Wood Row School Society vs State Of Up And 2 Others
- Court
- Allahabad High Court
A.F.R.
Reserved on 09.07.2026
Delivered on 14.09.2026
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
WRIT - C No. - 11397 of 2024
Wood Row School Society
.....Petitioner(s)
Versus
State Of Up And 2 Others
.....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Petitioner(s) : Pavan Kishore, Rahul Agarwal
Counsel for Respondent(s) : C.S.C.
Court No. - 40
HON'BLE SARAL SRIVASTAVA, J.
HON'BLE SUDHANSHU CHAUHAN, J.
(Delivered by Hon'ble Sudhanshu Chauhan J.)
1. Heard Sri Rahul Agarwal, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Pavan Kishore
Advocate for petitioners and Sri Mohan Srivastava for respondents.
2. The present writ petition has been filed seeking for the following reliefs :-
(A) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the entire
proceedings under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation), Act drawn against the
Mohd. Kamar in Case No. 213/100/82 State of U.P. Versus Mohd. Kamar in respect
of land of Gata No.367 situated in village Jagatpur Lala Begum, District Bareilly as
having abated in accordance with the provisions of the The Urban Land (Ceiling and
Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999.
(B) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing and
commanding the respondents not to dispossess the petitioner from land Gata No.367
situated in village Jagatpur Lala Begum, District Bareilly.
(C) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing and
commanding the respondents to correct the revenue records by recording the name of
petitioner on land of Gata No.367 situated in village Jagatpur Lala Begum, District
Bareilly.
3. The present controversy arises out of proceedings under the U.P. Urban Ceiling and
Regulation Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act, 1976") and the land in
dispute measures 4021.26 sq m, comprised in Gata No. 367, situated in Village
Jagatpur Lala Begam, District Bareilly.
4. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that Woodrow School Society -petitioner
is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. The petitioner
society is running a school by the name Woodrow Senior Secondary School, affiliated
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to Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) since the year 1991, the school has
about 3,000 students. The petitioner society, through Km Pushpa Vani, Principal,
Prem Vani, President, and Gul Vani, Vice President, vide registered sale deed dated
10.11.1987, had purchased the share of Mohd Kamar in land bearing Gata No. 367,
total area measuring 4 bighas 13 biswa and 13 biswansis, and land comprising Gata
No. 344, total area measuring 1 bigha 9 biswa and 10 biswansis, situated in Village
Jagatpur Lala Begum, Bareilly. The said sale deed was registered in the office of Sub-
Registrar, Bareilly, on 20.08.1988. It is also submitted that the sale deed dated
10.11.1987 was executed after giving notices under Section 26 of the U.P. Urban Land
(Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as, "the Act 1976"), dated
26.8.1987 and 31.08.1987 respectively. Further, at the time of the execution of the sale
deed, the land so purchased was recorded in the name of the seller - Mohd Kamar - in
the revenue records, the petitioner, in support thereof, has relied upon the Khatauni of
Fasli year 1393-1398.
5. It is further submitted that proceedings under the Act, 1976, were initiated against
the original landholder, Mohd. Kamar, and registered as case number 213/100/82.
Subsequently, vide an ex-parte order dated 12.07.1982, passed under Section 8(4) of
the Act,1976, 4,021.26 sq. m. of land comprised in Gata No. 367 was declared vacant
surplus. However, further proceedings in the case were stayed till the final decision of
the State on the application filed by the original landholder under Section 20 of the
Act, 1976. Thereafter, a notice under Section 9 was issued, followed by a notification
under Section 10(1) of the Act, 1976, dated 15.12.1982. Subsequently, a notification
under Section 10(3) was issued on 28.12.1989. On 22.4.1993, the Lekhpal concerned
had submitted a report that the application under Section 20 had been rejected by the
State Government vide order dated 01.09.1983 and in pursuance thereto, a notice
under Section 10(5) was issued on 22.4.1993, which was not served on the original
land holder. Therefore, another notice under Section 10 (5) of the Act,1976 dated
16.6.1993 was issued to the legal heirs of Mohd. Kamar, which was also not served
upon the legal heirs. The petitioner continued to remain in possession of the land in
dispute after the purchase of the same till date and was unaware about the proceedings
under the Act, 1976 and it is only when the FIR was lodged on 15.02.2024 registered
as Case Crime No. 0142 of 2024.
6. The petitioner has challenged the proceedings under the Act 1976 on various
grounds including the fact that the possession memo does not bear the signatures of
the person delivering the possession, no entries were made in Form No. ULC 1 and
Form No. ULC 3 under UP Urban Land Ceiling (Taking of Possession, Payment of
Amount and Allied Matters ) Directions, 1983 and the notifications under Section
10(1) and Section 10(3) were not valid in view of the fact that till 22.04.1993 the
competent authority was not aware of the disposal of the application under Section 20
of the Act, 1976, vide the order dated 01.09.1983 was passed by the State
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Government. Even otherwise it is contended that the petitioner was in possession of
the land in dispute at the time of the enforcement of the Urban Land (Ceiling and
Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as,"the Repeal Act, 1999"), as
such, the proceedings under the Act, 1976, stood abated, and the petitioner is entitled
to remain in possession of the land in dispute.
7. Per contra, learned Standing Counsel for the State respondents that pure question of
law are to be determined in the present writ petition in view of the fact that the
petitioner has purchased the land in dispute by means of registered sale deed dated
10.11.1987, however, the notification under Section 10 (1) and notification under
Section 10(3) were published in the State gazette on 19.10.1985 and 17.11.1990
respectively. Hence, the sale deed dated 10.11.1987 is null and void in view of the
provisions of Section 10 (4) of the Act, 1976. Further the petitioner had knowledge
about the proceedings under the Act, 1976 at the time of execution of the sale deed
dated 10.11.1987 and as such the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the
ground of delay as the petitioner has approached this Court only in April, 2024.
8. If we consider the submissions made by the petitioner, the sale deed was executed
on 10.11.1987 while the proceedings under the Act, 1976 were pending, the
Dakhalnama/possession memo under Section 10(5) was issued on 22.12.1993, the
Repeal Act was enforced in the year 1999, and the present writ petition has been filed
on 02.04.2024. Thus, the question of delay and laches would also arise in view of the
submissions made by the petitioner.
9. We have perused the provisions of the Act, 1976 as well as those of the Repeal Act,
1999 and in view of the submissions made by the petitioner, we are of the view that
the following points of determination arise and are required to be decided in the
present case:-
1. The effect of Section 26 of the Act, 1976 on the sale deed dated 10.11.1987
executed in favour of the petitioner.
2. Whether the sale deed dated 10.11.1987 is valid in view of the provisions of the
Act, 1976?
3. Whether the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the grounds of delay and
laches ?
4. To what reliefs is the petitioner entitled for
POINT No.1
10.The first and foremost submission on behalf of the petitioner is that the petitioner
had executed the sale deed dated 10.11.1987 after giving notice under Section 26 of
the Act, 1976, hence, the sale deed was a valid one. Before we advert to the factual
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aspects involved in this regard, we would like to consider the provisions of Section 26
of the Act, 1976, and the same reads as under :-
" Notwithstanding anything
26. Notice to be given before transfer of vacant lands. (1)
contained in any other law for the time being in force, no person holding vacant land
within the ceiling limit shall transfer such land by way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease or
otherwise except after giving notice in writing of the intended transfer to the
competent authority.
(2) Where a notice given under sub-section (1) is for the transfer of the land by way of
sale, the competent authority shall have the first option to purchase such land on
behalf of the State Government at a price calculated in accordance with the provisions
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894) or of any other corresponding law for
the time being in force and if such option is not exercised within a period of sixty days
from the date of receipt of the notice, it shall be presumed that the competent authority
has no intention to purchase such land on behalf of the State Government and it shall
be lawful for such person to transfer the land to whomsoever he may like:
Provided that where the competent authority exercises within the period aforesaid the
option to purchase such land the execution of the sale deed shall be completed and the
payment of the purchase price thereof shall be made within a period of three months
from the date on which such option is exercised.
(3) For the purpose of calculating the price of any vacant land under sub-section (2),
it shall be deemed that a notification under sub-section (1) of section 4 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894) or under the relevant provision of any other
corresponding law for the time being in force, had been issued for the acquisition of
such vacant land on the date on which the notice was given under sub-section (1) of
this section. "
11. At this stage, we would also take into consideration the provisions of clause (a) of
Section 28 of the Act, 1976, as the same is applicable to transfers referred to in
Section 26 and the same reads as under :-
" -Notwithstanding
28. Regulation of registration of documents in certain cases.
anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, where any document
required to be registered under the provisions ofclauses (a) to (e) of sub-section (1) of
section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), purports to transfer by way of
sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise any land or any building (including any
portion thereof),-
(a) in the case of any transfer referred to in section 26, no registering officer
appointed under that Act shall register any such document unless the transferor
produces before such registering officer evidence to show that he has given notice of
the intended transfer to the competent authority under that section and, where such
transfer is by way of sale, the period of sixty days referred to in sub-section (2) of that
section has elapsed;
(b) in the case of any transfer referred to in section 27, no registering officer
appointed under that Act shall register any such document unless the transferor
produces before such registering officer the permission in writing of the competent
authority for such transfer or satisfies the registering officer that the period of sixty
days referred to in sub-section (4) of that section has elapsed."
12. Hence, the provisions of Section 26 reveal that the same are applicable to transfer
of vacant land within the ceiling limit. Section 4 of the Act, 1976, specifies the ceiling
limit, and the same is provided under Schedule I of the Act, where the urban
WRIC No. 11397 of 2024
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agglomeration is divided into four categories viz Category A, Category B, Category C
and Category D. The land in dispute is situated in District Bareilly, which falls under
'Category C' and as such, under the provisions of clause (c) of subsection (1) of
Section 4 of the Act, 1976 the ceiling limit in the present case would be 1,500 sq m.
13. Now, the contention of the petitioner is that the petitioner had executed the sale
deed dated 10.11.1987 after giving notices under Section 26 of the Act, 1976, dated
26.08.1987 and 31.08.1987 respectively. Further, the sale deed also mentions the
notices under Section 26, dated 26.08.1987 and 31.08.1987, though it is not clear from
the records whether the permission was granted or not or it was a case of deemed
possession.
14. Be that as it may, the registering officer would not have registered the sale deed
dated 10.11.1987 in the absence of any notice under Section 26 in view of the
provisions of Section 28 of the Act, 1976 . Even otherwise, the order dated 12.07.1982
passed under Section 8(4) reveals that that 1,500 sq m of land comprised in Gata no.
367 and Gata No.344 was held to be within ceiling limits, and only the remaining land
measuring 4,021.26 sq m comprised in Gata No.367 was held to be vacant surplus.
Thus, we are of the view that the original landholder, Mohd. Kamar, was competent to
sell 1,500 sq m of land comprised in Gata No. 367 to the petitioner after applying for
permission under Section 26 of the Act, 1976.
15. Thus, we are of the view that the sale deed dated 10.11.1987, out of the total land
that was transferred in respect of land, which fell within the ceiling limits i.e. 1500 sq.
m. is valid. In view of the provisions of Section 26 read with Section 28 of the Act,
1976.
POINT No.2
16. The crux of the contention of the petitioner is that the petitioner had executed the
sale deed dated 10.11.1987 after obtaining permission under Section 26 of the Act,
1976, and the petitioner has continued to remain in possession of the land in dispute
ever since. Further, as the petitioner was in possession of land in dispute at the time of
enforcement of the Repeal Act 1999 and as such the proceedings under Act, 1976
stood abated, hence, the petitioner is entitled to remain in possession. Thus, it is
contended that the petitioner has a valid title and possession over the land in dispute.
17. In view of the submissions so made by the petitioner, we deem it fit to advert to
the provisions of the Act, 1976 in respect of transfer of land by the landholder during
the pendency of the proceedings of the Act, 1976. Section 5 of the Act, 1976, pertains
to transfer of vacant land. Section 5(3) of the Act, 1976, provides that no person
holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit immediately before the
commencement of this Act shall transfer any such land or part thereof by way of sale,
mortgage, gift, lease, or otherwise until he has furnished a statement under Section 6
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and a notification regarding the excess vacant land held by him has been published
under subsection (1) of Section 10. Any such transfers made in contravention of this
provision shall be deemed to be null and void.
18. Further, under subsection (4) of section 10 of the Act, 1976, during the period
commencing on the date of publication of the notification under subsection (1) and
ending with the date specified in the declaration made under subsection (3), no person
shall transfer by way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease, or otherwise any excess vacant
land, including part thereof, specified in the notification aforesaid. Any such transfer
made in contravention of this provision shall be deemed to be null and void.
19. Section 27 of the Act, 1976, provides that, notwithstanding anything contained in
any other law for the time being in force, but subject to the provisions of subsection
(3) of Section 5 and subsection (4) of Section 10, no person shall transfer by sale,
mortgage, gift, lease for a period exceeding ten years, or otherwise, any urban or
urbanizable land with a building (whether constructed before or after the
commencement of this Act) or a portion only of such building for a period of ten years
of such commencement or from the date on which the building is constructed,
whichever is later, except with the previous permission in writing of the competent
authority. However, we are of the-view that the provisions of Section 27 of the Act,
1976, would not come in the way of the petitioner, as admittedly, by means of the
registered sale deed dated 10.11.1987, vacant land had been transferred to the
petitioner.
20. The petitioner in the writ petition states that the notification under Section 10(1) of
the Act, 1976, was issued on 15.12.1982, and thereafter the notification under Section
10(3) of the Act, 1976 was issued on 28.12.1989. It is also admitted that the sale deed
in question was executed in favour of the petitioner on 10.11.1987. Thus, it is beyond
doubt that the sale deed, as per the own showing of the petitioner, was executed after
the issuance of notification under Section 10(1) and prior to issuance the notification
under Section 10(3). The perusal of the records further reveals that notices under
Section 10(1) and Section 10(3) were published in the State Gazette on 19.10.1985
and 17.11.1990 respectively. Hence, the provision of subsection (4) of Section 10 of
the Act, 1976, would be attracted in the present case.
21. The provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Act, 1976, read as under:-
"4) During the period commencing on the date of publication of the notification under
sub-section (1) and ending with the date specified in the declaration made under sub-
section (3), -
(i) no person shall transfer by way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise any
excess vacant land (including any part thereof) specified in the notification aforesaid
and any such transfer made in contravention of this provision shall be deemed to be
null and void; and
(ii) no person shall alter or cause to be altered the use of such excess vacant land."
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22. Thus, from the perusal of the provisions of the aforesaid sub section, it is evident
that a transfer including sale of excess vacant land after the date of publication of the
notification under sub section (1) of Section 10 and ending with the date specified in
the declaration made under sub section (3) of Section 10 shall be deemed to be null
and void.
23. Now the question that may arise is as to what would be the effect of the Repeal
Act, 1999, enforced w.e.f. 18.03.1999 on the sale deed dated 10.11.1987, executed in
favor of the petitioner. We have perused the provisions of the Repeal Act, 1999 and
are of the view that the said Act is silent in respect of the transfers of vacant surplus
land made during the pendency of the proceedings under the Act, 1976. In view of
such circumstances, we need to consider the provisions of Section 6 of the General
Clauses Act, 1897, which provides for the effect of repeal of an Act. Section 6 of the
General Clauses Act, 1897, makes it apparently clear that the Repeal Act will not
revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect.
Nor will it affect the previous operation of the enactment or anything suffered
thereunder.
24. Hence, it can be fairly held that if the transfer of surplus land by the landholder is
deemed null and void by operation of law as it existed on the date of transfer under the
provisions of the Act, 1976, then the Repeal Act, 1999 will not infuse life in the said
lease, nor will it affect the operation of the enactment in so far as it declares the sale to
be null and void. Thus, the sale deed dated 10.11.1987 executed in favour of the
petitioner is hit by the provisions of Section 10(4) of the Act, 1976.
25. We find strength to the findings arrived by us in paragraphs above in the judgment
of a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Ritesh Tiwari and another v. State
of UP through District Magistrate Agra, 2009 SCC Online ALL 40 , wherein it was
held as under :-
" 12. A bare reading of the same would establish that the transfer made by the
recorded tenure holder during the period starting from to the date of publication of
notification under section 10(1) and ending with the issuance of declaration under
section 10(3) is rendered null and void. In the facts of the case declaration under
section 10(3) has taken place in 1993. Therefore, the date of sale would fall between
issuance of section 10(1) notification and section 10(3) notification rendering the sale
null and void in view of section 10(4).
13. Therefore, in both the circumstances we have no hesitation to record that the
transfer which have been effected by the recorded tenure holder in favour of Mayur
Sahkari Awas Samiti on 20.4.1982 is deemed to be null and void by operation of law
either under section 5(3) or under section 10(4) of the Act of 1976.
14. Since Mayur Sahkari Awas Samiti cannot claim any title on the basis of sale
deemed to be null and void by operation of law, all subsequent purchaser of land of
Khasra Plot No. 258 from Mayur Sahkari Awas Samiti cannot derive any title i.e., the
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members of Mayur Sahkari Awas Samiti, M/s. Savy Homes (P) Ltd. as well as the
petitioners on the strength of such sale.
15. We, therefore, hold that the learned Standing Counsel is legally justified in
contending that the Writ Court may not recognise the title of the petitioners in respect
of the land the transfer by sale whereof is deemed under law to be null and void.
16. At this stage we may also deal with the contention raised on behalf of the writ
petitioners that since the Act of 1976 has been repealed by means of Urban Land
(Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999, the petitioners are entitled to the relief
prayed as actual possession of the surplus land in question had not been taken under
section 10(6) by the State Government. Suffice is to refer to section 6 of the General
Clauses Act, 1897 which deals with the consequences which follow from the repeal of
a Central Act. For ready reference section 6 is being quoted herein below:
" Effect of repeal.—Where this Act, or any [Central Act] or Regulation made after the
commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be
made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not—
(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect;
or
(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done
or suffered thereunder; or
(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred
under any enactment so repealed; or
(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence
committed against any enactment so repealed; or
(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right,
privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid;
and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued
or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the
repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed."
17. From a reading of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, it would be
apparently clear that the Repeal Act will not revive anything not in force or existing at
the time at which the repeal takes effect nor will it effect the previous operation of the
enactment or anything suffered thereunder. It logically follows that if the transfer of
the surplus land by the recorded tenure holder is deemed null and void by operation of
law as was existing on the date of transfer then the Repeal Act will not infuse life in
the said non est deed and nor will it effect the operation of the enactment in so for as
it declares the said sale deed to be null and void. Consequently we arrive at a
conclusion that the petitioner has no legal title over the land nor he can be permitted
to question the order dated 30.3.1981 passed under the Act of 1976 against the
recorded tenure holder after more than 25 years of the said order more so when he
cannot represent the recorded tenure holder on the basis of a void sale deed.
18. We, therefore, uphold the contention raised on behalf of the State Government and
hold that no relief can be granted to the writ petitioners in view of the transfer effect
in their favour being deemed to be null and void by operation of law.
19. Writ petition lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed."
26. The judgment so passed by this Court was also upheld by the Apex Court in the
case of Ritesh Tiwari and another v. State of UP and others, (2010) 10 SCC 677 .
27. Similarly, the Apex Court in the case of State of UP and others v. Adarsh Seva Sa
hkari Samiti Limited, (2016) 12 SCC 493 , while considering the provisions of Section
10 of the Act, 1976, had held as under :-
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" 4. We have examined this aspect. Having regard to the undisputed fact that the
respondent has purchased the property from the declarant which is vested with the
State Governments under Section 10(5) of the Act in terms of Section 10(3)
notification, therefore, the transfer of property in favour of the respondent, who is
claiming its interest in the said property is void ab initio in law. On this ground alone,
the order passed by the High Court cannot be allowed to sustain.
5. It is also brought to our notice by the learned Senior Counsel Mr. Misra that after
the proceedings under Sections 10(3) and 10(5), notice and the alleged taking over
possession of the land in question, the subsequent event has taken place, namely the
said property has been transferred to the Lucknow Development Authority by the State
Government and the Development Authority has laid a park for public under. On this,
the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent submits that the said event has taken
place during the pendency of the proceedings before the High Court. Though it may
be the fact, subsequently, after the transfer of the property in favour of the
Development Authority, the Authority has developed a park is an undisputed fact. This
is also a very relevant aspect of the matter for this Court to annul the impugned
judgment/order passed by the High Court.
6. In our opinion, the respondent herein has no locus standi to challenge the inaction
on the part of the appellants viz. not taking possession legally strictly complying with
the statutory provisions under Section 10(5) of the Act taking over possession as
provided under Section 10(6) of the Act. At this juncture, this aspect need not be
examined by this Court at the instance of the respondent"
28. Further, the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 5102 of 2016 (State of UP and others
vs. Surendra Pratap and others) , decided on 13.05.2016, while relying upon the
judgment in the case of Adarsh Seva Sarkari Limited (supra) , had held as under :-
" 8. We have heard Mr. Irshad Ahmad, learned Additional Advocate General for the
State in support of the appeal and Mr. Aarohi Bhalla, learned Advocate for
respondent Nos. 1 and 2. The record indicates that notification u/s 10(3) of the Act
was published in the official gazette on 29.04.1986 and an appropriate notice u/s
10(5) of the Act was issued by the Competent Authority on 31.03.1993. These aspects
of the matter are not disputed by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 but in their submission,
despite such notice u/s 10(5) of the Act, the possession was never taken over. The
factum about taking over the possession finds clear mention in the possession
certificate dated 20.08.1994. Further, the objections preferred by respondent Nos. 1
and 2 were dismissed vide order dated 30.06.1995 which order also records the fact
that possession of the land already stood taken over. In the premises, all requisite
actions contemplated under the Act were taken in accordance with law well before the
enactment of the Repeal Act and the surplus vacant land stood vested with the State
Government of which the possession was also taken over. The Writ Petition preferred
in the year 2005, therefore, had no stateable claim and the High Court was completely
in error in accepting the submissions advanced on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2.
9. Moreover, in Civil Appeal Nos. 369-370 of 2016 (State of U.P. v. Adarsh Seva
Sahakari Ltd.) decided on 19.01.2016, this Court has observed that after the vesting of
the surplus land with the State Government u/s 10(5) of the Act, if any transfer of the
property in question is effected, such transfer would be void ab initio and the
transferee would not be entitled to challenge the alleged inaction on part of the State
WRIC No. 11397 of 2024
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Government or the Competent Authority in not taking possession in compliance with
the provisions u/s 10(5) of the Act.
10. In the aforesaid circumstances, the view taken by the High Court in the instant
case is completely unsustainable. This appeal is, therefore, allowed and the Writ
Petition preferred by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein stands dismissed with costs."
29. In view of the above, if we advert to the facts of the present case, the perusal of the
order dated 12.7.1982, passed by the Competent Authority under Section 8(4) of the
Act, 1976, reveals that the original landholder, Mohd Kamar, had 5,521.26 sq m. of
land, comprised in Gata No. 344 and Gata No. 367, being his one-third share therein
and after exempting the land measuring 1,500 sq m, which fell within the ceiling
limits, an area of 4,021.26 sq m was declared as vacant surplus. Hence, in view of the
provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Act, 1976, and the law discussed
above the sale deed in respect of 4,021.26 sq m. of land, which was declared vacant
surplus, would be null and void.
30. Once the sale deed dated 10.11.1987 executed in favour of the petitioner in respect
of 4021.26 sq m. of land i.e. land in dispute is null and void, hence, the petitioner has
no right, title or interest over the same. Thus, there is no occasion for us to delve into
the questions of alleged irregularities in proceedings under the Act, 1976 at the
instance of the petitioner, who has no locus to question the same.
POINT No.3
31. The petitioner in paragraph no.17 the writ petition has alleged that the petitioner
was unaware of the land comprised in Gata No. 367, situated in village Jagatpur Lala
Begum, Bareilly, being under ceiling at any span of time and came to know only after
the lodging of the aforesaid FIR. Thus, the petitioner has tried to create an impression
that the petitioner, being unaware of the proceedings under the Act 1976, has
approached this court shortly after the lodging of the FIR on 15.02.2024.
32. We find the plea so raised by the petitioner to be incorrect and frivolous. The
contention so raised by the petitioner is contrary to the contents of the sale deed dated
10.11.1987, a registered instrument, executed in favour of the petitioner and duly
raised by the representative of the petitioner. The above said plea is also contrary to
the pleas raised elsewhere in the writ petition. In the said sale deed there is a mention
of the notice under Section 26, No. 866, 867, dated 26.08.1987, and another notice
under Section 26, No. 894 and 893, dated 31.08.1987. The petitioner in the writ
petition has also pleaded that the sale deed dated 10.11.1987 was executed after
permission under Section 26 of the Act, 1976.
33. Thus, it can very well be concluded that the petitioner was well aware of the fact
that proceedings under the Act, 1976 were underway in respect of the land so
transferred by means of the said sale deed and even then, the petitioner had went on to
purchase the land in dispute knowing fully well that the sale deed could have been
executed only in respect of land which fell within ceiling limits i.e. 1500 sq. m., in
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view of Section 26 and Section 10(4) of the Act, 1976. Probably it is for this reason
that notices under Section 26 of the Act, 1976 have not been brought on record by the
petitioner. Under the circumstances, considering the conduct of the petitioner and the
attempt made by it to mislead this Court, we are of the view that this is not a fit case to
exercise our extraordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on
the grounds of equity.
34. Moreover, it is stated by the petitioner that a possession memo/ dakhalnama dated
22.12.1993 was issued under Section 10(5) in respect of the land in dispute, and for
reasons assigned above the petitioner was also aware of the proceedings under the Act
1976 on the date of the sale deed i.e. 10.11.1987. However, the present petition has
been filed in April, 2024 after a lapse of more than 37 years from the date of sale deed
of the land in dispute, even though the petitioner was well aware about the
proceedings under the Act, 1976. Hence, even otherwise, the present petition is liable
to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches in view of the law laid down by the
Apex Court in the case of State of Assam vs. Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma & Ors.(2015) 5
SCC 321 and Kapilaben Ambalal Patel & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Anr. (2021) 12
SCC 95 and co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Writ-C No. 38977 of 2022 (Mithai Lal
& Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.) decided on 16.02.2023 and in Writ-C No. 19612 of
2018 (Kumbha Karan Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.) decided on 25.03.2026.
POINT No.4
35. From the paragraphs above it is evident that the sale deed dated 10.11.1987
executed in favour of petitioner is null and void in respect of 4021.26 sq m. of land
comprised in Gata no. 367 i.e. the land in dispute.
36. The Competent Authority vide the order dated 12.07.1982 passed in Case No.
213/100/82 (State of U.P. Vs. Mohd. Kamar) had declared 4021.26 sq m. of land as
vacant surplus. Hence, in view of the above so far as the relief (A) claimed in the writ
petition for quashing of the proceedings of Case No. 213/100/82 is concerned, the
petitioner has no right, title or interest over the land in dispute and the proceedings of
Case No. 213/100/82 (State of U.P. Vs. Mohd. Kamar) were initiated against the
original landholder Mohd. Kamar, hence, no relief as clamied can be granted at the
instance of the petitioner.
37. Further so far as the relief (B) seeking a direction for the respondents not to
dispossess the petitioner from the land in dispute and for the relief (C) to correct the
revenue records by recording the name of the petitioner in respect of land in dispute
are concerned, the said reliefs also cannot be granted as the sale deed dated
10.11.1987 on the basis of which the petitioner claims title and possession over the
land in dispute has already been held to be null and void in respect of 4021.26 sq m. of
land for the reasons assigned above. Thus, the petitioner also cannot be granted the
relief (B) and relief (C) as claimed in the writ petition.
WRIC No. 11397 of 2024
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38. In view of above, the petitioner is not entitled to any of the reliefs claimed in the
present writ petition.
39. Thus, the present writ petition is devoid of merits and is . No order as to
dismissed
costs.
September 14, 2026
Gaurav
(Sudhanshu Chauhan,J.) (Saral Srivastava,J.)
Digitally signed by :-
GAURAV PATEL
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad