BALAMURALI KRISHNA M( EX NO. 15497912 A SWR) vs UNION OF INDIA

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE K. NATARAJAN
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE JOHNSON JOHN
TH
FRIDAY, THE 29 DAY OF MAY 2026 / 8TH JYAISHTA, 1948
WP(C) NO. 2893 OF 2026
PETITIONERS/APPLICANT:
BALAMURALI KRISHNA M( EX NO. 15497912 A SWR)
AGED 40 YEARS, S/O. SHRI. MURUGESAN S.,
PANCHAKSHARI, ELIPPODE, VATTIYOORKAVU P.O., BALAKRISHNA
ROAD, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM DIST, KERALA, PIN – 695 013
BY ADVS.
SRI.T.R.JAGADEESH
SHRI.ADI NARAYANAN
SHRI.GOKULKRISHNA V.K.
SHRI.JOSE JOB
SMT.MANASI JAGADEESH
RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT:
1 UNION OF INDIA, REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF
DEFENCE (ARMY), SOUTH BLOCK, NEW DELHI, PIN – 110 011.
2 ADDITIONAL DIRECTOR GENERAL OF PERSONNEL SERVICES-4
AG’S BRANCH/PS-4(IMP-II), HEAD QUARTERS MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
(ARMY), IHQ PO NEW DELHI, PIN – 110 011.
3 OFFICER IN CHARGE RECORDS
ARMOURED CORPS RECORDS C/O 56 APO, PIN – 900 476.
4 ACCOUNTS OFFICER,
PCDA (PENSIONS) ALLAHABAD, UTTAR PRADESH, PIN – 211 014.
BY ADV. SMT. M.SHAJNA, CGC
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
22.05.2026, THE COURT ON 29.05.2026 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:

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‘CR’
K. NATARAJAN & JOHNSON JOHN, JJ.
---------------------------------------------------------
W.P.(C). No. 2893 of 2026
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th
Dated this the 29 day of May, 2026
J U D G M E N T
Johnson John, J.
The writ petitioner is the applicant in O.A. No. 99 of 2023 on the
file of the Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Kochi and he is
challenging the order dated 06.03.2024 passed by the Tribunal, whereby
the Tribunal rejected the claim of the petitioner for disability pension.
2. Heard Sri. T.R. Jagadeesh, the learned counsel for the
petitioner and Smt. Shajna, the learned Central Government Counsel for
the respondents.
3. The petitioner was enrolled in the Indian army on 18.11.2004
and was discharged on 30.11.2021 after serving the Indian army for 17
years and 12 days. At the time of his discharge, the Release Medical
Board assessed the disabilities: (i) primary hypertension at 30% for life;
and (ii) Obesity at 5% for life with a composite disability of 33.5% for
life. But, the Release Medical Board opined that the disabilities are

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neither attributable to nor aggravated by military service and
accordingly, the authorities rejected his claim for disability pension.
4. Aggrieved by the denial of disability element of pension, the
petitioner filed the Original Application before the Tribunal. But, the
Tribunal found that in view of Rule 5 of the Entitlement Rules for
Casualty Pensionary Awards, 2008 (‘Rules, 2008’ for short), there cannot
be a presumption in favour of the petitioner and that he is not entitled to
get the benefit of statutory presumptions under Rules 5 and 14 of the
Entitlement Rules for Casualty Pensionary Awards, 1982 (‘Rules, 1982’
for short) as the said Rules are not applicable to the petitioner who has
been discharged from service on 30.11.2021. The Tribunal further found
no reason to disagree with the opinion of the medical board that the
invaliding disease was neither attributable to nor aggravated by military
service.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the Tribunal
has not properly considered the effect of Rule 7 under the Rules, 2008
and that the said provision has not exonerated the establishment totally
from the burden of proof and that a coordinate bench of this Court in
Union of India and others v. Bhaskaran [2024 KHC 7223], after an
elaborate analysis of the various provisions under the Rules, 1982 and
Rules, 2008, held that in all cases in which the claim is raised within 15

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years of discharge/retirement/invalidment/release, the onus of proof will
be primarily on the Department and only in cases wherein claims are
raised after 15 years, the burden will be entirely on the claimant.
6. Rule 7 of Rules, 2008 is extracted below for convenient
reference:
“7. Onus of proof:
Ordinarily the claimant will not be called upon to prove the condition of
entitlement. However, where the claim is preferred after 15 years of discharge/
retirement/invalidment/release by which time the service documents of the
claimant are destroyed after the prescribed retention period, the onus to prove
the entitlement would lie on the claimant.”
7. The Honourable Supreme Court explained the meaning of word
"ordinarily” in Rule 7 under the Rules, 2008 as follows in State of A.P.
v. V. Sarma Rao [(2007) 2 SCC 159].
“19. … The expression “ordinarily” may mean “normally”, as has been
held by this Court in Kailash Chandra v. Union of India [(1962) 1 SCR 374 : AIR
1961 SC 1346] and Krishan Gopal v. Prakashchandra [(1974) 1 SCC 128] but, the
said expression must be understood in the context in which it has been used.
“Ordinarily” may not mean “solely” or “in the name”, and thus, if under no
circumstance an appeal would lie to the Principal District Judge, the court
would not be subordinate to it. When in a common parlance the expression
“ordinarily” is used, there may be an option. There may be cases where an
exception can be made out. It is never used in reference to a case where there

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is no exception. It never means “primarily”. In Kailash Chandra v. Union of India
[(1962) 1 SCR 374 : AIR 1961 SC 1346] it is stated: (SCR p. 379)
“This intention is made even more clear and beyond doubt by the use of
the word ‘ordinarily’. ‘Ordinarily’ means ‘in the large majority of cases but not
invariably’.”
8. The meaning of the word ‘ordinarily’ is also explained by the
Honourable Supreme Court in Union of India v. Hemraj Singh
Chauhan [(2010) 4 SCC 290] as follows:
“41. The word “ordinarily”, of course, means that it does not promote a cast-
iron rule, it is flexible (see Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar [(1976) 1
SCC 671] at SCC p. 682, para 35). It excludes something which is extraordinary
or special ( Eicher Tractors Ltd. v. Commr. of Customs [(2001) 1 SCC 315] at SCC
p. 319, para 6). The word “ordinarily” would convey the idea of something
which is done “normally” ( Krishan Gopal v. Prakashchandra [(1974) 1 SCC 128]
at SCC p. 134, para 12) and “generally” subject to special provision ( Mohan
Baitha v. State of Bihar [(2001) 4 SCC 350 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 710] at SCC p. 354).”
9. In Bhaskaran (supra), this Court held in paragraph 45 as
follows:
“45. By employing the word 'ordinarily', the rule making authority has
obviously diluted the rigor of the burden which was on the establishment
under the Rules of 1982. The intention is very clear that in all cases and under
all circumstances it shall no longer be the burden of the establishment to show
that the employee is not entitled for the benefit. In appropriate cases the
employee shall discharge the onus of proof to seek the benefit. The learned
Senior Central Government Counsel placed emphasis on this Rule and argued

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that the same has made a drastic change in the matter of onus of proof.
According to the learned counsel, claimants cannot no longer raise a demand
and leave it to the establishment to rebut. We shall now examine this
contention. We note that the second part of R.7 opens with the expression
'however' and the said sentence operates like a proviso carving out exception
to the general rule found in the previous sentence. Reason for providing the
exception is also clear from the latter sentence that; when claim is preferred
after 15 years, by that time, the service documents of the claimant would be
destroyed. Hence, ostensibly, the rule making authority altered the tenor of
the rule regarding onus of proof in view of the fact that when belated claims
are raised the establishment will not be in possession of the relevant records
and in such situations the employee may obtain undue advantages.
Unscrupulous persons waiting for destruction of records and raising claims
thereafter is also a conceivable situation. Nonetheless, the intention of the
rule makers regarding claims made within 15 years discernible from the
language employed, is that the onus will continue to be primarily on the
Department. We therefore hold with respect to R.7 of the Entitlement Rules of
2008 that the said provision does not exonerate the establishment totally from
the burden of proof and in all cases in which the claim is raised within 15 years
from the date of discharge / retirement / invalidment / release, the onus of
proof will be primarily on the Department. Only in cases wherein claims are
raised after 15 years, the burden will be entirely on the claimant. While
holding thus, we have kept in mind the observation of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Union of India and others v. 3989606 P, Ex - Naik Vijay Kumar (supra)
that the Entitlement Rules are beneficial in nature and ought to be liberally
construed.” (emphasis supplied)
10. In the present case, it is not in dispute that immediately after
the rejection of his claim for disability element of pension by the
adjudicating authority, he had preferred first and second appeals and
after the same were rejected, he approached the Tribunal under Section
14 of the Armed forces Tribunal Act, 2007 and therefore, we find force in
the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that since the
claim is raised within 15 years from the date of discharge, the onus of

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proof will be primarily on the Department and the findings of the
Tribunal in this regard is not legally sustainable.
11. The detailed justification given in the medical board report in
support of the opinion that the disability is neither attributable to nor
aggravated by the military service in part-VII of the medical report is
extracted below:
“PART-VII
OPINION OF THE MEDICAL BOARD
Please endorse disease/disabilities in chronological order of occurrence:-
Disability Attributable
to Service
(Y/N)
Aggravated
by Service
(Y/N)
Detailed Justification
1.PRIMARY
HYPERTEN
SION (I-10)
No NO ONSET OF ID IN PEACE
TENURE. THERE IS NO
CLOSE TIME
ASSOCIATION OF ONSET
OF ID WITH
FD/CIOPS/HIGH
ALTITUDE TENURE.
THERE IS NO ANY
EVIDENCE OF STRESS
AND STRAIN DUE TO
MIL SERVICE. HENCE
ID IS NANA. (AS PER
PARA 43 CHAPTER-VI,
GO-2008)
2. SIMPLE
OBESITY
(E66)
NO NO LIFE STYLE DISORDER,
HENCE NANA.
12. The learned counsel for the petitioner cited the decision of the
High Court of Delhi in MWO HFL Surendra Nath Singh v. Union of

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India and another [2026 SCC OnLine Del 728] and argued that the
mere fact that at the time of onset of the disease, military service was
being rendered in peace locations or that the disease is a lifestyle
disorder would not by itself be a sufficient reason to deny the
attributability of the disease to military service. The learned counsel for
the petitioner also cited the decision of the Delhi High Court in Union of
India and others v. Col. Balbir Singh (Retd.) and other connected
matters [2025 SCC OnLine Del 7873], wherein it was held as follows in
paragraphs 66 to 71 and 73:
“66. It would also be important to note the provision relevant to attributability,
that is, Regulation 423 of the Regulations for the Medical Services of the
Armed Forces, 2010. The said provision reads as under:
“ 423.(a). For the purpose of determining whether, the cause of a disability or death
resulting from disease is or not attributable to Service. It is immaterial
whether the cause giving rise to the disability or death occurred in an area
declared to be a Field Area/Active Service area or under normal peace
conditions. It is however, essential to establish whether the disability or
death bore a causal connection with the service conditions.
xxx
67. This provision was summarized in Rajumon T.M. (supra), wherein it was
observed as under:
“ 17. A careful examination of Regulation 423 of the Regulation for Medical
Services for Armed Forces would reveal the following aspects:
1. It is immaterial whether the cause giving rise to the disability or death

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occurred in an area declared to be a field service/active service area or
under normal peace conditions
2. It is, however, essential to establish that the disability or death bore a
casual connection with the service conditions.
3. All evidence, both direct and circumstantial, will be taken into account and
benefit of reasonable doubt, if any, will be given to the individual.… … …
…”
68. From a plain reading of Regulation 423(a) of the Regulations for the
Medical Services of the Armed Forces, 2010, it is clear that whether a
disability or death occurs in a Field/Active service area or under normal
Peace conditions is immaterial.
69. Nonetheless, it must be noted that even in Peace Stations, military
service is inherently stressful due to a combination of factors such as strict
discipline, long working hours, limited personal freedom, and constant
readiness for deployment. The psychological burden of being away from
family, living in isolated or challenging environments, and coping with the
uncertainty of sudden transfers or duties adds to this strain. Additionally, the
toll of continuous combat training further contributes to mental fatigue.
Despite the absence of active conflict or the challenges of hard area postings,
the demanding nature of military life at peace stations can significantly
impact the overall well-being of personnel.
70. Undisputably, even when not on the front lines or in hard areas, soldiers
are aware that the threat is never far away. This environment, where danger
is a constant reality for their peers and could become their own at any
moment, creates a persistent state of mental and emotional strain that cannot
be overlooked. Thus, military service, whether in peace locations or
operational zones, inherently carries stress that may predispose Force
personnel to medical conditions such as hypertension.
71. Moreover, it must be noted that lifestyle varies from individual to
individual. Therefore, a mere statement that a disease is a lifestyle disorder
cannot be a sufficient reason to deny the grant of Disability Pension, unless
the Medical Board has duly examined and recorded particulars relevant to
the individual concerned.
xxx

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73. A reading of the above reinforces that disability pension cannot be
denied solely on the ground that the onset of the disability occurred while
the Force personnel were posted at Peace Station. Furthermore, it is evident
that when Force personnel have rendered prolonged military service, there
exists a substantial onus on the RMB to establish that the hypertension is not
attributable to or aggravated by military service.”
(emphasis supplied)
13. In Rajumon T.M. v. Union of India and others [2025 SCC
OnLine SC 1064], the Honourable Supreme Court also held that if the
opinion of the medical board is devoid of reasons, the act of the
authority based on mere opinion sans reasons can certainly be
questioned.
14. In Maniben Maganbhai Bhariya v. Distt. Development
Officer, Dahod [(2022) 16 SCC 343], the Honourable Supreme Court
held thus:
“ 55. When social security legislations are being interpreted, it always has to
be interpreted liberally with a beneficial interpretation and has to be given
the widest possible meaning which the language permits, known as beneficial
interpretation. When a statute is meant for the benefit of a particular class
and if a word in the statute is capable of two meanings i.e. one which would
preserve the benefits and one which would not, then the former is to be
adopted.”
15. The denial of disability pension based on a medical opinion
without providing full reasons to support the opinion cannot be said to
be valid. Therefore, we find merit in the submissions of the learned

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counsel for the petitioner that the Armed Forces Tribunal committed an
error in denying the disability element of pension. Therefore, we find
that the petitioner is entitled for the disability element of pension.
Hence, the impugned order of the Tribunal is set aside.
In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the respondents are
directed to issue a corrigendum PPO granting disability pension to the
petitioner at the earliest, at any rate, within a period of three months
from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment, failing which the
unpaid arrears would carry interest at 7% per annum.
sd/-
K. NATARAJAN,
JUDGE.
sd/-
JOHNSON JOHN,
JUDGE.
Rv

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APPENDIX OF WP(C) NO. 2893 OF 2026
PETITIONER’S EXHIBITS:
Exhibit P-1 TRUE COPY OF ORIGINAL APPLICATION NO 99 OF 2023
ALONG WITH ALL THE ANNEXURES
Exhibit P-2 TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY STATEMENT ALONG WITH ALL
ANNEXURES
Exhibit P-3 TRUE COPY OF ORDER DATED 06 MAR 2024 IN O.A NO 99
OF 2023 OF THE HON’BLE AFT, RB, KOCHI
RESPONDENTS’ EXHIBITS: NIL
/True Copy/
P. S to Judge.
rv