THE STATE OF KARNATAKA vs PRAKASH S/O YALLAPPA JADHAV
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT DHARWAD
TH
DATED THIS THE 12 DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2026
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
AND
THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE HEMA KULKARNI
WRIT APPEAL NO.100005 OF 2025 (ULC
BETWEEN:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,
BY ITS SECRETARY TO DEPT. OF REVENUE,
M. S. BUILDING, BENGALURU – 560 001.
2. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
BELAGAVI D C COMPOUND,
BELAGAVI – 590 001.
3. REVENUE INSPECTOR ANGOL,
BELAGAVI – 590 001.
4. TASHILDAR, BELAGAVI – 590 001,
AMENDED V/C/O DTD 16-12-2021
…APPELLANTS
(BY SRI. RAKESH M. BILKI, GA)
AND:
1. PRAKASH S/O. YALLAPPA JADHAV,
AGE: 66 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O: ANGOL, BELAGAVI – 590 006.
ASHOK S/O. YALLAPPA JADHAV,
AGED: 41 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O: ANGOL, BELAGAVI,
SINCE DECEASED BY L.R’S.
2. LATA WD/O. ASHOK JADHAV,
AGE: 57 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O: HOUSE NO.641,
RAJHANS GALLI ANGOL,
BELAGAVI – 590 006.
Digitally signed
by RAKESH S
HARIHAR
Location: High
Court of
Karnataka,
Dharwad Bench
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3. AMITA W/O. LAXMAN JAMBOTKAR,
AGE: 35 YEARS, OCC: HOUSEWIFE,
R/O: YALLUR, BELAGAVI – 590 005.
4. MAYURI D/O. ASHOK JADHAV,
AGE: 32 YEARS, OCC: STUDENT,
R/O: HOUSE NO.641, RAJHANS GALLI ANGOL,
BELAGAVI – 590 006.
5. POOJA D/O. ASHOK JADHAV,
AGE: 30 YEARS, OCC: STUDENT,
R/O: HOUSE NO.641, RAJHANS GALLI ANGOL,
BELAGAVI – 590 006.
6. GANGUBAI W/O. YALLAPPA JADHAV,
AGE: 99 YEARS, OCC: HOUSEWIFE,
R/O: ANGOL, BELAGAVI – 590 006.
7. VIMAL W/O. YALLAPPA BALEKUNDRI,
AGE: 79 YEARS, OCC: HOUSEWIFE,
R/O: DHAMNE,
TALUKA & DIST: BELAGAVI – 590 005.
8. SUMITA W/O. KRISHNA HANGIRGEKAR,
AGE: 76 YEARS, OCC: HOUSEWIFE,
R/O: ANGOL, BELAGAVI – 590 006.
9. SUSHILA W/O. KALLAPPA KEDNURKAR,
AGE: 69 YEARS, OCC: HOUSEWIFE,
R/O: ANGOL, BELAGAVI – 590 006.
10. KALPANA W/O. KRISHNA YELLURKAR,
AGE: 62 YEARS, OCC: HOUSEWIFE,
R/O: BAMANWADI,
TALUKA & DIST: BELAGAVI – 590 014.
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. SHRIPRASAD J. JOSHI, ADVOCATE FOR R1 TO R5;
SRI. SHIVAPRARSAD SHANRANAGOUDAR, ADV. FOR R7 TO
R10;
R1 TO R5 & R7 TO R10 ARE LEGAL HEIRS THE DECEASED R6)
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S. 4 OF KARNATAKA HIGH
COURT ACT, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE IMPUGNED ORDER
PASSED BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE IN WRIT PETITION NO.
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64478/2012 (ULC) DATED 16.12.2021 AND FURTHER DISMISS
THE WRIT PETITION IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR ORDERS THIS DAY,
JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
AND
HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE HEMA KULKARNI
ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA )
1. The State is before the Court calling in question
an order of the learned Single Judge dated 16.12.2021 in WP
No.64478/2012.
2. The learned Single Judge allows the petition
owing to the fact of non-compliance of Section 10(6) of the
Urban Land (Ceiling) Regulation Act, 1976 (hereinafter
referred to as ‘the Act’ for short). The order of the learned
Single Judge reads as follows:
“ The then competent Authority under the
provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling Regulation) Act,
1976 passed an order declaring that the deceased
Yallappa Omanna Jadhav was holding excess vacant
land in Sy.No.152 of Angol.
2. Pursuant to the order of the competent
Authority, the Revenue Inspector is alleged to have
taken possession of the land in question in the
presence of panchas. Section 3(1) of the Repeal Act
provides for abatement of the proceeding if the
possession is not taken over by the State Government
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or any person duly authorized by the State
Government, as required under Section 10(3) of the
Principal Act.
3. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of
Mangalore Urban Development Authority –vs-
Leelavathi & others reported in ILR 2008 KAR 5059
has held that the competent Authority is empowered
to take possession of the land declaring as excess
vacant land under Section 10(6) of the Act. However,
in the present case, the Revenue Inspector who is not
the Authority under Section 10(6) of the Act has taken
possession of the land in question. Hence, the
proceeding culminating in passing of the order
declaring that the deceased Yallappa Omanna Jadhav
was holding excess vacant land stands abated.
Accordingly, I pass the following:
ORDER
i) Writ petition is allowed.
ii) The impugned order dated 27.2.1986 passed
by the 2 nd respondent vide Annexure-A is
quashed.
th
iii) The 4 respondent – Tahsildar concerned is
directed to delete the name of the
government and restore the name of Sri
Yallappa Omanna Jadhav in the revenue
records in respect of the land in question. ”
3. The direction was to the Tahsildar concerned to
delete the name of the Government and restore the name of
the petitioner in the revenue records as stood prior to the
passage of the impugned order. Though the order is passed
on 16.12.2021 and the State was a party to the proceedings,
the State gets into deep slumber for about 4 years, wakes up
and files the subject appeal on 11.11.2024 with an
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application seeking condonation of delay of 1031 days. The
application so filed seeking condonation of delay reads as
follows:
“ 1. It is respectfully submitted that, in the
above appeal the appellants have challenged the order
passed by the learned Single Judge on 16.12.2021 in
writ petition No.64478/2012.
2. The certified copy of the order dated
16.12.2021 was obtained by the office of the Advocate
General and thereafter, placed before the Law Officer
who appeared in the matter for opinion. The concerned
Law Officer has given his opinion after going through
the entire records as a fit case to prefer writ appeal
against the order passed by the Learned Single Judge in
W.P.No.64478/2012 on 16.12.2021.
3. Thereafter on 16.11.2022 received opinion
of Addl. Government Advocate submitted to the head of
the legal Cell, Department of Urban Development
Bengaluru and on 03.05.2022 clarification was sought
from the Government, Urban Development Department,
Bengaluru whether order of the Hon'ble High Court is to
be complied or appeal against the order in W.P.
No.64478/2012 is to be filed and 13.07.2022 letter
received from the Government, Urban Development
Department Bengaluru to get opinion of Head of the
Legal Cell to proceed in the matter and 02.09.2022
documents were furnished to the Government as sought
for and 03.11.2022 letter received from the
Government, Urban Development Department
Bengaluru to get opinion of Government Advocate to
proceed in the matter and opinion of Government
Advocate as sought by the Government furnished
03.06.2023 and on 05.09.2023 the government, Urban
Development Department Bengaluru issued meeting
notice to be held on 07.09.2023 to discuss about filing
of appeals against the order of Single Judge passed by
the Hon'ble High Court and 06.09.2023 the Assistant
Commissioner, Belagavi was directed to attend the
meeting to be held on 07.09.2023 and on 13.11.2023
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received copy of the proceedings of the meeting held by
the Addl. Chief Secretary dated 07.09.2023 directing to
file writ appeal immediately and 24.01.2024 letter
writing to the Government to appoint Tahasildar
Belagavi as a litigation conducting officer and also issue
order to the Advocate General to file writ appeal and on
15.03.2024 received order of Government, Urban
Development Department Bengaluru No.UDD 36 ULC
2012, dated 21.02.2024 appointing Tahasildar, Belagavi
as a litigation conducting Officer and swearing Officer
and to prepare writ appeal memo by the Government
Advocate and on 15.03.2024 received letter dated
06.03.2024 from the Government, Urban Development
Department Bengaluru there by authoring Advocate,
High Court of Karnataka Dharwad to prefer an appeal
against the order of single of Judge in W.P.
No.644478/2012. Thereafter, the Government Order
bearing No.UDD 36 ULC 2012 Bengaluru 21.02.2024
authorizing the Advocate General Office Dharwad to
prefer an appeal against the order passed by the
Learned Single Judge. The said communication was
received by the AG office on 03.04.2024. Thereafter, the
Advocate General Office who sought certain clarification
and the original file of the competent authority to enable
finalizing the drafting of the Writ Appeal.
4. It is further respectfully submitted that, On
going through the judgment and document, the law
officer could not draft the appeal in time due to
attending of day to day court proceedings and thereafter
also other office correspondence of the Government
Department officers could not draft well within time.
There is a delay in preferring Appeal but the said delay
in filing the above Appeal is not intentional one but it is
due to bonafide and administrative reasons as stated
above. In this process there is some delay in finalizing
and filing the above said writ appeal. Thereafter, the
appeal was drafted. The delay is bonafide and for the
reasons stated herein above and in the circumstance it
is prayed that the delay may be condoned by allowing
the application. If the interim application is allowed no-
prejudice will be caused to the Respondents herein. On
the other hand if the interim application is not allowed
the state will be put to huge losses and the lands being
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already handed over and utilized by public authorities
the same will affect the public
interest also.
WHEREFORE, it is prayed that this Hon'ble Court be
pleased to condone the delay of 1031 days in filing the
above appeal in the interest of justice.
”
4. A perusal at the application would make it
unmistakably clear that the reason so rendered is, moment
of file from table to table or moment of opinion on the file
from one to another. This would not be sufficient cause to
condone the enormous delay of 1031 days by the State.
5. The Apex Court in the case of STATE OF
ODISHA v. MANAGING COMMITTEE OF NAMATARA
1
GIRLS HIGH SCHOOL , rejected the appeal filed by State
of Odisha on the score that there was a delay of 291 days
totally in filing the appeal. The Apex Court holds as follows:
“…. …. ….
12. No cause, much less sufficient cause,
has been shown for exercise of discretion in
favour of the State of Odisha. The nature of
explanation in the application for condonation of
delay is such that with much ado, the
proceedings could be closed.
13. However, since there is a long line of
decisions of this Court propounding the law that the
expression ‘sufficient cause’ employed by the
1
2026 SCC OnLine SC 191
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legislature in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is
adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law
in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of
justice and in view of the submission of Ms. Sanjana,
we have considered it appropriate to consider the
matter in some depth.
14. Almost four decades back, in Collector, Land
Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst Katiji , a coordinate Bench
noting that the justifiably liberal approach which this
Court has been adopting in matters instituted before it
is not being followed by the courts lower in the
hierarchy, mandated that a justice-oriented approach
is indeed called for when a ‘State’ seeks condonation of
delay as distinguished from ‘a private party’.
15. Close on the heels of Katiji (supra), Hon'ble
Justice M.N. Venkatachaliah speaking for the
coordinate Bench in G. Ramegowda v. Land Acquisition
Officer had referred to Katiji (supra) in paragraph 14
and quoted the following passage therefrom:
“When substantial justice and technical
considerations are pitted against each other,
cause of substantial justice deserves to be
preferred for the other side cannot claim to
have vested right in injustice being done
because of a non-deliberate delay …
It must be grasped that judiciary is
respected not on account of its power to
legalise injustice on technical grounds but
because it is capable of removing injustice and
is expected to do so.”
Immediately thereafter, in paragraphs 15 to 17,
it was held as under:
15. In litigations to which Government
is a party there is yet another aspect which,
perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals
brought by Government are lost for such
defaults, no person is individually affected;
but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is
public interest. The decisions of Government
are collective and institutional decisions and
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do not share the characteristics of decisions of
private individuals.
16. The law of limitation is, no doubt,
the same for a private citizen as for
governmental authorities. Government, like
any other litigant must take responsibility for
the acts or omissions of its officers. But a
somewhat different complexion is imparted to
the matter where Government makes out a
case where public interest was shown to have
suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on
the part of its officers or agents and where the
officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it.
17. Therefore, in assessing what, in a
particular case, constitutes “sufficient cause”
for purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps,
be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the
considerations that go into the judicial verdict,
these factors which are peculiar to and
characteristic of the functioning of the
government. Governmental decisions are
proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by
a considerable degree of procedural red tape
in the process of their making. A certain
amount of latitude is, therefore, not
impermissible. It is rightly said that those who
bear responsibility of Government must have
“a little play at the joints”. Due recognition of
these limitations on governmental functioning
— of course, within reasonable limits — is
necessary if the judicial approach is not to be
rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be
unfair and unrealistic to put government and
private parties on the same footing in all
respects in such matters. Implicit in the very
nature of governmental functioning is
procedural delay incidental to the decision-
making process. In the opinion of the High
Court, the conduct of the law officers of the
Government placed the Government in a
predicament and that it was one of those
cases where the mala fides of the officers
should not be imputed to Government. It
relied upon and trusted its law officers. …
16. Katiji (supra) and Ramegowda (supra)
were consistently followed by this Court until
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adoption of a different and seemingly strict
approach while dealing with applications for
condonation of delay during the last decade and
a half became discernible starting with the
decision in Postmaster General v. Living Media
India Limited , where a delay of 427 days in filing
the relevant special leave petition was not
condoned. University of Delhi v. Union of India is
another decision (of a three-Judge Bench of this
Court) where delay of 916 days was not
condoned. While upholding the decision of the
relevant high court under challenge refusing to
condone the delay of 5659 days in presentation
of an appeal under Section 54 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 by the heirs of a deceased
landowner, a coordinate Bench in Pathapati
Subba Reddy v. Collector(LA) very recently
reiterated that the law of limitation is founded on
public policy, the object is that a legal remedy is
put to an end so that no litigation remains
pending for an indefinite period. It was also held,
departing from the earlier view, that the merits
of the case cannot be considered at the stage of
considering the application for condonation of
delay.
17. Indeed, one of us [Dipankar Datta] in
Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India authoring the
judgment for a coordinate Bench adopted the
view taken in Katiji (supra), Ramegowda (supra)
and a host of other decisions following the same
while not interfering with an order of
condonation of delay passed by the relevant high
court. However, it was observed that a
distinction ought to be drawn between an
‘explanation’ and an ‘excuse’ that is proffered as
cause for condonation of delay. It was also
emphasized that a different approach has to be
adopted while this Court is considering an
application for condonation of delay in
presentation of an appeal/application and when
it sits in appeal over a discretionary order of the
high court granting the prayer for condonation of
delay. In the case of the former, whether to
condone or not would be the only question
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whereas in the latter, whether there has been
proper exercise of discretion in favour of grant of
the prayer for condonation has to be examined.
18. However, what perhaps remained unnoticed
in any of the decisions post Katiji (supra) and
Ramegowda (supra) adopting a liberal approach is the
exasperation and consequent lament expressed by
none other than Hon'ble M.N. Venkatachaliah, CJI. in
course of authoring a brief order in Commissioner of
Wealth Tax, Bombay v. Amateur Riders Club, Bombay
and admonishing officers of the “revenue” in not acting
with promptitude. This order was made within six
years of the decision in Ramegowda (supra). We can
do no better than quoting the same in its entirety
hereunder:
1. We have heard Shri S.C. Manchanda,
learned senior counsel for the
Revenue.
2. This special leave petition filed on
November 16, 1993 is delayed by 264
days. For quite some time in the past,
this Court has been making
observations as to the grave prejudice
caused to public interest by appeals
brought on behalf of the Government
being lost on the point of limitation.
Such observations have been made for
over a few years in the past. But there
seems to be no conspicuous
improvement as is apparent in the
present petition which is filed in
November 1993. The explanation for
the delay, had better be set out in
petitioner's own words:
“( g ) The Advocate-on-Record got
the special leave petition drafted from the
drafting Advocate and sent the same for
approval to the Board on June 24, 1993
along with the case file. ( h ) The Board
returned the case file to the Advocate-on-
Record on July 9, 1993 who re-sent the
same to the Board on September 20, 1993
requesting that draft SLP was not approved
by the Board. The Board after approving
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the draft SLP sent this file to CAS on
October 1, 1993.”
3. This explanation is incapable of
furnishing a judicially acceptable
ground for condonation of delay. After
the earlier observations of this Court
made in several cases in the past, we
hoped that the matters might improve.
There seems to be no visible support
for this optimism. There is a point
beyond which even the courts cannot
help a litigant even if the litigant is
Government which is itself under the
shackles of bureaucratic indifference.
Having regard to the law of limitation
which binds everybody, we cannot find
any way of granting relief. It is true
that Government should not be treated
as any other private litigant as, indeed,
in the case of the former the decisions
to present and prosecute appeals are
not individual but are institutional
decisions necessarily bogged down by
the proverbial red-tape. But there are
limits to this also. Even with all this
latitude, the explanation offered for the
delay in this case merely serves to
aggravate the attitude of indifference
of the Revenue in protecting its
common interests. The affidavit is
again one of the stereotyped affidavits
making it susceptible to the criticism
that the Revenue does not seem to
attach any importance to the need for
promptitude even where it affects its
own interest.
4. The application for condonation of
delay is, accordingly, dismissed. The
special leave petition is, therefore,
dismissed as barred by time.
(emphasis ours)
19. Reading Ramegowda (supra) and Amateur
Riders (supra), one after the other, leaves none in
doubt that it did not take much time for this Court to
lose hope. It is absolutely clear that the law was laid
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down in Ramegowda (supra), following Katiji (supra),
with much optimism that matters would improve. Their
Lordships, however, found no visible support for such
optimism and the Court's patience having been tested
to the extreme limit, held that there is a point beyond
which even the courts cannot help a litigant even if the
litigant labouring under the shackles of bureaucratic
indifference is the Government.
20. We have found the State of Odisha to
be utterly lethargic, tardy and indolent not only
before the High Court but also before this Court.
Notwithstanding that its appeal was dismissed as
time-barred by the High Court, this Court has
been approached by the State of Odisha four
months after expiry of the period of limitation.
21. Condonation of delay cannot be claimed
as a matter of right. It is entirely the discretion
of the Court whether or not to condone delay.
Despite all the latitude that is shown to a
“State”, we are of the clear opinion that the
cause sought to be shown here by the State of
Odisha is not an explanation but a lame excuse.
No case for exercise of discretion has been set
up.
22. The applications for condonation of delay in
filing the special leave petition and condonation of
delay in re-filing the same, thus, stand rejected, with
the result that the special leave petition stands
dismissed as time-barred.”
The Apex Court in the afore-quoted judgment holds that the
State of Odisha was utterly lethargic, tardy and indolent in
filing the appeal. The Apex Court further holds that
condonation of delay cannot be claimed as a matter of right,
it is entirely the discretion of the Court whether or not to
condone the delay. The Apex Court rejected the appeal filed
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on the score that the cause sought to be shown by the State
is not an explanation but a lame excuse.
6. The Apex Court in the case of ISRAR AHMAD
2
KHAN v. AMARNATH PRASAD , has held as follows:
“…. …. ….
BELATED/DELAYED APPEALS TO DELAY/DEFEAT
IMPLEMENTATION:
27. Delayed filing of appeals should be the
exception, but in recent times, the exception has
practically evolved to become the rule. Orders
passed by the Courts are not complied with for a
long time, and when Contempt Petitions are filed,
belated appeals, with tremendous delay, are
preferred.
28. The (alleged) continuing contumacious
conduct of the defaulting party is sought to be
justified on the mere production of a
Diary/Filing/Stamp Reporting Number showing
that an appeal has been preferred, so as to
obtain multiple adjournments in contempt
matters.
29. We, in no uncertain terms, deprecate
these practices. It is felt that by such modus
operandi , disobedient litigants act brazenly
which has the further effect of bringing down the
authority and majesty of the Courts and the rule
of law, interfering in the administration of
justice. The same may well, in certain situations,
border on criminal contempt.
30. The High Courts should deal with such
unscrupulous litigants, more so when they
happen to be ‘State’, within the meaning of
Article 12 of the Constitution, or like bodies, with
2
2026 SCC OnLine SC 322
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an iron hand. Unless the High Courts, so also this
Court deal with these aspects firmly, we run the
clear risk of erosion of the unflinching faith that
the ordinary litigants of this country repose in
the Judiciary at all levels. It is the solemn duty of
all of us manning the Courts across the hierarchy
to ensure that the public faith never wavers .”
The Apex Court holds that the High Courts should deal with
unscrupulous litigants, more so when they happen to be
State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of
India or like bodies with an iron hand.
7. A little earlier to the afore-quoted judgments of
the Apex Court in the cases of MANAGING COMMITTEE OF
NAMATARA GIRLS HIGH SCHOOL supra and ISRAR
AHMED KHAN supra , the Apex Court in the case of STATE
3
OF MADHYA PRADESH v. RAMKUMAR CHOUDHARY , has
held as follows:
“…. …. ….
6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush
aside the delay occurred in preferring the second
appeal, due to callous and lackadaisical attitude on
the part of the officials functioning in the State
machinery. Though the Government adopts systematic
approach in handling the legal issues and preferring the
petitions/applications/appeals well within the time, due to
the fault on the part of the officials in merely communicating
the information on time, huge revenue loss will be caused to
the Government exchequer. The present case is one such
case, wherein, enormous delay of 1788 days occasioned in
preferring the second appeal due to the lapses on the part of
3
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3612
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the officials functioning under the State, though valuable
Government lands were involved. Therefore, we direct
the State to streamline the machinery touching the
legal issues, offering legal opinion, filing of cases
before the Tribunal/Courts, etc., fix the responsibility
on the officer(s) concerned, and penalize the
officer(s), who is/are responsible for delay, deviation,
lapses, etc., if any, to the value of the loss caused to
the Government. Such direction will have to be
followed by all the States scrupulously.
7. There is one another aspect of the matter which
we must not ignore or overlook. Over a period of time, we
have noticed that whenever there is a plea for condonation
of delay be it at the instance of a private litigant or State the
delay is sought to be explained right from the time, the
limitation starts and if there is a delay of say 2 years or 3
years or 4 years till the end of the same. For example if the
period of limitation is 90 days then the party seeking
condonation has to explain why it was unable to institute the
proceedings within that period of limitation. What events
occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence.
The court is required to consider what came in the way of
the party that it was unable to file it between the 1st day
and the 90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait
until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when
it allows the limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause
for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must
establish that because of some event or circumstance arising
before the limitation expired it was not possible to file the
appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after
the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause.
There may be events or circumstances subsequent to
the expiry of limitation which may further delay the
filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has been
allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must
be traced to a cause arising within the period of
limitation. (See : Ajit Singh Thakur Singh v. State of
Gujarat, (1981) 1 SCC 495 : AIR 1981 SC 733).
8. Accordingly, we dismiss this Special Leave
Petition with costs of Rs. 1,00,000/- to be deposited
by the State within a period of two weeks from today
with the Supreme Court Mediation Centre and file
proof thereof. If the said amount, as directed, is not
deposited by the State, the Registry shall take
necessary steps for recovery of the same, in
accordance with law. ”
(Emphasis supplied at each instance)
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The Apex Court in the afore-quoted judgment holds that
delay occurring due to a callous and lackadaisical attitude of
the State cannot be condoned and therefore, dismissed the
appeal filed by the State of Madhya Pradesh with costs.
8. The Apex Court in the afore quoted judgments
would clearly hold that the litigants who unscrupulously file
cases after enormous delay, be it the State, cannot be shown
any indulgence except dismissing those cases on account of
delay. The case at hand does not project anything different
from what is projected by the State in every case of
condonation of delay that the Litigation Conducting Officer
did not process the file immediately.
9. The learned Government Advocate would seek to
place reliance upon a judgment rendered by the Apex Court
in the case of UP CO-OPERATIVE FEDERATION LIMITED
4
v. RAKESH KUMAR DWIVEDI & OTHERS , wherein the
Apex Court has observed that the delay of 130 days
occasioned due to the ensuing Lok Sabha elections in the
case before it and therefore, there was sufficient cause for
4
Civil Appeal Nos.13239-40 of 2026, dated 29.09.2026
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the State not to prefer an appeal before the Apex Court,
while the elections had to be given importance. That was the
cause that was shown before the Apex Court. Therefore, the
Apex Court holds that the administrative delays sometimes
must be condoned in the teeth of those facts. Though it was
in the facts as the delay was only 130 days, here it is 1031
days and the so-called sufficient cause shown is quoted
herein above, which in our considered view is hardly
satisfactory. Therefore, in the light of the afore-quoted
judgments of the Apex Court, the appeal stands dismissed
only on account of delay. Consequently, the order of the
learned Single Judge stands affirmed.
As a consequence, pending applications also stand
disposed.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
Sd/-
(HEMA KULKARNI)
JUDGE
JTR
CT: ASC
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 33