KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREA DEVELOPMENT BOARD vs SMT M R SUJATHA

Court
Karnataka High Court

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WA No. 199 of 2016


RESERVED ON : 31.07.2026
PRONOUNCED ON : 29.10.2026



IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU


TH
DATED THIS THE 29 DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026

PRESENT

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAYANT BANERJI

AND

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE T.M.NADAF

WRIT APPEAL NO. 199 OF 2016 (LA-KIADB)


BETWEEN:

1. KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL
AREA DEVELOPMENT BOARD,
ND
2 FLOOR, RASHTRATHONA PARISHATH,
NO.14/3A, NRUPATHUNGA ROAD,
BANGALORE - 560 001.
REPRESENTED BY ITS
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
EXECUTIVE MEMBER.

2. THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISIITON OFFICER,
(INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT)
KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL
AREA DEVELOPMENT BOARD
TH
488-B, 14 CROSS,
PEENYA II STAGE
BANGALORE - 560 058.
…APPELLANTS









Digitally
signed by
REKHA R
Location:
High Court of
Karnataka

(BY SRI. SANJAY, ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. B.B. PATIL., ADVOCATE)




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WA No. 199 of 2016


AND:

1. SMT. M.R. SUJATHA,
W/O SRI. M.N. RAMESH,
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS,
TH
R/A NO .40/1, 29 CROSS,
TH
7 BLOCK, JAYANAGAR
BANGALORE - 560 082.

2. STATE OF KARNATAKA,
BY ITS SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
AND INDUSTRIES,
M.S. BUILDING,
BANGALORE - 560 001.
…RESPONDENTS
(BY MS. BHUVANESHWARI GURUVINA, ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. PAWAN KUMAR M.N., ADVOCATE FOR R1,
SRI. S.R. KHAMROZ KHAN, AGA FOR R2)

THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE
KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE
THE ORDER PASSED IN THE WRIT PETITION NO.21613-
21615/2010 DATED:05.03.2014. QUASHING THE ACQUISITION
NOTIFICATIONS ISSUED BY THE APPEALLANT NO.1 UNDER
SECTIONS 28(1) AND 28(4) OF THE KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL
AREAS DEVELOPMENT ACT, 1966 (HEREINAFTER REFEREED TO
AS THE KIAD ACT, 1966) INSOFAR AS THEY RELATE TO THE
LANDS OF RESPONDENT NO.1.
THIS APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR
JUDGMENT, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY,

JUDGMENT IS DELIVERED/ PRONOUNCED AS UNDER:

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAYANT BANERJI
and
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE T.M.NADAF


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WA No. 199 of 2016


CAV JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE T.M.NADAF)
This intra Court appeal by the Karnataka Industrial
1
Area Development Board and the Special Land Acquisition
2
Officer (International Airport), KIADB , calling in question
the order dated 05.03.2014 passed by the Writ Court in
W.P.No.21613-21615/2010.
2. Under the impugned order, the Writ Court

allowed the Writ Petition in view of law laid down by the
Division Bench of this Court in the case of
H.N.SHIVANNA AND OTHERS VS. STATE OF
3
KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER and quashed the
Notifications sought in the prayer, so far as the petitioner’s
lands are concerned.
3. The parties are referred to as per their ranking
before the Writ Court.

1
Hereinafter referred to as, ‘the KIADB’
2
Hereinafter referred to as, ‘the SLAO’
3
W.A.Nos.3189-3201/2010 C/w. W.A.Nos.3202-3206/2010, disposed of on 20.11.2012

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WA No. 199 of 2016


4. The petitioner filed the Writ Petition seeking
following reliefs:
a) Issue a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the
notification bearing No.CI 431 SPQ 2006 Bangalore
rd
dated 25.10.2006 issued by the 3 respondent U/S
3(1) of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development
Act, 1966 vide ANNEXURE-A, the Notification
bearing No.CI 431 SPQ 2006 Bangalore dated
rd
25.10.2006 issued by the 3 respondent U/S 1(3)
of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act,
1966 vide ANNEXURE-B, the Notification bearing
No.CI 431 SPQ 2006 Bangalore dated 25.10.2006
rd
issued by the 3 respondent U/S 28(1) of the
Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966
vide ANNEXURE-C and the Notification bearing
No.CI 307 SPQ 2009 Bangalore dated 02.02.2010
rd
issued by the 3 respondent U/S 28(4) of the
Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966
vide ANNEXURE-D to the Writ Petition, in so far as
the petitioner’s schedule properties are concerned.
b) Pass such other order/s as this Hon’ble Court
deems fit in the facts and circumstances of the
above case in the interest of justice and equity.
5. Facts in brief leading to file the present Writ
Appeal are as under:
5.1 The petitioner approached the Writ Court on two
grounds. The first and foremost ground is the delay

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WA No. 199 of 2016


in issuance of Final Notification under Section 28(4)
of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act,
4
1966 and secondly, non-consideration of the
objections filed in terms of 28(3) of Act of 1966.
5.2 The petitioner claims that she is the absolute owner
of five agricultural lands to a total extent of 02 Acres
in several survey numbers of Chellur Village,
Maralavadi Hobli, Kanakapura Taluk, Bengaluru Rural
District, which she has purchased under a registered
Sale Deed dated 06.04.2005. The details of the land
are as follows:
SURVEY NO. EXTENT
185/2 29 Guntas
185/3 9 Guntas
186/1 22 Guntas
371/2 13 Guntas
370/P2 7 Guntas
TOTAL 2.00 Acres
5.3 It is her further case that, subsequent to purchase of
the land, she has applied for permission to start a
garment factory in the name and style of ‘Sujatha

4
Hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1966’

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WA No. 199 of 2016


Garments’. A Provisional Registration Certificate as a
Small Scale Industry (Tiny Unit) was issued by the
Office of the Joint Director, District Industries Centre,
Bangalore Rural District on 26.08.2005.
5.4 It is her further case that she has applied for
conversion of land from Agricultural to Commercial
(Industrial Conversion) with the jurisdictional Deputy
Commissioner.
5.5 As the things stood thus, respondents issued
Notifications on 25.10.2006 under Sections 3(1),
1(3) and 28(1) of the Act of 1966 (Annexures-A to
C), declaring industrial area and notifying several
extent of lands in Bannikuppe, Devarakaganahalli,
Jakkasandra and Chellur Village situated in
Kanakapura Taluk of Bengaluru Rural District for
industrial development purpose, wherein three Items
of land belonging to the petitioner are included viz.,
Sy.No.186/1 measuring 22 Guntas, Sy.No.371/2
measuring 13 Guntas and Sy.No.370/P2 measuring
07 Guntas, totally measuring 01 Acre 02 Guntas.

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5.6 Thereafter, in terms of Section 28(2) of the Act of
1966, notices were issued on the persons interested
in the land, calling for the objections. In view
thereof, the petitioner submitted objections on
06.12.2006 and 08.02.2007 (Annexures-L and M). In
the objection, it was contended that the petitioner
was to set-up an industrial unit in the name and style
of ‘Sujatha Garments’ in the land which she has
purchased under the Sale Deed supra, sought to be
acquired.
5.7 It is the case of the petitioner that without
considering the objections filed by her, the
respondent SLAO rejected the objection and
proceeded to acquire the land, by means of order
dated 13.02.2009 under Section 28(3) of the Act of
1966 (Annexure-N).
5.8 Thereafter, on 02.02.2010 (Annexure-D) under
Section 28(4) of the Act of 1966, Final Notification
was issued acquiring the lands stated supra.
Aggrieved by the issuance of Final Notification, the

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petitioner was before the Writ Court, calling in
question the acquisition Notification on the ground of
delay and non-consideration of objection.
5.9 The respondents KIADB had taken a stand before the
Writ Court, that the contention of the petitioner that
she was to set-up industrial unit has been considered
by the SLAO and having found that the same is
untenable, rejected the objections filed by the
petitioner and other land owners, as per Section
28(3) of the Act of 1966, by means of order dated
13.02.2009. Thereafter the Final Notification was
issued under Section 28(4) and the lands have been
acquired in accordance with law.
5.10 It was contended that, further steps were not taken
in respect of the land of the petitioner in view of the
interim order granted by this Court.
5.11 So far as the contention of delay, which is the
primary contention of the petitioner, the respondents
contended that under the Preliminary Notification, it

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WA No. 199 of 2016


was proposed to acquire 1,612 Acres and 8½ Guntas.
The properties are situated at Bengaluru had several
complications. In view of objections filed by several
landowners, a detailed hearing had to be given as
mandated under Section 28(3) of the Act of 1966. In
that view of the matter, time has been consumed
inevitably and there is no intentional delay in issuing
the Final Notification. To support their contention, the
respondents relied on the Judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in P.NARAYANAPPA AND
ANOTHER VS. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND
5
OTHERS , wherein the very question whether the
delay in issuance of Notification under Section 28(4)
would be material or fatal to the Notification issued
under Section 28(1) has been considered with
reference to the provisions of the Land Acquisition
6
Act, 1894 , and the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held
that, in the absence of any specific provision to that
effect in the Act and held that the time gap being not

5
(2006) 7 SCC 578
6
For short, ‘the Act of 1894’

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WA No. 199 of 2016


very long to hold that the Notification under Section
28(4) of the Act of 1966 is invalid. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court observed that, there is no similar
provision in the scheme of the present Act i.e., the
Act of 1966, as the same is standing in a different
footing from Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act,
which lays down a period of limitation of one year for
making declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act
from the date of Preliminary Notification.
5.12 Secondly, the respondents relied on the Judgment of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
M.NAGABHUSHANA VS. STATE OF KARNATANA
7
AND OTHERS , wherein the question in respect of
Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act was in issue
and the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that, a
conjoint reading of Section 28(4) and 28(5) of the
Act of 1966 stands in a different footing than Section
11-A of the Act of 1894. Further held that, the Act of
1966 is a self-contained Code and provisions of

7
(2011) 3 SCC 408

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Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act is not
applicable even on the delay in passing of award
subsequent to Final Notification, since the possession
of the land is to be taken under Section 16 of the Act
of 1894 only after exercising power under Section
11, i.e., passing an award. Whereas, a conjoint
reading of the provisions, that is, 28(4) and 28(5) of
the Act of 1966, the moment Final Notification issued
under Section 28(4), the land gets vested with the
Government under Section 28(5) of the Act of 1966
and such vesting takes place by operation of law and
it has nothing to do with making/ passing of any
award. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in clear terms,
has held that the Act of 1966 is a self-contained Code
and Central Act is not supplemental to it and further
held that the shelter taken under the MARIYAPPA
AND OTHERS VS. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND
8
OTHERS is not attracted to the facts of the case.

8
(1998) 3 SCC 276

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WA No. 199 of 2016


5.13 On the other hand, the petitioner relied on the
Judgment of H.N.SHIVANNA supra to contend that,
though there is no timeframe fixed under the Act for
issuance of Final Notification from the date of
Preliminary Notification, however the same ought to
have been exercised within a reasonable time and
what is reasonable time, depends upon the facts and
circumstances of each case and submitted that, in
view of the same, the Final Notification issued after
03 years 04 months from the date of issuance of
Preliminary Notification gets vitiated.
5.14 The Writ Court followed the Judgment passed in
H.N.SHIVANNA supra and held that the judgments
of P.NARAYANAPPA and M.NAGABHUSHANA
referred by the respondents are not applicable to the
facts of the case. The reason being in
P.NARAYANAPPA ’s case, the delay caused was only
01 year 10 months and so far as
M.NAGABHUSHANA ’s case is concerned, it was with
reference to passing of award. The Writ Court

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WA No. 199 of 2016


bestowing much importance to the delay aspect of 03
year 04 months in issuance of Final Notification,
relying on the Judgment in H.N.SHIVANNA supra,
held that the delay in issuance of Final Notification
caused prejudice and jeopardized the interest of the
petitioner. Accordingly, allowed the Writ Petition and
quashed the Notifications as sought in the prayer. It
is this order passed by the Writ Court is called in
question in this appeal.
6. Heard, Sri.Sanjay, learned counsel appearing
on behalf of Sri.B.B.Patil, learned counsel for the
appellants and Ms.Bhuvaneshwari Guruvina, learned
counsel appearing on behalf of Sri.Pawan Kumar.M.N,
learned counsel for respondent No.1 and Sri.S.R.Khamroz
Khan, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing
for respondent No.2.
7. Sri.Sanjay, learned counsel appearing for the
appellants KIADB with all vehemence submits that the
Writ Court has failed to appreciate that the issue is settled
in terms of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme

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Court in P.NARAYANAPPA supra contending that, there
is no time limit prescribed for issuing of the Final
Notification.
7.1 Learned counsel further referring to the Judgment in
the case of M.NAGHABHUSHANA supra submitted
that, the Act of 1966 is standing on a different
footing when compared to the Land Acquisition Act,
1894. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in
M.NAGHABHUSHANA supra has held that the Act of
1966 is a special legislation and a self-contained
Code and the provisions of Land Acquisition Act is not
supplemental to the Act of 1966.
7.2 Learned counsel for the appellants further contended
that the delay caused is due to answering the
objections raised in accordance with Section 28(3) of
the Act of 1966. He further submitted that in a
subsequent decision of the Division Bench of this
Court in the case of ANANTHASWAMY VS. STATE

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WA No. 199 of 2016


9
OF KARNATANA AND OTHERS , the Coordinate
Bench of this Court has held that H.N.SHIVANNA is
no more a good law in view of law laid down by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of THE SPECIAL
LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, KIADB AND
ANOTHER VS. ANASUYA BAI (DEAD) BY LRS
10
AND OTHERS , OFFSHORE HOLDINGS (P) LTD.
11
VS. BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
and GIRNAR TRADERS (3) VS. STATE OF
12
MAHARASHTRA .
7.3 Learned counsel further submitted that, the matter
was referred to Full Bench by the Writ Court in
W.P.No.203585/2019 with following order, which
reads as under:
“ ORAL ORDER
Heard Sri K.N.Phaneendra, learned Senior
Counsel appearing for the petitioner in
W.P.No.203585/2019, learned Counsel Smt. Ratna
N.Shivayogimath appearing for the petitioners in

9
W.A.No.1451/2018, disposed of on 02.03.2021
10
(2017) 3 SCC 313
11
(2011) 3 SCC 139
12
(2011) 3 SCC 1

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WA No. 199 of 2016


W.P.No.201752/2016 and the learned Counsel
appearing for the respondents in the said writ
petitions.
W.P.No.201752/2016 has been filed by the
land owners whose lands are notified for
acquisition under the impugned notification issued
by Special Land Acquisition Officer, Karnataka
Industrial Areas Development Board (for short,
'KIADB'). Whereas, W.P.No.203585/2019 has
been filed by the beneficiary of the acquisition
proceedings challenging the notice issued to it to
pay the enhanced market value of the lands which
are sought to be acquired.
Learned Counsel for the petitioners in W.P.
No.201752/2016 has placed reliance on the
judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the
case of H.N.SHIVANNA & OTHERS VS THE STATE
OF KARNATAKA & ANOTHER - (2013)4 KCCR
2793, and submits that since the acquisition
proceedings which has been commenced in the
year 2007 has not been concluded yet and no
award has been passed in the matter, the
acquisition proceedings stands lapsed.
Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
petitioner in W.P.No.203585/2019 has contended
that since the acquiring authority has not
concluded the acquisition proceedings, a demand
is now made for payment of additional amount
towards difference in the market value of the
lands which is a burden on the beneficiary for the
lapse of the acquiring authority.

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WA No. 199 of 2016


Learned Counsel appearing for the Board
submits that the judgment in H.N.Shivanna's case
supra has been impliedly overruled in the
judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the
case of ANANTHASWAMY VS STATE OF
KARNATAKA & OTHERS - MANU/KA/1373/2021
(W.A.No.1451/2018) in view of the judgment of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY &
ANOTHER VS STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANOTHER -
(2018)9 SCC 122. He submits that the law laid
down in H.N.Shivanna's case supra is no more a
good law.
In reply, learned Counsel for the petitioners
in W.P.No.201752/2016 has brought to the notice
of this Court, the order passed by the Division
Bench of this Court (to which I am a party), in
W.A.No.557/2021 disposed of on 23.03.2022 in
the case of KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREA
DEVELOPMENT BOARD & ANOTHER VS
K.H.SHIVANNA & OTHERS and in
W.A.No.1268/2021 disposed of on 17.03.2022 in
the case of KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREA
DEVELOPMENT BOARD & ANOTHER VS SRI
MUNIANJINAPPA & ANOTHER and they submit that
in W.A.No.557/2021, this Court has placed
reliance on H.N.Shivanna's case supra. She also
submits that even if statute does not provide for
concluding the acquisition within a time frame, the
authorities under the statute are required to
conclude it within a reasonable time.

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Learned Counsels have also brought to the
notice of this Court the order passed by the
Division Bench of this Court in W.A.No.6819/2017
(THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER,
KIADB VS K.B.LINGARAJU & OTHERS) &
W.A.No.6820/2017 (THE SPECIAL LAND
ACQUISITION OFFICER, KIADB VS
VENUGOPAL.V.R. & OTHERS) disposed of on
04.02.2020, wherein it was held that the
acquisition had lapsed since the acquisition
proceedings were not concluded within a
reasonable time, and the said orders have been
set aside by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the
matter has been remanded to this Court for fresh
consideration. They have also submitted that the
Hon'ble Supreme Court has set aside the order
passed in K.B.Lingaraju's case supra, relying upon
the judgment passed in the case of OFFSHORE
HOLDINGS PVT. LTD. VS BANGALORE
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & OTHERS - (2011)3
SCC 139, which arose from the acquisition under
the Bangalore Development Authority Act and not
under the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development
Act. They submit that the Division Bench of this
Court in W.A.No.557/2021 has relied upon the
judgment in H.N.Shivanna's case, which according
to the Counsel for the KIADB has been impliedly
overruled in Ananthaswamy's case supra.
Having heard to the aforesaid contentions
urged and considering the material available on
record, I am of the view that the question that
arises for consideration in these two petitions is,

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WA No. 199 of 2016


"whether the acquisition
proceedings initiated under Section
28 of the Karnataka Industrial Areas
Development Act, 1966, stands
lapsed or vitiated if the said
acquisition proceedings is not
completed and the compensation is
not paid to the land loosers within a
reasonable time?"
The question that fell into consideration in
Ananthaswamy's case was whether the acquisition
proceedings initiated under the KIAD Act would
stand lapsed in view of Section 24(2) of the Right
to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act,
2013 (for short, 'Act of 2013'). Whereas the
judgment in H.N.Shivanna's case was rendered
much prior to the Act of 2013 coming into force.
In W.A.No.557/2021, the Division Bench of
this Court has placed reliance on the judgment in
H.N.Shivanna's case supra and has held that in
view of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India,
no citizen can be deprived of his property without
following the due process of law and it is further
held that where a statute does not provide for
time limit for doing an act, such an act has to be
done within a reasonable time and what would be
the reasonable time has to be decided in the facts
and circumstances of the case, and accordingly,
has upheld the order of the learned Single Judge
wherein the acquisition was quashed on account of

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WA No. 199 of 2016


delay caused in issuing the final notification under
Section 28(4) of the KIAD Act.
In the case on hand, though the acquisition
proceedings admittedly had commenced in the
year 2007, the award has not been passed till date
and no compensation has been paid to the land
owners. Even in the absence of any specific
provision under the KIAD Act which provides for
concluding the acquisition proceedings within a
prescribed time, the acquiring authorities are
required to conclude the acquisition proceedings
within a reasonable time, otherwise, the person
whose land is sought to be acquired will be
remedy less and he will also not be in a position to
enjoy his land.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
MEHER RUSI DALAL VS UNION OF INDIA -
(2004)7 SCC 362, P.K.SREEKANTAN VS
P.SREEKUMARAN NAIR - (2006)13 SCC 574, and
K.B.NAGUR VS UNION OF INDIA - (2012)4 SCC
483, has held that even if a statute does not
provide any time limit for doing an act, such an
act has to be done by the authorities under the
said statute within a reasonable time and what
would be the reasonable time has to be decided in
the facts and circumstances of the case.
In view of the divergent views expressed by
the two Division Benches of this Court in
W.A.No.557/2021 and in Ananthaswamy's case
supra, which are now brought to the notice of this
Court, I am of the opinion that the matter is

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WA No. 199 of 2016


required to be placed before the Hon'ble Chief
Justice to consider whether the question that
arises for consideration in these petitions is
required to be referred to a Larger Bench. Registry
is accordingly directed to place the matter before
the Hon'ble Chief Justice to consider referring the
matter to a Larger Bench.”
7.4 The Full Bench, after considering the rival
submissions, has held that the Division Bench in
ANANTHASWAMY case, has rightly held the
inapplicability of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, in
the light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court stated supra and the Judgment
passed by the Division Bench of this Court in
W.A.No.557/2021 has been rendered without
noticing the judgment in ANANTHASWAMY ’s case
and without appreciating the Judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in ANASUYA BAI and
M.NAGABHUSHANA supra. With this, learned
counsel sought to allow the appeal.
8. In contrast, Ms.Bhuvaneshwari Guruvina,
learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.1/

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WA No. 199 of 2016


petitioner, supporting the order impugned submits that,
the Judgment in P.NARAYANAPPA is not applicable to
the case on hand, since it has discussed with reference to
the passing of the award within two years from the date of
issuance of Final Notification, as the delay caused in the
said case was only 01 year 10 months. Whereas, in the
case on hand, it is 03 years 04 months.
8.1 Further, learned counsel contended that the
contention that the delay caused is bonafide and not
intentional, cannot be accepted, for the reason that
the authority has not properly explained the delay.
8.2 It was also contended that the large extent of land
proposed for acquisition under the Preliminary
Notification cannot be a circumstance to contend that
no time limit can be prescribed, since the land
acquired was for the establishment, maintenance,
and development of the Industrial Areas. The SLAO
ought to have chosen to hear the persons who have
filed their objections and pass orders and issued
declaration by way of Final Notification at the first

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WA No. 199 of 2016


instance and thereafter ought to have issued Final
Notification in respect of other portions of the lands
considering their objections. Therefore, it would be
incumbent on the State Government to make
different orders followed by different declarations, as
the said subsequent declaration would not in any
way cause prejudice to the owners and the same is
not impermissible in law. This exercise having not
been done by the KIADB and in the absence of
plausible explanation for issuance of Final Notification
after inordinate delay of 03 years 04 months, the
acquisition itself is vitiated, so far as petitioner is
concerned.
8.3 Learned counsel for the petitioner further contended
that the respondents – KIADB and SLAO have not
properly considered the objections. Though the
objection was filed in respect of all the three lands,
the objection was considered only in respect of
Sy.No.186/1 and so far as other lands are
concerned, it is stated in Column No.6 of the order

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WA No. 199 of 2016


passed by the SLAO under Section 28(3) of the Act
of 1966 (Annexure-N) at Sl.No.377 and 379 that, the
land owners have neither appeared nor submitted
objection. The same is palpably erroneous.
8.4 Learned counsel submits that the Writ Court has
considered these aspects of the matter and properly
applied the law laid down by the Division Bench of
this court in H.N.SHIVANNA supra and quashed the
Notifications on the ground of delay in the absence of
plausible explanation.
8.5 Learned counsel further submits that no award is
passed so far, in respect of the lands acquired. In
that view of the matter, the appeal is required to be
dismissed.
8.6 Learned counsel placed reliance on the Judgments of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of RAM
CHAND AND OTHERS VS. UNION OF INDIA AND
13
OTHERS , MANSARAM VS. S.P.PATHAK AND

13
(1994) 1 SCC 44

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WA No. 199 of 2016


14
OTHERS and the Judgment passed by the
Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of
SHIMOGA URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
AND ANOTHER VS. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND
15
OTHERS and rests her case.
9. At this stage, learned counsel appearing for the
KIADB submits that, in view of stay granted in respect of
further proceedings, the award is not passed. As such, the
same cannot be attributable to the KIADB.
10. Having heard the rival submissions, the only
point that would arise for our consideration is:
Whether the Writ Court is right in
applying H.N.SHIVANNA ’s case to the
case on hand to hold that the delay caused
in issuance of Final Notification is fatal to
the case of the respondent KIADB?
11. Our answer to the above question is in the
NEGATIVE , for the following:

14
(1984) 1 SCC 125
15
ILR 2002 KAR 2078

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REASONS
12. Before addressing the argument advanced by
both the parties, it is apt to refer to certain provisions of
the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966,
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 and the
exposition of law thereon by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
and this Court.
13. Sections 4 to 6, 11-A and 16 of Land Acquisition
Act, 1894, read as under:
“4. Publication of preliminary notification
and power of officers thereupon .
(1) Whenever it appears to the appropriate
Government the land in any locality [is needed or] is
likely to be needed for any public purpose or for a
company, a notification to that effect shall be
published in the Official Gazette and in two daily
newspapers circulating in that locality of which at
least one shall be in the regional language, and the
Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of
such notification to be given at convenient places in
the said locality the last of the dates of such
publication and the giving of such public notice,

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being hereinafter referred to as the date of the
publication of the notification.
(2) Thereupon it shall be lawful for any officer,
either generally or specially authorized by such
Government in this behalf, and for his servants and
workmen,
to enter upon and survey and take levels of
any land in such locality;
to dig or bore into the sub-soil;
to do all other acts necessary to ascertain
whether the land is adapted for such purpose;
to set out the boundaries of the land proposed
to be taken and the intended line of the work (if any)
proposed to be made thereon;
to mark such levels, boundaries and line by
placing marks and cutting trenches; and,
where otherwise the survey cannot be
completed and the levels taken and the boundaries
and line marked, to cut down and clear away any
part of any standing crop, fence or jungle;
Provided that no person shall enter into any
building or upon any enclosed court or garden
attached to a dwelling house (unless with the
consent of the occupier thereof) without previously
giving such occupier at least seven days' notice in
writing of his intention to do so.
5. Payment for damage. - The officer so
authorized shall at the time of such entry pay or
tender payment for all necessary damaged to be

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WA No. 199 of 2016


done as aforesaid, and, in case of dispute as to the
sufficiency of the amount so paid or tendered, he
shall at once refer the dispute to the decision of the
Collector or other chief revenue officer of the district,
and such decision shall be final.
5A. Hearing of objections. –
(1) Any person interested in any land
which has been notified under section 4, sub-section
(1), as being needed or likely to be needed for a
public purpose or for a Company may, [within thirty
days from the date of the publication of the
notification], object to the acquisition of the land or
of any land in the locality, as the case may be.
(2) Every objection under sub-section (1)
shall be made to the Collector in writing, and the
Collector shall give the objector an opportunity of
being heard in person or by any person authorized
by him in this behalf] or by pleader and shall, after
hearing all such objections and after making such
further inquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary, [either
make a report in respect of the land which has been
notified under section 4, sub-section (1), or make
different reports in respect of different parcels of
such land, to the appropriate Government,
containing his recommendations on the objections,
together with the record of the proceedings held by
him, for the decision of that Government. The
decision of the appropriate Government on the
objections shall be final.
(3) For the purpose of this section, a
person shall be deemed to be interested in land who

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would be entitled to claim an interest in
compensation if the land were acquired under this
Act.
6. Declaration that land is required for a
public purpose.
(1) Subject to the provision of Part VII of
this Act, appropriate Government is satisfied, after
considering the report, if any, made under section
5A, sub-section (2), that any particular land is
needed for a public purpose, or for a Company, a
declaration shall be made to that effect under the
signature of a Secretary to such Government or of
some officer duly authorized to certify its orders [and
different declarations may be made from time to
time in respect of different parcels of any land
covered by the same notification under section 4,
sub-section (I) irrespective of whether one report or
different reports has or have been made (wherever
required) under section 5A, sub-section (2)
Provided that no declaration in respect of any
particular land covered by a notification under
section 4, sub-section (1),
(i) published after the commencement of the
Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation)
Ordinance, 1967 (1 of 1967), but before the
commencement of the Land Acquisition
(Amendment) Act, 1984 (68 of 1984), shall be made
after the expiry of three years from the date of the
publication of the notification; or

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WA No. 199 of 2016


(ii) published after the commencement of the
Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (68 of
1984), shall be made after the expiry of one year
from the date of the publication of the notification:
Provided that no such declaration shall be
made unless the compensation to be awarded for
such property is to be paid by a Company, or wholly
or partly out of public revenues or some fund
controlled or managed by a local authority.
[Explanation 1. - In computing any of the
periods referred to in the first proviso, the period
during which any action or proceeding to be taken in
pursuance of the notification issued under section 4,
sub-section (1), is stayed by an order of a Court
shall be excluded.
Explanation 2. - Where the compensation to
be awarded for such property is to be paid out of the
funds of a corporation owned or controlled by the
State, such compensation shall be deemed to be
compensation paid out of public revenues.]
(2) the declaration shall be published in the
Official Gazette and in two daily newspapers
circulating in the locality in which the land is situated
of which at least one shall be in the regional
language, and the Collector shall cause public notice
of the substance of such declaration to be given at
convenient places in the said locality (the last of the
dates of such publication and the giving of such
public notice, being hereinafter referred to as the
date of the publication of the declaration), and such
declaration shall state] the district or other territorial

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WA No. 199 of 2016


division in which the land is situate, the purpose for
which It is needed, its approximate area, and, where
a plan shall have been made of the land, the place
where such plan may be inspected.
(3) The said declaration shall be conclusive
evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose
or for a company, as the case may be; and, after
making such declaration, the appropriate
Government may acquire the land in manner
hereinafter appearing.
xxxx
11-A. Period within which an award shall
be made:
(1) The Collector shall make an award
under section 11 within a period of two years from
the date of the publication of the declaration and if
no award is made within that period, the entire
proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall
lapse:
Provided that in a case where the said
declaration has been published before the
commencement of the Land Acquisition
(Amendment) Act, 1984, the award shall be made
within a period of two years from such
commencement.
Explanation. In computing the period of two
years referred to in this section, the period during
which any action or proceeding to be taken in
pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an
order of a Court shall be excluded.

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xxxx
16. Power to take possession: - When the
Collector has made an award under section 11, he
may take possession of the land, which shall
thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free
from all encumbrances.”
14. Section 28 of the Act of 1966, reads as under:

“28. Acquisition of land:
(1) If at any time, in the opinion of the
State Government, any land is required for the
purpose of development by the Board, or for any
other purpose in furtherance of the objects of this
Act, the State Government may by notification, give
notice of its intention to acquire such land.
(2) On publication of a notification under
sub-section (1), the State Government shall serve
notice upon the owner or where the owner is not the
occupier, on the occupier of the land and on all such
persons known or believed to be interested therein to
show cause, within thirty days from the date of
service of the notice, why the land should not be
acquired.
(3) After considering the cause, if any,
shown by the owner of the land and by any other
person interested therein, and after giving such
owner and person an opportunity of being heard, the
State Government may pass such orders as it deems
fit.
(4) After orders are passed under sub-
section (3), where the State Government is satisfied

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that any land should be acquired for the purpose
specified in the notification issued under sub-section
(1), a declaration shall, by notification in the official
Gazette, be made to that effect.
(5) On the publication in the official
Gazette of the declaration under sub-section (4), the
land shall vest absolutely in the State Government
free from all encumbrances.
(6) Where any land is vested in the State
Government under sub-section (5), the State
Government may, by notice in writing, order any
person who may be in possession of the land to
surrender or deliver possession thereof to the State
Government or any person duly authorized by it in
this behalf within thirty days of the service of the
notice.
(7) If any person refuses or fails to
comply with an order made under sub-section (5),
the State Government or any officer authorised by
the State Government in this behalf may take
possession of the land and may for that purpose use
such force as may be necessary.
(8) Where the land has been acquired for
the Board, the State Government, after it has taken
possession of the land, may transfer the land to the
Board for the purpose for which the land has been
acquired.”
15. Sections 24 and 25 of the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,

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Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, reads as
under:
“24. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in
this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings
initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,-
(a) where no award under section 11 of the
said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all
provisions of this Act relating to the determination
of compensation shall apply; or
(b) where an award under said section 11
has been made, then such proceedings shall
continue under the provisions of the said Land
Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been
repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in
sub-section (1), in case of land acquisition
proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act,
1894, where an award under the said section 11 has
been made five years or more prior to the
commencement of this Act but the physical
possession of the land has not been taken or the
compensation has not been paid the said
proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the
appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall
initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition
afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act:
Provided that where an award has been made
and compensation in respect of a majority of land
holdings has not been deposited in the account of the

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WA No. 199 of 2016


beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the
notification for acquisition under section 4 of the said
Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to
compensation in accordance with the provisions of
this Act.
25. The Collector shall make an award
within a period of twelve months from the date of
publication of the declaration under section 19 and if
no award is made within that period, the entire
proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall
lapse:
Provided that the appropriate Government
shall have the power to extend the period of twelve
months if in its opinion, circumstances exist
justifying the same:
Provided further that any such decision to
extend the period shall be recorded in writing and
the same shall be notified and be uploaded on the
website of the authority concerned.”
16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
P.NARAYANAPPA supra, while differentiating between
Section 28 of the Act of 1966 and Section 6 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894, at paragraph No.20, held as under:
“20. Learned counsel for the appellant has
next submitted that the notification under Section
28(1) was published on 10.12.2001 and the notification
under Section 28(4) was published on 23.10.2003 and
thus there was a delay of more than 1 year and 10

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WA No. 199 of 2016


months in publication of the second notification. As
already discussed, the Scheme of the present Act is
different and there is no similar provision like the one
contained in proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 6 of
the Land Acquisition Act which lays down a period of
limitation of one year for making a declaration under
Section 6(1) of the Act. In absence of any specific
provision to that effect in the Act, and the time gap
being not very long, it is not possible to hold that the
notification under Section 28(4) of the Act is invalid.”
17. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the plea
that certain lands which were proposed to be acquired
under the Preliminary Notification have been left out in the
Final Notification, answered the same in Paragraph No.23,
which reads as under:
“15. It is lastly submitted that the State
Government had acted in a discriminatory manner in
de-notifying some of the lands which had been
earlier included in the preliminary notification under
Section 28(1) of the Act and whosoever was in a
position to approach the concerned authority of the
State Government, his land was exempted from
acquisition. It has been urged that survey no.9/4
which was earlier included in the notification under
Section 28(1) of the Act was specifically de-notified.
We are afraid that this plea cannot be examined by
us for want of sufficient details. The acquisition of
the appellants' land cannot be struck down on the
ground that some of the land which was initially

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WA No. 199 of 2016


included in the notifications issued under Section 28
of the Act was de-notified.”
18. In M.NAGABHUSHANA case, the question
which fell for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme
Court was in respect of Section 11 of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 and Section 28(4) and 28(5) of the Act of 1966.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court at paragraph Nos.33 to 36 of
the Judgment, held as under:
“33. The same principle is attracted to the
present case also. Here also on a comparison
between the provisions of said Act and KIAD Act, we
find that those two Acts were enacted to achieve
substantially different purposes. In so far as KIAD
Act is concerned, from its Statement of Objects and
Reasons, it is clear that the same was enacted to
achieve the following purposes:
"It is considered necessary to make provision
for the orderly establishment and development of
Industries in suitable areas in the State. To achieve
this object, it is proposed to specify suitable areas for
Industrial Development and establish a Board to
develop such areas and make available lands therein
for establishment of Industries."
34. KIAD Act is of course a self contained
code. The said Act is primarily a law regulating
acquisition of land for public purpose and for
payment of compensation. Acquisition of land under

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WA No. 199 of 2016


the said Act is not concerned solely with the purpose
of planned development of any city. It has to cater to
different situations which come within the expanded
horizon of public purpose. Recently the Constitution
Bench of this Court in GIRNAR TRADERS VS. STATE
OF MAHARASHTRA & OTHERS, reported in 2011 (1)
SCALE 223 held that Section 11-A of the said Act
does not apply to acquisition under the provisions of
Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966.
35. The learned counsel for the appellant
has relied on the judgment of this Court in the case
of MARIYAPPA AND OTHERS VS. STATE OF
KARNATAKA AND OTHERS reported in (1998) 3 SCC
276. The said decision was cited for the purpose of
contending that Section 11-A is applicable to an
acquisition under KIAD Act. In MARIYAPPA (supra)
before coming to hold that provision of Section 11-A
of the Central Act applies to Karnataka Acquisition of
Land for Grant of House Sites Act, 1972 (hereinafter
"1972 Act"), this Court held that the 1972 Act is not
a self-contained code. The Court also held that the
1972 Act and the Central Acts are supplemental to
each other to the extent that unless the Central Act
supplements the Karnataka Act, the latter cannot
function. The Court further held that both the Acts,
namely, 1972 Act and the Central Act deals with the
same subject. But in the instant case the KIAD Act is
a self-contained code and the Central Act is not
supplemental to it. Therefore, the ratio in
MARIYAPPA (supra) is not attracted to the facts of
the present case.

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WA No. 199 of 2016


36. Following the aforesaid well settled
principles, this Court is of the opinion that there is no
substance in the contention of appellant that
acquisition under KIAD Act lapsed for alleged non-
compliance with the provisions of Section 11A of the
said Act. For the reasons aforesaid all the
contentions of the appellant, being without any
substance, fail and the appeal is dismissed.”
19. The Full Bench of this Court, on reference in
view of two Judgments by the Coordinate Bench of this
Court in ANANTHASWAMY as well as
W.A.No.557/2021 , from Paragraph No.5 onwards, held
as under:
“5. The matter has been heard on several
dates and in order to better appreciate the reference,
we now proceed to appreciate the facts pleaded in
the respective cases, the issues formulated for
determination and the reasons and conclusions
drawn by the respective Benches, while disposing of
the respective cases.
6. In Ananthaswamy’s case
The facts leading up to filing of the Writ Appeal
are recorded in a nut-shell by the Division Bench in
paragraph Nos.2, 3 and 4 and the point canvassed
by the appellant is that the acquisition stands
vitiated as having lapsed in view of the provisions of
Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013 is recorded in
Paragraph No.5. The relief sought for by the

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WA No. 199 of 2016


appellant/petitioner is noted in Paragraph No.12. The
relief sought for by the petitioner have been
recorded as being two fold i.e., one quashing of the
Acquisition Notification and two, for a declaration to
declare that the acquisition has lapsed in view of
Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013. The Division Bench
headed by Justice Smt. B. V. Nagarathna (as she
then was) was pleased to reject the first prayer on
the ground that the challenge to the Acquisition
Notification stands vitiated on account of delay and is
also hit by the principles of constructive res judicata.
From Paragraph No.22 onwards, the Division Bench
has examined the implication of enactment of
Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013 on other land
acquisition laws.
In paragraph No.25, the Division Bench has
referred to and discussed the ruling rendered by the
Hon’ble Apex Court in Anasuya Bai’s case and has
placed reliance on Paragraph Nos.28 and 29 of the
said judgment wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has
refereed to its own judgment in M. Nagabhushana’s
case. The Division Bench has also placed reliance on
Paragraph Nos.30 to 36 of Anasuya Bai’s case. The
Division Bench in Paragraph No.26 of its judgment
has also relied upon and examined the decisions in
Munithimmaiah vs. State of Karnataka's case
reported in (2002) 4 SCC 326, offshore Holdings
and Girnar Trader's case. In Paragraph No.27, the
Division Bench has examined the scheme and object
of KIAD Act and concluded that the scheme and
object of the KIAD and LA Act of 1894 are different.
In Paragraph No.32, the Division Bench has

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WA No. 199 of 2016


concluded that Section 24 of the Act of 2013
expressly refers to acquisition under LA Act of 1894
alone and does not refer to any other enactment. In
Paragraph No.42, the Division Bench has examined
the provisions of Section 105 of the Act of 2013. In
Paragraph No.43, the Division Bench has examined
the Fourth Schedule and the various enactments
enabling acquisition and in Paragraph Nos.44 and 45,
it has concluded that Section 24 of the Act of 2013
does not take within its sweep the State Enactment
such as KIAD Act, BDA Act or KUDA Act. In
Paragraph No.47, the Division Bench has held under
in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in Offshore Holdings’s case. Paragraph No.47,
reads as under:-
“47. In view of the above catena of judgments
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Offshore Holdings
(P) Limited, Bangalore Development Authority and in
Girnar Traders (3), reliance cannot be placed on the
judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in
H.N.Shivanna to hold that in the absence of any time
limit fixed under the provisions of KIAD Act for
passing of an award, it would have to be made within
a reasonable time, which is two years and if the
award has not been passed within the said time, it
would lead to grant of declaration that the acquisition
has lapsed. More pertinently, having regard to the
judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case
of M.Nagabhushana and Anasuya Bai, which are
directly under the provisions of KIAD Act, the
judgment in Ram Chand’s case, which is concerning
a situation prior to the insertion of Section 11-A to

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WA No. 199 of 2016


1894 Act would also not apply. Consequently, the
judgment of this Court in H.N.Shivanna cannot be
held to be good law so as to have a binding effect. As
already noted, H.N.Shivanna has ignored the dictum
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M.Nagabhushana.
Further, Anasuya Bai has also relied upon, inter alia,
M.Nagabhushana to set aside the judgment of the
Division Bench of this Court. Further, this Court in
Ahwathanarayana, did not refer to the judgments of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Offshore Holdings (P)
Limited and Girnar (3), but, reliance was placed on
H.N.Shivanna to grant relief to the petitioners
therein. But in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Bangalore Development Authority,
which arose from the judgment of this Court in
Ashwathanarayana, it could be observed that
H.N.Shivanna is no longer good law. Therefore, the
petitioners herein cannot be granted relief on the
basis of the dictum of the Division Bench in
H.N.Shivanna and reliance placed on the said
judgment by learned counsel for the petitioners is of
no assistance to them. This is because the
judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case
of M.Nagabhushana and Anasuya Bai rendered under
the provisions of the KIAD Act hold the field.
Similarly, the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of Offshore Holdings (P) Limited
and Bangalore Development Authority which are
rendered under the provisions of the BDA Act, 1976
are binding on this Court.”
7. Proceeding further in Paragraph No.48, the
Division Bench proceeded to hold that the ruling

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WA No. 199 of 2016


rendered in H. N. Shivanna’s case impliedly over-
ruled in view of the subsequent enunciation of law by
the Hon’ble Apex Court in BDA & Anr. Vs. State of
Karnataka & Anr. Reported in (2018) 9 SCC 122.
Paragraph No.48 reads as under:-
“48. With reference to the judgment of a
coordinate Bench of this Court in H.N.Shivanna and
others vs. State of Karnataka, Department of
Industries and Commerce, Bengaluru and another
[2013 KCCR 2793 DB], having regard to the
observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Bangalore Development Authority and another vs.
State of Karnataka and another, [(2018) 9 SCC 122 :
AIR Online 2018 SC 876], the same is impliedly
over-ruled even though the said observations were
made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the context of
an acquition made under the provisions of BDA Act.
Moreover, Anasuya Bai, which is a judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court under KIAD Act holds the
field and is binding on this Court.”
8. In Paragraph No. 49, the Division Bench has
also placed reliance on the observations of the
Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in the Indore
Development Authority vs. Manoharlal reported
in (AIR 2020 SC 1496) and has placed reliance on
the observations in Paragraph Nos.95, 151 and 172
of the said ruling. Consequently, the Division Bench
was pleased to uphold the judgment of the learned
Single Judge holding that the provisions of Section
24 (2) of the Act of 2013 are inapplicable to
acquisitions initiated under KIAD Act.

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WA No. 199 of 2016


9. In W.A.No.557/2021
The intra Court appeal was preferred by the
acquiring body i.e., KIADB being aggrieved by the
order of the learned Single Judge quashing the
Preliminary Notification on the ground of inordinate
delay in completing the acquisition proceedings. In
Paragraph No.4, the Division Bench has placed
reliance on the ruling of the Hon’ble Apex Court
rendered in the case of Ram Chand and Others vs.
Union of India and Others reported in (1994) 1
SCC 44 and the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court
in Aflatoon vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi reported in
(1975) 4 SCC 285 . On a reading of paragraph No.4,
it is apparent that both the cases relied upon related
to acquisition proceedings under the LA Act. In
paragraph No.5, the Division Bench has placed
reliance on H. N. Shivanna’s case and has also noted
M. Nagabhushana’s case.
10. In Paragraph No.6, the Division Bench has
placed reliance on the rulings of the Hon’ble Apex
Court in Meher Rusi Dalal vs. Union of India
reported in (2004) 7 SCC 362 and P. K.
Sreekantan vs. P. Sreekumaran Nair reported in
(2006) 13 SCC 574 and K. B. Nagur vs. Union of
India reported in (2012) 4 SCC 483 , to hold that
the Acquisition Notification issued under Section 28
(1) under KIAD Act stands vitiated on account of
inordinate delay in issuing the Final Acquisition
Notification under Section 28 (4) of the KIAD Act. In
Paragraph No.7, the Division Bench taking note of
the delay of 14 years and failure to issue Final
Acquisition Notification has been pleased to uphold

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WA No. 199 of 2016


the order of the learned Single Judge by holding that
the acquisition had lapsed on account of efflux of
time.
11. We have examined the judgment in
Ananthaswamy’s case and the judgment in
W.A.No.557/2021.
12. The judgment in Ananthaswamy’s case
rendered on 02.03.2021 precedes the judgment
rendered in W.A.No.557/2021. In Paragraph Nos.47
and 48 of Ananthaswamy’s case, the Division Bench
has recorded compelling reasons as to why H. N.
Shivanna’s case is no more good law and Section 24
(2) of the Act of 2013 is inapplicable to acquisitions
other than the acquisition initiated under the LA Act.
In W.A.No.557/2021 delivered on 23.03.2022, the
acquisition has been held to have been lapsed on
account of inordinate delay and in the light of the
judgments noted in Paragraph No.6 of the said
judgment. Thus, in our view, the judgment in
Ananthaswamy’s case has rightly held the
inapplicability of Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013, in
the light of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex
Court, as noted supra. W.A.No.557/2021 has been
rendered without noticing the judgment in
Ananthaswamy’s case and without appreciating the
judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Anasuya Bai’s
case and M. Nagabhushana’s case.
13. The Full Bench having perused the
judgments rendered by two Division Bench referred
to in the reference order, we find that the judgments

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WA No. 199 of 2016


rendered are on different factual aspects point of law
and there is no conflict with each other.
Accordingly, the reference is closed and
matter be placed before the learned Single Judge for
consideration in accordance with law. ”
20. The contention of the petitioner was that the

delay has not been properly explained by referring to the
case of SHIMOGA URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
supra. The Coordinate Bench at paragraph Nos.16 and 18
has taken an exception for non-issuance of Final
Notification within a reasonable period, which reads as
under:
“16. These appeals will have to fail on one more
ground. The Preliminary Notification was issued on
22.1.1985 and published on 7.11.1985. Navile
Village itself was included within the Urban Area only
with effect from 5.8.1987. The Development Scheme
was approved by the State Government under
Section 18(3) of the Urban Development Authorities
Act, 1987 on 15.3.1989. The Final Notification was
issued more than 3 years thereafter on 2.6.1992.
The time gap between the Preliminary Notification
and Final Notification is as much as 7 years. Even if
the period upto the approval of the scheme by the
State Government is excluded, there is a delay of
three years. It is no-doubt true that neither
Karnataka Improvement Board Act, 1976 nor the

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WA No. 199 of 2016


Karnataka Urban Development Authorities Act, 1987,
prescribes any time limit for issuing a publication of a
Final Notification under Setion 19(1).
xxxx
18. In this case the Authority has not explained
the inordinate delay. Even if it is assumed that the
delay up to 15.3.1989 is explained by reason of the
fact that the scheme was approved by the
Government under Section 18(3) of the Act on that
day, there is absolutely no reason forthcoming for
the delay of more than 3 years between 15.3.1989
to 2.6.1992. In this case, the land owners have
approached this Court in the year 1992 immediately
after the Final Notification and are having the benefit
of stay. In the circumstances, even if the preliminary
notification is held to be valid for any reason, the
final declaration under Section 19(1) of the Act may
have to be held to be invalid on the ground of delay
in issuing the same. Be that as it may.”
21. If the same principle applied to the case on

hand (as stated in paragraph No.16 of the aforesaid
Judgment), the Preliminary Notification was issued on
25.10.2006. The petitioner filed her objections on two
occasions; firstly on 06.12.2006 and secondly on
08.02.2007. The SLAO after hearing all the parties and
providing them an opportunity to submit their objections

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WA No. 199 of 2016


and put forth their case along with documents as
mandated under Section 28(3) of the Act of 1966, passed
the order on 13.02.2009.
22. If the time spent on the consideration of
objection under Section 28(3) is excluded, the Final
Notification which was issued is within a period of one
year. To be precise, the Preliminary Notification was issued
on 25.10.2006, the order under Section 28(3) was passed
on 13.02.2009 and the Final Notification was issued on
02.02.2010. If the time spent in respect of objections and
consideration of the same stated supra is excluded from
the date of Preliminary Notification (that is, 02 years 04
months), the Final Notification issued comes within the
period of one year, even according to the contentions of
the petitioner.
23. The petitioner has not placed any material in
support of her contention that, the SLAO/ KIADB ought to
have issued Declaration stage by stage by considering the
objections of several landowners and the failure has
caused delay, which is attributable to the KIADB.

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WA No. 199 of 2016


24. It is on record that large extent of lands have
been acquired and the respondent Board has clearly stated
the reason for the delay in issuance of 28(4) Notification,
in its additional statement of objection at paragraph Nos.2
and 3. The reason for issuance of Final Notification after
03 years 04 months is the time consumed in answering
the objections, as the same has taken 02 years 04 months
in terms of mandate under Section 28(3). In that view of
the matter, the contention of the petitioner that non-
issuance of declarations stage by stage cannot be
countenanced as no material produced as to why such an
action ought to have been exercised.
25. The reliance of the petitioner on paragraph No.7
in the Judgment of ROY RODRIGUES VS. GOVERNMENT
16
OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS , cannot be applied to
the case on hand. The reason being there is a clear fact
that some of the land owners were avoiding notices sent in
terms of Section 28(2) to file their objections and that has
caused delay in issuance of the Final Notification. No

16
2009 SC OnLine KAR 290

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WA No. 199 of 2016


documents have been produced by the petitioner to base
the contentions. Even there are no grounds urged in the
petition on this count. The grounds raised in the petition
are, (1) delay in issuing notification, that is, the
Notification is not issued within a reasonable time and (2)
non-consideration of objection. However, no ground has
been taken contending that the declaration ought to have
been issued stage by stage.
26. Though a contention has been taken in respect
of other two survey numbers, referring to Sl.Nos.377 and
379 of the order under Section 28(3), the reason for
acquiring these lands stating that the petitioner has
neither appeared nor filed any objection is concerned, the
entire objection of the petitioner has been answered at
Sl.No.255. In that view of the matter, this technical plea
cannot be considered at this stage, to escape the
acquisition, in the absence of any material to that effect.
27. So far as H.N.SHIVANNA ’s case is concerned,
the Full Bench of this Court in paragraph No.12 of the
Judgment has clearly held that the Division Bench in

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WA No. 199 of 2016


ANANTHASWAMY supra, at paragraph Nos.47 and 48
recorded the compelling reasons as to why
H.N.SHIVANNA ’s case is no more a good law.
28. So far as the Judgment in W.A.No.557/2021 is
concerned, there was an inordinate delay of 14 years in
issuing the Final Notification. In that circumstance, given
the facts of that case, the law has been laid down and the
order came to be passed. That has also been considered
by the Full Bench in paragraph No.13, stating that both
the Judgments rendered are on different factual aspects of
point of law and there is no conflict between the
Judgments.
29. Reverting to the facts of the case on hand, the
delay as stated above cannot be considered as fatal since
the provisions of the Act of 1894 are not made applicable
to the Act of 1966, as the Act of 1966 is a self-contained
Code, in view of the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in P.NARAYANAPPA and M.NAGABHUSHANA
supra and the Judgment of Division Bench of this Court in
ANANTHASWAMY supra and in view of further

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WA No. 199 of 2016


Judgments which have been rendered by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court, referred in the ANANTHASWAMY case,
to hold that the law laid down by the Division Bench of this
Court in H.N.SHIVANNA with respect to the provisions of
Act of 1966 deemed to be no more good law, there
remains nothing further to consider in the case on hand.
30. Be that as it may, in the absence of any
material to contend that the time taken is intentional or
willful in issuing the Final Notification is concerned, if the
time rendered for passing order under Section 28(3) is
excluded as stated supra, the Final Notification issued is
well within 01 year from the date of Preliminary
Notification. The Writ Court has failed to consider these
aspects of the matter.
31. However, during the course of hearing, it is
brought to the notice of this Court that, now by means of
Government Notification, the Government is proposing to
allot approximately 10,000 square feet of land for each
Acre acquired in lieu of compensation to the concerned
landowner. The material on record clearly indicates that 01

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WA No. 199 of 2016


Acre 02 Guntas of lands belonging to the petitioner have
been acquired.
32. So far as non-passing of award till date is
concerned, now the said issue has been settled in view of
the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of BERNARD FRANCIS JOSEPH VAZ AND OTHERS
17
vs. GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS ,
wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court considering the delay
in passing the award has held that, fixing the market value
of the lands acquired shall be postponed to the date of
passing award in terms of the Provisions of Section 24(2)
of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in
Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act,
2013.
33. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in BERNARD
FRANCIS JOSEPH VAZ supra, from paragraph No.52 to
58, held as under:
“52. Only after the notices were issued in
the contempt proceedings, the compensation was

17
(2025) 7 SCC 580

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WA No. 199 of 2016


nd
determined by the SLAO on 22 April 2019 taking
guideline values prevailing in the year 2011 for
determining the market value of the acquired land.
53. No doubt that as already observed by
us hereinabove, we do not find any error in the
approach adopted by the learned Single Judge of the
High Court in holding that the SLAO could not have
shifted the date and it could have been done only by
this Court in exercise of powers under Article 32/142
of the Constitution of India or by the High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
However, the learned Single Judge of the High Court
instead of relegating the appellants to again go
through the rigors of determination by SLAO, ought
to have exercised powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution to do complete justice. Even the Division
Bench of the High Court on a hyper technical ground
has non-suited the appellants.
54. In that view of the matter, we find
that it is a fit case wherein this Court in exercise of
its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution
should direct shifting of the date for determination of
the market value of the land in question of the
appellants.
55. If the compensation to be awarded at
the market value as of the year 2003 is permitted, it
would amount to permitting a travesty of justice and
making the constitutional provisions under Article
300-A a mockery.
56. Since the State/KIADB was in deep
slumber from 2003 to 2019 and acted for the first

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WA No. 199 of 2016


time only after the notices were issued in contempt
proceedings, we find that though SLAO had no power
to shift the date for determination of market value,
he had rightly done so. The learned Single Judge of
the High Court also does not say that the
determination of compensation to be awarded by
shifting of the date by the SLAO to that of 2011 was
unjust but only sets aside the award on the ground
that SLAO had no jurisdiction to do so.
57. There is another reason for doing so.
If on account of the inordinate delay in paying the
compensation and thereby depriving the
constitutional right to the appellants under Article
300-A, the land acquisition proceedings are quashed,
the only recourse available to the State/KIADB in
order to save the project will be to now issue a fresh
acquisition notification by invoking the provisions as
applicable under the 2013 LA Act which would entail
huge expenditure to the public exchequer.
58. We, therefore, in exercise of power of
this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of
India, find it appropriate in the interest of justice that
the SLAO be directed to determine the compensation
to be awarded to the appellants herein on the basis
nd
of the market value prevailing as on 22 April 2019.
The appellants shall also be entitled to all the
statutory benefits as are available to them under the
1894 LA Act. This shall be without prejudice to the
rights/contentions of either party, in case they make
a reference before an appellate authority, if they are
so aggrieved by the fresh determination of

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WA No. 199 of 2016


compensation by the SLAO. We further clarify that,
any other award which may have been passed
pursuant to the directions of the learned Single
Judge of the High Court shall stand nullified by this
judgment.”
34. In that view of the matter, it is for the

petitioner, either to seek the land in lieu of compensation
in terms of Government Notification or to seek
compensation in terms of BERNARD FRANCIS JOSEPH
VAZ supra .
35. For the foregoing reasons this Court proceeds

to pass the following:
ORDER
(i) The Writ Appeal is allowed .
(ii) The order dated 05.03.2014 passed by
the Writ Court in W.P.No.21613-
21615/2010 is set-aside. Consequently,
the Writ Petition is dismissed.
(iii) It is left to the petitioner either to seek
developed land as per the Government
Notification in terms of Acquisition as

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WA No. 199 of 2016


contended by the appellant KIADB or to
seek compensation in terms of
BERNARD FRANCIS JOSEPH VAZ
supra.
36. In view of disposal of the Writ Appeal, pending
interlocutory applications, if any, stand disposed of.


Sd/-
(JAYANT BANERJI)
JUDGE



Sd/-
(T.M.NADAF)
JUDGE


TKN