KAMAL SAINI vs PRITAM SINGH
- Court
- Jammu and Kashmir High Court
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT JAMMU
(through virtual mode)
CRMC No. 176/2018
Reserved on: 09.10.2026
Pronounced on:30.10.2026
Uploaded on: 31.10.2026
Whether the operative part or full
judgment is pronounced: Full
Kamal Saini, aged 63 years,
S/o Shri B.B. Saini, R/o H. No.
214-A, Sainik Colony, Jammu.
…Petitioner(s)/Appellant(s).
Through: Mr. Anil Sethi, Advocate
Vs.
Pritam Singh Saini , S/o Late
Ram Krishan Saini, R/o Akalpur,
Lower Muthi, Jammu.
...Respondent(s).
Through: Mr. Ajay Sharma, Sr. Advocate with
Mr. Naveed Naik, Advocate
CORAM:HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE WASIM SADIQ NARGAL, JUDGE
JUDGEMENT
31.10.2026
BRIEF FACTS
1. The present petition, bearing CRMC No. 176/2018, has been filed by the
petitioner, Kamal Saini, under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, seeking quashment of the criminal complaint titled Pritam Singh
Saini v. Kamal Saini, instituted under Section 500 Ranbir Penal Code
(RPC), along with the order dated 20.01.2018 passed by the learned Special
Mobile Magistrate, Passenger Tax, Jammu, whereby process was issued
against the petitioner.
2. The petitioner is a retired police officer, whereas the respondent, Pritam
Singh Saini, is a retired employee of the Information Department who
subsequently started publishing a newspaper under the name Nawa-i-Waqt
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Azeem. According to the petitioner, the respondent had been carrying out a
campaign of vilification and defamation against him through the said
newspaper.
3. Aggrieved by the alleged defamatory publications, the petitioner instituted
a criminal complaint on 27.03.2017 under Sections 499, 500, 501 and 502
RPC before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class/City Judge, Jammu.
On the same date, the petitioner also instituted a civil suit seeking damages
to the tune of Rs. 15 crore against the respondent before the learned
Additional District Judge, Jammu.
4. Upon recording the statements of the complainant and one witness, the
learned Magistrate took cognizance and issued process against the
respondent vide order dated 27.03.2017. The said order was challenged by
the respondent before this Court through CRMC No. 758/2017, invoking its
inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. The petition was
subsequently dismissed vide judgment dated 30.12.2023, thereby upholding
the order dated 27.03.2017.
5. Meanwhile, the respondent instituted a separate criminal complaint under
Section 500 RPC before the learned Special Mobile Magistrate, Passenger
Tax, Jammu, against the present petitioner, alleging that the petitioner had
made defamatory allegations and imputations against him in an
application/complaint submitted before the State Information Commission
(SIC), Srinagar, in November 2017.
6. In the said application, the petitioner allegedly accused the respondent of
blackmailing various government departments under the pretext of being
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the Editor-in-Chief of Nawa-i-Waqt Azeem, misusing the provisions of the
Right to Information Act, 2005, to exert pressure upon departmental heads,
and withdrawing RTI applications after obtaining illegal gratification
without insisting upon the information sought. The petitioner further
alleged that the respondent procured information under the RTI Act and
used his newspaper to coerce and threaten persons against whom pressure
was sought to be exerted, including by publishing their alleged criminal
antecedents.
7. According to the respondent, the aforesaid imputations were defamatory
and were intended to damage his reputation. It was specifically alleged that,
during the last week of November 2017, the petitioner distributed copies of
the application/complaint submitted before the SIC by hand and through
registered post among the respondent’s close relatives and friends, with the
intention of maligning him. The respondent further alleged that the
recipients shared the contents on social networking sites, thereby lowering
his reputation in the eyes of his friends, relatives and society at large.
8. The respondent accordingly instituted a criminal complaint under Section
500 RPC on 18.01.2018 before the learned Special Mobile Magistrate,
Passenger Tax, Jammu. Upon recording the statement of the complainant
and one witness and considering the allegations and material accompanying
the complaint, the learned Magistrate took cognizance and issued process
against the petitioner vide order dated 20.01.2018.
9. Aggrieved by the institution of the complaint and the consequential order
issuing process, the petitioner has invoked the inherent jurisdiction of this
Court through the medium of the instant petition under Section 561-A
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Cr.P.C.( 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS)), seeking
quashment of the complaint and the order dated 20.01.2018.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
10. Mr. Anil Sethi, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the criminal
complaint instituted by the respondent is misconceived, maliciously
motivated and constitutes an abuse of the process of law. It is contended
that the complaint has been filed as a counterblast to the criminal complaint
and civil suit earlier instituted by the petitioner against the respondent in
relation to the alleged defamatory publications carried in the latter’s
newspaper.
11. It is further submitted that the essential ingredients of an offence under
Section 500 RPC are not made out from the allegations contained in the
complaint. According to learned counsel, the imputations attributed to the
petitioner arose from an application submitted before the competent
statutory authority for redressal of grievances and cannot, merely by reason
of their contents, be treated as criminal defamation.
12. Learned counsel contends that the petitioner had merely availed himself of
remedies available under law by approaching the SIC. The submission of
an application before a statutory authority, it is argued, cannot by itself
establish that the petitioner intended to defame the respondent. It is further
contended that the allegations must be assessed in the context in which the
application was submitted and the purpose for which the statutory remedy
was invoked.
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13. It is also submitted that the learned Magistrate failed to properly appreciate
the nature and contents of the complaint and to examine whether the
allegations, taken at face value, satisfied the ingredients of the alleged
offence. The impugned order dated 20.01.2018 is, therefore, challenged as
legally unsustainable and as one resulting in an unwarranted continuation of
criminal proceedings.
14. Learned counsel further submits that the respondent instituted the complaint
with the ulterior object of settling personal scores and exerting pressure
upon the petitioner in view of the proceedings already initiated against him.
Reliance is placed upon the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, to
contend that criminal proceedings instituted maliciously, with an ulterior
motive to wreak vengeance, may be quashed in the exercise of inherent
jurisdiction.
15. It is accordingly argued that permitting the impugned proceedings to
continue would allow the criminal justice process to be used for collateral
purposes. The petitioner, therefore, seeks quashment of the complaint under
Section 500 RPC and the consequential order dated 20.01.2018 passed by
the learned Special Mobile Magistrate, Passenger Tax, Jammu.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
16. Per contra , Mr. Ajay Sharma, learned senior counsel for the respondent
submits that the respondent is a retired employee of the Information
Department who subsequently commenced publication of the newspaper
Nawa-i-Waqt Azeem. It is contended that, in the course of his journalistic
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activities, the respondent obtained information from various government
departments by filing applications under the Right to Information Act, 2005,
concerning alleged irregularities committed by the petitioner during his
tenure in the Police Department.
17. Learned counsel submits that, after obtaining information from the
concerned departments, the respondent published news reports relating to the
alleged irregularities. Aggrieved by these publications, the petitioner
instituted a criminal complaint under Sections 499, 500, 501 and 502 RPC
on 27.03.2017 and simultaneously filed a civil suit claiming damages of ₹15
crore against the respondent.
18. It is further submitted that the respondent challenged the order dated
27.03.2017, whereby process had been issued against him, by filing CRMC
No. 758/2017 before this Court under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. The said
petition was dismissed vide judgment dated 30.12.2023, thereby upholding
the order passed by the learned Magistrate.
19. The respondent alleges that the petitioner thereafter submitted an
application/complaint before the SIC in November 2017 containing
imputations that he was blackmailing government departments, misusing the
RTI Act to exert pressure upon departmental heads, and obtaining illegal
gratification in exchange for withdrawing RTI applications. It is contended
that these allegations were not confined to the statutory proceedings but were
also circulated among the respondent’s friends and close relatives, allegedly
resulting in damage to his reputation.
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20. Learned counsel for the respondent maintains that the allegations contained
in the application were defamatory and that the petitioner cannot escape
liability merely by asserting that the application was submitted before a
statutory authority. It is further contended that the RTI Act cannot be
employed as an instrument to malign an individual or damage his standing in
society.
21. In support of the respondent’s claim concerning the protection afforded to
reputation, reliance is placed upon the constitutional recognition of
reputation as an aspect of the right to life under Article 21. It is contended
that the right to criticise is not absolute and cannot be exercised in a manner
that unlawfully damages another person’s reputation.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
22. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. The principal
question requiring consideration is whether the allegations set out in the
complaint, taken in their entirety, disclose the commission of an offence
under Section 500 RPC or whether the continuation of the criminal
proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court.
23. Before proceeding further, it would be apposite to notice that the inherent
jurisdiction of this Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal
Procedure is intended to prevent abuse of the process of any Court and to
secure the ends of justice. Though such jurisdiction is to be exercised
sparingly and with circumspection, the same cannot be construed as a fetter
upon the Court's power to interfere where the allegations, even if taken at
their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or where the
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proceedings are manifestly attended with mala fides and have been instituted
for an ulterior purpose.
24. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a catena of cases enumerated the categories
of cases in which criminal proceedings may be quashed, including cases
where the allegations, even if accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie
constitute an offence, or where the proceedings are manifestly attended with
mala fide and instituted with an ulterior motive. The exercise of this power,
however, must be guided by the facts of the particular case and cannot be
founded merely upon the existence of a defence raised by the accused
25. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Neeharika Infrastructure Private limited
versus State of Maharashtra reported as (2021) 19 SCC 401 held as
under:
“ (i) Where the allegations made in the first information report or
the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any
offence or make out a case against the accused.
(ii) Where the allegations in the first information report and other
materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police
officers under Section 156(1) CrPC except under an order of a
Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) CrPC.
(iii) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or
complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do
not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a
case against the accused.
(iv)Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
Section 155(2) CrPC.
(v) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so
absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no
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prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(vi) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
provisions of CrPC or the Act concerned (under which a
criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and
continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a
specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing
efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(vii) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with
mala fides and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on
the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and
personal grudge”.
26. Similarly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana and others
versus Bhajan Lal and Ors 1992 Supp(1) SCC 335 has held as under:
“The commencement of investigation by a police officer is subject to
two conditions, firstly, the police officer should have reason to
suspect the commis- sion of a cognizable offence as required by
Section 157(1) and secondly, the police officer should subjectively
satisfy himself as to whether there is sufficient ground for entering
on an investigation even before he starts an investigation into the
facts and circumstances of the case as contemplated under clause
(b) of the proviso to Section 157(1) of the Code.
27. Furthermore, Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of West Bengal and others
Versus Swapan Kumar Guha and others (1982) 1 SCC 561 has held as
under:
“Whether an offence into which an investigation is made or to be
made is disclosed or not must necessarily depend on the facts and
circumstances of each particular case and in considering that
question the court has mainly to take into consideration the
complaint or F.I.R. On a consideration of all offence is disclosed or
not. The relevant materials, the court has to come to the conclusion
whether an If on such consideration, the court is satisfied that an
offence is disclosed, the court will normally not interfere with the
investigation into the offence and will generally allow the
investigation into the offence to be completed for collecting
materials for proving the offence. If, on the other hand, the court is
satisfied that no offence is disclosed, it will be the duty of the court
to interfere with any investigation and to stop the same to prevent
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any kind of uncalled for and unnecessary harassment to an
individual.”
28. The aforesaid judgments make it abundantly clear that where the allegations
contained in an FIR or complaint, even if accepted in their entirety, do not
prima facie disclose the commission of any offence, or where the criminal
proceedings are manifestly mala fide and instituted with an ulterior motive,
the Court is justified in exercising its inherent jurisdiction to quash such
proceedings.
29. It is equally well settled that where no offence is disclosed from the
allegations and the material on record, continuation of the investigation
would amount to an abuse of the process of law and cause unwarranted
harassment to the accused. However, such jurisdiction is to be exercised
sparingly, with circumspection and in accordance with the principles laid
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
30. Adverting to the facts of present case, the gravamen of the complaint is that
the petitioner made defamatory imputations against the respondent in an
application submitted before the State Information Commission in
November 2017, alleging, inter alia, that the respondent was misusing the
Right to Information Act, 2005, to exert pressure upon government
departments and was withdrawing applications after obtaining illegal
gratification. The respondent has further alleged that copies of the said
application were circulated among his relatives and friends, thereby
damaging his reputation. These two aspects of the complaint, namely, the
submission of the application before the statutory authority and its alleged
circulation among third parties, require consideration in their proper
perspective.
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31. As regards to first aspect, whether the petitioner’s act of submitting an
application before the State Information Commission, Srinagar, containing
allegations against the respondent, can, in the circumstances of the case, be
construed as an offence of defamation under Section 500 of the Ranbir Penal
Code. In the considered opinion of this Court, the answer must be in the
negative. A complaint alleging defamation cannot be sustained merely
because the allegations made before a competent statutory authority are
adverse to the person against whom they are directed or are perceived by that
person to have lowered his reputation. The nature of the forum approached,
the purpose for which the accusation was made, and the circumstances in
which it was submitted are all relevant considerations in determining
whether the ingredients of the alleged offence are attracted.
32. In the present case, the application was addressed to the State Information
Commission, a statutory authority approached by the petitioner in relation to
matters concerning the respondent’s alleged conduct in the exercise of his
activities. The petitioner, by placing his allegations before an authority
competent to examine the matter, invoked an institutional forum for
consideration of the grievance. The mere fact that the allegations may have
been unpalatable to the respondent, or may have cast his conduct in an
unfavourable light, does not, without more, convert the act of making such
an accusation into criminal defamation. The law does not equate every
adverse allegation with a defamatory offence; rather, the accusation must be
examined in the light of the statutory ingredients and the exceptions
expressly recognised by the legislature.
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33. In this context, the Eighth Exception to Section 499 of the Ranbir Penal
Code assumes significance, and reads as under:
“Eighth Exception.—Accusation preferred in good faith to
authorised person.— It is not defamation to prefer in good
faith an accusation against any person to any of those who
have lawful authority over that person with respect to the
subject-matter of accusation.”
34. A plain reading of the aforesaid Exception makes it evident that an
accusation preferred in good faith before a person or authority having lawful
competence in respect of its subject matter is not to be treated as defamation.
The protection is founded upon a legitimate principle: a person must be able
to approach a competent authority and place a grievance before it without the
act of doing so, by itself, exposing him to criminal prosecution for
defamation. To hold otherwise would risk discouraging individuals from
bringing alleged wrongdoing to the notice of the very authorities entrusted
with examining such matters.
35. In Kishore Balkrishna Nand v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. , reported as
2023 INSC 675, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under:
“16. Exception 8 to Section 499 clearly indicates that it is not a
defamation to prefer in good faith an accusation against any
person to any of those who have lawful authority over that
person with regard to the subject-matter of accusation.”
36. Tested against this statutory principle, the petitioner’s act of submitting the
application before the State Information Commission falls within the scope
of the protection contemplated by the Eighth Exception, provided the
accusation was made in good faith. The complaint, as presented, cannot be
sustained merely by alleging that the contents of the application were
defamatory or that the respondent’s reputation was thereby affected. There
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must be a legally sustainable basis to show that the petitioner’s conduct falls
outside the protection of the Exception and satisfies the ingredients of the
offence. The mere making of allegations before a competent authority,
without sufficient material demonstrating want of good faith or
circumstances otherwise taking the act beyond the Exception, is not enough
to justify criminal prosecution.
37. Insofar as the respondent’s reliance on the Madras High Court judgment in
Dr. J. Sudarshan V. R. Sankaran reported in 1992 Cri LJ 2427 is
concerned that does not, by itself, advance his case. The judgment in Dr. J.
Sudarshansupra , is distinguishable from the present case on the nature of the
allegations, the circumstances in which they were made, and the applicability
of Exception 8 to Section 499 IPC.
38. In Dr. J. Sudarshan supra, the respondent, after serving the Bank of Baroda
for nearly 55 years, attended an interview on 20 November 1988 for suitable
employment and paid ₹5,000 as a refundable membership fee. Upon
allegedly discovering that the interview was a sham, he demanded a refund.
Subsequently, the petitioner filed a civil suit against the respondent and
others, alleging in the plaint that the respondent had forged a signature to
secure employment in the private sector. Claiming that these allegations
were false and defamatory, the respondent initiated criminal proceedings
against the petitioner under Section 500 IPC. The petitioner approached the
High Court under Section 482 CrPC seeking quashing of the criminal
proceedings, contending that statements made in judicial pleadings were
absolutely privileged and that the pending civil suit precluded parallel
criminal proceedings.
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39. Rejecting the contention of the petitioner, Madras High Court held that
pleadings filed before the courts are not absolutely privileged and that an
accusation must satisfy the requirement of good faith to attract Exception 8;
it does not establish that every accusation made against a person before a
competent authority necessarily constitutes defamation, irrespective of its
context and purpose. For the facility of reference, the relevant part of the
judgment supra is reproduced as under:
"The Supreme Court in M. C. Verughese v. T. J. Ponnan
referred to and accepted the law laid down in the above
decision and reiterated that a person making a libellous
statement in his complaint filed in court, is not absolutely
protected in a criminal proceeding for defamation, for under
Exception 8 and as seen from illustration to S. 499, IPC the
statements are privileged, only when they are made in good
faith. The petitioner, therefore, cannot contend that the
averments have been made by him in a plaint and are
therefore absolutely privileged. In the event of the petitioner
claiming the benefit of Exception 8, which could be done only
during trial, since the averment is per se defamatory, he would
have to establish good faith as required under the above
Exception."
40. In the present case, the allegations were made before the State Information
Commission in the course of raising a grievance concerning the respondent's
alleged conduct in relation to RTI proceedings. The relevant inquiry,
therefore, is whether the complaint, read as a whole and in its factual
context, discloses the essential ingredients of defamation, or whether the
communication is prima facie protected as an accusation made in good faith
to an authority competent to deal with the subject matter. The mere fact that
the allegations may be adverse to the respondent cannot, by itself, conclude
that inquiry. Equally, the petitioner cannot claim immunity merely because
the allegations were addressed to a public authority. The distinction must rest
on the nature and purpose of the communication and the material available
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on record. Accordingly, Dr. J. Sudarshan supra does not preclude this Court
from independently examining whether continuation of the criminal
proceedings in the present case would amount to an abuse of process,
applying the settled principles governing the exercise of inherent
jurisdiction.
41. Furthermore, the reliance placed by the respondent on the judgment rendered
by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India,
reported as (2016) 7 SCC 221 , is misplaced, as the said judgment dealt
primarily with the constitutional validity of Sections 499 and 500 of the
Indian Penal Code and the recognition of the right to reputation as a facet of
Article 21 of the Constitution. The Hon’ble Supreme Court was not called
upon to determine the applicability of the Eighth Exception to Section 499 in
the context of an accusation made before a competent statutory authority.
The said judgment, therefore, does not govern the specific controversy
arising in the present case.
42. In Subramanian Swamy supra , the Hon’ble Supreme Court, inter alia,
observed as under:
“That as it may be, the aforesaid authorities clearly lay down
that freedom of speech and expression is a highly treasured
value under the Constitution and voice of dissent or
disagreement has to be respected and regarded and not to be
scuttled as unpalatable criticism. Emphasis has been laid on
the fact that dissonant and discordant expressions are to be
treated as viewpoints with objectivity and such expression of
views and ideas being necessary for growth of democracy are
to be zealously protected. Notwithstanding, the expansive and
sweeping ambit of freedom of speech, as all rights, right to
freedom of speech and expression is not absolute. It is subject
to imposition of reasonable restrictions.”
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43. The aforesaid observations or the judgment in whole, when read in their
proper context, do not advance the respondent’s case. The judgment does not
lay down that every statement capable of affecting a person’s reputation
must necessarily attract criminal liability, irrespective of the circumstances
in which it was made or the statutory Exceptions available under Section 499
IPC. The constitutional recognition of the right to reputation cannot be
construed as extinguishing the statutory protection expressly afforded to an
accusation made in good faith to a person having lawful authority over the
subject matter.
44. In the present case, the petitioner’s defence is not that the right to reputation
is not protected by law, but that the act of filing the complaint before State
Information Commission by petitioner falls within the Eighth Exception to
Section 499 IPC. The relevant inquiry, therefore, is whether the petitioner
approached the State Information Commission, an authority alleged to have
lawful jurisdiction over the subject matter, in good faith and in the
circumstances attracting the protection of the said Exception. That question
must be examined with reference to the nature of the accusation, the
authority to whom it was made and the circumstances in which it was made.
The general observations in Subramanian Swamy cannot negate a defence
expressly available under Section 499 IPC (499 RPC). The respondent’s
reliance on the said judgment, without addressing the applicability of the
Eighth Exception to the facts of the present case, is therefore not sufficient to
sustain the impugned proceedings.
45. Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that Exception 8 to Section 499 of the
Ranbir Penal Code embodies a legislative safeguard intended to protect bona
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fide accusations made to persons or authorities lawfully competent to deal
with the subject matter. To hold that the mere making of an accusation
before such an authority is sufficient to sustain a prosecution for defamation,
in the absence of material indicating want of good faith, would substantially
defeat the very purpose of the said Exception. Consequently, the authorities
relied upon by the respondent do not advance his case in the circumstances
obtaining herein, particularly when the complaint and the material
accompanying it do not disclose a sustainable basis for denying the petitioner
the protection contemplated by the statutory Exception.
46. In these circumstances, the complaint, insofar as it seeks to criminalise the
petitioner’s act of approaching the State Information Commission, fails to
disclose a sustainable basis for prosecution under Section 500 of the Ranbir
Penal Code. Permitting the proceedings to continue merely because the
respondent takes exception to the allegations made against him would
amount to subjecting the petitioner to criminal process without adequate
regard to the statutory protection embodied in the Eighth Exception to
Section 499.
47. Another circumstance requiring consideration is the background of the
dispute between the parties. The petitioner had instituted a criminal
complaint against the respondent on 27.03.2017, alleging defamation
through publications in the newspaper Nawa-i-Waqt Azeem, and had also
instituted a civil suit seeking damages of Rs. 15 crore. The respondent
thereafter instituted the complaint in question on 18.01.2018, alleging that
the petitioner had defamed him through the application submitted before the
State Information Commission in November 2017. The chronology of these
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proceedings lends relevance to the petitioner’s contention that the subsequent
complaint was a counterblast to the proceedings initiated by him.
48. So far as the allegation that the petitioner circulated copies of the application
among the respondent’s relatives and friends is concerned, the same is
equally untenable, inasmuch as no material has been placed on record to
substantiate the said allegation. The allegation remains a bald assertion,
unsupported by any cogent or tangible material, and does not find
corroboration from the record. In the absence of any prima facie material
demonstrating such circulation, the said allegation cannot be accepted
merely on the basis of the respondent’s averment. It appears that the
allegation has been introduced only to lend an additional foundation to the
complaint and to buttress the accusation of defamation, rather than being
founded upon any demonstrable material. A criminal prosecution cannot be
permitted to proceed on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations, particularly
when the very act sought to be criminalised is alleged to have occurred
independently of the application submitted before the competent statutory
authority. Consequently, in the absence of material supporting the alleged
circulation, the said allegation cannot be relied upon to sustain the criminal
proceedings against the petitioner.
49. Furthermore, the overall facts and circumstances of the case, when examined
in their entirety, lend considerable force to the petitioner’s contention that
the complaint in question is a counterblast to the proceedings initiated by
him against the respondent. It is not disputed that the petitioner had earlier
instituted criminal proceedings against the respondent in relation to the
alleged defamatory publications, besides pursuing civil remedies. The
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respondent had challenged the proceedings arising out of the petitioner’s
complaint before this Court in CRMC No. 758/2017, which came to be
dismissed vide order dated 30.12.2023. The subsequent institution of the
present complaint, founded upon the application submitted by the petitioner
before the State Information Commission, must, therefore, be viewed in the
backdrop of the pre-existing dispute and the continuing acrimony between
the parties.
50. The chronology of events assumes significance. The parties were already
embroiled in litigation concerning allegations of defamation, and the present
complaint appears to have emerged from the same continuing dispute.
Although the mere existence of prior litigation does not, by itself, render a
subsequent complaint mala fide, the Court is entitled to examine whether the
criminal process has been invoked to pursue a legitimate grievance or has
instead been employed as a means of retaliation. In the present case, the
nature of the allegations, the circumstances in which the complaint came to
be instituted, and the absence of cogent material substantiating the alleged
circulation of the application among the respondent’s relatives and friends,
when considered cumulatively, lend credence to the petitioner’s contention
that the complaint has been instituted with a view to retaliate against him and
settle scores arising out of the earlier litigation.
51. It is a settled principle of law that where criminal proceedings are manifestly
attended with mala fides or have been instituted maliciously with an ulterior
motive to wreak vengeance upon the accused, the inherent jurisdiction of the
High Court may be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of law. In State
of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal supra , the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while
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illustrating the categories of cases warranting the exercise of such
jurisdiction, recognised that proceedings instituted maliciously with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused fall within the ambit
of cases in which the High Court may intervene. Thus, the counterblast
nature of a complaint, though not by itself conclusive, assumes considerable
significance when supported by the surrounding circumstances and the
absence of a legally sustainable foundation for the prosecution.
Conclusion
52. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion
that the continuation of the impugned criminal proceedings would serve no
legitimate purpose and would instead amount to an abuse of the process of
law. The petitioner’s act of approaching the State Information Commission
must be assessed in the context of the statutory function of the authority, the
nature and purpose of the accusation, and the protection embodied in the
Eighth Exception to Section 499 RPC. The complaint, insofar as it seeks to
criminalise the making of an accusation before the competent statutory
authority, fails to disclose a sustainable basis for prosecution, particularly in
the absence of material sufficient to displace the protection claimed by the
petitioner. The allegation that copies of the application were circulated
among the respondent’s relatives and friends is, likewise, not supported by
any cogent material. Significantly, the complaint was instituted against the
backdrop of pre-existing litigation between the parties, and the chronology of
events, when considered alongside the nature of the allegations and the
absence of supporting material, lends credence to the petitioner’s contention
that the proceedings are retaliatory in nature.
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53. The inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A CrPC is precisely intended to
prevent the criminal process from being employed as an instrument of
harassment or vengeance. While the existence of prior litigation, by itself,
cannot establish mala fides, the cumulative effect of the circumstances
obtaining in the present case, coupled with the absence of a sustainable
foundation for the alleged offence, warrants the intervention of this Court.
Criminal law cannot be permitted to become a means of penalising a person
merely for approaching a statutory authority with a grievance, particularly
where the law expressly recognises protection for accusations made in good
faith to an authority competent to deal with the subject matter. To allow the
proceedings to continue in such circumstances would defeat the object of the
statutory Exception and subject the petitioner to the rigours of criminal
prosecution without a legally sustainable basis. Accordingly, the impugned
complaint and all proceedings emanating therefrom, insofar as they concern
the petitioner, are liable to be quashed in order to secure the ends of justice
and prevent abuse of the process of the Court.
54. Furthermore, this Court is of the considered view that that the criminal
process cannot be permitted to become an instrument for penalising a person
merely for approaching a competent statutory authority, particularly where
the law expressly contemplates protection for accusations made in good faith
before an authority having lawful jurisdiction over the subject matter. To
allow the impugned proceedings to continue in the circumstances obtaining
in the present case would not advance the legitimate object of criminal law;
rather, it would expose the petitioner to the ordeal of prosecution despite the
absence of a legally sustainable foundation for the same.
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55. Accordingly, the petition is allowed . The criminal complaint titled Pritam
Singh Saini v. Kamal Saini, instituted under Section 500 RPC, and the order
dated 20.01.2018 passed by the learned Special Mobile Magistrate,
Passenger Tax, Jammu, whereby process was issued against the petitioner,
are hereby quashed. The petition stands disposed of accordingly.
(WASIM SADIQ NARGAL)
JUDGE
SRINAGAR:
30.10.2026
Mubashir
i. Whether the order is speaking: Yes
ii. Whether the order is reportable: Yes.
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