Ashwini Pal vs State Nct Of Delhi And Anr

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on : 13.02.2026
Judgment delivered on: 22.05.2026
+ CRL.M.C. 5219/2024
ASHWINI PAL .....Petitioner
versus
STATE NCT OF DELHI AND ANR ..... Respondents
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Applicant : Mr. Nandan Kumar Rai & Mr. Gajendra
Mohan Thakur, Advs.
For the Respondent : SI Prashant Malik, PS Laxmi Nagar
CORAM
HON’BLE MR JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN
J U D G M E N T
CRL.M.A. 21905/2025 (appln. on behalf of Respondent No. 2 for
recall of order dated 03.12.2024) & CRL.M.A. 21906/2025
(exemption)
1. The present application has been filed by Respondent No.2/Ms.
P (hereinafter “ Applicant ” ), seeking recall of the order dated
03.12.2024 passed by this Court in CRL.M.C. 5219/2024 whereby
FIR No.152/2024 registered at Police Station Laxmi Nagar under
Sections 376(2)(n)/313/506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“ IPC ”)
and all proceedings emanating therefrom were quashed in exercise of
powers under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,
2023 (“ BNSS ”).
2. Succinctly stated, the record reflects that FIR No.152/2024
dated 29.05.2024 came to be registered at Police Station Laxmi Nagar
for offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(n)/313/506 of the IPC
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on the complaint made by Applicant herein. The allegations in the
FIR, in substance, were that the Applicant and the original
Petitioner/Sh. Ashwani Pal-Husband (hereinafter “ Respondent ” ),
were, then, in a live-in relationship during which the Respondent
established physical relations with the Applicant, on the assurance of
marriage and further caused termination of her pregnancy against her
will by administering abortion pills. It was alleged that the Respondent
subsequently refused to marry the Applicant, leading to registration of
the FIR in question.
3. Undisputedly, subsequent to registration of the FIR, the parties
solemnized their marriage on 31.05.2024 according to Hindu rites and
ceremonies.
4. Thereafter, the Respondent approached this Court by way of
CRL.M.C. 5219/2024 seeking quashing of the aforesaid FIR and all
proceedings arising therefrom on the ground that the disputes between
the parties stood amicably resolved and the parties have married.
5. This Court, vide order dated 03.12.2024, allowed the petition
and quashed the FIR. The said order records that both parties were
personally present before the Court and had been duly identified by
the Investigating Officer and further records that the Applicant, upon
being specifically queried by the Court, stated that:
a) she was in a consensual relationship with the Respondent;
b) the complaint had been lodged, due to certain
misunderstandings between the parties and when the
Respondent had refused to marry her;
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c) subsequently, the marriage had been solemnized on
31.05.2024; and
d) she was happily residing with the Respondent and did not
wish to pursue the proceedings arising out of the FIR.
6. The order also notes that the Petition was supported by a sworn
affidavit of the Applicant affirming that she had no objection if the
proceedings emanating from the FIR were quashed.
7. While passing the Order dated 03.12.2024, this Court examined
the legal position governing quashing of criminal proceedings
involving non-compoundable offences and specifically adverted to the
decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Narinder Singh v. State of
Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466; Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat ,
(2017) 9 SCC 641; Kapil Gupta v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2022 SCC
OnLine SC 1030; and Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of
Maharashtra, AIR 2019 SC 4010. This Court, specially noting that
though offences under Sections 376(2)(n) and 313 IPC are grave
offences involving mental depravity and ordinarily are not liable to be
quashed merely on the basis of a settlement, however, taking into
consideration the peculiar facts of the case including the statement of
the prosecutrix that the relationship was consensual, that the FIR was
lodged when marriage was refused, that the parties had already
solemnized marriage and that she no longer wished to pursue the
matter, exercised jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS and quashed
the proceedings.
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8. Now, after about 6 months of passing of the aforesaid Order, the
present application came to be filed seeking recall of the same.
9. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Applicant submits
that the order dated 03.12.2024 was obtained by fraud, coercion and
misrepresentation practised by the Respondent upon both the
Applicant as well as this Court.
10. It is submitted that the Applicant had agreed to quashing of the
FIR only because the Respondent and his family members had assured
her that the marriage would be honoured sincerely and that she would
be given a dignified matrimonial life.
11. It is contended that the very foundation of the quashing order
stood premised upon the belief that the marriage between the parties
was genuine and that continuation of criminal proceedings would
adversely affect the future matrimonial life of the parties.
12. It is contended that the subsequent conduct of the Respondent
demonstrates that the marriage itself was merely a device adopted to
evade criminal prosecution. It is alleged that shortly after the FIR
came to be quashed, the Applicant was subjected to physical violence,
emotional abuse, financial exploitation and repeated threats by the
Respondent and his family members, which show that he had no
genuine intention to continue the marital relationship. Reliance has
also been placed upon an alleged audio recording/transcript.
13. It is urged that the Applicant has been abandoned by the
Respondent on 06.04.2025 and on her last visit to the matrimonial
home, she was subjected to assault by the Respondent leading to her
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hospitalization on 28.05.2025. Reliance has also been placed upon
complaints made before the National Commission for Women and
medical documents.
14. Hence, it is prayed that the above order of quashing be re-
called.
15. Per contra , the it is submitted on behalf of the Respondent that
at the outset that the present application is not maintainable in law. It
is submitted that the order dated 03.12.2024 is a final judicial order
passed after due consideration of the factual and legal aspects of the
matter and after recording the voluntary statements of the parties
before the Court. Once the order attained finality, this Court became
functus officio and cannot reopen or review the same in view of the
express embargo contained under Section 362 CrPC corresponding to
Section 403 BNSS. Reliance has been placed on the decisions of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh
Bajwa, AIR 2001 SC 43 and Raghunath Sharma v. State of
Haryana, 2025 INSC 723 to contend that inherent powers under
Section 482 CrPC/Section 528 BNSS cannot be invoked to review or
alter a final judgment.
16. It is further submitted that once the parties are admittedly
legally wedded, the allegation of consent obtained on a false promise
to marry loses all force in law. A legally wedded husband cannot
retrospectively be prosecuted for rape on the basis of a promise that
has already been fulfilled by marriage.
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17. It is further submitted that the allegations now raised by the
Applicant pertain entirely to alleged post-quashing events relating to
matrimonial disputed and, even if assumed to be true, the same would
at best furnish fresh causes of action for which separate remedies are
available under law.
18. It is also submitted that no material has been placed on record to
demonstrate that any statement made before this Court at the time of
quashing was forged, fabricated or false to the knowledge of the
parties at that stage.
19. It is argued that the parties had admittedly solemnized marriage
on 31.05.2024, much prior to the quashing order dated 03.12.2024,
and had continued to reside together thereafter. Therefore, subsequent
matrimonial discord cannot retrospectively invalidate the judicial
order passed by this Court. The Respondent also disputes the
correctness and admissibility of the alleged electronic evidence relied
upon by the Petitioner and submits that the same cannot form the basis
for recalling a final judicial order.
20. It has also been urged that the Applicant herself has a history of
abusive and violent conduct towards the Respondent, including
beating, hurting, and threatening him and she is already on bail from
the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in connection with serious offences
under Sections 323, 304, 504 and 506 of the IPC and another FIR has
also been registered against her in Allahabad under Sections 115(2),
352, and 35(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita.
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21. It has also been urged that post marriage, the Applicant has
continuously subjected the Petitioner to physical assaults,
intimidation, and coercive conduct, resulting in grave emotional,
mental, and financial hardship. The Applicant frequently expelled the
Respondent from her residence, leaving him to reside at railway
stations or roadside and even instigating him to commit suicide. On
13.03.2025, the Applicant attacked the Respondent, causing head
injuries with bleeding and visible nail marks. Though PCR 112 was
called, instead of recording his complaint, SI Aman, allegedly acting
under the influence of Applicant’s cousin sister SI Priyanka Gupta (a
Delhi Police officer), illegally detained the Respondent.
22. Hence, it is prayed that the present frivolous application be
dismissed as the same is filed only to harass the Respondent
23. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
material placed on record.
Analysis and Findings
24. At the outset, it becomes necessary to examine the legal
framework governing the power of recall or review in criminal
proceedings. Section 362 CrPC (corresponding to Section 403 of the
BNSS) reads as under:
“ 362. Court not to alter judgment.— Save as otherwise provided
by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no
Court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a
case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or
arithmetical error.”
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25. The provision embodies the well settled principle that once a
Court has pronounced and signed its final judgment or order disposing
of a criminal proceeding, it becomes functus officio and lacks
jurisdiction to undertake a substantive review or reconsideration of the
matter except to the limited extent expressly permitted by statute. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hari Singh Mann (supra) categorically
held that the Court becomes functus officio the moment the final order
disposing of the case is signed and such order cannot thereafter be
altered except for correcting clerical or arithmetical errors. Similarly,
in Raghunath Sharma (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated
that inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC cannot be exercised in a
manner that defeats the express statutory prohibition contained under
Section 362 of the CrPC. The relevant extract is reproduced herein
below: -
“8. Chapter XXVII of the Cr. P.C. deals with ‘judgment’. It defines
what a judgment is; in what language it should be delivered; its
contents; effect (arrest, payment of compensation, release, etc.).
Section 362 provides that a Court shall not, once it has signed the
judgment or final order disposing of a case, alter or review the
same, except to correct an error clerical or arithmetic.
9. The scope of this power has been discussed in several judgments
of this Court.
9.1. Sanjeev Kapoor v. Chandana Kapoor7 discusses the scope of
this power in the following terms:
“19. The legislative scheme as delineated by Section 369 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, as well as legislative
scheme as delineated by Section 362 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973 is one and the same. The embargo put
on the criminal court to alter or review its judgment is with a
purpose and object. The judgments of this Court as noted
above, summarised the law to the effect that criminal justice
delivery system does not clothe criminal court with power to
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alter or review the judgment or final order disposing of the
case except to correct the clerical or arithmetical error. After
the judgment delivered by a criminal court or passing of the
final order disposing of the case the court becomes functus
officio and any mistake or glaring omission is left to be
corrected only by appropriate forum in accordance with law.”
9.2. In Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa8, this Court
observed:
“10. Section 362 of the Code mandates that no court, when it
has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case shall
alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or an
arithmetical error. The section is based on an acknowledged
principle of law that once a matter is finally disposed of by a
court, the said court in the absence of a specific statutory
provision becomes functus officio and disentitled to entertain
a fresh prayer for the same relief unless the former order of
final disposal is set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction
in a manner prescribed by law. The court becomes functus
officio the moment the official order disposing of a case is
signed. Such an order cannot be altered except to the extent of
correcting a clerical or an arithmetical error. …”
9.3. It is clear from the above extracts that Section 362 Cr. P.C.
provides for a fairly limited scope of the exercise of such power.
Next, what is required to be seen is whether the phrase, “Save as
otherwise provided by this Code” permits such alterations under
Section 482 Cr. P.C.
xxx xxxxxx
9.3.2. In Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal10, it was categorically held that:
“5. The appellant points out that he invoked the inherent
power of the High Court saved by Section 482 of the Code and
that notwithstanding the prohibition imposed by Section 362
the High Court had power to grant relief. Now it is well settled
that the inherent power of the court cannot be exercised for
doing that which is specifically prohibited by the Code
(Sankatha Singh v. State of U.P., [AIR 1962 SC 1208 : 1962
Supp (2) SCR 817 : (1962) 2 Cri LJ 288]). It is true that the
prohibition in Section 362 against the court altering or
reviewing its judgment is subject to what is “otherwise
provided by this Court or by any other law for the time being
in force”. Those words, however, refer to those provisions only
where the court has been expressly authorised by the Code or
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other law to alter or review its judgment. The inherent power
of the court is not contemplated by the saving provision
contained in Section 362 and, therefore, the attempt to invoke
that power can be of no avail.”
(Emphasis supplied)
9.3.3. The position in Sooraj Devi (supra) stands referred
to/followed in Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee11; State of Punjab v.
Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar12; Gian Singh v. State of Punjab13;
and Telangana Housing Board v. Azamunnisa Begum14.
xxx xxxxxx
10.1. State of M.P. v. Man Singh16, with reference to a decision
rendered by a three-Judge Bench in State of Kerala v. M.M.
Manikantan Nair17, makes this position clear as follows:
“7. It is well settled law that the High Court has no
jurisdiction to review its order either under Section 362 or
under Section 482 CrPC [State of Kerala v. M.M. Manikantan
Nair, (2001) 4 SCC 752 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 808]. The inherent
power under Section 482 CrPC cannot be used by the High
Court to reopen or alter an order disposing of a petition
decided on merits [State v. K.V. Rajendran, (2008) 8 SCC 673
: (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 600 : 2009 Cri LJ 355]. After disposing
of a case on merits, the Court becomes functus officio and
Section 362 CrPC expressly bars review and specifically
provides that no court after it has signed its judgment shall
alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or
arithmetical error [Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh
Bajwa, (2001) 1 SCC 169 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 113]. Recall of
judgment would amount to alteration or review of judgment
which is not permissible under Section 362 CrPC. It cannot be
validated by the High Court invoking its inherent powers
[Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal, (1981) 1 SCC 500 : 1981 SCC (Cri)
188 : AIR 1981 SC 736].”
(Emphasis supplied)
11. Again, in Narayan Prasad v. State of Bihar18 this Court
reiterated that once a judgment has been passed, the powers
under Section 482 Cr. P.C. do not permit its alteration or review.
Such power is meant solely to secure the ends of justice and it
cannot be taken to mean doing something that is expressly
prohibited by statute.
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12. In view of the above discussion of law, the conclusion is that
the impugned judgment was passed by the High Court without
any authority or basis. Once the criminal cases had been
quashed, under Section 482 Cr. P.C. on the ground of
compromise entered into between the parties, one of the parties
violating terms thereof is a ground entirely foreign to law, to once
again invoke such powers and recall the order of quashing.
Violations of a term of a compromise have their own avenues of
law from which they can be enforced. ”
(Emphasis Supplied)
26. Hence, there can be no quarrel with the proposition that
criminal courts do not possess any inherent power of substantive
review analogous to civil jurisdiction and once an order has been
passed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, the Court
should be slow in again exercising these powers to recall such order,
passed to prevent abuse of process of law, on account of any alleged
breach of conditions agreed to by the parties.
27. It has been urged by the Applicant that fraud vitiates all judicial
acts and an order obtained by practising fraud upon the Court does not
enjoy sanctity in the eyes of law. Therefore, the limited question which
arises for consideration is whether the present application discloses
circumstances sufficient to prima facie establish that the order dated
03.12.2024 was itself procured by fraud practised upon the Court.
28. In the considered opinion of this Court, the answer must be in
the negative.
29. A careful reading of the order dated 03.12.2024 demonstrates
that the FIR was not quashed merely on the basis of a future assurance
by the Respondent that he would maintain cordial matrimonial
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relations with the Applicant. Rather, the order records several material
circumstances, that, Firstly , the Applicant herself personally appeared
before this Court and categorically stated that she had been in a
consensual relationship with the Respondent and that the complaint
had been lodged, due to certain “misunderstandings” when the
Respondent had refused to marry her. Secondly , the applicant
acknowledged before this Court that the marriage between the parties
had already been solemnized on 31.05.2024. Thirdly , the Applicant
specifically stated before this Court that she was happily residing with
the Respondent and did not wish to pursue proceedings arising from
the FIR. Fourthly , the petition was supported by a sworn affidavit of
the applicant affirming her no objection to the quashing of the FIR.
Fifthly , this Court independently examined the legal permissibility of
quashing proceedings involving offences under Sections 376(2)(n) and
313 IPC and exercised discretion after considering the applicable legal
principles.
30. Thus, the order dated 03.12.2024 was not founded merely upon
a speculative expectation of future matrimonial harmony but upon
contemporaneous statements voluntarily made before the Court
coupled with the admitted factum of marriage between the parties.
31. Additionally, this Court, while passing the impugned order was
also conscious of the settled proposition of law that every breach of
promise to marry would not ipso facto amount to rape. To attract the
offence punishable under Section 376 of the IPC on the allegation of a
false promise to marry, it must prima facie appear that the promise
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itself was false from inception, made in bad faith, and with no
intention whatsoever of being honoured at the time when such promise
was extended. The promise must bear a direct nexus with the
prosecutrix’s decision to engage in the sexual relationship. A
subsequent breakdown of the relationship, reluctance to marry, or
failure of the relationship by itself cannot convert an otherwise
consensual relationship into an offence of rape. The Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar (supra) has clearly drawn a
distinction between a false promise made in bad faith and a mere
breach of promise arising subsequently due to changed circumstances
or failure of the relationship.
32. Hence, the above principles and the factum of marriage between
the parties was duly considered by this Court while exercising
jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS.
33. Significantly, the marriage between the parties had been
solemnized on 31.05.2024, whereas the FIR came to be quashed much
later on 03.12.2024. Thus, the marriage was not brought into existence
immediately before passing of the quashing order.
34. Though the Applicant now seeks to contend that the Respondent
never intended to honour the marriage and that the marriage itself was
merely a device to evade criminal prosecute, such allegation
essentially rests upon subsequent conduct and matrimonial discord
which arose thereafter.
35. These allegations relating to physical violence, cruelty,
emotional abuse, threats, financial exploitation, desertion, complaints
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before the NCW and alleged hospitalization (i.e. events which
allegedly occurred after the order dated 03.12.2024), even if assumed
to be correct, themselves do not inevitably establish that the
statements made before this Court on 03.12.2024 were false to the
knowledge of the parties at that stage or that the order itself was
procured by practising fraud upon the Court.
36. It is also apposite to mention that both parties have levelled
extensive allegations and counter-allegations against each other
pertaining to events allegedly occurring after the passing of the
quashing order dated 03.12.2024. While the Applicant has alleged acts
of cruelty, assault, abandonment, intimidation and emotional and
financial abuse, the Respondent, in turn, has alleged physical violence,
coercive conduct, threats and harassment at the hands of the Applicant.
This Court is consciously refraining from entering into an adjudication
upon the correctness, truthfulness or evidentiary value of such rival
allegations in the present proceedings.
37. The subsequent matrimonial disputes and acrimony sought to be
projected by either side cannot enlarge the limited jurisdiction of this
Court in a recall application and even commission of fresh offences
cannot automatically lead to the inference that the settlement recorded
earlier or the judicial order passed thereupon stood vitiated ab initio
by fraud.
38. Matrimonial relationships may unfortunately deteriorate after
marriage, on account of a multitude of circumstances. At best, the
allegations made by both parties reflect a subsequent breakdown of the
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marital relationship and deterioration of matrimonial harmony after
the quashing of the FIR.
39. Additionally, this Court is also unable to overlook the fact that
the Applicant voluntarily appeared before the Court and made
categorical statements supporting quashing of the FIR. No allegation
is made that the Applicant was prevented from freely addressing the
Court or that any statement recorded by the Court was inaccurately
transcribed. The contention that the Applicant had been “ tutored ” to
support the quashing petition is a matter which cannot be accepted
merely on subsequent assertions, particularly when the statements
were made before a judicial forum in the course of proceedings where
the Applicant had the full opportunity to express her stand
independently.
40. The present application, in substance, seeks reopening of a
quashing order on the basis of subsequent matrimonial disputes and
allegations arising after the FIR had already been quashed. Permitting
such a course would fundamentally defeat the very object underlying
the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS in
matrimonial and private disputes, where criminal proceedings are
quashed after parties voluntarily settle their disputes and choose to
restore or continue their relationship. If every subsequent matrimonial
disagreement, breakdown of marriage, or allegation arising after
quashing were permitted to revive concluded criminal proceedings, no
order passed on the basis of settlement or reconciliation would ever
attain finality. The jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS is
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intended to secure finality to such settlements and prevent
continuation of criminal proceedings where parties themselves choose
to bury their disputes. Accepting the present contention would render
such finality illusory and would expose concluded proceedings to
perpetual uncertainty depending upon future developments in the
matrimonial relationship.
41. At the same time, this Court deems it appropriate to clarify that
no opinion is being expressed in the present order on the veracity or
otherwise of the allegations made by the Applicant regarding alleged
acts of cruelty, assault, intimidation, domestic violence or any other
subsequent criminal conduct attributed to the Respondent. If the
Applicant is aggrieved by any subsequent acts allegedly committed by
the Respondent or any other person, it shall remain open to her to avail
such remedies as may be available in law and any such proceedings
shall be considered independently on their own merits uninfluenced by
observations made herein.
42. Consequently, this Court finds no merit in the present
application. The same is accordingly dismissed.
43. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
AMIT MAHAJAN, J
MAY 22, 2026
Jan
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