Deepjot Singh Anand vs Union Of India

Court
Delhi High Court

$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on: 02.09.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 18.11.2026

+ EX.F.A 12/2026 & CM APPL. 6121/2026 (U/O 39 Rule 10)
DEEPJOT SINGH ANAND .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Mahesh K. Mehta,
Advocate with Appellant in
Person
versus

UNION OF INDIA ...Respondent
Through: Appearance not given.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR

J U D G M E N T
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
1
1. The present Execution First Appeal , filed under Section 104
read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeks to
assail the Order dated 17.12.2025 , passed by the learned District
2
Judge-02, West District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi in Execution
3
Petition, being Ex. 202/2017 .
2. By way of the said Execution Petition, the Appellant sought
execution of Decree drawn from the Judgement dated 10.05.2016,
4
corrected vide Order Dated 07.03.2017 , by the Court of learned
Additional District Judge-02, West District, Tis Hazari Courts,

1
Present Appeal
2
Executing Court
3
Execution Petition
4
Reference Decree/ Judgment
Signature Not Verified
EX.F.A 12/2026 Page 1 of 37
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:14:48

5
Delhi , in Reference proceedings under Section 18 of the Land
6 7
Acquisition Act, 1894 , being LAC No. 8/10/01 , whereby interest on
the original awarded compensation for delay in disbursement;
enhanced compensation, together with consequential benefits and
interest thereupon, was awarded to the Appellant.
3. By way of the Impugned Order, the learned Executing Court,
upon consideration of the material on record, the payments made, and
the rival computations placed before it, determined that a further sum
of ₹88,681/- remained payable to the Appellant under the Reference
Judgment and Decree.

FACTUAL MATRIX:
I. Acquisition and LAC’s Award
4. The Appellant's land, situated in Village Tikri Kalan , Delhi, and
measuring 25 bighas 13 biswas , was acquired by the Government of
NCT of Delhi under the LA Act. Of this, 18 bighas 5 biswas were
classified as Category „A‟ land and 7 bighas 8 biswas as Category „B‟
land. The notification under Section 4 of the LA Act was issued on
12.08.1997, and the declaration under Section 6 followed on
10.09.1997. The urgency provisions under Section 17 were invoked,
and possession of the land was taken on 13.11.1997.
5. By Award dated 15.09.1998, bearing Award No. 3/DCW/98-
8 9
99 dated 15.09.1998 , the Land Acquisition Collector (West)
assessed the market value at ₹2,08,333/- per bigha for Category „A‟
land and ₹1,83,333/- per bigha for Category „B‟ land. The total

5
Reference Court
6
LA Act
7
Reference Petition
8
Award
9
LAC
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:14:48

market value thus came to ₹51,58,741.45, which, upon the addition of
solatium and the additional amount, resulted in total compensation of
₹68,65,790.20. By Notice dated 29.10.1998, the Appellant was
informed that a sum of ₹72,51,223.77 was payable to him, inclusive of
interest at the rate of 9% per annum on the market value for the period
between the taking of possession and the making of the Award.
II. Delayed Payment and the Resulting Writ Petition
6. The said amount was, however, not paid to the Appellant, who
10
consequently approached this Court by way of W.P.(C) 5463/1999 .
Pursuant to the directions issued in the Writ Petition, a cheque for the
11
awarded amount of ₹72,12,682/- , after deduction of tax at source,
12
was handed over to the Appellant in Court on 20.02.2002 .
7. During the pendency of the said Writ Petition, the LAC made
two further payments to the Appellant in February 2005. The first, of
₹3,84,295/- on 07.02.2005, was towards interest for a part of the
period of delay. The second, of ₹1,27,538/- on 15.02.2005, was
towards interest on the solatium and the additional amount, in view of
13
the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Sunder v. Union of India ,
which held that interest under the LA Act is payable on the entire
compensation, including solatium , and not merely on the market
value.
8. The Writ Petition was thereafter disposed of vide Judgment
dated 05.05.2005, with a direction to the Reference Court to determine
whether anything further was payable to the Appellant for the period

10
Writ Petition
11
The net amount is variously recorded in the Reference Judgment as ₹72,12,668/- (Paragraph No.
35) and ₹72,12,688/- (paragraph 34); the figure adopted is that in the payment table at Paragraph
No. 33 of the Impugned Order.
12
The payment is recorded as made on 08.02.2002 in Paragraph No. 33 of the Impugned Order;
the Reference Judgment and the Order of this Court record that the cheque was handed over on
20.02.2002.
13
(2001) 7 SCC 211.
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:14:48

of delay.
III. Reference Proceedings
9. The Appellant's reference under Section 18 of the LA Act,
registered as LAC No. 8/10/01, was decided by the learned Additional
District Judge-02 (West), Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, by Judgment dated
10.05.2016, as corrected by Order dated 07.03.2017. The Reference
Judgment granted the Appellant two distinct sets of relief.
10. The first relief related to the delay in payment of the
compensation awarded by the LAC. By Paragraph No. 35 of the
Reference Judgment, the Reference Court directed payment of interest
at the rate of 15% per annum under Section 34 of the LA Act on the
14
compensation awarded by the LAC, for the period from 15.09.1998
to 20.02.2002, during which that compensation had remained unpaid.
For ready reference, the said paragraph has been reproduced
hereunder:
“ 35. I have considered respective submissions of Counsels for
parties. The petitioner has proved that the acquired land was
possessed by LAC on 13.11.1997 and award was pronounced on
15.09.1998. The petitioner further proved the correspondence with
the LAC whereby compensation was demanded and ultimately a
Civil Writ No. 5463/99 filed before the Hon'ble High Court. It is
further proved on record that a cheque of Rs.72,12,668/- was
handed over to the petitioner before the Hon'ble High Court on
20.02.2002. It establish beyond any doubt that Land Acquisition
Collector failed to pay the amount of compensation till 20.02.2002
since the pronouncement of award on 15.09.1998. Hence, issue is
decided in favour of petitioner and against the respondents. I direct
the respondents to pay interest @ 15% p.a. for the period
15.09.1988 [sic.15.09.1998] to 20.02.2002 under Section 34 of the
Act on the compensation awarded by the Collector in the award to
the petitioner.”

11. The second relief related to the inadequacy of the Award itself.
The Reference Court enhanced the market value to ₹2,35,815/- per

14
The date of commencement of this period, initially recorded as 15.09.1988, was subsequently
corrected by an Order dated 07.03.2017.
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:14:48

bigha for Category „A‟ land and ₹1,90,156/- per bigha for Category
„B‟ land, i.e. , by ₹27,482/- and ₹6,823/- per bigha respectively. By
Paragraph Nos. 43 to 46 of the Reference Judgment, it granted
solatium at the rate of 30% and the additional amount at the rate of
12% per annum on the enhanced compensation. It also granted interest
thereon under Section 28 of the LA Act, at the rate of 9% per annum
for the first year from the date of taking possession and 15% per
annum thereafter “till the entire payment of the compensation is
made” . For ready reference, the relevant paragraphs have been
reproduced hereunder:
“ 43. In view of the above discussion & observations and having
regard to the fact and circumstances of the present case, the present
reference under Section 18 of the Act is disposed of by holding that
the compensation awarded to the petitioners @ Rs.8,80,000/- per
acre or Rs.1,83,333/- per bigha by the Collector was inadequate
and unreasonable. The petitioner is required to be paid the
compensation @ Rs.2,35,815/- for 'A' category and Rs.1,90,156/-
for 'B' category for the acquired land in question.
44. The petitioner is thus entitled to the above said enhancement in
the compensation along with 30% solatium.
45. The petitioners will also be entitled to additional amount @
12% per annum from the date of notification till the date of award
i.e. from 12.08.1997 to 15.09.1998.
46. In additional to above, the petitioner shall be entitled to the
interest @ 9% p.a. for the first year from the date of taking
possession of the land in question and @ 15% p.a. for the
subsequent years till the entire payment of the compensation is
made as per Section 28 of the Act.”

12. By Paragraph No. 47 of the Reference Judgment, the Appellant
was further held entitled to statutory benefits in accordance with
Sunder (supra) . For ready reference, the said paragraph has been
reproduced hereunder:
“ 47. The petitioners will also be entitled to the statutory benefits in
accordance with the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India
in case titled as 'Sunder vs. UOI' reported as 93 (2001) DLT
569 .”

Signature Not Verified
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:14:48

13. By Paragraph No. 48, however, the Reference Court declined
interest at the rate of 15% per annum for the period from 18.02.2010
to 30.03.2016, on the ground that the Appellant had himself delayed
the proceedings during that period. For ready reference, the said
paragraph has been reproduced hereunder:
“ 48. The petitioner is not entitled to interest of 15% because the
proceedings have been delayed by the petitioner since 18.02.2010
as petitioner failed to lead any evidence despite six opportunities
and moved one application or the other to delay the proceedings.
Even after conclusion of evidence by the petitioner on 01.03.2011,
he filed applications which were dismissed by this Court as well as
by the Hon'ble High Court with costs. Hence, the petitioner is not
entitled to 15% interest from 18.02.2010 to 30.03.2016.”

14. Subsequently, vide Order dated 16.07.2023 passed in M.A. No.
228/2020, the period for computation of the additional amount was
confined to 12.08.1997 to 13.11.1997 by the learned Reference Court,
since possession had been taken before the Award was made.
IV. Execution of the Reference Judgment and Decree
15. In 2017, the Appellant instituted an Execution Petition, being
Ex. 202/2017, before the learned Executing Court, seeking
enforcement of the Reference Judgement and Decree.
Payments during the Execution Proceedings
16. In the course of the execution proceedings, sums of
₹20,35,662/- and ₹3,76,389/-, each inclusive of tax deducted at
source, were released towards the enhanced compensation and interest
thereon on 19.09.2017 and 23.08.2018, respectively . A further sum of
₹28,85,895/-, inclusive of tax deducted at source, was released on
28.11.2018 towards the interest awarded under Paragraph No. 35 of
the Reference Judgment.
Dispute over Computation
17. The dispute in execution centred on a single question. The
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:14:48

interest awarded under Paragraph No. 35 of the Reference Judgment
had become payable in 2002 but was paid only on 28.11.2018. The
Appellant claimed that this amount constituted a “statutory benefit”
forming part of the compensation. He contended that, on the strength
of Sunder (supra) and Paragraph No. 47 of the Reference Judgment, it
must carry further interest for the intervening period at the rates
prescribed in Paragraph No. 46 of the Reference Judgment.
18. The Civil Nazir declined to compute the claim on that basis,
treating it as a claim for “interest upon interest” .
19. In the course of the execution proceedings, the Appellant filed
three calculations, each proceeding on a different basis, claiming
₹1,02,93,325/- in 2017, ₹1,16,54,931/- on 29.04.2019 and
₹2,10,32,977/- on 14.05.2025. In the last of these, after giving credit
for ₹50,46,714/- received after the Reference Judgment, he claimed a
net balance of ₹1,59,86,263/-.

20. The LAC, by report dated 13.05.2025, reflected an amount of
₹33,97,629.78 as payable to the Appellant. In a subsequent report, the
LAC acknowledged that the two payments made in February 2005
had not been accounted for. It revised the balance to ₹28,85,795/- and
requested that the figure be cross-checked against the computation
prepared by the Civil Nazir.
21. The Civil Nazir computed the amounts payable under the
Reference Judgment, as modified, under two separate heads, namely :
(a) the original compensation together with interest for delay, and
(b) the enhanced compensation together with interest thereon.
22. After giving credit for all the payments set out hereinabove, and
adjusting an excess payment of ₹1,82,733/- under the head of
enhanced compensation, the Civil Nazir determined the balance
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:14:48

payable to the Appellant to be ₹88,681/-.
V. Impugned Order and the present Appeal
23. By the Impugned Order dated 17.12.2025, the learned
Executing Court accepted the computation prepared by the Civil Nazir
while holding that Paragraph No. 35 of the Reference Judgment grants
interest only on the compensation awarded by the LAC for the
specified period of delay, and confers no entitlement to interest upon
that interest. It further held that Sunder (supra) brings solatium within
the amount on which interest is payable, but does not authorise
interest upon interest.
24. It also noted that the LAC's earlier report had not accounted for
the payments already made, and that the Appellant's computation of
the additional amount was contrary to the Order dated 16.07.2023.
The learned Executing Court accordingly held the Appellant entitled
to a sum of ₹88,681/- and directed the LAC to pay the same within
two days.
25. Aggrieved thereby, the Appellant has preferred the present
Appeal. He seeks a direction that the interest awarded under
Paragraph No. 35 of the Reference Judgment be treated as a “statutory
relief” forming part of the compensation, and that further interest be
paid thereon in terms of Sunder (supra) and the Reference Judgment.

SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT:
26. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant would
assail the Impugned Order, whereby the learned Executing Court held
that only a sum of ₹88,681/- remains payable to the Appellant under
the Reference Judgment and Decree. Learned counsel for the
Appellant would contend that the said computation is erroneous,
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:14:48

inasmuch as a sum of ₹1,59,86,263/- is due to him, and not ₹88,681/-.
27. Learned counsel for the Appellant would submit that the said
discrepancy in the amount due to him arose because the learned
Executing Court misconstrued the purport of Paragraph Nos. 46 and
47 of the Reference Judgment, since the amount granted to him under
Paragraph No. 35 of the Reference Judgment, by way of interest for
the delay in payment of the compensation awarded by the Collector,
was itself liable to carry interest for the period during which it
remained unpaid.
28. Learned counsel for the Appellant, elaborating upon the
aforesaid contention, would submit that the Reference Judgment
granted the Appellant two distinct reliefs, namely, first, the relief
granted under Paragraph No. 35 of the Reference Judgment, whereby
the Reference Court held that the Land Acquisition Collector had
failed to pay the compensation until 20.02.2002 and directed payment
of interest at 15% per annum under Section 34 of the LA Act for the
period from 15.09.1998 to 20.02.2002; and secondly , the enhanced
compensation determined by the Reference Court, together with
solatium , additional amount and interest under Paragraph Nos. 43 to
46 of the Reference Judgment.
29. Learned counsel for the Appellant would therefore contend that
the computation of the Civil Nazir, and consequently the Impugned
Order, gives effect only to the reliefs granted in Paragraph Nos. 43 to
46 of the Reference Judgment and fails to give full effect to the relief
granted under Paragraph No. 35 of the Reference Judgment. The
Appellant's case is that the amount granted under Paragraph No. 35 of
the Reference Judgment is not “mere interest” but a “statutory relief”
for the Respondent's delay in disbursing the compensation, and that it
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:14:48

forms a component of compensation, as such, liable to carry interest
until paid. In support, learned counsel advances two independent
limbs of challenge.

In respect of the First limb being that the Reference Judgment in
Paragraph No. 46 itself provides for interest on the amount under
Paragraph No. 35 thereof

30. Learned counsel for the Appellant would contend that the
Reference Judgment itself directs interest on the amount awarded
under Paragraph No. 35 of the Reference Judgment. It would be
submitted that Paragraph No. 46 of the Reference Judgment entitles
the Appellant to interest at 9% per annum for the first year and 15%
per annum for the subsequent years “till the entire payment of the
compensation is made as per Section 28 of the Act” , and that Section
28 of the LA Act provides for interest on the excess compensation
granted by the Court, which has been granted to the Appellant in
Paragraph No. 35 of the Reference Judgment.
31. Learned counsel for the Appellant would therefore submit that,
on this reading, the amount granted under Paragraph No. 35 of the
Reference Judgment, which became payable when the awarded
compensation was paid in 2002, forms part of “the compensation” ,
whose “entire payment” had not been made until 28.11.2018. It
would therefore be submitted that interest under Paragraph No. 46 of
the Reference Judgment runs on that amount for the intervening
period, until it was paid in full.

In respect of the Second limb being Sunder (supra) and Paragraph
No. 47 of the Reference Judgment, making the amount part of the
compensation

32. Learned counsel for the Appellant would contend that,
independently of the direction in Paragraph No. 46 of the Reference
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:14:48

Judgment, the amount under Paragraph No. 35 of the Reference
Judgment carries interest by virtue of the decision of the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court in Sunder (supra) , the benefit of which is expressly
extended to the Appellant by Paragraph No. 47 of the Reference
Judgment. It would be submitted that in Sunder (supra) , it was held
that the expression “compensation” , though not defined in the LA
Act, means the aggregate of all statutory benefits made available to a
landowner under the Act, including solatium and interest, under
Section 34 thereof.
33. Learned counsel for the Appellant would further submit that the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court, in the same decision, held that where any
component of compensation is not included at the time of its
computation, and is subsequently held to be payable, the State is liable
to pay interest on the amount so left unpaid in terms of Section 34 of
the LA Act. It would be urged that, just as the solatium in Sunder
(supra) was held to carry interest, the amount awarded under
Paragraph No. 35 of the Reference Judgment must likewise carry
interest.
34. It would therefore be contended that the amount under
Paragraph No. 35 of the Reference Judgment, being a statutory relief
forming part of the compensation, was payable to the Appellant when
the awarded amount was paid in 2002 and, having been withheld by
the Respondent and paid substantially only on 28.11.2018, it is said to
carry interest for the intervening period. It would be submitted that
since Paragraph No. 47 of the Reference Judgment categorically
entitles the Appellant to “the statutory benefits in accordance with”
Sunder (supra) , which, according to learned counsel, is wide enough
to extend to the amount awarded under Paragraph No. 35 of the
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:14:48

Reference Judgment.
35. On either limb, learned counsel for the Appellant would
contend that the learned Executing Court misconstrued both the
Reference Judgment and Sunder (supra) in characterising the
Appellant's claim as one for interest upon interest. It is urged that the
Appellant does not seek interest on interest, but interest on a statutory
relief which, by the terms of the Reference Judgment read with
Sunder (supra) , forms part of the compensation payable to him. The
claim, according to learned counsel, therefore flows from the
Reference Judgment itself, and the learned Executing Court, in
declining to give effect to it, failed to execute the Judgment and
Decree in its true terms.
36. Learned counsel for the Appellant would further submit that the
Respondent, including the beneficiary department, the Directorate of
Education, did not challenge the relief granted under Paragraph No. 35
in their Appeal against the Reference Judgment, and that it has,
therefore, attained finality. It would also be contended that the
Respondent filed no objections to the Appellant's calculations before
the learned Executing Court, and that the objection that the Appellant
was claiming interest on interest was raised only by the Civil Nazir,
on an informal objection of the LAC, and that, in the absence of any
objection by the Respondent, the Appellant's calculations ought to
have been accepted.
37. Learned counsel for the Appellant would accordingly pray that
the Impugned Order be set aside, and that the Respondent be directed
to treat the amount granted under Paragraph No. 35 of the Reference
Judgment as statutory relief forming part of the compensation, and to
pay interest thereon in terms of Sunder (supra) and at the rates
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:14:48

directed under Paragraph No. 46 of the Reference Judgment.
38. No other ground was pressed into service or submission
advanced on behalf of the Appellant.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT:
39. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent would
support the Impugned Order and contend that an Executing Court
cannot travel beyond the terms of the Decree/Judgement it is called
upon to execute. Paragraph No. 35 of the Reference Judgment directs
payment of interest at 15% per annum under Section 34 of the LA Act
on the compensation awarded by the LAC, and that too only up to
20.02.2002. No paragraph of the Reference Judgment grants interest
upon the interest so awarded. Significantly, even Row No. 7 of the
Appellant's own Execution Petition did not claim any such relief.
40. Learned counsel for the Respondent, answering the first limb of
the challenge, would submit that Paragraph No. 46 of the Reference
Judgment grants interest “as per Section 28 of the Act” , which
operates only on the excess compensation determined by the
Reference Court, namely , the enhancement granted under Paragraph
Nos. 43 to 45 of the Reference Judgment. Learned counsel would
submit that the amount awarded under Paragraph No. 35 of the
Reference Judgment is not such “excess compensation” , as the
Appellant seeks to construe, but is interest under Section 34 of the LA
Act upon the compensation awarded by the LAC.
41. It would be submitted that such interest compensates the
landowner for being deprived of the use of the compensation amount
during the period of delay in its disbursement, and remains distinct
from the compensation itself. What the Appellant describes as “excess
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:14:48

compensation” is, therefore, interest and not compensation, and the
attempt to levy further interest on it at 9% and 15% per annum is, in
substance, a claim for compound interest, which the LA Act does not
contemplate.
42. Learned counsel for the Respondent, controverting the second
limb of the challenge, would contend that the reliance sought to be
placed on the Judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Sunder
(supra) by the Appellant is misconceived, inasmuch as the said
decision recognises the entitlement of a landowner to interest on
solatium , in addition to interest on the market value of the acquired
land and does not hold that interest awarded for delayed payment
becomes a component of compensation.
43. Learned counsel for the Respondent would submit that
Paragraph No. 47 of the Reference Judgment only extends the
aforesaid benefit to the Appellant, and which has already been given
effect to. It would be submitted that the payment of ₹1,27,538/- made
on 15.02.2005 was released in view of Sunder (supra) , and the Civil
Nazir has computed interest on the entire compensation, including
solatium and the additional amount and further that Paragraph No. 47
of the Reference Judgment was, in essence, a direction to give effect
to Sunder (supra) by computing interest on the compensation
inclusive of solatium and the additional amount, under both heads,
which has already been done.
44. Learned counsel for the Respondent, in view of the foregoing,
would submit that the submission of the Appellant that the interest
granted under Paragraph No. 35 of the Reference Judgment amounts
to “Statutory Benefit”/“Compensation” in terms of Sunder (supra) or
amounts to “excess compensation” in terms of Section 28 of the LA
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:14:48

Act, thereby drawing benefit from Paragraph No. 46 of the Reference
Judgement, cannot be sustained, and therefore, the challenge to the
Impugned Order fails on both the limbs of challenge, as sought to be
raised on behalf of the Appellant.
45. Learned counsel for the Respondent would further submit that
the contention of the Appellant that the absence of any challenge to
Paragraph No. 35 of the Reference Judgment would entail finality in
terms of Appellant‟s own construction and interpretation of the
directions cannot be sustained. It would be submitted that what the
Appellant herein is seeking to do is to enlarge the scope of the
Reference Judgment and reap benefits which neither are contemplated
in the statute nor have been granted by the Reference Judgment.
46. Learned counsel would further contend that the calculations
furnished by the Appellant are ex facie erroneous. The Appellant has
applied an incorrect differential rate to Category „A‟ land and adopted
incorrect areas, calculated solatium on a time basis, extended the
period of the additional amount beyond that permissible, and claimed
interest from 12.08.1997, although possession was taken only on
13.11.1997. He has, moreover, furnished three separate calculations,
each proceeding on a different basis, which itself demonstrates the
inconsistency of the claim and has, most importantly, claimed
“interest on interest” , which in view of the foregoing submissions is
erroneous.
47. Learned counsel for the Respondent would submit that the
computation of the Civil Nazir accords with the Reference Judgment,
and that the Appellant has been unable to point out any arithmetical
error in the computation thereof. It would therefore be submitted that
the Impugned Order calls for no interference, and the present Appeal
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:14:48

is, accordingly, liable to be dismissed.
48. No other submission was advanced on behalf of the
Respondent.

ANALYSIS:
49. This Court has heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the parties and, with their able assistance, perused the material
available on record.
50. At the outset, it is necessary to note that, for clarity and
convenience, the ensuing analysis and discussion are arranged
hereinafter under separate headings corresponding to the principal
issues addressed. The said headings are merely intended to facilitate
the orderly appreciation of the reasoning and are not to be construed
as creating isolated compartments between the issues. The Judgment
is to be read as a whole, and the findings recorded under each heading
shall be understood in the context of, and in conjunction with, the
findings and reasoning contained in the other parts of the Judgment.

Scope of Controversy
51. The controversy arising in the present Appeal turns on the
construction of the Reference Judgment and, in particular, the legal
character of the interest awarded under Paragraph No. 35 thereof. The
rival submissions, though founded on different constructions of the
Reference Judgment, converge on a common question, namely ,
whether the interest awarded under Section 34 of the LA Act for the
delayed disbursement of the compensation, determined by the LAC,
can itself be treated as a component of compensation, so as to attract
further interest thereupon under Paragraph No. 46 of the Reference
Judgment, or by virtue of the statutory benefits referred to in
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:14:48

Paragraph No. 47 of the Reference Judgment in accordance with
Sunder (supra) .
Reference Judgment and Decree
52. Before examining the rival contentions in light of the statutory
scheme, it is necessary to refer to the relevant directions in the
Reference Judgment dated 10.05.2016, as corrected and modified by
the subsequent Orders. The relevant analysis and findings are
reproduced in full below:
“ 30. I have heard Sh. Mahesh Mehta, Ld. Counsel for the
petitioner, Sh. I.P. Singh, Ld. Counsel for the respondent no. 1/
Union of India and perused the record. My findings on issues are as
under:
31. The issues which were framed on 06.02.2013 are taken up first:
ISSUE NO.1:
32. This issue is framed as pleaded by respondent in the written
statement. However, neither any evidence led nor same has been
pressed at the time of final arguments. Therefore, in these
circumstances, the issue is decided against the respondents and in
favour of the petitioner.
33. The remaining two issues shall be taken up with the issues
framed on 20.11.2007. Now I will take issues framed on
06.03.2010:
"1(a) Whether the respondents have caused delay in
making payment of compensation in respect of
petitioner's acquired land in village Tikri Kalan? If
yes, by what period and whether the petitioner is
entitled to interest, if yes, at what rate and for which
period? OPP
34. The onus to prove this issue is on the petitioner, who examined
Sh. Deepjot Singh as PW1, who proved his affidavit Ex. PW1. As
per Section 19 Statement, the possession of acquired land was
taken on 13.11.1997. PW1 also deposed that award was made on
15.09.1998. Petitioner caused appearance before LAC on
10.11.1998 and reminded him in writing for release of
compensation and proved the reminder Ex. PW1/15. He further
proved the letter dated 03.12.1998, 08.12.1998, 03.04.1999 and
10.06.1999 Ex. PW1/16 to 19. Several letters were written to LAC
and Director of Education for release of the compensation amount.
PW1 further proved the legal notice dated 20.07.1999 served upon
respondents through Advocate Sh.A.P. Mahajan, Ex. PW1/20.
PW1 further proved that a writ petition titled as 'Sh. Deepjot Singh
Anand vs. Union of India & others' Civil Writ No. 5463/99 filed
before the Hon'ble High Court and proved two orders dated
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:14:48

28.01.2002 and 20.02.2002 Ex. PW1/29 and 30. In the cross-
examination, respondent did not put any question or suggestion on
the all exhibited documents including the filing of the Writ petition
by the petitioner. Further, there is no cross-examination by the
respondents on the point of non entitlement of compensation for the
period 23.10.1998 to 19.02.2002. Although Ex. PW1/30, the order
of Hon'ble High Court specifically mentioned that a cheque of
Rs.72,12,688/- was handed over to petitioner from the office of
LAC before the Court. It is not disputed by parties that the above
said writ petition was disposed of vide judgment dated 05.05.2005
by the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Swatantra Kumar, J and Hon'ble Mr.
Justice Madan B. Lokur, J. whereby the directions have been given
to this court to determine the final amount payable to the petitioner
including the above said period from 23.10.1998 to 19.02.2002.
35. I have considered respective submissions of Counsels for
parties. The petitioner has proved that the acquired land was
possessed by LAC on 13.11.1997 and award was pronounced on
15.09.1998. The petitioner further proved the correspondence with
the LAC whereby compensation was demanded and ultimately a
Civil Writ No. 5463/99 filed before the Hon'ble High Court. It is
further proved on record that a cheque of Rs.72,12,668/- was
handed over to the petitioner before the Hon'ble High Court on
20.02.2002. It establish beyond any doubt that Land
Acquisition Collector failed to pay the amount of compensation
till 20.02.2002 since the pronouncement of award on
15.09.1998. Hence, issue is decided in favour of petitioner and
against the respondents. I direct the respondents to pay interest
@ 15% p.a. for the period 15.09.1988 [sic.15.09.1998] to
20.02.2002 under Section 34 of the Act on the compensation
awarded by the Collector in the award to the petitioner.
36. Now coming to the issue no.2 framed on 06.02.2003 and issue
nos. 1 & 2 framed vide order dated 20.11.2007:
ISSUE NO. 2 dated 06.02.2003
And
ISSUE NO. 1 & 2 dated 20.11.2007
37. In the present case the land of petitioner as per Section 19
statement filed by the Collector mention rates for Block - A and
Block – B and the Collector vide above mentioned Award No.
3/DCW/98-99 dated 15.09.1998 has fixed the value of the acquired
land @ Rs.8,80,000/- per acre or Rs.1,83,333/- per bigha. The
petitioner in the affidavit Ex. PW1 deposed that the acquired land
should have been calculated at the rate fixed for category 'A' as no
part of it liable to be calculated otherwise. The calculation of the
Collector would have been done justly, fairly and reasonably. I
have gone through the Award Ex. R-1, where the land comprising
of 67 Bigha calculated in Category 'B' and rest of the land was in
Category 'A'. According to Section 19 statement land of petitioner
having Khasra no. 65/5/2, 6/1, 66/1/2/1 min, 1/2/2 min and 10/1
falls in category 'B'. As per record petitioner has not filed any
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:14:48

objections to Section 19 statement. In the amended reference also
there is no mentioning of any objection for the category 'B' land by
the petitioner as assessed by the Collector. Petitioner proved on
record Ex. PW1/3 to PW1/10, Khasra Girdawaris from the year
1985-86 to 1996-97, according to which Khasra no. 65//2 (0-12)
(structure), Khasra No.6/1 (2-8) (structure), Khasra No. 66/1/2/1
(0-2) (trees), 1/2/2 min (2-7) (trees), Khasra No. 10/1 (2-8).
However, as per award Ex. R-1, some part of Khasra no. 65/5/2,
6/1, 62/1/2/1, 1/2/2 also shown in category 'A'. The Collector has
correctly shown the categories of acquired land in his award Ex. R-
1 as category 'A and 'B', which is corroborated by Ex. PW1/3 to
PW1/10. Therefore, I do not find any error committed by Collector
in the award Ex. R-1 as well as in Section 19 Statement.
38. Hence, on the basis of above observation and discussion,
petitioner failed to establish/prove that all his land belong to
category 'A'. The petitioner is entitled to the rate as per award of his
acquired land as per categorization by Collector of both categories
'A' and 'B' respectively of respective portions.
39. The petitioner in this case has relied upon the order/judgment
dated 19.12.2008 passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in LA
(Appeal) No. 193/06 in case titled as "Partap Singh (dead) through
LRs etc. etc. vs. UOI & Ors" pertaining to Award No. 3/DCW/98-
99 dated 15.09.1998 of same village i.e. Tikri Kalan, wherein the
Hon'ble High Court has fixed the fair market value of the acquired
land of Block -A @ Rs.2,35,815/- and Block – B @ Rs.1,90,156/-.
40. In the case titled as ,"Nand Ram Vs. State of Haryana" reported
as JT 1988 (4) SC 260, it has been inter-alia held that if a
compensation amount is already fixed for a land then the same
amount of compensation has to be given to the other land owners
whose similarly placed land situated adjacent is acquired under the
same notification.
41. In the instant case, the petitioners have not brought on record
any evidence, documentary or otherwise that their land was having
more potential and that the compensation should have been granted
to them at a higher rate.
42. In these circumstances and in view of the aforesaid judgment of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Nand Ram
(Supra) and having regard to the fact and circumstances of the
present case, the petitioners shall be entitled to the compensation as
awarded by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi vide above said
order/judgment dated 19.12.2008 in LA Appeal Nos. 193/06 &
284, 229, 228 etc. of 2007 in case titled as "Pratap Singh (dead)
through LRs etc. etc. vs. UOI & Ors." in respect of the same village
i.e. Rs.2,35,815/- for 'A' category and Rs.1,90,156/- for 'B' category
for the acquired land in question. Hence, in view of the above,
issue no. 2 of dated 06.02.2003 and issue no. 1 & 2 dated
20.11.2007 are decided accordingly.
(RELIEF)
43. In view of the above discussion & observations and having
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
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regard to the fact and circumstances of the present case, the present
reference under Section 18 of the Act is disposed of by holding that
the compensation awarded to the petitioners @ Rs.8,80,000/- per
acre or Rs.1,83,333/- per bigha by the Collector was inadequate
and unreasonable. The petitioner is required to be paid the
compensation @ Rs.2,35,815/- for 'A' category and Rs.1,90,156/-
for 'B' category for the acquired land in question.
44. The petitioner is thus entitled to the above said enhancement in
the compensation along with 30% solatium.
45. The petitioners will also be entitled to additional amount @
12% per annum from the date of notification till the date of award
i.e. from 12.08.1997 to 15.09.1998.
46. In additional to above, the petitioner shall be entitled to the
interest @ 9% p.a. for the first year from the date of taking
possession of the land in question and @ 15% p.a. for the
subsequent years till the entire payment of the compensation is
made as per Section 28 of the Act.
47. The petitioners will also be entitled to the statutory benefits
in accordance with the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court of
India in case titled as 'Sunder vs. UOI' reported as 93 (2001)
DLT 569.
48. The petitioner is not entitled to interest of 15% because the
proceedings have been delayed by the petitioner since 18.02.2010
as petitioner failed to lead any evidence despite six opportunities
and moved one application or the other to delay the proceedings.
Even after conclusion of evidence by the petitioner on 01.03.2011,
he filed applications which were dismissed by this Court as well as
by the Hon'ble High Court with costs. Hence, the petitioner is not
entitled to 15% interest from 18.02.2010 to 30.03.2016.”
(emphasis supplied)

53. A conjoint reading of the aforesaid directions reveals that the
Reference Court granted interest under two distinct provisions of the
Act.
54. Paragraph No. 35 of the Reference Judgment directs payment of
interest at the rate of 15% per annum, under Section 34 of the LA Act,
on the compensation awarded by the Collector for the period of
delayed disbursement ending on 20.02.2002.
55. Paragraph No. 46 of the Reference Judgment, on the other hand,
grants interest at the prescribed rates under Section 28 of the LA Act
on the enhanced compensation determined by the Reference Court.
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:14:48

56. Paragraph No. 47 of the Reference Judgment extends the
statutory benefits recognised in Sunder (supra).
57. It is the legal relationship between these directions, and the
extent to which one may operate upon the amount awarded under the
other, that lies at the heart of the present controversy. The mere fact
that all three directions form part of the same Judgment does not, by
itself, resolve whether the interest awarded under Paragraph No. 35 of
the Reference Judgment can be treated as a component of
compensation for the purposes of Paragraph Nos. 46 and 47 of the
Reference Judgment.
58. All questions and contentions raised by the Appellant before
this Court would answer themselves upon consideration of the
statutory scheme governing the two heads of interest under the LA
Act, followed by an examination of the scope of the principle laid
down in Sunder (supra) in relation to the express or literal directions,
as noted above, contained in the Reference Judgment.

Section 34 and Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act: Distinct
Statutory Functions

59. Adverting to the first limb of the challenge whereby the
Appellant contends that Paragraph No. 46 of the Reference Judgment,
which grants interest “till the entire payment of the compensation is
made as per Section 28 of the Act” , extends to the amount awarded
under Paragraph No. 35. The premise is that Section 28 of the LA Act
provides for interest on the “excess compensation” granted by the
Court, and that such excess compensation was granted to the
Appellant under Paragraph No. 35, so that the amount awarded
thereunder carries interest until paid. However, the aforesaid
construction and interpretation finds no support in terms of the
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
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statutory scheme, and therefore, does not commend itself to this
Court.
60. At the threshold, the premise of the submission is contradicted
by the terms of the Reference Judgment itself. Paragraph No. 35 of the
Reference Judgment does not grant any excess compensation. It
directs payment of “interest @ 15% p.a….. under Section 34 of the
Act on the compensation awarded by the Collector” . The excess
compensation, in the sense in which Section 28 of the LA Act uses
that expression, was determined separately, under Paragraph Nos. 43
to 45 of the Reference Judgment. The two grants of interest in the
Reference Judgment are thus made under two different provisions of
the LA Act viz. , Paragraph No. 35 under Section 34 of the LA Act,
and Paragraph No. 46 under Section 28 of the LA Act. Whether one
can be carried into the other depends on the relationship between
those provisions, which read as under:
“ 28. Collector may be directed to pay interest on excess
compensation. -
If the sum which, in the opinion of the Court, the Collector ought to
have awarded as compensation is in excess of the sum which the
Collector did award as compensation, the award of the Court may
direct that the Collector shall pay interest on such excess at the rate
of nine per centum per annum from the date on which he took
possession of the land to the date of payment of such excess into
Court:
Provided that the award of the Court may also direct that where
such excess or any part thereof is paid into Court after the date of
expiry of a period of one year from the date on which possession is
taken, interest at the rate of fifteen per centum per annum shall be
payable from the date of expiry of the said period of one year on
the amount of such excess or part thereof which has not been paid
into Court before the date of such expiry.”

“ 34. Payment of interest. -
When the amount of such compensation is not paid or deposited on
or before taking possession of the land, the Collector shall pay the
amount awarded with interest thereon at the rate of nine per centum
per annum from the time of so taking possession until it shall have
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BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
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been so paid or deposited:
Provided that if such compensation or any part thereof is not paid
or deposited within a period of one year from the date on which
possession is taken, interest at the rate of fifteen per centum per
annum shall be payable from the date of expiry of the said period
of one year on the amount of compensation or part thereof which
has not been paid or deposited before the date of such expiry.”

61. A perusal of the aforestated provisions makes it manifest that
although Sections 28 and 34 prescribe the same rates of interest and
contemplate its accrual from the date of taking possession, they
operate upon different sums and are attracted in different
circumstances:
a) Section 34 of the LA Act operates on “the amount awarded” by
the Collector . It is attracted when that amount is not paid or
deposited on or before the taking of possession, and runs “until
it shall have been so paid or deposited” . The default it
addresses is the delay in paying what the Collector has himself
determined to be due.
b) Section 28 of the LA Act operates only on “such excess” ,
namely, the amount by which the compensation which, “in the
opinion of the Court, the Collector ought to have awarded” ,
exceeds “the sum which the Collector did award” . It runs until
“such excess” is paid into Court. The default it addresses is the
under-valuation of the land by the Collector, which the Court
corrects on reference.
62. The structure and distinction of the two provisions becomes
further clear when the compensation finally payable to a landowner is
seen as the sum of two parts. Where a reference succeeds, the total
compensation consists of (i) the compensation awarded by the
Collector, and (ii) the excess determined by the Court over and above
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
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that award. Section 34 provides interest on the first part, and Section
28 on the second. Each part carries interest from the date of taking
possession until it is paid. The two provisions are thus mutually
exclusive, since neither operates on the sum to which the other
applies. Taken together, they cover the whole of the compensation,
without gap and without overlap. Every rupee of compensation carries
interest once, and only once, from the date on which the owner was
dispossessed until the date on which it is paid.
63. The scheme is a deliberate one. Had either provision been
capable of operating on the sum covered by the other, the same
compensation would attract interest twice over for the same period.
By confining Section 34 to “the amount awarded” and Section 28 to
“such excess” , the statute ensures that interest is neither duplicated
nor compounded. It follows that the two provisions cannot be treated
as interchangeable, or applied cumulatively, merely because they
relate to the same acquisition, prescribe the same rates, or find place in
the same Judgment.
64. A bare reading of the Reference Judgment makes it clear that
the present case follows the statutory scheme precisely. Paragraph No.
35 of the Reference Judgment grants interest “under Section 34 of the
Act on the compensation awarded by the Collector” , for the period
from 15.09.1998 to 20.02.2002, during which that compensation
remained unpaid. Paragraph No. 46 of the Reference Judgment grants
interest “as per Section 28 of the Act” on the enhanced compensation
determined by the Reference Court under Paragraph Nos. 43 to 45 of
the Reference Judgment. Each direction operates on its own part of the
total compensation, and the two do not intersect. This is also how the
Reference Judgment has been executed.
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:14:48

65. The expression “till the entire payment of the compensation is
made” in Paragraph No. 46 of the Reference Judgment, on which the
Appellant places reliance, must be read in the context of the provision
under which that direction was issued. It refers to the payment of the
compensation on which interest under Section 28 runs, namely , the
enhanced compensation. It cannot be read as extending Section 28 to a
different sum, still less to the interest separately granted under Section
34 by Paragraph No. 35 of the Reference Judgment. The submission
that the “entire payment” of the compensation was not made until
28.11.2018 proceeds on treating the interest paid on that date as part
of “ the compensation” . That is the very premise which, for the
reasons stated above, cannot be accepted.
66. The Appellant's construction would require the interest awarded
under Section 34 to be treated as though it were itself “excess”
compensation attracting interest under Section 28 of the LA Act. That
would collapse the two parallel heads into one. It would also produce
precisely what the scheme of the LA Act avoids, i.e. , interest would
first be paid on the Collector's award under Section 34, and then paid
again, under Section 28, on that interest. As rightly contended on
behalf of the Respondent, the interest under Paragraph No. 35 of the
Reference Judgment is not “excess” compensation within the
meaning of Section 28. Nor does Section 34 permit interest payable
under it to be added to “the amount awarded” for computing further
interest.
67. This Court, therefore, holds that the interest granted under
Paragraph No. 35 of the Reference Judgment remains referable to
Section 34 of the LA Act, and that granted under Paragraph No. 46 to
Section 28. Paragraph No. 46 of the Reference Judgment does not
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BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
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authorise interest on the interest granted under Paragraph No. 35 of
the Reference Judgment, and therefore the first limb of the challenge
fails.
68. Whether the Appellant's reliance on Paragraph No. 47 of the
Reference Judgment, and on Sunder (supra) , warrants a different
conclusion is considered hereinafter.

Scope of the Principle in Sunder (supra)
69. The second limb of the Appellant‟s challenge rests upon the
expression “statutory benefits” employed in Paragraph No. 47 of the
Reference Judgment, which extends to the Appellant the benefits
recognised in Sunder (supra) .
70. The Appellant‟s contention is that such benefits are not
confined to the inclusion of solatium and the additional amount in the
base for computing awarded compensation, but also encompass the
interest awarded under Paragraph No. 35 of the Reference Judgment.
On this construction, the said interest, being a statutory entitlement
under Section 34 of the LA Act, must itself carry further interest. The
submission thus calls for an examination of the scope of the
expression “statutory benefits” in Paragraph No. 47 of the Reference
Judgment and the principle for which Sunder (supra) stands.
71. In Sunder (supra) , the question referred to the Constitution
Bench concerned the base on which interest is calculated under the
LA Act. More specifically, the Court had to determine whether the
solatium payable under Section 23(2) must be included in the amount
on which interest is payable under Sections 34 and 28, or whether
interest is confined to the market value of the acquired land.
72. In answering that question, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court
considered the meaning of “ amount awarded ” in the statutory scheme.
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BHATIA
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It held that compensation under Section 23 is not limited to the market
value determined under Section 23(1). It also includes the other
statutory components specified in Section 23, namely , the additional
amount under Section 23(1A) and solatium under Section 23(2).
Accordingly, where interest is payable on the compensation awarded,
the relevant base includes those components of compensation.
73. The expression “ statutory benefits ” in Paragraph No. 47 of the
Reference Judgment has to be read in light of the issue decided in
Sunder (supra) and the principle on which that decision rests. Sunder
(supra) addressed which components of compensation under Section
23 form part of the amount on which statutory interest is calculated.
For ready reference, the relevant portion of the judgment is
reproduced below:
“ 2. The power of granting interest on the sums involved in land
acquisition proceedings is endowed in two provisions of the Act.
Section 34 enjoins on the Collector to pay interest at two-tier rates.
For the first stage, from the date of taking possession until
disbursement of the awarded amount the rate is 9% per annum. If
such disbursement is delayed beyond one year the rate of interest
would escalate to 15% per annum from the date of expiry of the
said period of one year. Section 28 of the Act contains the same
postulates and it is supplementary to the above provision. It
empowers the court to direct the Collector to pay interest at the
above two-tier rates on the excess sum awarded by the court. The
real question is whether in calculating the interest, as mentioned in
the said provisions the amount of solatium envisaged in Section
23(2) of the Act should be included in or excluded from the sum on
which interest is liable to be paid.
*
23. In deciding the question as to what amount would bear interest
under Section 34 of the Act, a peep into Section 31(1) of the Act
would be advantageous. That sub-section says:
“31. (1) On making an award under Section 11, the
Collector shall tender payment of the compensation
awarded by him to the persons interested entitled thereto
according to the award, and shall pay it to them unless
prevented by some one or more of the contingencies
mentioned in the next sub-section.”
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BHATIA
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The remaining sub-sections in that provision only deal
with the contingencies in which the Collector has to
deposit the amount instead of paying it to the party
concerned. It is the legal obligation of the Collector to pay
“the compensation awarded by him” to the party entitled
thereto. We make it clear that the compensation awarded
would include not only the total sum arrived at as per sub-
section (1) of Section 23 but the remaining sub-sections
thereof as well. It is thus clear from Section 34 that the
expression “awarded amount” would mean the amount of
compensation worked out in accordance with the
provisions contained in Section 23, including all the sub-
sections thereof.
24. The proviso to Section 34 of the Act makes the position further
clear. The proviso says that “if such compensation” is not paid
within one year from the date of taking possession of the land,
interest shall stand escalated to 15% per annum from the date of
expiry of the said period of one year “on the amount of
compensation or part thereof which has not been paid or deposited
before the date of such expiry”. It is inconceivable that the solatium
amount would attract only the escalated rate of interest from the
expiry of one year and that there would be no interest on solatium
during the preceding period. What the legislature intended was to
make the aggregate amount under Section 23 of the Act to reach
the hands of the person as and when the award is passed, at any rate
as soon as he is deprived of the possession of his land. Any delay in
making payment of the said sum should enable the party to have
interest on the said sum until he receives the payment. Splitting up
the compensation into different components for the purpose of
payment of interest under Section 34 was not in the contemplation
of the legislature when that section was framed or enacted.
25. We may also point out that different High Courts have taken
the same view in the following decisions: G. Venkatesh v. Special
Land Acquisition Officer [AIR 1975 Kant 95], B. Ravinder
Reddy v. Special Dy. Collector, Land Acquisition (Industries)
[AIR 1981 AP 381], State of Haryana v. Kailashwati [AIR 1980
P&H 117] and Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. v. Muniswamy Reddy
[AIR 1993 Kant 77] .
26. We think it useful to quote the reasoning advanced by Chief
Justice S.S. Sandhawalia of the Division Bench of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court in State of Haryana v. Kailashwati [AIR
1980 P&H 117 ]: (SCC p. 119, para 10)
“Once it is held as it inevitably must be that the solatium
provided for under Section 23(2) of the Act forms an
integral and statutory part of the compensation awarded to
a landowner, then from the plain terms of Section 28 of
the Act, it would be evident that the interest is payable on
the compensation awarded and not merely on the market
value of the land. Indeed the language of Section 28 does
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BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
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not even remotely refer to market value alone and in terms
talks of compensation or the sum equivalent thereto. The
interest awardable under Section 28 therefore would
include within its ambit both the market value and the
statutory solatium. It would be thus evident that the
provisions of Section 28 in terms warrant and authorise
the grant of interest on solatium as well.”
27. In our view the aforesaid statement of law is in accord with the
sound principles of interpretation. Hence the person entitled to the
compensation awarded is also entitled to get interest on the
aggregate amount including solatium. The reference is answered
accordingly.”
(Emphasis supplied)

74. The reproduced extract confirms that interest under the LA Act
is calculated on the compensation awarded under Section 23,
including statutory components such as solatium under sub-section (2)
thereof, which forms part of that compensation. In Sunder (supra) , the
Court held that solatium could not be excluded from the interest-
bearing amount merely because it is a distinct statutory component.
The decision does not, however, establish that every amount payable
under any provision of the LA Act becomes part of the compensation,
and thereby attracts further interest, merely because it is payable by
operation of the statute. Whether an amount forms part of
compensation remains material to determining whether further interest
is payable on it.
75. Interest under Section 34 of the LA Act occupies a different
position in the statutory scheme. It is payable because the Collector
has delayed payment or deposit of the compensation awarded. The
compensation is the amount on which interest is calculated; the
interest is the consequence of delay in paying that amount. Thus, the
fact that interest is payable on statutory components that form part of
compensation does not, by itself, make the interest accrued another
component of compensation. The Appellant‟s reliance on Sunder
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(supra) conflates the compensation on which interest is payable with
the interest that accrues on that compensation.
76. The distinction between the two statutory provisions is also
borne out by the decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in CIT v.
15
Ghanshyam (HUF) wherein it was explained that interest under
Section 28 of the LA Act forms part of the enhanced compensation,
whereas interest under Section 34 is payable on account of delay in
payment of the compensation after its determination. This distinction
is material in the present case. The amount awarded under Paragraph
No. 35 of the Reference Judgment is expressly interest under Section
34 of the LA Act on the compensation determined by the Collector. Its
character does not change merely because the Reference Court
subsequently enhanced the compensation and separately awarded
interest under Section 28 of the LA Act.
77. The decision in Ghanshyam (HUF) (supra) , therefore, does not
support treating the interest awarded under Paragraph No. 35 of the
Reference Judgment as enhanced compensation upon which further
interest is payable. The relevant portion of the said Judgment, being
Paragraph No. 35 thereof, reads as under:
“ 35. To sum up, interest is different from compensation. However,
interest paid on the excess amount under Section 28 of the 1894
Act depends upon a claim by the person whose land is acquired
whereas interest under Section 34 is for delay in making payment.
This vital difference needs to be kept in mind in deciding this
matter. Interest under Section 28 is part of the amount of
compensation whereas interest under Section 34 is only for delay in
making payment after the compensation amount is determined.
Interest under Section 28 is a part of enhanced value of the land
which is not the case in the matter of payment of interest under
Section 34.”

78. Read in this statutory context, Sunder (supra) does not support

15
(2009) 8 SCC 412
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the proposition advanced by the Appellant that interest awarded under
Section 34 of the LA Act itself becomes part of the compensation, or
that the amount of such interest must consequently carry further
interest. To extend the principle in Sunder (supra) in that manner
would be to move from the proposition that interest is payable on
compensation to the materially different proposition that interest is
payable on interest.
79. Therefore, since Sunder (supra) concerns interest on the
statutory components of compensation, Paragraph No. 47 of the
Reference Judgment cannot, merely by employing the expression
“statutory benefits” , be construed as directing that the interest
awarded under Paragraph No. 35 of the Reference Judgment must
itself carry further interest. Such an interpretation would conflate two
distinct propositions, namely , that interest is payable on the
compensation together with its statutory components, and that interest
already awarded on that compensation itself becomes a component
upon which further interest is payable. The former is supported by
Sunder (supra) ; the latter does not follow from it. The Appellant‟s
reliance upon the expression “statutory benefits” cannot bridge that
distinction in the absence of a statutory provision or a direction in the
Reference Judgment supporting the further entitlement claimed.
80. Accordingly, Paragraph No. 47 of the Reference Judgment must
be understood as extending to the Appellant the statutory benefits
recognised in Sunder ( supra ), and not as creating an independent
entitlement to interest upon the interest awarded under Paragraph No.
35 of the Reference Judgment. Such an entitlement neither follows
from the principle laid down in Sunder ( supra ) nor finds expression in
the Reference Judgment. The second limb of the Appellant‟s
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challenge, therefore, fails.

Effect of Non-Challenge to Paragraph No. 35 of the Reference
Judgment

81. Another major contention of the Appellant before this Court is
that the Respondent did not challenge the relief granted under
Paragraph No. 35 of the Reference Judgment and raised no objection
in the initial stage of the execution proceedings. The Appellant
submitted that the objection concerning “ interest upon interest ” was
first raised by the Civil Nazir, and that too, at a later stage of the
execution proceedings.
82. In the considered view of this Court, these circumstances do not
support the Appellant‟s claim to interest on the interest.
83. The Appellant‟s submissions clearly overlook the distinction
between the relief expressly granted by the Reference Judgment and
the further relief which the Appellant seeks in the form of interest on
interest. Paragraph No. 35 of the Reference Judgment awards interest
on the compensation determined by the Collector for a specified
period. The Appellant seeks to treat that interest itself as a further
interest-bearing amount.
84. The Reference Judgment, dated 10.05.2016, by its Paragraph
No. 35, expressly directed payment of interest at 15% per annum
under Section 34 of the LA Act on the compensation awarded by the
Collector, for the period from 15.09.1998 to 20.02.2001. The direction
thus specifies both the amount on which interest is payable and the
period for which it is payable. Neither Paragraph No. 35 nor
Paragraph Nos. 46 and 47 of the Reference Judgment contain any
direction that the interest awarded for that period will itself carry
further interest. Read together, these paragraphs define the relief
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granted; they do not award interest on the interest directed under
Paragraph No. 35 in any manner.
85. From the very beginning of the Reference Judgment, the
Appellant was aware of its Paragraph Nos. 35, 46 and 47, Sections 28
and 34 of the LA Act, and the decision in Sunder ( supra ) as well. The
Reference Judgment was delivered on 10.05.2016, after 15 years for
which interest was awarded had ended. It nevertheless specified that
interest was payable on the Collector‟s compensation for that period,
without directing anywhere that the interest so awarded would itself
carry interest. If the Appellant believed that it granted or ought to have
granted further interest, it was for the Appellant to seek appropriate
clarification, modification or appellate relief. The Appellant did not do
so at that stage. The Appellant cannot now blame the Respondent for
failing to challenge the relief expressly granted and rely on that failure
as a basis for claiming additional relief that the Reference Judgment
does not contain. Given the express terms of the Reference Judgment
and Sections 28 and 34 of the LA Act and/or the principle in Sunder
( supra ), any ambiguity, if so perceived as such, was for the concerned
party, in this case, the Appellant herein, to raise in appropriate
proceedings.
86. At this juncture, it is pertinent to note that while passing
directions in the Reference Judgment, the Reference Court was well
aware of the historical and relevant factual circumstances, including
interest granted expressly in Paragraph Nos. 35 and 46. Had it
intended to award interest on the interest granted under Paragraph No.
35, it could have said so expressly in the Reference Judgment itself. It
did not do so. The Appellant cannot use the execution proceedings to
supply a direction absent from the Reference Judgment, particularly
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when that further relief does not follow from either Sections 28 and 34
of the LA Act or the principle determined in Sunder ( supra ), in any
manner.
87. It is settled law that once the Reference Judgment attained
finality, the executing court‟s task was to determine whether the
computation conformed to the relief expressly granted. The court may
construe the judgment to ascertain its true import, but it cannot
enlarge the award by adding an entitlement that the judgment does not
provide. The decree must be enforced in accordance with its terms.
That duty does not depend on whether the judgment debtor has raised
a particular objection at a particular stage. Nor is the court precluded
from examining the correctness of a computation because the issue
was first identified by the Civil Nazir. Therefore, in the considered
view of this Court, the learned Executing Court was entitled to call for
and examine the Civil Nazir‟s computation to determine the amount
payable under the Reference Judgment.

Assessment of Rival Computation
88. The Civil Nazir‟s computation, reproduced in Paragraph No. 28
of the Impugned Order, proceeds by separately calculating the
enhanced compensation and the compensation originally awarded by
the Collector, together with the interest and statutory benefits payable
under the Reference Judgment, as amended. The additional amount
has been calculated for the period from 12.08.1997 to 13.11.1997, in
accordance with the amendment dated 16.07.2023. Interest has been
computed on the compensation inclusive of solatium and the
additional amount, consistently with Sunder (supra) .
89. The period from 18.02.2010 to 30.03.2016 has been excluded in
accordance with Paragraph No. 48 of the Reference Judgment, an
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exclusion also reflected in the Appellant‟s own calculation dated
29.04.2019. The computation further accounts for the payments
previously made under the respective heads and adjusts the excess
identified in relation to the enhanced compensation. On this basis, the
Civil Nazir determined the balance payable to the Appellant to be
₹88,681/-.
90. The Appellant's latest calculation dated 14.05.2025, on the
other hand, cannot be accepted even on its own terms. Apart from
computing interest on the interest awarded under Paragraph No. 35 of
the Reference Judgment, it applies an incorrect differential rate of
₹52,482/- per bigha for Category 'A' land, in place of ₹27,482/-
( which the Appellant himself adopted in his earlier calculations ), and
adopts incorrect areas. Similarly, the period for which solatium was
calculated has been overstated.
91. Further, the calculation sheet continues to charge interest on the
aggregate amount up to 13.05.2025, even though the enhanced
compensation was admittedly paid in 2017-18 and a substantial
portion of the interest awarded under Paragraph No. 35 of the
Reference Judgment was paid on 28.11.2018. The sheet accounts for
these payments only by deducting them at the end of the calculation,
rather than reducing the interest-bearing balance from the dates on
which the payments were made. It also gives no credit for the
payments of ₹3,84,295/- and ₹1,27,538/- made in February 2005.
92. The Appellant has, moreover, filed three calculations, i.e., of
₹1,02,93,325, ₹1,16,54,931 and ₹2,10,32,977, each based on a
different method. In the considered view of this Court, the learned
Executing Court rightly declined to accept them, as they materially
overstate the amount payable and are inconsistent with the facts and
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the principles governing the computation.
93. At this stage, this Court expresses its strong disapproval of the
Appellant‟s approach to the calculations and his persistence in
prolonging the dispute before both the Executing Court and this Court.
The calculations advanced by the Appellant substantially overstate the
amount payable and have required the courts to devote considerable
judicial time to examining and verifying the parties‟ competing
claims. Such an approach is unacceptable. Parties are expected to
present accurate calculations and assist the court in resolving
execution proceedings efficiently. They should not prolong the dispute
by pressing an overstated claim that demands extensive judicial
scrutiny. The resulting expenditure of judicial time is serious and
avoidable.

DECISION:

94. In view of the foregoing, this Court finds that the Appellant has
identified no error in the Civil Nazir‟s application of the rates, periods
or components stipulated in the Reference Judgment. The Appellant‟s
principal objection is that the Civil Nazir‟s computation does not
include interest on the interest awarded under Paragraph No. 35 of the
Reference Judgment. For the reasons discussed in detail above, that
objection is untenable.
95. Accordingly, the present Appeal is dismissed, and the
Impugned Order dated 17.12.2025, passed by the learned Executing
Court in Execution Petition No. 202/2017, is upheld.
96. Accordingly, the Land Acquisition Collector (West) is directed
to pay the sum of ₹88,681/- to the Appellant, within two (02) weeks
from today, if it has not already been paid. Upon payment, the learned
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Executing Court shall determine the Execution Petition, being Ex.
202/2017, in accordance with law.
97. The present Appeal, along with pending Application(s), if any,
stands disposed of in the aforementioned terms.
98. There shall be no Order as to Costs.
99. A copy of this Judgment be transmitted to the learned
Executing Court for information and compliance.

HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
NOVEMBER 18, 2026/ DJ


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