SHRI B R VIJAY KUMAR vs SMT. NAGARATHNA
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
R
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
RD
DATED THIS THE 3 DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2026
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE D K SINGH
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.SHANTHI BHUSHAN
MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL NO.6129/2024(FC)
BETWEEN:
SHRI B R VIJAY KUMAR
SON OF SHRI C RUDRAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS,
ND
RESIDING AT NO. 632, 2 CROSS,
ND TH
2 PHASE, 7 BLOCK, BSK III STAGE,
BENGALURU 560 085.
…APPELLANT
(BY SRI. SREEVATSA, SENIOR COUNSEL A/W
SMT.YUKTHA ANIL, ADVOCATE)
AND:
SMT. NAGARATHNA
WIFE OF B R VIJAY KUMAR,
AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS,
RESIDING AT DUNIYA RUNA,
NO. 33, NEAR SHANKAR NAG PARK,
BANASHANKARI III STAGE, BENGALURU.
…RESPONDENT
(BY SRI.ANAND R.B.,ADVOCATE(ABSENT))
THIS MFA FILED U/S 19(1) OF FAMILY COURTS ACT, AGAINST
THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 13.06.2024 PASSED IN MC
NO.5779/2018 ON THE FILE OF THE II ADDITIONAL PRL.JUDGE,
FAMILY COURT, BENGALURU, DISMISSING THE PETITION FILED
UNDER SECTION 13(1)(I-A) (I-B) OF THE HINDU MARRIAGE ACT.
Digitally
signed by
MALA K N
Location:
High Court
of Karnataka
THIS APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR
ORDERS ON 11.08.2026 AND COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT
THIS DAY, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.SHANTHI BHUSHAN MADE
THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE D K SINGH
AND
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.SHANTHI BHUSHAN
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
INDEX
SL.
PAGE
CONTENTS
NO.
NO.
I. BRIEF FACTS OF THE PETITIONER 4-12
II. BRIEF FACTS OF THE RESPONDENT 12 - 17
III. ISSUES FRAMED BY THE FAMILY COURT 17 - 18
IV. PETITIONER’S EVIDENCE BEFORE THE
18 - 22
FAMILY COURT
V. RESPONDENT’S EVIDENCE BEFORE THE
22 - 24
FAMILY COURT
VI. REASONING OF THE FAMILY COURT 24 – 26
VII. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE
27 – 29
PETITIONER
VIII. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE
29 - 30
RESPONDENT
IX. POINTS FOR CONSIDERATION 30
X. REASONING AND CONCLUSION 30 - 76
XI. ORDER 76 - 77
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
CAV JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.SHANTHI BHUSHAN)
Fame does not create an exception to a person’s
conduct but it magnifies its standard. When a man of
public influence strays from the sanctity of marriage,
his fall from grace does not become a cause for
adulation. This Judgement is rendered, not in
celebration of the husband's conduct but inspite of it,
considering the peculiar facts herein. We hope that it
serves as a reminder that respect earned on screen
cannot compensate for dereliction of matrimonial
obligations at home.
2. The Appellant has approached this Court,
calling in question the Order dated 13.06.2024 passed by
the Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Bengaluru, in
M.C. No. 5779/2018, wherein the Family Court has
dismissed the Petition filed by the Appellant under Section
13(1)(i-a) and Section 13(1)(i-b) of the Hindu Marriage
Act, 1955 ( Hindu Marriage Act ).
3. For convenience, the parties are referred as per
their respective ranks in the Family Court.
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
I. BRIEF FACTS OF THE PETITIONER:
4. It is the case of the Petitioner that the
Petitioner-husband and the Respondent-wife tied the knot
on 29.08.1999, as per Hindu rites and customs, at S.S.
Kalyana Mantapa, Haro Gade, Anekal Taluk, Bengaluru
Rural District. Out of the present marriage, the couple
have two daughters and a son, all of whom have attained
majority. After the marriage, the couple are stated to have
lived together, along with their children, in their
matrimonial home, at Bengaluru.
5. The genesis of the litigious path which the
couple have tread began on 17.01.2013, when the
Petitioner filed a divorce petition against the Respondent
under Section 13(1)(i-a) and Section 13(1)(i-b) of the
Hindu Marriage Act, in M.C. No. 299/2013. On the
contrary, the Respondent had sought for restitution of
conjugal rights by filing M.C. No. 2966/2014.
6. Shorn of the details, the allegations levelled by
the Petitioner in the earlier divorce petition were similar to
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
the grounds urged by the Petitioner in the instant appeal,
in so far as they relate to, inter alia , the Respondent
suspecting the Petitioner to have extra-marital affairs, the
Respondent threatening to commit suicide and the
Respondent mistreating the Petitioner’s parents and
demanding that they stay separately from the couple,
which forced the Petitioner to send his parents to stay in
their hometown, at Harohalli.
7. The Petitioner also states that, during the
pendency of the earlier divorce petition, the Respondent
had made several false allegations before the media,
impugning the character and doubting the fidelity of the
Petitioner. The Petitioner states that he had obtained an
interim order restraining the Respondent to not make any
statement against him during the pendency of the earlier
divorce petition.
8. The dispute in M.C.No.299/2013 was referred to
mediation, wherein the couple had arrived at a
Memorandum of Settlement dated 19.11.2014, as per
which, the couple are stated to have amicably resolved
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
their differences and expressed their desire to reunite.
Among other terms, the petitioner had agreed to pay an
amount of Rs. 30,000 per month to the Respondent.
However, the Petitioner has alleged that the Respondent
had used the threat of damaging the Petitioner’s
reputation in the media and had pressurised him to enter
into this Memorandum of Settlement.
9. After entering into the Memorandum of
Settlement, the Petitioner and the Respondent withdrew
M.C. No. 299/2013 and M.C. No. 2966/2014, respectively,
and started residing together at their matrimonial home. It
is the case of the Petitioner that inspite of the Respondent
and himself resuming cohabitation, they could reside with
each other only for about one and a half years and that
even during this period, the couple were not on cordial
terms.
10. The differences between the Petitioner and the
Respondent, which were previously thought to have been
nipped, have started to sprout up again. In this regard,
the Petitioner states that the Respondent interfered in the
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
Petitioner’s career, that the Respondent threatened to file
false criminal cases, that the Respondent threatened to
commit suicide in order to frame the Petitioner.
11. Our attention has been drawn to the Mutual
Consent Agreement dated 02.05.2016. The averments in
this Mutual Consent Agreement have been heavily relied
upon by the Petitioner to buttress his claim for divorce and
it will be set out in extenso at the appropriate part of our
analysis. For the present, it is sufficient for us to note that
the Petitioner has emphasised that the parties had
mutually agreed herein that owing to the marital life of the
couple not being happy, the Respondent does not have
any objection to the Petitioner getting into another
marriage.
12. The Mutual Consent Agreement also places
certain financial obligations on the Petitioner, including for
the Petitioner to clear off any outstanding loan on the
matrimonial home, that the Respondent be the absolute
owner of the matrimonial home and that the Petitioner
shall transfer certain properties to the couple’s three
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
children. The Petitioner relies upon these terms to contend
that after the Petitioner had performed his financial
obligations under the Mutual Consent Agreement, he was
driven out of the matrimonial home by the Respondent on
May, 2016, after which, he has started living separately
with his parents in another house.
13. Despite the Petitioner having made several
attempts to enter the matrimonial home, he contends that
there were no reciprocating attempts by the Respondent.
Even on his attempts, that the Respondent conditioned to
take the Petitioner back only after he transfers all his
immoveable properties to the Respondent and that the
Petitioner’s parents live separately.
14. The Petitioner highlights the fact that after the
Petitioner was driven out of the matrimonial home, the
Respondent had yet again made several false allegations
to the media linking the Petitioner with different movie
actresses, that had prompted the Petitioner to file for a
suit for injunction under O.S. No. 3585/2016 on
03.05.2016, which happens to be just one day after the
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
couple had entered into the Mutual Consent Agreement on
02.05.2016. The Petitioner had also succeeded in getting
an ad interim ex parte order of temporary injunction
against the media outlets, vide order dated 05.05.2016, in
the said civil suit.
15. That apart the Petitioner has also levelled other
allegations against the Respondent, including that the
Respondent has abused the Petitioner’s parents and
children in filthy language, that the Respondent has
physically assaulted the Petitioner’s mother and the
children, that the Respondent has not permitted the
Petitioner to take care of his ailing parents, that the
Respondent always forced the Petitioner’s parents to live
apart from the couple and that the Respondent has forced
the children to file false complaints against the Petitioner.
16. To demonstrate the graveness of the
Respondent’s animosity with the Petitioner’s parents, the
Petitioner has relied on the Will dated 30.04.2016
executed by the Petitioner’s parents, to state that the
Respondent should not attend their funeral in the event of
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
their untimely demise. The Petitioner also goes on to
attribute the death of the Petitioner’s mother on
08.07.2021 and the Petitioner’s father on 18.11.2021,
being on account of the Respondent’s cruel behaviour.
17. The Petitioner also alleges that on 23.09.2018,
the Respondent had entered the Petitioner’s home and
assaulted the people in the home, including the
Petitioner's parents and another woman by the name of
Keerthi Gowda.
18. On account of the strained marital relationship
between the parties and their failure to reconcile, the
Petitioner files another divorce petition against the
Respondent under Section 13(1)(i-a) and Section 13(1)(i-
b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, in M.C. No. 5779/2018, on
29.10.2018. It is out of this divorce petition, that the
present proceedings have germinated.
19. It may also be added that even after the filing
of the present divorce petition, much bitterness has
transpired between the parties, involving other family
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
members. The Respondent has filed a complaint dated
03.12.2018 against the Petitioner filed before the
Karnataka State Commission for Women; the Respondent
has registered P.C.R. No. 9989/2018 alleging that the
Petitioner was involved in a bigamous relationship, which
came to be dismissed for non-prosecution by the
Respondent, vide order dated 09.12.2021; and, the
Petitioner’s allegation that the Respondent had entered his
home on 23.09.2018 assaulted his parents.
20. Further, it also appears that at several instances
in the month of September and October of 2018, the
Respondent has yet again made several statements in the
media alleging the Petitioner’s involvement with multiple
women, including the said Keerthi Gowda. The persistent
statements made by the Respondent against the Petitioner
in the media and the relation between the Petitioner and
Keerthi Gowda have a crucial bearing in our analysis and
will be discussed in extenso.
21. The Petitioner had also sent a notice dated
01.04.2019 to the Respondent, calling upon the
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
Respondent to pay an amount of Rs. 65,00,000 towards
mental agony, financial loss and injuries inflicted to the
Petitioner’s reputation as a result of false statements made
by the Respondent in the media outlets. These
circumstances looked at together, give a comprehensive
view of the matrimonial history between the parties.
II. BRIEF FACTS OF THE RESPONDENT:
22. We may now appreciate the brief facts as urged
by the Respondent, who has denied all claims of the
Petitioner and has also averred that the Petitioner and she
have lived a happy marital life. At the outset, the
Respondent admits to the marriage with the Petitioner on
29.08.1999 and states that at the time of the marriage,
her father had given an amount of Rs. 25,000 to the
Petitioner along with several gold ornaments and clothing.
23. Contrary to the Petitioner’s claims of discord
between the Respondent and the Petitioner’s parents, the
Respondent states that after the present marriage, the
couple were happily residing in their matrimonial home
along with the Petitioner’s parents. The Respondent also
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
avers that she had good relations with the Petitioner’s
parents and his sisters throughout the duration of the
present marriage and that their marriage was occasioned
with frequent visits from the Petitioner’s sisters.
24. The Respondent has also stated in good terms
about the conduct of the Petitioner in taking the
Respondent to multiple temples and taking good care of
her during her three pregnancies. It is also stated that it is
on account of the financial situation of the family not being
sound, that the Petitioner had consented to his parents
staying separate from the couple, while the couple stayed
in Bengaluru.
25. In the initial duration of the present marriage,
the Petitioner is said to have taken a job as a gym trainer,
during which time the Respondent has given him all her
support. The financial situation of their family is stated to
have improved after Petitioner acted in the role of the
male-lead in the 2007 Kannada movie called “Duniya”.
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
26. At this juncture, it would also not be out of
place for us to take note of the public stature of the
Petitioner. Admittedly, the Petitioner is an actor in the
Kannada Film Industry (also referred to as Sandalwood). It
is after the Petitioner acted in “Duniya”, that the Petitioner
started to gather considerable amounts of fanfare.
Consequent to the Petitioner’s rise to fame after the movie
“Duniya”, he is popularly known as “Duniya Vijay”.
27. The Respondent also states that after the movie
“Duniya”, the Petitioner started receiving offers for other
movies and on account of the movie filming, the Petitioner
would have to be away from the matrimonial home, during
which time, the Respondent used to take care of their
children and everyone at their matrimonial home. Further,
she also avers that even in the Petitioner’s time away from
home, the Petitioner used to take good care of the
Respondent and their children.
28. Until then, the matrimonial life of the couple
being happy, it is stated that the Petitioner had himself
confessed to the Respondent that the Petitioner was
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
influenced by other people to file the earlier divorce
petition. Respondent also admits to the couple resuming
cohabitation after the withdrawal of the earlier divorce
petition. On this note, the Respondent also places reliance
on certain public statements made by the Petitioner in a
certain television programme.
29. Respondent and the Petitioner are stated to
have lived together until the filing of the present divorce
petition, i.e., 2018; which is also contrary to the
Petitioner’s claim that the Respondent had driven him out
of the matrimonial home in May, 2016. It is the case of the
Respondent that she and the Petitioner are living a happy
life and that the Petitioner has filed the present divorce
petition without real reason; and as such, the Respondent
has opposed the present divorce petition and has sought
for restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 of the
Hindu Marriage Act.
30. Interestingly, during the Respondent’s cross-
examination, some facts have come to light, which we find
relevant to note here. It is stated that before the present
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
marriage, the Petitioner was married to another woman by
the name of Padmavati, with whom he has obtained a
decree for dissolution of marriage. Thereafter, the
Petitioner has contracted the present marriage with the
Respondent, as stated above.
31. It may also be noted that at the time of the
house warming ceremony of the couple’s matrimonial
home, the Petitioner is alleged to have told the
Respondent that if the Petitioner and the Respondent have
to be together, then the Respondent should accept another
woman by the name of Shubha Poonja, in their lives. To
this request of the Petitioner, the Respondent says she
acceded.
32. Undisputed photographs of the house warming
ceremony of the matrimonial home have been produced at
Ex.R-2 and Ex.R-3, wherein the Petitioner is seen together
with the Respondent and the said Shubha Poonja.
However, the Petitioner has stated that these photographs
were taken in the context of a film shoot.
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
33. Since, the pleadings in the earlier divorce
petition have been placed on record, it may be relevant for
us to note a few aspects therein. In these proceedings, the
Respondent had alleged that during the subsistence of the
present marriage, the Petitioner had contracted a marriage
with Shubha Poonja.
34. However, it would be sufficient for us to say
that neither has the Respondent nor has the Petitioner
produced any document to corroborate their respective
versions of the story with respect to Shubha Poonja.
35. That apart, the Respondent has also not denied
the fact of her making statements regarding the Petitioner
to the media; but she seeks to defend herself by stating
that she had not called the media outlets herself, rather it
was the media outlets that had forced her to appear in the
interviews. We will revert to the nature of the statements
made by the Respondent, particularly in relation to Keerthi
Gowda and other women, in our analysis.
III. ISSUES FRAMED BY THE FAMILY COURT
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
36. In the Family Court in M.C. No. 5779/2018,
after considering the pleadings of the parties, the following
issues were framed:
“(i) Whether the petitioner is entitled for
divorce under Sec.13 (1) (ia) (ib) of Hindu
Marriage Act ?
(ii) What order or decree?”
IV. PETITIONER’S EVIDENCE BEFORE THE
FAMILY COURT:
37. Before the Family Court, the Petitioner had
gotten himself examined as PW-1 and has marked
documents from Ex.P-1 to Ex.P-49. Praying for a decree of
divorce, the Petitioner had deposed the following:
(i) That after the Memorandum of Settlement dated
19.11.2014, the couple lived together in the
matrimonial home for only about one and a half
years;
(ii) That the Respondent began issuing threats of
instituting baseless criminal cases against the
Petitioner, that the Respondent threatened to
commit suicide in order to frame the Petitioner,
that the Respondent hurled abuses at the
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
Petitioner, and that the Respondent has not
allowed the Petitioner’s sisters and his other
relatives inside their matrimonial home;
(iii) That the Respondent had a dearth of trust on the
Petitioner, in so far as the Respondent always
kept a strict vigilance upon the activities of the
Petitioner, in ways such as checking mobile
phone, tracking email passwords, bank account
passwords and whereabouts of the Petitioner;
(iv) That the Respondent has made use of the
Petitioner for his hard-earned money and his
assets and that the Respondent was against the
Petitioner’s parents living together with the
couple in the matrimonial home, which
ultimately forced the Petitioner to send his
parents to live in a separate house;
(v) That the Respondent has forced the Petitioner to
go out of the matrimonial home from May, 2016,
and that the Respondent has never allowed the
Petitioner to come inside the matrimonial home
despite several attempts;
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
(vi) That the Respondent has approached the media
to impute false allegations of the Petitioner
having extramarital affairs with other women,
particularly the women who have acted
alongside him in movies, pursuant to which the
Petitioner had filed a suit for injunction in O.S.
No. 3585/2016 against the media outlets;
(vii) That the Respondent’s interviews with the media
has brought about disrepute and mental agony
to the Petitioner, in addition to causing a decline
in the demand for the Petitioner in the film
industry;
(viii) That the Respondent would resume cohabitation
with the Petitioner on the condition that the
Petitioner put all of his immovable properties in
the name of the Respondent and that the
Petitioner’s parents live separately;
(ix) That in the absence of the Petitioner, the
Respondent has visited the Petitioner’s house
and assaulted the people in the house including
the Petitioner’s parents with slippers;
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
(x) That the Respondent has instigated their children
against the Petitioner, including instigating their
eldest daughter to file a criminal complaint
against the Petitioner;
(xi) That owing to the Respondent’s acts of cruelty,
the Petitioner’s mother and father have executed
Wills dated 30.04.2016 to state that the
Respondent should not attend their funeral in the
event of their demise. Despite which, the
Respondent has entered the Petitioner’s home on
the demise of the Petitioner's mother on
08.07.2021 and that due to the Respondent’s
acts of cruelty, the father demised on
18.11.2021; and,
(xii) Therefore, for the reasons stated above, the
marriage is irretrievably broken down beyond
repair and that the couple have been staying
separately since the filing of the present divorce
petition and that they have no interaction,
emotions or sentiments for each other.
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
38. The Petitioner has also examined his personal
driver as PW-2, who has supported the Petitioner’s
allegations against the Respondent and has deposed the
following:
(i) That the Respondent used to quarrel with the
Petitioner, his sisters and his parents and that
the Respondent used to hurl abuses at all of
them, including PW-2;
(ii) That inspite of the old age and deteriorating
health of the Petitioner’s parents, the
Respondent did not permit them to stay with the
couple; and,
(iii) That the Respondent was behind the wealth of
the Petitioner and that the Respondent used to
threaten the Petitioner the spread rumours
against the character of the Petitioner in the
media.
V. RESPONDENT’S EVIDENCE BEFORE THE
FAMILY COURT:
39. The Respondent has examined herself as RW-1
and has marked documents from Ex.R-1 to Ex.R-55. In
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
addition thereto, the Respondent has also filed a petition
for restitution of conjugal rights. The Respondent has
opposed the divorce petition and has sought for dismissal
of the same by deposing the following:
(i) That at the time of marriage, the Respondent’s
father had given a few gold ornaments and an
amount of Rs. 25,000 to the Petitioner;
(ii) That in the initial years of the marriage, the
couple resided together in the matrimonial home
along with the Petitioner's parents and that the
Petitioner's sisters would also occasionally come
to the matrimonial home;
(iii) That the Petitioner’s parents took great care of
the Respondent, especially during the
Respondent’s pregnancies and that the
Respondent was very happy in the family;
(iv) That the Petitioner, who was initially working as
a gym trainer got an opportunity to star in the
movie ‘Duniya’, after which the Petitioner used to
be offered regular roles in other film projects,
during which time the Respondent used to take
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
care the couple's three children. Further, inspite
of the Petitioner’s time away from home, he gave
importance to the Respondent and his three
children;
(v) That after the Petitioner’s withdrawal of the
earlier divorce petition, the couple have resided
cordially with each other. Further, that the
Petitioner has also made a public statement in a
television show, that he will be with the
Respondent as her husband for the rest of his
life; and,
(vi) That the couple were living together until 2018
and that the couple were living a happy married
life. Further, the Petitioner has instituted the
present divorce petition without any real reason
and that Respondent is in contact with the
Petitioner.
VI. REASONING OF THE FAMILY COURT:
40. On consideration of the rival contentions, the
Family Court has answered issues no. (i) in the negative.
Briefly stated, the reasoning of the Family Court is that the
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
Petitioner has failed to prove that the Respondent had ill-
treated the Petitioner’s parents, since the Petitioner has
not initiated appropriate proceedings against the
Respondent in that regard. Further, from the photographs
of the house warming ceremony of the matrimonial home
in Ex.R-2 and Ex.R-3, it can be seen that the Respondent
had cordial relations with the Petitioner’s parents. Also,
that the Will dated 30.04.2016 being a disputed
document, it is for the beneficiary to prove the same, and
until it is proved, no evidentiary value can be attached to
it.
41. Further, the Family Court reasoned that the
Petitioner has failed to establish that the Respondent has
imputed false allegations of the Petitioner having extra-
marital affairs, since the Respondent filed O.S. No.
3585/2016 seeking an injunction order only against the
media houses and not against the Respondent and that
the Petitioner himself has stated before media outlets that
Keerthi Gowda is the Petitioner’s wife and that the
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
Respondent, in a state of distress made certain statements
before the media, which cannot be found fault with.
42. The Family Court also reasoned that the
Petitioner, in order to legalise his relationship with Keerthi
Gowda, has filed in the instant divorce petition; and thus,
it is the Respondent, who has suffered due to acts of
cruelty perpetrated by the Petitioner. Further, that the
Petitioner has failed to prove that the Respondent has
instigated one of their daughters to file a criminal
complaint against the Petitioner, to make statements
against the Petitioner in the media, and to institute several
complaints against the Petitioner before various forums.
43. Among other reasons, the Family Court has
held that the Petitioner has failed to prove all other
allegations of desertion and cruelty against the
Respondent. As such, the Family Judge, vide order dated
13.06.2024, has dismissed M.C. No. 5779/2018; thereby,
not granting the decree for divorce as prayed for by the
Petitioner. Aggrieved by this order of the Family Court, the
Petitioner has approached the portals of this Court.
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
VII. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE
PETITIONER:
44. During the pendency of the proceedings before
us, the couple were referred to mediation to make an
attempt in arriving at an amicable settlement. Accordingly,
this Court had directed the couple to appear before the
Karnataka Mediation Centre on 22.07.2025. However, the
Karnataka Mediation Centre has addressed a letter dated
16.08.2025 that the couple were not able to come to an
agreement in the course of the mediation. It is in this
background that this Court has proceeded to hear the
parties.
45. We have perused the records of the instant case
and heard Sri. S. Sreevatsa, Learned Senior Counsel for
the Petitioner, who has been assisted by Sri. Yukta Anil,
Learned Counsel for the Petitioner. The Learned Senior
Counsel has assailed the judgement of the Family Court
and has vehemently submitted:
(i) That there was no love and affection from the
Respondent to the Petitioner, which is clear from
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
averments of the Mutual Consent Agreement
dated 02.05.2016, which records in categorical
terms that the Respondent demanded certain
financial settlements from the Petitioner and that
the Respondent had also no objection for the
Petitioner to re-marry;
(ii) That after the Petitioner carried out his part of the
terms in the Mutual Consent Agreement dated
02.05.2016, the Petitioner was forced to leave the
matrimonial home. Further, that in view of this
Agreement, the events that took place prior to the
Agreement cannot be relied at to determine
whether the Respondent had cordial relationship
with the Petitioner’s parents;
(iii) That the animosity between the couple can be
seen from the fact that the Petitioner’s parents
had executed the Will dated 30.04.2016, stating
that they did not wish the presence of the
Respondent at their funeral, in the event of their
death;
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
(iv) That PW-2 has corroborated the evidence led by
PW-1 (i.e., Petitioner) that the Respondent
slapped the Petitioner’s mother, which can be
seen in Ex.P-40, and that the Respondent had
also prevented the Petitioner’s sisters from
entering the house;
(v) That the Respondent has not denied the fact that
she appeared in various media interviews
imputing allegations of extra-marital affairs upon
the Petitioner; and,
(vi) That neither was there any reference to Keerthi
Gowda in the evidence of the Respondent nor was
Keerthi Gowda made a party to the proceedings,
without which the Family Court ought not to have
considered the allegations levelled by the
Respondent against the Petitioner having an
extramarital affair.
VIII. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE
RESPONDENT:
46. Although, the case was adjourned to provide
sufficient opportunity for the Learned Counsel for the
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
Respondent to mark his appearance, there was no
representation on behalf of the Respondent, even in the
revised call. That being the case, we are constrained to
pass appropriate orders in consideration of the records
before us.
IX. POINTS FOR CONSIDERATION:
47. Having heard the Learned Senior Counsel for
the Petitioner and on a careful perusal of the records, we
are called upon to determine whether the Petitioner has
made out any grounds to interfere with the Order dated
13.06.2024 passed by the Family Court in M.C. No.
5779/2018?
48. Pursuant thereto, the following points arise for
our consideration:
(i) “Whether the Petitioner has proved that the
Respondent had deserted him within the meaning
of Section 13(1)(i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act?
(ii) Whether the Petitioner has proved that the
Respondent had treated him with cruelty within
the meaning of Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu
Marriage Act?”
X. REASONING AND CONCLUSION:
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
49. At this juncture, it is pertinent to note the
contours of Section 13(1)(i-a) and Section 13(1)(i-b) of
the Hindu Marriage Act, as is relevant for the instant case:
“ 13. Divorce.— (1) Any marriage solemnized,
whether before or after the commencement of
this Act, may, on a petition presented by either
the husband or the wife, be dissolved by a
decree of divorce on the ground that the other
party—
[(i) ; or *
(ia) has, after the solemnization of the
marriage, treated the petitioner with cruelty;
or
(ib) has deserted the petitioner for a
continuous period of not less than two years
immediately preceding the presentation of the
petition; or]
[(iii) ; or *
(v) ; or *
(vi) ; or *
(vii) ; or *
[Explanation.— In this sub-section, the
expression “desertion” means the desertion of
the petitioner by the other party to the
marriage without reasonable cause and without
the consent or against the wish of such party,
and includes the wilful neglect of the petitioner
by the other party to the marriage, and its
grammatical variations and cognate
expressions shall be construed
accordingly.]....”
50. We will begin our analysis with the ground for
desertion. Since, the Petition in M.C. No. 5779/2018 was
filed on 29.10.2018; therefore, the statutory period would
- 32 -
MFA No. 6129 of 2024
be for a duration not less than the time from 29.10.2016
to 29.10.2018 ( Statutory Period ).
51. The law on what constitutes as desertion came
up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
1
Bipinchandra Jaisinghbai Shah v. Prabhavati ,
wherein, after substantially considering the English Law on
the subject, the following principles were expounded:
“ 20. Thus the quality of permanence is one of
the essential elements which differentiates
desertion from wilful separation. If a spouse
abandons the other spouse in a state of
temporary passion, for example, anger or
disgust, without intending permanently to
cease cohabitation, it will not amount to
desertion. For the offence of desertion, so far
as the deserting spouse is concerned, two
essential conditions must be there, namely, (1)
the factum of separation, and (2) the intention
to bring cohabitation permanently to an end
(animus deserendi). Similarly two elements are
essential so far as the deserted spouse is
concerned: (1) the absence of consent, and (2)
absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to
the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to
form the necessary intention aforesaid. The
petitioner for divorce bears the burden of
proving those elements in the two spouses
respectively….
21. Desertion is a matter of inference to be
drawn from the facts and circumstances of
each case. The inference may be drawn from
1
1956 SCC OnLine SC 15.
- 33 -
MFA No. 6129 of 2024
certain facts which may not in another case be
capable of leading to the same inference; that
is to say, the facts have to be viewed as to the
purpose which is revealed by those acts or by
conduct and expression of intention, both
anterior and subsequent to the actual acts of
separation. If, in fact, there has been a
separation, the essential question always is
whether that act could be attributable to
an animus deserendi. The offence of desertion
commences when the fact of separation and
the animus deserendi co-exist. But it is not
necessary that they should commence at the
same time. The de facto separation may have
commenced without the necessary animus or it
may be that the separation and the animus
deserendi coincide in point of time; for
example, when the separating spouse
abandons the marital home with the in tention,
express or implied, of bringing cohabitation
permanently to a close. The law in England has
prescribed a three years' period and the
Bombay Act prescribes a period of four years
as a continuous period during which the two
elements must subsist. Hence, if a deserting
spouse takes advantage of the locus
poenitentiae thus, provided by law and decides
to come back to the deserted spouse by a bona
fide offer of resuming the matrimonial home
with all the implications of marital life, before
the statutory period is out or even after the
lapse of that period, unless proceedings for
divorce have been commenced, desertion
comes to an end and if the deserted spouse
unreasonably refuses the offer, the latter may
be in desertion and not the former. Hence it is
necessary that during all the period that there
has been a desertion, the deserted spouse
must affirm the marriage and be ready and
willing to resume married life on such
conditions as may be reasonable.”
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
52. Following the law in Bipinchandra Jaisinghbai
Shah (supra), a constitution bench of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v.
2
Meena, speaking through Rajagopala Ayyangar J.,
observed with regard to the burden of proof as follows:
“ 18 .…It is settled law that the burden of
proving desertion — the "factum" as well as
the "animus desrendi" — is on the petitioner,
and he or she has to establish beyond
reasonable doubt, to the satisfaction of the
court, the desertion throughout the entire
period of two years before the petition as well
as that such desertion was without just cause.
In other words, even if the wife, where she is
the deserting spouse, does not prove just
cause for her living apart, the petitioner
husband has still to satisfy the Court that the
desertion was without just cause…”
53. The above position of law has been followed by
several subsequent decisions and has governed the field
on desertion; thus, we do not wish to burden this
judgement by referring to all the judgements extensively.
Suffice it to say that the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in its
recent judgement in Nirmal Singh Panesar v. Paramjit
2
1963 SCC OnLine SC 32.
- 35 -
MFA No. 6129 of 2024
3
Kaur Panesar , in a distinctive set of facts, has reiterated
and applied these principles with authority.
54. It is the case of the Petitioner that after the
Memorandum of Settlement dated 19.11.2014, the
Petitioner and the Respondent resumed cohabitation in
their matrimonial home. The Petitioner states that the
couple had resided together in the matrimonial home for
about a year and a half, after which the discord between
the parties, which were thought to have been subdued,
had started to re-emerge.
55. Thereafter, the couple have entered into the
Mutual Consent Agreement dated 02.05.2016. The
Respondent has also not disputed the contents of this
Mutual Consent Agreement. Considering the importance
the Petitioner places on this Mutual Consent Agreement, it
would be relevant to note its terms, which are germane for
our consideration:
(i) The Petitioner shall clear the bank loan standing
on the house matrimonial home;
3
(2025) 3 SCC 790.
- 36 -
MFA No. 6129 of 2024
(ii) The Respondent shall be the absolute owner of
matrimonial home;
(iii) The Petitioner shall pay an amount of Rs. 50,000
per month to the Respondent;
(iv) The Petitioner shall pay a sum of Rs. 1,00,00,000
to the Respondent out of the monies generated in
the Petitioners’ movies; and,
(v) That any marital disputes arising between them
would be amicably resolved through mutual
discussions between them or through their
lawyers and that the parties would not, for any
reason, discuss the issues of their marriage in the
media.
56. We may also note reproduce some portions of
the Mutual Consent Agreement, which notes the
circumstances that gave cause for the couple to enter into
the same:
ಈ
“ ಪರಸ ರ ಒ ಕ ಾರು ಪತ ಾಡಲು ಾರಣೕಂದ
ಸುಖ
ಇಬ ರೂ ಪ ಾರರ ೖ ಾ!ಕ "ೕವನ ಸಂ %ೂೕಷ ಾ'ರದ
ಈ ಈ
ಾರಣ (ನ ಇಬ ರೂ ಪ ಾರರ ಪರಸ ರ ಒಪ ಂದದ )ೕ
*ದಲೕ ಪ ಾರ+ ಎರಡ ೕ ಪ ಾರರು ಇ ೂ-ಂದು
- 37 -
MFA No. 6129 of 2024
ಮದು ಎಂದು
ಾಗಲು ತನ ಅಭ ಂತರೕನೂ ಇರುವ ಲ
.
ಒ ರುಾ
ದಲೕ ಪ ಾರರು ಈ ಪರಸ ರ ಒ ಕ ಾರು ಪತ ಾಡಲು ಮುಖ
ಾರಣ ೕಂದ ಈ ಾಗ"ೕ ಸು ಾರು ಎರಡು ವಷ%ಗಳ 'ಂ( ದಲೕ
ಪ ಾರ) ಎರಡ ೕ ಪ ಾರರು ಾನ,ಕ -ರುಕುಳ ಮತು. ದಲೕ
ಪ ಾರರ ತಂ( - /ಾ0ಯವ) ಾನ,ಕ -ರುಕುಳ 2ೂಟು5 ಸ)6ಾ7
ೂೕ82ೂಳ9ದ ಾರಣ:ಂದ 2ೂೕ;%ನ<= ದಲೕ ಪ ಾರರು 2ೕ> ?ಾ-
ಎರಡ ೕ ಪ ಾರರು ಮುಂ( ಸ)@ೂೕಗುವ ಾರಣ:ಂದ ದಲೕ
ಪ ಾರರು 2ೕಸನುA BಾಪಸುC D ದು2ೂಂ8ರು/ಾ. . ಆದ ನಂತರವF ಸಹ
ಎರಡ ೕ ಪ ಾರರು ಅವರ ನಡವG2ಯ<= ಬದIಾವJ ಕಂ8ಲ=ದ
ಾರಣ:ಂದ ದಲೕ ಪ ಾರರು ತಮK ಮಕLG MೕರNೕ ಾದಂತಹ
ಸPತು.ಗಳನುA ಅವರವರ @ಸ) ಬ :ರು/ಾ. .”
English Translation
“The reason for making this mutual
consent agreement is that since the married
life of the two parties is not happy, on this day,
on the mutual consent of the two parties, the
second party has agreed to not have any
objection to the first party to have another
marriage.
The main reason for the first party to
make this mutual consent agreement is that
already about two years ago, the first party
filed a case in court for the mental harassment
of the first party by the second party and the
mental harassment to the first party’s parents
and for not taking proper care of them, the
first party withdrew this case on the reason
that the second party would improve going
ahead. But even thereafter since there was no
change in the behaviour of the second party
the first party has written the assets which
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
should have belonged to his children in their
names.”
57. The Petitioner places strong reliance upon the
Mutual Consent Agreement to contend that once the
Petitioner had performed the financial obligations towards
the Respondent, as stated therein, the Respondent had
driven the Petitioner out of the matrimonial home from
May, 2016. Pursuant thereto, the Petitioner states that he
started residing separately in a rented accommodation
along with his parents.
58. The averments of the Mutual Consent
Agreement do not evince this fact about the Petitioner
being driven out by the Respondent. What the Mutual
Consent Agreement does evince, with regard to the
matrimonial home, is that the Petitioner should clear any
outstanding loan on the matrimonial home and that the
matrimonial home was to vest absolutely with the
Respondent. It can also be discerned that the Mutual
Consent Agreement was entered into in the same month
as when the Petitioner alleges that he was driven out of
the matrimonial home by the Respondent (i.e., May,
- 39 -
MFA No. 6129 of 2024
2016). The Petitioner’s driver, PW-2 herein, has also
corroborated that pursuant to the Petitioner being driven
out of the matrimonial home in May, 2016, the Petitioner
has been residing separately.
59. On the other hand, the Respondent has
deposed that the couple were residing together throughout
the statutory period and until 2018, i.e., when the
Petitioner has filed the present divorce petition. The
Respondent has also deposed that even after the filing of
the present divorce petition, the Petitioner and the
Respondent were in contact with each other. However, the
Respondent has nowhere disputed the contents of the
Mutual Consent Agreement. Apart from denying all
contentions of the Petitioner, the Respondent has failed to
produce any convincing material on record to corroborate
her stand that the parties have cohabited together with
their matrimonial obligations intact during the entire
statutory period. Whereas, the Petitioner has placed
corroboratory material in the form of the Mutual Consent
Agreement and the examination of PW-2. Therefore, the
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
material produced by the Petitioner cannot be brushed
aside.
60. That being said, we now turn our attention back
to the Mutual Consent Agreement. It can be seen that
despite the couple having attempted to cohabit with each
other after the Petitioner’s withdrawal of the earlier
divorce petition in M.C. No. 299/2013, the marital life of
the couple could not be rekindled to the state of
happiness. Interestingly, it notes that the behaviour of the
Respondent has not changed. Be that as it may, what is
pertinent is that both the Petitioner and the Respondent
have mutually acknowledged that on account of their
marital life not being happy, the Respondent has no
objection to the Petitioner contracting another marriage.
61. On a reading of the reasons for entering into
the Mutual Consent Agreement in conjunction with the
course of events, what can be discerned is that the
contention of the Petitioner that he was compelled by the
Respondent’s conduct to withdraw from her cohabitation
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
from May, 2016, appears to be substantiated by the
Petitioner.
62. After the Petitioner was compelled to leave the
matrimonial home, it is presumed that the desertion by
the Respondent continues for the entire duration of the
statutory period. One way in which this presumption can
be rebutted is for the Respondent to show that before the
statutory period has expired, she had made a request to
the Petitioner to resume cohabitation and that the
Petitioner has unreasonably rejected that request.
However, no contention in this regard has been
forthcoming from the Respondent. By looking into the
conduct of the parties after May, 2016, it can also be
discerned that this factum of separation was accompanied
by animus deserendi .
63. We may also note here that apart from the
factum of separation and animus deserendi , for a spouse
(in this case, the husband) to seek for divorce on the
ground for desertion against the other spouse (in this
case, the wife), it may not be necessary for the husband
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
to show that he has made any attempts to induce his wife
to resume cohabitation with him. However, what is
essential is that the husband must have been willing to
perform his marital obligations all the while his wife had
deserted him and that the wife’s desertion was without his
consent or any reasonable cause.
64. In this regard, it is relevant for us to appreciate
some facts regarding the Petitioner’s relation with women
other than the Respondent, particularly during the
statutory period, with a woman by the name of Keerthi
Gowda.
65. For providing some context, we may reiterate
that the Petitioner is admittedly a film actor in
Sandalwood. The Petitioner’s relation with Keerthi Gowda,
as stated by the Petitioner in his cross examination, is that
Keerthi Gowda used to work as a costume designer in one
of the Petitioner’s movies. The Petitioner further states
that Keerthi Gowda also used to visit the Petitioner’s
house, to discuss about costume design and to meet the
Petitioner’s parents. PW-2 has also deposed about Keerthi
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
Gowda being a costume designer in the Petitioner’s movies
and her visiting the Petitioner’s house.
66. Considering the material on record, in Ex.R-20,
it is seen that on the Petitioner being released from the
Jail in connection with a criminal case against him, the
Petitioner embraces and gives a kiss on the cheek of
Keerthi Gowda. In his cross-examination, the Petitioner
has admitted to the visuals seen in this video. Further, in
Ex.R-19, the Petitioner is also seen giving a kiss on the
cheek of Keerthi Gowda, during the birthday party of the
Petitioner and a photograph taken of the said moment is
also seen at Ex.R-1.
67. Additionally, the Petitioner and Keerthi Gowda
have also appeared together in numerous interviews in the
media outlets. On this regard, we have perused the
transcript of the interviews at Ex.R-16, Ex.R-17 and Ex.R-
18. Particularly, in Ex.R-18, the Petitioner is observed
stating that Keerthi Gowda is his wife. In Ex.R-5, which is
a complaint dated 23.09.2018 written by Keerthi Gowda
against the Respondent, Keerthi Gowda has stated that
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
she is the wife of the Petitioner. In Ex.R-6, which is the
statement given by Keerthi Gowda in C.C. No. 11395/2019
on 06.01.2023, wherein Keerthi Gowda has stated that
CW-4 therein (the Petitioner herein) is her husband.
68. The only dispute that the Petitioner raises to
these materials are that the media outlets have created
baseless speculations about the Petitioner and Keerthi
Gowda. The Petitioner further states that he had instituted
O.S. No. 3585/2016 seeking an injunction against the
media outlets. The Petitioner, in his cross examination,
also states that he made an oral request to the police to
rectify the error of the Petitioner being stated to be the
husband of Keerthi Gowda in her complaint dated
23.09.2018 stated above; however, no document has been
provided by the Petitioner for the request so made.
69. Be that as it may, the Petitioner has not stated
anywhere in his deposition that his conduct in kissing
Keerthi Gowda on the cheek and himself proclaiming that
Keerthi Gowda is his wife, is false. All that the Petitioner
has stated is that the media outlets have portrayed it
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
falsefully. However, on appreciating the documentary
evidence placed before us, we are not inclined to accept
this contention of the Petitioner.
70. On an appreciation of these facts, it becomes
clear that inspite of the Petitioner’s present marriage with
the Respondent not being dissolved, the Petitioner has
involved himself intimately with another woman. The
Petitioner has also gone as far as proclaiming that Keerthi
Gowda is his wife. Therefore, it cannot be said that the
conduct of the Petitioner was of such an innocent nature
that he was, during the entire duration of the statutory
period, willing to resume cohabitation and the
consequential marital obligations with the Respondent.
71. Needless to state that a marriage entered into
during the subsistence of the present marriage is void by
virtue of Section 5(1)(i) r/w Section 17 of the Hindu
Marriage Act, apart from it being a made a criminal
offence. In this connection, the Respondent had also
registered P.C.R. No. 9989/2018 alleging that the
Petitioner was involved in a bigamous relationship.
- 46 -
MFA No. 6129 of 2024
However, vide order dated 09.12.2021, the Magistrate has
dismissed the case for non-prosecution by the
Respondent. As we have already observed, the
Respondent has not marked an appearance before us
inspite of the sufficient accommodation being given.
72. Therefore, we refrain from expressing any view
on whether the Petitioner has indeed contracted a
marriage with Keerthi Gowda; which is also because the
Respondent has failed to place any convincing material to
prove the same, apart from the exhibits referred to above.
That does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the
Petitioner’s intimate relationship with Keerthi Gowda has
escaped our vision. On the perusal of the material
provided by the Respondent, there can be no manner of
doubt in the mind of any reasonable person who viewed
the contents thereof that the Petitioner did share a more
intimate relationship with Keerthi Gowda.
73. We may also add that in a marriage, it is the
bounden duty on each spouse to uphold the sanctity of
marriage and not to engage in conduct that is contrary to
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
the very institution of marriage itself; more particularly, by
engaging in acts that betray the trust, exclusivity and
companionship that the other spouse is legitimately
entitled to expect. If the husband, by his own conduct,
projects a third person as occupying the place of a wife or
is otherwise involved intimately with the third person, he
cannot thereafter be heard to say that his legally wedded
spouse had deserted him without his consent.
74. In this regard, we take note of the provisions of
Section 23(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, in so far as it
relevant to the instant case:
“23. Decree in proceedings.— (1) In any
proceeding under this Act, whether defended or
not, if the court is satisfied that —
(a) any of the grounds for granting relief exists
and the petitioner 3[except in cases where the
relief is sought by him on the ground specified
in sub-clause (a), sub-clause (b) or sub-clause
(c) of clause (ii) of section 5] is not in any way
taking advantage of his or her own wrong or
disability for the purpose of such relief, and
(b) *
(bb) *
(c) *
- 48 -
MFA No. 6129 of 2024
(d) *
(e) there is no other legal ground why relief
should not be granted, then, and in such a
case, but not otherwise, the court shall decree
such relief accordingly.”
75. Here, it may also be noted that the Respondent
has not stated in her chief-examination that there was no
cohabitation between the couple during the statutory
period. It was stated that the couple have started residing
separately only from the time of filing of the present
divorce petition, i.e., in 2018; and thus, the Respondent
has sought for restitution of conjugal rights. The
Respondent has not imputed any allegations of dishonest
behaviour on the Petitioner during the statutory period and
has also gone on to say that they were on cordial terms.
The only place where the Respondent has made a mention
about the Petitioner’s relation with Keerthi Gowda, is in her
cross-examination. Even there, the Respondent has not
stated that the Petitioner and herself were not cohabiting
in the statutory period due to the Petitioner’s relation with
Keerthi Gowda.
- 49 -
MFA No. 6129 of 2024
76. That being said, it is not necessary for us to go
extensively into the law on constructive desertion. Suffice
it to say that in view of Section 23(1) of the Hindu
Marriage Act, irrespective of whether the Respondent has
defended the point of desertion or not, by virtue of Section
23(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, this Court has the power
to ensure that the Petitioner does not take advantage of
his own wrong and succeed in his claim for divorce on the
ground of desertion.
77. In light of the above, we hold that the Petitioner
has failed to establish the ground of desertion against the
Respondent beyond all reasonable doubt, within the
meaning of Section 13(1)(i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act.
78. Since, the Petitioner has also urged the ground
of cruelty, it is trite that we appreciate the facts in this
regard. Before we proceed in our analysis, it is important
for us to set out the law on cruelty as a ground for divorce
under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act. The
4
Hon’ble Supreme Court in V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat , while
4
(1994) 1 SCC 337.
- 50 -
MFA No. 6129 of 2024
observing that cruelty includes both physical and mental
cruelty, has held as follows:
“16. Mental cruelty in Section 13(1)(i-a) can
broadly be defined as that conduct which
inflicts upon the other party such mental pain
and suffering as would make it not possible for
that party to live with the other. In other
words, mental cruelty must be of such a nature
that the parties cannot reasonably be expected
to live together. The situation must be such
that the wronged party cannot reasonably be
asked to put up with such conduct and
continue to live with the other party. It is not
necessary to prove that the mental cruelty is
such as to cause injury to the health of the
petitioner. While arriving at such conclusion,
regard must be had to the social status,
educational level of the parties, the society
they move in, the possibility or otherwise of
the parties ever living together in case they are
already living apart and all other relevant facts
and circumstances which it is neither possible
nor desirable to set out exhaustively. What is
cruelty in one case may not amount to cruelty
in another case. It is a matter to be
determined in each case having regard to the
facts and circumstances of that case. If it is a
case of accusations and allegations, regard
must also be had to the context in which they
were made.”
79. While referring to V. Bhagat (supra), the
5
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh ,
while holding that an exhaustive definition for cruelty
5
(2007) 4 SCC 511.
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
cannot be given, has laid down an indicative list of
instances that amounts to cruelty, which has to be
considered in light of the entire matrimonial life of the
couple.
80. Considering the material on record, the
Petitioner, in his chief examination, has deposed that the
Respondent has treated him with cruelty on account of the
Respondent making unsubstantiated allegations of extra-
marital affairs against him. Regarding this, the Petitioner
contends to have instituted O.S. No. 3585/2016 seeking
an injunction order against the media outlets; however,
the Respondent was not made a party in this suit.
Thereafter, the Respondent appears to have given
interviews in the media outlets, which is available at Ex.P-
39 and its transcript at Ex.P-44, wherein the Respondent
has stated that the Petitioner has five wives, the fifth one
being Keerthi Gowda.
81. The Respondent, in her cross examination, has
deposed that she had not stated before the media that the
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
Petitioner has five wives, instead she had stated that there
are five women in the life of the Petitioner.
82. We have viewed the interview and have
perused the contents of its transcript. Therein, it is
observed that on a suggestion being made to the
Respondent as to why the Respondent has not protested
against the Petitioner taking another wife during the
subsistence of the present marriage, the Respondent
answers that it is not one woman but it is multiple women.
The Respondent goes on to say that there are as many as
five women, with Keerthi Gowda being the fifth one.
Understood in this context, we are unable to accept the
contention of the Respondent that she has not alleged that
the Petitioner has five wives.
83. Additionally, the Respondent had also registered
P.C.R. No. 9989/2018 alleging that the Petitioner was
involved in a bigamous relationship. However, vide order
dated 09.12.2021, the Magistrate has dismissed the case
for non-prosecution by the Respondent.
- 53 -
MFA No. 6129 of 2024
84. As far as the allegation with respect to Keerthi
Gowda is concerned, while there is no convincing material
on record to prove that the Petitioner has indeed married
Keerthi Gowda, nevertheless, in view of the affectionate
moments shared by the Petitioner with Keerthi Gowda, as
noticed hereinabove, we are not persuaded by the
contention of the Petitioner that the Respondent has made
unsubstantiated allegations against the Petitioner, so far as
the allegation against Keerthi Gowda is concerned.
85. However, as far as the Respondent’s allegations
with respect to the other wives are concerned, the
Respondent has failed to place any material to show that
the Petitioner has indeed entered into a marriage with four
other women; as such, these allegations remain
unsubstantiated.
86. Even if we were to observe that in respect to
the Respondent’s allegation that the Petitioner had five
wives, out of the five of them, one was Padmavati, one
was Shubha Poonja, one was the Respondent herself, and
one was Keerthi Gowda, there is no corroboration to prove
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
that the Petitioner had contracted a marriage with Shubha
Poonja, or that the Petitioner has contracted a marriage
with Keerthi Gowda, or that the Petitioner has contracted
another marriage with another woman apart from those
names mentioned hereinabove.
87. We may also note here that the bounds of
mental cruelty has to be considered in light of various
factors, such as, the level of sensitivity, social status and
educational background, among others. As noted in
Samar Ghosh (supra), the concept of mental cruelty
cannot be static and the impact of modern culture through
print and electronic media also has to be borne in mind.
88. Relying upon Samar Ghosh (supra) , the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in
K. Srinivas Rao v. D.A.
6
Deepa , has further held as follows:
“16. Thus, to the instances illustrative of
mental cruelty noted in Samar Ghosh [(2007)
4 SCC 511] , we could add a few more. Making
unfounded indecent defamatory allegations
against the spouse or his or her relatives in the
pleadings, filing of complaints or issuing
notices or news items which may have adverse
impact on the business prospect or the job of
6
(2013) 5 SCC 226.
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
the spouse and filing repeated false complaints
and cases in the court against the spouse
would, in the facts of a case, amount to
causing mental cruelty to the other spouse.”
89. With regard to the aspect of making
unsubstantiated allegations of extra-marital affairs, the
7
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Narendra v. K. Meena , after
referring to the law laid down in an earlier judgement of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vijaykumar Ramchandra
8
Bhate v. Neela Vijaykumar Bhate , has observed that
making such unsubstantiated allegations are torturous and
constitute mental cruelty. It was further held:
“16. We have carefully gone through the
evidence but we could not find any reliable
evidence to show that the Petitioner had an
extra-marital affair with someone. Except for
the baseless and reckless allegations, there is
not even the slightest evidence that would
suggest that there was something like an affair
of the Petitioner with the maid named by the
respondent. We consider levelling of absolutely
false allegations and that too, with regard to an
extra-marital life to be quite serious and that
can surely be a cause for mental cruelty.”
90. While this would be sufficient for us to hold that
the conduct of the Respondent amounted to mental cruelty
on the Petitioner, one of the reasons given by the Family
7
(2016) 9 SCC 455.
8
(2003) 6 SCC 334.
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
Court in brushing aside the media interviews given by the
Respondent is that the Respondent had not called for the
media on her own accord and that the Respondent did not
make the statements with an intention to defame the
Petitioner. However, we are not inclined to accept the
reasoning rendered by the Family Court.
91. In this regard, it may be noted that as
elucidated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shobha Rani
9
v. Madhukar Reddi , cruelty may be intentional or
unintentional. What is relevant to be considered is the
nature of the cruel conduct by one spouse and the impact
it has on the mind of the complaining spouse on whether
such a cruelty caused a reasonable apprehension in the
mind of the complaining spouse that it would be harmful
or injurious to live with the spouse guilty of cruelty.
92. On the facts of the case, it is observed that the
Petitioner is a film actor, having a certain amount of public
standing. That being said, the Petitioner’s life would be
open to more public scrutiny, as compared to people who
9
(1988) 1 SCC 105.
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
are perhaps not that well-known in the eyes of the public.
In such a circumstance, the image which such a person
holds becomes dear to him. A person stated to have a
public following is expected to imbibe a conduct that sets
an example to his followers; and consequentially, it is on
that person on whom there rests a greater responsibility
to ensure that his image is not soiled. However,
considering the nature of a matrimonial bond, it cannot be
said that the Respondent does not have any responsibility
whatsoever to maintain the image of her husband.
93. We have already taken note of the Petitioner’s
deplorable conduct with Keerthi Gowda, during the
subsistence of his marriage with the Respondent. Such
conduct does not deserve any praise. While it is
understandable that it may be that it is because of this
conduct of the Petitioner, that the Respondent, in a fit of
anger, has made the allegations against the Petitioner in
the media; but it cannot be said that this conduct of the
Petitioner gives a go-ahead to the Respondent to make
baseless allegations against the Petitioner. Regardless of
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
whether the Respondent had herself called for the media
interview, it is the Respondent who has herself chosen to
provide her audience in the interview and has answered
several questions put forth by the media, out of her own
volition.
94. Therefore, the fallacy in the reasoning of the
Family Court becomes apparent; as such, the
Respondent’s conduct in making unsubstantiated
allegations against the Petitioner of having multiple wives
would amount to cruelty.
95. The next ground urged by the Petitioner is that
the statements made by the Respondent in the media has
brought disrepute and mental agony to the Petitioner, in
addition to causing a decline in the demand for the
Petitioner in the film industry. It is true that the
Respondent has made persistent remarks against her
husband before the media outlets. It is also true that the
Respondent has also set the law in motion against the
Petitioner before the Karnataka State Commission for
Women. The Respondent has also signed and lent her
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
active support to the complaint dated 15.12.2018, filed by
the younger daughter against the Petitioner before the
Karnataka State Commission for Protection of Child Rights.
We may also note that the younger daughter was a minor
on the date of her filing his complaint.
96. The tolerability which one spouse is expected to
show to the statements made by the other spouse varies
and no fixed yardstick can be laid down but what can be
looked into is the mental impact which such remarks had
on the spouse on the receiving end of such remarks,
among other factors such as the social status and
educational background.
97. On this note, we have also drawn our attention
to the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
10
Joydeep Majumdar v. Bharti Jaiswal Majumdar,
wherein it was held as follows:
“12. When the appellant has suffered adverse
consequences in his life and career on account
of the allegations made by the respondent, the
legal consequences must follow and those
cannot be prevented only because, no court
has determined that the allegations were false.
10
(2021) 3 SCC 742.
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
The High Court, however, felt that without any
definite finding on the credibility of the wife's
allegation, the wronged spouse would be
disentitled to relief. This is not found to be the
correct way to deal with the issue.
13. Proceeding with the above understanding,
the question which requires to be answered
here is whether the conduct of the respondent
would fall within the realm of mental cruelty.
Here the allegations are levelled by a highly
educated spouse and they do have the
propensity to irreparably damage the character
and reputation of the appellant. When the
reputation of the spouse is sullied amongst his
colleagues, his superiors and the society at
large, it would be difficult to expect
condonation of such conduct by the affected
party.”
98. Considered in this context, it is without any
doubt that the Respondent’s conduct of persistently
making disparaging remarks against the Petitioner before
the media would not only bring about mental agony to the
Petitioner but also lower the Petitioner’s reputation and
degrade the professional footing of the Petitioner, among
his peers and the society at large. Through such repeated
appearances/statements before the media, the
Respondent has opened the doors for a media trial and
has given the literal flavour to the ‘in-camera’ proceedings
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
in a matrimonial dispute; which, in the facts of the instant
case, has resulted in cruelty upon the Petitioner.
99. The sustained media narrative against the
Petitioner when read conjointly with the multiplicity of
complaints instituted by the Respondent, form part of a
continued conduct that had the propensity to expose the
Petitioner to repeated public censure and consequent
professional decline, which also amounts to cruelty against
the Petitioner.
100. Another contention urged by the Petitioner is
that the Respondent has ill-treated the Petitioner’s parents
and has assaulted the Petitioner’s mother. To substantiate
his contention, the Petitioner relies on Ex.P-40, which is a
video, wherein on 23.09.2018, the Respondent is allegedly
seen to enter the house of the Petitioner and assault the
persons inside the house, including Keerthi Gowda.
101. In response to this incident, Keerthi Gowda files
a complaint against the Respondent, which comes to be
registered as C.C. No. 11395/2019. Interestingly, the
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
Respondent was acquitted of all charges in C.C. No.
11395/2019 on account of Keerthi Gowda herself turning
hostile to the case of the prosecution.
102. The Petitioner further alleges that the
Respondent has abused the Petitioner’s parents in filthy
language and that the Respondent was against the
Petitioner’s parents living together with the couple in the
matrimonial home, which ultimately forced the Petitioner’s
parents to live in a separate house. This deposition has
also been supported by PW-2. The Petitioner has also
produced two Wills dated 30.04.2016, executed by each of
the Petitioner’s parents to state that they have been
verbally abused by the Respondent and that they did not
wish the presence of the Respondent at their funeral, in
the event of their untimely death. It would be pertinent to
note that the Petitioner’s mother demised on 08.07.2021
and his father has demised on 18.11.2021.
103. Interestingly, the two Wills dated 30.04.2016
and Mutual Consent Agreement dated 02.05.2016, both
occur within a very short duration of time in April-May,
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
2026. As such, these two documents cannot be viewed in
isolation. Considering the contents of the two Wills and the
reasoning of the Mutual Consent Agreement, it can be
seen that there was discord not only between the
Respondent and the Petitioner but also between the
Respondent and the Petitioner’s parents. What would also
be seen is that it is the gradual degradation and
subsequent collapse of the marital life that has culminated
into these two documents.
104. No parent takes the drastic step of formally
recording their wish to exclude their daughter-in-law from
their own funeral. Under ordinary circumstances, there
would have been no occasion for the parents to depart
from natural affection towards their daughter-in-law. The
very fact that the parents considered it necessary to
formally record such a wish, therefore, is itself indicative
of the extent of the animosity and distress that must have
been occasioned to them by the conduct of the
Respondent. The Petitioner’s allegation of abusive conduct
of the Respondent upon the Petitioner’s parents, is
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
corroborated by both oral and documentary evidence,
which cannot be brushed aside.
105. The Supreme Court in Narendra (supra), has
held that in a Hindu society, it is a pious obligation of the
son to maintain his parents and that after marriage, the
wife is expected to be an integral part of her husband's
family. It was also observed that a wife attempting to
separate her husband from his parents without any
justifiable reason would amount to cruelty.
106. In consideration of the facts of the instant case,
we may also add that when the wife is expected to be an
integral part of the husband’s family, the wife would also
be expected to not create conditions wherein it becomes
impossible for the husband’s parents to live under the
same roof in the matrimonial home. This duty owed by the
wife to her husband, cannot be derogated from without
justifiable cause; and we find no justifiable cause from the
material on record. As such, we hold that the intolerable
environment created by the Respondent upon the
Petitioner’s parents, as could be seen from the course of
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
events surrounding April-May, 2026, would cause mental
agony and amount to cruelty upon the Petitioner.
107. It may also be that the Petitioner’s conduct in
sharing several intimate moments with Keerthi Gowda
constitutes an act of cruelty by itself. It is also true that
circumstances cannot be looked in isolation and the entire
matrimonial life has to be appreciated as a whole. The
nature of allegations levelled by both the parties against
the other, including before the media; the earlier divorce
proceedings; further deterioration in the relationship;
repeated failure of all previous attempts at reconciliation,
including through mediation; the bitter path tread by the
parties subsequent to the filing of the present divorce
petition, resulting in multiple rounds of litigation involving
family members; the cruel treatment meted out by the
Respondent to the Petitioner’s parents; and, the parties
themselves agreeing to the marital life not being happy
under the Mutual Consent Agreement, all goes to show a
broken marriage between the Petitioner and the
Respondent, that is beyond the scope of any revival.
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
108. The Petitioner alleges that there has been no
physical relation between the parties even after the couple
had resumed cohabitation on the Petitioner’s withdrawal of
the earlier divorce petition. While the Respondent denies
this allegation, in her cross-examination, the Respondent
has also stated that she does not remember the last time
the couple had physical relations with each other.
109. The litigation in the present dispute has been
protracted for the past eight years and admittedly, the
parties are residing separately for its entire duration, till
date. The Petitioner has expressed his desire to move past
this marriage. Even if it is the Respondent’s case that she
wants to save this marriage, neither has she taken enough
care to mark a representation on her behalf before us nor
is there any convincing material for us to accede to her
plea, if that is indeed her plea. Neither party has placed
any material to show that they have made any attempts at
reconciliation. It is the cumulative effect of all these
factors that demonstrates a disintegration of marital unity,
which in itself is sufficient to constitute cruelty.
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
110. It may be useful to refer to the judgement of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rakesh Raman v.
11
Kavita , wherein it was held:
“ 22. Irretrievable breakdown of a marriage
may not be a ground for dissolution of
marriage, under the Hindu Marriage Act, but
cruelty is. A marriage can be dissolved by a
decree of divorce, inter alia, on the ground
when the other party “has, after the
solemnisation of the marriage treated the
petitioner with cruelty” [ Section 13(1)(i-a) of
the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955] .
23. In our considered opinion, a marital
relationship which has only become more bitter
and acrimonious over the years, does nothing
but inflict cruelty on both the sides. To keep
the façade of this broken marriage alive would
be doing injustice to both the parties. A
marriage which has broken down irretrievably,
in our opinion spells cruelty to both the parties,
as in such a relationship each party is treating
the other with cruelty. It is therefore a ground
for dissolution of marriage under Section
13(1)(i-a) of the Act.”
111. In the facts of the present case, the cumulative
impact of all the circumstances when evaluated together
indicates a sustained course of animosity between the
parties, that is not on account of the normal wear and tear
of the relationship; rather, it indicates that the parties are
beyond any hopes of any reconciliation. In such
11
(2023) 17 SCC 433.
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
circumstances, marriage becomes merely a legal fiction,
unsupported by any real love, affection and bond between
the spouses. On account of the marriage being
irretrievably broken down, compelling the parties to be
unsevered by that fiction would amount to cruelty by itself
and no meaningful purpose would bear by forcing an
artificial reunion.
112. In light of the peculiar facts of the case as has
been noticed above, we are of the considered opinion that
the Petitioner has made out a case for dissolution of the
present marriage under the ground of cruelty under
Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act.
113. Apart from this aspect, we find no merit in all
the other contentions urged by the Petitioner vis-à-vis the
ground of cruelty. However, we wish to provide our
reasons for holding the same, before proceeding to answer
the question of permanent alimony.
114. To buttress his claim of cruelty against the
Respondent, the Petitioner has also contended that the
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
Respondent has instigated their children against the
Petitioner, including instigating their daughters to file
complaints against the Petitioner before various forums.
The details of these complaints are described as follows:
(i) Complaint dated 30.10.2018 filed by the younger
daughter before the Karnataka Commission for
Women, against the Petitioner and Keerthi
Gowda;
(ii) Complaint dated 15.12.2018 filed by the younger
daughter before the Karnataka State Commission
for Protection of Child Rights, against the
Petitioner and Keerthi Gowda; and,
(iii) Criminal Complaint dated 22.10.2018 registered
by the elder daughter before the Girinagara Police
Station, against the Petitioner and Keerthi Gowda.
115. The Respondent, in her cross examination, has
admitted that their elder daughter had filed false
complaints against the Petitioner and that the Police has
filed a B-Final Report in that regard. Concerning the
complaint dated 30.10.2018, there is no convincing
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
evidence to show that the Respondent had forced the
younger daughter to file this complaint.
116. On the other complaint dated 15.12.2018 filed
by the younger daughter, the signature of the Respondent
appears to be present. Also, that on the date of filing of
such complaints, the younger daughter was aged about
fifteen years old. While we are not expressing any opinion
on whether the Respondent had indeed forced her minor
younger daughter to file this complaint against the
Petitioner, we do observe that the Respondent signing on
this complaint would evince not only the animosity
between the spouses but also institution of multiple
complaints that would derail the reputation of the
Petitioner, as we have noted hereinabove.
117. The Petitioner has also urged other facts to
establish the acts of cruelty against the Respondent. These
are that the Respondent has threatened to commit suicide
in order to frame the Petitioner, the Respondent regularly
checks the mobile phone, e-mail password, bank account
password and whereabouts of the Petitioner, the
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
Respondent has made use of the Petitioner for his hard
earned money and that the Respondent has not allowed
the Petitioner’s sisters and his other relatives inside their
matrimonial home. However, the Petitioner has placed no
convincing material on record to prove these allegations
against the Respondent.
118. Regarding the Respondent’s allegations that the
Petitioner has received dowry from the Respondent’s
parents, no corroboratory material has been placed by the
Respondent; and thus, we are in limited agreement with
the Family Court that this aspect needs no further
discussion.
119. Having held that the marriage between the
Petitioner and the Respondent is to be dissolved on the
ground of cruelty, it is now necessary for us to answer the
question of permanent alimony payable to the
Respondent.
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
120. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajnesh v.
12
Neha , has extensively laid down certain guidelines to be
followed with respect to the award of permanent alimony.
While a list of factors is indicated, we may extract a
portion of the judgement that effectively captures the
position so expounded:
“81. A careful and just balance must be drawn
between all relevant factors. The test for
determination of maintenance in matrimonial
disputes depends on the financial status of the
respondent, and the standard of living that the
applicant was accustomed to in her matrimonial
home. [Chaturbhuj v. Sita Bai, (2008) 2 SCC
316 : (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 547 : (2008) 1 SCC
(Cri) 356] The maintenance amount awarded
must be reasonable and realistic, and avoid
either of the two extremes i.e. maintenance
awarded to the wife should neither be so
extravagant which becomes oppressive and
unbearable for the respondent, nor should it be
so meagre that it drives the wife to penury. The
sufficiency of the quantum has to be adjudged
so that the wife is able to maintain herself with
reasonable comfort.”
121. It may also be relevant to refer to a judgement
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Reema Salkan v.
13
Sumer Singh Salkan, wherein another relevant factor
would be as to whether the husband is an able-bodied
12
(2021) 2 SCC 324.
13
(2019) 12 SCC 303.
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
person. In this regard it may be useful for us to note some
observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anju Garg
14
v. Deepak Kumar Garg, wherein by reiterated the duty
of an able-bodied husband to provide financial support to
his wife, it was held:
“10. This Court had made the above
observations as the Court felt that the Family
Court in the said case had conducted the
proceedings without being alive to the objects
and reasons, and the spirit of the provisions
under Section 125 of the Code. Such an
impression has also been gathered by this
Court in the case on hand. The Family Court
had disregarded the basic canon of law that it
is the sacrosanct duty of the husband to
provide financial support to the wife and to the
minor children. The husband is required to earn
money even by physical labour, if he is an able-
bodied, and could not avoid his obligation,
except on the legally permissible grounds
mentioned in the statute. In Chaturbhuj v. Sita
Bai, it has been held that the object of
maintenance proceedings is not to punish a
person for his past neglect, but to prevent
vagrancy and destitution of a deserted wife, by
providing her food, clothing, and shelter by a
speedy remedy. As settled by this Court,
Section 125 Cr.P.C. is a measure of social
justice and is specially enacted to protect
women and children. It also falls within the
Constitutional sweep of Article 15(3), reinforced
by Article 39 of the Constitution of India.”
14
2022 SCC OnLine SC 1314.
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
122. Considering that the Respondent has remained
absent in the proceedings before us and has not sought
any monetary relief, we have taken into account the
overarching demands of justice to protect the social
standing and financial stability of the Respondent after the
dissolution of the present marriage. In this regard, it
would be apt to refer to the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s
15
observation in Amutha v. A.R. Subramanian , wherein
it was held:
“ 36. While granting the decree of divorce, we
deem it appropriate to award permanent
alimony to the appellant wife and the parties'
daughter. Although the appellant wife has not
specifically claimed any monetary relief or
maintenance during these proceedings, it is
trite and equitable to grant such relief,
considering the financial status of the parties,
their professional backgrounds, and the larger
interest of justice. The financial independence
of a party does not preclude the High Court
from granting maintenance if it is necessary to
secure dignity, social standing, and financial
stability post-divorce, especially in cases where
the marriage has subsisted for a long period.”
123. While neither of the parties have filed their
respective financial statements for fixing the permanent
alimony payable, we have noticed that the Petitioner is a
15
(2024) SCC OnLine SC 3822.
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
film actor, whose films are admittedly being well received.
Although the three children of the parties have admittedly
attained majority, we have considered the need to secure
the general well-being and educational needs of the
children, including their future marriage expenses. The
children must not be allowed to suffer due to the
protracted litigation between their parents.
124. We have also noticed the terms of the Mutual
Consent Agreement dated 02.05.2016, wherein the
Petitioner has also made certain financial commitments to
the Respondent and his three children. Despite the same,
granting a lumpsum amount as permanent alimony
ensures finality in the matter and minimises any possibility
of future litigation between the parties.
125. We have taken into account several factors
peculiar to the instant case, including the duration of the
present marriage between the parties, the nature of their
respective roles as spouses during the entirety of their
marriage and the age of the parties and the financial
needs of their three children. That apart, since the
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
Petitioner is an able-bodied person, he is under an
obligation to provide financial support to his wife and
children, in order to ensure that the order for dissolution
of marriage does not serve as a punishment to them.
126. Therefore, considering the need to secure
financial stability of the Respondent and the three children
and to put quietus to the long-standing litigation, we deem
it appropriate, in the interest of equity, to direct the
Petitioner to pay a sum of Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees
Two Crores Only) as permanent alimony to the
Respondent as a one-time payment.
127. In light of the foregoing observations, we pass
the following;
ORDER
(i) The appeal is allowed;
(ii) The marriage between the parties solemnized on
29.08.1999 at S.S. Kalyana Mantapa, Haro Gade, Anekal
Taluk, Bangalore Rural District, stands dissolved on the
ground of cruelty under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu
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MFA No. 6129 of 2024
Marriage Act, by a decree of divorce with effect from the
date of the decree; and,
(iii) Since the Petitioner has transferred the dwelling
house to the Respondent, where she is presently residing,
and considering the Petitioner’s financial capabilities and
the need to secure the financial stability of the Respondent
and the three children, we deem it just and proper to
grant permanent alimony of Rs. 2,00,00,000 (Rupees
Two Crore Only) to be paid within three months from the
date of receipt of copy of this order, failing which he is
required to make payment of the said amount with
interest @ 6% per annum from the date of decree till
payment.
Sd/-
(D K SINGH)
JUDGE
Sd/-
(H.SHANTHI BHUSHAN)
JUDGE
KNM