Jai Narain vs State

A.F.R.
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 2262 of 1989
Jai Narain





.....Appellant(s)
Versus
State
.....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s) : Apul Misra, Y.K.Shukla
Counsel for Respondent(s) :

Court No. - 45
HON'BLE SALIL KUMAR RAI, J.
HON'BLE PADAM NARAIN MISHRA, J.
Heard Shri Apul Mishra, Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Devrat Mishra,
counsel for the appellants and Ms. Archana Singh, A.G.A.-I for the State.
This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 25.11.1989
passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Pilibhit in Sessions Trial No. 194
of 1984, whereby appellant No. 2, Kanauji Lal, along with appellant No. 1,
Jai Narain, was convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the
Indian Penal Code and sentenced to imprisonment for life. The other
accused, Rajendra, was acquitted of the charge under Section 302/34 IPC but
was convicted under Section 201 IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for one year with a fine of Rs. 500/-. During the pendency of
the appeal, appellant No. 1, Jai Narain, died and the appeal has been
declared as abated so far as he was concerned. Consequently, the present
appeal survives only at the instance of appellant No. 2, Kanauji Lal.
The prosecution case, in brief, is that the deceased, Gaindan Lal, and the
appellant, Kanauji Lal, had remained close friends for a considerable period.
Both had jointly purchased a tractor by raising a loan after mortgaging their
respective agricultural holdings. Their relationship was further strengthened
by matrimonial alliances, inasmuch as the sons of both families had been
married into the same family. Jai Narain was the samdhi of Kanauji Lal and
his daughter had been married to Jai Narain's son only about a week prior to
the occurrence.
According to the prosecution, Jai Narain had borrowed four sacks of wheat

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from the deceased. On the morning of 15.05.1984, the deceased demanded
that Jai Narain return the wheat or render an account thereof. Jai Narain
declined to do so and asserted that he would settle the matter only after the
deceased accounted for the financial liabilities arising out of the jointly
purchased tractor. Kanauji Lal, who was present there, supported Jai Narain
and insisted that the tractor accounts should be settled first. The deceased,
however, persisted in demanding the return of the wheat. A heated exchange
followed between the parties, which was eventually pacified by the
intervention of the villagers. The parties thereafter dispersed.
The prosecution further alleges that at about 8.00 a.m., when the deceased
was going to his agricultural field accompanied by his son, Shanti Swaroop
(PW-1), Rajendra called him near the flour mill with the assurance that the
dispute could be amicably settled. The deceased accordingly sat on a takhat
placed outside the premises. Shortly thereafter, Kanauji Lal and Jai Narain
also reached the spot. Kanauji Lal was carrying his licensed SBBL gun. The
discussion soon degenerated into another quarrel regarding the same dispute.
According to the prosecution, Jai Narain exhorted Kanauji Lal to kill the
deceased, whereupon Kanauji Lal fired a single shot which hit the chest of
the deceased. The deceased collapsed on the spot and succumbed to the
injury almost instantaneously. The prosecution further alleges that after the
deceased fell down, Kanauji Lal attempted to drag the body towards his
cattle shed. Anarkali, the widow of the deceased, rushed to the spot and
threw herself over the body, thereby preventing its removal. It is also alleged
that Rajendra washed the blood stains from the takhat on which the deceased
had been seated.
On the written report submitted by Shanti Swaroop at Police Station
Barkhera at about 10.30 a.m. on the same day, a case was registered under
Sections 302 and 201 IPC against Kanauji Lal, Jai Narain and Rajendra. The
distance between the place of occurrence and the police station was about six
miles. The prompt lodging of the First Information Report has not been
questioned before us and lends assurance to the prosecution version
regarding the genesis and time of the occurrence.
The investigation commenced immediately. The Investigating Officer
reached the place of occurrence, prepared the inquest report and other
necessary papers, and forwarded the dead body for post-mortem
examination. The post-mortem was conducted on 16.05.1984 at 2.30 p.m.
The autopsy disclosed a firearm entry wound measuring 3 cm × 3 cm on the
front of the chest with an abrasion collar. There was no blackening, tattooing
or scorching. On internal examination, the sternum, ribs, heart, left lung and

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3
major blood vessels were found extensively lacerated. One tikli was
recovered from the body. Four corresponding exit wounds were present on
the lower left side of the chest. The doctor opined that death had occurred
due to haemorrhage and shock resulting from the ante-mortem firearm
injury.
During the course of investigation, blood-stained earth and plain earth were
collected from the place of occurrence. Subsequently, the SBBL gun
allegedly used in the commission of the offence, along with cartridges and
the blood-stained clothes of the deceased, were recovered. The serological
examination confirmed the presence of human blood on the articles sent for
forensic examination. On completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet
was submitted against all the accused under Sections 302 and 201 IPC,
whereupon the case was committed to the Court of Session.
To prove its case, the prosecution examined Shanti Swaroop (PW-1), the son
of the deceased and the informant, and Gokaran Prasad (PW-2) as
eyewitnesses to the occurrence. The doctor who conducted the post-mortem
examination was examined as PW-4 and proved the post-mortem report. The
Investigating Officer entered the witness box as PW-5, while PW-3 was
examined as a formal witness. The accused denied the prosecution
allegations in their statements recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and
pleaded false implication on account of previous enmity. Rajendra
specifically asserted that he had been implicated merely because he
happened to be the nephew of Kanauji Lal.
The trial court, upon appreciation of the evidence on record, accepted the
testimony of PW-1 and PW-2 insofar as Kanauji Lal and Jai Narain were
concerned and held that the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt
that Kanauji Lal fired the fatal shot at the exhortation of Jai Narain.
However, the trial court found no material to conclude that Rajendra had
shared the common intention to commit the murder and, accordingly,
acquitted him of the charge under Section 302/34 IPC while convicting him
under Section 201 IPC. Kanauji Lal and Jai Narain were consequently
convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced to
imprisonment for life.
Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has, however, fairly stated that
the finding recorded by the trial court that the fatal shot was fired by Kanauji
Lal is not under challenge. The appellant does not dispute either his presence
at the place of occurrence or the fact that the firearm injury sustained by the
deceased proved fatal. The submission advanced before us is confined to the
nature of the offence. According to the learned counsel, even if the

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4
prosecution case is accepted in its entirety, the facts proved on record do not
attract the offence of murder punishable under Section 302 IPC. It is urged
that the occurrence was the outcome of a sudden quarrel arising out of an
existing dispute between the parties and that the surrounding circumstances
unmistakably indicate that the appellant possessed only the knowledge that
his act was likely to cause death, but lacked the intention necessary to
constitute murder under Section 300 IPC. It is, therefore, submitted that the
conviction deserves to be altered to one under Section 304 Part II IPC.
Per contra, learned Additional Government Advocate has supported the
judgment of the trial court. It is submitted that the appellant had reached the
place of occurrence armed with an SBBL gun and deliberately fired at the
chest of the deceased, a vital part of the body. According to the learned
A.G.A., the use of a deadly weapon coupled with the situs of the injury
clearly establishes the intention to cause death or, at any rate, the intention to
inflict such bodily injury as was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death. It is, therefore, contended that the conviction recorded under
Section 302 IPC warrants no interference.
Having bestowed our anxious consideration to the rival submissions and
having carefully examined the entire evidence on record, we find that the
principal controversy before us is not whether the appellant caused the death
of the deceased. That fact stands established beyond reasonable doubt by the
consistent testimony of the eyewitnesses, which receives complete
corroboration from the medical evidence. The real question is whether, on
the facts proved by the prosecution, the mental element accompanying the
act of the appellant answers the description of intention contemplated under
Section 300 IPC or whether the case discloses only the knowledge envisaged
under Section 299 IPC.
Sections 299, 300 and 304 of the Indian Penal Code embody the legislative
distinction between culpable homicide and murder. Section 299 defines
culpable homicide, while Section 300 specifies the circumstances in which
culpable homicide amounts to murder. Section 304 prescribes the
punishment where the act does not amount to murder, either because it does
not satisfy any of the clauses of Section 300 or because it falls within one of
the statutory exceptions. The distinction between these provisions has
engaged the attention of the Courts on numerous occasions and has often
been described as one of the most difficult branches of criminal
jurisprudence. The difficulty lies not in the language of the statute but in its
application to the infinitely varying factual situations that arise before the
courts.

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The Supreme Court, in , (2024) 20 SCC 500, after
Anbazhagan v. State
referring to the earlier decision in , (1983) 4
Jawahar Lal v. State of Punjab
SCC 159, reiterated that the determination of the accused's mental element
cannot rest upon any isolated circumstance, such as the fact that only one
injury was inflicted or that the injury proved fatal. The Court emphasised
that the enquiry has to be directed towards the entire factual matrix. The
nature of the weapon used, the part of the body targeted, the force employed,
the extent of the injury and the manner of assault are undoubtedly relevant
considerations. Equally relevant, however, are the circumstances preceding
the occurrence, the events immediately attendant upon the assault, the
relationship between the parties, the genesis of the dispute and the conduct
of the accused before and after the occurrence. These surrounding
circumstances frequently provide the clearest indication of the accused's
state of mind.
The Supreme Court further observed that intention, being a state of mind, is
seldom capable of direct proof and has necessarily to be inferred from the
proved facts. There is no inflexible rule that the infliction of a single injury
necessarily negatives the intention required under Section 300 IPC, nor can
the use of a deadly weapon or the fatal nature of the injury, by themselves,
be regarded as conclusive of the existence of such intention. Whether the
accused acted with guilty intention or merely with guilty knowledge is
essentially a question of fact to be determined upon a cumulative assessment
of all the surrounding circumstances. Where the evidence establishes an
intention to inflict the particular bodily injury which is sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death, the case would ordinarily fall
within Clause Thirdly of Section 300 IPC. Conversely, where the
surrounding circumstances disclose absence of premeditation, a sudden
quarrel, a sudden fight, an accidental or unintended injury, or an intention
merely to cause a simple injury coupled only with the knowledge that death
was a likely consequence, the offence would appropriately fall within
Section 304 Part II IPC.
It is in the light of these settled principles that the evidence in the present
case is required to be examined. The determination cannot rest solely on the
circumstance that the appellant used an SBBL gun or that the firearm injury
was inflicted on the chest of the deceased. Those facts undoubtedly
constitute important circumstances, but they cannot be viewed in isolation.
The Court is required to examine the entire chain of circumstances preceding
and accompanying the occurrence in order to ascertain the true mental
element with which the appellant acted.

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6
The evidence on record unmistakably establishes that the appellant and the
deceased had enjoyed cordial relations for several years preceding the
occurrence. They had jointly purchased a tractor by raising a loan after
mortgaging their respective agricultural lands, thereby entering into a
financial arrangement founded on mutual confidence. Their relationship was
further reinforced by close matrimonial ties between the two families. The
prosecution has not brought on record any evidence to indicate that the
appellant bore any longstanding grudge or hostility against the deceased. On
the contrary, the evidence suggests that their relationship had remained
cordial and that no dispute had arisen between them until the events
immediately preceding the occurrence.
The genesis of the occurrence also assumes considerable significance. The
prosecution itself attributes the immediate cause of the dispute not to any
disagreement between the appellant and the deceased but to Jai Narain's
refusal to return or account for the four sacks of wheat borrowed from the
deceased. It was only when the deceased insisted upon repayment that Jai
Narain sought to link the issue with the unsettled accounts relating to the
jointly purchased tractor. The appellant appears to have intervened in
support of Jai Narain, who had become closely related to him by reason of
the marriage performed scarcely a week earlier. Significantly, there is no
evidence to suggest that, at any point of time prior to the occurrence, the
appellant himself had demanded settlement of the tractor accounts or had
raised any grievance against the deceased on that score. Had there existed
any deep-seated animosity arising out of the tractor transaction, one would
reasonably expect some evidence of previous discord between them. The
prosecution has led none.
The sequence of events preceding the occurrence also does not disclose any
pre-conceived plan to eliminate the deceased. The first altercation ended
with the intervention of the villagers, whereafter the parties dispersed. It is
the prosecution case itself that the deceased was thereafter called by
Rajendra on the pretext that the dispute could be amicably resolved. The
deceased, believing that an effort was being made to bring about a
settlement, voluntarily went to the place where the parties again assembled.
These circumstances are inconsistent with a carefully designed plan to
commit murder. Had there been any settled intention to take the life of the
deceased, the prosecution would have been expected to produce some
evidence suggesting prior deliberation or preparation. The record is
conspicuously silent in this regard.
Equally significant is the manner in which the occurrence unfolded. The

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7
prosecution does not allege that immediately upon reaching the spot the
appellant opened fire. On the contrary, another exchange of words took
place regarding the same dispute. It was during the course of this altercation
that Jai Narain is stated to have exhorted the appellant to kill the deceased.
According to the eyewitnesses themselves, the firearm was discharged
immediately thereafter. This sequence of events indicates that the fatal act
was committed during the heat of the altercation and not pursuant to any
prior determination to cause death. The exhortation attributed to Jai Narain,
whether accepted in its entirety or not, is itself indicative of the fact that the
decision to use the firearm was taken in the course of the quarrel and not
before it.
Much emphasis has been laid by the learned A.G.A. on the circumstance that
the appellant had come to the place of occurrence carrying an SBBL gun. It
is undoubtedly true that the appellant was armed with a firearm and that the
shot struck the chest of the deceased. These are relevant circumstances and
cannot be ignored. At the same time, they do not conclude the enquiry. As
noticed earlier, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that neither the nature
of the weapon nor the situs of the injury is by itself decisive of the question
whether the accused acted with the intention required under Section 300
IPC. The Court must evaluate these circumstances in conjunction with the
entire factual background. In the present case, the long-standing cordial
relationship between the parties, the absence of previous hostility, the
sudden revival of the quarrel regarding the wheat transaction, the
intervention of the appellant on behalf of his samdhi , and the firing of a
single shot in the midst of the altercation are all circumstances which cannot
be ignored while assessing the appellant's state of mind.
The trial court appears to have proceeded substantially on the premise that
since the appellant had fired at the chest of the deceased with a firearm, the
offence must necessarily amount to murder. Such an approach overlooks the
distinction which the law has consistently maintained between the act and
the mental element accompanying the act. The physical act of causing death
may remain the same; what determines the nature of the offence is the state
of mind with which that act is committed. It is for this reason that the
Supreme Court in Anbazhagan cautioned that the enquiry cannot be confined
to the injury alone but must extend to the entire factual matrix, including the
circumstances preceding and attendant upon the occurrence.
Viewed cumulatively, the circumstances proved by the prosecution do not
persuade us to hold that the appellant had formed the intention either to
cause the death of the deceased or to inflict that particular bodily injury

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8
which he knew to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death. At the same time, it would be wholly unrealistic to suggest that the
appellant was unaware of the likely consequences of his act. A person who
discharges a firearm at another, even in the course of a sudden quarrel, must
ordinarily be attributed with the knowledge that such an act is likely to cause
death. The knowledge contemplated by Part III of Section 299 IPC is,
therefore, clearly established. What is not established beyond reasonable
doubt is the higher degree of mens rea necessary to attract Clause Thirdly of
Section 300 IPC.
The cumulative effect of the circumstances, therefore, persuades us to hold
that the present case falls outside the ambit of Section 300 IPC and is more
appropriately covered by Section 304 Part II IPC. The conviction of the
appellant under Section 302 IPC recorded by the trial court cannot,
therefore, be sustained and deserves to be altered accordingly.
The conviction of the appellant is accordingly altered from Section 302 read
with Section 34 IPC to Section 304 Part II IPC.
The only question that now survives for consideration is the appropriate
sentence to be imposed upon the appellant.
Ordinarily, an offence punishable under Section 304 Part II IPC would merit
a substantial term of imprisonment, having regard to the gravity of the
consequence resulting from the act. At the same time, sentencing is not an
inflexible exercise. It must be informed not merely by the nature of the
offence but also by the circumstances attending its commission, the passage
of time since the occurrence, the conduct of the accused and other mitigating
circumstances which have emerged on the record.
The occurrence in the present case took place on 15.05.1984, more than four
decades ago. During this prolonged period, the appellant has remained under
the shadow of criminal proceedings. It has been brought to our notice that he
is now about ninety years of age. There is nothing on record to indicate that
after the present occurrence he was involved in any other criminal activity.
The incident itself arose out of a sudden quarrel relating to a dispute with Jai
Narain, the deceased appellant and a co-accused, and was not the result of
any premeditated design to eliminate the deceased. While none of these
circumstances diminish the seriousness of the act, they nevertheless
constitute relevant considerations while determining the appropriate
sentence.
The object of sentencing is not merely to punish the offender but also to

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9
ensure that the punishment is proportionate to the degree of criminality
established by the evidence. Once it is held that the prosecution has failed to
prove the intention necessary to constitute murder and that the case falls
under Section 304 Part II IPC, the sentence must reflect that altered degree
of culpability. In the peculiar facts of the present case, particularly the
advanced age of the appellant, the extraordinary lapse of time since the
occurrence and the circumstances in which the offence was committed, we
are of the considered opinion that the ends of justice would be adequately
served by sentencing the appellant to the period already undergone coupled
with payment of heavy fine.
Accordingly, while altering the conviction of the appellant from Section 302
read with Section 34 IPC to Section 304 Part II IPC, we sentence him to the
period of imprisonment already undergone and a fine of Rs. 1,00,000/-
(Rupees One Lakh) which shall be deposited by the appellant before the trial
court within a period of three months from today. In the event of failure to
deposit the aforesaid amount within the stipulated period, the appellant shall
undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year.
The conviction of Rajendra under Section 201 IPC is not the subject matter
of the present appeal. No further orders are, therefore, required in that
regard.
The appeal is, accordingly, . The conviction and sentence of
partly allowed
the appellant under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC are set aside.
Instead, the appellant is convicted under Section 304 Part II IPC and
sentenced in the manner indicated above.
Since the appellant is on bail, he shall not be required to surrender, subject to
his depositing the amount of fine within the period stipulated herein. His bail
bonds and sureties shall stand discharged upon such deposit. In case of
default, the trial court shall take appropriate steps in accordance with law to
enforce the sentence and recover the fine as directed above.
Let the trial court record be transmitted forthwith to the trial court and the
judgement be also certified to the trial court for information and compliance.
July 17, 2026
Vipasha
(Padam Narain Mishra,J.) (Salil Kumar Rai,J.)
Digitally signed by :-
VIPASHA MUKHERJEE
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad