State Bank Of Patiala vs Anil Kumar & Anr
- Court
- Delhi High Court
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on:28.07.2026
Judgment pronounced on:08.09.2026
Judgment uploaded on:08.09.2026
# CNR No. DLHC011153872007
+ W.P.(C) 6756/2007 & CM APPL. 12795/2007, CM APPL.
17524/2008, CM APPL. 1826/2012, CM APPL. 4975/2013,
CM APPL. 2869/2014, CM APPL. 49363/2019, CM APPL.
45136/2025, CM APPL. 45137/2025
STATE BANK OF PATIALA ..... Petitioner
versus
ANIL KUMAR & ANR ..... Respondents
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Petitioner : Mr. Rajiv Kapur, Standing Counsel with
Mr. Akshit Kapur, AOR and Ms. Riya Sood,
Adv.
For the Respondent : Mr. Vipin Mohan, Adv.
CORAM
HON’BLE MR JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN
JUDGMENT
1. The present petition has been field under Article 226/227 of the
Constitution of India, assailing the Award dated 16.04.2007, by the
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:HARMINDER
KAUR
Signing Date:08.09.2026
18:01:38
W.P.(C) 6756/2007 Page 1 of 26
Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-
Labour Court – II, (hereinafter ‘CGIT’ ) in I.D. No. 199/1997, whereby
the learned CGIT held the termination of Respondent/Shri Anil Kumar
to be illegal and directed his reinstatement with effect from
22.12.1992with 10 % back wages.
2. Succinctly stated, the Respondent/Workman raised an industrial
dispute alleging that he had been directly engaged by the
Petitioner/Bank as a “ Peon ” on 16.04.1990 at its Meerut City Branch
and he had continuously discharged the duties attached to the said post
till 21.12.1992. It was his case that despite having rendered continuous
service for more than 240 days, his services were abruptly terminated
without issuance of any notice or payment of retrenchment
compensation as contemplated under the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947. In support of his claim, reliance was placed upon Identity Card,
Character and Experience Certificatesand other documents such as
Payment Vouchers and Curfew Pass allegedly issued by the Branch
Manager of the Petitioner/Bank, to establish his engagement and
continuity of service.
3. The Petitioner/Bank had contested the claim in its entirety. It
specifically denied that the Respondent had ever been appointed as a
Peon or that any relationship of employer-employee existed between
the parties and contended that the Respondent had been deputed by M/s
Secure Well Servic es, a partnership firm engaged for providing
security personnel to the Bank, and that all payments in respect of
such engagement were made directly to the said contractor. He
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:HARMINDER
KAUR
Signing Date:08.09.2026
18:01:38
W.P.(C) 6756/2007 Page 2 of 26
performed the duties of a Security Guard and the engagement ended
when the contract was terminated with M/s Secure Well Services . The
Petitioner/Bank also asserted that the identity card and curfew pass
relied upon by the workman had been issued only to facilitate his
movement during the curfew period and did not establish any contract
of employment. It additionally raised the plea that an earlier
adjudication by the Labour Court-I Meerut in Misc. Case No. 41/1993
vide Order dated 13.05.1997, had already negatived the Respondent's
claim of employment with the Bank and, therefore, the present
proceedings were barred by the principles of res judicata .
4. The Ministry of Labour had referred the point of adjudication as
“Whether the action of the management of State Bank of Patiala in
terminating the services of Shri Anil Kumar s/o Shri Malkhan Singh is
legal and justified? If not, to what relief is the workman entitled.”
Upon completion of pleadings and recording of evidence, the
following issues were framed for determination: -
“1. Whether the workman has worked for 240
days in the year 1990 to 1992?
2. Whether the workman is entitled to
reinstatement?
3. To what amount of back wages the workman
is entitled?”
5. Vide the impugned Award dated 16.04.2007, the learned CGIT
answered the reference in favour of the Respondent. While deciding
Issue No. 1 , the learned CGIT relied upon the Identity Card of the
workman which designated him as a “ peon” ;CharacterCertificate
issued by the Branch Manager of the Bank which certified that the
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:HARMINDER
KAUR
Signing Date:08.09.2026
18:01:38
W.P.(C) 6756/2007 Page 3 of 26
workman was well known to him for 2 years 2 months and bears a
good moral character; Curfew Pass issued to the Peon as a
“ Government Servant ”; Certificateissued by the Branch Manager on
the letter head of the Bank certifying that the Respondent had worked
in the Bank from 16.04.1990 to 21.12.1992, and Payment Vouchers
produced by the workman, and observed that these documents had
either been admitted by the management or that the Bank had failed to
specifically dispute the signatures appearing thereon. It was further
observed that the management had failed to establish its plea that the
Respondent had been engaged through M/s Secure Well Services as a
“ security guard ”, noting that no documentary evidence had been
produced in support of the alleged contractual arrangement. It was
also observed that on all documents he has been mentioned as “ Peon ”
and not designated as a “ Security Guard ”. Even the payment vouchers
indicated that payments were made directly to the Respondent in his
personal capacity. Further, adverse inference was drawn against the
Bank for not disclosing the identity of any regular Peon allegedly
working at the branch during the relevant period. The learned CGIT
rejected the plea of res judicata by observing that the Civil Court did
not have jurisdiction to decide or give findings on issues pertaining an
industrial dispute. On the basis of the aforesaid reasoning, the learned
CGIT concluded that the Respondent had been engaged by the Bank
as a daily-wage Peon , had worked continuously from 16.04.1990 till
21.12.1992, and had completed more than 240 days of service in the
relevant period.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:HARMINDER
KAUR
Signing Date:08.09.2026
18:01:38
W.P.(C) 6756/2007 Page 4 of 26
6. While considering the relief to be granted, the learned
CGITheld that the Respondent's services had been terminated in
violation of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as no
notice pay or retrenchment compensation had been paid prior to
termination. It held that, since the Bank was neither a sick industrial
undertaking nor shown to be in financial distress, there was no
justification for substituting reinstatement with monetary
compensation. Accordingly, Issue No. 2 was decided in favour of the
workman by directing reinstatement .
7. Insofar as back wages were concerned, it was noted that
although the workman had approached the industrial forum after
approximately five years, he had initially pursued a remedy before a
Civil Court, which resulted in delay, and further observed that the
proceedings had been prolonged on account of adjournments sought
by the workman, these circumstances warranted only a partial denial
of back wages. Consequently, while declining full back wages, the
learned CGITawarded 10% back wages .
8. The Reference was thus answered by holding that the action of
the Petitioner in terminating the services of the Respondent was
neither legal nor justified, and the Bank was directed to reinstate the
Respondent with effect from 22.12.1992 along with 10% back wages.
9. Aggrieved, the Petitioner approached this Court by way of the
present Writ Petition.
10. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner has submitted that there
existed no employer-employee relationship between the Petitioner and
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:HARMINDER
KAUR
Signing Date:08.09.2026
18:01:38
W.P.(C) 6756/2007 Page 5 of 26
the Respondent as the Respondent was appointed through M/s
Industrial Services Agency . By letter dated 31.05.1990, M/s Industrial
Services Agency offered their services of Watchman-cum-peon to the
Petitioner Bank at rate of Rs. 800/- per month with 15% service
charges. The offer was accepted by the Petitioner vide Letter dated
01.06.1990 at the rate of Rs. 760/- per month with 10% service
charges. The acceptance of same was signified by M/s Industrial
Services Agency by signing the office copy of the Letter and at the
reverse side it was mentioned that they were sending a person named
Mr. Anil Kumar/Respondent for duty i.e. their employee. Thus, the
contract was between the Petitioner and M/s Industrial Services
Agency .
11. It is further submitted that the M/s Industrial Services Agency
deputed the Respondent on duty with the Petitioner at the above
agreed rate and the payments were made to M/s Industrial Services
Agency .
12. It is further submitted that when a permanent security guard was
posted, the Petitioner discontinued the services of the service provider
and terminated the contract. In the response to the Respondent’s Legal
Notice dated 17.02.1993, the Petitioner had specifically mentioned
that there is no privity of contract between the Respondent and the
Petitioner, and the Respondent was engaged through a third party i.e.
“ M/s Secure Well Services ”. The same was mentioned inadvertently as
“ M/s Secure Well Services ” instead of M /s Industrial Services Agency .
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:HARMINDER
KAUR
Signing Date:08.09.2026
18:01:38
W.P.(C) 6756/2007 Page 6 of 26
13. It is further submitted that the Respondent’s Application under
Section 33(c)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in the Labour
Court, Meerut Registered as Misc. Case 41 of 1993 praying for Award
of Rs. 57,912/- as salary since 16.04.1990 till 30.04.1993. The same
was duly contested by the Petitioner and the signatures on the
Certificate purportedly issued by the Branch Manger were denied. The
case was dismissed vide Judgment dated 13.05.1997 holding that,
since the certificate issued by Branch Manager was not proved as the
Respondent failed to disclose the name of the Branch Manager, the
Respondent had also admitted that he did not make any application for
seeking employment before the Petitioner, no appointment letter was
issued, Salary was never paid by the Petitioner and no letter
terminatingthe services was issued, there is no employer-employee
relationship established between the parties.
14. It was further submitted that the Respondent also filed Civil
Suit O.S. No. 1025/1993 seeking a declaration of legal status as
continuous and regular employee as Peon of the Bank, was dismissed
vide Judgment and Decree dated 12.05.1995 holding that the
Petitioner has failed to prove his employment with the Petitioner.
Since, the issue was an industrial dispute liberty was granted to the
Respondent to approach the appropriate forum. No appeal has been
filed against the above Decree and thus, the same has attained finality
and is binding on the parties.
15. It was further submitted that merely on the basis of the ID card/
curfew passes, it could not have been deduced that the Respondent is
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:HARMINDER
KAUR
Signing Date:08.09.2026
18:01:38
W.P.(C) 6756/2007 Page 7 of 26
employed with the Petitioner, in the absence of appointment letter,
termination letter, attendance register, payment of salary etc. Even the
payment vouchers were towards reimbursement of misc. expenses
incurred by the Respondent and were not salary payment vouchers.
The burden rested upon the Respondent to prove that he had been
engaged with the Petitioner bank and was in service for 240 days,
which has not been discharged.
16. It has also been submitted that without prejudice to the above
argument, as regards the relief granted is concerned, the learned CGIT
has erred in granting the relief of reinstatement and back wages, when
it is well settled that even if termination is found illegal, the relief of
reinstatement and grant of back wages cannot be granted
mechanically. As per the recent trend, compensation has been held to
meet the ends of justice. To buttress the above argument, reliance is
placed upon BSNL v. Bhurumal : (2014) 7 SCC 177 .
17. Hence, it is urged that the Award is liable to be set-aside.
18. Per Contra , the learned Counsel for the Respondent has
vehemently opposed the present petition and has submitted that all the
contentions raised have already been addressed by the learned CGITin
detail, which is the fact-finding authority and this Court cannot sit in
appeal and re-appreciate evidence, once a plausible view has been
adopted by the learned CGIT.
19. It is further submitted that the Respondent has duly performed
duties of a Peon , and was working under direct control of the Bank,
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:HARMINDER
KAUR
Signing Date:08.09.2026
18:01:38
W.P.(C) 6756/2007 Page 8 of 26
which is evident from the documents filed before the learned CGIT.
However, the services of the Respondent were terminated illegally.
20. It is further submitted that the Respondent has had no relation
with any service provider or M/s Industrial Services Agency . Rather,
the documents relating to M/s Industrial Services Agency were never
filed before the learned CGITand it is for the first time a stand has
been taken that the Respondent was engaged through M/s Industrial
ServicesAgency as before the learned CGIT it has been stated that the
Respondent was engaged through M/s Secure Well Services .
21. It is further submitted that the Judgment and Decree dated
12.05.1995 has not been filed by the Petitioner and in any case, by the
same, only the point of jurisdiction was decided in negative. Even the
reliance placed by the Petitioner upon the outcome of the Application
filed under Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is
misplaced as the same was dismissed by holding that it had no
jurisdiction to decide the relationship of employer-employee between
the parties and the case would have to be decided by way of an Award
in the appropriate proceedings.
22. Hence, it is urged that the present petition is liable to be
dismissed.
23. Vide Order dated 30.08.2011, the workman’s application
underSection 17B was allowed and the Bank was directed to pay the
higher of the last-drawn wages and applicable minimum wages , from
the date of the award till the final disposal of the writ.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:HARMINDER
KAUR
Signing Date:08.09.2026
18:01:38
W.P.(C) 6756/2007 Page 9 of 26
24. The Petitioner Bank had challenged the above order by way of
LPA No. 1005/2011, which was allowed vide Order dated 28.02.2012
and the Order was set-aside. This Order was then challenged by the
Respondent by way of Civil Appeal No. 7359/2013 which was
allowed, and the original Order dated 30.08.2011 was restored by
observing that even if the proof of last drawn wages has not been
furnished, the Respondent cannot be deprived of the benefit of
minimum wages fixed by the Authority.
25. Arguments heard and the material placed on record perused.
26. At the outset, it is apposite to mention that in exercise of
jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, this Court
does not sit as a Court of appeal over the findings recorded by the
Labour Court/Tribunals. Interference is warranted only where the
findings suffer from patent perversity, are based on no evidence, or are
such that no reasonable person could have arrived at them. Merely
because another view on the evidence is possible would not justify
interference.Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment in
International Airport Authority of India v. International Air Cargo
Workers Union :(2009) 13 SCC 374 where the Hon’ble Apex Court
held as under: -
“47. It is true that in exercising the writ
jurisdiction, the High Court cannot sit in appeal
over the findings and award of the Industrial
Tribunal and therefore, cannot reappreciate
evidence. The findings of fact recorded by a fact-
finding authority should ordinarily be considered
as final. The findings of the Tribunal should not
be interfered with in writ jurisdiction merely on
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:HARMINDER
KAUR
Signing Date:08.09.2026
18:01:38
W.P.(C) 6756/2007 Page 10 of 26
the ground that the material on which the
Tribunal had acted was insufficient or not
credible.
48. It is also true that as long as the findings of
fact are based on some materials which are
relevant, findings may not be interfered with
merely because another view is also possible. But
where the Tribunal records findings on no
evidence or irrelevant evidence, it is certainly
open to the High Court to interfere with the
award of the Industrial Tribunal.”
27. In the present case, the learned CGIT has returned its findings
after appreciating both the oral as well as documentary evidence led
by the parties. The Respondent relied upon contemporaneous admitted
documents including the Identity Card describing him as a " Peon ",
Character and Experience Certificates issued on the Bank's letterhead
showing that he had worked with the bank for almost 2 years, Curfew
Pass issued to him as “ Government Servant ”, and Payment Vouchers
which demonstrated that payments were made directly to him.
28. Though the Petitioner had admitted that the Respondent had
been working with it since 1990-1992, the principal challenge raised
before the learned CGIT as well as this Court has been that no
employer-employee relationship existed between the parties as the
Respondent had merely been deployed through a service provider.
29. The cross-examination dated 28.07.2000, of MW1-Sh. Rattan
Lal Gupta, Branch Manager, reflects that it is an admitted position that
“Shri Anil Kumar had never worked on the score of the Bank. The
workman had worked in the bank as watchman through an agency .
The workman had worked in the Bank approximately from year
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:HARMINDER
KAUR
Signing Date:08.09.2026
18:01:38
W.P.(C) 6756/2007 Page 11 of 26
1990 to 1992 .” Once it was admitted that the Respondent has been
discharging duties and working with the Bank and a specific defence
was raised regarding the engagement through a third party, the
burdenshifted upon the Petitioner to substantiate the same by
producing the best evidence available in its possession.
30. In Bank of Baroda v. Ghemarbhai Harjibhai Rabari , (2005)
10 SCC 792, the hon’ble Apex Court, while discussing the onus and
degree of proof required to be discharged by a workman, opined that
though the initial burden to establish employment with the
management rests primarily with the workman, however, the degree of
proof so required would vary from case to case. It was held that,
despite no letter of appointment, the workman would be entitled to
relief as the he had been able to establish a prima facie case on the
basis of the payment vouchers furnished and the management has
failed to rebut the case of the workman. The relevant extract is
reproduced herein below: -
“8. While there is no doubt in law that the burden
of proof that a claimant was in the employment of
a management, primarily lies on the workman
who claims to be a workman, the degree of such
proof so required, would vary from case to case. In
the instant case, the workman has established the
fact which, of course, has not been denied by the
Bank, that he did work as a driver of the car
belonging to the Bank during the relevant period
which comes to more than 240 days of work. He
has produced 3 vouchers which showed that he had
been paid certain sums of money towards his wages
and the said amount has been debited to the
account of the Bank. As against this, as found by the
fora below, no evidence whatsoever has been
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:HARMINDER
KAUR
Signing Date:08.09.2026
18:01:38
W.P.(C) 6756/2007 Page 12 of 26
adduced by the Bank to rebut even this piece of
evidence produced by the workman. It remained
contented by filing a written statement wherein it
denied the claim of the workman and took up a plea
that the employment of such drivers was under a
scheme by which they are, in reality, the employee
of the executive concerned and not that of the
Bank; none was examined to prove the scheme.
No evidence was led to establish that the vouchers
produced by the workman were either not genuine
or did not pertain to the wages paid to the
workman. No explanation by way of evidence was
produced to show for what purpose the workman's
signatures were taken in the register maintained
by the Bank. In this factual background, the
question of the workman further proving his case
does not arise because there was no challenge at
all to his evidence by way of rebuttal by the Bank .”
(emphasis supplied)
31. Keeping the above in mind, in the present case, the Petitioner
has miserably failed to rebut the case of the Workman. If indeed the
Respondent had been deputed by an independent contractor, the
agreement executed with such contractor, payment records, bills,
correspondence, deployment records, or examination of the
representative of the contractor would have constituted the primary
evidence in support of the said plea. Admittedly, no such material was
ever produced before the learned CGIT. Notably, no such material has
been placed before this Court as well. Rather, even the identity of the
alleged contractor has not remained consistent. While the defense
before the learned CGIT referred to M/s Secure Well Services being
the service provider, the present writ petition has sought to attribute
the Respondent's engagement to M/s Industrial Services Agency . No
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:HARMINDER
KAUR
Signing Date:08.09.2026
18:01:38
W.P.(C) 6756/2007 Page 13 of 26
satisfactory explanation has been furnished for this inconsistency.The
record, as presented, does not show a complete commercial trail
consisting of the agency’s registration, proprietor or partner evidence,
recurring invoices, receipts, account entries and testimony explaining
deployment and payment. There is nothing to even support the plea of
alleged termination of agreement between the Petitioner and the
Agency or any contemporaneous document to show that the salary of
the Respondent was being paid to any Agency. Further, the Petitioner
has also not been able to substantiate the plea that the permanent
security guard had replaced the Respondent.
32. In these circumstances, the learned CGIT’s conclusion that the
Bank was the real employer cannot be characterized as based on no
evidence or as one no reasonable adjudicator could reach. The finding
that the Respondent was engaged directly by the Petitioner is not
based upon a solitary document but upon a cumulative appreciation of
the evidence produced by the parties coupled with the failure of the
Petitioner to produce the material evidence which was admittedly
within its exclusive possession. The appreciation of evidence by the
learned CGIT is certainly a plausible one. Hence, the observations
regarding the illegal termination do not warrant interference.
33. Further, the reliance placed by the Petitioner on the Judgment
dated 12.05.1995 and Order 13.05.1997, vide which the Suit O.S. No.
1025/1993 and Section 33 Application, filed by the Respondent, were
dismissed, is misplaced. A perusal of the same demonstrates that the
Labour Court while deciding the Section 33 Application, had
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:HARMINDER
KAUR
Signing Date:08.09.2026
18:01:38
W.P.(C) 6756/2007 Page 14 of 26
categorically observed that the proceedings under Section 33C(2) are
in the nature of computation of an existing right and thus, it possesses
no jurisdiction to decide whether an employer-employee relationship
exists between the parties and the present issues have to be decided by
way of an Award.
34. As regards the Judgment and Decree dated 12.05.1995, the
same has not been placed on record. However, it is recorded in the
Judgment dated 28.02.2012 passed by the Division Bench of this
Court in LPA No. 1005/2011 (challenging the 17-B Order), that: -
“3. After his alleged termination, the workman
first filed civil suit in the year 1993 in the Court of
City Munsif, Meerut. The said suit was contested
by the appellant/management raising various
defences. One of the defences of the management
was that respondent/workman was never
appointed/ employed by the management.
According to the management, it hadengaged the
services of M/s. Secure Well Services, a
partnership firm, to provide security guard to the
bank on temporary basis and it was M/s. Secure
Well Services which had deployed the
respondent/workman at the aforesaid Meerut
Branch therefore there was no employer-
employee relationship between the management
and the respondent. Another defence was that the
civil court had no jurisdiction as it was an
industrial dispute. The Civil Court while deciding
the aforesaid suit in July 1995 recorded a
finding that there was no employer-employee
relationship between the appellant and the
respondent. At the same time, the suit was
dismissed on the ground that it was an industrial
dispute and therefore the jurisdiction was of the
industrial tribunal / labour court under the ID
Act.”
(emphasis supplied)
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:HARMINDER
KAUR
Signing Date:08.09.2026
18:01:38
W.P.(C) 6756/2007 Page 15 of 26
35. From a perusal of the above, it emerges that the issue in the Suit
was also never decided finally and the matter was to be decided afresh
by the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court. As rightly observed by the
learned CGIT, the dismissal of the civil suit does not bar the industrial
reference and when the jurisdiction was itself in issue; a finding by a
court lacking jurisdiction cannot be enlarged into a final industrial
adjudication on the existence of an employer-employee relationship.
36. As regards violation of Section 25F, it is well settled that the
workman bears the initial burden of showing 240 days of service
however, the practical reality is that daily-wage workers rarely possess
formal service records. Thus, an adverse inference may be drawn
against the Employer if such records are not produced depending on
the facts. The finding that the Respondent had completed continuous
service and that his services were terminated (despite him serving the
Petitioner from 1990-1992 as admitted by MW-1 in his cross-
examination) in violation of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act
is founded upon the evidence appreciated by the learned CGIT. The
Bank did not produce a coherent alternate attendance and payment
record demonstrating intermittent service or employment elsewhere.
The Petitioner has been unable to demonstrate that the said findings
are based on no evidence or suffer from such perversity as would
warrant interference in exercise of the writ jurisdiction of this Court.
37. Reliance has been placed by the Petitioner upon Municipal
Corpn., Faridabad v. Siri Niwas, (2004) 8 SCC 195 , to contend that
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:HARMINDER
KAUR
Signing Date:08.09.2026
18:01:38
W.P.(C) 6756/2007 Page 16 of 26
the initial burden of establishing that the workman had completed 240
days of service rests upon the workman. As discussed above, there can
be no quarrel with the said proposition. However, whether such
burden has been discharged has to be examined on the basis of the
evidence led in the particular case. The said judgment does not lay
down that the workman is required to establish his employment only
through a formal appointment letter or other records which,
particularly in the case of a daily-wage engagement, may ordinarily
remain in the custody of the employer.
38. The submissions advanced on behalf of the Petitioner
essentially invite this Court to re-appreciate the evidence and
substitute its own conclusions for those arrived at by the learned
Labour Court. Such an exercise is impermissible while exercising
supervisory jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution. Since the view taken by the learned CGIT is a
reasonably possible view emerging from the material on record, no
interference with the observations regarding illegal terminationin the
impugned Award is called for.
39. Having upheld the finding of illegal termination, the next
issuethat arises for consideration is the nature and extent of relief to
begranted to the Respondent. It is no more res-integral that the finding
of illegality of termination does not make reinstatement with back
wages automatic. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Allahabad Bank v.
Krishan Pal Singh : (2021) 19 SCC 227 , has held that reinstatement
with full back wages is not automatic in every case where termination
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:HARMINDER
KAUR
Signing Date:08.09.2026
18:01:38
W.P.(C) 6756/2007 Page 17 of 26
or dismissal is found to be not in accordance with the procedure
prescribed under law and that the relief can be molded depending
upon the facts and circumstances of the case.
40. As regards the relief of reinstatement, the Petitioner has placed
reliance upon Jagbir Singh v. Haryana State Agriculture Marketing
Board, (2009) 15 SCC 327 and Haryana Tourism Corporation Ltd.
v. Fakir Chand , (2003) 8 SCC 248 , to contend that reinstatement does
not follow as an automatic consequence even where termination is
found to be in violation of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act.
The said proposition is well settled and has subsequently been
reiterated in a catena of decisions. In Jagbir Singh (supra), the
Hon’ble Supreme Court recognized that the earlier principle of
automatic reinstatement with back wages had undergone a shift and
that compensation instead of reinstatement may meet the ends of
justice. The relevant extract is reproduced herein below: -
“7. It is true that the earlier view of this Court
articulated in many decisions reflected the legal
position that if the termination of an employee
was found to be illegal, the relief of reinstatement
with full back wages would ordinarily follow.
However, in recent past, there has been a shift in
the legal position and in a long line of cases, this
Court has consistently taken the view that relief
by way of reinstatement with back wages is not
automatic and may be wholly inappropriate in a
given fact situation even though the termination
of an employee is in contravention of the
prescribed procedure. Compensation instead of
reinstatement has been held to meet the ends of
justice.
xxx xxx xxx
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:HARMINDER
KAUR
Signing Date:08.09.2026
18:01:38
W.P.(C) 6756/2007 Page 18 of 26
14. It would be, thus, seen that by a catena of
decisions in recent time, this Court has clearly
laid down that an order of retrenchment passed in
violation of Section 25-F although may be set
aside but an award of reinstatement should not,
however, be automatically passed. The award of
reinstatement with full back wages in a case
where the workman has completed 240 days of
work in a year preceding the date of termination,
particularly, daily wagers has not been found to
be proper by this Court and instead compensation
has been awarded. This Court has distinguished
between a daily wager who does not hold a post
and a permanent employee.
15. Therefore, the view of the High Court that the
Labour Court erred in granting reinstatement and
back wages in the facts and circumstances of the
present case cannot be said to suffer from any
legal flaw. However, in our view, the High Court
erred in not awarding compensation to the
appellant while upsetting the award of
reinstatement and back wages.
16. As a matter of fact, in all the judgments of this
Court referred to and relied upon by the High
Court while upsetting the award of reinstatement
and back wages, this Court has awarded
compensation.
17. While awarding compensation, a host of
factors, inter alia, manner and method of
appointment, nature of employment and length
of service are relevant. Of course, each case will
depend upon its own facts and circumstances.”
(emphasis supplied)
41. Similarly, in Haryana Tourism Corporation Ltd. (supra), the
Hon’ble Supreme Court, while considering that the claimants were
daily-wage employees; who were not recruited through any
employment exchange or any accepted mode of selection; whether
there was any advertisement calling for applications for appointment
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:HARMINDER
KAUR
Signing Date:08.09.2026
18:01:38
W.P.(C) 6756/2007 Page 19 of 26
of them;none of them was regularized in service before their
termination; considerable passage of time; and possibility that a daily
wager must have continued working somewhere after termination,
held that reinstatement would not be a just or equitable solution and
interest of justice would be met if compensation in lieu of
reinstatement.
42. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in Bhurumal (supra) has also held
that daily-wage workers are not automatically entitled to reinstatement
with back wages when their termination violates procedural laws like
Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. Instead, the Court held
that lump-sum monetary compensation is the appropriate remedy. The
relevant extract is reproduced herein below: -
“ 28. The only question that survives for
consideration is as to whether the relief of
reinstatement with full back wages was rightly
granted by CGIT.
29. The learned counsel for the appellant referred
to two judgments wherein this Court granted
compensation instead of reinstatement.
In BSNL v. Man Singh [BSNL v. Man Singh,
(2012) 1 SCC 558 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 207] ,
this Court has held that when the termination is
set aside because of violation of Section 25-F of
the Industrial Disputes Act, it is not necessary
that relief of reinstatement be also given as a
matter of right.In Incharge Officer v. Shankar
Shetty [(2010) 9 SCC 126 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S)
733] , it was held that those cases where the
workman had worked on daily-wage basis, and
worked merely for a period of 240 days or 2 to 3
years and where the termination had taken place
many years ago, the recent trend was to grant
compensation in lieu of reinstatement.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:HARMINDER
KAUR
Signing Date:08.09.2026
18:01:38
W.P.(C) 6756/2007 Page 20 of 26
30. In this judgment of Shankar Shetty [(2010) 9
SCC 126 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 733] , this trend
was reiterated by referring to various judgments,
as is clear from the following discussion: (SCC
pp. 127-28, paras 2-4)
“2. Should an order of reinstatement
automatically follow in a case where
the engagement of a daily-wager has
been brought to an end in violation of
Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (for short ‘the ID
Act’)? The course of the decisions of
this Court in recent years has been
uniform on the above question.
3. In Jagbir Singh v. Haryana State
Agriculture Mktg. Board [Jagbir
Singh v. Haryana State Agriculture
Mktg. Board, (2009) 15 SCC 327 :
(2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 545] , delivering
the judgment of this Court, one of us
(R.M. Lodha, J.) noticed some of the
recent decisions of this Court,
namely, U.P. State Brassware Corpn.
Ltd. v. Uday Narain Pandey [(2006) 1
SCC 479 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 250]
, Uttaranchal Forest Development
Corpn. v. M.C. Joshi [(2007) 9 SCC
353 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 813] , State
of M.P. v. Lalit Kumar Verma [(2007)
1 SCC 575 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S)
405] , M.P.
Admn. v. Tribhuban [(2007) 9 SCC
748 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 264] , Sita
Ram v. Moti Lal Nehru Farmers
Training Institute [(2008) 5 SCC 75 :
(2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 71] , Jaipur
Development
Authority v. Ramsahai [(2006) 11
SCC 684 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 518]
, GDA v. Ashok Kumar [(2008) 4 SCC
261 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 1016]
and Mahboob Deepak v. Nagar
Panchayat, Gajraula [(2008) 1 SCC
575 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 239] and
stated as follows: (Jagbir Singh
case [Jagbir Singh v. Haryana State
Agriculture Mktg. Board, (2009) 15
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:HARMINDER
KAUR
Signing Date:08.09.2026
18:01:38
W.P.(C) 6756/2007 Page 21 of 26
SCC 327 : (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 545] ,
SCC pp. 330 & 335, paras 7 & 14)
‘7. It is true that the earlier view of
this Court articulated in many
decisions reflected the legal position
that if the termination of an employee
was found to be illegal, the relief of
reinstatement with full back wages
would ordinarily follow . However, in
recent past, there has been a shift in
the legal position and in a long line
of cases, this Court has consistently
taken the view that relief by way of
reinstatement with back wages is not
automatic and may be wholly
inappropriate in a given fact
situation even though the
termination of an employee is in
contravention of the prescribed
procedure. Compensation instead of
reinstatement has been held to meet
the ends of justice.
*
14. It would be, thus, seen that by a
catena of decisions in recent time,
this Court has clearly laid down that
an order of retrenchment passed in
violation of Section 25-F although
may be set aside but an award of
reinstatement should not, however,
be automatically passed. The award
of reinstatement with full back wages
in a case where the workman has
completed 240 days of work in a year
preceding the date of termination,
particularly, daily-wagers has not
been found to be proper by this Court
and instead compensation has been
awarded. This Court has
distinguished between a daily-wager
who does not hold a post and a
permanent employee.’
4. Jagbir Singh [Jagbir
Singh v. Haryana State Agriculture
Mktg. Board, (2009) 15 SCC 327 :
(2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 545] has been
applied very recently in Telegraph
Deptt. v. Santosh Kumar Seal [(2010)
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:HARMINDER
KAUR
Signing Date:08.09.2026
18:01:38
W.P.(C) 6756/2007 Page 22 of 26
6 SCC 773 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S)
309] , wherein this Court stated:
(SCC p. 777, para 11)
‘11. In view of the aforesaid legal
position and the fact that the workmen
were engaged as daily-wagers about
25 years back and they worked hardly
for 2 or 3 years, relief of
reinstatement and back wages to them
cannot be said to be justified and
instead monetary compensation would
subserve the ends of justice.’”
31. In Deptt. of Telecommunications v. Keshab
Deb [(2008) 8 SCC 402 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S)
709] the Court emphasised that automatic
direction for reinstatement of the workman with
full back wages is not contemplated. He was at
best entitled to one month's pay in lieu of one
month's notice and wages of 15 days of each
completed year of service as envisaged under
Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. He
could not have been directed to be regularised in
service or granted/given a temporary status. Such
a scheme has been held to be unconstitutional by
this Court in A. Umarani v. Registrar, Coop.
Societies [(2004) 7 SCC 112 : 2004 SCC (L&S)
918] and State of Karnataka v. Umadevi
(3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] .
32. It was further submitted by the learned
counsel for the appellant that likewise, even when
reinstatement was ordered, it does not
automatically follow that full back wages should
be directed to be paid to the workman. He drew
the attention of this Court to Coal India
Ltd. v. Ananta Saha [(2011) 5 SCC 142 : (2011) 1
SCC (L&S) 750] and Metropolitan Transport
Corpn. v. V. Venkatesan [(2009) 9 SCC 601 :
(2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 719] .
33. It is clear from the reading of the aforesaid
judgments that the ordinary principle of grant of
reinstatement with full back wages, when the
termination is found to be illegal is not applied
mechanically in all cases. While that may be a
position where services of a regular/permanent
workman are terminated illegally and/or mala
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:HARMINDER
KAUR
Signing Date:08.09.2026
18:01:38
W.P.(C) 6756/2007 Page 23 of 26
fide and/or by way of victimisation, unfair
labour practice, etc. However, when it comes to
the case of termination of a daily-wage worker
and where the termination is found illegal
because of a procedural defect, namely, in
violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act, this Court is consistent in taking
the view that in such cases reinstatement with
back wages is not automatic and instead the
workman should be given monetary
compensation which will meet the ends of
justice. Rationale for shifting in this direction is
obvious.
34. The reasons for denying the relief of
reinstatement in such cases are obvious. It is trite
law that when the termination is found to be
illegal because of non-payment of retrenchment
compensation and notice pay as mandatorily
required under Section 25-F of the Industrial
Disputes Act, even after reinstatement, it is
always open to the management to terminate the
services of that employee by paying him the
retrenchment compensation. Since such a
workman was working on daily-wage basis and
even after he is reinstated, he has no right to seek
regularisation [see State of
Karnataka v. Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006
SCC (L&S) 753] ]. Thus when he cannot claim
regularisation and he has no right to continue
even as a daily-wage worker, no useful purpose is
going to be served in reinstating such a workman
and he can be given monetary compensation by
the Court itself inasmuch as if he is terminated
again after reinstatement, he would receive
monetary compensation only in the form of
retrenchment compensation and notice pay. In
such a situation, giving the relief of
reinstatement, that too after a long gap, would
not serve any purpose.”
(Emphasis supplied)
43. The reliance placed by the Petitioner upon Haryana Urban
Development Authority v. Devi Dayal, (2002) 3 SCC 473 , is also
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:HARMINDER
KAUR
Signing Date:08.09.2026
18:01:38
W.P.(C) 6756/2007 Page 24 of 26
relevant to the extent that the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while
considering the question of back wages, took into account the short
duration of service of the daily wager and the possibility of gainful
employment during the intervening period, and thus, moulded the
relief of full back wages to 50% back wages.
44. Hence, it is well crystallized that the relief of reinstatement and
back wages is required to be moulded having regard to the facts and
circumstances of each case.
45. Applying the above settled principles to the case at hand, it is
noted that the present case concerns an engagement of less than three
years ending in 1992; more than thirty-three years have elapsed; and
the workman is near the applicable age of superannuation. Vide Order
dated 30.08.2011, the workman’s application under Section 17B was
allowed and the Bank was directed to pay the higher of the last-drawn
wages and applicable minimum wages . It had been submitted by the
Counsel for the Petitioner Bank that it has been complying with the
17B orders and till 2022 approximately Rs. 11 Lakhs has already been
paid to the Respondent. Though the amounts paid under 17B are in the
nature of subsistence allowance, however, the Respondent has gotten
the benefit of payments made under 17B without working or rendering
any services to the Petitioner and the Petitioner had been paying the
same for a long period. In the opinion of this Court, considering the
totality of circumstances, ends of justice will be met by modifying the
relief and awarding a lumpsum compensation of Rs. 3,00,000 to the
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:HARMINDER
KAUR
Signing Date:08.09.2026
18:01:38
W.P.(C) 6756/2007 Page 25 of 26
Respondent. The same shall be paid by the Petitioner within a period
of eight weeks from the date of this Judgment.
46. The above compensation amount shall be paid over and above
sums validly paid under Section 17B. The Petitioner shall remain
liable for any unpaid amount due under Section 17B till date of this
Judgment.
47. Accordingly, the Impugned Award is modified to the above
extent and present petition is disposed with the above directions, along
with pending application(s).
AMIT MAHAJAN, J
SEPTEMBER 8, 2026
‘KDK’
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:HARMINDER
KAUR
Signing Date:08.09.2026
18:01:38
W.P.(C) 6756/2007 Page 26 of 26