Special Police Establishment vs Brajendra Prasad Pandey

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR

BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR
th
ON THE 7 OF SEPTEMBER, 2026
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 2752 of 2018
SPECIAL POLICE ESTABLISHMENT
Versus
BRAJENDRA PRASAD PANDEY
Appearance:
Shri Abhinav Shrivastava - Advocate for the applicant.
Shri Siddharth Kumar Sharma - Advocate for the respondent.
ORDER
Heard on I.A No.1014/2018, an application for condonation of delay
filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
2 . The Special Police Establishment, Lokayukta, State of M.P
preferred appeal feeling aggrieved by the judgment of acquittal dated
31.01.2017 passed in Special Case No.02/2016 by the Special Judge,
Prevention of Corruption Act, Rewa, District Rewa whereby the respondent
has been acquitted from the charges of offence punishable under Section 7
and Section 13 (1)(d) r/w Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
Since, the application for grant of leave was filed beyond the prescribed
period of limitation of 90 days from the date of judgment of acquittal, the
applicant/ appellant submitted an application for condonation of delay.
3 . Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the application for
grant of leave to appeal is presented with delay of 250 days. The delay is
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explained in the application. The Certified copy of impugned judgement was

obtained on 02.02.2017. Thereafter, the Public Prosecutor sent the proposal
for assailing the judgment to the Superintendent of Police on 14.02.2017. It
was forwarded to Additional Director General on 17.02.2017. Thereafter, it
was sent to law department for opinion. The law department opined and
instructed for filing of appeal on 08.05.2017. Thereafter, OIC was appointed
on 30.12.2017. The OIC approached the Special Public Prosecutor on
05.01.2018 and appeal was prepared after examination of record. The delay
is attributable to the functioning of the State Government requiring
permission, deliberations at various levels which consumed time. The delay
is unintentional, bonafide and procedural and was beyond the control of the
applicant. Therefore, the delay of 250 days in filing of present appeal be
condoned. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Court may take
judicial notice of the procedural delay in functioning of public authorities.
The delay is not intentional or deliberate, therefore, the appeal deserves to be
heard on merits as it involves the grievous offences under the Prevention of
Corruption Act. The dismissal of appeal merely on delay may have adverse
effect on the administration of justice. Learned counsel referred to the
judgment of Supreme Court in case of State of Nagaland vs. Lipok AO and
Ors. reported in 2005 (3) SCC 752 to bolster his contentions regarding
condonation of delay in matters involving public machinery.
4 . Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent opposes the
application and submits that reasonable explanation for delay has not been
pleaded in the application. The reasons are vague and unsatisfactory. The
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learned counsel. referring to the judgment of Supreme Court in the cases of

State of M.P vs. Bherulal reported in 2020 (10) SCC 654, Postmaster
General vs. Living Media India Ltd., reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563 and
Shivamma vs. Karnataka Housing Board and Ors. reported in 2025 INSC
1104, contends that the State authorities does not deserve any special
treatment in explaining the delay. The "sufficient cause" has to be
established for condonation of delay. The application is meritless.
5. Heard both the parties and perused the record.
6 . There is no controversy that application for grant of leave to
appeal against the impugned judgment of acquittal is filed with delay of 250
days. The applicant has submitted the explanation that the delay in filing the
application is attributable to red-tape and the procedural delay involved in
the functioning of public authorities.
7. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Nagaland vs. Lipok AO
(supra) observed as under:
13. Experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in
charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be a
subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with
the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part
is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. The State
which represents collective cause of the community, does not deserve a
litigant-non-grata status. The courts, therefore, have to be informed with the
spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the
expression of sufficient cause. Merit is preferred to scuttle a decision on merits
in turning down the case on technicalities of delay in presenting the appeal.
Delay as accordingly condoned, the order was set aside and the matter was
remitted to the High Court for disposal on merits after affording opportunity of
hearing to the parties. In Prabha v. Ram Parkash Kalra this Court had held that
the court should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in rejecting the
application for condonation of delay. The appeal was allowed, the delay was
condoned and the matter was remitted for expeditious disposal in accordance
with law.
15. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at
a slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table
and keeping it on the table for considerable time causing delay intentional or
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otherwise is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process
of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of
latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for
such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis
suffers, is public interest. The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore,
be considered with pragmatism in a justice-oriented approach rather than the
technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The
factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the
governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of
pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The court should decide the
matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate
standards to d determine the cause laid by the State vis-à-vis private litigant
could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at
appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any
legal principles are involved for decision by the courts or whether cases require
adjustment and should authorise the officers to take a decision or give
appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal, e
needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the
appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any.
Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The
individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would
pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person
legally injured while the State is an impersonal machinery working through its
officers or servants.
16. The above position was highlighted in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani
and Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition v. K.V. Ayisumma. It was noted that
adoption of strict standard of proof sometimes fails to protract (sic) public
justice, and it would result in public mischief by skilful management of delay
in the process of filing an appeal.
17. When the factual background is considered in the light of legal principles
as noted above, the inevitable conclusion is that the delay of 57 days deserved
condonation. Therefore, the order of the High Court refusing to condone the
delay is set aside.
8 . The Supreme Court in case of Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India,

reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531, on consideration of law laid down in
Collector (LA) v. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107, G. Ramegowda v. LAO , (1988)
2 SCC 142, State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani, (1996) 3 SCC 132, Tehsildar
(LA) v. K.V. Ayisumma, (1996) 10 SCC 634, State of Nagaland v. Lipok
Ao, (supra), State of Manipur v. Koting Lamkang, (2019) 10 SCC 408,
Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd., (supra), Esha Bhattacharjee
v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649, State of M.P. v.
Bherulal, (supra), University of Delhi v. Union of India, (2020) 13 SCC 745 ,
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observed as under-

30. Considering the aforementioned decisions, there cannot be any
quarrel that this Court has stepped in to ensure that substantive rights of
private parties and the State are not defeated at the threshold simply due
to technical considerations of delay. However, these decisions
notwithstanding, we reiterate that condonation of delay being a
discretionary power available to courts, exercise of discretion must
necessarily depend upon the sufficiency of the cause shown and the
degree of acceptability of the explanation, the length of delay being
immaterial.
31. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being shown or an
acceptable explanation being proffered, delay of the shortest range may
not be condoned whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods
can be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory and acceptable. Of
course, the courts must distinguish between an "explanation" and an
"excuse". An "explanation" is designed to give someone all of the facts
and lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify the circumstances of
a particular event and allows the person to point out that something that
has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must,
however, be taken to distinguish an "explanation" from an "excuse".
Although people tend to see "explanation" and "excuse" as the same
thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a
distinction which, though fine, is real.
32. An "excuse" is often offered by a person to deny responsibility
and consequences when under attack. It is sort of a defensive action.
Calling something as just an "excuse" would imply that the explanation
proffered is believed not to be true. Thus said, there is no formula that
caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay
based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its
own facts. At this stage, we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and
not explanations, that are more often accepted for condonation of long
delays to safeguard public interest from those hidden forces whose sole
agenda is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not reach the higher
courts for adjudication.
40. We can also profitably refer to State of Manipur v. Koting Lamkang,
(2019) 10 SCC 408, cited by Mr Sen, where the same Bench of three
Hon'ble Judges of this Court which decided University of Delhi v. Union
of India, (2020) 13 SCC 745 was of the view that the impersonal nature
of the State's functioning should be given due regard, while ensuring that
individual defaults are not nit-picked at the cost of collective interest.
The relevant paragraphs read as follows:
"7. But while concluding as above, it was necessary for the
Court to also be conscious of the bureaucratic delay and the
slow pace in reaching a government decision and the routine
way of deciding whether the State should prefer an appeal
against a judgment adverse to it. Even while observing that
the law of limitation would harshly affect the party, the
Court felt that the delay in the appeal filed by the State,
should not be condoned.
8. Regard should be had in similar such circumstances to the
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impersonal nature of the Government's functioning where
individual officers may fail to act responsibly. This in turn,
would result in injustice to the institutional interest of the
State. If the appeal filed by the State are lost for individual
default, those who are at fault, will not usually be
individually affected." (emphasis supplied)
39. According to Mr Sharma, University of Delhi v. Union of India,
(2020) 13 SCC 745 is a decision by a larger Bench and, therefore,
binding on us. This Court, while deciding University of Delhi, was
seized of a situation where even if the delay were to be condoned, it
would cause grave prejudice to the respondent Delhi Metro Rail
Corporation at the instance of the casual approach of the appellant
University. This Court, on the argument of non-availability of the Vice
Chancellor for granting approval to file the appeal, and other reasons put
forth in the matter, could not conclude that there was fulfilment of
sufficient cause for condonation of delay; hence, the refusal to condone
the delay. The decision really turns on the facts before this Court
because of the prejudice factor involved.
41. Having bestowed serious consideration to the rival contentions, we
feel that the High Court's decision to condone the delay on account of
the first respondent's inability to present the appeal within time, for the
reasons assigned therein, does not suffer from any error warranting
interference. As the aforementioned judgments have shown, such an
exercise of discretion does, at times, call for a liberal and justice-oriented
approach by the courts, where certain leeway could be provided to the
State. The hidden forces that are at work in preventing an appeal by the
State being presented within the prescribed period of limitation so as not
to allow a higher court to pronounce upon the legality and validity of an
order of a lower court and thereby secure unholy gains, can hardly be
ignored. Impediments in the working of the grand scheme of
governmental functions have to be removed by taking a pragmatic view
on balancing of the competing interests.
Thereafter, in the matter of DDA v. Tejpal, reported in (2024) 7 SCC

433, it was held that-
C. Law on condonation of delay
22. Since the issue in this batch of appeals concerns the
condonation of delay, it would be worthwhile to briefly allude to
the law of limitation. The Limitation Act, 1963 ("the Limitation
Act") is a statute of repose founded on considerations of public
policy and expediency. The dominant objective underlying the law
of limitation is that the title to property, and matters of rights in
general, cannot be kept in a state of constant uncertainty, doubt or
suspense. Public interest requires that finality should be put to
litigation. The Limitation Act, thus, prescribes the specific points
of time from which the period of limitation begins to run for the
institution of actions. On expiry of such period, no action can be
initiated save and except where the court condones the delay for a
sufficient cause. A party who is insensible to the value of civil
remedies, and who does not assert his claim with promptitude is
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denied the ability to enforce even an otherwise rightful claim. This
position is reflected in the Latin maxim, vigilantibus et non
dormientibus jura subveniunt i.e the law aids the vigilant and not
those who sleep on their rights.
23. The Bombay High Court in Kumudini Ramdas Shah v. K.M.
Mody [Kumudini Ramdas Shah v. K.M. Mody, 1984 SCC OnLine
Bom 302: AIR 1985 Bom 320, para 4] aptly exposited the
philosophical pillars supporting the concept of limitation: (i) the
sword of prosecution ought not to be hanging over an individual
for an indeterminate period; (ii) those who have been lethargic in
safeguarding their interests should not expect the law to come to
their rescue; and (iii) a defendant ought not to suffer for lost
evidence owing to the passage of time.
24. Section 3 of the Limitation Act reflects this philosophy. Every
suit or appeal made after the period of limitation ought to be
dismissed, notwithstanding whether such ground had been raised
by the opposite side. However, this does not imply that the
Limitation Act destroys the right itself. Instead, it only
extinguishes the ability to enforce the right, without either creating
or destroying the underlying cause of action or entitlement itself.
25. As is clear from a plain reading of Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, there are exceptions to this general rule. The statute allows
for admitting an action provided "sufficient cause" is shown. This
vests courts with the discretion to extend the period of limitation if
the applicant can show that he had sufficient cause for not
preferring an appeal or application within the prescribed period.
Section 5 requires analysis of two ingredients: first, an
examination of whether "sufficient cause" has been made out; and
second, whether such cause has been shown for not filing the
appeal/application "within the prescribed period".
26. As regards the first ingredient, the Limitation Act itself does
not provide more guidance on what its constituent elements ought
to be. Instead, Section 5 leaves the task of determining appropriate
reasons for seeking condonation of delay to judicial interpretation
and exercise of discretion upon the facts and individual
circumstances of each case,
27. While there is no arithmetical formula, through decades of
judicial application, certain yardsticks for judging the sufficiency
of cause for condonation of delay have evolved. Mere good cause
is not sufficient enough to turn back the clock and allow
resuscitation of a claim otherwise barred by delay. The court ought
to be cautious while undertaking such an exercise, being
circumspect against condoning delay which is attributable to the
applicant. [Basawaraj v. LAO, (2013) 14 SCC 81, paras 9-11]
Although the actual period of delay might be instructive, it is the
explanation for the delay which would be the decisive factor.
[Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom v. Bhargavi Amma, (2008) 8
SCC 321, para 13]
28. The court must also desist from throwing the baby out with the
bathwater. A justice-oriented approach must be prioritised over
technicalities, [Raheem Shah v. Govind Singh, (2023) 18 SCC

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764: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 910, para 6] as one motivation
underlying such rules is to prevent parties from using dilatory
tactics or abusing the judicial process. Pragmatism over
pedanticism is therefore despite it appearing liberal or
magnanimous. The sometimes necessary expression "sufficient
cause" should be given liberal construction so as to advance
substantial justice. [Lonand Grampanchayat v. Ramgiri Gosavi,
1967 SCC OnLine SC 105, para 4.]
29. In addition to "sufficient cause", Section 5 also requires that
such cause must be shown within the prescribed period. To satisfy
the latter condition, the applicant must show sufficient cause for
not filing the appeal/application on the last day of the prescribed
period and explain the delay made thereafter. [Ramlal v. Rewa
Coalfields Ltd., 1961 SCC OnLine SC 39, para 8] Causes arising
after the culmination of the limitation period, despite being
sufficient in substance, would not suffice for condonation given
this second prong of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. However, the
applicant shall not be required to prove each day's delay till the
date of filing such appeal/application. [Ummer v. Pottengal
Subida, (2018) 15 SCC 127, para 14: (2019) 1 SCC (Civ) 113]
*
D. .Leeway to be granted to Government entities

48. The appellants have vehemently contended that the
Government entities ought to be allowed leeway for condonation
of delay. For this, the appellants placed reliance on Collector (LA)
v. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107 and G. Ramegowda v. LAO, (1988) 2
SCC 142 which held that courts ought to be generous while
considering delay on the part of Government entities given factors
unique to them like the impersonal nature of their functioning,
inherited bureaucratic methodology, and procedural red-tapeism.
49. However, with time, the position of law held in these cases has
been diluted. In CWT v. Amateur Riders Club, 1994 Supp (2)
SCC 603, para 3, this Court noted that while latitude can be
granted to the Government, it has to show its bona fides and
diligence in filing the appeals. In case of bureaucratic indifference,
delay cannot be condoned.
50. Subsequently, in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India)
Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563, this Court noted that the delay cannot be
condoned mechanically only because the appellant is a
government entity. The Court explicitly negated the earlier
rationale of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic
methodology given modern improvements in technology. Lastly,
the Court held that Government entities must show bona fides and
demonstrate diligence in pursuing the matter.
51. This Court has again in State of M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10
SCC 654, reiterated the reasoning of the Postmaster General and
held that the Collector (LA) could not be relied upon any longer as
it was laid down in a different bureaucratic and technological
period. The proposition that Government entities ought to be
afforded greater latitude on issues of delay on account of
administrative exigencies, is no longer a precedent to be followed
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routinely.

54. It seems to us that acceding to the appellants' request on the aforesaid
account would also have undesirable consequences. If delay were to be
condoned merely on the basis of a broad general assertion of
bureaucratic indifference, without requiring demonstration of bona fides
or an act of mala fides on the part of specific individuals, it would create
an artificial distinction between the private parties and the Government
entities vis-à-vis the law of limitation. This would not be in conformity
with the spirit of equality before law as guaranteed under our
Constitution. Allowing such latitude would further distort incentives for
the Government and encourage more laxity by the bureaucracy in its
general functioning, thereby undermining quality governance.
9. Later, in the matter of Shivamma Vs. Karnataka Housing Board

and Ors. (supra), the Supreme Court, on consideration of precedents on the
subject, observed as under-
210. What may be discerned from the aforesaid is that the jurisprudence
on condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
particularly where the State or any of its instrumentality is involved, has
witnessed a significant shift. From a regime that once accorded
preferential indulgence to the State, premised on its bureaucratic
complexities and institutional inertia, the law has now evolved to insist
upon parity between the government and private litigants. The rationale
is that public interest is better served not by excusing governmental
inefficiency, but by fostering accountability, diligence, and responsibility
in the conduct of public litigation.
211. The earlier decisions of this Court, particularly in K.V. Ayisumma
(supra), Chandra Mani (supra), Lipok AO (supra) and Indian Oil Corpn
(supra) insofar as they favoured a liberal approach towards the State or
any of its instrumentality in matters of condonation of delay, and showed
indulgence in condoning the same on ground of impersonal and slow-
moving nature of these entities, no longer reflects the correct position in
law. No litigant, be it a private party or a State or any of its functionaries,
is entitled to a broader margin of error, falling in the category of
inaction, negligence or casualness, in matters of limitation.
212. The law as it presently stands, post the decision of Postmaster
General (supra), is unambiguous and clear. Condonation of delay is to
remain an exception, not the rule. Governmental litigants, no less than
private parties, must demonstrate bona fide, sufficient, and cogent cause
for delay. Absent such justification, delay cannot be condoned merely on
the ground of the identity of the applicant.
213. From a combined reading of Bal Kishan Mathur (supra) and Sheo
Raj Singh (supra) it is equally manifest that the ratio of Postmaster
General (supra) is, in essence, twofold. First, that State or any of its
instrumentalities cannot be accorded preferential treatment in matters
concerning condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
The State must be judged by the same standards as any private litigant.
To do otherwise would not only compromise the sanctity of limitation.
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The earlier view, insofar as it favoured a liberal approach towards the
State or any of its instrumentality is no more the correct position of law.
Secondly, that thehabitual reliance of Government departments on
bureaucratic red tape, procedural bottlenecks, or administrative
inefficiencies as grounds for seeking condonation of delay cannot
always, invariably accepted as a "sufficient cause" for the purpose of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If such reasons were to be accepted as a
matter of course, the very discipline sought to be introduced by the law
of limitation would be diluted, resulting in endless uncertainty in
litigation.
214. What has been conveyed in so many words, by the decision of
Postmaster General (supra) is that while excuses premised solely on
bureaucratic lethargy cannot, by themselves, constitute sufficient cause,
there may nonetheless be circumstances where the explanation offered,
though involving bureaucratic procedures, reflects a genuine and bona
fide cause for the delay. In such instances, the true test is whether the
explanation demonstrates that the State acted with reasonable diligence
and whether the delay occurred despite efforts to act within time. Where
such bona fides are established, the Court retains the discretion to
condone the delay.
215. In other words, Postmaster General (supra) does not shut the door
on condonation of delay by the State in all cases involving bureaucratic
processes. The real distinction lies between a case where delay is the
result of gross negligence, inaction, or casual indifference on the part of
the State, of a defensive action. Calling something as just an "excuse"
would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. An
"explanation" on the other hand would demonstrate genuineness in
actions and reasons assigned, and would other wise be devoid of any
gross negligence, deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, or
indifference or casualness in conduct. Thus said, there is no formula that
caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay
based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its
own facts. of a defensive action. Calling something as just an "excuse"
would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. An
"explanation" on the other hand would demonstrate genuineness in
actions and reasons assigned, and would other wise be devoid of any
gross negligence, deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, or
indifference or casualness in conduct. Thus said, there is no formula that
caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay
based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its
own facts.
218. However, equally important to note is that wherever, any
explanation is sought to be given on account of bureaucratic lethargy and
inherent complexities of governmental decision-making, the same more
often than not would invariably always is an "excuse", as experience has
shown us, depicted from a long line of decisions of this Court. It is at this
stage, where the decision of Postmaster General (supra) assumes
significance. It seeks to convey the messages, that court should not be
agnostic, to how the State or its instrumentalities, often tend to take the
recourse of condonation of delay in a casual manner.
219. Which is why, as per the ratio of Postmaster General (supra) and a

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plethora of other subsequent decision, the ordinary approach of the
courts, in cases where delay is sought to be condoned by offering the
explanation of bureaucratic lethargy or red-tapism, must be one of
circumspection and reluctance. The courts ought to loathe in accepting
such explanations as "sufficient cause". They should apply their minds
carefully, be slow in condoning delays on such reasons, and exceptional
instances, where the explanation is found to be genuine, reflective of
reasonable vigilance and promptitude in conduct, and free from gross
negligence, deliberate inaction, lack of bona fides, or casual indifference,
should such an explanation be accepted.
231. Public interest, therefore, does not lie in condoning governmental
negligence, but in compelling efficiency, responsibility, and timely
decision-making. This Court has time and again emphasised that liberal
condonation of delay on behalf of the State, merely on the ground that
refusal might cause the dismissal of a potentially meritorious matter, is a
misplaced proposition. Public interest is not synonymous with the cause
of the Government; it is, instead, synonymous with the enforcement of
rule of law, certainty in legal rights, and an administrative machinery that
functions with diligence and accountability.
232. It must, therefore, be underscored that the guiding principle is not
the protection of governmental indifference but the promotion of
responsible governance. The State is under a higher duty to act in time,
for in every matter it litigates, it does so not in its private capacity, but as
the trustee of the people's interest. Hence, repeated indulgence in
condoning delays on grounds of bureaucratic inefficiency would amount
to eroding the very object of limitation statutes, which are enacted in
every civilised jurisdiction for the sake of finality, certainty, and public
order.
233. Any other view, would invariably defeat the sound public policy
embodied in the Limitation Act and fail in enthusing efficiency in
administration, and bring a balance between accountability and
autonomy of action, It would result in giving immunity or carte blanche
power to act as it pleases with the public at whim or vagary and
inevitably spell doom all over the collective responsibility that the State
and its instrumentalities are entrusted with. Thus, we are of the
considered opinion, that delay cannot be condoned, merely because not
doing so would result in non-suiting the State and thereby run the
ostensible risk of public interest suffering. Such by no stretch can be the
sole consideration for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, as
to do so would be to ignore the provision of Section 3 and the
overarching public policy of giving quietus to lis, that forms the bedrock
of the Limitation Act.
10. Thus, the condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation

Act cannot be claimed as a matter of right. No special concession can be
granted merely because the applicant is a State or a functionary of the State.
Despite the latitude conventionally shown to the functionaries of the State,
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the applicant cannot get an automatic or presumptive benefit of condonation

on the ground of bureaucratic lethargy. The "sufficient cause" must be a
genuine bonafide explanation and not a formal excuse for a bureaucratic
formality. The explanation that merely narrates the file having moved
through official channels for approval from higher authorities, without
disclosing the genuine and bonafide impediments, may not amount to
sufficient cause. Such an explanation is not an explanation amounting to
"sufficient cause" but a lame excuse. An explanation reflecting only the
routine procedural movement of files between officials without particulars of
what caused the specific delay, who was responsible for it and why it could
not have been avoided, is a stereo-typed explanation that fails to meet the
threshold of "sufficient cause".
[Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay v. Amateur Riders Club, 1994 Supp (2) SCC
603; Pathapati Subba Reddy (Dead) by LRs v. The Special Deputy Collector
(LA) (2024) 12 SCC 336; State of Orissa v. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls
High School, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 191 relied.]
1 1 . The material on record is examined in light of aforestated
propositions of law. It is pertinent to mention that the initial presumption of
innocence in favour of accused stands fortified by the impugned judgement
of acquittal after trial on merits. When the applicant/appellant seeks to assail
such a judgment after delay of more than four months beyond the prescribed
period of limitation, a substantial burden lies upon the applicant to
demonstrate "sufficient cause". Delay in preferring an appeal against an
acquittal cannot be viewed as a mere administrative oversight as it directly
impinges upon the accrued right of liberty enjoyed by the accused acquitted
after trial by a competent Court.
1 2 . Learned counsel for the applicant contended that the matter
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involves grievous offences punishable under the Prevention of Corruption

Act, therefore, dismissal of appeal on the ground of delay may have adverse
effect on the administration of justice. If the applicant considered the matter
to be of such importance as to impact administration of justice, the officials
of the applicant organization were expected to be vigilant, careful, and
diligent in prosecuting it.
1 3 . The applicant/Special Police Establishment has attempted to
explain the delay on the ground of bureaucratic functioning and procedural
necessities. However, the period consumed in seeking the legal opinion,
preparing the appeal and filing the application for grant of leave to appeal, as
set out in the application, manifests bureaucratic lethargy, inaction, casual
indifference and lack of diligence on the part of the officials concerned. The
applicant cannot take refuge under administrative exigency and procedural
niceties. The delay attributable to the appointment of the Officer-in-Charge
(OIC) and the preparation of the appeal was avoidable, reflecting neither
bona fides nor diligence on the part of the officials of the applicant
organization. Every stage of the process, as stated in application, suffers
from laxity and laches. The applicant has failed to demonstrate that the
officials of the applicant organization acted with a reasonable diligence and
the delay occurred despite bonafide efforts to act within the period of
limitation. Consequently, the reasons proffered for the delay appear to be a
lame excuse rather than a cogent and satisfactory explanation.
1 4 . In view of above discussion, this Court is of the considered
opinion that the applicant has failed to satisfactorily explain the delay of 250
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days (more than twice the prescribed period of limitation) in filing the

application for grant of leave to appeal.
1 5 . Consequently, the application I.A. No.1014/2018 for
condonation of delay filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is
dismissed.
16. Consequently, the present M.Cr.C. is also dismissed.
(SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR)
JUDGE
PK/P

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