Subhajit Saha vs REVENUE

1 OA/310/00553/2026 and MA 366/2026
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
CHENNAI BENCH
OA/310/00553/2026
AND
MA/310/366/2026
th
Dated this the 16 day of October, Two Thousand Twenty Six
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. M. SWAMINATHAN, MEMBER (J)
AND
HON'BLE MR. M.L. SRIVASTAVA, MEMBER(A)
Shri Subhajit Saha,
S/o Shri Nikhil Baran Saha,
Appraiser,New Customs House,
Meenambakka, Chennai. .. Applicant
By Advocate M/s. S. Ramachandran
Vs
1. Union of India
rep by Secretary to Govt. of India
Department of Revenue
Ministry of Finance
Government of India
New Delhi.
2. Chairman,
CBIC,Department of Revenue
Ministry of Finance
Government of India
New Delhi.
3. Directorate General of Vigilance
Rep. by its Director General
Indirect Taxes and Customs
Department of Revenue
Ministry of FinanceGovernment of India
New Delhi.

2 OA/310/00553/2026 and MA 366/2026
4. Chief Commissioner of Customs
Chennai Customs Zone
Customs House
No. 60, Rajaji Salai
Chennai.
5. The Commissioner of Customs (General)
And Disciplinary Authority
Customs House
No. 60, Rajaji Salai
Chennai. .. Respondents
By Advocate Mr. M. Kishore Kumar, SPC

3 OA/310/00553/2026 and MA 366/2026
ORDER
(Pronounced by Hon'ble Mr. M. Swaminathan, Judicial
Member)
In the instant OA, the applicant seeks to quash the
Charge Memo dated 10.03.2026, issued by the 5th
respondent in F. No. GEN/VIG/DE/49/2026-CIU-VIG.
2. The fact and circumstances giving rise to the filing of
the OA are as follows:
The applicant, an Appraiser in the Indian Customs
Service, challenges the Charge Memorandum dated
10.03.2026 arising from an assessment decision taken in the
discharge of his official duties. He joined the Customs
Department, Chennai, as an Examiner on 08.11.2021 and
was promoted as Appraiser on 01.01.2024. At the relevant
time, he was posted to Appraising Group 5I (FAG/PAG), Air
Cargo Commissionerate, Chennai, which was his first
assignment in an Assessment Group. The case concerns Bill
of Entry No. 3367406 dated 19.07.2025, filed by M/s.
Wintrack Inc. for importing “Body Massagers” under CTH
90191010. The Faceless Assessment Group (FAG), New

4 OA/310/00553/2026 and MA 366/2026
Delhi, ordered 100% first-check examination. The
examination report dated 26.07.2025 recorded that the
goods matched the declared description but resembled a sex
toy, potentially attracting restrictions under the applicable
notifications and Foreign Trade Policy. The FAG thereafter
referred the Bill of Entry to the applicant for further action.
The applicant submits that, after considering the importer’s
submissions, including acceptance of enhanced valuation,
previous clearances under a similar classification and an
MSME registration certificate, he bona fide believed that the
importer was exempt from Extended Producer Responsibility
(EPR) requirements under the Battery Waste Management
Rules, 2022. Accordingly, he assessed the Bill of Entry at the
enhanced value and granted Out of Charge (OOC) on
02.08.2025. The applicant further contends that the
importer’s earlier allegations of corruption and delay against
Chennai Customs officials on social media created pressure
to expedite clearance. As a first-time Appraiser in an
Assessment Group, he apprehended that further queries or
reclassification might invite additional public criticism. In his
statement before the Directorate General of Vigilance on

5 OA/310/00553/2026 and MA 366/2026
11.11.2025, he candidly acknowledged that this
apprehension influenced his decision. He submits that the
investigation does not allege bribery, corruption or personal
gain. The impugned Charge Memorandum alleges that the
applicant failed to obtain the product catalogue and
technical details, resulting in incorrect classification under
CTH 90191010 instead of CTH 90191020 and consequent
revenue loss, and failed to verify EPR compliance, thereby
permitting clearance of restricted goods based on an
erroneous assumption of MSME exemption. The applicant
contends that the alleged lapses arose from bona fide errors
of judgment during his initial assessment assignment, in the
absence of clear guidance and amid external pressure. He
maintains that his reliance on the importer’s submissions,
previous clearances and available documents was bona fide
and that, in the absence of any allegation of corrupt practice
or mala fide intention, the matter amounts at most to an
error of assessment rather than misconduct warranting
disciplinary action. Aggrieved by the Charge Memorandum,
he has filed the present Original Application.

6 OA/310/00553/2026 and MA 366/2026
3. The learned counsel for the applicant assailed the
impugned Charge Memorandum primarily on the ground of
the limited role of examination officers, contending that the
assessment of the Bills of Entry had largely been undertaken
by the Faceless Assessment Group (FAG), while the officers
at the Import Shed were responsible only for physical
examination of the goods vis-à-vis the import documents and
forwarding the Bills of Entry to the competent Assessment
Group for appropriate assessment and determination of
duty. Since assessment is a quasi-judicial function, the same
could not be attributed to officers discharging examination-
related duties.
4. On the aspect of independent assessment and statutory
remedies, the learned counsel submitted that assessment
orders are subject to modification, review and appeal under
Sections 17, 28, 128 and 129 of the Customs Act, 1962.
Misclassification of goods under a particular Customs Tariff
Heading (CTH), particularly when the importer's self-
assessment had been verified by the FAG, could not, by
itself, be attributed to the applicant.

7 OA/310/00553/2026 and MA 366/2026
5. With regard to alleged discrepancies in valuation,
quantities and EPR compliance, it was contended that the
assessments had been made on an ad valorem basis and
that any discrepancy in quantities was required to be
examined in the assessment and adjudication proceedings
relating to the respective Bills of Entry. Further, valuation of
imported goods is governed by Section 14 of the Customs
Act, 1962, read with the applicable notification defining the
jurisdiction of the proper officer. Accordingly, the allegations
of misclassification, quantity discrepancies and non-
verification of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR)
registration under the Bio-Medical Waste Management
Rules, 2022, were stated to be misconceived.
6. On the question of uncertainty regarding the correct
classification of the imported goods, the learned counsel
pointed out that even the Commissionerate at the Air Cargo
Complex had sought clarification from the Board on the
issue, which remained unanswered. In these circumstances,
the allegation that the applicant had adopted an incorrect
classification was contended to be untenable.

8 OA/310/00553/2026 and MA 366/2026
7. Regarding the alleged motivated complaint leading to
disciplinary proceedings, the learned counsel submitted that
the proceedings appeared to have been initiated in the wake
of a complaint posted by the importer on social media,
containing general allegations without identifying the officers
concerned or specifying any demand for illegal gratification.
The statements recorded by the Directorate General of
Valuation (DGOV) also contained no specific allegation of
such misconduct in connection with the examination of the
imported goods.
8. As regards procedural irregularities in the disciplinary
inquiry, it was contended that the proceedings initiated
under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, were vitiated
by procedural infirmities, including the absence of identified
witnesses, reliance on unauthenticated or irrelevant
documents, and non-supply of certain relied-upon
documents to the charged officers.
9. Finally, on the issue of suspension and consequential

9 OA/310/00553/2026 and MA 366/2026
relief, the learned counsel pointed out that some of the
charged officers had also been placed under suspension. He
contended that, in view of the prima facie infirmities
rendering the Charge Memoranda unsustainable, the
consequential continuation of suspension was also liable to
be reconsidered and set aside.
10. On the foregoing grounds and relied on the following
judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the learned
counsel submitted that the impugned Charge Memorandum
was legally unsustainable and liable to be quashed and set
aside, together with the consequential reliefs sought by the
applicant:
(i) Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar Vs Union of India, reported in
(1999) 7 SCC 409;
(ii) Union of India Vs K.K. Dhawan, reported in (1993) 2 SCC
56;
(iii) Roop Singh Negi Vs Punjab National Bank & Others
reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570.

10 OA/310/00553/2026 and MA 366/2026
11. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents
vehemently opposed the contentions advanced on behalf of
the applicant and reiterated the averments made in the reply
statement. On the issue of reliance on past clearances and
similar imports, he submitted that the treatment accorded to
other consignments was wholly irrelevant to the present
proceedings, as each import transaction was required to be
examined independently in accordance with the applicable
statutory and regulatory provisions. Any action or omission
concerning other consignments could not absolve the
applicant of responsibility for the alleged lapses in the
instant case.
12. With regard to the specific allegations of omission and
failure to discharge official duties, the learned counsel
submitted that the Charge Memorandum pertained to the
applicant's alleged failure to verify compliance with
mandatory licensing requirements, identify and report goods
requiring regulatory clearance, and take appropriate action
despite examination findings warranting further scrutiny. He

11 OA/310/00553/2026 and MA 366/2026
contended that the validity of these charges could not be
undermined by reference to the manner in which other
imports had been dealt with.
13. On the question of classification of the imported goods
and the alleged absence of policy clarification, the learned
counsel submitted that the disciplinary proceedings were not
founded merely on a dispute regarding classification or the
absence of clarification from the competent authority.
Rather, the charges arose from specific acts of omission and
commission allegedly committed by the applicant in the
discharge of his official duties, as set out in the Articles of
Charge and the Statement of Imputations. Whether the
applicant had duly discharged his responsibilities was a
matter to be determined during the departmental inquiry on
the basis of the evidence and records available. The
contentions raised by the applicant, according to the
respondents, constituted matters of defence and did not
warrant interference with the disciplinary proceedings at the
preliminary stage.

12 OA/310/00553/2026 and MA 366/2026
14. Finally, on the issue of the validity and maintainability
of the Charge Memorandum, the learned counsel contended
that the same had been issued by the competent authority in
accordance with the applicable rules and on the basis of
prima facie material available on record. It was submitted
that the Charge Memorandum suffered from no legal,
procedural or jurisdictional infirmity warranting interference
by this Tribunal. The applicant's contentions were stated to
be devoid of merit, particularly as the issues raised involved
disputed questions of fact that were appropriately required to
be examined in the course of the departmental inquiry.
15. He relied on the following Hon'le Apex Court
judgements in support of his contentions and prayed for
dismissal of the OA:.
(i) Union of India Vs Kunisetty Satyanarayan reported in AIR
2007 SC 906;
(ii) UOI Vs Upendra Singh reported in (1994) 2 SCC 357;
(iii) The Secretary, Ministry of Defence & Others Vs Prabhash
Chandra Mirdha reported in (2012) 11 SCC 565;

13 OA/310/00553/2026 and MA 366/2026
(iv) Chairman, LIC of India Vs A. Masilamani (2013) 6 SCC
530.
16. We have carefully considered the rival submissions
advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the parties
and perused the pleadings and the material available on
record.
17. The principal question that arises for consideration is
whether the impugned Charge Memorandum warrants
interference by this Tribunal at the threshold, having regard
to the nature of the duties discharged by the applicants, the
allegations levelled against them, and the settled principles
governing judicial review of disciplinary proceedings at the
stage of issuance of a charge memorandum.
18. We would like to extract the Role of the Applicant,
Details of Charge memo and Article of Charge in nutshell
and the stage of disciplinary proceedings in a tabulated form:

14 OA/310/00553/2026 and MA 366/2026
Role of the
Details of Charge Memo
Stage of the
Disciplinary Case
Applicant
& Gist of Article of
charge
OA
No.553/2026
Subhajit Saha
F.No.C-13/17/2026-CIU/VIG
issued in
F.No.GEN/VID/DE/49/2026-
CIU/VIG dated10.03.2026
Appraiser at
Port
Assessment
Group (PAG)
1.Failure to verify mandatory
documents resulting in wrong
classificatrion at a lower rate
of duty, leading to loss of
government revenue.
Inquiry Officer &
Presenting Officer
appointed and
proceedings are pending.
2. Enabling unlawful clearance
of goods imported under Bill
of Entry dated 19.07.2025
without submission of
mandatory Extended Produced
Responsibility registration
certificate under Battery Waste
Management Rules, 2022
paving way for potential
unlawful release of
prohibited/restricted goods
from Customs control.
19. The learned counsel for the applicant placed reliance on
the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Zunjarrao
Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India , reported in (1999) 7 SCC
409, particularly paragraphs 42 to 44 thereof. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that disciplinary proceedings cannot be
initiated on vague or indefinite allegations or merely on the
basis of suspicion. It was further observed that an error of
law committed in the discharge of quasi-judicial functions

15 OA/310/00553/2026 and MA 366/2026
would not, by itself, constitute misconduct unless something
more, such as the influence of extraneous considerations, is
alleged. The underlying principle is that officers discharging
quasi-judicial functions must be allowed to perform their
duties independently, without the threat of disciplinary
action merely because a decision taken by them is
subsequently found to be erroneous. The relevant portion of
the judgment is extracted for better understanding:
“42. Initiation of disciplinary proceedings against an
officer cannot take place on information which is
vague or indefinite. Suspicion has no role to play in
such matter. There must exist reasonable basis for
the disciplinary authority to proceed against the
delinquent officer. Merely because penalty was not
imposed and the Board in the exercise of its power
directed filing of appeal against that order in the
Appellate Tribunal could not be enough to proceed
against the appellant. There is no other instance to
show that in similar case the appellant invariably
imposed penalty.
43. If every error of law were to constitute a charge
of misconduct, it would impinge upon the
independent functioning of quasi-judicial officers
like the appellant. Since in sum and substance
misconduct is sought to be inferred by the appellant
having committed an error of law, the charge-sheet
on the face of it does not proceed on any legal
premise rendering it liable to be quashed. In other
words, to maintain any charge-sheet against a
quasi-judicial authority something more has to be
alleged than a mere mistake of law, e.g., in the
nature of some extraneous consideration influencing
the quasi-judicial order. Since nothing of the sort is
alleged herein the impugned charge-sheet is
rendered illegal. The charge-sheet, if sustained, will

16 OA/310/00553/2026 and MA 366/2026
thus impinge upon the confidence and independent
functioning of a quasi-judicial authority. The entire
system of administrative adjudication whereunder
quasi-judicial powers are conferred on
administrative authorities, would fall into disrepute
if officers performing such functions are inhibited in
performing their functions without fear or favour
because of the constant threat of disciplinary
proceedings.
44. Considering whole aspects of the matter, we are
of the view that it was not a case for initiation of any
disciplinary proceedings against the appellant. The
charge of misconduct against him was not proper. It
has to be quashed.“

20. The applicant also relied upon Roop Singh Negi v.
Punjab National Bank , reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570, wherein
the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that, although the
strict provisions of the Evidence Act may not apply to
departmental proceedings, the principles of natural justice
must be observed and findings of misconduct must be
supported by evidence. Suspicion, however strong, cannot
substitute proof, and findings founded merely on conjectures
and surmises cannot be sustained.
21. The principal contention of the applicant, therefore, is
that an erroneous interpretation or application of law
cannot, by itself, constitute misconduct, unless the alleged

17 OA/310/00553/2026 and MA 366/2026
error is accompanied by circumstances indicative of
deliberate wrongdoing, mala fides, extraneous influence or
other culpable conduct. In the present case, the applicant
contend that the assessment of the imported goods had been
undertaken by the competent Assessment Group, whereas
his role at the Import Shed was confined to examination-
related functions and issuance of the Out of Charge order
following clearance by the competent authority. It was
further submitted that the alleged discrepancies in
classification, quantity and regulatory compliance cannot
automatically be attributed to him when the assessment and
clearance involved the exercise of independent statutory
functions by the competent authorities.
22. At the same time, the scope of judicial review at the
stage of issuance of a charge memorandum is circumscribed
by well-settled principles of law. In Union of India v. Upendra
Singh , reported in (1994) 3 SCC 357, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court held that a Tribunal or Court may interfere where the
charges, read with the statement of imputations and

18 OA/310/00553/2026 and MA 366/2026
particulars, do not disclose any misconduct or other
irregularity, or where the charges are contrary to law.
However, at that stage, the Tribunal cannot examine the
correctness or truth of the allegations, as those matters fall
within the domain of the disciplinary authority.
23. The same principle was reiterated in Union of India v.
Kunisetty Satyanarayana , reported in (2006) 12 SCC 28,
wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that a charge
memorandum ordinarily does not give rise to a cause of
action warranting judicial interference, since it is not, by
itself, an adverse final order affecting the rights of the
delinquent officer. Interference at the threshold is justified
only in exceptional circumstances, such as where the charge
memorandum has been issued by an authority lacking
jurisdiction or where a recognised ground for judicial review
is otherwise established. The principles governing
interference with disciplinary proceedings were also
considered in State of Tamil Nadu v. Pramod Kumar, IPS ,
reported in (2018) 17 SCC 677.

19 OA/310/00553/2026 and MA 366/2026
24. It is equally relevant to note that, in Chairman-cum-
Managing Director, Coal India Ltd. v. Ananta Saha , reported
in (2011) 5 SCC 142, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
emphasised the importance of compliance with the
applicable legal requirements governing disciplinary action.
The initiation of disciplinary proceedings must be founded
upon due application of mind and cannot be undertaken
mechanically or as a matter of routine.
25. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the
present case, we find that the applicant has raised
substantial questions concerning the precise nature of his
duties, the allocation of assessment responsibilities between
the officers at the Import Shed and the competent
Assessment Group, and the extent to which the alleged
discrepancies could be attributed to him. The contention
that the final clearance was granted by the competent
Assessment Group is a relevant circumstance for
consideration. However, it does not, by itself, conclusively
absolve the applicant of responsibility for any independent

20 OA/310/00553/2026 and MA 366/2026
examination-related or supervisory lapses specifically
attributable to him. The issue is whether the Articles of
Charge and the accompanying Statement of Imputations
disclose identifiable acts of omission or commission falling
within the scope of the applicant's official duties, and
whether those allegations are supported by a prima facie
factual foundation.
26. The distinction between an erroneous decision and
misconduct must, therefore, be maintained. A mere error of
judgment, an arguable question of classification, or a
technical irregularity would not, without more, necessarily
warrant disciplinary action. Conversely, where specific
dereliction of duty, failure to comply with mandatory
requirements, or disregard of material examination findings
is alleged, the matter may legitimately be examined in
disciplinary proceedings, provided the charges are founded
on relevant material and are not merely speculative or
unsupported by any discernible factual basis.

21 OA/310/00553/2026 and MA 366/2026
27. In the present case, the respondents maintain that the
Charge Memorandum is founded upon specific allegations
concerning failure to verify mandatory licensing
requirements, failure to identify and report goods requiring
regulatory clearance, and failure to take appropriate action
despite examination findings warranting further scrutiny.
These allegations, if borne out by the record, would require
consideration independently of the question whether the
final assessment or classification was undertaken by another
competent authority. At this stage, however, it would be
inappropriate for this Tribunal to record a definitive finding
on the truth or otherwise of those allegations, as doing so
would amount to prejudging the issues entrusted to the
disciplinary authority.
28. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the
sustainability of the disciplinary proceedings must be
examined within the limited parameters of judicial review
applicable to a challenge against a charge memorandum.
Unless it is demonstrated that the Charge Memorandum

22 OA/310/00553/2026 and MA 366/2026
suffers from want of jurisdiction, mala fides, violation of
statutory provisions, or that the allegations, even if accepted
at face value, do not disclose any misconduct or irregularity,
the Tribunal ought not to substitute its assessment for that
of the Disciplinary Authority. Equally, the Disciplinary
Authority must ensure that the proceedings are not founded
merely upon suspicion, an alleged error of law, or the
outcome of an assessment undertaken by another competent
authority, without identifying the applicant's own acts or
omissions constituting misconduct.
29. As regards the procedural objections raised by the
applicant, including the alleged non-supply of relied-upon
documents and the absence of authenticated material, we
observe that the applicant must be afforded a meaningful
and effective opportunity to defend themselves in accordance
with the applicable rules and the principles of natural
justice. All relied-upon documents necessary for the defence
must be made available, subject to the applicable rules, and
the charges must be examined on the basis of relevant and

23 OA/310/00553/2026 and MA 366/2026
legally sustainable material. Any specific procedural infirmity
established during the inquiry must be addressed in
accordance with law.
30. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the
opinion that the applicant must be permitted to raise all his
factual and legal defences before the Disciplinary Authority,
which shall consider the same objectively and independently,
without being influenced by any observations made herein
on the merits of the allegations. The Disciplinary Authority
shall also ensure that the proceedings are conducted fairly,
in accordance with the applicable rules, and within a
reasonable period.
31. In the result, the Original Application is disposed of
with a direction to the respondents to ensure that the
disciplinary proceedings, if continued, are conducted strictly
in accordance with the applicable rules and the principles of
natural justice and are concluded, as far as practicable,
within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a

24 OA/310/00553/2026 and MA 366/2026
copy of this order. The applicant shall cooperate with the
inquiry, and the respondents shall afford him a full and fair
opportunity to defend his case. Consequently, pending MA
st
No.366 of 2026 filed by the respondents for deletion of 1
nd
and 2 respondent stands dismissed. In the circumstsances,
there shall be no order as to costs.
(M.L. SRIVASTAVA) (M. SWAMINATHAN)
MEMBER(A) MEMBER(J)
16. 10.2026
mas

Digitally signed
by M A SUNDAR
Date:
2026.11.02
16:29:51 +05'30'
M A
SUNDAR