Mathanvignesh vs State Of Tamilnadu Rep By Inspector Of Police, Cyber Crime Police Station (CCD-III),
- Court
- Madras High Court
CRL OP(MD) No. 15653 of 2026
BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT
Reserved on : 04.11.2026
Pronounced on : 11.11.2026
CORAM
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.VIJAYAKUMAR
Crl.O.P.(MD)No. 15653 of 2026
CNR:{HCMD011025262026}
and
Crl.M.P.(MD)No. 15170 of 2026
Mathanvignesh
..Petitioner(s)
Vs
1. State of Tamil Nadu,
Rep by the Inspector Of Police,
Cyber Crime Police Station (CCD-III),
Ramanathapuram District.
(Crime No. 10 of 2023)
2. Karthikeyan
..Respondent(s)
PRAYER: Criminal Original Petition is filed under Section 528 of
BNSS, 2023, to call for the records pertaining to the impugned FIR made
st
in Crime No.10 of 2023, on the file of the 1 respondent and quash the
same.
For Petitioner(s) :M/s.K.Azhagarsamy
For Respondent(s) : M/s.P.Samuel Gunasingh
Additional Public Prosecutor for R1
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ORDER
The present Criminal Original Petition has been filed by the sole accused
in Crime No.10 of 2023 on the file of the first respondent police, seeking
to quash the FIR registered on 12.04.2023 for the alleged offences under
Sections 153, 504 and 505(2) of IPC and Section 67 of the Information
Technology Act, 2008.
The case of the prosecution is as follows:-
2. The second respondent is a Grade-I Police Constable attached to
the Social Media Cell, District Police Office, Ramanathapuram. On
12.04.2023, at about 21.00 hours, while monitoring social media, he
noticed a status posted on the Instagram ID "Billa Mathan @
billamathan_editzs_ramnad". The status referred to a clash between the
Maravar and Mutharaiyar communities, which had only just subsided. It
stated that the Maravars had beaten and chased away the Mutharaiyar
group, that one person had died and another was in hospital, and it
warned against creating mischief in Ramnad. It ended by stating, in
substance, "come and live as friends with us and we will also be friends;
if you do unnecessary things instead, this will be the fate". On the basis of
his written complaint, the Sub-Inspector of Police, Cyber Crime Police
Station, Ramanathapuram, registered an FIR on the same day at 21.30
hours, in which the petitioner is arrayed as the sole accused.
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The submissions of the Counsel appearing on either side are as
follows:-
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner made the following
submissions:-
a) The FIR was registered on 12.04.2023 and no charge sheet has
been filed till date. The period of limitation prescribed under Section
468(2) of Cr.P.C. has expired and, therefore, the proceedings cannot be
continued;
b) Section 67 of the Information Technology Act is not attracted, as
there is no allegation that the material is obscene or lascivious;
c) The ingredients of Sections 153, 504 and 505(2) of IPC are not
made out. The status was temporary in nature; it disappears after 24 hours
and is no longer in existence; and
d) The complaint is actuated by malice and the case falls within the
parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana
Vs. Bhajan Lal reported in 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 355.
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4. Per contra, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for
the first respondent opposed the petition. He submitted that the FIR was
registered within half an hour of the occurrence and, therefore, the
question of limitation does not arise. On merits, he submitted that the
status named two castes, revived a recent clash and taunted one
community and, therefore, prima facie discloses the offences alleged. In
support of his submissions, he relied upon the decisions of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Amritlal Vs. Shantilal Soni and others reported in
(2022) 13 SCC 128, Ghanshyam Soni Vs. State and another reported in
2025 SCC Online SC 1301 and Roma Ahuja Vs. State and another
reported in 2026 SCC Online SC 557.
5. This Court has carefully considered the submissions made on
either side and perused the materials available on record.
Discussion:-
6. The points that arise for consideration in this petition are as
follows:-
a) Whether the FIR is liable to be quashed on the ground of
limitation under Section 468 of Cr.P.C.; and
b) Whether the allegations in the FIR, taken at their face value,
disclose the offences alleged or any of them.
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a)Limitation:-
7. Of the offences alleged, the offences under Section 505(2) of IPC
and Section 67 of the Information Technology Act are punishable with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years. By virtue of
Sections 468(2)(c) and 468(3) of Cr.P.C., the period of limitation is three
years, commencing from 12.04.2023 as per Section 469 of Cr.P.C. The
contention of the petitioner is that since no final report has been filed
within three years, the proceedings are barred by limitation.
8. The Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Sarah
Mathew Vs. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases and others reported
in (2014) 2 SCC 62 , framed the question in paragraph No.3.1 and
answered it in paragraph No.51 as follows:-
“3.1. (i) Whether for the purposes of computing
the period of limitation under Section 468 CrPC the
relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or
the date of institution of the prosecution or whether
the relevant date is the date on which a Magistrate
takes cognizance of the offence?
51. In view of the above, we hold that for the
purpose of computing the period of limitation under
Section 468 CrPC the relevant date is the date of
filing of the complaint or the date of institution of
prosecution and not the date on which the Magistrate
takes cognizance. We further hold that Bharat Kale
which is followed in Japani Sahoo lays down the
correct law. Krishna Pillai will have to be restricted
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to its own facts and it is not the authority for deciding
the question as to what is the relevant date for the
purpose of computing the period of limitation under
Section 468 CrPC.”
9. The contention that the judgment in Sarah Mathew case cited
supra governs only private complaints, and that in cases instituted on a
police report the date of filing of the final report must be taken into
account, stands answered by three later decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court.
10. In Amritlal Vs. Shantilal Soni and others reported in (2022) 13
SCC 128 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held in paragraph No.11 as
follows:-
“ 11. Therefore, the enunciations and declaration of
law by the Constitution Bench in Sarah Mathew case,
do not admit of any doubt that for the purpose of
computing the period of limitation under Section 468
CrPC, the relevant date is the date of filing of the
complaint or the date of institution of prosecution and
not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance
of the offence. The High Court has made a fundamental
error in assuming that the date of taking cognizance i.e.
4-12-2012 is decisive of the matter, while ignoring the
fact that the written complaint was indeed filed by the
appellant on 10-7-2012, well within the period of
limitation of 3 years with reference to the date of
commission of offence i.e. 4-10-2009.”
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11. In Ghanshyam Soni Vs. State and another reported in 2025
SCC Online SC 1301 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held in paragraph
Nos.17 and 18 as follows:-
“17. The observations made by the High Court
in respect of computation of the limitation period is
the correct appreciation of facts, and it is right in
holding that "considering the date of commission of
offence as 08.09.1999 and the dale of filing of
complaint as 03.07.2002, this Court finds that the
Complaint was lodged by the Petitioner within a
period of two years and ten months from the date of
commission of alleged offence, which is within. the
period of limitation of three years as per Section 468
of CrPC."
18. Therefore, this is certainly not a case
where the Complaint or the issuance of process is
ex-facie barred by limitation, that the question of
condonation of delay would arise. It is therefore
clarified that the Magistrate had rightly taken
cognizance of the offence under section 498A and
the question of applicability or exercise of powers
under section 473 CrPC as erroneously observed by
the Sessions Court, does not even arise and need not
be delved into at this stage.”
12. In Roma Ahuja Vs. State and another reported in 2026 SCC
Online SC 557 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held in paragraph Nos.7.2,
7.3 and 10 as follows:-
“ 7.2. The above submission is stated to be rejected.
The computing point of limitation for the purpose of
Section 468, Cr.P.C. is held to be the date of filing
complaint the date of initiation of criminal
proceedings. Whether the case belongs to one
instituted before the Magistrate under Section 173 or it
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is upon a complaint filed before the police, what
matters is the date of initiation of criminal
proceedings.
7.3. The criminal proceedings can be said to have
been initiated in both categories of complaint when the
complaint is filed before the Magistrate or FIR is
lodged before the police, as the case may be. It
remains a complaint-made either to the Magistrate or
to the police to become the starting point of initiation
of criminal proceedings
10. As a consequence of all the foregoing reasons
and discussion, it is to be held that the High Court
committed a patent error in quashing the FIR No. 121
of 2011, on the ground of limitation, taking an
erroneous view that the date of taking cognizance by
the Magistrate is relevant. As held by the Constitution
Bench in Sarah Mathew (supra), the relevant date for
the purpose of reckoning the limitation under Section
468, Cr.P.C. is the date of filing of complaint or the
date of initiation of criminal proceedings.”
13. This Court, in Abiganesh Vs. State of Tamil Nadu in Crl.O.P.
(MD)No.17860 of 2024, dated 29.10.2024 , held in paragraph No.28 as
follows:-
“28. In the present case, the occurrence took place on
03.04.2021, and the FIR was registered on the same day.
Consequently, the date of institution of prosecution is
03.04.2021, being the date of FIR registration.
In light of the settled legal position, it is clear that
the case is not barred by limitation, as the charge sheet
filing date is irrelevant for computing the limitation
period. Therefore, the prosecution in this case is well
within the prescribed limitation period.”
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14. From a conspectus of the above decisions of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court and this Court, the following propositions of law emerge:-
a) The filing of a formal complaint before the police authorities
within a period of three years, reckoned in the manner provided under
Section 469 of Cr.P.C., is sufficient to stop the running of the period of
limitation;
b) As per the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in
2025 SCC Online SC 1301 (paragraph No.3.8), the filing of a formal
complaint is sufficient to stop the running of the period of limitation, and
the date of registration of the FIR is immaterial; and
c) Insofar as private complaints are concerned, if the prosecution is
instituted within a period of three years (the commencement of limitation
being calculated as per Section 469 of Cr.P.C.), the date on which the
Magistrate takes cognizance is irrelevant.
15. In the present case, the occurrence took place at 21.00 hours on
12.04.2023 and the FIR was registered at 21.30 hours on the same day.
Thus, the prosecution was instituted within half an hour of the
occurrence. Any delay in filing the charge sheet does not attract the bar
under Section 468 of Cr.P.C. Accordingly, the first point is answered
against the petitioner.
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b) Merits:-
16. Section 67 of the Information Technology Act penalises the
publication or transmission, in electronic form, of any material which is
lascivious or appeals to the prurient interest, or the effect of which is such
as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely to read, see or
hear it. The FIR does not allege that the status contains any such material.
Its contents relate to a clash between two communities. The essential
ingredients of Section 67 are wholly absent and, therefore, the invocation
of that provision cannot be sustained.
17. To attract Section 504 of IPC, the insult must be communicated
directly to the person concerned, either in person or through a letter or
messenger, and the provision is meant to cover only one-to-one
interactions. A post on a social media platform does not satisfy this
requirement. In G.Sivarajaboopathi Vs. State and another in Crl.O.P.
(MD)No.106 of 2022, dated 21.01.2022 reported in 2022 Livelaw
(Madras) 30 , this Court held in paragraph No.6 as follows:-
“6.Section 504 of IPC is as follows:-
“504.Intentional insult with intent to provoke
breach of the peace-Whoever intentionally insults, and
thereby gives provocation to any person, intending or
knowing it to be likely that such provocation will cause
him to break the public peace, or to commit any other
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offence, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to two years,
or with fine, or with both.” This provision came up for
consideration in quite a few decisions of the Madras
High Court. In Muniswami Naicker Vs. P.Kanniappa
Naicker (1949) 2 MLJ 767 , it was held that the
gravamen of the offence under Section 504 of IPC lies
in the utterer provoking the victim by his words to
commit an immediate breach of the peace. That can
only occur if he utters the words in the presence of the
victim or has them conveyed to him by letter or
messenger. When the accused uttered the abuse in the
absence of the complainant, he cannot be convicted
under Section 504 of IPC unless he asked his hearers to
convey it to the complainant. In Vasireddi Sivalinga
Prasad Vs. Emperor (1941) MWN (Crl.) 31 , where the
accused abused the Zamindarini and her agents in the
course of his speech on the inam
legislation but neither the zamindarini nor her agents
were present at the meeting, the accused cannot be
convicted under Section 504 of IPC.
In S.Gopal Vs. State (1952 MWN (Crl.) 60) , it was held
that the only two points necessary or that the person
insulted must be present and such insult must give
provocation to the person so insulted then or soon after
to commit a breach of peace. Thus, as per the aforesaid
decisions, in order to attract the offence of Section 504
IPC, the accused must intentionally communicate an
abuse or insult directly to the victim. In this case, the
petitioner had posted the offending text in his Face
Book page. The contents of one's Face Book page are
primarily meant for one's “Face Book friends”, though
any one can access the same. Even the defacto
complainant must have seen it only by chance or some
body must have drawn his attention to it. Though the
post was made on 08.12.2021, the complaint was
lodged on 15.12.2021. Section 504 of IPC is intended to
cover only one to one interactions and not a case of this
nature.”
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18. In the present case, the FIR does not name any individual who
was insulted or provoked. The defacto complainant is a Police Constable
deputed to monitor social media, and he was not the person insulted.
Hence, the ingredients of Section 504 of IPC are not made out.
19. Section 153 of IPC requires that the accused, malignantly or
wantonly, by doing anything which is illegal, gives provocation to any
person, intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation will
cause the offence of rioting to be committed. In Sivarajaboopathi case
cited supra, this Court held that a social media post, by itself, does not
create the situation contemplated by the Section, namely, one in which
the provocation results in rioting.
20. The FIR does not allege that the status was addressed to any
gathering, or that it was posted at or near the place of any assembly, or
that it was followed by any riot or attempt to commit riot. Nor does it
identify any illegal act, apart from the posting itself, by which
provocation to riot was given. Thus, the fundamental requirements of
Section 153 of IPC are absent.
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21. Section 505(2) of IPC penalises the making, publishing or
circulating of any statement or report containing rumour or alarming
news with intent to create or promote, or which is likely to create or
promote, feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious,
racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities. Intention is
an essential ingredient of the offence. The words used must be read as a
whole and judged from the standpoint of reasonable, strong-minded, firm
and courageous persons.
22. The status was posted at a time when the dispute between the
two communities in the area had only just subsided. It refers to one
community having "beaten and chased away" the other, asserts that one
person died and another is in hospital, and ends with what can reasonably
be read as a warning that those who do "unnecessary things" will meet
the same fate. Read as a whole, even from the standpoint of a reasonable
and strong-minded person, these words are prima facie capable of
promoting enmity between the two communities.
23. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the
concluding words are a call for friendship and that the clash and the death
were already in the public domain. These submissions raise questions of
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intention and of the meaning of the words in the local context, which can
be decided only at the time of trial. They cannot be resolved in a petition
to quash.
24. The submission that the status disappears after 24 hours does not
advance the case of the petitioner. The offence under Section 505(2) of
IPC is complete upon the making, publishing or circulating of the
statement. Its subsequent deletion from the platform does not undo the
publication.
25. That apart, Section 473 of Cr.P.C. excludes the time required for
obtaining sanction, which is mandatory for the offences referred to under
Section 196(1-A) of Cr.P.C. Section 473 of Cr.P.C. also empowers the
Court to take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of
limitation, if it is necessary to do so in the interest of justice.
26. The plea of malice has not been substantiated. The defacto
complainant is a Police Constable who lodged the complaint in the course
of his official duty, and no personal enmity or motive has been alleged
against him.
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27. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court holds that no
offence is made out under Section 67 of the Information Technology Act
or under Sections 153 and 504 of IPC. However, the allegations prima
facie disclose the offence under Section 505(2) of IPC.
28. It is made clear that the observations made in this order are
confined to the disposal of this petition and shall not influence the
investigation or the trial in any manner.
Conclusion and directions:-
29. In the result, it is ordered as follows:-
a) The plea that the proceedings are barred by limitation under Section
468 of Cr.P.C. is rejected;
b) The FIR in Crime No.10 of 2023 on the file of the first respondent
stands quashed insofar as it relates to the offences under Sections 153 and
504 of IPC and Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2008;
c) The FIR shall stand, and the investigation shall proceed, only in
respect of the offence under Section 505(2) of IPC;
d) The first respondent shall complete the investigation and file a final
report before the jurisdictional Magistrate within a period of 3 (three)
months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. If a final report is
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filed for the offence under Section 505(2) of IPC, it shall be filed only
after obtaining the previous sanction required under Section 196(1-A) of
Cr.P.C.; and
e) It is open to the petitioner to raise all available pleas, including those
under Sections 196, 468 and 473 of Cr.P.C., before the trial Court at the
appropriate stage.
30. Accordingly, this Criminal Original Petition is partly allowed on
the above terms. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is
closed.
11-11-2026
Index: Yes/No
Speaking/Non-speaking order
Neutral Citation: Yes/No
RJR
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To
1. The Inspector Of Police,
Cyber Crime Police Station (CCD-III)
Ramanathapuram District
2. The Additional Public Prosecutor
Madurai Bench of Madras High Court
Madurai
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R.VIJAYAKUMAR, J.
RJR
Pre-delivery order made in
CRL OP(MD) No. 15653 of 2026
11-11-2026
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