Satya Bagga And Ors vs Sudha Sodhi And Ors
- Court
- Delhi High Court
$~18
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 01.09.2026
# CNR No. DLHC010367692026
+ RC.REV. 275/2026, CM APPL. 52854/2026 (U/O 41 Rule 5),
CM APPL. 52855/2026 (Ex. From filing the certified copies of
annexures) & CM APPL. 52856/2026 (Addl.Doc)
SATYA BAGGA AND ORS .....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Anshul Sharma and Mr.
Abhishek, Advocates.
versus
SUDHA SODHI AND ORS .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Irfan Ahmed, Advocate for
R-1.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
% JUDGEMENT (Oral)
1. The present Petition, filed under Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi
1
Rent Control Act, 1958 , seeks to assail the Order dated
2
10.06.2026 , passed by the learned ACJ-cum-CCJ-cum-ARC,
3
Patiala House Courts, New Delhi , in Eviction Petition, being RC
4
ARC 15/2023 , titled “Sudha Sodhi v. Satya Bagga & Ors.” .
2. By way of the Impugned Order, the learned ARC dismissed the
Application seeking leave to defend filed by the Petitioners and,
consequently, an Eviction Order came to be passed in favour of the
Respondents with respect to tenanted premises, bearing no. C-1,
1
DRC Act
2
Impugned Order
3
Learned ARC
4
Eviction Petition
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BHATIA
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Local Shopping Centre, Mezzanine Floor, Vasant Vihar, New
5
Delhi- 110057 .
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES:
3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners contends
that the Impugned Order is vitiated by concealment of a material
subsequent development by Respondent No.1, after the institution of
the Eviction petition, which bears directly upon the question of bona
fide requirement.
4. Learned counsel for the Petitioner, elaborating on the aforesaid
contention, submits that a Shop, bearing No. F-43, First Floor,
6
Triveni Complex, Community Centre, Sheikh Sarai-I, New Delhi ,
which was specifically disclosed by Respondent No.1 in the Eviction
Petition as one of her properties, was, during the pendency of the
proceedings before the learned ARC, alienated by way of Sale Deed
dated 14.11.2025 by Respondent No.1.
5. Learned counsel submits that the concealment lies in the fact
that the aforesaid sale was neither brought to the notice of the learned
ARC before the arguments on the Application seeking leave to defend
were heard nor before the Impugned Order came to be passed on
10.06.2026. It is also submitted that the Petitioners assumed
knowledge of the said alienation only after the passing of the
Impugned Order.
6. Learned counsel for the Petitioners submit that the said
concealment is of significance since F-43 had itself been relied upon
by Respondent No.1 as part of the pool of properties available to her,
5
Subject premises
6
F-43
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while seeking to demonstrate that she had no reasonably suitable
alternative accommodation. It is, therefore, contended that the
subsequent alienation of F-43, without the same being brought to the
notice of the learned ARC, constitutes a material circumstance which
ought to have been before the learned ARC, while determining the
bona fides of the requirement pleaded, and thereby disclosing a triable
issue.
7. In support of the aforesaid submission, learned counsel places
reliance upon the decision of this Court in Subhash Chand & Anr. v.
7
Ravi Chand Garg , particularly Paragraph No. 32 thereof. It is
submitted that this Court, in the said case, found a triable issue to arise
where the tenant had specifically disclosed properties alleged to be
available with the landlord, the landlord had not specifically dealt with
their status, and the learned ARC had, in turn, failed to return specific
findings in respect thereof. The relevant observations of this Court
read as under:
“ 32. Perusal of the aforesaid averments would show that
petitioners in their leave to defend application had disclosed certain
properties which were under the occupation and possession of the
respondent, and it was alleged that same were concealed by him.
The respondent in response to the same, stated that he, along with
the eviction petition, had filed complete sets of documents and
disclosed all material facts as would be required for adjudication of
the eviction petition, and no concealment has been made in the
matter. However, no specific denial was made by the respondent
with respect to the properties mentioned in the paragraph 48 of the
affidavit filed by the petitioners along with the application seeking
leave to defend, to rebut or deny the fact, whether the same were
not in occupation and possession of the respondent. The respondent
had also not made any averment with respect to the status of the
said properties. Perusal of the findings returned by learned ARC
with respect to alternate suitable accommodation shows that the
aforesaid properties mentioned by the petitioners in their
application seeking leave to defend were just referred to but not
7
2016:DHC:4565
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dealt with in the impugned order, and nor any specific findings
have been given regarding the said properties by learned ARC. The
averments made on behalf of the petitioners in their leave to defend
application, with respect to availability of the properties enlisted, as
noted hereinbefore, in view of the vague response made on behalf
of the respondent, will be a triable issue.”
8. Learned counsel for the Petitioners submits that the principle
emerging therefrom is that where the availability and suitability of
alternative accommodation constitute a material aspect of the
adjudication of bona fide requirement, the correct status of such
accommodation cannot be left unaddressed, particularly where a
subsequent event materially alters the factual position placed before
the Rent Controller.
9. Learned counsel for the Petitioner submits that the aforesaid
subsequent alienation assumes greater significance when considered in
conjunction with the prior mala fide conduct attributed to Respondent
No.1 in respect of another premises.
10. Learned counsel for the Petitioners, therefore, submits that the
Impugned Order is also assailed on the ground of the alleged mala fide
conduct of Respondent No.1, which contention, according to him, was
duly raised before the learned ARC but was not duly appreciated.
11. Learned counsel for the Petitioners, elaborating on the aforesaid
second limb of challenge, submits that, on an earlier occasion,
possession of another premises was obtained and, thereafter, the very
same premises was re-let at a substantially enhanced rent. It is
contended that the subsequent sale of F-43, when viewed alongside
the aforesaid prior conduct, cannot be regarded in isolation and
furnishes a circumstance which lends support to the Petitioners’ plea
that the requirement pleaded in the present proceedings is not
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genuinely intended for the use asserted, but is actuated by an intention
to secure possession of the subject premises and thereafter
commercially exploit the same.
12. Per contra , learned counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent
No.1 submits that the allegation of concealment is misconceived. He
points out that F-43 was specifically disclosed in the Eviction Petition
and its status was fully placed before the learned ARC. It had been
stated to be lying vacant, but was categorically pleaded to be
unsuitable for the requirement of Respondent No.1, inter alia , on
account of its being situated on the first floor and there being no lift
facility. In this regard, reliance was sought to be placed upon
Paragraph No. 13 of the Amended Eviction petition filed before the
learned ARC.
13. Learned counsel for the Respondent No. 1, accordingly, submits
that the subsequent alienation of F-43, even if taken into
consideration, does not detract from the findings returned by the
learned ARC, upon considering the material placed before it, that F-43
does not constitute as a reasonable suitable alternative accomodation
for the requirement on which the Eviction of the Petitioners was
sought.
14. Learned counsel for the Respondent No. 1 further controverts
the allegation of mala fide conduct and submits that the Petitioners
seek to draw an adverse inference from a transaction concerning
another premises without demonstrating any nexus between such
transaction and the bona fide requirement pleaded in the present
proceedings.
15. Learned counsel for the Respondent No. 1 contends that the
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Petitioners are, in substance, seeking a re-appreciation of the material
and factual conclusions already considered by the learned ARC, an
exercise which falls outside the limited revisional jurisdiction of this
Court. No jurisdictional error, material irregularity, manifest illegality
or perversity, it is submitted, is demonstrated in the Impugned Order
so as to warrant interference under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of
the DRC Act.
ANALYSIS:
16. This Court has heard learned counsel appearing for the parties
at length and, with their able assistance, perused the material on record
as also the Impugned Order.
17. Before proceeding to examine the grounds of challenge urged
on behalf of the Petitioner, it would be apposite to advert to the scope
and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court under the
proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act.
18. The contours of the aforesaid jurisdiction are well settled. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance
8
Co. Ltd. , Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar
9 10
Singh , and, more recently, in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua , has
consistently held that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court
under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act is supervisory
and revisional in character and cannot be equated with the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction.
19. The aforesaid principles have also been reiterated and relied
upon by Coordinate Benches of this Court, inter alia , in Pankaj
8
(1998) 8 SCC 119
9
(2014) 9 SCC 78
10
(2022) 6 SCC 30
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11
Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors. , and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny
12
Grover .
20. In Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while
elucidating the legislative intendment underlying Section 25-(B) of the
DRC Act, observed that the omission of an appellate remedy against
an Order passed by the learned Rent Controller is conscious and
deliberate. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is,
therefore, one of superintendence over the decision-making process,
including the legality and propriety thereof, and does not permit the
High Court to substitute its own view for that of the learned Rent
Controller merely because another view on the material available on
record may be possible. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court read as under:
“ 23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive
power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller,
being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the
decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance.
Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its
views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate
jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The
scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and
except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the
record, which would only mean that in the absence of any
adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb
such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in
such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the
power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act,
totally forbidden by the legislature.”
21. In Pankaj Pahwa (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court,
upon considering the principles enunciated in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra),
reiterated that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the
proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act is limited in scope and that
11
2024:DHC:9322
12
2025:DHC:11285
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this Court is not expected to substitute or supplant its view for that of
the learned ARC. The revisional scrutiny is confined to examining the
decision-making process and determining whether the Impugned
Order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or an
absence of adjudication warranting interference.
22. In view of the foregoing discussion, the position which emerges
is that, while exercising jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25-
B(8) of the DRC Act, this Court is neither required nor permitted to
undertake a fresh appreciation of the material on record with a view to
arrive at an independent conclusion on the merits of the dispute.
Interference would be warranted only where the Impugned Order
suffers from a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material
irregularity or perversity, or where the conclusion arrived at by the
learned ARC is wholly unreasonable or founded upon an erroneous
premise of law. Equally, where a material plea has been left
unconsidered, or the decision-making process otherwise discloses an
error apparent on the face of the record, exercise of revisional
jurisdiction may be warranted.
23. It is within the aforesaid limited parameters of revisional
scrutiny that the grounds urged by the learned counsel on behalf of the
Petitioner against the Impugned Order are required to be examined.
24. In order to appreciate the challenge raised by the Petitioner, it
would be appropriate to examine the findings returned by the learned
ARC. The relevant observations of the learned ARC in the Impugned
Order are extracted herein below:
“ 27) Further, it is contended that alternative accommodation is
available with the petitioner in the form of the second floor, third
floor and terrace of the subject premises, which is admittedly lying
vacant. Further, it is stated that alternative accommodation is also
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available in the form of a shop no. F-43, First floor, Triveni
Complex, Community Centre, Shaik Sarai – 1, New Delhi.
However, it is also pertinent to note that the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Abid-ul-Islam Vs. Inder Sain Dua, (2022) 6 SCC 30 has
held for availing leave to defend a mere assertion by the tenant is
insufficient. Section 14(1)(e) of the Act creates a presumption in
favour of the landlord regarding bona fide need, which is rebuttable
only with substantive material capable of raising a triable issue. It
was further held that the burden of proof is on the tenant to
demonstrate, with cogent evidence, that the landlord’s requirement
is not genuine. The Court also reiterated the settled principle of law
that leave to defend should not be granted on mere asking but when
the pleas and contentions raise triable issues.
28) The petitioner has admitted that the said shop no. F-43, which
is situated on the first floor, as well as the upper floors of the
subject premises, are lying vacant, but have categorically averred
that the said properties do not have any lift facility. It is not
disputed by the respondents in the entire pleadings that there is no
lift in the Triveni complex as well as the subject premises. Further,
the petitioner has categorically averred that the tenanted premises,
which are situated on the mezzanine floor, only require a flight of
8-9 steps, whereas the shop F-43 at Triveni Complex on the first
floor requires a flight of over 30 steps from the ground floor. The
said assertions have not been repudiated by the respondents, nor
any material to the contrary placed on record by the respondents.
Furthermore, it is not in dispute that the second floor, third floor, as
well as the hall on the terrace are situated after climbing further
stairs from the tenanted premises situated on the mezzanine floor.
Therefore, in comparison to the tenanted premises, the said
purported alternatives have many more flights of stairs to be
climbed before reaching the said premises.
29) Similarly, in the present matter, the tenant cannot dictate that
the petitioner should climb 30 stairs or go to the second floor or
third floor, when in comparison the tenanted premises are on the
mezzanine floor with 8-9 stairs only. It is always the prerogative of
the landlord that if he requires the premises in question for his bona
fide use, then it is not for the respondent/tenant to dictate the terms
and advise as to what and what not should the landlord do when he
has other premises available. Reference is also made to the decision
of the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in the case of M/s A.K.
Woolen Industries and Ors. Vs. Shri Narayan Gupta RC Rev.
495/2017 dated 31.10.2017 in which the following was held:-
“19. The law to be applied in this regard has been laid
down by the Supreme Court in Ragavendra Kumar Vs.
Firm Prem Machinery & Co. (2000) 1 SCC 679, Sait
Nagjee Purushottam & Co. Ltd. Vs. Vimlabai Prabhulal
(2005) 8 SCC 252 and Anil Bajaj Vs. Vinod Ahuja (2014)
15 SCC 610. It has been held that even if the landlord has
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other commercial premises available to him and even if
the landlord is carrying on other businesses, if it is found
that the landlord intends to use the premises in occupation
of the tenant for carrying on his business therefrom, the
landlord is entitled to an order of eviction and the Courts
cannot intervene in the same.”
30) Further, in the case titled as Ragavendra Kumar Vs. Firm
Prem Machinery 2000 SC 534 , it was observed as under:-
“It is settled position of law that the landlord is best judge
of his requirement for residential or business purpose and
he has got complete freedom in the matter, (See: Prativa
Devi (Smt.) v. T.K Krishnan, [1996] 5 SCC 353. In the
case in hand the plaintiff- landlord wanted eviction of the
tenant from the suit premises for starting his business as it
was suitable and it cannot be faulted.””
(Emphasis supplied)
25. Further, this Court also takes particular note of the averment
made in the amended Eviction Petition, filed by the Respondents
before the learned ARC, and in particular Paragraph No. 13 thereof.
The same reads as under:
“13. That of all the properties mentioned in paragraph 10 of the
present petition that belongs to the Petitioner, the subject premises
is most suitable to open a boutique and the same would be apparent
from the following table:-
Description of the
Sl.No
Nature of
Status of the property
property
Property
This property is lying
vacant. However, the same
is situated on the first floor
and the access is through a
flight of over 30 steps from
the ground floor, as such at
the age of 73 years, the
Petitioner would not be in a
position to take the said
flight of stairs for access to
the shop on a daily basis
and as such the same is not
suitable for her
requirement. The said
property also does not even
have any lift access and the
access is not elderly
friendly as such is not
Shop No. F-43,
First Floor, Triveni
Complex,
Community Centre,
Sheikh Sarai-1,
New Delhi-110017
1.
Commercial
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Description of the
Sl.No
Nature of
Status of the property
property
Property
suitable for the bona fide
need of the Petitioner.
This property is already
rented to one tenant Ms.
Mini Mehta who is paying
a monthly rent of Rs.
16,000/- (Rupees sixteen
thousand only). Even
otherwise the property is
situated on the first floor
which is accessible through
a flight of approximately
20 steps and as such is not
suitable for the bona fide
need of the Petitioner.
Shop No. 72, first
floor, CSC No. 2,
DDA Market,
Rohini Sector-9,
New Delhi-110085
2.
Commercial
The two shops on Ground
Floor are already rented out
to 1. Salad Chef @
monthly rent of Rs.
1,00,000/- (Rupees one
lakh only) and 2. Mr.
Sanjay Gupta and Mr.
Manoj Gupta (running their
business in the name of
M/s Gupta Glass) are the
tenants @ monthly rent of
Rs. 4,500/- (Rupees four
thousand and five hundred
only).
The aforesaid rents are
being received by the
Petitioner and Respondent
Nos. 4 and 5 in the
proportion of 1/3rd each.
The rent from the said
tenants also forms source
of income for the
Respondent Nos. 4 and 5.
Mezzanine Floor is under
the tenancy of the
Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and
can be accessed through
just about 8-9 steps and the
same is easily noticeable as
well as accessible by the
Co-owner of two
shops on ground
floor, one shop on
mezzanine floor,
second floor, third
floor, terrace along
with 50%
undivided share in
leasehold rights
along with
Respondent Nos. 4
and 5 in property
bearing No. C-1,
L.S.C. Vasant
Vihar, New Delhi-
110057.
3.
Commercial
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Description of the
Sl.No
Nature of
Status of the property
property
Property
target customers of the
Petitioner and as such the
same is most suitable
property for the bonafide
need of the Petitioner.
The Second Floor and
Third Floor and a hall on
Terrace are vacant,
however, again there being
no lift facility and even
otherwise upper floors i.e.
Second, Third or the small
hall on Terrace level would
not be suitable for the
Petitioner for the purpose
of her bona fide
requirement. It is also for
the reason that the target
customers would not be
inclined to come to a
boutique if it is on the
upper portions of the
building.
Being a residential property
let out to one Mr. Navneet
Singh, Mr. Prince Keshari,
Mr. Arman Patel and Mr.
Pranjal Singh for
residential purpose at a
monthly rent of Rs.
13,500/-(Rupees thirteen
thousand and five hundred
only) the same is not
suitable for the bona fide
need of the Petitioner.
40-C/1, upper
ground floor, Gali
No. 1, Govindpuri,
New Delhi-110019
4.
Residential
The Petitioner, as per
arrangement with her sons
i.e. Respondent Nos. 4 and
5, is residing in the said
property with the family of
Respondent No. 4 having
merely the right to reside
during her lifetime.
Right to reside in
property No. 2/31,
Kalkaji extension,
new Delhi-110019
during her lifetime.
5.
Residential.
(Emphasis supplied)
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26. Adverting to the facts of the present case, the grievance of the
Petitioners is not that F-43 was concealed as a property, rather, it is
that after institution of the Eviction Petition, F-43 was alienated by
Respondent No.1 on 14.11.2025, and the said subsequent event was
not brought to the notice of the learned ARC before the arguments on
the Application seeking leave to defend were heard or before the
Impugned Order was passed. The Sale Deed dated 14.11.2025
forming part of the record before this Court substantiates the factum of
such alienation.
27. The distinction is material. The learned ARC considered F-43
on the factual premise that it continued to constitute an available
accommodation and examined its suitability by reference to its
location, accessibility and absence of lift facility. The subsequent
alienation of F-43, therefore, was not a matter which was considered
by the learned ARC, because the record before it, as reflected in the
Impugned Order, did not disclose the said subsequent event.
28. The question which consequently arises is whether such non-
disclosure, by itself, is sufficient to vitiate the Impugned Order in
exercise of the limited revisional jurisdiction of this Court.
29. In the opinion of this Court, the answer, in the facts of the
present case, must be in the negative. The subsequent alienation of F-
43 undoubtedly constitutes a subsequent circumstance which could
have been brought to the notice of the learned ARC. However, the
mere fact that a subsequent event was not placed before the learned
ARC does not establish a manifest error in the adjudication already
undertaken.
30. This Court is of the considered view that, in such
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circumstances, what must be demonstrated is that the subsequent
event either renders a material finding of the learned ARC
unsustainable, demonstrates that the learned ARC proceeded upon a
fundamentally erroneous factual premise, or otherwise goes to the root
of the decision-making process so as to warrant revisional
interference.
31. In the present case, the finding of the learned ARC regarding
the relative suitability of F-43 and the subject premises was based
principally upon the physical characteristics of the two premises,
particularly their respective accessibility and the absence of lift
facility. The fact that F-43 was situated on the first floor and required
more than 30 steps, whereas the subject premises was situated on the
mezzanine floor and required only 8-9 steps, constituted the basis of
the learned ARC’s conclusion that the latter was more suitable for
Respondent No.1, a senior citizen.
32. The subsequent sale of F-43 does not render those findings
regarding its physical suitability erroneous. Nor does the fact of such
sale, without further material, establish that the requirement pleaded
by Respondent No.1 in respect of the subject premises was fabricated
or that the learned ARC’s assessment of the suitability of the subject
premises was perverse.
33. The reliance placed by learned counsel for the Petitioners upon
Subhash Chand (supra) also does not advance the case of the
Petitioners. In that case, as is evident from Paragraph No. 32 thereof,
the properties specifically disclosed by the tenant were not specifically
dealt with by the landlord, and the learned ARC, in turn, merely
referred to those properties without returning specific findings
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regarding their availability or suitability. It was in that factual setting
that this Court found the tenant’s plea to constitute a triable issue.
34. The present case stands on a materially different footing. Here,
F-43 was expressly disclosed by Respondent No.1; its alleged
availability was not left unaddressed; its suitability was specifically
considered by the learned ARC; and a reasoned finding was returned
upon the comparative accessibility/ suitability of F-43 and the subject
premises. The grievance of the Petitioners is, therefore, not one of
absence of adjudication upon F-43, but that a subsequent event
concerning F-43 was not brought before the learned ARC. Subhash
Chand (supra) cannot, therefore, be read as laying down that every
subsequent development concerning an alternative property,
irrespective of its legal or factual impact upon the adjudication,
automatically constitutes a triable issue or warrants interference in
revision.
35. What has to be considered is whether the premises were in fact
suitable for the purpose espoused. When the said alternate property
sought to be pressed in service was not suitable, the sale of the same
cannot in any manner be held to be fatal to the conclusion by the
learned ARC.
36. Accordingly, the question before this Court that whether the
alleged non-disclosure of alienation F-43 has rendered the decision-
making process of the learned ARC so defective as to warrant
interference under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act. In
view of the foregoing discussion and the material placed before this
Court, this Court is unable to hold that the requisite threshold has been
crossed.
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37. The second limb of the challenge rests upon the allegation that
Respondent No.1 had, on an earlier occasion, obtained possession of
another tenanted premises and thereafter caused the same to be re-let
at an enhanced rent. The Petitioners contend that this circumstance,
read with the subsequent sale of F-43, demonstrates a course of
conduct which casts doubt upon the bona fides of the present
requirement.
38. The allegation, in its broad form, was indeed raised before the
learned ARC, in Paragraph No. 11 of the Affidavit of Petitioner No.1
accompanying the Application seeking Leave to Defend. The said
Paragraph reads as under:
“ 11. That the Petitioner is a rich landlady, who has been living and
surviving only on rent. Her business is to get one shop vacated then
re-let the same to another tenant after getting pagri /premium. and
some time the rent is charged in excess and receipts are issued for
lessor amount just to save House-tax, & Income Tax. The
Respondent are . not admitted the Present petitioner as owner in
any manner in the absence.”
39. What is significant, however, is that the Petitioners did not
place before the learned ARC any documentary material in support of
this allegation. The material concerning the earlier proceedings
involving Ms. Manju Goyal, the subsequent re-letting of the ground-
floor shop and the Order dated 17.12.2020 passed by this Court in
CS(OS) 558/2019 has been relied upon before this Court as additional
material. The Petitioners themselves acknowledge that such material
was not filed with their original Leave to Defend application.
40. The position, therefore, is not that the Petitioners had never
raised the plea of mala fides before the learned ARC. What was absent
was the documentary material now sought to be relied upon in support
of that plea.
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BHATIA
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41. Even assuming that the aforesaid material is taken into
consideration for the limited purpose of examining the present
challenge, it does not, without more, establish the requisite nexus
between the earlier transaction and the bona fide requirement pleaded
by Respondent No.1 in the present proceedings. The earlier
transaction concerns a different premises and arose in a different
factual context. The mere fact that a premises was re-let after
possession had been obtained, even at a higher rent, cannot by itself
establish that the present Eviction Petition is similarly actuated by an
intention to commercially exploit the subject premises.
42. Equally, the fact that Respondent No.1 has other properties or
derives rental income therefrom cannot, in isolation, negate a bona
fide requirement. The learned ARC was required to consider whether
the accommodation relied upon by the Petitioners constituted
reasonably suitable alternative accommodation and whether the
requirement pleaded in respect of the subject premises was bona fide .
Those aspects were duly considered in the Impugned Order.
43. The Petitioners’ challenge, in substance, therefore requires this
Court to draw a different inference from a combination of
circumstances, namely , the subsequent sale of F-43, the earlier re-
letting transaction and the existence of other properties and rental
income. Such an exercise would necessarily entail a re-appraisal of the
factual matrix and a substitution of the assessment of this Court for
that of the learned ARC.
44. This Court is conscious that, at the stage of consideration of an
Application seeking leave to defend, the tenant is not required to
conclusively establish the defence, but is only required to disclose
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BHATIA
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facts which, if ultimately proved, would disentitle the landlord from
obtaining an Eviction Order. At the same time, the material relied
upon must be such as to disclose a genuine triable issue and not
merely furnish an assertion, unsupported by material, which would
require a roving factual inquiry at the revisional stage.
45. Tested on the aforesaid parameters, this Court is unable to
discern any jurisdictional error, material irregularity, manifest
illegality or perversity in the decision-making process adopted by the
learned ARC.
46. The Petitioners have been unable to demonstrate an infirmity in
the decision-making process of the learned ARC of the nature
contemplated by the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act. What
is sought, in substance, is for this Court to reassess the factual
circumstances and arrive at a different conclusion regarding the bona
fides and suitability of the accommodation. Such an exercise would
amount to appellate re-appreciation, which, as discussed herein before,
is impermissible in the Revisional jurisdiction exercised by this Court.
DECISION:
47. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no merit in
the present Petition. The Petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
48. The present Petition, along with the pending Applications, if
any, stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
SEPTEMBER 01, 2026/tk/DJ
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BHATIA
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