Praveen Gupta vs Delhi Development Authority

$~J
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Judgment reserved on: 20.03.2026
Judgment pronounced on:03.07.2026

+ W.P.(C) 6761/2021, CM APPL. 21290/2021 &, CM APPL.
23374/2021
PRAVEEN GUPTA
...Petitioner
Through: Mr. Zeeshan Hashmi, Adv.

versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ... Respondent

Through: Mr. Vaibhav Agnihotri, ASC, DDA
with Mr. Vidit Pratap Singh Adv.
+ W.P.(C) 7612/2021 & CM APPL. 23825/2021
DEEVIK GARG
...Petitioner
Through: Mr. Zeeshan Hashmi, Adv.

versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ...Respondent

Through: Mr. Vaibhav Agnihotri, ASC, DDA
with Mr. Vidit Pratap Singh Adv.

CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE JASMEET SINGH




Digitally Signed
By:ANSH SRIVASTAVA
Signing Date:03.07.2026
18:37:53
W.P. (C) 6761/2021 and W.P. (C) 7612/2021 Page 1 of 18

J U D G M E N T
1. These are writ petitions filed under Article 226 of Constitution of
India seeking directions against the respondent/Delhi Development
Authority ( “DDA” ) for handing over possession of Industrial Plot
No. B-349, Mangol Puri Industrial Area, Phase-I, Delhi, and Plot
No. 86, Pocket E-1, Sector-7, Rohini, New Delhi.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND in W.P. (C) 6761/2021
2. In W.P. (C) 6761/2021 (hereinafter referred to as “the case of
Praveen Gupta”) the petitioner was allotted Industrial Plot No. B-
349, Mangol Puri Industrial Area, Phase-I, Delhi, pursuant to an e-
auction conducted on 26.04.2019 wherein the petitioner emerged as
a successful bidder. Pursuant thereto, the petitioner deposited 25%
of the premium amount and was issued a Demand-cum-Allotment
Letter dated 18.07.2019 requiring payment of the balance 75%
premium amount of Rs. 2,10,93,000/- within the stipulated period.
3. Upon the petitioner’s request, the respondent granted successive
extensions of time vide letters dated 23.10.2019 and 19.02.2020, the
latter extension remaining valid up to 20.04.2020. Before the expiry
of the extended period, the COVID-19 pandemic struck and all
offices were closed. Due to this the petitioner sought further
extension by email dated 18.04.2020 and thereafter arranged
finances through a loan sanctioned by Axis Bank on 27.07.2020.
4. The petitioner thereafter addressed several emails between
September and December 2020 requesting permission and necessary
directions for depositing the balance premium amount. Despite
repeated representations, no response was received from the
Digitally Signed
By:ANSH SRIVASTAVA
Signing Date:03.07.2026
18:37:53
W.P. (C) 6761/2021 and W.P. (C) 7612/2021 Page 2 of 18

respondent. Consequently, the petitioner, on its own accord,
deposited the entire balance premium amount of Rs. 2,10,93,000/-
with the respondent on 29.12.2020.
5. After making the payment, the petitioner repeatedly approached the
respondent seeking possession of the plot. However, vide letter dated
09.04.2021, the respondent informed the petitioner that the bid stood
cancelled and the earnest money stood forfeited on the ground that
the petitioner had failed to deposit the premium amount within the
period allegedly extended by the Circular dated 02.12.2020.
Subsequently, a corrigendum dated 17.06.2021 to the cancellation
letter dated 09.04.2021 was also issued by the respondent.
6. It is the case of the petitioner that despite having deposited the entire
balance premium amount prior to 31.12.2020; the respondent
proceeded to cancel the allotment. Further, the Circular dated
02.12.2020, on the basis of which the impugned action was taken,
was neither communicated to the petitioner nor made publicly
available. The petitioner ultimately obtained a copy of the said
Circular in July 2021 and has challenged its validity, as well as the
consequential communications dated 09.04.2021 and corrigendum
dated 17.06.2021 to the cancellation letter.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND in W.P. (C) 7612 of 2021
7. Similar to the facts stated above, the connected writ petition W.P.
(C) 7612/2021 (hereinafter referred to as “the case of Deevik Garg”)
has been filed against DDA for handing over possession of Plot No.
86, Pocket E-1, Sector-7, Rohini, New Delhi, which was allotted to
the petitioner pursuant to an e-auction conducted on 24.04.2019.
Digitally Signed
By:ANSH SRIVASTAVA
Signing Date:03.07.2026
18:37:53
W.P. (C) 6761/2021 and W.P. (C) 7612/2021 Page 3 of 18

8. The petitioner emerged as the highest bidder for the aforesaid
residential plot with a bid amount of Rs. 3,87,57,040/-.
Consequently, a Letter of Intimation dated 21.06.2019 was issued in
favour of the petitioner and the petitioner deposited 25% of the
amount. Thereafter, the respondent issued a demand notice dated
04.09.2019 requiring payment of the balance sale consideration
amounting to Rs. 2,90,67,880/-.
9. On 15.11.2019, the petitioner sought an extension of 180 days for
making the balance payment. The said request was accepted by the
respondent vide communication dated 27.02.2020, extending the
time for payment till 31.05.2020. During the period affected by the
COVID-19 pandemic, the petitioner addressed an email dated
30.05.2020 and subsequent communications requesting a further
extension of time. Subsequently, the respondent issued a Circular
dated 17.06.2020 extending the period for making payments till
31.08.2020.
10. On 02.12.2020, the respondent issued a Circular prescribing
timelines for payment by successful bidders. In respect of allottees
who had been issued demand letters prior to 01.10.2019, the Circular
stipulated 01.11.2020 as the last date for payment. In cases where
demand letters had been issued after 01.10.2019, the date for
payment was stated to be 31.12.2020.
11. Thereafter, the petitioner deposited the balance sale consideration as
well as the applicable interest. The principal amount was deposited
on 18.12.2020 and the interest component was deposited on
24.12.2020.
Digitally Signed
By:ANSH SRIVASTAVA
Signing Date:03.07.2026
18:37:53
W.P. (C) 6761/2021 and W.P. (C) 7612/2021 Page 4 of 18

12. The petitioner also submitted the requisite documents in connection
with delivery of possession. However, possession of the subject plot
has not been handed over by the respondent.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
13. Mr. Zeeshan Hashmi, learned counsel for the petitioners, in both the
petitions submits that the impugned Circular dated 02.12.2020 is
arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India. It is contended that the Circular creates two
classes of allottees one before 01.11.2020 and one after, from a
homogeneous category of successful bidders without any intelligible
differentia or rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved.
14. It is further submitted that the Circular was issued on 02.12.2020,
yet prescribed 01.11.2020 as the cut-off date for one category of
allottees. Consequently, the benefit contemplated under the Circular
stood exhausted even before the Circular came into existence,
thereby rendering compliance impossible and depriving affected
allottees of any meaningful opportunity to avail its benefit.
15. Learned Counsel submits that the petitioners were diligent
throughout and had continuously approached the respondent seeking
extension of time during the unprecedented circumstances created by
the COVID-19 pandemic. The respondent neither rejected the
requests nor communicated any final decision thereon. Having
remained silent despite repeated representations, the respondent
cannot now penalise the petitioners for alleged delay in payment.
16. It is further argued that the petitioner in the case of Deevik Garg had
deposited the entire balance premium amount, together with
applicable interest, prior to the impugned action of cancellation or
Digitally Signed
By:ANSH SRIVASTAVA
Signing Date:03.07.2026
18:37:53
W.P. (C) 6761/2021 and W.P. (C) 7612/2021 Page 5 of 18

refusal of possession. In these circumstances, no loss whatsoever has
been caused to the respondent. The action of the respondent in
refusing to honour the allotments despite receipt of the entire
consideration is stated to be arbitrary, disproportionate and contrary
to the principles of fairness that govern State action.
17. Reliance is placed upon V.P. Sunita v. DDA, 2013 SCC OnLine Del
5108, Raj Kumar Sharma v. DDA, LPA No. 188/2008 , Mohd. Sultan
v. DDA , 176 (2011) DLT 788 , Kailash Nath Associates v. DDA ,
(2015) 4 SCC 136, R.K. Saxena v. DDA (2001) 4 SCC 137 and
Dhanpothowar Co-operative Group Housing Society Ltd. v. DDA
2001 AIR (Del) 65 , to contend that delay in payment can be
condoned in appropriate circumstances, that DDA possesses the
power to extend time, and that acceptance of delayed payments may
amount to a deemed extension of time.
18. On the aforesaid grounds, it is prayed that the impugned Circular
and consequential actions taken thereunder be set aside and the
respondent be directed to honour the allotments and hand over
possession of the respective plots to the petitioners.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
19. Mr. Vaibhav Agnihotri, learned ASC for the respondent submits,
that the controversy in the present petition is confined to the
question as framed on 03.08.2021, whether the suo motu payment
made by the petitioner after the expiry of the prescribed and
extended timelines could be accepted so as to entitle the petitioner to
possession of the subject plot, despite there being no policy
permitting regularization of such delayed payments.
Digitally Signed
By:ANSH SRIVASTAVA
Signing Date:03.07.2026
18:37:53
W.P. (C) 6761/2021 and W.P. (C) 7612/2021 Page 6 of 18

20. The respondent in the case of Praveen Gupta has placed reliance on
the following table to state that the petitioner failed to make timely
payments.
Event Timeline Status
Original period for payment of
18.07.2019-15.10.2019 Not paid
balance 75% premium
First extension (90 days) 16.10.2019 - 13.01.2020 Not paid
Second extension (90 days) 14.01.2020-12.04.2020 Not paid
Covid extension (90 days) 13.04.2020 -11.07.2020 Not paid
One-time Covid relief by
01.11.2020 Not paid
Circular dated
02.12.2021
Actual payment by petitioner 29.12.2020 Paid
belatedly

21. Mr. Agnihotri, submits that under Rule 28 of the Delhi Development
Authority (Disposal of Developed Nazul Land) Rules, 1981, read
with Clauses 9 and 10 of the Tender Document governing the e-
auction, the competent authority was empowered to extend the time
for payment by a maximum period of 180 days upon sufficient cause
being shown. In the event of failure to make payment within the
stipulated or extended period, the bid automatically stood liable to
cancellation and the earnest money deposit was liable for forfeiture.
22. It is further submitted that owing to the extraordinary circumstances
arising out of the COVID-19 pandemic, the respondent granted an
additional extension of 90 days through Circular dated 17.06.2020
Digitally Signed
By:ANSH SRIVASTAVA
Signing Date:03.07.2026
18:37:53
W.P. (C) 6761/2021 and W.P. (C) 7612/2021 Page 7 of 18

pursuant to directions and approval of the Hon’ble Lieutenant
Governor. The petitioners, however, failed to make payment even
within the said extended period.
23. Learned counsel submits that thereafter, as a one-time relief
measure, the respondent issued Circular dated 02.12.2020 whereby
delays were regularized in cases where the demand letter for
payment of the balance premium had been issued prior to
01.10.2019, provided full payment had been made by 01.11.2020. It
is contended that the said policy was intended to protect genuine
bidders who had made efforts to arrange funds during the pandemic
but were unable to adhere strictly to the original schedule.
24. It is also stated that, the petitioners did not satisfy the conditions
mentioned in the Circular dated 02.12.2020 as the balance premium
was deposited only on 29.12.2020 and 18.12.2020, i.e., after the cut-
off date of 01.11.2020. Consequently, the petitioners were not
entitled to the benefit of the one-time regularization scheme.
25. It is submitted that no extension of time beyond 01.11.2020 was
granted to any successful bidder falling within the category
applicable to the petitioner and that no policy exists for
regularization of payments made suo motu after the expiry of the
extended timelines.
26. Learned counsel further contends that the petitioners’ delayed
payment could not confer any vested right to seek possession of the
plot. Since the payment was made beyond all permissible and
policy-based extensions, the respondent was justified in treating the
allotment as cancelled and proceeding in accordance with the tender
conditions, including forfeiture of the earnest money deposit and
refund of the balance amount deposited subsequently.
Digitally Signed
By:ANSH SRIVASTAVA
Signing Date:03.07.2026
18:37:53
W.P. (C) 6761/2021 and W.P. (C) 7612/2021 Page 8 of 18

27. Similarly with respect to the case of Deevik Garg it has been argued,
that even the extended timelines were not adhered to as evident from
the chart reproduced below:
Event Timeline Status
Original period for payment of
04.09.2019 - 03.12.2019 Not Paid
balance 75% premium (90 days)
Request for extension of time by
15.11.2019 -
petitioner
First Extension granted on
03.12.2019 - 31.05.2020 Not Paid
05.02.2020 (180 days)
during
Extension
Second Extension (90 days) 13.04.2020 - 11.07.2020 Not Paid
Third Extension as per Circular
Till 01.11.2020 Not Paid
dated 02.12.2020
Actual Payment by the petitioner 18.12.2020 Paid
belatedly
28. Reliance is placed upon Shikhar v. National Board of Examination ,
WP No. 208 of 2022, State of Punjab v. Ram Lubhaya Bagga , (1998)
4 SCC 117, Hirandra Kumar v. High Court of Allahabad , (2020) 17
SCC 401 , Directorate of Film Festivals v. Gaurav Ashwin Jain,
(2007) 4 SCC 737 and Ugar Sugar Works Ltd. v. Delhi
Administration, (2001) 3 SCC 635.
29. It is further submitted that grant of any relief in the present case,
would create an undesirable precedent and encourage similarly
situated bidders, who failed to comply with payment timelines, to
seek regularization through judicial intervention. Reliance in this
regard is placed upon Jitin Garg v. DDA , LPA 419/2021.
Digitally Signed
By:ANSH SRIVASTAVA
Signing Date:03.07.2026
18:37:53
W.P. (C) 6761/2021 and W.P. (C) 7612/2021 Page 9 of 18

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
30. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties and perused the
material on record.
31. The limited question that arises for my consideration is whether the
Circular dated 02.12.2020 is valid as per law and whether the
payment of the petitioners made beyond the extended timelines
should be accepted by DDA?
32. The Circular dated 02.12.2020 is reproduced as under:

33. The above Circular, especially to the extent of point B cannot be
legally sustained. Though the respondent has sought to characterize
the said Circular as granting an extension of time for making the
balance payment, a plain reading of it demonstrates otherwise. The
Digitally Signed
By:ANSH SRIVASTAVA
Signing Date:03.07.2026
18:37:53
W.P. (C) 6761/2021 and W.P. (C) 7612/2021 Page 10 of 18

Circular, issued on 02.12.2020, stipulates that in respect of allottees
who had been issued demand letters prior to 01.10.2019, the last date
for making payment would be 01.11.2020. Consequently, on the
very date the Circular came into force, the period for compliance had
already expired. Such a stipulation is self-defeating and cannot, by
any stretch of imagination, be regarded as an extension of time.
34. An extension necessarily contemplates the grant of a future
opportunity to perform an obligation. A notification which merely
informs a party that the period for compliance had already expired
prior to its own issuance is arbitrary on the face of it and goes
against the principles of fairness and reasonableness that govern
administrative action.
35. The main challenge to the Circular by the petitioners is that it is
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
36. In S. Seshachalam v. Bar Council of T.N. , (2014) 16 SCC 72 the
Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:
“21. Article 14 of the Constitution of India states that:
“ 14.Equality before law .—The State shall not deny to any
person equality before the law or the equal protection of the
laws within the territory of India.”
Article 14 forbids class legislation but it does not forbid
reasonable classification. The classification, however, must
not be “arbitrary, artificial or evasive” but must be based
on some real and substantial bearing, a just and reasonable
relation to the object sought to be achieved by the
legislation. Article 14 applies where equals are treated
differently without any reasonable basis. But where equals
Digitally Signed
By:ANSH SRIVASTAVA
Signing Date:03.07.2026
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and unequals are treated differently, Article 14 does not
apply. Class legislation is that which makes an improper
discrimination by conferring particular privileges upon a
class of persons arbitrarily selected from a large number of
persons all of whom stand in the same relation to the
privilege granted and between those on whom the privilege
is conferred and the persons not so favoured, no reasonable
distinction or substantial difference can be found justifying
the inclusion of one and the exclusion of the other from such
privilege.
22. While Article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not
forbid reasonable classification of persons, objects and
transactions by the legislature for the purpose of achieving
specific ends. But classification must not be “arbitrary,
artificial or evasive”. It must always rest upon some real
and substantial distinction bearing a just and reasonable
relation to the object sought to be achieved by the
legislation. Classification to be reasonable must fulfil the
following two conditions: firstly, the classification must be
founded on the intelligible differentia which distinguishes
persons or things that are grouped together from others left
out of the group. Secondly, the differentia must have a
rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the
Act. The differentia which is the basis of the classification
and the object of the Act are two distinct things. What is
necessary is that there must be nexus between the basis of
classification and the object of the Act. It is only when there
is no reasonable basis for a classification that legislation
Digitally Signed
By:ANSH SRIVASTAVA
Signing Date:03.07.2026
18:37:53
W.P. (C) 6761/2021 and W.P. (C) 7612/2021 Page 12 of 18

making such classification may be declared
discriminatory.”
37. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, it is
clear that the classification introduced by the impugned Circular
dated 02.12.2020 fails to satisfy either of the twin tests under Article
14 of the Constitution. The Circular classifies successful bidders into
two categories on the basis of whether the demand letter was issued
before or after 01.10.2019 and accordingly prescribes the deadline
for payment of balance amount. While the respondent does have the
prerogative to decide a cut-off date, it does not mean the same can
arbitrarily be set to an earlier date when the time frame has already
elapsed.
38. The Circular dated 02.12.2020, while purporting to extend the time
for payment, retrospectively stipulates that Category B allottees
ought to have made payment by 01.11.2020, a date which had
already elapsed more than a month prior to the issuance of the
Circular itself. Thus, unlike Category A allottees who were granted a
real and effective extension till 31.12.2020, Category B allottees
were afforded no opportunity whatsoever to avail the benefit of the
Circular. The so-called extension, insofar as Category B is
concerned, is therefore illusory.
39. The respondent has failed to demonstrate that the said date
constitutes an intelligible differentia having any rational relation to
the object sought to be achieved. Admittedly, the object of issuing
the Circular was to grant relaxation in view of the unprecedented
disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The financial
hardship occasioned by the pandemic was common to all allottees
Digitally Signed
By:ANSH SRIVASTAVA
Signing Date:03.07.2026
18:37:53
W.P. (C) 6761/2021 and W.P. (C) 7612/2021 Page 13 of 18

and was not dependent upon the date of issuance of the demand
letter. Thus, all allottees who had yet to make the balance payment
constituted one homogeneous class and there existed no rational
basis to distinguish one set of such allottees from another merely on
the basis of the date of issuance of the demand letter.
40. The reason for justifying the impugned classification by contending
that the purpose of point B was to protect the interests of genuine
bidders who had already deposited the balance consideration within
the prescribed period. This justification, in my opinion, is
misconceived.
41. The petitioners in the instant case, do not seek parity with those
allottees who had already fulfilled their tender obligations within
time. The challenge is not between those who paid and those who
defaulted, but between two classes of defaulting allottees, namely
those whose demand letters were issued prior to 01.10.2019 and
those whose demand letters were issued thereafter. The Circular
itself does not distinguish between genuine and non-genuine bidders;
rather, it distinguishes solely on the basis of the date of issuance of
the demand letter.
42. The respondent has failed to establish how such date bears any
rational nexus with the so called stated object of protecting genuine
bidders. In fact according to me the objective of issuing the Circular
is clear, i.e., to assist buyers who were hit by adverse COVID 19
pandemic.
43. Even otherwise, the justification advanced by the respondent cannot
be accepted. The interests of those allottees who had already made
timely payments were never likely to be prejudiced by granting
additional time to other allottees who were similarly affected by the
Digitally Signed
By:ANSH SRIVASTAVA
Signing Date:03.07.2026
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W.P. (C) 6761/2021 and W.P. (C) 7612/2021 Page 14 of 18

pandemic. Such allottees had already secured their allotments and no
vested right of theirs would have been defeated by extending the
payment period to others.
44. The respondent has not demonstrated any prejudice, financial or
otherwise, which would have been caused to timely-paying allottees
had the benefit of extension been uniformly granted. In the absence
of any such demonstrable prejudice, the purported object of
protecting genuine bidders remains wholly disconnected from the
classification sought to be introduced by the impugned Circular.
45. The respondent’s own conduct further exposes the irrationality of
the impugned condition. As evident from the record, the respondent
had itself exercised its discretion to extend the payment period
beyond the original timeline by communications dated 27.02.2020
and 17.06.2020. This clearly demonstrates that the respondent
possessed the authority to relax the payment schedule in appropriate
circumstances. Having exercised such discretion in view of the
extraordinary situation created by the pandemic, the respondent
could not arbitrarily deny a meaningful extension to one class of
similarly situated allottees without disclosing any rational basis for
such distinction.
46. I am of the view that point B of the Circular dated 02.12.2020 is
founded upon an artificial and irrational classification which bears
no nexus whatsoever to the object sought to be achieved. The
distinction based solely upon the date of issuance of the demand
letter neither protects genuine bidders nor advances the object of
mitigating the hardship caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Instead,
it arbitrarily deprives one class of similarly situated allottees of any
meaningful extension while conferring a substantive benefit upon
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By:ANSH SRIVASTAVA
Signing Date:03.07.2026
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another without any discernible rationale. The impugned condition
thus fails both the tests of reasonable classification under Article 14
of the Constitution and is liable to be declared arbitrary,
discriminatory and unconstitutional. To that extent, point B of the
Circular dated 02.12.2020 deserves to be struck down.
47. Further the reliance placed on Jitin Garg (supra) does not really aid
the respondent as the case had a different factual position. It is
helpful only to the extent that the Circular dated 02.12.2020 was
available in the public domain, a contention of the petitioner which I
reject. However the case of Jitin Garg was with respect to an allottee
falling under the category A wherein although an actual extension
was provided the same was not adhered to therefore resulting in
forfeiture of money.
48. Similarly reliance on Meerut Development Authority (supra) is
misplaced as the judgment deals with the nature of rights of a bidder
participating in the tender process. The petitioners are not
challenging the tender document but the Circular dated 02.12.2020.
49. Even the reliance on the case of Jitin Verma v. DDA, LPA 468/2021
is misplaced as in Jitin Verma (supra) there was a delay of 13 days
in making the deposit and the issue did not concern the Circular
dated 02.12.2020 which is the main bone of contention in the present
case.
50. Similarly respondent has also placed reliance on Shikhar (supra) to
state that fixing of the cut-off date is within the domain of the
executive and is a policy decision. While the same is true, the
judgment of Shikhar (supra) also states that a cut-off date will be
arbitrary and ultra vires if fixed without any rational basis or is
Digitally Signed
By:ANSH SRIVASTAVA
Signing Date:03.07.2026
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manifestly unreasonable leading to violation of Article 14 as has
happened in the present case.
51. I have also perused the other judgments relied on by the respondent
and the same also do not aid the respondent’s case as there is no
quarrel with the settled law that a policy decision is not within the
province of the judiciary to test the correctness as long as it is not
tainted by malafides or unreasonableness or arbitrariness.
52. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case of Praveen Gupta,
the petitioner had, on its own accord, deposited the balance 75% of
the bid amount, i.e., Rs. 2,10,93,000/-, on 29.12.2020. Despite such
payment, the cancellation letter dated 09.04.2021, read with the
corrigendum dated 17.06.2021, states that the H-1 bidder had failed
to deposit the balance amount by the “extended” deadline of
01.11.2020. As already observed hereinabove, 01.11.2020 was not
an extension of time granted to the petitioner. Consequently, the
foundation of the cancellation order is factually and legally
untenable, and the same cannot be sustained.
53. Likewise, in the case of Deevik Garg, the balance consideration,
along with the applicable interest for delayed payment, was
deposited on 24.12.2020. Accordingly, the cancellation order in his
case also cannot be upheld.
54. Since both the petitioners have made the entire deposit before the
last date i.e., 31.12.2020 therefore the petitions are allowed.
CONCLUSION
55. In view of the above, the present petitions are allowed and point B of
the Circular dated 02.12.2020 is struck down as being discriminatory
and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
Digitally Signed
By:ANSH SRIVASTAVA
Signing Date:03.07.2026
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56. Accordingly, the petitioners shall be entitled to:
(i) In W.P.(C) 6761/2021 - Allotment of Industrial Plot No. B-
349, Mangol Puri Industrial Area, Phase-I, Delhi.
(ii) In W.P.(C) 7612/2021 - Allotment of Plot No. 86, Pocket E-1,
Sector-7, Rohini, New Delhi.

57. The balance amount and interest, if any, along with incidental
charges shall be communicated to the petitioners by the respondent
within 4 weeks from the pronouncement of the judgement. The
payments of the said amount shall be made within 4 weeks thereafter
and thereon the allotment letter of the plots shall be handed over to
the petitioners.
58. Accordingly, the present petitions are disposed of along with
pending applications, if any.

JASMEET SINGH, J
rd
JULY 03 , 2026/DE







Digitally Signed
By:ANSH SRIVASTAVA
Signing Date:03.07.2026
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