Shri Jugal Kishore Kansal vs Zonal Manager, Haryana, Punjab And Sind Bank, And Others
- Court
- Punjab and Haryana High Court
CR-1688-2026 (O&M)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
CR-1688-2026 (O&M)
Shri Jugal Kishore Kansal ...Petitioner
Versus
Zonal Manager, Haryana, Punjab and Sind Bank and others ...Respondents
Reserved on: 19.11.2026
Pronounced on: 21.11.2026
Pronounced fully/operative part: Fully
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA
Argued by: Mr. Shubham Sharma, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. Gaurav Goel, and Mr. Tarlok Advocates
for the respondent-Bank.
DEEPAK GUPTA, J.
The petitioner, who is the decree-holder, has invoked the
supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India, assailing the order dated 27.08.2024 (Annexure P-4) passed by the learned
Civil Judge (Junior Division), Chandigarh, whereby the application moved by the
respondents/judgment-debtors for recording satisfaction of the decree was
allowed and the execution petition was disposed of upon tendering a demand
draft for ₹24,718/-.
2. The controversy arises out of a judgment & decree dated
15.07.2014 passed in Civil Suit No.45 of 2003, instituted by the petitioner against
Punjab & Sind Bank and its authorities. The petitioner had challenged three
orders dated 12.09.2000, 30.04.2001 and 14.10.2002, whereby disciplinary
punishment had been imposed upon him.
3. Initially, vide order dated 12.09.2000, the petitioner was awarded
punishment of reduction by one stage in the time scale for a period of one year,
with the further stipulation that he would not earn an increment during the
period of reduction and that such reduction would postpone his future
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increments. The Appellate Authority, vide order dated 30.04.2001, modified the
punishment to reduction of one increment for one year without cumulative
effect and without adversely affecting his pension. The Reviewing Authority
upheld the modified punishment vide order dated 14.10.2002.
4. The Civil Court, vide judgment & decree dated 15.07.2014, declared
all three disciplinary orders illegal and set them aside. Besides granting
declaratory relief, the Court held the petitioner entitled to recover arrears with
compound interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of accrual till
realization, as well as all benefits to which he would have been entitled in the
absence of the impugned disciplinary orders. A consequential decree for
mandatory injunction was also passed directing the respondents to release the
aforesaid monetary and other benefits.
5. The decree attained finality upon dismissal of the first appeal on
28.10.2016, and RSA No.4308 of 2017 by this Court on 13.07.2023.
6. In the execution proceedings, the respondents submitted that, upon
restoration of the increment affected by the disciplinary punishment, the
petitioner was entitled to ₹24,718/- only. They accordingly tendered demand
draft No.689326 dated 08.02.2024 for the said amount and sought disposal of
the execution petition as fully satisfied. It was further submitted that the
petitioner had already received provident fund amounting to ₹2,95,894/-,
gratuity of ₹5,98,319/- and leave encashment of ₹2,40,116/- upon his
superannuation in September 2006.
7. The petitioner contested the application, asserting that the
consequences of the disciplinary proceedings had adversely affected his career
advancement. According to him, he was entitled to promotion from the year
1993 and, had the illegal disciplinary proceedings not intervened, he would have
progressed in service like his contemporaries, namely Tejinder Singh and N.S.
Virk, who retired as Deputy General Manager and Assistant General Manager,
respectively.
8. On this premise, the petitioner claimed ₹35,82,262/- towards
difference of salary from March 1993 to September 2006, ₹46,01,389/- towards
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CR-1688-2026 (O&M)
difference of pension from October 2006 to December 2023, and ₹19,218/-
towards the withheld increment, aggregating to ₹82,02,869/-.
9. The learned Executing Court, while observing that it could neither
travel beyond the decree nor grant relief not awarded therein, held that the
petitioner had not sought a specific decree for salary and pension equivalent to
those of his aforesaid colleagues. It consequently concluded that the petitioner
was entitled only to ₹24,718/- tendered by the respondents and disposed of the
execution petition as satisfied.
Submissions of learned counsel
10. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the Executing
Court has adopted an unduly restrictive interpretation of the decree. It is
submitted that the decree expressly grants not merely restoration of the
withheld increment but all consequential benefits, which the petitioner would
have received in the absence of the disciplinary orders. According to learned
counsel, the Executing Court could not have confined the decree to the amount
unilaterally calculated by the judgment-debtor Bank without examining whether
the entire consequential monetary relief, including compound interest, had been
paid.
11. It is further contended that the expression "all the benefits"
employed in the decree is sufficiently comprehensive to include the
consequential service benefits flowing from the setting aside of the punishment.
The petitioner, therefore, submits that the Executing Court ought to have
examined his claim rather than accepting the Bank's calculations as conclusive.
12. Per contra , learned counsel for the respondents supports the
impugned order. It is argued that the original suit concerned the legality of the
disciplinary punishment and did not involve adjudication of the petitioner's
independent entitlement to promotion to higher posts. The decree does not
declare the petitioner entitled to promotion as Assistant General Manager or
Deputy General Manager, nor does it direct fixation of his salary or pension at
par with any particular officer.
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13. Learned counsel further submits that the final punishment was only
reduction of one increment for one year without cumulative effect and without
affecting pension. Consequently, upon setting aside that punishment, the
petitioner could claim restoration of the financial benefits actually withheld, but
could not obtain, in execution, a substantive relief of retrospective promotion or
higher pension which had never been adjudicated. It is thus prayed that the
revision petition be dismissed.
Consideration by this Court
14. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and examined the
impugned order, the question which arises for consideration is whether the
Executing Court was justified in treating the decree as fully satisfied merely upon
tendering ₹24,718/-, while declining to examine the consequential benefits and
interest expressly awarded under the decree.
15. The governing principle is that an Executing Court cannot go behind
the decree or modify its substantive terms. Equally, it is under an obligation to
enforce the decree in its true letter and spirit. Where the decree requires
interpretation for determining the extent of the relief granted, the Executing
Court is competent to construe it by reference to the judgment, pleadings and
issues, without reopening matters already adjudicated.
16. In Topanmal Chhotamal v. Kundomal Gangaram and others, AIR
1960 SC 388 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court explained the limited jurisdiction of an
Executing Court and the prohibition against travelling beyond the decree.
Likewise, in Bhavan Vaja and others v. Solanki Hanuji Khodaji Mansang and
another, (1973) 2 SCC 40 , it was held that, for ascertaining the true meaning and
effect of a decree, the Executing Court may examine the pleadings and
judgment, which preceded it. The decree is not to be construed in isolation from
the adjudication of which it is the culmination.
17. In M/s Brakewel Automotive Components (India) (P) Ltd. v. P.R.
Selvam Alagappan, (2017) 5 SCC 371 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that
the Executing Court is bound to execute the decree as it stands and cannot
undertake an exercise, which alters or enlarges its scope.
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18. Applying these principles, it is necessary to distinguish between two
separate aspects of the petitioner's claim. The first concerns restoration of the
actual service and monetary benefits lost on account of the disciplinary
punishment, which has been set aside. The second concerns his assertion that,
but for the disciplinary proceedings, he would have earned successive
promotions and attained the status and emoluments of his contemporaries.
19. Adverting to the facts of the present case, a perusal of the judgment
dated 15.07.2014 reveals that the plaintiff had specifically sought a declaration
that the disciplinary orders dated 12.09.2000, 30.04.2001 and 14.10.2002 were
illegal and void, besides claiming consequential monetary and service benefits,
including promotions, which he would have received in the absence of those
orders. Thus, it cannot be said that the claim for consequential promotional
benefits was altogether foreign to the original suit.
20. However, the nature and extent of the relief actually granted must
be determined from the judgment and decree read as a whole. The trial Court
framed issues regarding the plaintiff's entitlement to declaration and mandatory
injunction. While deciding these issues, the Court examined the legality of the
disciplinary proceedings, particularly the denial of an opportunity to engage a
legal practitioner despite the Presenting Officer being legally qualified.
21. The trial Court concluded that the disciplinary proceedings suffered
from violation of the applicable service regulations and principles of natural
justice. Consequently, the disciplinary orders were declared illegal and set aside.
The plaintiff was held entitled to arrears with compound interest at the rate of
6% per annum from the date of accrual till realization, besides all benefits which
he would have received in the absence of the impugned orders.
22. Importantly, the trial Court did not record any specific finding that
the plaintiff was entitled to promotion from March 1993 or to any particular
higher post. Neither was there any adjudication regarding his comparative
seniority, eligibility, suitability or entitlement to promotion vis-à-vis Tejinder
Singh and N.S. Virk. The decree also does not direct the Bank to fix his salary or
pension at par with either of these officers.
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23. The distinction between a decree granting consequential service
benefits and one specifically directing retrospective promotion is material.
Although setting aside an adverse disciplinary order removes the legal
impediment arising from that order, it does not necessarily establish that the
employee would have secured promotion to a particular post on a particular
date. Promotion ordinarily depends upon the applicable service rules, eligibility,
availability of vacancies and the prescribed method of selection.
24. Consequently, the decree cannot be interpreted as conferring an
automatic right upon the petitioner to receive the salary and pension of officers,
who subsequently attained higher positions in the Bank. Such an interpretation
would require the Executing Court to undertake an adjudication, which was
never undertaken by the Court passing the decree.
25. This conclusion is further reinforced by the fact that the petitioner
claims difference of salary commencing from March 1993, whereas the
disciplinary orders set aside under the decree were passed in September 2000,
April 2001 and October 2002. The show-cause notice issued in 1993 and its
alleged adverse effect on the petitioner's promotion prospects were referred to
in the pleadings and evidence. However, the trial Court did not return a finding
that the petitioner had been illegally denied promotion in 1993 or that he was
entitled to retrospective promotion from that date.
26. The mere reference to the show-cause notice of 1993 in the
judgment cannot, therefore, be construed as an adjudication granting promotion
from that year. The Executing Court was justified in declining to award the entire
amount of ₹82,02,869/- calculated by the petitioner on the assumption that his
salary and pension ought to have been equivalent to those of his named
colleagues.
27. Nevertheless, the matter requires examination from another
perspective. The decree expressly grants all benefits, which the plaintiff would
have received in the absence of the impugned disciplinary orders. These words
cannot be treated as redundant. The Executing Court was required to give effect
to the entire decree rather than confining its consideration merely to the
restoration of the withheld increment.
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28. The original punishment imposed on 12.09.2000 contemplated
reduction by one stage in the time scale for one year, with postponement of
future increments. The Appellate Authority subsequently modified the
punishment on 30.04.2001 to reduction of one increment for one year without
cumulative effect and without adversely affecting pension. Both these orders,
along with the reviewing order dated 14.10.2002, were ultimately set aside by
the decree.
29. It was, therefore, necessary for the Executing Court to ascertain the
actual financial consequences of these orders during the periods for which they
operated. The Bank was required to show, through relevant service and pay
records, that the petitioner's pay had been correctly restored and that all
consequential monetary benefits flowing directly from the setting aside of the
punishment had been released.
30. Furthermore, the decree specifically awards compound interest at
the rate of 6% per annum from the date of accrual till realization. The impugned
order does not disclose whether the amount of ₹24,718/- tendered by the Bank
includes the compound interest awarded under the decree. Nor does it contain
any independent determination of the amount payable under this head.
31. The Executing Court appears to have proceeded on the premise
that, since the petitioner was not entitled to claim salary and pension equivalent
to those of his contemporaries, the amount tendered by the Bank necessarily
represented full satisfaction of the decree. Such an approach overlooks the
distinction between an impermissible claim for retrospective promotion and the
enforceable right to receive the actual consequential benefits awarded under the
decree.
32. At the same time, it must be clarified that the Executing Court
cannot undertake a fresh determination of the petitioner's entitlement to
promotion, nor can it grant salary or pension attached to higher posts merely on
the assumption that the petitioner would have attained those positions. Its
jurisdiction is confined to enforcing the rights which have already crystallised
under the decree.
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33. If, however, any financial benefit was withheld solely because of the
disciplinary orders, which have been set aside, and its restoration follows directly
from the decree and the applicable service rules without requiring a fresh
adjudication of promotional entitlement, the same cannot be excluded merely
because it was not separately quantified in the decree. Whether any such benefit
actually exists must be determined from the relevant records.
34. In the present case, the Executing Court has not undertaken the
necessary exercise of verifying the Bank's calculations with reference to the
decree, the relevant pay records and the interest expressly awarded. The finding
that the decree stood fully satisfied upon tendering ₹24,718/- is, therefore,
premature and cannot be sustained.
35. In view of the foregoing discussion, the present revision petition is
partly allowed. The impugned order dated 27.08.2024 is set aside to the extent
that it records full satisfaction of the decree and disposes of the execution
petition. The conclusion that the petitioner cannot, merely on the strength of the
decree, claim retrospective promotions or salary and pension equivalent to those
of Tejinder Singh and N.S. Virk does not warrant interference.
36. The execution petition shall stand restored to its original number.
The learned Executing Court shall direct the respondents/judgment-debtors to
furnish a detailed and authenticated calculation of the monetary benefits
payable to the petitioner upon setting aside the disciplinary orders dated
12.09.2000, 30.04.2001 and 14.10.2002, together with the relevant service and
pay records.
37. The Executing Court shall verify whether the petitioner has received
all consequential monetary benefits directly flowing from the setting aside of the
aforesaid disciplinary orders, including restoration of the withheld increment and
any resulting adjustment in his admissible pay or retiral benefits. It shall also
determine the compound interest payable at the rate of 6% per annum from the
respective dates of accrual till realization, strictly in accordance with the decree.
38. It is clarified that the Executing Court shall not undertake any fresh
adjudication concerning the petitioner's entitlement to promotion from 1993 or
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to any particular higher post, nor shall it determine salary or pension on the basis
of a hypothetical promotional career. Its inquiry shall remain confined to the
actual consequences of the disciplinary orders set aside by the decree and the
benefits enforceable without creating any new substantive entitlement.
39. After affording both parties an opportunity to submit their
calculations and objections, the Executing Court shall determine whether any
amount remains payable under the decree, after giving due credit for amounts
already received by the petitioner. The exercise shall be completed
expeditiously, preferably within four months from the date of receipt of a
certified copy of this order.
40. The revision petition stands disposed of accordingly.
21.11.2026 (DEEPAK GUPTA)
Yogesh
JUDGE
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No
Whether reportable: Yes/No
Uploaded on: 21.11.2026
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