Kuljinder Singh @ Kola vs State Of Punjab

Court
Punjab and Haryana High Court

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120 120 120 120
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH AT CHANDIGARH AT CHANDIGARH

CRM CRM-M-45985 CRM CRM 45985 45985-2026 (O&M) 45985 2026 (O&M) 2026 (O&M) 2026 (O&M)

Kuljinder Singh @ Kola
….Petitioner
versus
State of Punjab
….Respondent

Date of Decision: Date of Decision: November 18 Date of Decision: Date of Decision: November 18 November 18, 2026 November 18 , 2026 , 2026 , 2026
Date of Uploading: Date of Uploading: November 18 Date of Uploading: Date of Uploading: November 18 November 18, 2026 November 18 , 2026 , 2026 , 2026

CORAM: CORAM: CORAM: CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL

Present: Present:- Present: Present: Mr. Prateek Pandit, Advocate for the petitioner.

Ms. Mahima Yashpal Singla, Senior DAG Haryana.


SUMEET GOEL SUMEET GOEL, J. (ORAL) SUMEET GOEL SUMEET GOEL , J. (ORAL) , J. (ORAL) , J. (ORAL)

rd
Present 3 petition has been filed under Section 483 of the BNSS,
2023/ 439 Cr. P.C. seeking grant of regular bail to the petitioner, in case bearing
FIR No.44 dated 29.02.2020, registered for the offences punishable under Section
21 of the NDPS Act, 1985, at Police Station Sultanpur Lodhi, District Kapurthala.
2. The FIR in question pertains to recovery of 260 grams of Heroin.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has iterated that the petitioner was
initially arrested on 29.02.2020 whereinafter he was granted the concession of
interim regular bail on account of non-filing of FSL report on 10.04.2020. Learned
counsel has urged that the petitioner did not surrender back in time and came to be
subsequently arrested on 28.02.2023 and is in continuous custody since then.
Learned counsel has further submitted that mandatory provisions of the NDPS Act
have not scrupulously been complied with, and thus, the prosecution case suffers
from inherent defects. Learned counsel has iterated that the trial is delayed and the







MAHAVIR SINGH
2026.11.18 17:58
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/ judgment

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liability thereof cannot be fastened upon the petitioner. Learned counsel has
argued that the petitioner has suffered incarceration for more than 03½ years.
Thus, regular bail is prayed for.
4. Learned State counsel has opposed the present petition by arguing
that the allegations raised against the petitioner are serious in nature and, thus, he
does not deserve the concession of the regular bail. Learned State counsel has
further submitted that the instant bail plea is barred by the rigors of Section 37 of
the NDPS Act, and thus, the same ought to be dismissed. Learned State counsel
seeks to place on record custody certificate dated 18.11.2026, in the Court today,
which is taken on record.
5. I have heard counsel for the rival parties and have gone through the
available records of the case.
6. The petitioner was initially arrested on 29.02.2020, whereinafter he
was released on interim regular bail on 10.04.2020 on account of non-filing of
FSL report. Thereafter, the petitioner did not surrender and came to be re-arrested
on 28.02.2023, and is in continuous custody since then. Challan (upon culmination
of investigation) has already been filed. It is, thus, indubitable that conclusion of
the trial will take long time. The rival contentions raised at Bar give rise to
debatable issues, which shall be ratiocinated upon during the course of trial. This
Court does not deem it appropriate to delve deep into these rival contentions, at
this stage, lest it may prejudice the trial. Nothing tangible has been brought
forward to indicate the likelihood of the petitioner absconding from the process of
justice or interfering with the prosecution evidence.
6.1. The trial is indeed procrastinating and folly thereof cannot be
saddled upon the petitioner. As per custody certificate dated 18.11.2026 filed by
the learned State counsel, the petitioner has already suffered incarceration for a
period of 03 years, 09 months and 29 days.







MAHAVIR SINGH
2026.11.18 17:58
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/ judgment

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6.2. Further, as per the said custody certificate, the petitioner is stated to
be involved in other FIR(s). However, this factum cannot be a ground, sufficient
by itself, to decline the concession of regular bail to the petitioner in the FIR in
question when a case is made out for grant of regular bail qua the FIR in question
by ratiocinating upon the facts/circumstances of the said FIR. Reliance in this
regard can be placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Maulana Maulana
Maulana Maulana
Mohd. Amir Rashadi v. State of U.P. and another, 2012 (1) RCR (Criminal) 586 Mohd. Amir Rashadi v. State of U.P. and another, 2012 (1) RCR (Criminal) 586 ; a
Mohd. Amir Rashadi v. State of U.P. and another, 2012 (1) RCR (Criminal) 586 Mohd. Amir Rashadi v. State of U.P. and another, 2012 (1) RCR (Criminal) 586
Division Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in case of Sridhar Sridhar
Sridhar Sridhar
Das v. State, 1998 (2) RCR (Criminal) 477 Das v. State, 1998 (2) RCR (Criminal) 477 Das v. State, 1998 (2) RCR (Criminal) 477 Das v. State, 1998 (2) RCR (Criminal) 477 & judgments of this Court in CRM-M
No.38822-2022 titled as Akhilesh Singh v. State of Haryana Akhilesh Singh v. State of Haryana Akhilesh Singh v. State of Haryana Akhilesh Singh v. State of Haryana , decided on
29.11.2021, and Balraj v. Balraj v. State of Haryana, 1998 (3) RCR (Criminal) 191. Balraj v. Balraj v. State of Haryana, 1998 (3) RCR (Criminal) 191. State of Haryana, 1998 (3) RCR (Criminal) 191. State of Haryana, 1998 (3) RCR (Criminal) 191.
6.3. This Court in a judgment titled as Kulwinder versus State of Punjab Kulwinder versus State of Punjab Kulwinder versus State of Punjab Kulwinder versus State of Punjab
passed in CRM CRM CRM-M-64074 CRM 64074 64074-2024 64074 2024 2024 2024 (2025:PHHC:002695); after relying upon the ratio
decidendi of the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hussainara Khatoon
vs. Home Secy., State of Bihar (1980) 1 SCC 81; Abdul Rehman Antulay vs R.S.
Nayak (1992) 1 SCC 225; Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh vs. State of Maharashtra and
another, 2024(3) RCR (Criminal) 494; Mohd Muslim @ Hussain vs. State (NCT
of Delhi) reported as 2023 INSC 311; Criminal Appeal No.245/2020 dated
07.02.2020 titled as “Chitta Biswas Alias Subhas vs. The State of West Bengal”;
“Nitish Adhikary @ Bapan vs. The State of West Bengal”, Special Leave to
Appeal (Crl.) No.5530-2022 dated 22.08.2022 titled as “Mohammad Salman
Hanif Shaikh vs. The State of Gujarat”; Criminal Appeal No.1169 of 2022 dated
05.08.2022 titled as Gopal Krishna Patra @ Gopalrusma vs. Union of India, and
Ankur Chaudhary vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024(4) RCR (Criminal) 172; has
held, thus:
“ 7.8. The right to a speedy and expeditious trial is not only a
vital safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration; to mitigate
anxiety and concern accompanying the accusation as well as to curtail any







MAHAVIR SINGH
2026.11.18 17:58
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/ judgment

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impairment in the ability of an accused to defend himself, but there is an
overarching societal interest paving way for a speedy trial. This right has
been repeatedly actuated in the recent past and the ratio decidendi of the
above-referred to Supreme Court’s judgments have laid down a series of
decisions opening up new vistas of fundamental rights. The concept of
speedy trial is amalgamated into the Article 21 as an essential part of the
fundamental right to life and liberty, guaranteed and preserved under our
Constitution. The right to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint
imposed at the time of the arrest of the accused and consequent
incarceration which continues at all stages, namely, the stage of
investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that any possible
prejudice that may result due to impermissible and avoidable delay since
the time of the commission of the offence till the criminal proceedings
consummate into a finality, could be averted. The speedy trial, early
hearing and quick disposal are sine qua non of criminal jurisprudence. The
overcrowded Court-dockets, the heavy volume of work and the resultant
pressure on the prosecution and the Police, indubitably keeps the entire
criminal jurisprudential mechanism under stress and strain. However, this
cannot be an excuse for keeping the sword of Damocles hanging on the
accused for an indefinite period of time. It does not serve any credit to the
criminal justice system, rather it makes for a sad state of affairs. The
guarantee of a speedy trial is intended to avoid oppression and prevent
delay by imposing on the Court and the prosecution an obligation to
proceed with the trial with a reasonable dispatch. The guarantee serves a
threefold purpose. Firstly, it protects the accused against oppressive pre-
trial imprisonment; secondly, it relieves the accused of the anxiety and
public suspicion due to unresolved criminal charges and lastly, it protects
against the risk that evidence will be lost or memories dimmed by the
passage of time, thus, impairing the ability of the accused to defend
himself. It goes without saying that the consequences of pre-trial detention
are grave. Accused, presumed innocent, till proven otherwise, are
subjected to psychological and physical deprivations of jail-life, usually
under onerous conditions. Equally important, the burden of detention of
such an accused frequently falls heavily on the innocent members of his
family.

There is yet another aspect of the matter which deserves
consideration at this stage. The allegations in the present case relate to
accused being involved in an FIR relating to commercial quantity of
contraband under the NDPS Act, 1985. While considering a bail petition
in a case involving commercial quantity, the Court has to keep in mind the
rigours enumerated under Section 37 of NDPS Act, 1985 which mandates
that Courts can grant bail to an accused only after hearing the public
prosecutor and after having satisfied itself of twin conditions which are
reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the
offence charged/alleged and that, he is not likely to commit any offence
while on bail. The stringent rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985
must be meticulously scrutinized against the backdrop of accused’s
fundamental right to a speedy trial. The right to life and personal liberty
cannot be rendered nugatory by unwarranted delays in the judicial process,
particularly where such delay(s) is neither attributable to the accused nor
justified at the end of the prosecution by cogent reasons. An individual
cannot be kept behind bars for an inordinate period of time by taking
refuge in rigours laid down in Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985. The
legislature in its wisdom, in order to ensure speedy and timely disposal of
the cases under the Act, has provided for the constitution of special Courts
under Section 36-A of the Act. However, this Court cannot turn Nelson’s







MAHAVIR SINGH
2026.11.18 17:58
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/ judgment

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eye to the protracted delays and systematic inefficiency that frustrate this
legislative purpose. A Court of law is duty-bound to ensure that it does
not become complicit in violation of an individual’s fundamental rights,
notwithstanding anything contained in a statute. While dealing with bail
petition in a case governed by the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act,
1985, the Court must strike a judicious balance between the legislative
intent to curb the menace of drugs and the sacrosanct right of the accused
to a fair and expeditious trial. Prolonged incarceration, without justifiable
cause, risks transforming pre-trial detention into punitive imprisonment,
an outcome antithetical to the principle of justice and equity.

Ergo, the unequivocal inference is that where the trial has
failed to conclude within a reasonable time, resulting in prolonged
incarceration, it militates against the precious fundamental rights of life
and liberty granted under the law and, as such, conditional liberty
overriding the statutory embargo created under Section 37 of the NDPS
Act, 1985 ought to be considered as per facts of a given case. In other
words, grant of bail in a case pertaining to commercial quantity, on the
ground of undue delay in trial, cannot be said to be fettered by Section 37
of the NDPS Act, 1985. ”

In this view of the matter, the rigor imposed under Section 37 of the
NDPS Act stands diluted in light of the Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
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6.4. Indubitably, the present petition is the 3 attempt by the petitioner to
secure regular bail. The last bail plea was dismissed as withdrawn on 05.05.2026.
Keeping in view the entirety of the factual matrix of the case in hand; especially,
the extended incarceration of the petitioner, glacial pace of trial; this Court is
inclined to affirmatively consider the instant plea for bail. A profitable reference,
in this regard, can be made to a judgment of this Court passed in CRA CRA CRA-S-2332 CRA 2332 2332- 2332
2023 2023 titled as Rafiq Khan versus State of Haryana and another 2023 2023 Rafiq Khan versus State of Haryana and another Rafiq Khan versus State of Haryana and another; relevant whereof Rafiq Khan versus State of Haryana and another
reads as under:
“ 10. As an epilogue to the above discussion, the following principles
emerge:
I Second/successive regular bail petition(s) filed is maintainable in
law & hence such petition ought not to be rejected solely on the ground
of maintainability thereof.
II. Such second/successive regular bail petition(s) is maintainable
whether earlier petition was dismissed as withdrawn/dismissed as not
pressed/dismissed for non-prosecution or earlier petition was dismissed
on merits.
III For the second/successive regular bail petition(s) to succeed, the
petitioner/applicant shall be essentially/pertinently required to show
substantial change in circumstances and showing of a mere superficial or
ostensible change would not suffice. The metaphoric expression of
seeking second/successive bail plea(s) ought not be abstracted into literal







MAHAVIR SINGH
2026.11.18 17:58
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/ judgment

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iterations of petition(s) without substantial, effective and consequential
change in circumstances.
IV No exhaustive guidelines can possibly be laid down as to what
would constitute substantial change in circumstances as every case has
its own unique facts/circumstance. Making such an attempt is nothing
but an utopian endeavour. Ergo, this issue is best left to the judicial
wisdom and discretion of the Court dealing with such second/successive
regular bail petition(s).
V In case a Court chooses to grant second/successive regular bail
petition(s), cogent and lucid reasons are pertinently required to be
recorded for granting such plea despite such a plea being
second/successive petition(s). In other words, the cause for a Court
having successfully countenanced/entertained such second/successive
petition(s) ought to be readily and clearly decipherable from the said
order passed. ”

Suffice to say, further detention of the petitioner as an undertrial is
not warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case.
7. In view of above, the present petition is allowed allowed allowed. Petitioner is allowed
ordered to be released on regular bail, if not required in any other case, on his
furnishing bail/surety bonds to the satisfaction of the Ld. concerned trial
Court/Duty Magistrate. However, in addition to conditions that may be imposed
by the concerned trial Court/Duty Magistrate, the petitioner shall remain bound by
the following conditions:
(i) The petitioner shall not mis-use the liberty granted.
(ii) The petitioner shall not tamper with any evidence, oral or
documentary, during the trial.
(iii) The petitioner shall not absent himself on any date before the
trial.
(iv) The petitioner shall not commit any offence while on bail.
(v) The petitioner shall deposit his passport, if any, with the trial
Court.
(vi) The petitioner shall give his cellphone number to the
Investigating Officer/SHO of concerned Police Station and
shall not change his cell-phone number without prior
permission of the trial Court/Illaqa Magistrate.
(vii) The petitioner shall not in any manner try to delay the trial.
(viii) The petitioner shall submit, on the first working day of every
month, an affidavit, before the concerned trial Court, to the
effect that he has not been involved in commission of any
offence after being released on bail. In case the petitioner is
found to be involved in any offence after his being enlarged
on bail in the present FIR, on the basis of his affidavit or
otherwise, the State is mandated to move, forthwith, for
cancellation of his bail which plea, but of course, shall be
ratiocinated upon merits thereof.








MAHAVIR SINGH
2026.11.18 17:58
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/ judgment

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8. In case of breach of any of the aforesaid conditions and those which
may be imposed by concerned trial Court/Duty Magistrate as directed hereinabove
or upon showing any other sufficient cause, the State/complainant shall be at
liberty to move cancellation of bail of the petitioner.
9. Ordered accordingly.
10. Nothing said hereinabove shall be construed as an expression of
opinion on the merits of the case.
11. Since the main case has been decided, pending miscellaneous
application, if any, shall also stands disposed off.










(SUMEET GOEL SUMEET GOEL SUMEET GOEL) SUMEET GOEL
JUDGE
JUDGE JUDGE JUDGE
November 18 November 18, 2026 November 18 November 18 , 2026 , 2026 , 2026
mahavir
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No

Whether reportable: Yes/No







MAHAVIR SINGH
2026.11.18 17:58
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/ judgment