COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA, NEW DELHI vs M/S RUNGTA MINES LIMITED, KOLKATA
- Court
- Odisha High Court
WA/909/2026
ODHC010459612026
2026:OHC:284-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
W.A. No.909 of 2026
CNR No. ODHC010459612026
Competition Commission of India, New
Delhi & Another
Appellants
….
Ms. Madhavi Divan, Sr. Advocate
Ms. Swati Smita Pati, Advocate
Mr. Binod Kumar Behera, Advocate
Mr. Ankur Singh, Advocate
Mr. Kaustav Som, Advocate
Mr. Garvish Jain, Advocate
Ms. Aishani Narain, Advocate
-Versus-
M/S Rungta Mines Limited, Kolkata &
Others
…. Respondents
Mr. Abhisek Manu Singhvi, Sr. Advocate
Mr. Manoj Kumar Mishra, Sr. Advocate
Mr. Tanmay Mishra, Advocate
Mr. D. Poddar, Advocate
Mr. H. Dadwal, Advocate
Ms. T. Shreyashi, Advocate
Ms. P. Jagetia, Advocate
Mr. A. Nagar, Advocate
(For Respondents)
CORAM:
HON BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
’
AND
HON BLE MR. JUSTICE CHITTARANJAN DASH
’
Date of Hearing: 08.10.2026
Date of Judgment: 10.11.2026
W.A. No.909 of 2026 Page 1 of 37
Chittaranjan Dash, J.
1. This intra-court appeal has been filed by the Competition
Commission of India (hereinafter referred to as the CCI ) and the
“ ”
Director General (Investigation) (hereinafter referred to as the DG ),
“ ”
assailing the judgment and order dated 22.05.2026 passed by the
learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No. 24391 of 2025. By the impugned
judgment, the learned Single Judge allowed the Writ petition filed by
Rungta Mines Limited and its Whole-Time Director, and quashed the
investigation arising out of Suo Motu Case No. 02 of 2021, together
with all consequential proceedings, insofar as the Writ Petitioners
were concerned.
Background Facts
2. The factual background giving rise to the present appeal may be
briefly noticed. The matter traces back to a complaint dated
06.03.2021 lodged by the Coimbatore Corporation Contractors
Welfare Association (hereinafter referred to as CCCWA ) before the
“ ”
Central Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter referred to as the CBI ),
“ ”
alleging cartelisation and price-fixing by certain steel manufacturers.
Rungta Mines Limited was not named in the said complaint. On
30.04.2021, the CBI forwarded the complaint to the DG, CCI, for
necessary action. In the meantime, CCCWA had approached the
Madras High Court by instituting Crl. O.P. No. 6153 of 2021 under
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. By order dated
29.07.2021, the Madras High Court directed the DG to proceed
further and take necessary and appropriate action on the complaint in
accordance with law.
W.A. No.909 of 2026 Page 2 of 37
The CCI thereafter considered the matter in its meeting held on
17.08.2021 and, by the minutes recorded on 23.08.2021, directed
registration of a suo motu case and investigation by the DG in terms
of the directions contained in the order of the Madras High Court.
Accordingly, Suo Motu Case No. 02 of 2021 came to be registered
before the CCI.
In the course of the investigation, the DG obtained search
warrants from the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi,
on 29.11.2022. Pursuant thereto, search and seizure operations were
conducted at the Kolkata office of Rungta Mines Limited between
16.12.2022 and 18.12.2022, during which statements of its employees
were recorded. Subsequently, on 27.03.2023, summons were issued to
two of its employees in connection with the investigation. Meanwhile,
the Calcutta High Court, by order dated 18.05.2023 in Shyam Steel
Industries Limited v. Union of India (in WPA No. 10107 of 2023),
declined to interfere with the ongoing investigation in. Thereafter, the
Madras High Court, by judgment dated 19.10.2023 in Agni Steels
Private Limited v. Union of India
, (in W.P. No. 11911 of 2023),
dismissed a challenge to the investigation arising out of the same suo
motu case. The Special Leave Petition preferred against the said
judgment was dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on
10.11.2023.
The DG submitted its investigation report before the CCI on
05.01.2024. Upon consideration thereof, the CCI, by its direction
dated 05.04.2024, required further investigation under Section 26(3A)
of the Competition Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). A
“ ”
supplementary investigation report was submitted on 11.04.2025.
W.A. No.909 of 2026 Page 3 of 37
Thereafter, the CCI issued further directions for investigation on
23.07.2025, pursuant to which the DG submitted a second
supplementary investigation report on 12.08.2025.
On 18.07.2025, Rungta Mines Limited sought inspection of the
records relating to Suo Motu Case No. 02 of 2021. The CCI allowed
the request on 08.08.2025, and certified copies of the records were
furnished on 20.08.2025. According to the Writ Petitioners, it was
upon inspection of the records that they came to know that Rungta
Mines Limited had been treated as an Opposite Party in the
proceedings.
Consequently, on 01.09.2025, they instituted W.P.(C) No.
24391 of 2025 before this Court, principally challenging the
jurisdictional foundation of the investigation and the consequential
proceedings insofar as they were concerned. The learned Single
Judge, by the impugned judgment dated 22.05.2026, allowed the Writ
petition and quashed the investigation and consequential proceedings
insofar as the Writ Petitioners were concerned. Aggrieved thereby, the
CCI and the DG have preferred the present intra-court appeal.
Contention on behalf of both the Parties
3. Ms. Divan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
Appellants submitted that the learned Single Judge erred in quashing
the investigation arising out of Suo Motu Case No. 02 of 2021. It was
contended that the CCI had duly considered the matter and directed
investigation in exercise of its powers under Section 26(1) of the Act,
pursuant to the order dated 29.07.2021 passed by the Madras High
Court. She submitted that the said order, having been acted upon and
W.A. No.909 of 2026 Page 4 of 37
having attained finality, could not be questioned in the present
proceedings. Reliance was placed on Agni Steels Private Limited v.
Union of India , W.P. No. 11911 of 2023, decided on 19.10.2023,
whose challenge was dismissed by the Court, as
Hon’ble Supreme
Shyam Steel Industries Ltd. v. Union of
well as the proceedings in
India
, WPA No. 10107 of 2023. It was further contended that the
investigation was in the nature of an inquisitorial fact-finding exercise
and that the Director General was not confined to the entities named
in the original complaint, but could investigate other enterprises
whose involvement emerged during the course of investigation. In
support of this submission, reliance was placed on Competition
Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. , (2010) 10 SCC
744; Excel Crop Care Ltd. v. CCI , (2017) 8 SCC 47; Cadila
Healthcare v. CCI , 2018 SCC OnLine Del 11229; and CCI v. Grasim
Industries Ltd. , 2019 SCC OnLine Del 10017. Ms. Divan also
questioned the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and alleged forum
shopping and suppression of the earlier proceedings before the
Madras and Calcutta High Courts. They further contended that the
Writ petition was premature, suffered from delay and ought not to
have been entertained at the stage of investigation. In support of the
plea concerning the binding effect of the earlier proceedings and
judicial comity, reliance was also placed on Tayabbhai M.
Bagasarwalla v. Hind Rubber Industries (P) Ltd ., (1997) 3 SCC 443,
and Kamatchi v. Lakshmi Narayanan , (2022) 15 SCC 50.
4. Per contra, Mr. Singhvi learned Senior Counsel appearing for
the Respondents supported the judgment of the learned Single Judge
and submitted that the investigation was without a valid jurisdictional
W.A. No.909 of 2026 Page 5 of 37
foundation, in the absence of a proper order reflecting the CCI s
’
independent application of mind and prima facie satisfaction under
Section 26(1) of the Act. It was contended that the order dated
29.07.2021 passed by the Madras High Court merely required the DG
to take action in accordance with law and could not dispense with the
statutory requirement under Section 26(1) of the Act. Mr. Singhvi
further submitted that the decision in Agni Steels was distinguishable,
was not binding on this Court and, in any event, the dismissal of the
Special Leave Petition against it did not result in merger or constitute
a declaration of law under Article 141 of the Constitution of India.
Reliance was placed, in this regard, on Kunhayammed v. State of
Kerala , (2000) 6 SCC 359, and other decisions concerning the
doctrine of merger and the effect of dismissal of a Special Leave
Petition. It was also contended that Rungta Mines Limited had been
brought within the investigation and treated as an Opposite Party
without following the procedure contemplated under Regulation 24 of
the Competition Commission of India (General) Regulations, 2009, or
affording the requisite notice and opportunity. Reliance was placed on
MRF Ltd. v. Competition Commission of India
, 2024 SCC OnLine
Mad 2244. He further sought to distinguish Excel Crop Care (supra),
Cadila Healthcare (supra) and Grasim Industries (supra) on the
ground that those decisions did not authorise the DG to implead an
unnamed entity as an Opposite Party without following the prescribed
procedure. They also resisted the objections regarding territorial
jurisdiction, forum shopping and delay, placing reliance on Kusum
Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India , (2004) 6 SCC 254; Alchemist
Ltd. v. State Bank of Sikkim , (2007) 11 SCC 335; and Sterling Agro
Industries Ltd. v. Union of India , AIR 2011 Delhi 174. It was,
W.A. No.909 of 2026 Page 6 of 37
accordingly, submitted that the learned Single Judge had rightly
interfered with the investigation and the consequential proceedings
insofar as the Respondents were concerned.
5. The learned Single Judge, upon consideration of the rival
submissions, held that the order dated 29.07.2021 passed by the
Madras High Court could not be construed as dispensing with the
statutory requirement under Section 26(1) of the Act, or as a substitute
for the CCI ’ s independent formation of a prima facie opinion. It was
further held that the minutes dated 23.08.2021 did not disclose the
requisite independent application of mind by the CCI and,
consequently, the investigation against the Writ Petitioners suffered
from a jurisdictional infirmity. The learned Single Judge also found
merit in the Writ Petitioners objection regarding their inclusion in the
’
investigation without following the requisite procedure. Accordingly,
the Writ petition was allowed and the investigation arising out of Suo
Motu Case No. 02 of 2021, together with all consequential
proceedings, was quashed insofar as the Writ Petitioners were
concerned.
Analysis
6. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties at
considerable length and have also carefully perused the pleadings, the
materials available on record and the detailed Written submissions
filed on their behalf. At the outset, it may be observed that, in exercise
of its intra-court appellate jurisdiction, this Court is not required to
undertake a fresh appraisal of the entire factual material as though it
were sitting as a Court of first instance. The principal consideration is
W.A. No.909 of 2026 Page 7 of 37
whether the impugned judgment suffers from any error warranting
appellate interference. At the same time, this limitation does not
preclude this Court from examining and clarifying the legal position
governing the issues.
I. Whether the learned Single Judge was justified in
entertaining the Writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India, notwithstanding the objections raised by the CCI regarding
maintainability, availability of statutory remedies, delay and
prematurity?
7. The objection to the maintainability of the Writ petition is
required to be examined in the context of the nature of the challenge
raised by the Writ Petitioners. The settled position is that the existence
of an alternative statutory remedy does not, by itself, operate as an
absolute bar to the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution. Although the High Court ordinarily refrains from
entertaining a Writ petition where an efficacious alternative remedy is
available, such restraint is not inflexible, particularly where the
proceedings are alleged to have been initiated without jurisdiction or
in breach of the principles of natural justice. The exceptions to the
rule of alternative remedy have been recognised by the Hon ’ ble
Supreme Court in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade
Marks , (1998) 8 SCC 1, and reiterated in M/S Radha Krishan
Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh , (2021) 6 SCC 771.
Relevant paragraphs are reproduced as below:
1
“ 26. Following the dictum of this Court in Whirlpool , in
2
Harbanslal Sahnia v Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd . , this court
noted that :
1
Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1
W.A. No.909 of 2026 Page 8 of 37
“ 7. So far as the view taken by the High Court that the
remedy by way of recourse to arbitration clause was available
to the appellants and therefore the Writ petition filed by the
appellants was liable to be dismissed is concerned, suffice it
to observe that the rule of exclusion of Writ jurisdiction by
availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and
not one of compulsion. In an appropriate case, in spite of
availability of the alternative remedy, the High Court may
still exercise its Writ jurisdiction in at least three
contingencies: (i) where the Writ petition seeks enforcement
of any of the fundamental rights; (ii) where there is failure of
principles of natural justice; or (iii) where the orders or
proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an
Act is challenged. (See Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of
Trade Marks) The present case attracts applicability of the
first two contingencies. Moreover, as noted, the appellants ’
dealership, which is their bread and butter, came to be
terminated for an irrelevant and non-existent cause. In such
circumstances, we feel that the appellants should have been
allowed relief by the High Court itself instead of driving them
to the need of initiating arbitration proceedings . ”
(emphasis supplied)
27. The principles of law which emerge are that:
(i) The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue
Writs can be exercised not only for the enforcement of
fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well;
(ii) The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a Writ
petition. One of the restrictions placed on the power of the
High Court is where an effective alternate remedy is available
to the aggrieved person;
(iii) Exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy arise where (a)
the Writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of a
fundamental right protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b)
there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice;
(c) the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction;
or (d) the vires of a legislation is challenged;
(iv) An alternate remedy by itself does not divest the High
Court of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in
an appropriate case though ordinarily, a Writ petition should
not be entertained when an efficacious alternate remedy is
provided by law;
2
Harbanslal Sahnia v Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 107
W.A. No.909 of 2026 Page 9 of 37
(v) When a right is created by a statute, which itself
prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right or
liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory remedy
before invoking the discretionary remedy under Article 226 of
the Constitution. This rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies
is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion; and
(vi) In cases where there are disputed questions of fact, the
High Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a Writ
petition. However, if the High Court is objectively of the view
that the nature of the controversy requires the exercise of its
Writ jurisdiction, such a view would not readily be interfered
with.
”
8. In the present case, the Writ Petitioners did not seek an
adjudication on the merits of the allegations under investigation or
invite the Writ Court to examine the sufficiency of the material
collected by the DG. Their principal challenge was to the very
jurisdictional foundation of the investigation, namely, the alleged
absence of a valid direction under Section 26(1) of the Act. The
appellate remedy under Section 53B of the Act is available against
orders falling within the statutory framework specified therein; it does
not provide an appeal against the initiation of an investigation under
Section 26(1) of the Act or the investigative steps undertaken by the
DG. The opportunity to file objections or suggestions before the
Commission at a subsequent stage cannot, by itself, be regarded as an
efficacious remedy for questioning the jurisdictional basis on which
the investigation was commenced. In these circumstances, the mere
availability of remedies at the later adjudicatory stage would not
preclude the Writ Petitioners from invoking the jurisdiction of this
Court.
9. It is true that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Competition
Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. (supra), has
W.A. No.909 of 2026 Page 10 of 37
emphasised the preliminary and administrative character of a direction
under Section 26(1) of the Act and cautioned against judicial
interference at the stage of investigation. The principle underlying the
decision is that an investigation ought not to be interdicted merely
because an affected enterprise disputes the allegations or the material
collected against it. However, that principle does not foreclose judicial
scrutiny where the challenge is directed to the existence of the
statutory foundation itself. There is a material distinction between
questioning the manner or outcome of an investigation and
questioning the authority under which it was initiated. The Writ
petition, as framed, raised the latter question. Whether that
jurisdictional objection is ultimately sustainable is a matter to be
considered independently while examining the relevant statutory
provision and the decision of the Commission.
10. The objection founded on delay and laches also does not
persuade us to reject the Writ petition at the threshold. The Appellants
have emphasised that the Writ Petitioners were aware of the
investigation at least from December 2022, when search and seizure
operations were conducted at their premises, and thereafter when
summons were issued to their employees. Mr. Singhvi, on the other
hand, presses that they were not made aware of their status as an
Opposite Party and that the material disclosing the alleged
jurisdictional infirmity came to their knowledge only upon inspection
of the Commission ’ s records in August 2025. The distinction is
relevant. Knowledge of the existence of an investigation cannot,
without more, be equated with knowledge of the statutory basis on
which an enterprise is sought to be proceeded against. The record
W.A. No.909 of 2026 Page 11 of 37
indicates that the request for inspection was made on 18.07.2025,
inspection was permitted on 08.08.2025, and certified copies were
furnished on 20.08.2025. The Writ petition was instituted on
01.09.2025. In the circumstances, the interval between the asserted
discovery of the relevant material and the institution of the Writ
petition cannot be characterised as unexplained or unreasonable delay.
11. A plea of want of jurisdiction does not, by itself, exclude the
application of delay and laches, as the exercise of Writ jurisdiction
remains discretionary. However, in the present case, the Writ
Petitioners approached this Court promptly after obtaining access to
the relevant records. Their prior participation in the investigation,
without demonstrated knowledge of the precise jurisdictional
infirmity now alleged, cannot by itself amount to acquiescence.
12. The Writ petition cannot be rejected as premature merely
because the investigation had not culminated in a final adjudicatory
order. While Courts ordinarily refrain from interfering with ongoing
investigations, a challenge to the very authority to initiate such
investigation stands on a different footing. The Writ Petitioners could
not be compelled to await its conclusion before questioning the
existence of the statutory precondition. We, therefore, find no
infirmity in the learned Single Judge entertaining the Writ petition
under Article 226 of the Constitution. This finding is confined to
maintainability and does not touch upon the validity of the direction
under Section 26(1) of the Act.
II. Whether the learned Single Judge was justified in holding
that a substantial part of the cause of action arose within the
W.A. No.909 of 2026 Page 12 of 37
territorial jurisdiction of the Orissa High Court under Article 226(2)
of the Constitution?
13. The next objection concerns the territorial jurisdiction of this
Court. Article 226(2) of the Constitution enables a High Court to
exercise jurisdiction where the cause of action, wholly or in part,
arises within its territorial limits, notwithstanding that the seat of the
Government or authority concerned is situated outside such limits.
The expression “ cause of action ” refers to the bundle of material facts
which the Petitioner is required to establish to obtain relief. It is not
necessary that the entirety of the cause of action should arise within
the territorial jurisdiction of the Court; however, the facts relied upon
must have a real and integral connection with the lis. The mere
existence of an incidental or remote consequence within the territorial
limits would not suffice. This principle has been explained by the
Court in Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal
Hon’ble Supreme
Kumar Basu , (1994) 4 SCC 711.
14. The Appellants contend that the registered office of Rungta
Mines Limited is situated at Kolkata, the search and seizure
operations were conducted there, and the summons to its employees
were also issued in Kolkata. According to them, the material events
giving rise to the challenge occurred outside the territorial jurisdiction
of this Court. The Respondents, however, point out that three out of
the four manufacturing units of Rungta Mines Limited are situated in
Odisha and that a substantial part of its manufacturing and sales
operations, together with its network of suppliers and customers, is
located within the State.
W.A. No.909 of 2026 Page 13 of 37
15. In our view, the territorial nexus cannot be determined merely
by reference to the location of the registered office of Rungta Mines
Limited or the place where particular investigative steps were
undertaken. The nature of the challenge and the subject matter of the
investigation must also be taken into consideration. In the present
case, the investigation concerns alleged anti-competitive conduct in
the steel market, and Rungta Mines Limited itself is sought to be
proceeded against in relation thereto. The Respondents have
specifically pointed out that three of its four manufacturing units are
situated in Odisha and that substantial manufacturing and sales
operations are carried on within the State. These facts assume
relevance because the challenge is directed against the very inclusion
of Rungta Mines Limited in the investigation, and not merely against
an isolated investigative step undertaken outside the State. The
connection of the enterprise's manufacturing and commercial
operations within Odisha with the subject matter of the investigation,
therefore, cannot be regarded as incidental or remote. We are,
accordingly, satisfied that a part of the cause of action arose within the
territorial jurisdiction of this Court. The learned Single Judge was
justified in entertaining the writ petition on that basis.
16. Furthermore, the mere fact that other High Courts have
considered similar challenges arising from the same investigation
does not, by itself, establish forum shopping. The proceedings before
the Madras and Calcutta High Courts were instituted by different
parties, and the present Respondents were not parties thereto. While
the earlier decisions are relevant circumstances, they do not, in the
W.A. No.909 of 2026 Page 14 of 37
absence of identity of parties, operate as a bar to the present
Respondents invoking the jurisdiction of this Court.
III. Whether the order dated 29.07.2021 passed by the Madras
High Court in Crl.O.P. No.6153 of 2021 could be construed as
dispensing with, or substituting, the statutory requirement of
forming a prima facie opinion under Section 26(1) of the Act?
17. Ms. Divan, learned senior counsel, contends that the order
dated 29.07.2021 passed by the Madras High Court attained finality
and was binding upon the CCI and the DG. It is submitted that the
Madras High Court, upon being informed that the complaint had
already been forwarded to the DG, directed the latter to proceed
further and take necessary and appropriate action. She argues that the
direction was not merely to consider the complaint, but to act upon it.
It is further contended that, pursuant to the said direction, the CCI
convened a meeting, deliberated upon the matter and registered a suo
motu case, following which the DG undertook an investigation. The
Appellants maintain that the investigation was not confined to the
entities named in the original complaint and that Rungta Mines came
under scrutiny in the course of the wider investigation.
18. The operative direction of the Madras High Court was to the
DG to proceed further and take necessary and appropriate action on
the complaint in accordance with law. The order neither examined the
merits of the allegations nor directed the DG to commence an
investigation irrespective of the statutory requirements. It also did not
consider or adjudicate upon the procedure contemplated under Section
26(1) of the Act.
W.A. No.909 of 2026 Page 15 of 37
The fact that the order was not challenged and attained finality
cannot be disputed. However, the finality of the order attaches to the
direction actually issued and cannot be extended to a meaning or
consequence which its terms do not support. The direction to take
appropriate action in accordance with law required the authorities to
act within the statutory framework governing their respective powers.
It could not be construed as authorising the DG to exercise a power
which the Act vests in the CCI, or as dispensing with a statutory
precondition for setting the investigative process in motion.
19. The statute makes a clear distinction between the functions of
the CCI and the DG. The power to form a prima facie opinion and
direct an investigation under Section 26(1) of the Act vests in the CCI,
whereas the DG undertakes investigation pursuant to such direction.
A judicial direction to take action in accordance with law cannot be
read as transferring the statutory power of the CCI to the DG or
permitting the latter to proceed independently of the prescribed
statutory framework.
20.
Moreover, the fact that the CCI thereafter registered a suo motu
case and the DG undertook an investigation pursuant to the
proceedings initiated thereunder does not, by itself, establish that the
requirement under Section 26(1) of the Act stood dispensed with by
reason of the Madras High Court ’ s order. Whether the investigation
could extend beyond the entities named in the original complaint, and
whether the proceedings could validly encompass Rungta Mines in
the course of such investigation, are questions concerning the scope of
the CCI s investigative powers, which we shall consider separately.
’
Meanwhile, it is sufficient to hold that the order dated 29.07.2021,
W.A. No.909 of 2026 Page 16 of 37
notwithstanding its finality, could neither substitute the CCI s
’
statutory satisfaction nor dispense with the requirement under Section
26(1) of the Act.
IV. Whether the decision of the CCI dated 23.08.2021, registering
Suo Motu Case No.02 of 2021 and directing the DG to investigate,
constituted sufficient compliance with Section 26(1) of the Act?
21. The question requires an examination of the legal framework
governing the initiation of an inquiry by the Competition Commission
of India, the nature of the satisfaction required to be arrived at before
directing an investigation, and the extent to which such satisfaction
must be reflected in the decision of the Commission. It would,
therefore, be appropriate to reproduce the relevant statutory
provisions.
“ Inquiry into certain agreements and dominant position
of enterprise
19. (1) The Commission may inquire into any alleged
contravention of the provisions contained in subsection (1)
of section 3 or sub-section (1) of section 4 either on its own
motion or on
—
(a) [receipt of any information, in such manner and]
accompanied by such fee as may be determined by
regulations, from any person, consumer or their association
or trade association; or
(b) a reference made to it by the Central Government or a
State Government or a statutory authority.
(2) Without prejudice to the provisions contained in sub-
section (1), the powers and functions of the Commission
shall include the powers and functions specified in sub-
sections (3) to (7).
…
Inquiry into combination by Commision
20. (1) The Commission may, upon its own knowledge or
information relating to acquisition referred to in clause (a) of
W.A. No.909 of 2026 Page 17 of 37
section 5 or acquiring of control referred to in clause (b) of
section 5 or merger or amalgamation referred to in clause (c)
of that section, inquire into whether such a combination has
caused or is likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on
competition in India:
Provided that the Commission shall not initiate any inquiry
under this subsection after the expiry of one year from the
date on which such combination has taken effect.
(2) The Commission shall, on receipt of a notice under sub-
section (2) of section 6, inquire whether a combination
referred to in that notice or reference has caused or is likely
to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition in
India.
(3) Not with standing anything contained in section 5, the
Central Government shall, on the expiry of a period of two
years from the date of commencement of this Act and
thereafter every two years, in consultation with the
Commission, by notification, enhance or reduce, on the
basis of the wholesale price index or fluctuations in
exchange rate of rupee or foreign currencies, the value of
assets or the value of turnover, for the purposes of that
section.
(4) For the purposes of determining whether a combination
would have the effect of or is likely to have an appreciable
adverse effect on competition in the relevant market, the
Commission shall have due regard to all or any of the
following factors, namely:
—
(a) actual and potential level of competition through imports
in the market
(b) extent of barriers to entry into the market;
(c) level of combination in the market;
(d) degree of countervailing power in the market;
(e) likelihood that the combination would result in the
parties to the combination being able to significantly and
sustainably increase prices or profit margins;
(f) extent of effective competition likely to sustain in a
market;
(g) extent to which substitutes are available or arc likely to
be available in the market;
(h) market share, in the relevant market, of the persons or
enterprise in a combination, individually and as a
combination;
W.A. No.909 of 2026 Page 18 of 37
(i) likelihood that the combination would result in the
removal of a vigorous and effective competitor or
competitors in the market;
(j) nature and extent of vertical integration in the market;
(k) possibility of a failing business;
(I) nature and extent of innovation;
(m) relative advantage, by way of the contribution to the
economic development, by any combination having or likely
to have appreciable adverse effect on competition;
(n) whether the benefits of the combination outweigh the
adverse impact of the combination, if any.
Procedure for inquiry under section 19
26. (1) On receipt of a reference from the Central
Government or a State Government or a statutory authority
or on its own knowledge or information received under
section 19, if the Commission is of the opinion that there
exists a prima facie case, it shall direct the Director General
to cause an investigation to be made into the matter:
Provided that if the subject matter of an information
received is, in the opinion of the Commission, substantially
the same as or has been covered by any previous
information received, then the new information may be
clubbed with the previous information.
(2) Where on receipt of a reference from the Central
Government or a State Government or a statutory authority
or information received under section 19, the Commission is
of the opinion that there exists no prima facie case, it shall
close the matter forthwith and pass such orders as it deems
fit and send a copy of its order to the Central Government or
the State Government or the statutory authority or the parties
concerned, as the case may be.
(3) The Director General shall, on receipt of direction under
sub-section (1), submit a report on his findings within such
period as may be specified by the Commission.
(4) The Commission may forward a copy of the report
referred to in sub section(3) to the parties concerned:
Provided that in case the investigation is caused to be made
based on reference received from the Central Government or
the State Government or the statutory authority, the
Commission shall forward a copy of the report referred to in
sub- section (3) to the Central Government or the State
Government or the statutory authority, as the case may be.
W.A. No.909 of 2026 Page 19 of 37
(5) If the report of the Director General referred to in sub-
section (3) recommends that there is no contravention of the
provisions of this Act, the Commission shall invite
objections or suggestions from the Central Government or
the State Government or the statutory authority or the parties
concerned, as the case may be, on such report of the
Director General.
(6) If, after consideration of the objections and suggestions
referred to in sub section (5), if any, the Commission agrees
with the recommendation of the Director General, it shall
close the matter forthwith and pass such orders as it deems
fit and communicate its order to the Central Government or
the State Government or the statutory authority or the parties
concerned, as the case may be.
(7) If, after consideration of the objections or suggestions
referred to in sub section (5), if any, the Commission is of
the opinion that further investigations is called for, it may
direct further investigation in the matter by the Director
General or cause further inquiry to be made by in the matter
or itself proceed with further inquiry in the matter in
accordance with the provisions of this Act.
(8) If the report of the Director General referred to in sub-
section (3) recommends that there is contravention of any of
the provisions of this Act, and the Commission is of the
opinion that further inquiry is called for, it shall inquire into
such contravention in accordance with the provisions of this
Act.
22. A conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions indicates that the
Act entrusts the Commission with the responsibility of examining
alleged contraventions of its provisions and taking appropriate steps to
protect competition in the market. Section 19 of the Act provides the
statutory basis for an inquiry into alleged contraventions, including
one initiated by the Commission on its own motion. Section 20 of the
Act, on the other hand, deals with inquiries into combinations and
operates in its own distinct field. Section 26 of the Act prescribes the
procedure to be followed by the Commission upon receipt of a
reference, on its own knowledge, or upon receipt of information under
W.A. No.909 of 2026 Page 20 of 37
Section 19 of the Act. The statutory scheme thus vests the power to
initiate an investigation under Section 26(1) of the Act in the
Commission, upon its formation of an opinion that a prima facie case
exists.
23. The expression prima facie assumes significance in this
“ ”
context. The formation of such an opinion is not intended to be a final
determination of the allegations, nor does it require the Commission
to undertake an elaborate adjudication at the threshold. It is a
preliminary satisfaction as to whether the information or material
before it warrants an investigation by the Director General.
Nevertheless, the requirement is statutory and cannot be reduced to a
mere procedural formality. The Commission must apply its mind to
the material placed before it and arrive at its own satisfaction that a
prima facie case exists. The power to direct an investigation is thus
not an automatic consequence of the receipt of a complaint or
information.
24. The nature of the function performed by the Commission at this
stage, and the degree of application of mind required of it, fell for
consideration before the Hon ’ ble Supreme Court in Competition
Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. , (supra). The
Hon ’ ble Supreme Court, while recognising that a direction under
Section 26(1) of the Act is administrative and preparatory in nature
and does not involve adjudication of the rights of the parties,
nevertheless explained that the Commission is expected to record at
least some reasons while forming its prima facie view. The relevant
observations of the Hon ble Supreme Court are reproduced
’
hereinbelow:
W.A. No.909 of 2026 Page 21 of 37
“ 31. The power under Section 33 of the Act to pass temporary
restraint order can only be exercised by the Commission
when it has formed prima facie opinion and directed
investigation in terms of Section 26(1) of the Act, as is
evident from the language of this provision read with
Regulation 18(2) of the Regulations.
5) In consonance with the settled principles of administrative
jurisprudence, the Commission is expected to record at least
some reason even while forming a prima facie view.
However, while passing directions and orders dealing with
the rights of the parties in its adjudicatory and determinative
capacity, it is required of the Commission to pass speaking
orders, upon due application of mind, responding to all the
contentions raised before it by the rival parties.
×××
38. In contradistinction, the direction under Section 26(1)
after formation of a prima facie opinion is a direction
simpliciter to cause an investigation into the matter. Issuance
of such a direction, at the face of it, is an administrative
direction to one of its own wings departmentally and is
without entering upon any adjudicatory process. It does not
effectively determine any right or obligation of the parties to
the lis. Closure of the case causes determination of rights and
affects a party i.e. the informant; resultantly, the said party
has a right to appeal against such closure of case under
Section 26(2) of the Act. On the other hand, mere direction
for investigation to one of the wings of the Commission is
akin to a departmental proceeding which does not entail civil
consequences for any person, particularly, in light of the strict
confidentiality that is expected to be maintained by the
Commission in terms of Section 57 of the Act and Regulation
35 of the Regulations.
39. Wherever, in the course of the proceedings before the
Commission, the Commission passes a direction or interim
order which is at the preliminary stage and of preparatory
nature without recording findings which will bind the parties
and where such order will only pave the way for final
decision, it would not make that direction as an order or
decision which affects the rights of the parties and therefore,
is not appealable.
×××
91. The jurisdiction of the Commission, to act under this
provision, does not contemplate any adjudicatory function.
The Commission is not expected to give notice to the parties
W.A. No.909 of 2026 Page 22 of 37
i.e. the informant or the affected parties and hear them at
length, before forming its opinion. The function is of a very
preliminary nature and in fact, in common parlance, it is a
departmental function. At that stage, it does not condemn any
person and therefore, application of audi alteram partem is not
called for. Formation of a prima facie opinion departmentally
(the Director General, being appointed by the Central
Government to assist the Commission, is one of the wings of
the Commission itself) does not amount to an adjudicatory
function but is merely of administrative nature. At best, it can
direct the investigation to be conducted and report to be
submitted to the Commission itself or close the case in terms
of Section 26(2) of the Act, which order itself is appealable
before the Tribunal and only after this stage, there is a
specific right of notice and hearing available to the
aggrieved/affected party. Thus, keeping in mind the nature of
the functions required to be performed by the Commission in
terms of Section 26(1), we are of the considered view that the
right of notice or hearing is not contemplated under the
provisions of Section 26(1) of the Act.
×××
93. We may also usefully note that the functions performed
by the Commission under Section 26(1) of the Act are in the
nature of preparatory measures in contrast to the decision-
making process. That is the precise reason that the legislature
has used the word “ direction ” to be issued to the Director
General for investigation in that provision and not that the
Commission shall take a decision or pass an order directing
inquiry into the allegations made in the reference to the
Commission. ”
25. The Hon ’ ble Supreme Court has clarified that, having regard to
the preliminary and administrative nature of the function under
Section 26(1) of the Act, the Commission is not required to afford a
prior opportunity of hearing to the parties likely to be affected by the
investigation. The aforesaid exposition of law makes two aspects
clear. First, a direction under Section 26(1) of the Act is not an
adjudicatory order and is not required to contain an elaborate
discussion of the allegations or a final finding on the existence of a
contravention. Secondly, the administrative nature of the direction
W.A. No.909 of 2026 Page 23 of 37
does not dispense with the requirement that the Commission must
form a prima facie opinion before setting the investigative machinery
in motion. The expectation, that the Commission record at least some
reasons, is not to be equated with the requirement of a detailed
speaking order; it is intended to ensure that the decision reflects an
application of mind and that the basis for forming the prima facie
view is discernible.
26. The scope of the investigation which follows such a direction
was subsequently considered by the Hon ’ ble Supreme Court in Excel
Crop Care Ltd. , (supra). While dealing with the contention that the
Director General ’ s investigation ought to remain confined to the
specific allegations contained in the complaint, the Hon ’ ble Supreme
Court held that such a restricted interpretation would defeat the very
object of the Act. The relevant paragraph is reproduced hereinbelow:
If the contention of the appellants is accepted, it would
“
render the entire purpose of investigation nugatory. The entire
purpose of such an investigation is to cover all necessary facts
and evidence in order to see as to whether there are any anti-
competitive practices adopted by the persons complained
against. For this purpose, no doubt, the starting point of
inquiry would be the allegations contained in the complaint.
However, while carrying out this investigation, if other facts
also get revealed and are brought to light, revealing that the
‘ persons ’ or ‘ enterprises ’ had entered into an agreement that
is prohibited by Section 3 which had appreciable adverse
effect on the competition, the DG would be well within his
powers to include those as well in his report. Even when the
CCI forms prima facie opinion on receipt of a complaint
which is recorded in the order passed under Section 26(1) of
the Act and directs the DG to conduct the investigation, at the
said initial stage, it cannot foresee and predict whether any
violation of the Act would be found upon investigation and
what would be the nature of the violation revealed through
investigation. If the investigation process is to be restricted in
the manner projected by the appellants, it would defeat the
very purpose of the Act which is to prevent practices having
W.A. No.909 of 2026 Page 24 of 37
appreciable adverse effect on the competition. We, therefore,
reject this argument of the appellants as well touching upon
the jurisdiction of the DG. ”
27. The aforesaid decision recognises the latitude available to the
Director General in examining facts and material which emerge
during an investigation, even if they were not specifically set out in
the original complaint. However, the principle enunciated therein
operates on the premise that the Commission has first formed the
requisite prima facie opinion and issued a direction under Section
26(1) of the Act. The breadth of the investigation which may
thereafter be undertaken cannot be conflated with, or relied upon to
dilute, the statutory condition governing its initiation. The question
whether the investigation could extend to enterprises not named in the
original complaint will, therefore, have to be considered in the light of
this distinction while examining the next issue.
28. It is against the aforesaid statutory and legal backdrop that the
decision of the CCI dated 23.08.2021 requires examination. The
Appellants contend that the Commission convened a meeting on
17.08.2021, considered the matter after detailed deliberations and
thereafter directed registration of Suo Motu Case No.02 of 2021 and
investigation by the DG. According to Ms. Divan, the decision itself
embodies the requisite prima facie satisfaction and the Act does not
prescribe any particular form or nomenclature for an order under
Section 26(1) of the Act. It is further contended that the learned Single
Judge erred in treating the absence of a separate or formally worded
order under Section 26(1) of the Act as fatal to the investigation.
29. Mr. Singhvi, on the other hand, contends that the minutes dated
23.08.2021 do not disclose any independent consideration of the
W.A. No.909 of 2026 Page 25 of 37
complaint or formation of a prima facie opinion by the Commission.
He points out that, although the minutes record the decision to register
a suo motu case, the direction to the DG is expressly to investigate the
matter in terms of directions contained in the Order dated
“
29.07.2021 ” passed by the Madras High Court. According to him, the
Commission merely proceeded on the basis of the judicial direction,
without undertaking the independent statutory exercise required under
Section 26(1) of the Act.
30. In our considered view, the question is not whether the minutes
dated 23.08.2021 were separately styled as an order under Section
26(1) of the Act, nor whether the Commission was required to pass a
detailed speaking order at the stage of directing investigation. The Act
does not prescribe any rigid form in which the direction must be
expressed. The substance of the decision, rather than its nomenclature,
must govern its validity. Equally, however, the mere fact that the
Commission convened a meeting, recorded that detailed deliberations
had taken place and directed the registration of a suo motu case
cannot, by itself, conclude the inquiry into statutory compliance. What
is required to be ascertained is whether the decision, read as a whole
and in the context of the material placed before the Commission,
demonstrates that the Commission independently considered the
matter and formed the requisite prima facie opinion before directing
the DG to investigate.
31. The distinction is material. The requirement of recording at
least some reasons, as explained by the Hon ’ ble Supreme Court in
Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India Ltd.
(supra), is not a demand for an elaborate adjudication at the threshold.
W.A. No.909 of 2026 Page 26 of 37
It is, however, a safeguard against the exercise of statutory power in
the absence of the satisfaction which the legislature has made its
condition precedent. A recital that deliberations took place may
indicate that a meeting was held and the matter was discussed; but the
decision must nevertheless disclose, at least in substance, that the
Commission applied its mind to the material before it and arrived at
its own prima facie view. Otherwise, the statutory requirement would
stand reduced to the mere recording of a direction to investigate.
32. In the present case, the minutes dated 23.08.2021 record that
the Commission, after detailed deliberations, decided to register the
matter as a suo motu case and directed the DG to investigate it “ in
terms of directions contained in ” the order dated 29.07.2021 passed
by the Madras High Court. The minutes do not, however, record any
prima facie opinion on the allegations of cartelisation, nor do they
disclose even in brief the basis on which the Commission considered
the material sufficient to warrant an investigation under the Act. The
operative direction, instead of indicating an independent assessment
by the Commission, expressly links the investigation to the directions
contained in the Madras High Court ’ s order. The significance of that
reference must be appreciated in the context of the order itself, which,
as already noticed, required the authorities to take appropriate action
in accordance with law and did not dispense with the statutory
exercise contemplated under Section 26(1) of the Act.
33. We are conscious of the submission that the minutes were
preceded by deliberations and that the Commission was not required
to record elaborate reasons. We are also conscious that a direction
under Section 26(1) of the Act is administrative in character and that
W.A. No.909 of 2026 Page 27 of 37
no prior notice or hearing was required to be afforded to the proposed
Opposite Parties. Those principles, however, do not answer the
distinct question whether the Commission itself formed the prima
facie opinion required by the statute. The absence of a requirement to
hear an affected party cannot be equated with the absence of a
requirement to apply the Commission ’ s own mind. Likewise, the
administrative character of the direction does not render the statutory
precondition dispensable.
34. The Appellants have also placed reliance on the decisions
rendered by the Madras High Court in Agni Steels Private Limited v.
Union of India (supra), and by the Division Bench of the Calcutta
High Court in Shyam Steel Industries Ltd. v. Union of India (supra),
in support of their submission that the minutes dated 23.08.2021
sufficiently reflected the formation of a prima facie opinion. We have
carefully considered the said decisions, particularly the judgment of
the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court dated 06.10.2026,
which concerns the very same investigation and the same decision of
the CCI. While the view taken therein is entitled to due consideration,
we are required to independently examine whether the statutory
requirement under Section 26(1) stands satisfied on the basis of the
decision actually recorded by the Commission. In this regard, the
governing principle laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India Ltd.
(supra) is that, although the direction under Section 26(1) of the Act is
administrative in nature and does not require an elaborate speaking
order, the Commission is nevertheless expected to record at least
some reasons while forming its prima facie opinion. Applying that test
W.A. No.909 of 2026 Page 28 of 37
to the minutes dated 23.08.2021, we find that the mere recital of
the substance or
“detailed deliberations”, without any indication of
outcome of the Commission s consideration, does not sufficiently
’
disclose the formation of an independent prima facie opinion. The
reference in the operative decision to the directions contained in the
order of the Madras High Court assumes significance in this context,
particularly since that order itself required action only in accordance
with law. We are, therefore, unable to accept that the minutes satisfy
the statutory requirement merely because the Commission had
convened a meeting and recorded that deliberations had taken place.
35. Hence, the minutes dated 23.08.2021, on their face, do not
disclose the requisite independent application of mind or the
formation of a prima facie opinion by the CCI before directing the DG
to investigate. The defect is not one of form or nomenclature, but of
the absence of a discernible satisfaction which constitutes the
statutory foundation for an investigation under Section 26(1) of the
Act. The learned Single Judge was, therefore, justified in holding that
the investigation could not be sustained on the basis of the said
minutes.
36. The next issue concerns the extent of the investigative powers
available to the Director General once an inquiry has been validly set
in motion under Section 26(1) of the Act, particularly whether such
investigation may extend to enterprises not named in the original
complaint.
V. Whether, pursuant to an inquiry validly initiated under
Section 26(1) of the Act, the DG could extend the investigation to
W.A. No.909 of 2026 Page 29 of 37
enterprises not named in the original complaint, and whether the
direction registering Suo Motu Case No.02 of 2021 operated in rem,
rather than being confined to the nine steel manufacturers named
therein?
37. Ms. Divan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
Appellants, submitted that the investigation under the Act is directed
towards the alleged anti-competitive conduct and is not confined to
the enterprises specifically named in the original complaint. She
contended that the DG is competent to investigate the role of other
enterprises whose participation in the alleged cartel emerges during
the course of investigation. It was further submitted that proceedings
under the Act are in rem in nature and that the direction under Section
26(1) of the Act is to investigate the matter as a whole, rather than the
affairs of any particular enterprise.
38. Mr. Singhvi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
Respondents, submitted that while the DG may, in an appropriate
case, investigate enterprises not named in the original complaint, such
power necessarily presupposes a validly initiated inquiry under
Section 26(1) of the Act. It was contended that the original complaint
dated 06.03.2021 concerned alleged cartelisation by nine steel
manufacturers in the State of Tamil Nadu, whereas Rungta Mines
Limited was neither named therein nor shown to have participated in
the alleged conduct. According to learned Senior Counsel, the
description of proceedings as in rem cannot confer an unrestricted
authority upon the DG to investigate every steel manufacturer across
the country, irrespective of the subject matter of the original
complaint.
W.A. No.909 of 2026 Page 30 of 37
39. The legal position regarding the scope of investigation is
substantially covered by various decisions of the Hon ble Supreme
’
Court and it has been made clear that although the complaint furnishes
the starting point of the inquiry, the DG is not precluded from
including other facts and the involvement of additional enterprises
which emerge during investigation and disclose a possible
contravention of the Act. Thus, the mere fact that an enterprise was
not named in the original complaint does not, by itself, place such
enterprise beyond the reach of investigation.
40. The aforesaid principle is consistent with the nature of
competition proceedings explained by the Hon ’ ble Supreme Court in
Samir Agrawal vs Competition Commission of India , (2021) 3 SCC
136, as follows:
“ 20. Clearly, therefore, given the context of the Act in which
the CCI and the NCLAT deal with practices which have an
adverse effect on competition in derogation of the interest of
consumers, it is clear that the Act vests powers in the CCI and
enables it to act in rem, in public interest. This would make it
clear that a “ person aggrieved ” must, in the context of the
Act, be understood widely and not be constructed narrowly,
as was done in Adi Pherozshah Gandhi (supra)…
×××
22. Obviously, when the CCI performs inquisitorial, as
opposed to adjudicatory functions, the doors of approaching
the CCI and the appellate authority, i.e., the NCLAT, must be
kept wide open in public interest, so as to subserve the high
public purpose of the Act.
”
41. The Apex Court recognised that the CCI performs an
inquisitorial function and exercises its powers in rem , having regard to
the public interest in maintaining competition in the market. The
object of such proceedings is to examine anti-competitive conduct and
W.A. No.909 of 2026 Page 31 of 37
its effect upon the market, rather than merely to determine the rights
of the informant and the enterprises initially named in the complaint.
42. The expression in rem , however, does not imply that an inquiry
concerning a particular industry automatically extends to every
enterprise operating in that industry. It signifies that the investigation
is directed towards the alleged anti-competitive conduct and may
extend to other participants whose involvement in that conduct
emerges during the course of investigation. The additional entities
must, therefore, have a demonstrable nexus with the subject matter of
the inquiry. The power to expand the investigation is not an authority
to embark upon an altogether independent or unrelated inquiry.
43. In the instant case, the Appellants contend that the decision of
the CCI dated 23.08.2021 to register Suo Motu Case No.02 of 2021
constituted a common direction to investigate the alleged cartelisation
by steel manufacturers and was not confined to the nine enterprises
named in the CCCWA complaint. In support of this contention, they
rely upon the judgment of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High
Shyam Steel Industries Ltd. v. Union of India
Court in , MAT No.967
of 2023 and MAT No.1157 of 2023, decided on 06.10.2026, which
recognised the in rem character of the proceedings.
44. We are unable to accept, however, that the registration of a suo
motu case, merely because it concerns alleged cartelisation in the steel
industry, necessarily constitutes a blanket direction against every steel
manufacturer across India. The scope of the investigation must be
understood with reference to the subject matter of the complaint and
the direction issued by the Commission. The principle so laid down
permits the DG to follow the trail of evidence and examine additional
W.A. No.909 of 2026 Page 32 of 37
enterprises whose participation in the alleged anti-competitive conduct
comes to light. It does not dispense with the requirement that such
investigation must remain within the framework of a validly initiated
inquiry.
45. Accordingly, we hold that the DG is not necessarily confined to
the nine enterprises named in the original complaint and may
investigate other enterprises whose involvement in the alleged cartel
emerges during a valid investigation. A separate direction under
Section 26(1) of the Act against each such enterprise is not, merely on
that account, necessary. Nevertheless, the in rem character of the
proceedings cannot be treated as an independent source of jurisdiction
or as a substitute for a valid statutory direction.
46. In the present case, since we have already held that the minutes
dated 23.08.2021 do not disclose the requisite independent formation
of a prima facie opinion by the CCI, the Appellants cannot rely upon
the wider scope of the DG s investigative powers to sustain the
’
investigation against the Respondents. The distinction is between the
permissible expansion of an investigation validly commenced and the
absence of the statutory foundation for commencing it in the first
place.
VI. Whether the investigation against Rungta Mines was vitiated
by procedural irregularities or breach of natural justice, and
whether the learned Single Judge was justified in quashing the
investigation and consequential proceedings insofar as Rungta
Mines and its Director were concerned?
W.A. No.909 of 2026 Page 33 of 37
47. We have already noticed that the name of Rungta Mines did not
find place in the original complaint, the order of the Madras High
Court or the minutes of the CCI dated 23.08.2021. The Appellants are
right in contending that an enterprise cannot claim immunity from
investigation merely because it was not named in the original
complaint. Equally, the law laid down in Competition Commission of
India v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. (supra), makes it clear that no
prior notice or hearing is required to be afforded to an enterprise
before the Commission forms its prima facie opinion under Section
26(1) of the Act. However, the Respondents ’ grievance is not merely
that they were not heard before initiation of the investigation. It is also
that Rungta Mines was treated as an Opposite Party without any
identifiable order of the Commission or adherence to the procedure
contemplated under Regulation 24 of the CCI (General) Regulations,
2009.
48. In this regard, it is significant that, in the course of the very
same investigation, the Director General had sought and obtained the
Commission ’ s permission, by order dated 01.07.2025, to investigate
certain associations which were not named in the original complaint.
No corresponding order or procedure has been shown to have been
followed in respect of Rungta Mines. The Appellants have not
satisfactorily explained this difference in treatment. While the power
to investigate additional enterprises cannot be disputed, the exercise of
that power must remain within the statutory framework and cannot be
equated with an unrestricted authority to bring an enterprise on record
as an Opposite Party without following the prescribed procedure.
W.A. No.909 of 2026 Page 34 of 37
49. The decision in MRF Ltd. v. Competition Commission of India
(supra), also lends support to the distinction between the absence of a
right to hearing at the preliminary stage of investigation and the
procedural fairness required when an entity is sought to be arrayed as
an Opposite Party. In this regard, Mr. Singhvi submitted that formally
identifying an enterprise as an Opposite Party in proceedings alleging
cartelisation or anti-competitive conduct is not without consequence.
It is capable of creating a prejudicial impression about the company ’ s
conduct of business and affecting its commercial reputation, even
before any final finding of contravention is returned. While the mere
initiation of a lawful investigation cannot, by itself, be treated as
causing legal prejudice, the submission underscores the need for the
authority to act transparently and in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law before formally placing an enterprise in that
position.
50. We are, therefore, of the view that the learned Single Judge was
justified in examining not only the absence of a valid jurisdictional
foundation under Section 26(1) of the Act, but also the manner in
which Rungta Mines was brought within the proceedings. The
procedural infirmity assumes added significance when considered
alongside our finding that the minutes dated 23.08.2021 do not
disclose the requisite independent formation of a prima facie opinion
by the CCI. The power of the Director General to extend an
investigation to enterprises not named in the original complaint, as
recognised in Excel Crop Care Ltd. (supra), presupposes an inquiry
validly initiated in accordance with law. It cannot cure the absence of
that foundational requirement.
W.A. No.909 of 2026 Page 35 of 37
51. For these reasons, we find no infirmity in the judgment of the
learned Single Judge quashing the investigation arising out of Suo
Motu Case No.02 of 2021, together with the consequential
proceedings and measures, insofar as Rungta Mines Limited and its
Whole-Time Director are concerned. The relief granted is confined to
the Writ Petitioners and does not constitute any determination on the
merits of the allegations against other enterprises or persons involved
in the proceedings.
Conclusion
52. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered
view that the order dated 29.07.2021 passed by the Madras High
Court did not dispense with the statutory requirement under Section
26(1) of the Act, and that the minutes of the CCI dated 23.08.2021 do
not sufficiently disclose an independent formation of the requisite
prima facie opinion. We also hold that, although the DG is not
necessarily confined to the enterprises named in the original complaint
and may extend an investigation to other enterprises whose
involvement emerges in the course thereof, such power presupposes
an inquiry validly initiated in accordance with law. The procedural
infirmities in the manner in which Rungta Mines Limited was brought
within the proceedings further reinforce this conclusion. We,
therefore, find no infirmity in the judgment of the learned Single
Judge quashing the investigation arising out of Suo Motu Case No.02
of 2021, together with all consequential proceedings and measures,
insofar as Rungta Mines Limited and its Whole-Time Director are
concerned. The relief granted, however, remains confined to the Writ
W.A. No.909 of 2026 Page 36 of 37
Petitioners and shall not be construed as a determination on the merits
of the allegations against the other enterprises or persons involved in
the proceedings.
53. Accordingly, we find no ground to interfere with the impugned
judgment.
54.
The Writ Appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. The judgment and
order dated 22.05.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C)
No.24391 of 2025 is affirmed. All pending interlocutory applications,
if any, stand disposed of.
I, Agree.
(Harish Tandon) (Chittaranjan Dash)
Chief Justice Judge
AK Pradhan/Sarbani/Priyanka
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: SARBANI DASH
Reason: Authentication
Location: HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, CUTTACK
Date: 11-Nov-2026 13:34:42
W.A. No.909 of 2026 Page 37 of 37