Haji Iqbal Alias Bala vs State Of U.P. And 2 Others

A.F.R.
Reserved on 01.05.2026
Delivered on 16.07.2026
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 1443 of 2026
Haji Iqbal Alias Bala
…..Petitioner(s)
Versus
State of U.P. and 2 others
…..Respondent(s)
Counsel for Petitioner(s) : Indra Bhan Yadav
Counsel for Respondent(s) : G.A.
Court No. - 48
HON'BLE CHANDRA DHARI SINGH, J.
HON'BLE LAKSHMI KANT SHUKLA, J.
Per: Hon’ble Chandra Dhari Singh,J.
1. The instant petition has been filed inter alia seeking
quashing of a First Information Report bearing Case Crime No.
421/2024 lodged under Section 406, 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B,
506 of the Indian Penal Code (‘IPC’ hereinafter) at Police Station
Ecotech-IIIrd, District Gautam Buddh Nagar (‘Impugned FIR’
hereinafter).
Brief Facts
2. The brief factual matrix relevant for adjudication of the
instant petition is as follows:

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CRLP No. - 1443 of 2026
2.1 The petitioner is a former Member of the Legislative Council
(‘MLC’ hereinafter) from the State of Uttar Pradesh and is stated
to be presently residing abroad. He is also the Chancellor of
Glocal University, Saharanpur. The dispute giving rise to the
Impugned FIR has its origins in a series of financial transactions
involving real estate development in Greater Noida.
2.2 In the year 2014, one Naved Ahmad (‘Complainant’
hereinafter) entered into negotiations with representatives of M/s
Enchant Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. regarding the development of Plot
No. GH-02-D, Sector-12, Greater Noida, measuring 12,500 sq.
metres, which had been allotted by the Greater Noida Industrial
Development Authority.
2.3 As per material on record, between 01.12.2013 and
04.03.2014, the Complainant transferred a total sum of INR
6,33,00,000/- to M/s Enchant Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. A
development agreement was subsequently executed on
01.10.2014 between the Complainant and Vinod Kumar, the
Authorised Signatory of M/s Enchant Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd.
2.4 Notably, no construction activity was undertaken on the plot
thereafter. The company also failed to keep up with installment
payments due to the Greater Noida Authority. Consequently, vide
letter dated 23.08.2022, the Greater Noida Authority cancelled the
allotment of the said plot, citing outstanding dues of INR
29,30,05,883/- against which only INR 4,49,42,881/- had been
paid.
2.5 In the interregnum, an NGO named ‘Save India’ had filed
W.P.(C) No. 818/2015 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, thereby
raising concerns about alleged financial irregularities and shell
company operations linked to the petitioner. The Hon’ble Supreme

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CRLP No. - 1443 of 2026
Court, thereafter, directed the Ministry of Corporate Affairs to
grant sanction for directing the Serious Fraud Investigation Office
(‘SFIO’ hereinafter) to investigate the affairs related to the
petitioner herein.
2.6 SFIO, upon conclusion of its investigation, filed Complaint
No. 720/2017 under the Companies Act, 2013 (‘Act’ hereinafter),
before the Special Judge, Dwarka Court, New Delhi. The
complaint examined, inter alia, the roles of M/s Enchant
Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. and Mastiff India Pvt. Ltd. A summoning
order was passed against the petitioner and other co-accused.
2.7 The said summoning order was challenged before this Court
in Applications U/s 482 Nos. 18806 and 20317 of 2019. Vide
orders dated 10.05.2019 and 29.05.2019, the Co-ordinate Bench
of this Court afforded the applicants an opportunity to seek
discharge before the learned Trial Court. The discharge
applications so filed remain pending as of the date of institution of
the present petition.
2.8 In May 2022, the Ministry of Home Affairs issued a Lookout
Circular (‘LoC’ hereinafter) against the petitioner. He was also
named in Case Crime No. 83/2022 under Sections 2/3 of the U.P.
Gangsters Act, 1986 (‘Gangster Act’ hereinafter), at Police Station
Mirzapur, Saharanpur. Since the petitioner was abroad,
proceedings under Section 82 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (‘CrPC’ hereinafter) were also initiated against him in the
above-mentioned case.
2.9 Pursuant thereto, the petitioner’s passport was impounded
by the Passport Office, Ghaziabad, on 30.01.2023, and his
challenge to the same remains pending before the Delhi High
Court. During this period, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in

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CRLP No. - 1443 of 2026
connected proceedings, directed that no coercive steps be taken
against the petitioner and permitted him to participate in
investigations through Video Conferencing. The order dated
09.02.2024 passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP(Crl.)
No.5535/2023 read as under:
“1. Mr. Sidhartha Dave, learned senior counsel appearing for the
applicant submits that in pursuant to order passed by this Court
dated 30th January, 2024, the applicant will not be in a position to
attend Investigating Officer physically, inasmuch as he does not
have a valid passport.
2. It is further submitted that the order challenging cancellation of
passport is under challenge.
3. We, therefore, grant liberty to the applicant to join the
investigation through video-conferencing.
4.The application is, accordingly, disposed of”
2.10 On 04.09.2023, the Complainant filed a formal complaint
with the police authorities. A preliminary inquiry was conducted
by the STF Gautam Buddh Nagar, following which the Impugned
FIR was registered.
2.11 Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has approached this Court
seeking quashing of the Impugned FIR and all proceedings arising
therefrom.
SUBMISSIONS
( O N BEHALF OF THE P ETITIONER )
3. Mr. G.S. Chaturvedi, learned senior counsel, Ms. Somya
Chaturvedi, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the
petitioner, submitted that the Impugned FIR is nothing but a
reiteration of the very allegations which have already been
investigated by the SFIO, a specialised statutory agency, acting
under the express directions of the Supreme Court of India,

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CRLP No. - 1443 of 2026
culminating in a complaint already pending before the appropriate
Court.
4. It is submitted that the SFIO complaint specifically examines
the role of the petitioner and the companies associated with him,
including M/s Enchant Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. and M/s Mastiff
India Pvt. Ltd., in paragraphs 24 and 100 to 122 thereof. The
Impugned FIR is, therefore, a second investigation into the same
set of facts, which is impermissible in law.
5. It is submitted that the petitioner held no post or
shareholding in M/s Enchant Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. The
transactions in the Impugned FIR were entered into solely
between the Complainant and the company’s authorised
signatory, Vinod Kumar. No specific overt act, independent of the
company’s actions, has been attributed to the petitioner anywhere
in the FIR.
6. It is submitted that the substratum of the complaint is, at
best, non-performance of a development agreement, which is a
dispute of a civil nature. There is no material on record to suggest
any fraudulent or dishonest intent on the part of the petitioner at
the inception of the transaction.
7. The learned senior counsel also urged that pursuant to
liberty granted by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in another
petition, the petitioner has filed the discharge application before
the learned Trial Court in the SFIO complaint, which remains
pending to date. Therefore, the registration of a fresh FIR on
overlapping facts amounts to a clear abuse of the process of law.
8. It is further submitted that the FIR makes sweeping and
omnibus references to several shell companies, benami

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CRLP No. - 1443 of 2026
properties, and money laundering, without directly attributing any
specific transaction, date, or document to the petitioner. Such
general and vague allegations, bereft of material particulars, are
wholly insufficient to sustain criminal proceedings.
9. The learned counsel also apprised this Court about the
liberty granted to the petitioner by the Hon’ble Supreme Court to
cooperate with investigations through Video Conferencing,
recognising his inability to be physically present in India.
10. Lastly, it is submitted that any coercive action against the
petitioner in these circumstances is wholly disproportionate and
runs contrary to the spirit of those directions and therefore, the
Impugned FIR deserves to be quashed in its entirety qua the
petitioner.
( O N BEHALF OF THE R ESPONDENT )
11. Per Contra, Mr. Manish Goyal, learned Additional Advocate
General (AAG), appearing on behalf of the State, submitted that
the petitioner is not an ordinary accused but a former legislator
who has been absconding abroad for a considerable period of
time, and is actively monitoring and operating a syndicate of
white-collar crimes from abroad.
12. The learned AAG submitted that the SFIO investigation and
the Impugned FIR are distinct in nature and cannot be treated as
investigations into the same subject matter. The SFIO, as a
specialised agency under the Act, investigates corporate fraud
and violations of company law, whereas the Impugned FIR has
been registered under the IPC for criminal offences committed
against private individuals who were defrauded of their hard-
earned money.

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CRLP No. - 1443 of 2026
13. It is submitted that the Impugned FIR is founded on the
complaint of Naved Ahmad, who transferred INR 6,33,00,000/- to
M/s Enchant Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. on the basis of
representations made by the petitioner’s associates. The
investigation reveals that neither was any construction ever
intended nor were the instalment dues paid to the Greater Noida
Authority, establishing dishonest intent at the very inception of
the transaction.
14. It is further submitted that the offence in question is in the
nature of a continuing offence, having commenced with the
collection of funds from the Complainant in 2013-14 and having
continued across different time periods with various investors, the
last known transaction being as recent as 2022. The investigation
is therefore at a nascent stage, and no interference is warranted
at this juncture.
15. It is submitted that an absconding accused who has wilfully
chosen not to return to India and has not cooperated with the
investigating agency despite repeated opportunities, is not
entitled to the discretionary relief of stay of arrest from this Court.
Granting such relief would seriously prejudice the ongoing
investigation and the victims’ interests.
16. It is, therefore, submitted that the petition is devoid of merit
and deserves to be dismissed with costs.
A NALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
17. Heard the learned senior counsel for the parties and
perused the material placed on record.
18. The crux of the arguments vehemently contended by the
learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner is

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CRLP No. - 1443 of 2026
that the Impugned FIR constitutes nothing more than a second
investigation into facts already comprehensively examined by the
SFIO under the directions of the Supreme Court, and that no
specific overt act has been attributed to the petitioner in the FIR
to sustain criminal proceedings against him.
19. Before delving into the question at hand, this Court deems it
imperative to reiterate the powers granted to the High Courts
under Section 528 Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023
(‘BNSS’ hereinafter). The said provision reads as follows:
Section 528: Nothing in this Sanhita shall be deemed to limit or
affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders
as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Sanhita,
or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to
secure the ends of justice.
20. A bare perusal of the provision reveals that it is not the
source of the High Court’s inherent power but merely a statutory
recognition of it. The words “nothing in this Sanhita shall be
deemed to limit or affect” are instructive in this regard. By
employing such a formulation, the legislature has ensured that the
codification of criminal procedure does not, even inadvertently,
displace a power that is inseparable from the constitutional position
of the High Court as a Court of record.
21. It is equally noteworthy that the provision does not
prescribe any exhaustive enumeration of circumstances in which
the inherent power may be exercised. The three purposes, namely
giving effect to orders under the BNSS, preventing abuse of
process, and securing the ends of justice, are illustrative of the
breadth of the power and not a strait-jacket that confines its
exercise. The ends of justice and abuse of process, in particular,
are expressions of wide amplitude, and their content must
necessarily be determined by the facts of each case.

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CRLP No. - 1443 of 2026
22. The parameters governing the exercise of this power to
quash an FIR, which was formerly codified under Section 482 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘CrPC’ hereinafter)and now
finds statutory recognition in Section 528 of the BNSS, have been
settled through a catena of decisions. In Ashok Kumar Jain v. State
1
of Gujarat , the Hon’ble Supreme Court consolidated the legal
position as follows:
“8…………….
8.1. State of Odisha v. Pratima Mohanty
As per the settled proposition of law, while examining an
FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot
embark upon any enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness of
allegations made in the FIR/complaint. Quashing a complaint/FIR
should be an exception rather than any ordinary rule. Normally, the
criminal proceedings should not be quashed in exercise of powers
under section 482 of the Code when, after a thorough investigation,
the charge-sheet has been filed. At the stage of discharge and/or
considering the application under section 482 of the Code, the
courts are not required to go into the merits of the allegations
and/or evidence in detail as if conducting a mini-trial. As held by this
Court, the powers under this section are very wide, but the
conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious.
It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the Court.
8.2. Kaptan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh
The inherent jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code, though wide,
is to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution, only when
such exercise is justified by tests specifically laid down in the section
itself. Further, the appreciation of evidence is not permissible at this
stage.
8.3. Pratibha v. Rameshwari Devi
It is not open to the High Court to rely on the report of the
investigating agency, nor can it direct the report to be submitted
before it as the law is very clear that the report of the investigating
agency may be accepted by the Magistrate, or the Magistrate may
reject the same on consideration of the material on record. Such being
the position, the report of the investigating agency cannot be relied
on by the High Court while exercising powers under section 482 of
the Code.”
2
23. In Anukul Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh , the Hon’ble
Supreme Court restated the illustrative categories laid down in
1 2025 SCC OnLine SC 998
2 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2060

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CRLP No. - 1443 of 2026
3
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal in which the exercise of the
power to quash is justified, and distilled the cumulative
principles governing the exercise of the jurisdiction in the
following terms:
“11.1. This Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, at paragraph 102,
laid down illustrative categories where quashing of proceedings is
justified. These are:
“(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in
their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a
case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other
materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable
offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section
156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the
purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint
and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the
commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable
offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation
is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd
and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can
ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal
proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the
proceedings and/or, where there is a specific provision in the Code or
the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of
the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide
and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior
motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite
him due to private and personal grudge.” The categories in Bhajan Lal
are illustrative and not exhaustive, but they provide guiding principles
to balance two competing considerations - (a) preventing abuse of
process of law, and (b) ensuring that criminal proceedings are not
stifled at the threshold on disputed questions of fact.
11.2. Equally, this Court has consistently cautioned that the High Court,
while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., cannot embark
upon a “mini-trial” or weigh the sufficiency of evidence, which falls
within the domain of the trial Court. The scope of enquiry is confined
3 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335

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CRLP No. - 1443 of 2026
to whether, on a plain reading of the FIR/complaint and accompanying
material, the ingredients of the alleged offence are disclosed. [See:
Rajiv Thapar v. Madal Lal Kapoor, HMT Watches v. Abida, and Rathish
Babu Unnikrishnan v. the State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)].
11.3. In Md. Allauddin Khan v. State of Bihar, it was reiterated that
appreciation of contradictions or inconsistencies in witness statements
lies within the exclusive domain of the trial Court and not in proceedings
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Similarly, in CBI v. Aryan Singh, it was
emphasized that the High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction by
examining the merits of the prosecution's case and holding that charges
were not proved, which is a matter strictly for trial.
11.4. Nevertheless, an exception has been recognized where the
defence relies upon unimpeachable, incontrovertible evidence of
sterling quality - such as documents of undisputed authenticity – which
ex facie demonstrate that continuation of criminal proceedings would
be unjust and oppressive. This principle was recognized in Suryalakshmi
Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Rajvir Industries Ltd, and followed in subsequent
decisions. 11.5. Thus, the cumulative principles that emerge are: while
the jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is extraordinary and must be
exercised sparingly, it is the duty of the High Court to intervene where
continuation of criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of
process of law, or where the dispute is purely of a civil nature and
criminal colour has been artificially given to it. Conversely, where
disputed questions of fact arise requiring adjudication, the matter must
ordinarily proceed to trial.”
24. What emerges from the decisions referred to above is that
the inherent power to quash an FIR, though wide in amplitude, is
a power to be exercised with restraint and only within judicially
recognised limits. Quashing is the exception and not the rule. The
court does not, at this stage, assess the reliability or genuineness
of the allegations, weigh the evidence, or conduct what amounts
to a mini-trial. Its inquiry is confined to whether, on a plain reading
of the FIR, the allegations disclose a cognizable offence.
4
25. Nonetheless, the categories set out in the Bhajan Lal case
serve as signposts for identifying cases in which the extraordinary
jurisdiction may lawfully be invoked. Where the allegations are
specific, the offences are cognisable, and the accusations are not
inherently improbable on their face, the criminal process must
ordinarily be permitted to run its course. The power to quash is not
4 Supra

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CRLP No. - 1443 of 2026
to be used to stifle a legitimate prosecution at the threshold, and
the court must be careful to distinguish between cases that disclose
no offence whatsoever and those where the complaint of the
accused is, in substance, one going to the merits of the
prosecution, a matter that belongs exclusively to the trial.
26. The fulcrum of the dispute in the Impugned FIR is that the
petitioner is named as the principal accused in a scheme of financial
fraud perpetrated through M/s Enchant Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. and
a chain of associated companies. To determine whether the
contentions raised by the learned senior counsel on behalf of the
petitioner are sustainable, it becomes necessary to examine the
SFIO complaint and the Impugned FIR in juxtaposition.
27. To that end, an examination of the complaint filed by the
SFIO before the Special Court, pursuant to its investigation, reveals
that it was not limited to technical violations under the Act. The
SFIO examined the entire architecture of the alleged fraud, i.e. the
network of shell companies, the individual roles of the accused, and
the criminal conspiracy that bound them together.
28. The SFIO complaint reveals that a sum of INR 610.30 crore
is alleged to have been systematically routed through 84 accused
entities under investigation, each a shell company with no genuine
operational activity, for the purpose of acquiring land, real estate,
and sugar mills, and channelling funds to the Abdul Waheed
Educational and Charitable Trust.
29. It is noteworthy that M/s Enchant Infrastructure Private
Limited, the vehicle through which the Complainant was allegedly
defrauded, is named as an accused entity in the SFIO complaint.
Further, the complaint is not confined to the Act alone; it invokes

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CRLP No. - 1443 of 2026
several provisions of the IPC in respect of the same accused
persons and transactions of a similar nature.
30. Turning to the Impugned FIR, the excerpt of the relevant
contents of the same is as under:

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CRLP No. - 1443 of 2026

15
CRLP No. - 1443 of 2026

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CRLP No. - 1443 of 2026
31. The perusal of the Impugned FIR discloses that the
petitioner does not appear in the records of M/s Enchant as a
director or shareholder. His alleged role, as the FIR narrates, is of
a person who conceived and drove the fraudulent scheme through
associates and front companies while remaining distanced from
them on paper.
32. The petitioner’s connection to M/s Enchant is alleged
through Saurabh Mukund, who holds 5% shareholding in M/s
Enchant and is described in the FIR as the petitioner’s principal
associate in the scheme. Dilshad, who is stated to be the
petitioner’s brother-in-law and a co-accused, is similarly linked to
the network of companies through which investor funds were
collected and diverted. The FIR proceeds on the basis that these

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CRLP No. - 1443 of 2026
persons acted as the visible face of the scheme while the petitioner
remained its driving force.
33. The FIR further discloses the upstream ownership of M/s
Enchant. The remaining 95% of its shares, beyond Saurabh
Mukund’s 5%, vests in Mastiff Industries Pvt. Ltd., whose
shareholding is in turn divided between Net AgroFoods Pvt. Ltd. at
26.81% and VK Health Solutions Pvt. Ltd. at 73.19%. Dilshad is a
director of Net AgroFoods Pvt. Ltd., and Saurabh Mukund holds a
directorial position in VK Health Solutions Pvt. Ltd. The corporate
chain thus leads from M/s Enchant upward through Mastiff to
companies alleged to be controlled by the petitioner’s own
associates.
34. The Complainant invested INR 6,33,00,000/- in M/s Enchant
under an agreement for the development of a plot, which was
cancelled, and this is but one instance of the fraud alleged against
the petitioner. The FIR, more broadly, alleges that the petitioner
incorporated multiple companies using fabricated documents and
fictitious directors to collect investor funds. The investigation has
further revealed that these funds were channelled to the same
Trust of which the petitioner is the Chairman, as disclosed in the
SFIO complaint.
35. The SFIO complaint and the Impugned FIR, when read
together, disclose a degree of congruence that is material to the
adjudication of the present petition. The petitioner is arrayed as
Accused No. 1 in the SFIO complaint and is specifically identified as
the directing will and mind of the entire group’s operations. The
said excerpt of the SFIO complaint reads as under:

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CRLP No. - 1443 of 2026
“Para 24:
Accused No. 1, his family members, associates, professionals jointly
and severally through their various illegal acts have been able to create
an empire, which consists of a core group of high net worth companies
controlling smaller companies having land as an asset and a Trust
controlling Glocal University. It is submitted that the Trust was
primarily created as a vehicle for channelizing their own unaccounted
money and for creating a façade of respectability by running
educational institutions and promoting social cause. Accused No. 1
comes out as the directing will and mind of the entire operations and
piercing of the corporate veil would reveal his active participation in
the large scale laundering indulged by the group and creation of
agriculture land bank and real estate.
Para 25:
The key outcome of the investigation carried out by the Complainant
is that the unaccounted money amassed through the mining
operations were through a devious pre planned strategy converted into
a set of assets consisting of:
i. Large tract of agriculture land held through accused entities
ii. Closed sugar mills acquired from UPCGVNL at a throw away price,
which came with a land bank of 234.76 hectare.
iii. Majority shareholding in a set of companies which are in the
business of real estate and construction.
iv. Abdul Waheed Educational and Charitable Trust under whose aegis
Glocal University has been set up under a State legislation. In a short
period of three financial years, the balance sheet of the Trust grew from
Rs. 60.39 Crore to Rs. 171.46 Crore as on 31.03.2015.”
36. M/s Enchant Infrastructure Private Limited is the very
company at the centre of the Impugned FIR, and it is also named
as an accused entity in the SFIO complaint. The SFIO complaint
records that the petitioner’s group operated through an extensive
network of accused entities, spanning seven identified clusters, to
accumulate and launder funds across activities ranging from
fictitious share allotments to the acquisition of land, real estate,
and sugar mills.
37. The convergence is not confined to M/s Enchant alone. The
Impugned FIR traces the corporate ownership of M/s Enchant
through Mastiff Industries Pvt. Ltd., Net AgroFoods Pvt. Ltd. and
VK Health Solutions Pvt. Ltd. All three entities are already named

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CRLP No. - 1443 of 2026
in the SFIO complaint, with Mastiff Industries appearing as
Opposite Party No. 95, Net AgroFoods as Opposite Party No. 97 and
VK Health Solutions as Opposite Party No. 98. Each company in the
chain identified in the Impugned FIR as a conduit for the alleged
fraud is therefore already an accused entity in the proceedings
before the Special Court.
38. The legal provisions invoked in both proceedings also point
in the same direction. The SFIO complaint, in its prayer, invokes
IPC Sections 406, 420, 468, 471 and 477-A, inter alia, read with
Section 120-B IPC, in addition to provisions of the Act. The core
provisions under which the Impugned FIR stands registered are, to
a substantial extent, the same. In pursuing the present
investigation, the STF does not venture into any legal territory that
the SFIO has not already covered.
39. In this context, it is crystal clear that the Impugned FIR
names the petitioner in connection with the same companies, and
the same alleged modus operandi that form the subject matter of
the SFIO complaint pending before the Special Court. The offences
invoked are, to a substantial extent, those already charged in the
SFIO complaint in connection with the accused entities and the
transactions under inquiry.
40. Since the basis for filing the instant petition is the pendency
of the SFIO complaint of a similar nature before the appropriate
authority, we deem it appropriate to discuss aspects of the
statutory framework governing the SFIO’s investigative mandate,
as they have a direct impact on the adjudication of the instant case.
41. The Companies Act, 2013 established the SFIO as a body of
specialists with expertise in banking, forensic audit, capital
markets, taxation and law. Section 447 of the Act, which defines

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CRLP No. - 1443 of 2026
fraud in wide terms, covers the very conduct alleged in the
Impugned FIR. The investigation of such fraud demands expertise
that ordinary police investigation cannot be expected to bring.
42. Section 212(2) of the Act addresses this directly. Where the
Central Government assigns investigation to the SFIO, no other
investigating agency shall proceed further, and all relevant
5
documents shall stand transferred. As held in SFIO v. Rahul Modi ,
upon such assignment, the original agencies are completely
divested of jurisdiction, and the transfer is irrevocable. The relevant
part reads as under:
“33. The very expression 'assign' in Section 212(3) of the 2013 Act
contemplates transfer of investigation for all purposes whereafter
the original investigating agencies of the Central Government or
any State Government are completely denuded of any power to
conduct and complete the investigation in respect of the offences
contemplated therein. The idea under sub-section (2) is complete
transfer of investigation. The transfer under sub-section (2) of
Section 213 would not stand revoked or recalled in any contingency.
If a time-limit is construed and contemplated within which the
investigation must be completed then logically, the provisions
would have dealt with as to what must happen if the time-limit is
not adhered to. The statute must also have contemplated a
situation that a valid investigation undertaken by any investigating
agency of the Central Government or the State Government which
was transferred to SFIO, must then be retransferred to the said
investigating agencies. But the statute does not contemplate that.
The transfer is irrevocable and cannot be recalled in any manner.
Once assigned, SFIO continues to have the power to conduct and
complete investigation. If that be so, can such power stand
curtailed or diminished if the investigation is not completed within
a particular period. The statute has not prescribed any period for
completion of investigation.”
43. It is also pertinent to note that the SFIO's jurisdiction is not
confined to violations under the Companies Act alone. Once a
transaction is assigned to the SFIO for investigation, its authority
extends to all offences arising from that transaction, including those
under the IPC.
5 (2019) 5 SCC 266, Para 33.

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44. Section 212(15) of the Act further reinforces the position.
The SFIO’s investigation report filed before the Special Court shall
be deemed a police report under Section 173 CrPC. The SFIO
therefore stands in the shoes of a police officer for all purposes of
trial, including for IPC offences.
45. Section 212(17) of the Act does not, in our view, preserve
any concurrent right of investigation by other agencies. The
subsection provides for inter-agency sharing of information and
documents. It does not reopen what Section 212(2) has closed.
46. Notwithstanding the foregoing, there is one material
distinction between the SFIO complaint and the Impugned FIR. The
SFIO complaint, as filed before the Special Court, does not
specifically examine the transaction attributed to the complainant
in respect of Plot.
47. The FIR, by contrast, is centrally concerned with this
transaction. The Complainant invested INR 6,33,00,000/- in M/s
Enchant for the development of Plot GH-02-D; the allotment was
subsequently cancelled, and the funds were never returned. The
Impugned FIR is therefore the only proceeding that seeks to bring
this transaction within the ambit of criminal inquiry, and the
Complainant has no recourse outside of it.
48. Applying the settled position of law to the facts of the
instant case, we are of the considered view that the present case
does not warrant quashing of the FIR in its entirety. We say so
because the allegations in the Impugned FIR are specific, the
complainant’s loss has been quantified and the transaction is
identifiable. More importantly, the Complainant’s grievance finds no
place in the SFIO Complaint. To quash the Impugned FIR would
leave him without any remedy for a loss of his hard-earned money.

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CRLP No. - 1443 of 2026
49. We have also considered whether the judgment rendered by
the learned Single Bench of the Delhi High Court in the case of
6
Ashish Bhalla v. State can come to the petitioner’s rescue.
However, the facts in the said case were materially different as the
complainant before the SFIO and the EOW were one and the same
person, and the two complaints were verbatim copies of each other.
50. Notably, in the abovementioned case, the complainant
himself acknowledged in his complaint to the EOW that the nature
of the offences warranted investigation only by a specialised expert
agency. The Delhi High Court found the FIR to be a deliberate act
of forum shopping, filed with an ulterior motive against the
accused. On the contrary, in the instant case, the Complainant is
not the person who triggered the SFIO proceedings, and the
transaction forming the subject matter of the Impugned FIR does
not find a place in the SFIO complaint.
51. Crucially, in Ashish Bhalla, the learned Single Judge not only
transferred the proceedings to the SFIO but also quashed the FIR.
That twin relief was granted because the same complainant had
approached two agencies with verbatim complaints on identical
facts. The present case stands on an altogether different footing.
52. Be that as it may, the power to quash an FIR is one that
courts exercise with circumspection. The allegations in the
Impugned FIR, taken at face value, disclose the commission of
cognizable offences under Sections 406, 420 and 120-B of the IPC.
The transaction forming the basis of the Impugned FIR is specific,
the amount involved is ascertainable, and the complainant is
identifiable. There is no ground on which the investigation can be
foreclosed at the threshold.
6 2023 SCC OnLine Del 5818

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CRLP No. - 1443 of 2026
53. Reverting to the question of relief, the prayer sought by the
petitioner is the outright quashing of the Impugned FIR. As this
Court has noted, the Complainant has no avenue of redress outside
of this proceeding in respect of the transaction already referred to
above. Acceding to the prayer for quashing would leave the
Complainant remediless.
54. However, the refusal to quash does not, in this Court’s view,
fully address the situation at hand. While it is true that the
Complainant has suffered a specific loss as part of the alleged
fraud, it is also true that the said fraud is a part of a series of
activities spanning multiple entities and is already under the SFIO’s
examination. Therefore, transferring the Complainant’s grievance
to the SFIO is the viable course that reconciles his right to an
effective remedy while preventing the multiplicity of proceedings.
55. In this regard, admittedly, the SFIO has already completed
its investigation, thereafter submitted the complaint, and the
Special Judge has taken cognisance; however, the said factum does
not exhaust the agency’s investigative mandate. Section 193(9) of
the BNSS expressly provides that nothing therein shall be deemed
to preclude further investigation after a report has been forwarded
to the Magistrate, and that further evidence, whether oral or
documentary, may be collected and placed before him.
56. We are conscious that the power to transfer investigation to
another agency is an extraordinary power, to be exercised sparingly
7
and only in exceptional circumstances. However, where the same
scheme of fraud is already under investigation by a specialised
agency, entrusting one strand of it to a general law enforcement
agency does not serve the interests of either party. The
Complainant requires a thorough, expert inquiry into his specific
7 Kabir Shankar Bose v. State of West Bengal (2024) INSC 930

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CRLP No. - 1443 of 2026
grievance. The petitioner requires an investigation that does not
fragment or contradict the findings already placed before the
Special Court.
57. In the facts and circumstances of this case, therefore,
transfer of investigation in the Impugned FIR qua the petitioner
herein to the SFIO is the course that best serves the ends of justice
for both parties. It preserves the integrity of the broader inquiry,
avoids the risk of conflicting outcomes, and ensures that the
Complainant’s grievance is addressed within the framework of an
investigation that already encompasses the scheme of which it
forms a part.
58. The preceding discussion has produced two findings that
together determine the appropriate relief. This Court has declined
to quash the Impugned FIR, for the Complainant’s grievance
regarding the Plot GH-02-D transaction finds no other forum. At the
same time, permitting the STF to continue a parallel investigation
into the same corporate network already before the Special Court
would fragment what is, in substance, a single and indivisible
scheme of fraud.
59. The transfer of the investigation to the SFIO, however, is a
relief the petitioner has not prayed for. The petition seeks only
quashing and nothing beyond. This Court is nonetheless
empowered to grant such relief as the facts of the case demand,
and the jurisdiction under Article 226 is not limited to the prayer as
framed.
60. In exercise of that jurisdiction, this Court directs the transfer
of the investigation in the Impugned FIR qua the petitioner to the
SFIO, which is the agency already seized of the broader fraud of
which it forms a part.

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61. In view of the foregoing discussion, the writ petition is
disposed of in the following terms.
i) The prayer for quashing the Impugned FIR in entirety is
rejected. The investigation under the Impugned FIR qua
petitioner shall, however, stand transferred to the Serious
Fraud Investigation Office with immediate effect;
The STF shall forthwith transmit the case diary, all statements
ii)
recorded, documents seized or collected, electronic records
and any other investigative material gathered in connection
with the Impugned FIR qua petitioner to the SFIO;
The SFIO shall treat the material so transmitted as
iii)
forming part of its ongoing investigation and shall investigate
the allegations arising from the Plot GH-02-D transaction of
the Complainant as further investigation within the meaning
of Section 193(9) of the BNSS. Upon completion, the SFIO
shall be at liberty to file a supplementary complaint before
the Special Court, if the investigation so warrants, in
accordance with Section 212(15) of the Companies Act,
2013; and
iv) The Special Court, New Delhi, before which the original SFIO
complaint is pending, shall be informed of this order.
62. At last, we may hasten to add that ordinarily, investigation by
the SFIO is initiated pursuant to an assignment order of the Central
Government under Section 212(1) of the Act. In the present case,
however, the SFIO’s investigation against the petitioner was already
sanctioned by the Central Government pursuant to the orders
passed by the Supreme Court. This order does not constitute a

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fresh assignment but merely extends the scope of an ongoing
inquiry. No fresh sanction is therefore required.
63. Ordered Accordingly.
64. All interim orders passed during the pendency of this writ
petition shall stand vacated.
65. The pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
(Lakshmi Kant Shukla,J.) (Chandra Dhari Singh,J.)
July 16, 2026
Saurabh
Digitally signed by :-
SAURABH KUMAR
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad