Swamideen vs State Of U.P. And 3 Others

A.F.R
Reserved on 29.05.2026
Delivered on 21.07.2026
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 686 of 2026
Swamideen
…..Appellant(s)
Versus
State of U.P. and 3 others
…..Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s) : Vijay Bahadur Shivhare
Counsel for Respondent(s) : G.A., Indrajeet
Court No. - 93
HON'BLE SANTOSH RAI, J.
1. Heard Sri Vijay Bahadur Shivhare, learned counsel for the
appellant and Sri Rajesh Kumar Shukla, learned A.G.A. for the
State and perused the record.
2. This criminal appeal has been preferred by the appellant,
Swamideen, against the judgment and order dated 10.12.2025
passed by the learned Additional District Judge/Special Judge,
POCSO Act, Hamirpur ("the trial court") in Session Case
POCSOACT No. 108 of 2022 No. 108 of 2022 (State vs.
Swamideen), arising out of Case Crime No. 417 of 2021,

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registered at Police Station Sumerpur, District Hamirpur by
whereby the appellant was convicted under Section 6 of the
POCSO Act and sentenced to undergo 20 years' rigorous
imprisonment together with a fine of Rs. 10,000/-, and in default
of payment of fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment for
six month.
3. In view of the sensitivity attached to matters concerning
sexual offences against children, and in keeping with the
direction of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the identity of a
child victim of a sexual offence ought not to be disclosed, the
victim is referred to in this judgment as "the victim" and not by
name.
4. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 10.12.2021, at about
10:48 a.m., an FIR was lodged at Police Station Sumerpur by
Smt. Rani Prajapati (PW-2), on the written report (Tahrir)
scribed at her instance, alleging that on 05.12.2021, at about
12:00 noon, her daughter, the victim, aged about four years, was
playing at the door of the house when the appellant, a neighbour
aged about eighty years, lured her with the offer of a toffee, took
her inside his house, bolted the door, and committed obscene
acts upon her private parts. It is alleged that on the victim raising
an alarm, the appellant released her, whereupon she returned
home and informed her mother, following which the informant
went to the police station and lodged the report. On the strength
of the said report, Case Crime No. 417 of 2021 was initially
registered under Section 354 IPC and Section 10 of the POCSO
Act. During investigation, upon the victim's age being
ascertained as approximately four to five years on the basis of
her birth certificate, an application was moved by the
Investigating Officer for amendment of the sections applied,

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which was allowed by the court, and a charge-sheet (Charge-
sheet No. 384-A of 2021) came to be submitted against the
appellant under Section 376-AB IPC and Section 6 of the
POCSO Act. The appellant was arrested on 28.12.2021 and,
upon commitment, charges under Section 376-AB IPC and
Section 6 of the POCSO Act were framed against him by the trial
court, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
5. In support of its case, the prosecution examined six
witnesses: PW-1, the victim; PW-2, Smt. Rani Prajapati, the
informant and mother of the victim; PW-3, Dr. Anshu Mishra,
the Medical Officer who examined the victim; PW-4, Head
Constable Devlal Tiwari, the scribe of the computerised FIR;
PW-5, Dr. Pushpendra Kumar, the Medical Officer in-charge
who proved the delivery register and birth record of the victim;
and PW-6, Inspector Rajkumar Verma, the Investigating Officer.
The prosecution also relied upon documentary evidence,
including the victim's statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C.
(Exhibit Ka-1), the written report (Exhibit Ka-2), the medico-
legal examination report (Exhibit Ka-3), the General Diary entry
(Exhibit Ka-4), the FIR (Exhibit Ka-5), the delivery register
(Exhibit Ka-6), the birth certificate (Exhibit Ka-7), the site plan
(Exhibit Ka-8), the arrest memo (Exhibit Ka-9), the charge-sheet
(Exhibit Ka-10), and the report of the Forensic Science
Laboratory.
6. In his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., the appellant
denied the prosecution version in its entirety and asserted that he
had been falsely implicated on account of personal enmity, that
the witnesses had deposed falsely at the instance of the police
and the informant, and that he was elsewhere, undergoing
medical treatment, on the date of the alleged occurrence.

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7. In support of his defence, the appellant examined two
witnesses: DW-1, Shivdayal, the Village Pradhan of Para
Raipura; and DW-2, Smt. Sangeeta, the appellant's daughter-in-
law. The defence also placed on record documentary evidence,
including a notice/registration slip of Sadguru Netra
Chikitsalaya, Janki Kund, Chitrakoot (Exhibit 41-Kha) and an
out-patient registration record bearing code "DTDREF 2204", to
demonstrate that the appellant was undergoing eye treatment at
Chitrakoot between 05.12.2021 and 10.12.2021, and a
representation dated 12.12.2021 addressed by the villagers of
Para Raipura to the Station House Officer, Sumerpur, in support
of the said defence.
8. By the impugned judgment, the trial court convicted the
appellant, principally on the findings that (i) the five-day delay
in lodging the FIR stood sufficiently explained; (ii) there were no
material contradictions in the testimony of the victim (PW-1) and
the other prosecution witnesses, and that the victim's testimony
stood corroborated by her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C.;
and (iii) the appellant had failed to displace the prosecution case.
Aggrieved thereby, the appellant has preferred the present
appeal.
9. Learned counsel for the appellant has assailed the
impugned judgment on the following principal grounds:
(i) The trial court has erroneously convicted the appellant
under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, despite the fact that he stood
charged, and was tried, for the graver offence under Section
376-AB IPC read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act; the manner
in which the trial court has dealt with the two distinct charges
discloses non-application of mind to the ingredients of the
offences and to the evidence bearing upon each.

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(ii)
The delay of five days in lodging the FIR has not, in
fact, been satisfactorily explained. The prosecution's own
witnesses have given inconsistent and irreconcilable accounts of
when, and by whom, information of the incident was received
and communicated.
(iii) The FIR, as originally lodged, invoked only Section
354 IPC and Section 10 of the POCSO Act, offences of
outraging modesty and sexual assault and contained no
allegation whatsoever of penetrative sexual assault.
(iv) The testimony of PW-2 is riddled with material
contradictions and improvements. She has, on the one hand,
stated that the victim was at home with her between 12:00 and
1:00 p.m., the very time of the alleged occurrence, and that she
did not see the victim go towards the appellant's house, while, on
the other hand, maintaining that the occurrence took place at
12:00 noon an inherently self-contradictory position on a
witness's own opportunity to observe the events she purports to
describe.
(v) PW-2 denied being present when the victim's statement
under Section 164 Cr.P.C. was recorded before the Magistrate,
whereas the record of that very statement reflects her presence.
(vi) The victim's statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. itself
contains a material and unexplained discrepancy going to the
very root of identification of accused, and furthermore,
contradictory statement regarding time of occurrence.
(vii) The victim's description of the act, using the word
Musanna", was never clarified, or explained either in the
evidence or by the trial court in its judgment.

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(viii)
The medico-legal evidence of PW-3, Dr. Anshu
Mishra and FSL report does not corroborate the prosecution
case.
(ix) The trial court has failed to give due weight to the
appellant's defence of alibi.
(x) The alibi defence is further reinforced by a
representation 37-B dated 12.12.2021, made by several residents
of the village to the Station House Officer, Sumerpur, even
before the appellant's arrest on 28.12.2021, asserting his
presence at Chitrakoot on the date of occurrence and alleging
false implication. Being a document of a date prior to arrest, it
cannot be dismissed as a post-facto fabrication, and the trial
court has not considered it at all.
(xi) The defence version, supported by DW-1 and DW-2,
that the informant was involved in an alleged illicit relationship
with a person of the village, that the appellant had confronted
and rebuked her on this account, and that she had thereafter
threatened to falsely implicate him in a serious case, furnishes a
plausible motive for false implication which the trial court has
failed to examine or exclude.
10. Learned counsel for the State, per contra, has supported the
impugned judgment and submitted that the testimony of a child
victim of a sexual offence cannot be discarded merely on
account of minor discrepancies natural to a witness of tender
years; that the statement of the victim stood corroborated by her
statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C.; that delay in lodging an
FIR in offences of this nature is often explained by the trauma
and social stigma attached thereto; and that the trial court, having
had the advantage of observing the demeanour of the witnesses,

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was best placed to assess their credibility, calling for no
interference by this Court.
11. The short question that falls for determination is whether
the prosecution has succeeded in proving the charge against the
appellant beyond reasonable doubt, by cogent, reliable and
consistent evidence, or whether the material contradictions, the
unexplained delay, the possibility of tutoring, the absence of
medical corroboration, and the unrebutted defence of alibi,
cumulatively, entitle the appellant to the benefit of doubt and
consequent acquittal.
12. This Court has gone through the entire evidence on record,
including the depositions of PW-1 to PW-6 and DW-1 and
DW-2, the documentary exhibits, and the medico-legal and
forensic material, as also the impugned judgment.
13. Before proceeding to appreciate the evidence, it is apposite
to notice the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
three recent decisions bearing directly upon the standard to be
applied where the testimony of a minor victim, or the statements
relied upon by the prosecution, are shown to suffer from material
contradictions:
(a) In P. Yuvaprakash v. State rep. by Inspector of Police,
(2024) 17 SCC 684, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that where
the victim's own statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. gives a
version materially at variance with the graver charge levelled by
the prosecution, and is not shown to have been obtained under
tutoring, coercion, or compulsion, the courts below cannot
simply discard it; the prosecution must, at the very least,
examine the Magistrate who recorded it before asking the court
to disbelieve it. Acting on this reasoning, the Supreme Court set
aside the conviction under Section 6 of the POCSO Act.

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(b) In Nirmal Premkumar & Anr. v. State rep. by Inspector
of Police (2024) 20 SCC 293 Hon’ble the Supreme Court held as
under:
“23. In Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana [Krishan
Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana, (2011) 7 SCC 130 :
(2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 61] , this Court laid down that
although the victim's solitary evidence in matters related
to sexual offences is generally deemed sufficient to hold
an accused guilty, the conviction cannot be sustained if the
prosecutrix's testimony is found unreliable and insufficient
due to identified flaws and lacunae. It was held thus: (SCC
p. 138, paras 31-32)
“31. No doubt, it is true that to hold an accused guilty
for commission of an offence of rape, the solitary
evidence of the prosecutrix is sufficient provided the
same inspires confidence and appears to be absolutely
trustworthy, unblemished and should be of sterling
quality. But, in the case in hand, the evidence of the
prosecutrix, showing several lacunae, which have
already been projected hereinabove, would go to show
that her evidence does not fall in that category and
cannot be relied upon to hold the appellant guilty of
the said offences.
32. Indeed there are several significant variations in
material facts in her Section 164 statement, Section
161 statement (CrPC), FIR and deposition in court.
Thus, it was necessary to get her evidence
corroborated independently, which they could have
done either by examination of Ritu, her sister or Bimla
Devi, who were present in the house at the time of her
alleged abduction. The record shows that Bimla Devi
though cited as a witness was not examined and later
given up by the Public Prosecutor on the ground that
she has been won over by the appellant.”
24. What flows from the aforesaid decisions is that in
cases where witnesses are neither wholly reliable nor
wholly unreliable, the Court should strive to find out the
true genesis of the incident. The Court can rely on the
victim as a “sterling witness” without further
corroboration, but the quality and credibility must be
exceptionally high. The statement of the prosecutrix ought
to be consistent from the beginning to the end (minor
inconsistences excepted), from the initial statement to the
oral testimony, without creating any doubt qua the

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prosecution's case. While a victim's testimony is usually
enough for sexual offence cases, an unreliable or
insufficient account from the prosecutrix, marked by
identified flaws and gaps, could make it difficult for a
conviction to be recorded.”
Further Hon’ble Apex Court held that although the solitary
testimony of a victim of a sexual offence is ordinarily sufficient
to sustain a conviction, this rule cannot be stretched to sustain a
conviction where that testimony is found unreliable on account
of identified contradictions, flaws, and lacunae. The Court
emphasised that evidence "damaged by inadequacies from the
outset", evident in contradictions within statements and
testimonies, cannot be permitted to imperil an accused's liberty
and reputation, particularly given the severe and irreversible
consequences of a POCSO conviction, and set aside the
conviction accordingly.
(c) In Manojbhai Jethabhai Parmar (Rohit) v. State of
Gujarat (2025) SCC Online SC 2803 Hon’ble the Supreme Court
held as under:-
“65. In the present case, it is manifest that the
Investigating Officer had ample opportunity to secure
and preserve crucial forensic material, particularly by
securing samples necessary for conducting DNA
profiling of the child victim and the accused-appellant.
Such scientific examination, now an integral component
of modern criminal investigation, would have provided
objective corroboration and materially assisted in
ascertaining the truth. However, no effort was made to
obtain or preserve such forensic material. This
omission, whether arising from negligence or otherwise,
assumes significance in light of the seriousness of the
allegations. The failure to pursue an available and
reliable scientific avenue not only weakens the
prosecution's case but also raises a legitimate
apprehension that the investigation may not have been
carried out with the requisite fairness and diligence. In
the circumstances, the possibility that such inaction was

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intended, or at least operated, to shield the actual
perpetrators of the offence cannot be ruled out. Such
lapses ex facie undermine the credibility of the
prosecution's case and strike at the foundational
requirement that every investigation must be fair,
diligent, and oriented solely towards the discovery of
truth.
66. The admitted sequence of facts narrated above
clearly indicates something very fishy and unnerving in
the manner in which, the entire prosecution story has
been unfolded. In face of such grave allegations, the
rank apathy of the Investigating Officers in not
conducting expeditious and diligent investigation,
should have been sufficient to put the Courts below on
guard and become cognizant of the fact that something
was really amiss in the case presented for trial.
However, sadly, neither the trial Court nor the High
Court, adverted to these glaring shortcomings in the
case and mechanically accepted the case of prosecution
even though the conduct of the material witnesses (of
last seen together circumstance) was sufficient to raise a
strong suspicion that they might have been the actual
perpetrators of the crime.
67. It is imperative to state that during the trial, the
child victim was herself examined as (PW-18) however,
she could not give any evidence whatsoever to connect
the accused-appellant with the crime. She could not
even identify the accused-appellant as the assailant. She
further stated that she was tutored by her mother.
Hence, this significant point was also missed by the trial
Court before convicting the accused-appellant.
Thus, the material omissions in the FIR of facts admittedly
within the informant's knowledge seriously erode the credibility
of the prosecution case, and that contradictions and unnatural
conduct in the witnesses relied upon by the prosecution render
their testimony unreliable. The Court cautioned that sympathy
for a child victim, however compelling, cannot substitute for
proof beyond reasonable doubt, and set aside a conviction that
had subsisted for nearly thirteen years.

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14. The common thread running through these decisions is that
the testimony of a minor victim, and the statements of witnesses
relied upon to corroborate it, must be of "sterling quality" to
sustain a conviction of the gravity contemplated by Section 6 of
the POCSO Act and Section 376-AB IPC; that a statement under
Section 164 Cr.P.C., where genuine, cannot be brushed aside
merely because it does not suit the prosecution; and that the
benefit of any real and unresolved contradiction must enure to
the accused, however grave the offence alleged and however
natural the court's sympathy for the victim. This Court is guided
by these principles in evaluating the evidence in the present case.
15. On the question of delay, this Court is unable to accept the
trial court's finding that the five-day delay in lodging the FIR
stood satisfactorily explained. The explanation offered by the
prosecution is internally inconsistent while the victim is said to
have informed her mother on the day of occurrence or after one
day,itself, the informant told the treating doctor that she learnt of
the matter only two days thereafter; the identity and whereabouts
of the informant's husband, said to necessitate the delay, remain
unestablished by any reliable evidence; and the report itself was
scribed not by the husband but by the informant's brother-in-law.
Where the delay is sought to be explained by shifting and
mutuallyinconsistent versions, it cannot be said to have been
"duly explained" within the meaning attributed to that phrase by
the trial court.
16. Equally significant is the fact that the FIR, as originally
registered, made no allegation of penetrative sexual assault,
invoking only Section 354 IPC and Section 10 of the POCSO
Act. The graver charge came to be added only during
investigation. While this circumstance, by itself, may not be

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CRLA No. - 686 of 2026
conclusive, it is a material fact bearing on the truthfulness of the
prosecution version which the trial court ought to have, but did
not, take into account.
17. The contradictions in the testimony of PW-2, as to whether
she witnessed the victim leave for the appellant's house, as to the
precise time of occurrence, as to the date of lodging the FIR, and
as to her own presence at the recording of the victim's statement
under Section 164 Cr.P.C. (a fact falsified by the record of that
very statement) are not minor lapses of memory. They go to the
heart of the informant's reliability as a witness, and, more
importantly, raise a real and substantial possibility that the
victim, examined at the age of four and again, years later, at the
age of six, had the opportunity to be tutored by her mother, with
whom she remained in constant company. The discrepancy in the
Section 164 statement as to the identity of the person named
therein "Suraj", grandson of accused "Baladeen" as against the
accused, Swamideen, and the conflicting versions as to whether
the occurrence took place by day or by night, reinforce rather
than dispel this doubt. Applying the test laid down in Nirmal
Premkumar (supra), this testimony cannot be said to be of the
"sterling quality" required to sustain a conviction of this gravity;
and, following P. Yuvaprakash (supra), the victim's Section 164
statement, not having been shown to be tutored or involuntary on
any cogent material beyond the informant's own bare assertion,
cannot be brushed aside where it detracts from the prosecution's
case.
18. The word used by the victim to describe the act was never
clarified in evidence, and the trial court's judgment is silent on
what, precisely, this term was understood to mean or how it was
found to satisfy the ingredient of penetration required to sustain a

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conviction under Section 5/6 of the POCSO Act or Section 376-
AB IPC. A conviction for so grave an offence, entailing so
severe a sentence, cannot rest on an unclarified and ambiguous
description of the act.
19. The medical evidence of PW-3 does not advance the
prosecution case. The internal genital examination disclosed a
normal hymen with no injury or swelling, and no corroboration
is forthcoming from the forensic report. While the absence of
injury is not, by itself, destructive of a POCSO prosecution, in
the facts of this case, where the medical evidence stands entirely
neutral, where there are serious contradictions in the ocular
evidence, and where an unrebutted alibi has been set up, the
absence of corroboration assumes considerable weight. As held
in Manojbhai Jethabhai Parmar (supra), whatever sympathy the
facts of a case involving a child victim may command, that
sympathy cannot substitute for proof beyond reasonable doubt,
and gaps of this nature in the prosecution's evidence cannot be
filled by the gravity of the accusation alone.
20. This Court finds that the trial court has not accorded due
consideration to the defence of alibi. The documentary evidence
produced by the defence, the out-patient registration record of
Sadguru Netra Chikitsalaya, Chitrakoot, bearing code DTDREF
2204 dated 05.12.2021 and others medical treatment papers of
Sadguru Hospital, read with the corroborating testimony of
DW-1 and DW-2, establishes a plausible and unrebutted case that
the appellant was away from the place of occurrence, undergoing
eye treatment at Chitrakoot, on the date of the alleged incident.
The medical treatment was provided to the accused between
05.12.2021 to 10.12.2021 and number of papers/documents
evidence has been submitted by the defence with list of

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documents. It is well settled that defence evidence is not to be
viewed with suspicion or treated as inherently inferior to
prosecution evidence; where it is cogent, reliable, and unshaken
in cross-examination, it must be weighed on the same footing as
the evidence led by the prosecution, and it is enough if it renders
the prosecution version doubtful, without the defence being
required to prove the alibi to the hilt. Thus the presence of
accused is said to be in the hospital at Chitrakoot, the distance
between district Hamirpur and Chitrakoot is about 150 kilometers.
The prosecution led no evidence in rebuttal of this documentary
material, and the trial court's judgment does not reflect any
independent evaluation of its evidentiary worth. This constitutes
a serious infirmity in the impugned judgment. The representation
37-B, dated 12.12.2021, made by residents of the village to the
police prior to the appellant's arrest, lends further,
contemporaneous, support to the defence version and could not
have been ignored.
21. In Yogesh Singh vs. Mahaveer Singh (2017) 11 SCC 195,
Hon’ble Supreme Court relying on Panchhi Vs. State of U.P.
(1998) 7 SCC 177 held that:
"it is not the law that if a witness is a child, his evidence
shall be rejected, even if it is found reliable. The law is
that evidence of a child witness must be evaluated more
carefully and with greater circumspection because a
child is susceptible to be swayed by what others tell
him and thus a child witness is an easy prey to
tutoring."
22. In Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra,
(1973) 2 SCC 793). the landmark observation of Hon’ble Apex
Court is as under:-
"The cherished principles or golden thread of proof
beyond reasonable doubt which runs through the web of
our law should not be stretched morbidly to embrace

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every hunch, hesitancy and degree of doubt. The
excessive solicitude reflected in the attitude that a
thousand guilty men may go but one innocent martyr
shall not suffer is a false dilemma. Only reasonable
doubts belong to the accused. Otherwise any practical
system of justice will then break down and lose
credibility with the community."
23. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that
suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof, and
that the prosecution is required to establish the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt by cogent, credible and
reliable evidence. Where two views are reasonably possible on
the evidence on record, the view favourable to the accused must
be adopted. This is precisely the position reaffirmed by the
Supreme Court in Nirmal Premkumar (supra), P. Yuvaprakash
(supra), and Manojbhai Jethabhai Parmar (supra), that a
conviction of the gravity contemplated by the POCSO Act
cannot rest on the testimony of a minor victim, or on statements
relied upon to corroborate it, once that testimony is shown to be
riddled with material, unresolved contradictions, that a genuine
Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement cannot be discarded merely
because it is inconvenient to the prosecution, and that sympathy
for a child victim, however natural, cannot substitute for proof
beyond reasonable doubt. In the present case, the cumulative
effect of the unexplained and inconsistently explained delay in
lodging the FIR, the absence of any allegation of penetrative
assault in the original report, the material contradictions and
improvements in the testimony of the informant, the real
possibility of tutoring of a child witness examined years apart,
the discrepancy of identity and time in the Section 164
statement, the unclarified description of the alleged act, the
absence of medical or forensic corroboration, and the cogent and
unrebutted defence of “alibi” supported by contemporaneous

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documentary evidence, leads this Court to the conclusion that the
prosecution has failed to prove the charge against the appellant
by cogent and reliable evidence, and that the appellant is entitled
to the ‘benefit of doubt.’
24. For the reasons recorded above, this Court is of the
considered view that the prosecution has failed to prove the
charge against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, and that
the finding of guilt recorded by the trial court, and the
consequent conviction of the appellant under Section 6 of the
POCSO Act, cannot be sustained in law.
25. The criminal appeal is allowed.
26. The judgment and order of conviction dated 09.12.2025
and the order of sentence dated 10.12.2025, passed by the
Additional District Judge/Special Judge, POCSO Act, Hamirpur,
in Session Case POCSOACT No. 108 of 2022 (State vs.
Swamideen), arising out of Case Crime No. 417 of 2021, Police
Station Sumerpur, District Hamirpur, are hereby set aside.
27. The appellant, Swamideen, is acquitted of the charges
under Section 376-AB IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act,
2012. The appellant, if in custody in connection with the present
case and not required in any other case, shall be released
forthwith.
28. The fine, if already deposited by the appellant, shall be
refunded to him in accordance with law. Any bail bonds/personal
bonds furnished if any shall stand discharged.
29. The trial court record be sent back ‘forthwith’ to the trial
court, along with a copy of this judgment, for information and
necessary compliance.

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30. The trial court is directed to submit its compliance report
within two months from the date of receipt of this order.
Furthermore, Registry is also directed to place the compliance
report on record.
31. There shall be no order as to costs.
32. Register (compliance) is directly to communicate this order
to the concerned trial court through district and Sessions Judge
within 24 hour.
33. Before parting with this judgment, this Court records its
appreciation for the sincere assistance rendered by the Research
Associates, Mr. Shivansh Pandey and Mr. Sandeep Kumar Singh,
in researching the legal issues involved and assisting in the
preparation of this judgment. Their efforts are gratefully
acknowledged.
(Santosh Rai,J.)
July 21, 2026
(Asha)
Digitally signed by :-
ASHA
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad