also owed a duty/obligation to every visitor of the Park
(including children) to ensure a safe, congenial and hazard free
environment, which it failed to discharge. Thus, the respondent No.
1/DDA cannot be allowed to contend that since the work was being
carried out by the respondent No. 2, it was not responsible in any way
or manner. Respondent No. 1/DDA cannot be absolved of its vicarious
obligation, as it was the primary agency/authority under whose
jurisdiction the Park was situated and it was responsible to ensure that
there were no lapses in maintaining safety of the Park area.
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18
68. In Pravesh Kumar v. Delhi Jal Board , which is a case based on
somewhat similar facts, a 9 year old child died because of falling into a
pit and the same was held to be a dereliction of duty on the part of DJB
despite its defence being that it erected a wall as a precautionary
measure which was broken by the local residents to get illegal access to
the ground, thereby, allowing the child to enter the ground.
69. In Pravesh Kumar (Supra), this Court discussed the application of the
maxim res ipsa loquitur in terms of Shagufta Ali (Supra) and observed
as under:
“23. In Shagufta Ali, the Court, while referring to the
enunciation of law in various judicial precedents, laid down
the essential conditions for the applicability of the legal
maxim res ipsa loquitur in exercise of its discretionary
powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to
grant compensation. It was categorically held that when
the State instrumentalities are directly and solely
responsible for an incident, and the cause and fact of
death are undisputed, the maxim res ipsa loquitur would
be applicable. This principle allows for the presumption of
negligence, strictly based on the facts of each case.
24. This Court in the case of Munna reiterated the findings
in Shagufta Ali and held that it is a settled law that where
the negligence and breach of duty by the State are writ large
and duty of care is found to be specifically of the public
authorities, the maxim res ipsa loquitur shall apply. When
the State is under a statutory duty of care and fails to fulfil
such duty, the presumption of liability without proof will
also be attracted . ..”
18
2024 SCC OnLine Del 8158.
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70. The decision of a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Pravesh Kumar
(Supra), was challenged by both the parties. The appeal preferred by
the one of respondents/DJB was dismissed by the Hon’ble Division
19
Bench and the said Order of dismissal dated 23.04.2025 was upheld
20
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court . In the appeal preferred by the
petitioner, the judgment of the learned Single Judge was partly
21
modified by the Hon’ble Division Bench only to the extent of the
quantum of compensation.
71. From a conspectus of the aforesaid judicial pronouncements and the
facts of the present case, it is clear that the application of the maxim res
ipsa loquitur (the thing speaks for itself) is squarely attracted. The fact
of death of the children is undisputed and the cause of the death, i.e., by
falling into the open sewer/manhole is also undisputed. Now, by
application of the principle of res ipsa loquitur the onus of proof
shifted to the respondents to dislodge the presumption of negligence
existing against them.
72. The only ground of defence raised by the respondent No. 2/DJB in its
favour that it had erected a wall surrounding the open sewer/manhole
also does not advance its case. It was the authority responsible for not
covering the open sewer/manhole which has led to the death of two
children. It owed a greater duty of care in case of a Park which was
open to public. Hence, there is a dereliction of duty on part of the
respondent No. 2/DJB and it is liable for gross negligence resulting in
death of Master Robiyal and Master Arjun.
19
LPA No. 266/2025, Delhi High Court.
20
Order dated 11.08.2025, SLP(Civil)Diary No.31574/2025.
21
Pravesh Kumar v. Delhi Jal Board, 2026 SCC OnLine Del 4356.
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73. Another contention raised by the respondent No. 2/DJB is that the
investigating authority has filed a cancellation report with respect to the
FIR lodged against the respondents, and the same proves that the
respondent No. 2 has not been negligent in its conduct.
74. The aforesaid contention lacks merit and is baseless because the
standard of proof and the nature of inquiry undertaken for the purpose
of awarding compensation in case of tortious liability of state
instrumentality is different from the nature of investigation and its
conclusion drawn by the investigating authorities in criminal
proceedings, as the present proceeding is founded on violation of the
core fundamental right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution of
India.
75. Also, the cancellation report is entirely based on the premise that there
had been carelessness on part of the children and the entry of the
children into that area after jumping the walls was itself illegal.
76. The findings recorded in the cancellation report even though
immaterial for the purpose of adjudication of the present matter relating
to the award of compensation, the same to my mind are also entirely
absurd.
77. I am of the view that children of tender age playing in a park cannot be
attributed with carelessness when there are dangerous structures left
open around them by the authority responsible to take every safety and
precautionary measure to prevent loss of life and limb. The cancellation
report filed by the police stands on a different footing altogether and
does not inspire my confidence to rule in favour of the respondent No.
2.
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78. In any case, the respondent No.2/DJB has not disputed that the
sewer/manhole was uncovered at the relevant time and since it was the
respondent No. 2 who owed a greater duty of care (having reference to
the site being a general public park), respondent No. 2/DJB has been
grossly negligent in its conduct resulting in the death of two innocent
children.
79. Similarly, respondent No. 1/DDA, is the authority under whose
jurisdiction the Park is situated. Respondent No. 1/DDA has raised two
fold objections, first regarding the maintainability of the petition
(which has already been adjudicated) and second regarding its liability
as respondent No. 2/DJB was the authority responsible for civil works
being undertaken in the Park and respondent No. 1/DDA has no role in
the same.
80. Once, for the aforesaid reasons, it is undisputed that the children died
because of falling into the open sewer/manhole situated in the Park and
the principle of res ipsa loquitur is squarely attracted, it was upon the
respondent No. 1/DDA to prove that it had adopted proper safeguards
and precautionary measures. Mere denial of liability on the ground that
it had no role to play in civil works cannot be countenanced.
81. The respondent No. 1/DDA was the authority under whose jurisdiction
the Park was situated and it was incumbent upon it to maintain the Park
with adequate safeguards to protect the visitors. It was within the
knowledge of the respondent No. 1/DDA that the general public
including children visit the Park and it might result in some untoward
incident. The very fact that the Park was kept open for general public
visitation and recreational purposes gives rise to a presumption that the
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same is safe and free from any form of hazard let alone an open
sewer/manhole.
82. Even though the respondent No. 1/DDA was not concerned with the
civil works and the same was being undertaken by the respondent No.
2/DJB, it cannot be said that it had no duty of due care towards the
visitors visiting the Park including the children who lost their lives on
16.04.2010. The respondent No. 1/DDA has failed in performing its
public duty and taking reasonable precautionary measures towards the
safety hazards existing in the Park. It was bound to ensure that if the
Park is open for general public’s visitation then the same is kept in a
safe and secure condition so that a person of general prudence
including children who lack reasonable foresight of an adult are kept
safe from any safety hazard including the open sewer/manhole as it was
in the present case.
83. The inter se dispute between respondent No. 1/DDA and respondent
No. 2/DJB, cannot be an impediment for adjudication of the present
matter and award of compensation.
84. Accordingly, the respondent No. 1/DDA is also found negligent and is
liable to compensate the petitioners for the death of Master Robiyal and
Master Arjun.
QUANTUM OF COMPENSATION
85. The petitioners initially sought compensation of Rs. 10,00,000/- each,
however, the petitioners have updated their claim for compensation to
Rs. 70,75,000/- each by way of written submissions. Reliance is placed
on Naval Kumar (Supra) and Rajesh (Supra) , to substantiate the said
updated quantum of compensation.
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22
86. In the case of Naval Kumar v. State of H.P. , the Hon’ble Division
Bench of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh awarded a compensation
of Rs. 1.25 crores under different heads including loss of
companionship, happiness, mental distress, etc. and based on
assumption of the petitioner’s expected income to the tune of Rs.
30,000/- per month. The said judgment was then partly modified by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Naval Kumar (Supra) to reduce the
awarded amount from Rs. 1.25 crores to Rs. 90 lacs. The relevant
paragraphs of the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Naval Kumar
(Supra) read as under:
“14. The High Court held and, in our view, rightly that the
incident in question occurred due to the negligence of the
State and its authorities and hence, the State was
vicariously liable to compensate the respondent for the
losses sustained by the respondent. It may be mentioned that
the State rightly did not challenge this finding and hence,
we need not go into its correctness. The High Court further
held and, in our view, rightly that having regard to the
family background of the respondent and further
respondent's excellent performance as a brilliant student in
studies, he would have easily earned Rs 30,000 per month in
his life. We find no good ground to interfere in this finding
of fact, which, in our opinion, is based on proper material
on record.
22
2015 SCC OnLine HP 731.
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15. The High Court, however, further awarded Rs 10,00,000
towards loss of companionship, life amenities/pleasures and
happiness, Rs 10,00,000 for pain and suffering, mental
distress, trauma and discomfort and inconvenience, Rs
10,00,000 towards attendant/nursing expenses, and lastly,
Rs 5,00,000 for securing artificial/robotic limbs and future
medical expenses. In our considered view, the award of
compensation under these four heads appears to be on very
higher side and is not supported by any evidence. It is, in
our view, based on assumptions and presumptions to which
we do not concur. In our view, entitlement under these
heads is one thing and the quantum of grant of
compensation under these heads is another thing. In this
case, as rightly urged by the learned counsel for the
appellant State that lump sum award of compensation under
these heads is on higher side and is not supported by any
evidence. It is, therefore, not legally sustainable.
16. In our considered view, taking into consideration the
facts and circumstances of the case such as the respondent's
family background, his age (8 years), nature of permanent
disability suffered by the respondent, his performance in
studies, the determination of monthly/yearly income made
by the High Court, expenses incurred and all the relevant
factors, which are usually taken into account in awarding
compensation to the victim , the respondent is held entitled
for a total lump sum compensation of Rs 90,00,000
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(Rs ninety lakhs) together with interest payable @ 6% p.a.
in place of Rs 1,25,00,000 awarded by the High Court.
17. The award of Rs 90,00,000 together with interest
payable @ 6% p.a., in our view, would fetch sufficient
regular monthly income to the respondent by way of interest
alone, if the awarded sum is deposited in the bank and
would thus take care of the respondent's upbringing and
other needs for the rest of his life. The award of
compensation determined by us is just and reasonable
compensation payable to the respondent.”
87. The said judgment is distinguishable on facts. In the case of Naval
Kumar (Supra), the child namely Naval Kumar was electrocuted with
a high tension live wire leading to 100% permanent disability and
dependency upon his family members for his entire life. The High
Court of Himachal Pradesh while assuming his expected monthly
income had referred to the fact that the child was a “brilliant student”
and he would normally have started earning monthly salary of Rs.
30,000/- after attaining the age of 20 years. In the instant case, there is
no document on record to show the education or skills of the two
children. In fact as per Police status report (annexed as Annexure P-
42), the two children were stated to be engaged in “scrap collection” .
88. The law with regards to quantification of compensation has been
discussed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in a similar case of
Pravesh Kumar (Supra) and the same reads as under:
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“42. A Coordinate Bench of this Court in Varinder Prasad
was considering a case of compensation under Article 226
of the Constitution of India for death of a ten-year-old boy,
due to the falling of the chajja present in the respondent's
premises. The Court, while granting compensation to the
deceased's parents, calculated the amount that was payable
as compensation and made the following observation:—
“As far as pecuniary compensation is concerned, as
already explained in Kamla Devi (supra) the income of
the parents can be taken as a standard measure for
arriving at the expected annual income of the children.
The method of calculating the compensation for
pecuniary loss of dependency depends upon the
potential earning capacity of the deceased Ajay
Kumar, had he attained adulthood. As per the affidavit
of the petitioner no. 1 dated 15.12.2011, his monthly
salary at the time of this incident was Rs. 10,000. At
the time of filing of the affidavit, the earnings of
petitioner no. 1 were Rs. 30,000/- per month
approximately. The petitioners have applied a
multiplication factor of 1.5 to counter inflation and
erosion of the value of money. Considering the fact that
in a span of about four years, there has been a
threefold increase in the earnings of petitioner no. 1
from Rs. 10,000/- p.m. to Rs. 30,000/- p.m., in my view,
the multiplicand factor of 1.5, to off set the effects of
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inflation and erosion of the value of money should be
adopted. It can be assumed that Ajay Kumar would
have, at least, earned what his father was earning, if
not more. Therefore, the multiplicand would be the
expected annual income, less what he required for
himself. As Ajay would have grown up, his personal
expenses would have only risen. The contribution to
the household would not have exceeded half of the
income. Thus the multiplicand work out to be Rs.
90,000/- i.e. (1,80,000/2). This multiplicand is to be
multiplied by the multiplier of 15, in terms of the
second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. This
comes out to be a figure of Rs. 13,50,000.”
43. This Court, in the case of Kamla Devi laid down the
principle for calculation of monetary compensation in cases
of Constitutional torts. The above principle of quantification
has been applied by this Court in subsequent decisions in
Kishan Lal, Subramanium, and Varinder Prasad. The
relevant paragraphs of the decision in Kamla Devi are
reproduced hereunder as:—
“5. The compensation to be awarded by the Courts,
based on international norms and previous decisions of
the Supreme Court, comprises of two parts:— (a)
„standard compensation‟ or the so-called
„conventional amount‟ (or sum) for non-pecuniary
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losses such as loss of consortium, loss of parent, pain
and suffering and loss of amenities; and (b)
Compensation for pecuniary loss of dependency.
6. The „standard compensation‟ or the „conventional
amount has to be revised from time to time to counter
inflation and the consequent erosion of the value of the
rupee. Keeping this in mind, in case of death, the
standard compensation in 1996 is worked out at Rs.
97,700/-. This needs to be updated for subsequent
years on the basis of the Consumer Price Index for
Industrial Workers (CPI-IW) brought out by the
Labour Bureau, Government of India.
7. Compensation for pecuniary loss of dependency is to
be computed on the basis of loss of earnings for which
the multiplier method is to be employed. The table
given in Schedule II of the MV Act, 1988 cannot be
relied upon, however, the appropriate multiplier can
be taken therefrom. The multiplicand is the yearly
income of the deceased less the amount he would have
spent upon himself. This is calculated by dividing the
family into units - 2 for each adult member and 1 for
each minor. The yearly income is then to be divided by
the total number of units to get the value of each unit.
The annual dependency loss is then calculated by
multiplying the value of each unit by the number of
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units excluding the two units for the deceased adult
member. This becomes the multiplicand and is
multiplied by the appropriate multiplier to arrive at the
figure for compensation of pecuniary loss of
dependency.
8. The total amount paid under 6 and 7 above is to be
awarded by the Court along with simple interest
thereon calculated on the basis of the inflation rate
based on the Consumer Prices as disclosed by the
Government of India for the period commencing from
the date of death of the deceased till the date of
payment by the State”
44. Thus, taking into account the aforesaid decisions, an
attempt is being made herein to compute the compensation
in accordance with the principles laid down in Kamla Devi.
The said determination of the amount of compensation
payable to the petitioners can be made while classifying the
compensation into following two heads:—
A) Standard Compensation
As per the guidelines, the standard compensation is stated
to be 50,000/- in the year 1989 and is to be revised from
time to time to counter inflation and the consequential
erosion of the value of the Indian National Rupee and the
amount needs to be updated for subsequent years on the
basis of the Consumer Price Index for Industrial Workers
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(CPI-IW) brought out by the Labour Bureau, Government of
India. In Kamla Devi, the (CPI-IW) with respect to the base
year 1982 was 171.
As per the website and annual report of the Labour Bureau,
Government of India, in July 2016 (the month when the
petitioners' son died) the CPI (IW) was 280 (with respect to
Base Year 2001). This number must be reworked with
regard to the Base Year 1982 using the linking factor. As
per the said report, the All India Linking factor between
New Series of Consumer Price Index Numbers for Industrial
Workers on base 2001 = 100 and the previous series on
base 1982=100 (General Index) linking factor is 4.63.
Therefore, the CPI (IW) in July 2016 with respect to Base
Year 1982, would be calculated as:
280 × 4.63 = 1296 (approx)
The standard compensation for the present case would be
worked out in the following manner:
(50,000 × 1296)/171 = 3,78,947 approx
Therefore, the estimated standard compensation after
rounding off is worked out to be Rs. 3,78,947/-.
B) Loss of Dependency and Pecuniary Losses.
As per Kamla Devi, the product of the multiplicand and the
multiplier results in the figure of annual loss of dependency.
The age of the deceased was nine years and the multiplier
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for it, according to the Schedule II of the Motor Vehicles
Act, 1988, is 15. The multiplicand is calculated by dividing
the family into units - 2 for each adult member and 1 for
each minor. Then annual income is divided by the total
number of units to get the value of each unit. The annual
dependency loss is then calculated by multiplying the value
of each unit by the number of units excluding the two units
for the deceased adult member.
In Kishan Lal, while the Court relied upon Kamla Devi to
calculate the standard compensation, it also opined that
there is a need to adopt a different approach while
calculating the pecuniary losses. It was observed that the
Court in Kamla Devi was adjudicating a prayer for
compensation involving an earning adult whose death had
an immediate financial impact on his family, whereas, in
contrast, the prayer for compensation in Kishan Lal
concerns the death of a small child who was not
contributing to the household income. Consequently, the
Court, relying on the principles laid down in M.S. Grewal v.
19
Deep Chand Sood evolved the following methodology for
calculating compensation for the death of a minor, which
reads as under:—
“31. Calculating the compensation for pecuniary loss
of dependency is somewhat more complicated,
Whereas Kamla Devi (supra) involved an earning
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adult whose death had an immediate financial impact
on his family, the present petition involves the death of
a small child who was not contributing to the
household income and who would have been unable to
do so for many more years. A somewhat different
approach would be needed.
32. In Smt. Kumari v. State of Tamil Nadu : 1992 AC)
283, the six-year old son of the appeilant died as a
result of falling in an open manhole. The appellant
filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution
seeking a writ of mandamus directing the respondents
to pay Rs. 50,000/- as compensation. The Madras High
Court dismissed the writ petition on the ground that in
a writ petition it was not possible to determine which
respondent was negligent in leaving the sewerage tank
uncovered. The Supreme Court set aside the judgment
of the High Court and awarded the appellant the sum
of Rs. 50,000 with interest at 12% per annum from the
date of the accident until the date of payment. The
Supreme Court further held that the State of Tamil
Nadu may take appropriate proceedings to claim the
said. amount from any of the respondents who might
have been responsible for leaving the manhole
uncovered. Thus, one method of calculating the
compensation of pecuniary loss of dependency is to
bring the above compensation given in Kumari (supra)
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up to date based on India's inflation rate between
1992, when the case was decided, and 2005, when
Puran died, and to subtract from it what the standard
compensation would have been in 1992.
33. However, the approach in M.S. Grewal (supra)
appears to be the better and more rational approach.
In M.S. Grewal (supra) fourteen children drowned in a
river during a school picnic as a result of the school's
negligence. The Supreme Court awarded Rs. 5 lakhs to
each family, partly on the basis that the school was one
of the most affluent in the country and the deceased
children's earning potential was significant. Therefore,
the method of calculating the compensation for
pecuniary loss of dependency entails the examination
of Puran's potential earning capacity had he lived to
adulthood. The petitioner No. 1, Puran's father, was
working in a market as a Security Guard and was
earning approximately Rs. 4,000/- per month. The late
rd
Puran, who was in the 3 Standard, when he passed
away, was an excellent student. In the previous
academic year, he was ranked First in his class.
Therefore, we can safely assume that Puran as an
adult would have earned at least as much as his father,
if not more. So, as evidenced by his academic skills,
Puran's father's salary can be used as a starting base
for calculating the compensation for pecuniary loss of
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dependency. The multiplicand would be the expected
annual income less what he required for himself. Since,
this expected income would only arise when Puran
grew up to be an adult, it would be safe to assume that
his personal expenditure would be higher. True, he
would be contributing to the household, but his
contribution in my view would definitely not exceed
half of his income. It must be remembered that here we
are concerned with compensation for pecuniary loss of
depending of Puran's parents. For some stretch of time
Puran's father would be earning and his dependency
would not be much. Furthermore, Puran would have
married and would have had to support his wife and
children. So, the assumption that, in the maximum,
Puran's parents would have lost only half of Puran's
expected annual. income, would not, be an
unreasonable one. Thus, the multiplicand would work
out to Rs. 24,000/- (4000 × 12 × 1/2). The multiplicand
and is to be multiplied by the multiplier of 15 as
derived from the Second Schedule to the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988 in respect of victim in the age group
of upto 15 years. Therefore, Puran's parents would be
entitled to a sum of Rs. 3,60,000/- (24000 × 15) for
compensation for pecuniary loss of dependency.
34. Accordingly, the petitioners are entitled to a total
compensation of Rs. 5,13,801/-. The standard
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compensation or conventional sum being Rs.
1,53,801/- and the compensation for pecuniary loss of
dependency being an amount of Rs. 3,60,000/- as
computed above.”
(emphasis supplied)
Therefore, adhering to the same principle as laid down in
Kishan Lal, the multiplicand can be calculated by
considering the father's monthly salary as the assumed
monthly income of the deceased. This amount is multiplied
by 12 to arrive at the annual income and then halved.
Subsequently, this multiplicand amount is multiplied by the
appropriate multiplier as prescribed. In the instant case, the
monthly salary of the father, as indicated in the rejoinder
affidavit filed by the petitioners, is approximately Rs.
20,000. Consequently, the annual income would be Rs.
2,40,000, and the annual loss of dependency is calculated
accordingly, as under:—
(2,40,000/2) (multiplicand) × 15 (multiplier) = Rs.
18,00,000/-
The total compensation is, thus, computed to be:
18,00,000 (pecuniary loss of dependency) +
3,78,947(standard compensation) = Rs. 21,78,947/-
38. In view of the aforesaid, DJB is directed to pay a lump
sum amount of Rs. 22,00,000/- alongwith simple interest at
the rate of 6% per annum from the date of incident i.e., till
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the date of realisation, as compensation to the petitioners
for the death of their son within a period of three months
from the passing of this judgment. Any failure to comply
with the aforesaid direction shall result in the petitioners
being entitled for payment of additional simple interest at
the rate of 10% per annum, till the payment is made.”
89. From a conspectus of the aforesaid, it is clear that the Court followed
the principles laid down in the case of Kamla Devi v. State (NCT of
23
Delhi) , wherein the calculation was classified under two separate
heads, namely, Standard damages and Pecuniary loss of dependency.
24
90. In another judgment of Kishan Lal v. Govt. NCT of Delhi , the
computation of pecuniary losses was discussed in relation to a small
child who was not earning at the time of his death and his expected
income was assumed to be the same as that of his father and
accordingly, the compensation for pecuniary loss of dependency was
calculated.
91. Keeping in view the aforesaid judicial authorities and the factual matrix
of the present case, the claims of the petitioners are quantified as
follows:
A. Standard Compensation:
92. For the purpose of calculating standard compensation, the starting
point/standard of Rs. 50,000/- in the year 1989 needs to be adjusted to
counter inflation and the value of Indian Rupee on the basis of
Consumer Price Index for Industrial Workers (“CPI-IW”) . The CPI-
23
2004 SCC OnLine Del 721.
24
2007:DHC:692.
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IW for the year 1989 (Base 1982) as applied in the case of Kamla Devi
(Supra) was 171.
93. As per the Annual Report 2010 available on the website of Labour
Bureau, Ministry of Labour & Employment, Government of India, the
CPI(IW) for the relevant time i.e., April, 2010 on Base 2001=100 (date
of incident being 16.04.2010) is 170. The linking factor to convert CPI
(IW) on the old base year of 1982=100 to relevant base year of
2001=100 is 4.63. Thus, the CPI(IW) in April, 2010 with respect to the
previous base year i.e., 1982 is as follows:
170 x 4.63 = 787.10
94. Accordingly, the standard compensation in the present case can be
computed by multiplying the standard of Rs. 50,000 with the adjusted
CPI(IW), i.e., (50,000 x 787.10)/171 = Rs. 2,30,147 (approx.)
B. Pecuniary loss of dependency
95. In the present case, there are no material facts which are brought to my
notice in order to decide the quantum with respect to pecuniary loss of
dependency. Additionally, there is no proof of annual income of either
of the petitioners, in order to facilitate my computation of
compensation by estimating annual income of the children who lost
their lives in the unfortunate incident.
96. In the status report annexed as Annexure P-42 to the present petition, it
is stated as under:
“It is submitted that on 16-04-2010 three teenage boys
namely 'Sonu', 'Robial' S/o Lakhmuddin R/o C-514,
Jehangirpuri aged 10 years and 'Arjun' S/o Ranjit Haldar
R/o Jhuggi No.C-,44, Jehangirpuri aged 15 years from
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Jehangir puri Delhi were involved in the scrap collection
and two of them had slipped into a sewer main hole
situated in the SU Block, DDA Park, near double Tanki,
Pitampura and the third boy 'Sonu' got scared and rushed
to his home and returned with his parents on the spot.”
97. From a perusal of the aforesaid, it is clear that the children were
involved in scrap collection from the Park. Hence, I am inclined to
award compensation in the present petition on the basis of working out
the minimum wages for a skilled person as applicable on the relevant
date of incident, i.e., 16.04.2010. Even though the children were
involved in the work of scrap collection, the same to my mind, cannot
be an impediment to apply the minimum rate of wages of a skilled
person for children who lost their lives at such young age of about 11
and 12 years.
98. In the case of Chob Singh (Supra), a child died because of falling into
the sewer tank and with respect to pecuniary compensation it was held
as under:
“26. As far as the peculiarly compensation is concerned, as
already explained in Kamla Devi (supra), the income of the
parents can be taken as a standard measure for arriving at
the expected annual income of the children. In this case,
the petitioner is a three wheeler auto driver.
Unfortunately, in this case the petitioner has not placed,
on record any income proof of his earnings. It is only
stated by him that he is an auto driver. In such a situation,
to minimize the element of guess work it would be
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appropriate if the minimum wages are taken as the basis
for determining the expected income. The minimum wages
multiplied by a factor of 1.5 would enable in arriving at a
reasonable estimate of income. The minimum wages for
skilled workers notified by the office of the Labour
Commissioner, government of NCT for the year 14-4-2009
was Rs 4,358 per month. If the same is multiplied by a
factor of 1.5, it becomes Rs 6,537 per month.
27. It can safely be assumed that Nand Kishore as an adult
would have earned at least as much as his father if not
more. Therefore the multiplicand would be the expected
annual income less required by himself. Since the expected
income would only arise when Nand Kishore grew up to be
an adult, it would be safe to assume that his personal
expenditure would be higher. The contribution to the
household would have not exceeded half of the income.
Accordingly, the figure of Rs 6,537 ought to be divided by 2
to provide a monthly figure of Rs 3,268.50 and an annual
figure of Rs 39,222. This multiplicand is to be multiplied by
the multiplier of 15, in terms of second schedule of Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988. This comes to be a figure of Rs
5,88,330. Taking the above calculation into account, the
total compensation to which the petitioners are entitled
works out to be Rs 2,03,216.38 + Rs 5,88,330 = Rs
7,91,546.38. The petitioner has disclosed that he has
already received Rs 80,000 till date towards compensation.
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Therefore, the compensation amount payable on the date of
filing of the petition works out to Rs 7,11,546.38. This
amount shall carry simple interest @ 6% p.a. from the date
of filing this petition till the date of payment. The amount
should be paid to the petitioner within three months.”
99. In the present case, in absence of any proof of income or occupation of
the petitioners and in view of the fact that the children were engaged in
scrap collection, I am of the view that minimum rate of wage for a
skilled person as applicable on the date of incident shall be used for the
purpose of computing pecuniary compensation. The same is based on
the presumption that the children at present were of a young age and in
the course of years they would have attained some form of skill or
training.
100. As per the Order dated 09.03.2010 by Labour Department, Government
of National Capital Territory of Delhi, the minimum rate of wage with
effect from 01.02.2010 for a skilled worker was Rs. 6,448/- per month.
101. In the judgment of Hon’ble Division Bench dated 29.05.2026 in the
case of Pravesh Kumar (Supra), the judgment of learned Single Judge
dated 18.11.2024 was partly modified (in the appeal filed by the
petitioner) only to the extent that the learned Single Judge failed to
adjust the annual income by a multiplying factor of 1.5 in order to
offset inflation and erosion in the value of money. The relevant
paragraphs of the judgment of Hon’ble Division Bench read as under:
“17. Accordingly, the annual income determined for the
purposes of assessing pecuniary compensation is liable to
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be multiplied by a factor of 1.5 so as to offset inflation and
erosion in the value of money. The said principle has been
evolved to ensure that the compensation awarded remains
just, fair, and realistic, having due regard to the impact of
inflation and the diminishing value of money.
18. In the present case as well, once the monthly salary of
Appellant 1 was taken as the assumed monthly income of
the Deceased-Child, the factor of 1.5, as recognised in
Laxmi Narayan (supra), Rajeev Singhal (supra), and
Sharafat Khan (supra), would equally apply for the
purpose of offsetting inflation and devaluation of money.
The contention advanced on behalf of Respondent 1 that
application of the factor of 1.5 would amount to
conferring a double benefit cannot be accepted, inasmuch
as the said factor is applied solely as a measure to
neutralise inflationary effects and erosion in the value of
money while determining just compensation in accordance
with settled law.
19. In view of the above, the compensation payable to the
Appellants under the pecuniary head is liable to be
recomputed by taking the monthly income of Appellant 1 at
Rs 20,000 and, thereafter, applying the factor of 1.5. The
adjusted monthly income thus works out to Rs 30,000. Upon
deducting 50% towards personal expenses, the monthly
contribution is assessed at Rs 15,000. Applying the
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multiplier of 15, the compensation payable under the
pecuniary head is quantified at Rs 27,00,000 and adding the
standard compensation in the sum of Rs 3,78,947 to the
pecuniary compensation, the total compensation payable to
the Appellants stands reassessed at Rs 30,78,947.
20. Insofar as the rate of interest is concerned, we do not
find any ground warranting interference with the rate of 6%
per annum awarded by the learned Single Judge, the same
being consistent with the rate of interest awarded in similar
cases. Accordingly, the enhanced compensation of Rs
30,78,947 shall carry simple interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from the date of the incident, i.e., 20-7-2016, until
the date of realisation.
21. Consequently, the present appeal stands partially
allowed and the Impugned judgment is modified in the
aforesaid terms.”
102. For the reasons stated above, having already accepted the expected
monthly income of the children in the present case as Rs. 6,448/-, it
needs to be adjusted with respect to the multiplying factor of 1.5. Thus,
Rs. 6,448 x 1.5 = Rs. 9,672/-.
103. Now, after deducting 50% of the same towards personal expenses of
each child, the monthly contribution of each child in their respective
families can be assessed at Rs. 4,836/-.
104. On the basis of monthly contribution of Rs. 4,836/-, the annual
contribution of each child is Rs. 58,032/-.
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105. Applying the multiplier of 15, the pecuniary compensation payable to
the petitioners with respect to each child can be assessed as Rs.
8,70,480 (Rs. 58,032 x 15).
106. Hence, the compensation payable to the petitioners in the present
petition under the head of pecuniary loss is Rs. 8,70,480/- for each
child namely, Master Robiyal and Master Arjun.
107. Since the petitioners are persons with limited means and have been
pursuing this litigation for over 10 years, I am inclined to allow the
costs of litigation in favour of the petitioners to the extent of Rs.
1,00,000/- for each petitioner.
108. Accordingly, the entire payable compensation to the petitioners is:
Standard Compensation + Pecuniary loss of dependency
Rs. 2,30,147 + Rs. 8,70,480/-
= Rs. 11,00,627/-.
CONCLUSION
109. For all the aforesaid reasons, having found negligence in the conduct of
authorities namely respondent No. 1/DDA and respondent No.2/DJB in
fulfilment of their duties owed to the general public in the present
cases, the petitioners in both the petitions are entitled to a compensation
of Rs. 11,00,627/- each along with simple interest at the rate of 9% per
annum from the date of filing of the writ petitions till the date of
payment.
110. Accordingly, the respondent No. 1/DDA and respondent No. 2/DJB are
directed to pay a lump sum amount of Rs. 11,01,000/- (rounded off)
along with interest calculated in the manner as stated above to the
petitioners in both the petitions, i.e., W.P. (C) 284/2016 and W.P. (C)
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317/2016 separately, plus Rs. 1,00,000/- as costs of litigation (in each
petition). The liability of respondent No. 1/DDA and respondent No.
2/DJB for the purpose of payment as described above is joint and
several.
111. Since respondent No. 3/MCD had no role in the maintenance of the
Park, no liability is fastened upon them.
112. The present petitions are allowed in the aforesaid terms.
JASMEET SINGH, J
th
NOVEMBER 18 , 2026/SS
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