Nraesh Pal vs State

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
st
Date of reserving Judgment: 21 July, 2026
th
Date of Decision: 4 November, 2026
IN THE MATTER OF:
+ CRL.A. 1010/2008
NARESH PAL .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Ramesh Gupta, Sr. Adv. with Mr.
Tejvir Singh, Mr. Shailendra Singh
and Mr. Ishan Jain, Advs. with
Appellant in person.
versus
STATE .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Mukesh Kumar, APP for State
with SI Bheem Singh, PS Anti
Corruption Branch.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIMAL KUMAR YADAV
JUDGMENT
VIMAL KUMAR YADAV, J.
1. The present appeal assails the judgment dated 07.11.2008 (hereinafter
referred to as „impugned judgment‟) passed by the learned Special Judge-
Delhi, whereby the appellant was convicted for the offences punishable
under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as “PC Act”) and the order on
sentence dated 10.11.2008 (hereinafter referred to as „impugned order‟)
whereby the appellant was sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment
(„RI‟) for a period of two years and a fine of Rs. 10,000/- for the offence
punishable under Section 7 of the PC Act, and in default of payment of fine
he was further sentenced to undergo Simple Imprisonment („SI‟) for a period
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of three months. Vide the impugned order, the appellant was also sentenced
to undergo RI for a period of two years and a fine of Rs. 10,000/-, for the
offence punishable under Section 13(2) of the PC Act, and in default of
payment of fine, he was further sentenced to undergo SI for a period of three
months.
2. Bereft of unnecessary details, the prosecution‟s case, in brief, is that
the complainant, Lakhan Singh (PW-2), was running a factory engaged in
the manufacture of lemon soda water under the name of M/s R.K. Soft
Drinks at Raghubir Nagar, Delhi. It was alleged that the appellant, who was
serving as a Beat Constable, along with his colleagues, Constables Amit and
Dharambir, used to visit the complainant‟s premises and harass him in
connection with his license, which at the time was not in the possession of
the complainant. It has been further alleged that the appellant along with his
fellow constables abovenamed had demanded ₹5,000/- from the complainant
on the pretext of allowing the complainant to continue running his business.
According to the prosecution, on 23.03.2004, the appellant and Constable
Dharambir had again visited the factory and demanded the aforesaid
amount. When the complainant expressed his inability to arrange the entire
amount, it was agreed that ₹1,000/- would initially be paid and the
remaining amount would be paid thereafter.
3. The complainant thereafter approached the Anti-Corruption Branch
(hereinafter referred to as „ACB‟). A complaint (Ex. PW-2/A) was recorded,
and the pre-trap proceedings were conducted. Two Government Currency
(„GC‟) notes of ₹500 each were treated with phenolphthalein powder and
their serial numbers were noted down by the Raid Officer (PW-9) in the pre-
raid report (Ex. PW-2/B). The complainant was instructed to hand over the
treated currency notes to the appellant upon the relevant demand. A raiding
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party was constituted, and the complainant proceeded to the spot i.e. jhuggis
located in Raghubir Nagar with the members of the raiding party. Radha
Kishan (PW-7), was assigned the role of shadow witness. The prosecution
alleges that the appellant accepted the treated currency notes from the
complainant and that, upon the predetermined signal, the raiding party
apprehended him. Thereafter, the treated currency notes were recovered
from the left pocket of the appellant‟s shirt. Hand washes of the accused and
the wash of the relevant shirt pocket belonging to the appellant were taken,
and the solutions turned pink.
4. The prosecution examined thirteen witnesses in support of its case.
The complainant, Lakhan Singh, was examined as PW-2, Inspector Hari
Chand, the initial Investigating Officer („IO‟) as PW-4, Radha Kishan, the
shadow witness, as PW-7and Inspector S.S. Sandhu, the Raid Officer, as
PW-9. The incriminating evidence coming on record was put to the
appellant and his statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, (hereinafter referred to as Cr.P.C.) was recorded wherein
he denied the incriminating circumstances put to him. The defence also
examined two witnesses, Praveen Kumari as DW-1 and Pratap Singh as
DW-2.
5. At the outset, learned counsel for the appellant has assailed the
impugned judgment primarily on the ground that the prosecution has failed
to establish the demand and voluntary acceptance of illegal gratification.
Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the complainant
Lakhan Singh (PW-2), who is the person from whom the alleged demand
was made and who was allegedly present at the time of the transaction, did
not support the prosecution‟s case on material aspects. Rather, PW-2 stated
that the appellant had refused to accept the money and that it was the
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complainant himself who inserted the treated currency notes into the pocket
of the appellant‟s shirt.
6. It has been further submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant
that PW-2 was cross-examined by the prosecution after being declared
hostile, but he did not support the prosecution‟s material allegations despite
the suggestions put to him. Additionally, learned counsel for the appellant
has also submitted that the prosecution could not be allowed to treat the
complaint (Ex.PW-2/A) as substantive evidence of demand merely because
it had formed the basis of the registration of the case and the subsequent trap
proceedings. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant
that once the maker or the person from which the actual complaint
originated from, did not affirm the material allegation of demand in Court,
the prosecution was required to establish that fact through other legally
admissible evidence without taking refuge behind the contents of the
complaint (Ex. PW-2/A).
7. Learned counsel for the appellant has also assailed the reliance placed
upon the testimony of the shadow witness Radha Kishan (PW-7) by the
prosecution. It is submitted that although PW-7 acted as the shadow witness
during the raid proceedings, he stated that he had not accompanied the
complainant inside the factory and while he did witness the complainant
handing something over to the appellant, who accepted it with his right hand
and kept it in the pocket of his pants, the currency notes were subsequently
recovered from the left pocket of the appellant‟s shirt. Learned counsel for
the appellant vehemently submits that this is not a minor discrepancy, but a
material inconsistency concerning the very manner in which the alleged
gratification was accepted and retained by the appellant. It has been
submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the prosecution
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cannot rely upon the deposition of PW-7 to fill the void left by the
complainant‟s testimony on the aspect of demand, particularly when the
testimony of PW-7 itself is inconsistent with regard to the manner in which
the alleged transaction took place, including the hand with which the
appellant accepted the money and the pocket in which he allegedly kept it,
which is at variance with the place from where the treated currency notes
were ultimately recovered.
8. Learned counsel for the appellant has also drawn attention to the
testimony of the Raid Officer, Inspector S.S. Sandhu (PW-9), who
conducted the trap proceedings and carried out the apprehension of the
appellant and recovery of the treated currency notes from his person. It is
submitted that PW-9 did not personally witness the alleged demand or
acceptance of the money. His evidence, therefore, concerns the proceedings
conducted after the signal and cannot independently establish what
transpired between the complainant and the appellant before the raiding
party intervened.
9. Learned counsel for the appellant has further relied upon the
testimony of Inspector Hari Chand (PW-4), the initial IO. It is pointed out
that PW-4 admitted in his cross-examination that he had not verified the
correctness of the complaint. It is also submitted that, although Constable
Dharambir was named in connection with the alleged demand, he was not
charge-sheeted. According to learned counsel, these circumstances cast
doubt upon the manner in which the investigation proceeded and the extent
to which the allegations were independently verified.
10. In support of the arguments raised in support of the appellant, learned
counsel for the appellant has relied upon M. Sambasiva Rao v. State of
Andhra Pradesh , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1463, and has submitted that the
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failure to verify the complaint before laying the trap constitutes a serious
infirmity in the prosecution‟s case. It is contended that the prosecution
proceeded upon the complaint without adequately testing or verifying its
correctness, and that the subsequent recovery cannot, by itself, cure this
deficiency. Learned counsel for the appellant has also relied upon Neeraj
Dutta v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC 731, and B.
Jayaraj v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2014) 13 SCC 55, to submit that proof
of the relevant demand and acceptance is essential to a conviction under the
provisions invoked in the present case. It is urged that the statutory
presumption under Section 20 of the Act cannot be invoked to supply the
very facts which the prosecution has failed to establish.
11. Learned counsel for the appellant has further challenged the manner
in which certain circumstances were put to the appellant during the
recording of his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. In particular, learned
counsel has drawn attention to Questions Nos. 13 and 15, wherein it was put
to the appellant that evidence had emerged against him to the effect that he
had demanded and accepted ₹1,000/- from the complainant as illegal
gratification. It is contended that there was no evidence whatsoever
establishing the alleged demand, nor had any witness deposed to the
appellant having demanded the bribe amount. According to learned counsel,
only circumstances supported by evidence and appearing incriminating
against the accused can be put to him for his explanation, and the mere
formulation of Questions Nos. 13 and 15 could not be treated as evidence of
demand where no such evidence had emerged during trial.
12. Learned counsel has also objected to Question No. 29 put to the
appellant, wherein it was stated that the sanction for prosecution had been
granted by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, R.S. Yadav (PW-5). It is
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submitted that this assertion is contrary to the record, as no sanction had
been granted by the Deputy Commissioner of Police. On this basis, learned
counsel has contended that the conviction is also rendered unsustainable on
account of the incorrect circumstance put to the appellant regarding the grant
of sanction.
13. Per contra, learned APP for the State has stood by the impugned
judgment. It has been submitted that the prosecution‟s case must be assessed
by considering the complaint, the pre-trap proceedings, the voluntary
acceptance by the appellant, the recovery of the treated currency notes, the
positive hand and pocket washes, and the testimony of the members of the
raiding party. According to the learned APP, the fact that the treated
currency notes were recovered from the appellant‟s shirt pocket, coupled
with the positive washes, is a significant circumstance supporting the
prosecution case.
14. Learned APP has further submitted that the testimony of a witness
who has been declared hostile or in this case the testimony of the
complainant, Lakhan Singh (PW-2) is not required to be discarded in its
entirety. It is contended that reliable portions of such testimony can be acted
upon if it is otherwise supported or corroborated by the evidence on record.
The prosecution maintains that the complainant‟s failure to support the
prosecution on the question of demand does not necessarily result in
acquittal where other evidence and the surrounding circumstances are
sufficient to establish the offence.
15. Learned APP has further submitted that the evidence of the Raid
Officer (PW-9) and the recovery proceedings cannot be ignored merely
because the officer did not personally hear the demand. According to the
prosecution, the evidence must be appreciated cumulatively, and the
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recovery of the treated currency notes, the positive washes and the
surrounding circumstances lend support to the prosecution version. Learned
APP for the State has accordingly urged that the findings recorded by the
learned Trial Court do not call for interference.
16. Having considered the rival submissions and examined the material
forming part of the appeal record, the principal question that arises for
consideration is whether the prosecution has established beyond reasonable
doubt the facts necessary to sustain the appellant‟s conviction under
Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act.
17. Before proceeding to examine the evidence, it is necessary to notice
the legal position governing the proof of demand, acceptance and
obtainment of illegal gratification. The law in this regard has been
authoritatively considered by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court
in Neeraj Dutta (supra) wherein the Constitution Bench clarified that the
prosecution must prove the facts constituting the offence and that the
relevant facts may be established either by direct evidence or by
circumstantial evidence. The fact that the complainant does not support the
prosecution or is unavailable as a witness does not, by itself, bring the
prosecution to an end. The Court must examine whether the remaining
evidence establishes the relevant facts beyond reasonable doubt.
18. The judgment in Neeraj Dutta (supra) also requires a distinction to be
maintained between the offence under Section 7 and the offence of obtaining
illegal gratification under the then applicable Section 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of
the PC Act.
19. Act. Where the public servant demands illegal gratification and
obtains it, the prosecution must establish the demand and the consequent
obtainment. However, where the bribe-giver independently offers illegal
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gratification and the public servant knowingly and voluntarily accepts it, the
absence of a prior demand by the public servant does not, by itself, defeat
the charge under Section 7. In either situation, the prosecution must establish
the facts constituting the offence; mere recovery of currency notes is not
sufficient.
20. The distinction is material in the present case. The prosecution has
proceeded on the specific allegation that the appellant demanded ₹5,000/-
from the complainant and that the subsequent payment of ₹1,000/- was
made pursuant to that demand. The appellant, however, relies upon the
complainant‟s testimony that no demand was made and that the appellant
refused the money, which the complainant himself inserted into the
appellant‟s pocket. Consequently, the evidence must be assessed not only to
determine whether the alleged demand and obtainment have been proved,
but also to determine whether the prosecution has independently established
knowing and voluntary acceptance of an offer of illegal gratification.
21. In B. Jayaraj (supra), the Hon‟ble Supreme Court cautioned that mere
recovery of currency notes, in the absence of proof of the requisite facts, is
insufficient to sustain a conviction. The principles in that decision must now
be applied in the light of the subsequent Constitution Bench judgment in
Neeraj Dutta (supra). The latter does not require demand to be proved only
by direct testimony, but equally does not permit demand or voluntary
acceptance to be presumed merely from the fact of recovery. The statutory
presumption under Section 20 of the Act must also be considered within
these limits. The presumption does not dispense with proof of the
foundational facts necessary to attract it. The prosecution must first establish
the relevant facts concerning acceptance of gratification, and the
presumption must then operate in accordance with the statutory provision. It
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cannot be used to convert an uncertain or disputed transaction into proof of
knowing and voluntary acceptance.
22. Turning to the evidence in the present case, PW-2 is the complainant
and the person from whom the alleged demand was made. His testimony is,
therefore, of particular significance. The prosecution‟s case is that the
appellant demanded ₹5,000/- and that the complainant subsequently agreed
to pay ₹1,000/- as an initial payment. However, PW-2 did not affirm the
allegation of demand in his testimony before the Court. Instead, he denied
that the appellant had demanded the bribe and stated that the appellant
refused to accept the money and that the complainant himself inserted the
currency notes into the pocket of the appellant‟s shirt.
23. The fact that PW-2 was declared hostile does not mean that his
testimony must be rejected in its entirety. It is settled that the evidence of a
hostile witness remains part of the record and may be relied upon to the
extent that it is found credible and is supported by other evidence. The Court
must, however, examine the substance of the testimony and determine which
portions, if any, can safely be accepted. On this very aspect, the Apex court
in K.P. Tamilmaran v. State by Deputy Superintendent of Police, 2025
SCC OnLine SC 958, held that the declaration of hostility does not
automatically render the witness‟s testimony completely adverse or
undependable to the prosecution‟s case, nor does it permit the Court to
disregard the portions which are inconsistent with the prosecution‟s case
without assigning reasons. The relevant portion of K.P. Tamilmaran (supra)
has been reproduced hereunder:
“36. It is though trite and much overstated but the maxim
“falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus”3, is not applicable to our
criminal justice system. It is for the Court to distinguish the
wheat from the chaff while dealing with the depositions of a
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hostile witness. Courts can rely upon that part of the deposition
of a hostile witness which is corroborated by other evidence on
record. This Court in Bhajju v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2012)
4 SCC 327 discussed the worth of the evidence of a hostile
witness in the following words: “36. It is settled law that the
evidence of hostile witnesses can also be relied upon by the
prosecution to the extent to which it supports the prosecution
version of the incident. The evidence of such witnesses cannot be
treated as washed off the records, it remains admissible in trial
and there is no legal bar to base the conviction of the accused
upon such testimony, if corroborated by other reliable
evidence…” If part of the evidence of a hostile witness
corroborates with other reliable evidence, then that part of the
evidence is admissible. Once a prosecution witness has been
declared hostile and then cross-examined by the prosecution,
then it is for the Court to evaluate the veracity of the testimony.
There can be several reasons for a witness to turn hostile and
the court must also look into these factors while evaluating the
evidence given by a hostile witness. It is an uncomfortable
reality in our criminal Courts for a prosecution witness to turn
hostile. But then the purpose of a Trial Court is to go to the truth
of the matter. Whatever evidence is there before the Court must
be examined, tested, corroborated (whenever necessary), before
a verdict can be finally given.”

24. In the present case, the complainant‟s testimony is material not
merely because it fails to support the allegation of demand, but because it
provides a peculiarly convenient explanation for the presence of the treated
currency notes in the appellant‟s pocket. The complainant‟s version, if
accepted, would indicate that the appellant did not voluntarily accept the
money and that the notes came to be placed in his pocket through the
complainant‟s own act. The prosecution was, therefore, required to
demonstrate through other reliable evidence that this explanation could not
reasonably be accepted and that the appellant had, in fact, knowingly and
voluntarily accepted the gratification.
25. The complaint (Ex. PW-2/A) recorded before the trap proceedings
undoubtedly explains how the investigation commenced. However, the
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complaint cannot, merely by virtue of having been recorded and signed, be
treated as substantive proof of the truth of its contents once the maker does
not affirm the material allegations in Court. A previous statement may be
used in accordance with the applicable rules of evidence, including for
contradiction, but it does not automatically become substantive evidence of
the facts asserted therein.

26. The next material witness is Radha Kishan (PW-7), who was assigned
as the shadow witness. The purpose of associating a shadow witness is to
provide independent evidence of the relevant transaction, to the extent that
the witness is in a position to observe it. The evidentiary value of such
testimony must, however, be assessed by reference to what the witness
actually saw and heard. The mere fact that a person was designated as a
shadow witness does not mean that every part of the transaction necessarily
falls within his personal knowledge.
27. The testimony of Radha Kishan (PW-7), the shadow witness, assumes
significance in determining whether the appellant voluntarily accepted the
treated currency notes. PW-7 deposed that he saw the complainant return
and hand over something to the appellant, who accepted it in his right hand
and kept it in the pocket of his pants. However, the two treated currency
notes were subsequently recovered from the left pocket of the appellant‟s
shirt. PW-7 also denied the suggestion put to him in cross examination that
he had previously stated that the appellant accepted the money with his left
hand, transferred it to his right hand and thereafter placed it in his pocket.
Thus, while Radha Kishan‟s testimony supports the prosecution to the extent
that he witnessed the complainant hand over an object to the appellant and
the appellant accept it, his account of the manner in which the treated
currency notes were retained differs from the place from which the currency
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notes were recovered during the post-raid recovery. This discrepancy must
be weighed while assessing the reliability of his testimony. However, it does
not, by itself, negate his evidence that the transfer and acceptance took
place. The material question is whether PW-7‟s testimony, notwithstanding
this discrepancy, considered alongside the recovery of the treated currency
notes and the other evidence on record, establishes the appellant‟s voluntary
acceptance of the gratification.
28. The aforementioned discrepancy is not necessarily conclusive in
isolation. A witness may fail to recall every movement accurately,
particularly where the transaction occurs quickly and logically it cannot be
expected of such a witness to have a photographic memory or a frame by
frame account without having minor discrepancies and inconsistencies.
However, the importance of a discrepancy depends upon the issue to which
it relates. In the present case, the dispute concerns whether the appellant
voluntarily accepted the money or whether the complainant inserted the
notes into the appellant‟s pocket despite his refusal. The precise manner in
which the money was allegedly received and retained is, therefore, directly
relevant to the disputed question of voluntary acceptance.
29. The more significant aspect of the testimony of PW-7, however, is
that he did not merely state that the complainant and the appellant were
present at the spot or that some object changed hands between them. In his
examination in chief, he specifically deposed that the complainant returned
and gave something to the appellant, who accepted it in his right hand and
kept it in the pocket of his pants. The relevant portion of Radha Kishann‟s
(PW-7) examination in chief has been reproduced hereunder for reference:
“ Thereafter, complainant went to somewhere and came back and
gave something to the accused which he accepted in his right hand
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and had kept the same in his pocket of his pant. Thereafter, I gave
pre-determined signal by hurling my hand over my head. The
members of raiding party immediately came at the spot and Raid
Officer apprehended the accused while the accused was putting the
money in his pocket.”
30. More importantly, in cross-examination, when confronted with the
suggestion that the complainant had thrust the money into the appellant‟s
pocket despite his refusal to accept it, PW-7 denied the suggestion. His
testimony, therefore, does not support the defence version in the manner
suggested by learned counsel for the appellant. On the contrary, it provides
affirmative evidence of a transfer of an object by the complainant to the
appellant and of the appellant receiving it, while expressly negating the
suggestion that the transfer was forcibly effected against the appellant‟s will.
Relevant portion of PW-7‟s cross-examination has been reproduced
hereunder for reference:
“ I do not remember if the accused denied to accept the money
saying that the license would be given by the MCD not by the
police. It is incorrect to suggest that the complainant thrust the
money in the pocket of the accused while accused was denying to
accept the same.”
31. The fact that PW-7 did not testify to having heard the alleged demand
does not render his testimony irrelevant to that issue. The question of
demand cannot be examined in isolation from the circumstances in which
the transaction took place. Although PW-7‟s evidence does not directly
establish the precise words allegedly spoken by the appellant, his account of
the transaction is a circumstance which the Court is required to consider
while determining whether the payment was voluntary and whether the
circumstances surrounding it support the prosecution case that the money
was being paid as illegal gratification. The distinction between direct
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evidence of demand and circumstantial evidence bearing upon demand must
be maintained. The absence of direct testimony to the demand does not
foreclose an inference arising from the cumulative effect of the proved
circumstances.
32. In this regard, the complaint (Ex. PW-2/A), cannot be treated as
substantive proof of the truth of the allegations recorded therein merely
because it preceded the trap. Nevertheless, the evidentiary limitations
attached to the complaint do not require the Court to disregard the entire
sequence of events which led to the trap. The fact that the complainant
approached the Anti-Corruption Branch, that the complaint was recorded,
that the pre-trap proceedings were thereafter undertaken and recorded vide
pre-raid report (Ex. PW-2/B), and that the complainant subsequently
participated in the transaction witnessed by PW-7 form part of the
surrounding circumstances. These circumstances must be considered
alongside the testimony given in Court, without elevating the allegations in
the complaint to the status of independently proved facts. The inference, if
any, must ultimately arise from the evidence which has been brought on
record and not merely from the existence of the complaint.
33. Learned counsel for the appellant has placed considerable emphasis
on the discrepancy between the pocket described by PW-7 and the pocket
from which the treated currency notes were ultimately recovered. This
circumstance undoubtedly requires consideration, as it concerns the manner
in which the appellant allegedly retained the money. It would, however, be
inappropriate to treat this discrepancy as such that it would result in effacing
the entire testimony of PW-7, especially without examining the remaining
evidence relating to the transaction and the recovery. PW-7 described the
appellant as having accepted the treated currency notes in his right hand and
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placed it in the pocket of his pants, whereas the treated currency notes were
recovered from the left pocket of his shirt. While it may be noted that the
discrepancy concerns the precise movement and retention of the treated
currency notes after it was received, it does not, by itself, displace PW-7‟s
deposition that the complainant handed over an object to the appellant and
that the appellant accepted it. Its significance must be assessed cumulatively,
particularly in view of PW-7‟s denial of the suggestion that the complainant
had forcibly inserted the money into the appellant‟s pocket. Moreover, the
defence version that the complainant forcibly inserted the treated currency
notes into the appellant‟s pocket also requires consideration in light of the
fact that the notes were ultimately recovered from the left breast pocket of
his shirt. The suggestion that the complainant managed to insert the notes
into that pocket, despite the appellant‟s alleged resistance, is difficult to
accept, especially in the context the circumstances of the transaction and the
sequence of events deposed to by PW-7.
34. The prosecution has also relied upon the recovery of the two treated
currency notes of ₹500 each from the appellant‟s shirt pocket and the
resulting positive hand, shirt and pant pocket washes. There is no ambiguity
regarding the relevance of the chemical test as evidence towards the fact,
that is to say that it, by itself, cannot establish the purpose for which the
money was transferred, nor can it independently prove a prior demand.
However, when considered with PW-7‟s testimony regarding the transfer
and acceptance, the recovery of the very currency notes which had been
treated during the pre-trap proceedings lends corroborative support to the
prosecution version of the transaction. The recovery and the positive hand
and shirt pocket washes must thus be treated as corroborative circumstances
and not as substitutes for proof of the essential ingredients of the offences.
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35. The version advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant, on the
other hand, is that the appellant refused to accept the money and that the
complainant himself inserted the notes into the appellant‟s shirt pocket. If
this version were supported by the remaining evidence, it would
undoubtedly be material to the question of voluntary acceptance. However,
the complainant‟s assertion in this regard cannot be accepted without testing
it against the testimony of PW-7 and the circumstances surrounding the
recovery. PW-7, who was associated with the trap as a shadow witness,
expressly denied the suggestion that the complainant had thrust the money
into the appellant‟s pocket while the appellant was refusing to accept it. His
evidence on this aspect is significant because it directly contradicts the
particular explanation advanced by the complainant (PW-2) in Court and
subsequently relied upon by the appellant.
36. The testimony of the Raid Officer, Inspector S.S. Sandhu (PW-9),
must also be considered within its proper limits. It is correct that PW-9 did
not personally witness the alleged demand and that his evidence concerning
the events preceding the signal cannot be treated as direct proof of words or
conduct which he did not himself observe. His testimony nevertheless
remains relevant to the proceedings conducted upon the signal, the
apprehension of the appellant, the recovery of the treated currency notes and
the subsequent hand and pocket washes. To the extent that these proceedings
are proved through his testimony and the other evidence on record, they
corroborate the circumstances in which the appellant was apprehended and
the treated notes were recovered. The fact that PW-9 was not an eyewitness
to the alleged demand does not render his evidence concerning the recovery
and subsequent proceedings immaterial and at the same time, such evidence
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cannot be relied upon to establish matters falling outside his personal
knowledge.
37. This Court is conscious that recovery of treated currency notes, even
when accompanied by positive hand washes, does not automatically
establish the offence of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification. The
prosecution must prove the relevant facts beyond reasonable doubt, and the
statutory presumption cannot be invoked to fill a complete absence of proof
of the foundational facts. Likewise, the evidence on record cannot be
examined in fragments of isolated events, on the contrary, the larger
evidentiary picture must be assessed as a whole. The shadow witness Radha
Kishan‟s (PW-7) evidence provides consistent account of the transfer and
willing acceptance of the treated currency notes by the appellant. His
testimony does not support the allegation or claim that the appellant, at the
outset, had refused the money and that the complainant forcibly planted it
upon him. The recovery of the treated notes from the appellant‟s person and
the positive washes provide corroborative circumstances concerning the
handling of those notes. The cumulative effect of this evidence must be
assessed in deciding whether the prosecution has established the transaction
alleged against the appellant.
38. The explanation furnished by the appellant in his statement recorded
under Section 313 Cr.P.C., when considered alongside the testimony of the
complainant, Lakhan Singh (PW-2), requires closer scrutiny. Both versions
seek to explain the presence of the treated currency notes on the appellant‟s
person on the premise that the complainant had forcibly thrust the money
into his pocket despite his refusal to accept it. However, this explanation
does not find support in the testimony of the shadow witness, Radha Kishan
(PW-7), who specifically denied the suggestion that the complainant had
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forcibly inserted the money into the appellant‟s pocket while the appellant
was refusing to accept it. The said explanation must, therefore, be tested
against the evidence of the witness who observed the transaction, rather than
accepted merely because the complainant subsequently resiled from the
prosecution case.
39. The testimony of PW-7, read with that of the Raid Officer (PW-9)
concerning the sequence of events following the predetermined signal,
indicates that the transaction was followed by the arrival of the raiding party
and the apprehension and search of the appellant. The defence version, on
the other hand, would require this Court to accept that the appellant
protested against the transfer of the money, that the complainant
nevertheless managed to thrust the currency notes into his pocket, and that
the notes remained there until they were recovered during the ensuing
proceedings. Although the appellant‟s failure to remove the notes from his
pocket cannot, by itself, establish voluntary acceptance, the explanation
advanced by him assumes significance when considered alongside PW-7‟s
affirmative testimony regarding the transfer and acceptance of the object and
his express rejection of the suggestion that the money was forcibly thrust
into the appellant‟s pocket. In these circumstances, the defence explanation
qua the statement of the accused recorded under 313 Cr.P.C. and the
submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant falls flat as it fails to
create a reasonable doubt sufficient enough to displace the prosecution‟s
case.
40. The principles laid down by the Constitution Bench in Neeraj Dutta
(supra), are instructive in this regard. The Constitution Bench clarified that
the facts constituting demand and acceptance may be proved by direct as
well as circumstantial evidence. The inability or refusal of the complainant
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to support the prosecution case does not, in itself, render conviction legally
impermissible, provided the remaining evidence establishes the necessary
ingredients of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. The decision also makes
clear that this Court must distinguish between proof of demand and the mere
fact of recovery, and that an inference of demand must arise from the
circumstances proved in the particular case rather than from recovery alone.
Applying these principles, the testimony of Lakhan Singh (PW-7) cannot be
excluded from the assessment of demand merely because he did not depose
to having directly heard the alleged demand. His evidence regarding the
actual transaction, the manner in which the transfer of the treated currency
notes took place, the appellant‟s acceptance coupled with PW-7‟s denial of
the suggestion of forcible insertion of the treated currency in the appellant‟s
pocket, must be considered together with the other proved circumstances.
41. The objection regarding the absence of pre-trap verification also
requires consideration in the context of the entire prosecution case. The
failure to verify the complaint before arranging the trap is a circumstance
which may bear upon the reliability of the investigation and the weight to be
attached to the prosecution version. It does not, however, follow that every
subsequent event proved through admissible evidence must be disregarded
solely because the complaint was not independently verified beforehand.
The evidence of the witnesses examined at trial, the circumstances of the
transaction, and the recovery proceedings must still be assessed on their own
merits. In the present case, the deficiency alleged by the appellant in the pre-
trap procedure does not, by itself, displace the affirmative testimony of PW-
7 concerning the transfer and acceptance, particularly when that testimony is
considered with the evidence relating to recovery and the positive washes.
The admission of PW-4, the initial Investigating Officer, that he did not
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verify the correctness of the complaint is relevant to the assessment of the
investigation, but it cannot be treated as sufficient, standing alone, to negate
the evidence subsequently brought on record at trial.
42. The fact that Constable Dharambir, who was also named in the
complaint, was not charge-sheeted likewise does not establish that the
allegation against the appellant was false nor does it diminish the evidence
that ultimately concerns the implication and the involvement of the appellant
in the present case. The prosecution‟s case against the appellant must be
assessed on the evidence led against him and him alone insofar as the
confines of the present case and the law governing it dictates. The failure to
prosecute another person named in the complaint may invite some level of
scrutiny of the investigation and the manner in which the allegations were
dealt with, but whether such scrutiny would be warranted and whether it
would serve the ends of justice at this stage is a question which may be
answered in the negative, especially as far as the present case is concerned.
Nevertheless, the failure to chargesheet Ct. Dharambir does not and would
not absolve the appellant in any manner, where the evidence concerning his
own conduct is otherwise found reliable. This Court must guard against
drawing an adverse inference merely from the investigating agency‟s
decision in relation to another individual, while at the same time ensuring
that the appellant‟s guilt is not inferred simply from the fact that he was the
person apprehended during the trap. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court, in
Suvarna Coop. Bank Ltd. v. State of Karnataka , (2021) 17 SCC 268 had
held that failure to chargesheet other persons who might have committed an
offence does not vitiate the charge or the evidence proved against those
accused persons. The relevant portion of Suvarna Coop. (supra) has been
reproduced hereunder:
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4.3. The aforesaid cannot be a ground to quash the criminal
proceedings against the accused who was charge-sheeted by the
investigating officer after thorough investigation. Merely because
some other persons who might have committed the offences, but
were not arrayed as accused and were not charge-sheeted cannot
be a ground to quash the criminal proceedings against the accused
who is charge-sheeted after a thorough investigation. During the
trial if it is found that other accused persons who committed the
offence are not charge-sheeted, the Court may array those persons
as accused in exercise of powers under Section 319CrPC. Merely
because some of the persons who might have committed the
offences are not charge-sheeted, cannot be a ground to quash the
proceedings against the accused charge-sheeted after having found
prima facie case against him after investigation. Nothing has been
further observed by the High Court on merits and/or on the
allegations against the private respondent herein-original Accused.
43. The objection concerning the appellant‟s examination under Section
313 Cr.P.C. must also be considered in the same manner. The questions put
to an accused under that provision are intended to afford him an opportunity
to explain the circumstances appearing against him. While it is very well
settled that such questions cannot themselves constitute substantive evidence
in support of the facts alleged by the prosecution, nor can an omission in the
prosecution evidence be cured merely by putting an incriminating question
to the accused. The findings in the present appeal therefore, rest upon the
evidence adduced by the prosecution and not upon the formulation and the
substance of the questions put to the accused.
44. Learned counsel for the appellant has also raised an objection with
regards to question Nos. 13 and 15 put to the appellant during the recording
of his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., contending that the questions
proceeded on the premise that the appellant had demanded and accepted
illegal gratification, despite the alleged demand not having been
independently established by the prosecution‟s evidence. This submission,
however, does not, by itself, disclose any such material infirmity as would
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undermine the prosecution‟s case or warrant interference with the findings
of the learned Trial Court. This court is aware that the questions put to the
appellant under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. are intended to afford him an
opportunity to explain the incriminating circumstances appearing against
him in the evidence. They are neither substantive evidence of the facts stated
therein nor can they, by themselves, remedy a deficiency in the
prosecution‟s case. At the same time, the mere formulation of Questions
Nos. 13 and 15 in terms which refer to the alleged demand and acceptance
does not render the entire proceedings defective or displace the evidence
otherwise brought on record. The relevant inquiry remains whether the
circumstances put to the appellant find support in the evidence adduced
during trial and whether the prosecution has established the necessary
ingredients of the offences charged. Accordingly, these questions must be
considered in the context of the evidence as a whole.
45. The appellant has also furnished an explanation for his presence at the
jhuggi of the complainant at the relevant time. In his statement recorded
under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., the appellant stated that he was present at
the police station when he received a telephone call from the complainant
informing him that some dispute was taking place at his jhuggi. This
explanation finds some corroboration in the testimony of Constable Pratap
Singh (DW-2), who deposed that he was present with the appellant at the
police station on the date of the raid and that a telephone call was received
regarding a dispute at the complainant‟s jhuggi. At first glance, this
circumstance may appear to provide a plausible explanation for the
appellant‟s presence at the spot at the relevant time. However, the
explanation must be examined in the light of the entirety of DW-2‟s
testimony and the other circumstances emerging from the record.
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46. A closer examination of the deposition of DW-2 reveals that, although
he claimed to have heard the telephone call being received, he categorically
stated in his cross-examination that he could not hear the conversation
between the appellant and the complainant. His knowledge regarding the
purpose of the call, therefore, was not derived from having personally heard
the conversation, but from what the appellant subsequently told him. This is
also consistent with his examination-in-chief, wherein he stated that the
appellant had informed him that a dispute was taking place at the
complainant‟s jhuggi and that he was proceeding there in response to the
same. Thus, while the testimony of DW-2 lends some support to the
appellant‟s explanation regarding the receipt of a telephone call, it does not
independently establish either the nature of the dispute or the circumstances
in which the appellant was required to proceed to the complainant‟s jhuggi.
It is also pertinent to note that neither the appellant nor DW-2 made any
Daily Diary entry in connection with the receipt of the alleged call or the
appellant‟s departure from the police station pursuant thereto. This
circumstance assumes some significance, particularly when the appellant
claims to have proceeded to the spot in the discharge of his official duties.
47. There is, however, another circumstance which further weakens the
explanation furnished by the appellant. The shirt worn by the appellant at the
time of the raid, from whose pocket the treated currency notes were
recovered and which was subsequently subjected to the phenolphthalein test,
was described as a purple-blue shirt which was reproduced during trial to
both PW-7 and PW-9 as Ex. P-9. The appellant‟s explanation is that he was
on duty at the relevant time, a fact which finds some support in the
testimony of DW-2. However, the nature of the clothing worn by the
appellant at the time of the raid is a circumstance which requires
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consideration in this context. It is a matter of common knowledge that police
constables of the Delhi Police, when performing their ordinary beat duties,
are ordinarily required to wear their prescribed uniform, subject to the nature
of their deployment and the applicable instructions. The fact that the
appellant was wearing a purple-blue shirt, rather than the prescribed „khaki‟
coloured uniform, therefore, does not sit comfortably with the explanation
that he had proceeded to the spot in the ordinary discharge of his official
duties. Considered cumulatively, these circumstances materially weaken the
appellant‟s explanation that he was present at the spot merely in response to
an emergency call and was thereafter falsely implicated.
48. Learned counsel has further raised an objection concerning Question
No. 29, which, according to the appellant, incorrectly referred to the Deputy
Commissioner of Police as the authority granting sanction for prosecution.
This objection must be distinguished from a substantive challenge to the
validity of the sanction itself. The mere description of the sanctioning
authority in a question put to the appellant cannot determine whether the
sanction was validly granted. That issue must be examined with reference to
the sanction order on record, the identity and designation of the officer who
actually granted it, the authority vested in that officer under the applicable
law, and the evidence led by the prosecution to prove the sanction. In the
present case, R.S. Yadav (PW-5) was examined to prove the sanction, he has
deposed regarding his position as Additional Deputy Commissioner of
Police and his competence to grant the same. The objection concerning the
wording of Question No. 29 would, therefore, assume significance only if
the record establishes a substantive defect in the authority of the officer who
granted sanction or in the sanction itself. It cannot, in isolation, establish
such a defect. The validity of the sanction must consequently be determined
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on the basis of the sanction order and the evidence concerning its grant,
rather than on the description employed in the question put to the appellant.
49. Upon an overall consideration of the evidence, this Court is unable to
accept the submission that the complainant‟s hostility necessarily destroys
the prosecution‟s case. The complainant did not support the prosecution on
the allegation of demand and furnished an explanation that the appellant had
refused the money and that the complainant himself inserted the notes into
the appellant‟s pocket. However, this explanation is contradicted by the
testimony of PW-7, who witnessed the transfer and acceptance and
specifically denied the suggestion that the money had been forcibly thrust
into the appellant‟s pocket despite his refusal. The recovery of the treated
currency notes from the appellant‟s person, together with the positive hand
and pocket washes, lends further support to the evidence concerning the
transfer and handling of the money. The discrepancy regarding the precise
pocket in which PW-7 claimed the object was placed is a circumstance to be
weighed, but it is not sufficient, in the facts of the present case, to erase the
substance of his testimony or to compel acceptance of the defence version.
50. What now falls before this court is the inference concerning demand,
which this court is aware, must be drawn cautiously and from the
circumstantial evidence proved on record. The complaint (Ex. PW-2/A)
cannot be treated as substantive proof of the allegations, neither the recovery
of the treated currency nor the positive washes can independently establish a
prior demand. Nevertheless, the prosecution‟s case is not founded upon
recovery or veracity of the complaint (Ex. PW-2/A) alone. The complaint
may lend assistance to the prosecution‟s case to the limited extent that it put
into motion the events leading up to the trap while providing the context in
which the alleged transaction took place. Even if the complaint were to be
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kept aside momentarily, Lakhan Singh(PW-7) supplies direct evidence of
the transfer and acceptance and rejects the explanation that the money was
forcibly inserted into the appellant‟s pocket as well as the appellant‟s alleged
refusal to accept the same. Apart from this, PW-7 also provides a direct
account about the recovery of the treated currency notes as well as the
subsequent hand washes thus, providing and account for both scientific as
well as procedural evidence. While the deposition of PW-7 with respect to
the recovery and the hand wash may not lend much assistance towards the
core requirement of evidence i.e. towards the factum of demand and
acceptance, it nevertheless provides a first-hand account and an unbroken
chain of events which in turn, lends considerable credibility to the testimony
of PW-7. Considered cumulatively, these circumstances support the
prosecution case that the payment was not an accidental or forcibly
engineered transfer, but a transaction involving the appellant‟s knowing and
voluntary receipt of the money in the circumstances of the trap.
51. So far as Section 7 of the PC Act is concerned, the distinction
explained in Neeraj Dutta (supra) assumes significant importance. The
prosecution‟s original case was that the payment followed a demand for
illegal gratification. The absence of direct testimony from the complainant
does not preclude the Court from considering whether the relevant facts
have been established circumstantially. Further, for the purpose of Section 7
of the PC Act, the law recognises that knowing and voluntary acceptance of
an independent offer of illegal gratification may constitute the offence even
in the absence of proof of a prior demand by the public servant. While every
receipt of money cannot be converted into an offence under Section 7 of the
PC Act, in the present case, the evidence of PW-7 regarding voluntary
acceptance, considered with the recovery and the positive washes,
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establishes more than the mere presence of the treatedcurrency notes on the
appellant‟s person. The circumstances in which the complainant handed
over the money, the appellant‟s receipt of it, and the subsequent recovery of
the very treated notes, when read together, support the conclusion that the
appellant knowingly and willingly accepted the illegal gratification.
52. The charge under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2), requires
separate consideration because the former provision, as applicable in the
present case, concerns the public servant obtaining illegal gratification by
the means specified therein. In this regard, the prosecution‟s case is that the
appellant obtained the money pursuant to the demand alleged to have been
made in connection with the complainant‟s factory. As explained in Neeraj
Dutta (supra), the requisite demand and obtainment may be established
through circumstantial evidence, but the Court must be satisfied that the
circumstances prove the facts constituting the offence beyond reasonable
doubt. For the reasons already discussed, the testimony of PW-7 cannot be
treated as neutral or irrelevant merely because he did not hear the demand.
On the contrary, his account of the voluntary transfer, his rejection of the
suggestion of forcible insertion, and the corroborative evidence of recovery
and chemical washes must all be considered in their cumulative effect. In the
facts of the present case, these circumstances, considered with the sequence
in which the complaint was made and the trap was arranged, support the
prosecution‟s case that the appellant obtained the illegal gratification in the
course of the raid and the transaction alleged against him.
53. The findings of the learned Trial Court, therefore, cannot be set aside
merely on the ground that the complainant turned hostile or that PW-7 did
not provide direct testimony to the precise words of the alleged demand. The
law on this aspect has been propounded at length and it does not require this
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Court to accept the version of the defence simply because the complainant
resiled from his earlier allegations, nor does it permit this Court to convict
an accused solely because the treated notes were recovered. In the present
case, the testimony of the shadow witness Radha Kishan (PW-7) concerning
the transaction, supplemented by the deposition of the Raid Officer Insp.
S.S. Sandhu (PW-9) the circumstances of recovery, and the positive hand
and pocket washes, when assessed together, provide a sufficient evidentiary
basis to sustain the conclusion that the appellant knowingly and voluntarily
accepted the illegal gratification and that the prosecution has established the
relevant ingredients of the offences charged.
54. For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds no sufficient ground to
interfere with the judgment of conviction dated 07.11.2008. The prosecution
has established the appellant‟s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the
offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2),
of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
55. The conviction recorded by the learned Trial Court is accordingly
upheld, and the appeal, insofar as it challenges the judgment of conviction,
is dismissed.
56. The Appellant shall surrender forthwith to undergo the sentence
awarded and shall be entitled to the benefit of set off under Section 428
Cr.P.C., as already granted by the learned Trial Court.
57. Appeal along with pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of
accordingly
58. Copy of the judgment be transmitted to the Trial Court and Prison
Authorities for information and requisite compliance.

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VIMAL KUMAR YADAV, J
NOVEMBER 04, 2026/ ij
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