BRANCH MANAGER vs SMT. RASHMI SHRIVASTAVA

1


2026:CGHC:26160
NAFR
Digitally signed
by ALOK
SHARMA
Date:
2026.06.29
11:22:59 +0530
ALOK
SHARMA
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WP227 No. 710 of 2026
1 - Branch Manager State Bank Of India Collectorate Branch Near Nehru
Chowk, Tehsil And District- Bilaspur Chhattisgarh- 495001
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - Smt. Rashmi Shrivastava W/o Late Ashok Kumar Shrivastava R/o E-12/13
River View Colony, Koni Tehsil And District- Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh – 495001
2 - Branch Manager, S B I Life Insurance Company Limited, Local Office C M
D Chowk Apollo City Centre Complex, Bilaspur, Tehsil And District- Bilaspur
Chhattisgarh - 495004
... Respondent(s)
(Cause title taken from Case Information System)
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Pankaj Singh, Advocate.
For Respondent No. 1 :
Ms. Rashmi Shrivastava, In Person.
Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J.
Order on Board
25/06/2026
The petitioner has filed the instant writ petition under Article 227 of the
1.
Constitution of India, against the order dated 12.03.2026, passed by
the learned National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New
Delhi, in Second Appeal No. 168 of 2026, whereby the second appeal
filed by the petitioner has been dismissed and the order dated
01.09.2025 passed by Chhattisgarh State Consumer Disputes

2
Redressal Commission, Raipur, in Appeal Case No.
SC/22/FA/2024/776 and the order dated 10.10.2024 passed by the
District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Bilaspur (C.G.) in
Complaint Case No. CC/2017/201 has been affirmed.
The case of the complainant, in brief, is that the complainant's
2.
husband, Late Shri Ashok Kumar Srivastava, had availed a home loan
of Rs. 15,65,000/- from the State Bank of India, Collectorate Branch,
Bilaspur, bearing Loan Account No. 35634218770. To secure the said
loan, he had obtained an SBI Life Rinn Raksha Insurance Policy from
SBI Life Insurance Company Limited, under Policy No. 7006225376
(Customer ID No. 42625201/70000011107), wherein the complainant,
Smt. Rashmi Srivastava was the nominee. According to the terms and
conditions of the insurance policy, in the event of the death of the
insured during the policy period, the outstanding loan liability was to be
discharged by the insurer, and any additional policy benefits were
payable to the nominee. It is pleaded that Late Shri Ashok Kumar
Srivastava suffered a sudden brain haemorrhage and was admitted to
KIMS Hospital, Bilaspur, on 25.01.2017, where he expired during
treatment on 30.01.2017. The deceased had regularly paid the policy
premium during his lifetime, which was deducted from his bank
account. After his death, the complainant submitted a claim application
on 16.03.2017 seeking settlement of the outstanding loan amount
under the policy; however, the claim was allegedly repudiated by the
opposite parties without any communication or intimation to her.
Despite repeated personal requests, submission of claim documents,
and a legal notice dated 17.04.2017 sent through her advocate, no
response was furnished by the opposite parties. The complainant,

3
therefore, contends that the opposite parties were contractually bound
to liquidate the outstanding loan liability upon the death of the insured
and their failure to do so amounts to a deficiency in service and unfair
trade practice, entitling her to appropriate relief from the Consumer
Commission.
The Opposite Party No. 1/SBI Life Insurance Co. Ltd., in its written
3.
statement, has submitted that although the complainant has sought
insurance benefits arising out of the death of Late Shri Ashok Kumar
Srivastava, who expired on 30.01.2017, no valid contract of insurance
ever came into existence between the deceased and Opposite Party
No. 1. It is pleaded that the proposal submitted by the deceased for
insurance coverage under the SBI Life Rinn Raksha Group Insurance
Scheme could not be accepted as he failed to comply with the medical
requirements that were necessary for assessment of the risk on his life.
Consequently, the proposal was rejected, and the premium amount
received from him was refunded during his lifetime. According to the
insurance company, mere submission of a proposal form and payment
of the premium do not automatically result in the grant of insurance
coverage. The proposer is required to submit a duly completed and
signed proposal form and comply with all requirements. It is further
pleaded that Opposite Party No. 1 had issued Master Policy No.
700000011107 in favour of the State Bank of India under a group
insurance scheme. Under such schemes, while a master policy is
issued to the master policyholder, individual members become entitled
to insurance coverage only upon satisfying the eligibility criteria and
upon acceptance of their risk by the insurer. In the present case, a
membership form bearing No. 7006225376 dated 19.03.2016 was

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received in respect of Late Shri Ashok Kumar Srivastava for an insured
sum of Rs. 14,93,000/- linked to Loan Account No. 35634165328.
During the process, the insurer issued a letter dated 31.03.2016 calling
upon the deceased to furnish medical documents, which was
dispatched through Speed Post under Consignment No.
EC05511844IN, and a copy was also sent to the master policyholder
on the same date. Since the deceased failed to comply with the
medical requirements within the stipulated period, his proposal was
cancelled. Thereafter, the premium amount of Rs. 16,993/- was sought
to be refunded through EFT to Account No. 35634218770; however,
the transaction failed due to invalid credit account details.
Subsequently, Cheque No. 570950 dated 17.05.2016 for Rs. 16,993/-
was issued and forwarded to the bank for credit into the deceased’s
account, and the deceased was informed thereof by letter dated
19.05.2016. Thereafter, a fresh cheque bearing No. 928438 for Rs.
17,691/- was issued on 31.03.2017 and intimation thereof was sent to
the complainant and the bank on 11.04.2017.
Opposite Party No. 1 has, therefore, submitted that since the proposal
4.
was never accepted and no insurance certificate was ever issued, no
insurance cover existed on the life of the deceased. It is further
submitted that documentary evidence clearly establishes that no life
insurance policy came into force in favour of Late Shri Ashok Kumar
Srivastava. The insurance company also claims to have furnished a
detailed reply to the legal notice issued by the complainant vide
communication dated 29.05.2017. It is further contended that Opposite
Parties No. 1 and 2 are separate and distinct legal entities, and the
insurer cannot be held liable for any act or omission on the part of the

5
bank. Since no insurance contract came into existence and no risk was
assumed by the insurer, Opposite Party No. 1 had no contractual
obligation either to provide insurance benefits or to discharge the
outstanding loan liability of the deceased. Accordingly, it is denied that
there was any deficiency in service on its part, and dismissal of the
complaint has been prayed for.
Opposite Party No. 2/State Bank of India, in its written statement, has
5.
submitted that insurance coverage in respect of the loan account is
governed by the terms and conditions of the insurance scheme and
that the present dispute essentially relates to an insurance claim. It is
submitted that insurance services are not rendered by the bank and,
therefore, the complainant has unnecessarily impleaded the bank as a
party to the proceedings. According to Opposite Party No. 2, the
acceptance or repudiation of an insurance claim falls exclusively within
the domain of the insurance company, and the bank has no knowledge
regarding the grounds on which the insurance claim of the deceased
was rejected. It is further pleaded that the bank is unaware as to
whether the insurance company had communicated the repudiation of
the claim to the complainant. While admitting receipt of the legal notice
sent on behalf of the complainant, the bank has denied the allegations
contained therein. Any claim for insurance benefits can be maintained
only against the insurance company, and the lending bank is neither a
necessary nor a proper party to such a dispute. On these grounds,
Opposite Party No. 2 has prayed for dismissal of the complaint as
against it.
After considering the pleadings and documents placed on record, the
6.
District Consumer Commission found it undisputed that Late Shri

6
Ashok Kumar Srivastava had been sanctioned a housing loan on
19.03.2016 and that a premium amount of Rs. 16,993/- towards the
SBI Life Rinn Raksha Group Insurance Scheme was deducted from his
account and remitted by the bank to the insurance company. The
insurance proposal was not accepted due to non-compliance with
medical requirements, and the proposal had been cancelled. However,
the Commission found that the insurance company failed to produce
any satisfactory evidence to establish that the deceased had actually
been informed either about the requirement of medical documents or
about the subsequent rejection of his proposal. Although the insurer
relied upon a computer-generated screenshot and certain
correspondence allegedly sent to the deceased, no cogent proof of
service of such communications upon Late Shri Ashok Kumar
Srivastava was produced. The Commission, therefore, observed that it
could not be conclusively held that the deceased knew the rejection of
his proposal. Nevertheless, since the proposal had admittedly not been
accepted and no insurance certificate had been issued, the District
Consumer Commission held that no deficiency in service on the part of
the insurance company was established.
The Commission further held that the Opposite party No. 2/State Bank
7.
of India, being the Master Policy Holder under the group insurance
scheme, had a duty to communicate to its borrower-member the status
of the insurance proposal, including any deficiency, rejection, or
cancellation thereof. The evidence on record revealed that the insurer
had sent the refund cheque of the premium amount to the bank in May
2016, but the bank failed to establish that it had informed the deceased
about the rejection of the proposal or about the refund of the premium.

7
Significantly, the refund amount was ultimately adjusted in the loan
accounts only on 22.05.2017, i.e., after the death of the borrower on
30.01.2017. The Commission found the bank's explanation regarding
non-credit of the refund amount during the lifetime of the deceased to
be unsatisfactory and indicative of negligence. It, therefore, concluded
that the bank had committed deficiency in service by failing to
communicate the rejection of the insurance proposal and by not taking
appropriate steps to ensure refund of the premium during the lifetime of
the borrower. Holding that the complainant had thereby been deprived
of the benefit of insurance coverage and had suffered financial loss
equal to the outstanding home loan liability, the Commission partly
allowed the complaint against the bank and directed it to credit and
adjust the outstanding loan amount of Rs. 14,05,585/- together with
applicable interest in the loan account, close the home loan account in
satisfaction, and issue a No Objection Certificate (NOC) to the
complainant, along with compensation and other consequential reliefs
as specified in the order.
The Opposite party No. 2/State Bank of India, filed the first Appeal
8.
before the Chhattisgarh State Consumer Dispute Redressal
Commission, Raipur. The State Commission, upon re-appreciation of
the material available on the record and the findings recorded by the
District Commission, held that it was undisputed that Late Shri Ashok
Kumar Srivastava had obtained a housing loan from the appellant/bank
and that a premium amount of Rs. 16,993/- towards the SBI Life Rinn
Raksha Insurance Scheme had been deducted and remitted to the
insurance company. The Commission further found that the insurance
proposal of the deceased was cancelled by the insurer on account of

8
non-submission of the requisite medical documents and that the
premium amount was refunded to the bank along with intimation
regarding rejection of the proposal. However, despite being the Master
Policy Holder and having received such information, the bank failed to
establish that it had ever communicated the rejection of the proposal or
the refund of premium to the borrower during his lifetime. The
Commission observed that had the borrower been informed in time, he
could have complied with the requirements and obtained insurance
coverage under the scheme. The bank also failed to explain why the
refund cheque was not credited to the borrower’s account and why the
amount was adjusted only after his death. Holding that such omissions
constituted gross negligence and clear deficiency in service on the part
of the bank, the State Commission concurred with the detailed findings
of the District Commission and concluded that no interference with the
impugned order was warranted. Consequently, the first appeal
preferred by the bank was dismissed on 01.09.2025, and the order
dated 10.10.2024, passed by the District Consumer Commission in
Complaint Case No. CC/2017/201 was affirmed.
The order dated 01.09.2025 was challenged by the petitioner/State
9.
Bank of India, in Second Appeal before the learned National Consumer
Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi. The National Consumer
Commission, vide its order dated 12.03.2026, held that since the
deceased borrower was sought to be covered under the SBI Life Rinn
Raksha Group Insurance Scheme through the Master Policy obtained
by the bank, it was primarily the bank's responsibility to ensure
compliance with all requirements necessary for obtaining insurance
coverage, including submission of requisite documents. The

9
Commission observed that despite receiving the insurer's
communication regarding non-grant of coverage and refund of
premium, the bank neither took effective steps to ascertain and rectify
the deficiencies in the proposal nor adequately coordinated with the
borrower to secure coverage. The Commission further found that the
bank had failed to satisfactorily explain the misplacement of the original
refund cheque and the consequent delay of more than one year in
obtaining and crediting the replacement cheque. Holding that such
conduct constituted deficiency in service and negligence on the part of
the bank, and finding no error in the concurrent findings of the District
and State Commissions, the National Commission declined to
interfere, dismissed the second appeal.
Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner/Bank submits that the
10.
findings concurrently recorded by the District Consumer Disputes
Redressal Commission, the State Consumer Disputes Redressal
Commission and the National Consumer Disputes Redressal
Commission are contrary to the pleadings, documentary evidence and
the material available on record. It is argued that the petitioner/Bank
had merely acted as a lending institution and, in terms of the group
insurance arrangement, its role was confined to deducting the
insurance premium from the borrower's account and remitting the
same to the Insurance Company. It is further argued that the proposal
for insurance was independently scrutinized by the Insurance
Company and, upon finding certain deficiencies, the Insurance
Company itself issued communications calling upon the borrower to
furnish the requisite medical documents. Learned counsel would
submit that once the proposal was under the consideration of the

10
Insurance Company, it was the exclusive responsibility of the insurer to
communicate the deficiencies, the rejection of the proposal, and the
refund of the premium directly to the insured. Therefore, fastening
liability upon the petitioner-Bank for the alleged failure of
communication is wholly misconceived and unsupported by the
contractual terms governing the Master Policy. It is further argued that
the Insurance Company itself had pleaded that copies of the
communications regarding medical requirements, rejection of the
proposal and refund of premium were dispatched to the insured, and
therefore the finding that the petitioner/Bank alone was liable suffers
from perversity and is contrary to the evidence on record.
Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the complaint
11.
itself was not maintainable against the petitioner/Bank under the
provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019. It is argued that the
dispute essentially pertains to the repudiation of an insurance claim
and no deficiency in banking service, as defined under the Act, can be
attributed to the petitioner. The petitioner neither undertook any
obligation to provide insurance coverage nor possessed any authority
to accept or reject the insurance proposal, which was exclusively
vested with the Insurance Company. It is further submitted that the
complainant does not satisfy the requirements of a "consumer" within
the meaning of Section 2(7) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019,
insofar as the petitioner/Bank is concerned, as there was no hiring or
availing of any independent service from the Bank relating to the
insurance contract. Consequently, it is submitted that the consumer
forums have committed a jurisdictional error in entertaining the
complaint against the petitioner/Bank and in recording findings of

11
deficiency in service despite the absence of any statutory or
contractual obligation on its part. Therefore, the impugned orders are
liable to be set aside in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction of this
Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
The Respondent No. 1/complainant, who appeared suo-moto in the
12.
case, in person, supported the impugned orders passed by the
consumer forums and submitted that the findings recorded by the
District Commission, affirmed by the State Commission as well as the
National Commission, are based on documentary evidence available
on record. It is submitted that the petitioner/Bank, being the Master
Policy Holder under the SBI Life Rinn Raksha Group Insurance
Scheme, was under a legal and contractual obligation to keep the
borrower informed about the deficiencies in the insurance proposal, its
rejection and the refund of premium. However, despite receiving
communication from the Insurance Company, the Bank neither
informed the deceased borrower about the rejection of the proposal nor
credited the refunded premium amount during his lifetime, and it could
be deposited much after the death of the deceased, thereby depriving
him of an opportunity to comply with the requisite formalities and obtain
insurance coverage. It was further submitted that all three consumer
forums have concurrently held that the petitioner is liable. Accordingly,
it was prayed that the writ petition, being devoid of merit, deserves to
be dismissed.
I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner/Bank, perused the
13.
documents annexed with the petition and gone through the orders of
the learned District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, the

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State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission and the National
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission.
The submission advanced on behalf of the petitioner that Respondent
14.
No. 1 is not a "consumer" within the meaning of Section 2(7) of the
Consumer Protection Act, 2019, is equally untenable.
To discuss this argument, it would be relevant to notice the definition of
15.
“Consumer” under the provisions of Section 2(7) of the Consumer
Protection Act, 2019, which is as under:-
“(7) “consumer” means any person who—
(i) buys any goods for a consideration which has
been paid or promised or partly paid and partly
promised, or under any system of deferred
payment and includes any user of such goods
other than the person who buys such goods for
consideration paid or promised or partly paid or
partly promised, or under any system of deferred
payment, when such use is made with the
approval of such person, but does not include a
person who obtains such goods for resale or for
any commercial purpose; or
(ii) hires or avails of any service for a
consideration which has been paid or promised
or partly paid and partly promised, or under any
system of deferred payment and includes any
beneficiary of such service other than the person
who hires or avails of the services for
consideration paid or promised, or partly paid
and partly promised, or under any system of
deferred payment, when such services are
availed of with the approval of the first mentioned
person, but does not include a person who avails
of such service for any commercial purpose.
Explanation. —For the purposes of this clause,
—
(a) the expression “commercial purpose” does
not include use by a person of goods bought and
used by him exclusively for the purpose of
earning his livelihood, by means of self-
employment;
(b) the expressions “buys any goods” and “hires
or avails any services” includes offline or online
transactions through electronic means or by
teleshopping or direct selling or multi-level
marketing;”

13
Section 2(7) of the Act of 2019 expressly includes within its ambit not
16.
only the person who hires or avails of a service for consideration but
also any beneficiary of such service. It is an admitted position that the
deceased husband of the complainant had availed a housing loan from
the petitioner/Bank and, as an integral part of the loan transaction, the
petitioner deducted the premium amount for securing insurance
coverage under the SBI Life Rinn Raksha Group Insurance Scheme
floated through the Master Policy held by the Bank. The Bank was,
therefore, not acting merely as a conduit for remittance of the premium
but had undertaken the responsibility of facilitating insurance coverage
for its borrowers under the Master Policy. The material on record
further reveals that after the Insurance Company declined the
proposal, the communication regarding rejection along with the refund
of premium was admittedly received by the petitioner-Bank, yet the
borrower was neither informed of the rejection nor was the refunded
amount credited to his account during his lifetime. Thus, the deficiency
alleged by the complainant arises not out of the insurance contract
alone but from the banking service rendered by the petitioner.
In  Spring Meadows Hospital v. Harjol Ahluwalia , (1998) 4 SCC 39,
17.
the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a beneficiary of the services hired
for consideration is also a consumer. Further, in  Shriram Chits (India)
Pvt. Ltd. v. Raghachand Associates , (2024) 1 SCC 164, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court reiterated that the definition of "consumer" under
Section 2(7) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, is to be construed
liberally to advance the object of the legislation. Applying these
principles, this Court is of the considered view that the deceased
borrower had hired the banking services of the petitioner for

14
consideration, which included facilitation of insurance under the Master
Policy, and the complainant, being the nominee and beneficiary of such
services, squarely falls within the inclusive definition of "consumer"
under Section 2(7) of the Act. Consequently, the objection regarding
the maintainability of the consumer complaint against the
petitioner/Bank is without merit.
So far as the liability of the petitioner/Bank is concerned, the
18.
foundational facts are largely undisputed. It is not in dispute that Late
Shri Ashok Kumar Srivastava had availed a housing loan from the
petitioner/Bank and that a premium amount of Rs. 16,993/- under the
SBI Life Rinn Raksha Group Insurance Scheme was deducted and
remitted to the Insurance Company. It is also undisputed that the
Insurance Company subsequently declined coverage on account of
non-submission of certain requisite documents and refunded the
premium amount to the Bank. The controversy essentially revolves
around whether the petitioner/Bank, being the Master Policy Holder
under the group insurance scheme, discharged its obligation of
communicating the deficiencies in the proposal, the rejection thereof,
and the refund of premium to the borrower during his lifetime.
The District Consumer Commission, upon appreciation of the
19.
documentary evidence, recorded a categorical finding that although the
Insurance Company had intimated to the Bank regarding cancellation
of the proposal and refund of premium, the Bank failed to establish that
such information was ever communicated to the deceased borrower.
The District Commission further found that the refund amount was not
credited to the borrower's account during his lifetime and that the
adjustment of the amount was made only after his death. On such

15
findings, the District Commission held the Bank guilty of deficiency in
service and granted relief to the complainant. The said findings were
independently re-examined by the State Commission, which concurred
with the conclusions of the District Commission and held that the
Bank's failure to keep the borrower informed deprived him of an
opportunity to comply with the requirements and secure insurance
coverage.The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
has also examined the matter and affirmed the concurrent findings
recorded by the fora below. The National Commission specifically held
that in a group insurance arrangement obtained through a Master
Policy, the Bank was expected to ensure compliance with the
requirements necessary for obtaining insurance coverage and to
appropriately coordinate with the borrower. It further found that the
Bank failed to satisfactorily explain the non-credit of the original refund
cheque and the delay of more than one year in securing and crediting
the replacement cheque. On that basis, the National Commission
concluded that the Bank was deficient in service and declined to
interfere with the findings concurrently recorded by the District and
State Commissions.
The submission of the petitioner that its role was confined merely to
20.
deduction and remittance of the insurance premium to the Insurance
Company and that thereafter it was exclusively for the insurer and the
insured to correspond with each other cannot be accepted in the facts
of the present case. It is an admitted position that the insurance cover
was not obtained by the deceased through an independent contract
with the Insurance Company but under the SBI Life Rinn Raksha
Group Insurance Scheme operating through the Master Policy held by

16
the petitioner-Bank. In such an arrangement, the petitioner was not a
mere collecting agent, but the Master Policy Holder through whom the
proposal was processed and the premium was remitted. Significantly,
the record reveals that upon cancellation of the proposal, the Insurance
Company addressed its communication dated 09.05.2016 to the
petitioner/Bank enclosing the refund cheque of the premium amount
with a request either to credit the amount to the borrower's loan
account or hand it over to the borrower against acknowledgement. The
refund cheque admittedly remained with the petitioner/Bank and was
neither credited to the borrower's account nor was the borrower
informed of the rejection of the proposal during his lifetime. The
petitioner has also failed to produce any material to establish that it
took any effective steps to inform the borrower of the rejection of his
proposal or to facilitate compliance with the alleged deficiencies. In
these circumstances, the petitioner cannot absolve itself of its
obligations by saying that the insurer alone was required to
communicate with the insured. Once the petitioner undertook to
facilitate insurance under the Master Policy and admittedly received
the insurer's communication along with the refunded premium, it was
under a corresponding duty to act with due diligence and keep the
borrower informed.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in  Canara Bank v. United India
21.
Insurance Co. Ltd. , (2020) 3 SCC 455, has held that although
effecting insurance may not originally be the bank's obligation, once
the bank undertakes such responsibility, it becomes an integral part of
the banking service rendered to the customer and negligence in
discharging that obligation constitutes deficiency in service. The

17
concurrent findings recorded by the consumer forums are in
consonance with the aforesaid principle and do not warrant
interference in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227
of the Constitution.
At this juncture, it is apposite to note that the supervisory jurisdiction of
22.
this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is confined to examining
whether the subordinate forum has acted without jurisdiction, in excess
of jurisdiction, committed a patent perversity, or ignored material
evidence resulting in manifest injustice. The power under Article 227 is
neither appellate nor intended to permit re-appreciation of evidence
merely because another view may also be possible. Where findings of
fact are based upon an appreciation of evidence and have been
concurrently recorded by competent forums, interference is warranted
only when such findings are shown to be perverse, arbitrary, or wholly
unsupported by the record.
In  Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil , (2010) 8 SCC
23.
329, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the jurisdiction under
Article 227 is supervisory and not appellate in nature and cannot be
exercised for correcting mere errors of fact or law. In paragraphs 40 to
45 and 49, it has been held that:-
“ 40 . Same principles have been followed by this Court
1
in Mani Nariman c Daruwala v. Phiroz N. Bhatena ,
wherein it has been held that in exercise of its
jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court can set
aside or reverse finding of an inferior court or tribunal
only in a case where there is no evidence or where no
reasonable person could possibly have come to the
conclusion which the court or tribunal has come to. This
Court made it clear that except to this "limited extent"
the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the
1 (1991) 3 SCC 141

18
findings of fact (see SCC pp. 149-50, para 18). In
coming to the above finding, this Court relied on its
previous decision rendered in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna
2
Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram" . The decision in
Chandavarkar!! is based on the principle of the
3
Constitution Bench judgments in Waryam Singh and
4
Nagendra Nath discussed above.
41. To the same effect is the judgment rendered in
Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani v. Pratapsing
5
Mohansingh Pardeshi . In SCC para 9 at pp. 579-80 of
the Report, this Court clearly reminded the High Court
that under Article 227 that it cannot assume unlimited
prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong
decisions. Its exercise must be restricted to grave
dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental
principles of law and justice.
42. Same views have been taken by this Court in
respect of the ambit of High Court's power under Article
6
227 in Lonand Grampanchayat v. Ramgiri Gosavi (see
AIR pp. 222-34, para 5 of the Report) and the decision
7
of this Court in Jijabai Vithalrao Gajre v. Pathankhan .
8
The Constitution Bench ratio in Waryan Singh about
the scope of Article 227 was again followed in
Ahmedabad Mfg. & Calico Ptg. C. Ltd. v. Ram Tahel
9
Ramnand .
10
43 * . In a rather recent decision of the Supreme Court
16
in Surva Dev Rai v Ram Chander Rai , a two-Judge
Bench of this Court discussed the principles of
interference by the High Court under Article 227. Of
11
course in Surya Dev Rai this Court held that a writ of
certiorari is maintainable against the order of a civil
court, subordinate to the High Court (SCC p. 688.
Division Bench of this Court in Radhey Shyam v.
2 (1986) 4 SCC 447
3 Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215
4 Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commr. of Hills Division and Appeals, AIR 1958 SC 398
5 (1995) 6 SCC 576
6 AIR 1968 SC 222
7 (1970) 2 SCC 717
8 Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215
9 (1972) 1 SCC 898
10 *Ed.: Para 43 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./84/2010 dated 26-8-2010.
11 (2003) 6 SCC 675

19
12
Chhabi Nath and a para 19 of the Report). The
correctness of that ratio was doubted by another
request to the Hon'ble Chief Justice for a reference to a
larger Bench is pending. But insofar as the formulation
of the principles on the scope of Interference by the
High Court under Article 227 is concerned, there is no
divergence of views.
44 . In para 38 sub-para (4) at SCC p. 695 of the
Report, the following principles have been laid down in
11
Surya Dev Rai and they are set out:
"38.(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227
of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the
subordinate courts within the bounds of their
jurisdiction. When a subordinate court has
assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or
has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does
have or the jurisdiction though available is being
exercised by the court in a manner not permitted
by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has
occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in
to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction."
45 . Sub-paras (5), (7) and (8) of para 38 are also on the
11
same lines and extracted below: (Surya Dev Rai case
16, SCC pp. 695-96)
"38.(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of
supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to
correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the
following requirements are satisfied: (i) the error
is manifest and apparent on the face of the
proceedings such as when it is based on clear
ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of
law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of
justice has occasioned thereby.
(6) *
(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the
supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised
sparingly and only in appropriate cases where
the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates
it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave
injustice should occasion. Care, caution and
circumspection need to be exercised, when any
12 (2009) 5 SCC 616

20
of the abovesaid twojurisdictions is sought to be
invoked during the pendency of any suit or
correction is yet capable of being corrected at the
conclusion of the proceedings in a subordinate
court and the error though calling for proceedings
in an appeal or revision preferred thereagainst
and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or
supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would
obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of
the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel
inclined to intervene where the error is such, as,
if not corrected at that very moment, may
become incapable of correction at a later stage
and refusal to intervene b would result in travesty
of justice or where such refusal itself would result
in prolonging of the lis.
(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or
supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into
a court of appeal and indulge in re appreciation
or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in
drawing inferences or correct errors of mere
formal or technical character."
49 . On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this
Court, the following principles on the exercise of High
Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution
may be formulated:
(a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution
is different from a petition under Article 227. The
mode of exercise of power by the High Court
under these two articles is also different.
(b) In any event, a petition under Article 227
cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the
conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is
substantially different from the history of
conferment of the power of superintendence on
the High Courts under Article 227 and have been
discussed above.
(c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in
exercise of its power of superintendence under
Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the
orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. Nor can
it, in exercise of this power, act as a court of
appeal over the orders of the court or tribunal

21
subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative
statutory mode of redressal has been provided,
that would also operate as a restrain on the
exercise of this power by the High Court.
(d) The parameters of interference by High
Courts in exercise of their power of
superintendence have been repeatedly laid down
by this Court. In this regard the High Court must
be guided by the principles laid down by the
Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam
13
Singh and the principles in Waryam Singh have
been repeatedly followed by subsequent
Constitution Benches and various other decisions
of this Court.
(e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh4,
followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in
exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendencecan
interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and
courts subordinate to it, "within the bounds of
their authority".
(f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such
tribunals and courts by exercising jurisdiction
which is vested in them and by not declining to
exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them.
(g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and ().
High Court can interfere in exercise of its power
of superintendence when there has been a
patent perversity in the orders of the tribunals
and courts subordinate to it or where there has
been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the
basic principles of natural justice have been
flouted.
(h) In exercise of its power of superintendence
High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors
of law or fact or just because another view than
the one taken by the tribunals or courts
subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other
words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly
exercised.
(i) The High Court's power of superintendence
under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any
13 Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215

22
statute. It has been declared a part of the basic
structure of the Constitution by the Constitution
Bench of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union
14
of India and therefore abridgment by a
constitutional amendment is also very doubtful.
(j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a
rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the
Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure
Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and
cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power
under Article 227. At the same time, it must be
remembered that such statutory amendment
does not correspondingly expand the High
Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under
Article 227.
(k) The power is discretionary and has to be
exercised on equitable principle. In an
appropriate case, the power can be exercised
suo motu.
(l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and
unfettered power of the High Court under Article
227, it transpires that the main object of this
article is to keep strict administrative and judicial
control by the High Court on the administration of
justice within its territory.
(m) The object of superintendence, both
administrative and judicial, is to maintain
efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the
entire machinery of justice in such a way as it
does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of
interference under this article is to be kept to the
minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does
not come to a halt and the fountain of justice
remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain
public confidence in the functioning of the
tribunals and courts subordinate to the High
Court.
(n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial
intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of
relief in individual cases but should be directed
for promotion of public confidence in the
administration of justice in the larger public
14 (1997) 3 SCC 261 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 577

23
interest whereas Article 226 is meant for
protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the
power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its
exercise is subject to high degree of judicial
discipline pointed out above.
(o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this
power will be counterproductive and will divest
this extraordinary power of its strength and
vitality.”
The said view was subsequently reaffirmed in  Radhey Shyam v.
24.
Chhabi Nath , (2015) 5 SCC 423, wherein the Supreme Court clarified
that the power under Article 227 has not been expanded and is
intended only to ensure that subordinate courts act within the limits of
their jurisdiction and that interference is warranted only in cases of
patent perversity, gross miscarriage of justice, or jurisdictional error.
In the present case, the petitioner has not been able to demonstrate
25.
that the findings recorded by the District Commission, affirmed by the
State Commission and thereafter by the National Commission, suffer
from any jurisdictional error, perversity, or manifest illegality warranting
interference under Article 227 of the Constitution. The conclusions
reached by the consumer forums are founded upon the evidence
available on record and represent a plausible and reasonable view of
the matter. This Court, therefore, finds no ground to upset the
concurrent findings of fact recorded by the consumer forums.
Consequently, the writ petition deserves to be and is hereby
26.
dismissed .
Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)
Judge
Alok