PAVITRA RAMANUJAM vs DEPUTY DIRECTOR
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
- 1 -
NC: 2026:KHC:35482
WP No. 14309 of 2026
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
R
TH
DATED THIS THE 7 DAY OF JULY, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
WRIT PETITION NO. 14309 OF 2026 (GM-RES)
BETWEEN:
1. PAVITRA RAMANUJAM
D/O N. RAMANUJAM
AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS
R/AT P-40/G-A/BLOCK-I,
SEAWARD STREET,
VALMIKI NAGAR, THIRUVANMIYUR,
VELACHERY, CHENNAI,
TAMIL NADU - 600 041
…PETITIONER
(BY SRI. GAUTHAM BHARADWAJ, ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. ANKITH JAIN, ADVOCATE)
Digitally signed
by
PADMAVATHI
B K
Location: High
Court of
Karnataka
AND:
1. DEPUTY DIRECTOR
DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT
BENGALURU ZONAL OFFICE,
HMT MACHINE TOOLS LIMITED COMPOUND,
BANGALORE COMPLEX,
NEAR HMT CIRCLE, JALAHALLI,
BENGALURU - 560013.
…RESPONDENT
(BY SRI. MADHU N. RAO, ADVOCATE)
- 2 -
NC: 2026:KHC:35482
WP No. 14309 of 2026
HC-KAR
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA READ WITH SECTION 528 OF
THE BNSS, 2023 PRYAING TO QUASH THE IMPUGNED
PROVISIONAL ATTACHMENT ORDER
NO.ECIR/BGZO/15/2023/12607 DATED 28/03/2026 ISSUED BY
THE RESPONDENT/ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE IN SO FAR AS
THE PETITIONER IS CONCERNED, ARISING OUT OF PREDICATE
OFFENCE IN CRIME NO.26/2020 REGISTERED BY
KORAMANGALA POLICE ANNEXURE-A.
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY,
ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
ORAL ORDER
The petitioner is before the Court, seeking the following
prayer:
"A. Issue a writ in the nature of certiorari to quash the
impugned Provisional Attachment Order No.
ECIR/BGZO/15/2023/12607 dated 28.03.2026 issued by
the Respondent/Enforcement Directorate in so far as the
Petitioner is concerned, arising out of predicate offence
in Crime No. 26/2020 registered by Koramangala Police;
ANNEXURE-A.
B. Pass such other order(s) that this Hon'ble Court may
deem fit in the interest of justice & equity."
- 3 -
NC: 2026:KHC:35482
WP No. 14309 of 2026
HC-KAR
2. Heard Sri. Gautham Bharadwaj, learned counsel
appearing for the petitioner, Sri. Madhu N. Rao, learned counsel
appearing for the respondent and have perused the material on
record.
3. Sans details, facts germane, are as follows:
It would suffice to being that the very petitioner had, on
an earlier occasion, approached this Court in W.P. No.7336 of
2026 , calling in question the summons issued by the
respondent–Enforcement Directorate. This Court, while
declining to place the entire investigative process in abeyance
by granting a blanket stay of further proceedings in the ECIR,
considered it appropriate to strike a delicate balance between
the investigation and the preservation of the petitioner's
personal liberty.
4. In the aforesaid backdrop, this Court passed an order
dated 10.03.2026 , it reads as follows:
"This Court on 04.03.2026 had passed the following
order:
"Sri. Madhu N. Rao, learned counsel is
directed to accept notice for the respondent -
Directorate of Enforcement.
- 4 -
NC: 2026:KHC:35482
WP No. 14309 of 2026
HC-KAR
The summons so issued to the respondent
shall stand suspended, till 06.03.2026.
List this matter on 06.03.2026."
Learned counsel Madhu N. Rao appearing for the
respondent-Enforcement Directorate would submit that
the amount involved in the case at hand against the
allegation revolves around the money transaction or
money collected by the directors of a company Generis
Consulting Services Private Limited to the tune of ₹ 7.9
crores and allegedly hoodwinked.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the
petitioner is accused No.6 against whom there is no
allegation. She was also one of the directors. The
counsel Sri.Madhu N Rao submits that she was the
director at the relevant point in time, therefore cannot
escape investigation. The learned counsel further
submits that the predicate offence has been stayed at
the hands of the Coordinate Bench way back in the
year 2021 and the stay is still subsisting as on today.
In the light of investigation against all others
being continued except the petitioner, I deem it
appropriate to direct the petitioner to co-operate
with the investigation with a direction that the
respondent-Enforcement Directorate shall not
take any coercive steps.
The petitioner shall be present for the purpose of
investigation before the Enforcement Directorate on
18.03.2026.
List this matter on 09.04.2026."
(Emphasis supplied)
The operative portion of the aforesaid order admits of no
ambiguity. While the petitioner was enjoined to extend her
fullest co-operation to the investigative process, the
- 5 -
NC: 2026:KHC:35482
WP No. 14309 of 2026
HC-KAR
respondent–Enforcement Directorate was directed "not to
take any coercive steps".
5. What falls for interpretation is, what is legal import of
the words "not to take any coercive steps". The legal
import of the said direction is neither uncertain nor susceptible
to expansive interpretation. It is by now a settled principle that
an order restraining the investigating agency from taking
coercive steps is essentially a judicial shield erected to
preserve the personal liberty of the individual under
investigation. Such a direction, in its ordinary legal
connotation, proscribes the investigating agency from resorting
to arrest or other measures directly impinging upon the
person's liberty. It does not, however, denude the statutory
authority of its power to continue the investigation, collect
evidence, file a prosecution complaint (by the Enforcement
Directorate), or invoke such other statutory remedies as the
enactment itself contemplates. The context in which the order
dated 10-03-2026 came to be rendered, leaves no manner of
doubt that the protection extended by this Court was confined
- 6 -
NC: 2026:KHC:35482
WP No. 14309 of 2026
HC-KAR
to insulating the petitioner against arrest, during the course of
investigation and nothing beyond.
6. The petitioner, in compliance with the said order,
appeared before the Enforcement Directorate and co-operated
with the investigation. The investigation thereafter culminated
in filing of a prosecution complaint before the jurisdictional
Court. Consequent upon the presentation of the prosecution
complaint, the Adjudicating Authority, exercising jurisdiction
under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, initiated
attachment proceedings and, by order dated 28-03-2026 ,
passed a Provisional Attachment Order attaching the
properties of the petitioner. It is this very order of provisional
attachment that constitutes the fulcrum around which the
present writ petition revolves.
7. The matter thereafter came to be listed before a Co-
ordinate Bench on 29-04-2026 , which passed the following
interim order:
"Sri Madhukar Deshpande, learned counsel is
directed to accept notice for the respondent.
A coordinate Bench of this Court in W.P
No.7336/2026 while dealing with the challenge to
- 7 -
NC: 2026:KHC:35482
WP No. 14309 of 2026
HC-KAR
the summons issued to the petitioner herein under
the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, took
note of the fact that the predicate offence in
C.C.No.417/2021 on the file of the IV Additional
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru, was
stayed in so far as the petitioner herein is
concerned in Crl. P. No.8938/2021, and directed the
petitioner to co-operate with the investigation and
also directed the Enforcement Directorate not to
take any coercive steps. This order was passed on
10.03.2026.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits
that despite the direction issued by a coordinate
Bench of this Court directing the Enforcement
Directorate not to take any precipitative action,
provisional order of attachment is passed by the
Enforcement Directorate dated 28.03.2026.
In that view of the matter, until the next date
of hearing, the provisional order of attachment
bearing F.No.ECIR/BGZO/15/2023/12607 dated
28.03.2026 passed by the respondent is stayed.
One-week time is granted to comply with the office
objections.
List this petition along with W.P. No.7336/2026 on
04.06.2026."
(Emphasis supplied)
The submission advanced before the Co-ordinate Bench
proceeded upon the premise that this Court, by its earlier order
dated 10.03.2026 , had interdicted the Enforcement
Directorate from taking any "precipitative action" , and that
the issuance of the provisional attachment order amounted to a
palpable overreach of the judicial mandate. Proceeding on that
- 8 -
NC: 2026:KHC:35482
WP No. 14309 of 2026
HC-KAR
understanding, the Co-ordinate Bench deemed it appropriate to
grant an interim stay of the provisional attachment order.
8. A careful reading of the order dated 10.03.2026 ,
however, unmistakably demonstrates that the foundation upon
which the interim order came to rest was, with great respect,
factually erroneous. This Court never directed the respondent
not to take "precipitative action." The words employed by
this Court were precise, deliberate and unambiguous— "not to
take any coercive steps". The Courts are presumed to
choose their words with care, and every expression employed
in a judicial order carries with it a distinct legal consequence.
9. The distinction between the two expressions is
not one of mere semantics or lexical elegance; it is one
that strikes at the very root of the controversy. A
direction restraining precipitative action is one of wide
amplitude. It has the effect of arresting the onward
march of statutory proceedings, freezing the hands of
the authority from taking any consequential action, until
the Court directs otherwise. Such an order virtually
suspends the statutory process in its entirety.
- 9 -
NC: 2026:KHC:35482
WP No. 14309 of 2026
HC-KAR
10. A direction restraining coercive steps, on the
other hand, occupies a markedly narrower field. It is a
judicial assurance against coercion directed at the
person, not against the statutory process. It protects
liberty; it does not paralyse jurisdiction. It prevents
arrest; it does not prohibit investigation. It insulates the
individual from arrest; it does not eclipse the statutory
authority to carry the investigation to its logical
culmination or to invoke remedies expressly sanctioned
by law, including the institution of prosecution or the
initiation of attachment proceedings under the
Prevention of Money Laundering Act.
11. To conflate these two distinct expressions would be to
blur a boundary that the law has consciously and consistently
maintained. A judicial order must be understood as it is
written, not as one of the parties subsequently perceives or
portrays it.
12. Viewed thus, the order dated 10-03-2026 can
admit of but one construction—that the respondent was
restrained only from taking coercive steps, namely, from
- 10 -
NC: 2026:KHC:35482
WP No. 14309 of 2026
HC-KAR
arresting the petitioner during the course of
investigation. It was never an injunction against the
continuation of the statutory process under the Prevention
of Money Laundering Act, nor a prohibition against the
respondent exercising powers otherwise vested in it under the
statute. Consequently, the provisional attachment order
cannot, by any accepted canon of legal interpretation, be
characterised as an act in defiance of or in overreach to the
order dated 10-03-2026 . The edifice of the petitioner's
challenge, therefore, rests upon a conflation of two
expressions which, in law, inhabit entirely different
fields.
13. The legal connotation of the expression “ coercive
steps ” has also engaged the attention of several High Courts.
The High Court of Calcutta in MENKA GAMBHIR v. UNION OF
1
INDIA , while interpreting the expression in the context of
proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering
Act, 2002 , lucidly expounded its import. The High Court holds
as follows:
1
2022 SCC OnLine Cal 3349
- 11 -
NC: 2026:KHC:35482
WP No. 14309 of 2026
HC-KAR
"….. ….. …..
7. The expression “coercive steps” is generally
understood to mean steps towards arrest and
confinement of a person. Although the phrase has
frequently been used in numerous orders, parties
before the courts accept the meaning to be
protection from arrest and detention. The words
carry an unmistakable sense of forceful
confinement in a manner so as to severely restrict
the freedom of a person. In Punit v. State, 2017 SCC
OnLine Raj 4061; a Single Bench of the Rajasthan High
Court construed the phrase “no coercive steps” to
automatically mean that a person cannot be arrested."
(Emphasis supplied)
The High Court of Calcutta in the afore-quoted judgment
was dealing with a case relating to the action of the
Enforcement Directorate arising of the proceedings under the
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.
13.1. Subsequently, the High Court of Delhi in the case of
2
SATYA PRAKASH BAGLA v. STATE , holds as follows:
“DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS:
31. Upon a careful perusal of order dated
10.01.2025 passed by this court, and after
considering the submissions made on behalf of the
parties, in order to put to rest any confusion
arising from the phrase “coercive measures” used
by this Bench in that order, this court would
observe as follows:
2
2025 SCC OnLine Del 7658
- 12 -
NC: 2026:KHC:35482
WP No. 14309 of 2026
HC-KAR
31.1. No authoritative judicial
precedent giving any specific
connotation or meaning to the phrases
‘coercive measures’ or ‘coercive steps’
has been brought to the notice of this
court in the present proceedings. If
anything, in Neeharika Infrastructure
the Supreme Court has observed that
where a High Court uses the phrase
“no coercive steps to be adopted” ……
the High Court must clarify what does
it mean by “no coercive steps to be
adopted” as the term “no coercive
steps to be adopted” can be said to be
too vague and/or broad which can be
misunderstood and/or misapplied”.
31.2. In the considered view of this
court, the expressions ‘coercive
measures’ and ‘coercive steps’ derive
their meaning, import and significance
from the context and the nature of the
proceedings in which they are used. To
ascertain the court's intention in
employing these expressions in a
given order, it is necessary to examine
the nature of the relief or protection
that was sought and what the court
intended to grant to a party at the
relevant stage of the proceedings. It
would, therefore, be neither
appropriate nor judicious for a court to
attribute to these expressions any
fixed, inflexible, or predetermined
meaning. To give an illustration, this
phrase is commonly used when a court
grants interim relief to a person
seeking anticipatory bail; in which
case, the phrase is used only in
relation to the personal liberty of a
person and nothing more.
- 13 -
NC: 2026:KHC:35482
WP No. 14309 of 2026
HC-KAR
31.3. It can, however, be stated
with certainty that the mere
articulation of the phrases ‘no coercive
measures’ or ‘no coercive steps’ with
reference to a person cannot to be
construed as necessarily implying a
stay or suspension of any ongoing
investigation against that person.
32. Insofar as the use of the phrase “coercive
measures” in order dated 10.01.2025 is concerned, this
court clarifies that the said phrase was used in the
context of what the learned APP had submitted before
the court at that stage - viz., that since the petitioner
was joining investigation as and when called, the I.O. did
not require the petitioner's custodial interrogation -
which statement was taken on record. Reference made
by the learned APP to the petitioner joining investigation,
was clearly in relation to the ongoing investigation; and
it cannot be said that the I.O. intended to suspend
investigation or was inviting an order from this court
staying investigation.
33. Order dated 10.01.2025 does not contain any
reference to this court interfering with the ongoing
investigation against the petitioner; or constraining the
investigative powers vested in the I.O. under the BNSS,
such as the power to seize or attach property, which are
integral to investigation.
34. It was in this backdrop that in para 9 of order
dated 10.01.2025, this court recorded, that if
subsequently, the I.O. requires to adopt any “coercive
measures” against the petitioner, he would move an
appropriate application before this court prior to taking
any such action.
35. Insofar as the reference made on behalf of the
petitioner to orders dated 18.08.2023, 01.10.2024 and
29.11.2024 passed by the Supreme Court in Satish
Kumar Ravi is concerned, in the opinion of this court,
those orders were passed in the specific backdrop and
context of the proceedings in that matter. It bears
attention that vide order dated 18.08.2023, the Supreme
Court had restrained all further action against the
- 14 -
NC: 2026:KHC:35482
WP No. 14309 of 2026
HC-KAR
petitioner in that case, but despite such order, a charge
sheet was filed based on the instructions contained in a
letter dated 15th April, 2011 issued by the Additional
Director General of Police of the State.
36. However, that is not the case in the
present matter; and the meaning and intent of the
phrase “coercive measures” was not to restrain
further investigation against the petitioner. The
phrase “coercive measures” was used in order
dated 10.01.2025 with reference only to the
custodial interrogation of the petitioner, and was
therefore used in the context only of the
petitioner's personal liberty.
37. It is pertinent to note, that in the present
case, para 9 of order dated 10.01.2025 was not a
‘direction’ of the court but was based on the
concession offered by the learned APP, that if and
when the I.O. needs to adopt any coercive
measures against the petitioner, he would move an
appropriate application before this court, prior to
taking such action.
38. Having held that the phrase “coercive
measures” did not apply to freezing of bank
accounts, it may further be observed that if it is the
petitioner's contention that freezing of bank
accounts can only be done in exercise of the
powers of ‘attachment’ contained in section 107 of
the BNSS and not in exercise of the powers of a
Police Officer to ‘seize’ property under section 106
of the BNSS, that contention would be a matter to
be pursued by the petitioner before the concerned
court.
(Emphasis supplied)
The judgment of the High Court of Delhi is a lucid
exposition of the law. It holds that the expression “ No
coercive measures” and “ No coercive steps” do not
possess a rigid, immutable or universal meaning capable of
- 15 -
NC: 2026:KHC:35482
WP No. 14309 of 2026
HC-KAR
mechanical application in every case. Their true import is
gathered from the context in which they are employed, the
nature of the proceedings before the Court and, above all, the
relief which the Court intended to grant. Yet, the High Court
emphatically declared one proposition beyond the pale of
controversy – that a direction restraining coercive measures
does not , by itself, does not stay the investigation, nor does it
denude the investigating agency of its statutory powers,
including powers incidental to investigation such as seizure,
attachment or other measures authorised by law. The
protection is directed towards preserving the individual’s
personal liberty i.e., arrest only; it is not an injunction
freezing the statutory machinery itself.
14. If the exposition of law by the High Courts of
Calcutta and Delhi is juxtaposed with the order passed by this
Court on 10.03.2026 , the conclusion becomes inescapable.
The direction issued by this Court restraining the respondent-
Enforcement Directorate from taking “ coercive steps ” was
never intended to interdict the investigation, nor to suspend
the exercise of statutory powers vested under the Prevention
- 16 -
NC: 2026:KHC:35482
WP No. 14309 of 2026
HC-KAR
of Money Laundering Act. The protection extended by this
Court was confined to the petitioner’s arrest and nothing
beyond. It neither eclipsed the authority of the respondent to
continue its investigation nor denuded the Adjudicating
Authority of its jurisdiction to proceed in accordance with law
and pass a Provisional Attachment Order , should the
statutory requirement so warrant.
15. The submission that the provisional attachment
order is rendered illegal merely because this Court had
directed that no coercive steps be taken, therefore, rests upon
a complete misapprehension of the scope of the earlier order.
The order protected the petitioner from coercive action –
arrest; it did not place the statutory process in suspended
animation.
16. Once the Provisional Attachment Order has come
into existence, the statutory scheme under the Prevention of
Money Laundering Act must be permitted to take its ordained
course. The petitioner is, therefore, relegated to the statutory
forum and shall appear before the Adjudicating Authority,
- 17 -
NC: 2026:KHC:35482
WP No. 14309 of 2026
HC-KAR
place such objections as are available in law, and participate
in the adjudicatory proceedings.
17. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would
submit that the petitioner is willing to furnish an undertaking
that she shall neither alienate, nor encumber the subject
properties in any manner during the pendency of adjudicatory
proceedings. Such an undertaking, though fairly made, is a
matter that appropriately falls within the province of the
Adjudicating Authority itself. It is always open to the
petitioner to appear before the said Authority, place the
undertaking on record and seek such consideration as the
Authority may deem fit in accordance with law.
18. Should the provisional attachment order ultimately
culminate in an order of confirmation by the Adjudicating
Authority, the petitioner would not be rendered remediless.
Every contention presently urged, including those touching
upon the scope of the earlier order of this Court and the
legality of the attachment proceedings, would remain
available to be agitated in appropriate proceedings. The doors
of judicial review are never irrevocably closed; they merely
- 18 -
NC: 2026:KHC:35482
WP No. 14309 of 2026
HC-KAR
await the ripening of the statutory process. The petitioner
would, therefore, be at liberty to seek appropriate relief
before this Court at the appropriate stage, if the
circumstances so warrant.
SUMMARY:
a. An order directing “no coercive steps” or “no
coercive measures” would only mean that the
accused or any person in favour of whom such
order is passed, shall not be arrested.
b. An order directing not to take any precipitative
action is of wide amplitude. It stays or
suspends the process of investigation in its
entirety which would mean all action pursuant
to the said action would remain stayed.
19. With the aforesaid observations, the petition stands
disposed .
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
SJK
List No.: 2 Sl No.: 19