Mehmood Khan vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh

2026 INSC 706
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1217 OF 2021

MEHMOOD KHAN … APPELLANT
VERSUS
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH … RESPONDENT

J U D G E M E N T

V. MOHANA, J.
1. The present appeal is directed against the common
judgment and order dated 12.03.2019 passed by the
High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Indore, in
Criminal Appeal No.1376 of 2008 (preferred by the
appellant along with co-accused Kismatulla @ Guddu)
and Criminal Appeal No.1331 of 2008 (preferred by co-
accused Hatim Khan), which were heard and disposed of
together. Insofar as the present appellant is
concerned, the High Court upheld his conviction under
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
NITIN TALREJA
Date: 2026.07.15
16:52:34 IST
Reason:
Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”)
for the murder of Aziz Khan and affirmed the sentence
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of imprisonment for life, and upheld his conviction
under Section 307 IPC for attempting to murder
Riyasat Khan and the sentence of five years’ rigorous
imprisonment.

2. The conviction of Hatim Khan under Section 307 IPC
was likewise affirmed, while the conviction of
Kismatulla @ Guddu under Section 307 IPC was set
aside and he was acquitted. Hatim Khan’s own Special
Leave Petition, Diary No.19837 of 2019, has since
been dismissed by this Court vide order dated
08.11.2019. The present appeal is accordingly
confined to the conviction and sentence of the
appellant, Mehmood Khan.

3. When the Special Leave Petition came up for admission
on 16.09.2020, this Court, after condoning the delay,
issued notice confined to the quantum of sentence. By
order dated 08.10.2021, leave was granted and the
appellant was enlarged on bail, having by then
undergone incarceration for more than eleven years.

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4. At the final hearing, learned counsel additionally
addressed us on whether the conviction under Section
302 IPC warrants alteration to one under Section 304
IPC, and we have considered that issue along with the
question of sentence.

5. Consequently, the short question that survives is
whether the act attributed to the appellant amounts
to murder punishable under Section 302 IPC or
culpable homicide not amounting to murder, and what
sentence would meet the ends of justice.

A. BRIEF FACTS
6. The case has its origin in the election of the
Parent-Teacher Association of the Government High
School, Village Kotrikalan, Police Station Kurawar,
District Rajgarh (Madhya Pradesh), where candidates
set up by two rival groups — one led by the deceased,
Aziz Khan, and the other by the appellant — were
contesting on 11.10.2006.

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7. The appellant’s group allegedly attempted to deter
one Devchand from casting his vote and threatened his
wife; on this being objected to by Aziz Khan, an
exchange of abuses between the two groups escalated
into a clash, during which the appellant inflicted a
blow with a Gupti (a sword-cane) on the right side of
Aziz Khan’s abdomen. Riyasat Khan and Shafiq Khan,
who intervened to rescue Aziz Khan, were also
assaulted and injured.

8. Cross-FIRs were registered at the same Police Station
— FIR No.291 of 2006 by the appellant’s group and FIR
No.292 of 2006 by Aziz Khan, the latter also being
read as his dying declaration.

9. Aziz Khan was referred, through the Primary Health
Centre, Kurawar, to Hamidia and then LBS Hospital,
Bhopal; his formal dying declaration recorded on
12.10.2006 by the Executive Magistrate again
attributed the Gupti blow to the appellant. He was
later shifted to Peoples’ Hospital and then Bhopal
Memorial Hospital, where he died on 04.12.2006 —
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fifty-four days after the incident — of cardiac
arrest resulting from septicemia with duodenal
perforation traceable to the stab injury; the
postmortem attributed death to failure of the heart
and respiratory system consequent upon peritonitis.

10. On his death, the case was converted to one under
Section 302 IPC. During investigation, thirteen
persons were arrested and several weapons, including
a Gupti , were recovered at their instance; a
chargesheet was filed and the accused were tried as
Sessions Case No.22 of 2007, pleading false
implication owing to prior enmity and asserting that
the complainant’s side were the aggressors.

B. FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT
11. Holding that the occurrence was a free fight
attracting no charge under Section 147 IPC, the Trial
Court examined the role of each accused individually.

12. Relying on the deceased’s dying declarations and the
medical evidence, it found that the appellant had
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inflicted the fatal abdominal injury on Aziz Khan and
that the interval of fifty-four days before death did
not detract from its gravity or from the absence of
any negligence in treatment.

13. It accordingly convicted the appellant under Section
302 IPC, sentencing him to life imprisonment with a
fine of Rs.5,000 (in default, one year’s simple
imprisonment). On the injuries to Riyasat Khan —
caused on vital parts, namely the head and abdomen —
the Trial Court convicted the appellant, along with
Hatim and Kismatulla, under Section 307 IPC,
sentencing each to five years’ rigorous imprisonment
with a fine of Rs.1,000 (in default, six months’
simple imprisonment), to run concurrently with the
appellant’s other sentence.

14. The prosecution having failed to establish who caused
the stab injury to Shafiq Khan, all accused were
given the benefit of doubt on that count, and the
remaining accused were acquitted.

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C. THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT OF THE HIGH COURT
15. The High Court affirmed that the death of Aziz Khan
was homicidal, holding that the interval of fifty-
four days did not break the chain of causation since
death resulted from an infection that developed from
the very abdominal injury.

16. It rejected the challenge based on an alleged change
in the place of occurrence, finding the two locations
spoken to by witnesses to be proximate, and noted
that the injuries on the appellant’s side were simple
and did not establish a case of private defence. On
this basis, it upheld the appellant’s conviction
under Sections 302 and 307 IPC, as well as Hatim
Khan’s conviction under Section 307 IPC, and
confirmed the sentences awarded by the Trial Court.

17. However, finding no specific act attributed to
Kismatulla @ Guddu, it set aside his conviction under
Section 307 IPC and acquitted him.


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D. CONTENTIONS
18. Learned counsel for the appellant did not seriously
assail the concurrent findings on the homicidal
nature of Aziz Khan’s death or the appellant’s
authorship of the fatal injury.

19. She primarily submitted that the occurrence was an
unpremeditated, sudden fight arising in the heat of
passion during an election, in which both sides were
armed and injured; that the appellant inflicted only
a solitary blow which he neither repeated nor
followed up; and that he took no undue advantage and
acted in no cruel or unusual manner, bringing the
case within Exception IV to Section 300 IPC.

20. She further submitted that death, occurring fifty-
four days later on account of a supervening
infection, negatived any intention to cause death,
and that the offence would, at the highest, fall
under Section 304 Part II IPC.

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21. Learned counsel for the respondent-State supported
the judgments of the Courts below, submitting that
the deliberate and forceful stab into the abdomen —
sufficient to injure the duodenum — satisfied the
description of murder under Section 300 IPC, and that
the interval between injury and death was immaterial
once death was shown to result from that injury.

E. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
22. We have considered the submissions and perused the
record. The question is whether the appellant’s act
attracts Section 302 IPC or falls under Section 304
Part I or Part II IPC.

23. The distinction between murder and culpable homicide
not amounting to murder has engaged this Court in a
catena of decisions. In Virsa Singh v. State of
1
Punjab , Vivian Bose, J., held that:

“ to bring a case within clause thirdly of
Section 300, IPC, the prosecution must
establish the presence of bodily injury, its
nature, an intention to inflict that

1
1958 SCR 1495.
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particular injury (that it was not accidental
or unintentional or that some other injury
was intended) and that the injury so intended
was sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death. It is the intention to
inflict the particular injury found to be
present that is decisive and it is to be
gathered from the totality of the
circumstances and not from the mere fact that
the injury is inflicted.”

24. This test was authoritatively restated in Pulicherla
2
Nagaraju v. State of A.P. , where this Court cautioned
that the question of intention must be decided with
care, so that cases of murder are not diluted into
culpable homicide, nor cases of culpable homicide
elevated into murder, and set out a non-exhaustive
list of circumstances relevant to that determination:

“… the intention to cause death can be
gathered generally from a combination of a
few or several of the following, among other,
circumstances: (i) nature of the weapon used;
(ii) whether the weapon was carried by the
accused or was picked up from the spot; (iii)
whether the blow is aimed at a vital part of
the body; (iv) the amount of force employed
in causing injury; (v) whether the act was in
the course of sudden quarrel or sudden fight
or free for all fight; (vi) whether the
incident occurs by chance or whether there
was any premeditation; (vii) whether there
was any prior enmity or whether the deceased
was a stranger; (viii) whether there was any

2
(2006) 11 SCC 444.
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grave and sudden provocation, and if so, the
cause for such provocation; (ix) whether it
was in the heat of passion; (x) whether the
person inflicting the injury has taken undue
advantage or has acted in a cruel and unusual
manner; (xi) whether the accused dealt a
single blow or several blows. ”

25. In Pulicherla (supra) itself, this Court declined to
interfere because the accused had carried a dangerous
weapon to the spot, there was prior enmity, the
deceased was unarmed, there was no sudden quarrel or
fight, and the fatal blow was driven with great force
into a vital part just below the neck.

26. The present case is materially different: both the
Courts below concurrently found that members of the
two groups were present at the polling booth by
reason of the election and not by any prior design,
that the quarrel over the casting of votes was
sudden, and that the encounter was a free fight —
findings on which the charges under Sections 148 and
149 IPC themselves failed, being inconsistent with
any prior planning.

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27. The fight arose from an objection to the restraint of
a voter, escalating through an exchange of abuses
into a clash in which both groups, already armed,
sustained injuries; there was no interval permitting
tempers to cool, and the fatal blow was struck in
that instantaneous fight. The mere fact that both
sides carried weapons in the charged atmosphere of a
contested village election does not convert a sudden
mutual fight into a premeditated assault.

28. The appellant inflicted a solitary blow, which he
neither repeated nor followed up, and there is
nothing to suggest that he took undue advantage or
acted in a cruel or unusual manner.

3
29. In Sukhbir Singh v. State of Haryana , this Court held
that Exception IV applies where the offence is
committed without premeditation, in a sudden fight in
the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel, without
the offender taking undue advantage or acting cruelly
or unusually — a description that fits the case
before us.

3
(2002) 3 SCC 327.
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30. Applying the test in Virsa Singh (supra) , we are
satisfied that the prosecution has not established an
intention to cause death. The appellant struck a
single blow in the course of a sudden free fight; it
is not shown that he intended the Gupti to penetrate
to the depth that injured the duodenum, and death did
not follow on the spot or soon after but only fifty-
four days later, from an infection that developed
from the injury.

31. While a single blow does not by itself reduce murder
to culpable homicide, it is not relied on in
isolation here. Taken together with the sudden and
unpremeditated free fight, the mutual provocation,
the injuries on both sides, the absence of any prior
design to kill, and the absence of repetition or
undue advantage, these circumstances establish
knowledge that the act was likely to cause death, but
not an intention to cause death or to cause an injury
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death. The case therefore falls within Exception IV
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to Section 300 IPC and is punishable under Section
304 Part II IPC.

32. As regards the conviction under Section 307 IPC for
the injuries to Riyasat Khan, both Courts below
concurrently found that the stab wound above the
umbilicus, together with four incised wounds
including those on the cheek and scalp, established
the requisite intention or, at the least, knowledge
that death, had it ensued, would have made the
assailants guilty of murder — it being the intention
or knowledge of the offender, and not the ultimate
gravity of the injury, that is determinative under
Section 307 IPC. We see no reason to disturb this
concurrent finding.

33. On sentence, we may note that the appellant is about
fifty-eight years of age; the occurrence was the
unpremeditated product of a sudden fight; and he has
already undergone more than eleven years of actual
incarceration, having been on bail since 08.10.2021.
Having altered the conviction to Section 304 Part II
IPC, we sentence him to the period already undergone.
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CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS
34. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed in the
following terms:-
(i) The conviction of the appellant, Mehmood
Khan, under Section 302 IPC is altered to one
under Section 304 Part II IPC;
(ii) The sentence of imprisonment for life under
Section 302 IPC is set aside; for the offence
under Section 304 Part II IPC, the appellant
is sentenced to the period already undergone;
(iii) The conviction under Section 307 IPC is
affirmed, and the sentence of five years’
rigorous imprisonment thereunder, having run
concurrently, is treated as already
undergone;
(iv) The fine, if already deposited, shall not be
refunded; if not deposited, the default
sentence shall not be enforced, having regard
to the period of incarceration already
undergone; and
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(v) The appellant’s bail bonds shall stand
discharged.
35. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed
of.

………………………………………………………,CJI.
[SURYA KANT]


………………………………………………………………,J.
[V. MOHANA]

NEW DELHI;
JUNE 18, 2026.
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