M/S.I LAND INFRASTRUCTURE vs MOHAMMED NAZEER AHMED

Court
Karnataka High Court

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

TH
DATED THIS THE 12 DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.T. NARENDRA PRASAD

CIVIL MISC. PETITION NO. 608 OF 2025

BETWEEN:

M/S.I LAND INFRASTRUCTURE
A PARTNERSHIP FIRM
HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT
TH
NO.1535, 1ST FLOOR, 39 CROSS
TH
4 T BLOCK, JAYANAGAR
BANGALORE-560041

REPRESENTED BY ITS PARTNERS
1) YESHWANTH RAO KODLI

2) RAGHAVENDER GOUD KUNA AND

3) K.CHANDRA SHEKAR.
…PETITIONERS
(BY SRI. RADHANANDAN B S., ADVOCATE)










AND:

MOHAMMED NAZEER AHMED
S/O LATE MOHAMMED HAYATH SAHEB
AGED ABOUT 74 YEARS
ST
R/AT NO.575, 1 A MAIN ROAD
TH
6 SECTOR, HSR LAYOUT
BANGALORE - 560 103.
ALSO AT
APARTMENT NO.5A
ROSA RESIDENCY LA MAZADA
CHIKKANNA LAYOUT
HBR LAYOUT, BENGALURU - 560 043
…RESPONDENT

Digitally Signed by NARENDRA PRASAD
HAREKOPPA THIMMANNA GOWDA

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(BY SRI. VIREN MICHAEL PERES., ADVOCATE)
THIS CMP IS FILED UNDER SECTION 11(5) OF THE
ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT, 1996, PRAYING TO APPOINT
A SOLE ARBITRATOR TO RESOLVE THE DISPUTE BETWEEN THE
PARTIES HERETO AS PER CLAUSE 26 OF THE JOINT DEVELOPMENT
AGREEMENT DATED 12.09.2014 AT ANNEXURE G, IN THE INTERESTS
OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY, ORDER
WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.T. NARENDRA PRASAD
ORAL ORDER
This petition is filed under Section 11(5) of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, “the
Act”), seeking appointment of a Sole Arbitrator for
adjudication of the disputes that have arisen between the
parties under the Joint Development Agreement (for short,
‘JDA’) dated 12.09.2014, particularly in terms of Clause 26
thereof, produced at Annexure-G.

2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner is
a Partnership firm, engaged in the business of
development of properties for residential purpose.
Respondent is the absolute owner of the property bearing
Sy.No.95/1, measuring 17.08 guntas at Singasandra
Digitally Signed by NARENDRA PRASAD
HAREKOPPA THIMMANNA GOWDA

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Village, Begur Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk, Bangalore.
Thereafter, the parties entered into a JDA dated
12.09.2014. Subsequently, disputes arose between the
parties in relation to the said JDA.

3. As the disputes arose between the parties, the
petitioner, invoking the arbitration clause contained in the
JDA, issued a notice dated 05.05.2025, vide Annexure-L,
to the respondent under Section 21 of the Act. The said
Arbitration Clause 26 reads as under:
DISPUTE RESOLUTION
“ :
Any disputes / or differences whatsoever arising
under or in connection with this Agreement which could
not be settled by the parties through negotiations, shall
be finally settled by arbitration in accordance with the
Arbitration and conciliation Act, 1996 by an arbitral
panel comprising of three arbitrators, one to be
appointed by the Owner collectively, one by the
Developer and the two arbitrators so appointed shall
appoint the third arbitrators, who shall be the Chairman
of the arbitral panel. All proceedings shall be conducted
in English. The venue of arbitration shall be Bangalore.
The decision of the arbitration shall be final and binding
on both parties. ”
Digitally Signed by NARENDRA PRASAD
HAREKOPPA THIMMANNA GOWDA

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4. Despite service of the said notice, the respondent
did not furnish any response. Hence, the present petition
is filed seeking appointment of a sole Arbitrator.

5. The learned counsel for the respondent submits
that subsequently, the parties have entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding (for short, ‘MOU’), dated
28.11.2016 vide Annexure-J for cancellation of the JDA.
In view of the above MOU, the JDA itself has been
cancelled. Therefore, the petitioner cannot invoke the
arbitration clause in the JDA.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the
judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Ashapura
Mine-Chem Ltd. vs. Gujarat Mineral Development
Corporation (SLP (C) No.1963/2014 disposed of on
16.04.2015) to contend that, once there is an arbitration
clause in the agreement, the court has to refer the matter
to the arbitrator to decide whether the agreement is
existing or not, in spite of the termination of the
agreement.
Digitally Signed by NARENDRA PRASAD
HAREKOPPA THIMMANNA GOWDA

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7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
the petition papers.
8. It is not in dispute that the parties have entered
into a JDA dated 12.09.2014 vide Annexure-G.
Thereafter, they have also entered into a MOU for
cancellation of the JDA and GPA as per Annexure-J dated
28.11.2016. Since the claim of the petitioners is in
respect of the said JDA and in the said JDA, there is an
arbitration clause, whether the JDA is cancelled or not, is
the issue which has to be decided by the arbitrator. In so
far as existence of arbitration clause is concerned, the
clause survives termination/cancellation of the main
agreement. Therefore, the dispute can be referred to an
arbitrator. This issue has been considered by the Apex
Court in the case of Ashapura Mine-Chem Ltd. (supra).
The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment is extracted
below:
“20. In this context, we find, the reliance
placed upon by Mr. Dushyant Dave, learned senior
Digitally Signed by NARENDRA PRASAD
HAREKOPPA THIMMANNA GOWDA

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counsel for the appellant on the decisions in Reva
Electrical Car Company Private Ltd. (supra), Today
Homes and Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and
Enercon (India) Limited (supra) fully support the
stand of the appellant. The decision in Reva
Electrical Car Company Private Ltd. (supra) was a
case which arose under Section 11 of the Act. A
question was raised on behalf of the respondent in
the said case to the effect that with the termination
of the MoU itself, the Arbitration Clause would
cease to exist. Dealing with the said question, the
learned Judge has held as under in paragraphs 54
and 55:
"54. Under Section 16(1), the legislature
makes it clear that while considering any
objection with respect to the existence or
validity of the arbitration agreement, the
arbitration clause which formed part of the
contract, has to be treated as an agreement
independent of the other terms of the contract.
To ensure that there is no misunderstanding,
Section 16(1)(b) further provides that even if
the Arbitral Tribunal concludes that the contract
is null and void, it should not result, as a matter
of law, in an automatic invalidation of the
arbitration clause. Section 16(1)(a) presumes
the existence of a valid arbitration clause and
mandates the same to be treated as an
agreement independent of the other terms of
the contract. By virtue of Section 16(1)(b), it
continues to be enforceable notwithstanding a
declaration of the contract being null and void.
In view of the provisions contained in Section
16(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996, it would not be possible to accept the
Digitally Signed by NARENDRA PRASAD
HAREKOPPA THIMMANNA GOWDA

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submission of Ms Ahmadi that with the
termination of the MoU on 31-12-2007, the
arbitration clause would also cease to exist.
55. As noticed earlier, the disputes that have
arisen between the parties clearly relate to the
subject-matter of the relationship between the
parties which came into existence through the
MoU. Clearly, therefore, the disputes raised by
the petitioner need to be referred to arbitration.
Under the arbitration clause, a reference was to
be made that the disputes were to be referred to
a single arbitrator. Since the parties have failed
to appoint an arbitrator under the agreed
procedure, it is necessary for this Court to
appoint the arbitrator."
(Emphasis added)
21. In Today Homes and Infrastructure Pvt.
Ltd. (supra), this Court approved the statement of
law stated by the learned Judge of this Court in
Reva Electrical Car Company Private Ltd. (supra).
Paragraph 14 can be usefully referred to which
reads as under:
"14. The same reasoning was adopted by a
member of this Bench (S.S. Nijjar, J.), while
deciding Reva Electric Car Co. (P) Ltd. v. Green
Mobil, wherein the provisions of Section 16(1) in
the backdrop of the doctrine of kompetenz
kompetenz were considered and it was inter alia
held that under Section 16(1), the legislature
makes it clear that while considering any
objection with regard to the existence or validity
of the arbitration agreement, the arbitration
clause, which formed part of the contract, had to
be treated as an agreement independent of the
other terms of the contract. Reference was made
in the said judgment to the provisions of Section
16(1)(b) of the 1996 Act, which provides that
Digitally Signed by NARENDRA PRASAD
HAREKOPPA THIMMANNA GOWDA

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even if the Arbitral Tribunal concludes that the
contract is null and void, it should not result, as
a matter of law, in an automatic invalidation of
the arbitration clause. It was also held that
Section 16(1)(a) of the 1996 Act presumes the
existence of a valid arbitration clause and
mandates the same to be treated as an
agreement independent of the other terms of
the contract. By virtue of Section 16(1)(b) of the
1996 Act, the arbitration clause continues to be
enforceable, notwithstanding a declaration that
the contract was null and void."
(Emphasis added)
22. Again this very question came up for
consideration in Enercon (India) Limited (supra) to
which one of us (F.M.I Kalifulla, J.) was a party. In
the said decision, the nature of transaction between
the parties was more or less identical to the facts of
this case. The contention raised on behalf of the
appellant in that case was that there can be no
arbitration agreement in the absence of a
concluded contract, that, therefore, there was no
question of an arbitration agreement coming into
existence and, therefore, there was no scope for
referring the dispute for arbitration.
23. As against the above submissions, it was
contended on behalf of the respondent in the said
decision that even if the existence of the main
contract is under dispute, the Court is concerned
only with the arbitration agreement, i.e. the
arbitration clause and that when once such a Clause
Digitally Signed by NARENDRA PRASAD
HAREKOPPA THIMMANNA GOWDA

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is very much present, that would by itself result in
the matter being referable for arbitration. In fact, in
the said case, the Clause relating to arbitration was
found in Clause No.18.1 which provided for an
attempt to resolve the dispute, controversy or
difference through mutual consultation and if it is
not resolved through mutual consultation within 30
days after commencement of discussion, then the
parties may refer the dispute, controversy or
difference for resolution to an Arbitral Tribunal.
24. Dealing with the said Clause and the
arguments raised on behalf of the respective
parties, the law has been laid down as under in
paragraphs 82 and 83 which are to the following
effect:
"82. Further, the arbitration agreement
contained in Clauses 18.1 to 18.3 of IPLA is very
widely worded and would include all the
disputes, controversies or differences concerning
the legal relationship between the parties. It
would include the disputes arising in respect of
the IPLA with regard to its validity,
interpretation, construction, performance,
enforcement or its alleged breach. Whilst
interpreting the arbitration agreement and/or
the arbitration clause, the court must be
conscious of the overarching policy of least
intervention by courts or judicial authorities in
matters covered by the Indian Arbitration Act,
1996. In view of the aforesaid, it is not possible
for us to accept the submission of Mr Nariman
that the arbitration agreement will perish as the
IPLA has not been finalised. This is also because
Digitally Signed by NARENDRA PRASAD
HAREKOPPA THIMMANNA GOWDA

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the arbitration clause (agreement) is
independent of the underlying contract i.e. the
IPLA containing the arbitration clause. Section
16 provides that the arbitration [pic]clause
forming part of a contract shall be treated as an
agreement independent of such a contract.
83. The concept of separability of the arbitration
clause/agreement from the underlying contract
is a necessity to ensure that the intention of the
parties to resolve the disputes by arbitration
does not evaporate into thin air with every
challenge to the legality, validity, finality or
breach of the underlying contract. The Indian
Arbitration Act, 1996, as noticed above, under
Section 16 accepts the concept that the main
contract and the arbitration agreement form two
independent contracts. Commercial rights and
obligations are contained in the underlying,
substantive, or the main contract. It is followed
by a second contract, which expresses the
agreement and the intention of the parties to
resolve the disputes relating to the underlying
contract through arbitration. A remedy is elected
by parties outside the normal civil court remedy.
It is true that support of the national courts
would be required to ensure the success of
arbitration, but this would not detract from the
legitimacy or independence of the collateral
arbitration agreement, even if it is contained in a
contract, which is claimed to be void or voidable
or unconcluded by one of the parties."
(Emphasis added)
25. Mr. Vikas Singh, learned senior counsel for
the respondent by referring to the Seven Judge
Bench decision of this Court in Patel Engineering
Ltd. (supra) sought to contend that the reliance
placed upon the said decision by this Court in Today
Homes and Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. (supra) with
Digitally Signed by NARENDRA PRASAD
HAREKOPPA THIMMANNA GOWDA

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particular reference to the position stated in
paragraph 13 of the said judgment was not
appropriate.
26. We are not inclined to entertain the said
submission, as we find that we are not concerned
with the said issue as to whether what was held in
paragraph 13 of Today Homes and Infrastructure
Pvt. Ltd. (supra) judgment was correct or not when
it makes reference to the Seven Judge Bench
decision in Patel Engineering Ltd.(supra). We are
only concerned with the question whether an
Arbitration Clause contained in the MoU is a stand
alone agreement or not. For that purpose, what has
been stated in Today Homes and Infrastructure Pvt.
Ltd. (supra) in paragraph 14 is only relevant and
we find the legal position stated therein in tune with
the ratio decidendi laid down consistently by this
Court in very many decisions.
27. The reliance was also placed upon the
decision in National Insurance Company Ltd.
(supra). Paragraphs 19, 20 and 21 were referred to
in the said judgment. Paragraph 19 can be usefully
referred, which reads as under:
"19. In SBP & Co. v. Patel Engg. Ltd., a seven-
Judge Bench of this Court considered the scope
of Section 11 of the Act and held that the
Digitally Signed by NARENDRA PRASAD
HAREKOPPA THIMMANNA GOWDA

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scheme of Section 11 of the Act required the
Chief Justice or his designate to decide whether
there is an arbitration agreement in terms of
Section 7 of the Act before exercising his power
under Section 11(6) of the Act and its
implications. It was of the view that sub-sections
(4), (5) and (6) of Section 11 of the new Act,
combined the power vested in the court under
Sections 8 and 20 of the old Act (the Arbitration
Act, 1940). This Court held: (SCC pp. 660-61 &
663, paras 39 & 47)
"39. It is necessary to define what exactly
the Chief Justice, approached with an
application under Section 11 of the Act, is to
decide at that stage. Obviously, he has to
decide his own jurisdiction in the sense,
whether the party making the motion has
approached the right High Court. He has to
decide whether there is an arbitration
agreement, as defined in the Act and whether
the person who has made the request before
him, is a party to such an agreement. It is
necessary to indicate that he can also decide
the question whether the claim was a dead one;
or a long-barred claim that was sought to be
resurrected and whether the parties have
concluded the transaction by recording
satisfaction of their mutual rights and
obligations or by receiving the final payment
without objection. It may not be possible at that
stage, to decide whether a live claim made, is
one which comes within the purview of the
arbitration clause. It will be appropriate to leave
that question to be decided by the Arbitral
Tribunal on taking evidence, along with the
merits of the claims involved in the arbitration.
The Chief Justice has to decide whether the
applicant has satisfied the conditions for
appointing an arbitrator under Section 11(6) of
the Act. For the purpose of taking a decision on
these aspects, the Chief Justice can either
proceed on the basis of affidavits and the
documents produced or take such evidence or
get such evidence recorded, as may be
necessary. We think that adoption of this
procedure in the context of the Act would best
serve the purpose sought to be achieved by the
Digitally Signed by NARENDRA PRASAD
HAREKOPPA THIMMANNA GOWDA

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Act of expediting the process of arbitration,
without too many approaches to the court at
various stages of the proceedings before the
Arbitral Tribunal.
*
47. (iv) The Chief Justice or the Designated
Judge will have the right to decide the
preliminary aspects as indicated in the earlier
part of this judgment. These will be his own
jurisdiction to entertain the request, the
existence of a valid arbitration agreement, the
existence or otherwise of a live claim, the
existence of the condition for the exercise of his
power and on the qualifications of the arbitrator
or arbitrators."
28. Having gone through the said paragraphs,
we do not find any position in law contrary to what
has been stated in Today Homes and Infrastructure
Pvt. Ltd. (supra), Reva Electrical Car Company
Private Ltd. (supra) and Enercon (India) Limited
(supra).
29. Similarly, the reliance placed upon in Chloro
Controls India Pvt. Ltd. (supra) also does not in any
manner dislodge the legal position relating to the
stand alone Arbitration Clause in a substantive
transaction recorded in writing. Therefore, we do
not find any useful purpose by referring to the said
decision as well.
30. Having thus ascertained the legal position
regarding the stand alone agreement relating to
arbitration with particular reference to arbitration
Digitally Signed by NARENDRA PRASAD
HAREKOPPA THIMMANNA GOWDA

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agreement in a legal transaction between the
parties, when we refer to Clause 27 of the MoU, we
wish to find out whether the said Clause satisfies
the principles set down and applicable to a stand
alone Arbitration Agreement. When we refer to
Clause 27, we find that in the event of failure of an
amicable settlement at the bilateral level relating to
a dispute or difference arising between the
appellant and the respondent to be reached as
contained in Clause 26 of the MoU, then such
unresolved dispute or difference concerning or
arising from the MoU, its implementation breach or
termination whatsoever including any difference or
dispute as to the interpretation of any of the terms
of the MoU is referable to the sole Arbitrator
appointed by the appellant and the respondent.
Therefore, irrespective of the question or as to the
fact whether the MoU fructified into a full-fledged
agreement, having regard to the non-fulfilment of
any of the conditions or failure of compliance of any
requirement by either of the parties stipulated in
the other Clauses of MoU, specific agreement has
been entered into by the appellant and the
respondent under Clause 27 to refer such
controversies as between the parties to the sole
arbitrator by consensus. Therefore, when
consensus was not reached as between the parties
Digitally Signed by NARENDRA PRASAD
HAREKOPPA THIMMANNA GOWDA

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for making the reference, eventually it will be open
for either of the parties to invoke Section 11 of the
Act and seek for reference of the dispute for
arbitration.”
9. Under Section 16 of the Act, it is for the arbitrator
to decide all these issues. Since there is an arbitration
clause in the JDA, which is signed by both the parties, the
matter requires to be referred to the arbitrator.

10. Having regard to the existence of the arbitration
clause contained in the JDA, which provides for resolution
of disputes arising between the parties, and the fact that
the petitioner has duly invoked the said arbitration clause
by issuing notice under Section 21 of the Act, and since
both the parties have agreed for appointment of a Sole
Arbitrator, this Court is of the opinion that a Sole
Arbitrator is required to be appointed for adjudication of
the disputes between the parties.

11. Accordingly, the following:

Digitally Signed by NARENDRA PRASAD
HAREKOPPA THIMMANNA GOWDA

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ORDER

a) Civil Miscellaneous Petition is allowed.


b) Sri M.Ramesh Rao, a retired District Judge, is
appointed as the Sole Arbitrator in the present
case to arbitrate the disputes between the
parties at the Arbitration and Conciliation
Centre (Domestic & International), Bengaluru,
as per the Rules governing the said Arbitration
Centre.


c) All the claims and contentions of the parties are
left open.


d) Registry is directed to communicate this order
via e-mail to the Arbitration and Conciliation
Centre (Domestic & International), Khanija
Bhavan, Bengaluru, and also to the learned
Sole Arbitrator.


e) Registry is directed to return all the original
documents produced by any of the parties after
obtaining Photostat copies of the same.

Digitally Signed by NARENDRA PRASAD
HAREKOPPA THIMMANNA GOWDA

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f) Parties are directed to appear before the
Director, Arbitration and Conciliation Centre,
Bengaluru, on 17.12.2026 at 11:30 a.m.
Digitally Signed by NARENDRA PRASAD
HAREKOPPA THIMMANNA GOWDA


(H.T. NARENDRA PRASAD)
JUDGE





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