GOVIND RAM vs DILA RAM DECEASED THROUGH LRS OM PRAKASH AND OTHERS

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
RSA Nos. 210 and 216 of 2007
Reserved on: 18.5.2026
Date of Decision: 25.6.2026
RSA No. 210 of 2007
Govind Ram and others ...Appellants
Versus
Dila Ram (deceased) through LRs and others
...Respondents
RSA No. 216 of 2007
Govind Ram and others ...Appellants
Versus
Dila Ram (deceased) through LRs and others
...Respondents
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla , Judge.
1
Whether approved for reporting? Yes.
For the Appellants : Mr Bhupender Gupta, Senior
Advocate, with Mr Janesh Gupta,
Advocate, in both the appeals.
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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For the Respondents : Mr Anand Sharma, Senior
Advocate, with Mr Karan
Sharma, Advocate, in both the
appeals.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The present appeals are directed against the judgment
and decree dated 27.2.2007, passed by learned District Judge,
Solan, HP (learned Appellate Court) vide which the judgment and
decree dated 1.7.2006, passed by learned Civil Judge, (Senior
Division), Kasauli, District Solan, H.P., (learned Trial Court) were
partly upheld. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same
manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for
convenience).
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
appeals are that the plaintiffs filed a civil suit for a declaration that
they had become the owners in possession of the suit land
mentioned in the headnote of the plaint by efflux of time. It was
asserted that one Laxmi was the owner of the suit land, who had
mortgaged the suit land with possession to Dhani Ram, the
predecessor of the plaintiffs, for a sum of ₹350/-. Mutation No.
314, dated 30.4.1953, was registered to this effect. Dhani Ram
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expired, and he was succeeded by the plaintiff No.1, Liaq Ram.
Laxmi Devi was succeeded by Dila Ram. The mortgage was not
redeemed, and the period of redemption expired on 30.4.1983. The
plaintiffs became the owners after the efflux of time because of
non-redemption. Hence, the suit was filed to seek the relief
mentioned above.
3. The suit was opposed by filing a written statement
taking a preliminary objection regarding the lack of locus-standi.
The contents of the plaint were denied on the merits. It was
asserted that the mortgage was oral for a consideration of more
than ₹100/- and was required to be effected by way of a registered
document. The defendant purchased the land in the year 1971 and
paid ₹350/- towards the redemption of the mortgage. The
plaintiffs have filed a false suit, taking advantage of the wrong
revenue entries. Hence, it was prayed that the present suit be
dismissed.
4. No replication was filed.
5. Learned Trial Court framed the following issues: -
1. Whether the plaintiff has purchased the land from
Smt. Laxmi vide registered sale deed on 5.1.1971
measuring 19 bighas and 12 biswas? OPP.
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2. Whether the plaintiff paid ₹350/- as the alleged
mortgage amount and got possession? OPP.
3. Whether the plaintiff is in adverse possession of the
suit land, as alleged? OPD.
4. Whether the mortgage is illegal and non est as
alleged? OPP.
5. Whether the defendants want to dispossess the
plaintiff from the suit land forcibly? OPD.
6. Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi to file the
suit? OPD.
7. Whether the suit is not maintainable as the
defendants are in possession of the suit land? OPD.
8. Whether the alleged sale deed is an illegal and
fabricated document as alleged? OPD.
9. Whether the suit has not been properly valued for the
purpose of court fees and jurisdiction? OPD.
10. Whether the defendants have become owners-in-
possession of the suit land by lapse of the period of
limitation for redemption? OPD.
11. Relief.
6. The parties were called upon to produce the evidence,
and plaintiff No.2 Gobind Ram examined himself (PW1) and Gian
Chand (PW2). The defendant examined himself (DW1).
7. Dila Ram also filed a civil suit for seeking a Permanent
Prohibitory Injunction for restraining the defendants from
interfering in his ownership and possession of the suit land
mentioned in para-one of the plaint. It was asserted that Dila Ram
had purchased the suit land from one Laxmi vide registered Sale
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Deed on 5.1.1971. He had paid ₹350/- as the mortgage money and
obtained possession. He continued to be in possession. The
defendants threatened to interfere with his possession. Hence, he
filed a suit seeking the relief mentioned above.
8. The defendants filed a written statement taking
preliminary objection regarding the lack of maintainability, the
suit having not been properly valued for the purpose of Court fees
and jurisdiction, and the suit being liable to be stayed under
Section 10 of the CPC. The contents of the plaint were admitted to
the extent that Laxmi Devi had mortgaged the land to Dhani Ram.
It was asserted that the defendants became the owners in
possession because of non-redemption of the mortgage. The
present defendants had also filed a civil suit seeking a declaration
that they had become the owners of the suit land by efflux of time.
Therefore, it was prayed that the suit be dismissed.
9. The defendants also filed a counterclaim asserting that
the suit land was mortgaged by Laxmi Devi with the predecessor
of the defendants. Laxmi Devi or her successors failed to redeem
the mortgage and the defendants have become the owners by the
efflux of time. Hence, it was prayed that the counterclaim be
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decreed and the defendants be declared to be the owners of the
suit land.
10. A replication denying the contents of the written
statement and affirming those of the plaint was filed.
11. The learned Trial Court framed the following issues on
25.4.2003:
1. Whether the plaintiffs have become owners in
possession of the suit land by lapse of the period of
redemption, as alleged? OPP.
2. Whether the plaintiffs have no locus standi to file the
suit? OPD.
3. Relief.
12. Subsequently, an application for consolidation of the
suit was filed, which was allowed, and the suits were ordered to be
consolidated.
13. The learned Trial Court held that Laxmi Devi had
mortgaged the land to Dhani Ram. The period of redemption of
the mortgage was 30 years, which had expired. The plea taken by
Dila Ram that he had deposited ₹350/- was not sufficient because
there was no proof of the payment of the mortgage money to the
mortgagee. The period of limitation for redemption of the
mortgage was 30 years, and Laxmi Devi had lost her right to
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redeem the mortgage. Dila Ram, being the successor of Laxmi
Devi, had also lost his title; therefore, the Trial Court dismissed
the suit filed by Dila Ram and decreed the suit and counterclaim
filed by Govind Ram, etc.
14. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by
the learned Trial Court, the parties filed separate appeals which
were decided by the learned District Judge, Solan, H.P. (learned
Appellate Court). The Appellate Court held that Laxmi Devi had
mortgaged the land to Dhani Ram in the year 1953. The mortgage
was not required to be registered because the provisions of the
Transfer of Property Act were not in force at the time of the
mortgage. Dhani Ram remained in possession, and the plaintiffs
were in possession after the death of Dhani Ram. Himachal
Pradesh Debt Reduction Act, 1976, provides that a final decree of
foreclosure cannot be passed in a suit based upon the redemption.
The learned Trial Court had passed a decree of foreclosure without
following the provisions of the H.P. Debt Reduction Act. The
plaintiffs can only retain possession as the mortgagees till the
mortgage is redeemed. The plaintiffs were permitted to retain
possession of the suit land till it is redeemed and the defendant,
Dila Ram, was restrained from interfering with the suit land till
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the redemption of the mortgage. The suit filed by Dila Ram was
dismissed.
15. Being aggrieved by the judgments and decrees passed
by the learned Appellate Court, Govind Ram, etc., have filed the
present appeals, which were registered as RSA Nos. 210 and 216 of
2007.
16. RSA No. 210 of 2017 was admitted on the following
substantial questions of law on 20.3.2009: -
1. Whether the plaintiff-respondent at no point of time
invoked the provisions of H.P. Debt Reduction Act,
exercising the right of redemption of mortgage, has not the
Lower Appellate Court acted in a highly illegal, erroneous
and perverse manner in creating a new right in favour of the
plaintiff for redemption of mortgage, which right stood
extinguished by efflux of time under the relevant provisions
of the Limitation Act?
2. Whether the Lower Appellate Court has committed grave
error of law and jurisdiction in holding that the mortgaged
amount falls within the definition of ‘loan’ as defined in the
H.P. Debt Reduction Act and acted arbitrarily, in recording
erroneous and perverse findings that the provisions of said
Act bars the passing of preliminary and final decree for
foreclosure?
3. Whether the Lower Appellate Court committed grave
illegality and irregularity in ignoring the provisions of the
Transfer of Property Act as well as the Limitation Act,
especially when the provisions of the H.P. Debt Reduction
Act, 1976, could not have been made applicable to the
present case?
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17. RSA No. 216 of 2017 was admitted on the following
substantial questions of law on 20.3.2009: -
1. Whether the Trial Court held that the mortgage was created
th
on 30 April, 1953, which findings were accepted by the
Lower Appellate Court, has not the Lower Appellate Court
acted in an erroneous and perverse manner in dismissing
the suit of the plaintiffs-appellants by wrongly applying the
provisions of H.P. Debt Reduction Act, 1976?
2. Whether the Lower Appellate Court has committed grave
error of law and jurisdiction in holding that the mortgaged
amount falls within the definition of “loan” as defined in
the H.P. Debt Reduction Act and acted arbitrarily in
recording the erroneous and perverse findings that the
provisions of said Act bars the passing of preliminary and
final decree for foreclosure?
3. Whether the Lower Appellate Court committed grave
illegality and irregularity in ignoring the provisions of the
Transfer of Property Act as well as the Limitation Act,
especially when the provisions of the H.P. Debt Reduction
Act, 1976, could not have been made applicable to the
present case?
4. Whether the Lower Appellate Court has acted in excess of its
jurisdiction in granting a right to redeem the mortgage to
the defendant-respondent, when such right became
unenforceable on account of the provisions of the
Limitation Act?
18. This Court also formulated the following substantial
questions of law on 7.12.2016: -
1. Whether a single appeal was maintainable against the
judgment and decree passed by the Court of learned Civil
Judge (Sr. Div.), Kasauli in Civil Suit No.201/1 of 2002 dated
1.7.2006 vide which learned trial Court while dismissing the
suit so filed by plaintiff allowed the counter claim filed by
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defendant therein and what will be the effect of non-filing
of two distinct appeals in that case in proceedings arising
out of Civil Suit No. 230/1 of 2001?
19. I have heard Mr Bhupender Gupta, learned Senior
Advocate, assisted by Mr Janesh Gupta, learned counsel for the
appellants, and Mr Anand Sharma, learned Senior Advocate,
assisted by Mr Karan Sharma, learned counsel for the
respondents.
20. Mr Bhupender Gupta, learned Senior Advocate for the
appellants, submitted that the learned Appellate Court erred in
reversing the well-reasoned judgment passed by the learned Trial
Court. Learned Trial Court had rightly held that the period of
redemption is 30 years from the date of the mortgage. Learned
Appellate Court applied the provisions of the H.P. Debt Reduction
Act to the present case, whereas the definition of creditor showed
that it applied to a person who, in the regular course of business,
advances money. Dhani Ram was not shown to be advancing the
loan in the regular course of business, and the learned Appellate
Court erred in applying the provisions of HP Debt Reduction Act to
the present case. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be
allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the learned
Appellate Court be set aside. He relied upon the judgments of the
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Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kanshi Ram and another Vs. Lachhman
(dead) through LRs and others (2001) 5 SCC 546 and Singh Ram
(dead) through LRs Vs. Sheo Ram and others (2014) 9 SCC 185 in
support of his submission.
21. Mr Anand Sharma, learned Senior Advocate for the
respondent, submitted that the learned Trial Court had passed
three judgments and decrees; one in the civil suit filed by Govind
Ram, etc., second in counterclaim filed by Govind Ram etc and
third in the civil suit filed by Dila Ram. Three appeals were
required to be preferred before this Court. Two appeals are not
maintainable, and the appeals are liable to be dismissed on this
short ground alone. On merits, he submitted that the learned Trial
Court erred in holding that a period of 30 years applied to the
redemption of a usufructuary mortgage. There is no limitation for
the redemption of a usufructuary mortgage, and the learned
Appellate Court had rightly held that the mortgagor or her
successors were entitled to redeem the mortgage at any time. The
matter was squarely covered by the provisions of the H.P. Debt
Reduction Act, and the learned appellate Court had rightly applied
the provisions of the H.P. Debt Reduction Act to the present case.
There is no infirmity in the judgments and decrees passed by the
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learned Appellate Court. Hence, he prayed that the present appeals
be dismissed.
22. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
Substantial Question of Law framed on 7.12.2016:
23. Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court considered the
question of filing of appeals in consolidated suits and the
counterclaims in Ramesh Chand Vs. Om Raj 2022 SCC OnLine HP
2094 and held as under: -
42. The principles deducible from the afore-discussed law
can be summarised as follows: -
(i) When two suits are consolidated and tried together
with common issues framed and common evidence
led by the parties, resulting in a common judgment
and decree, the same can be subjected to challenge by
way of a single appeal at the instance of the aggrieved
party;
(ii) Where a single appeal is filed questioning the
judgment and decree passed in two suits, which were
consolidated and decided by a common judgment, the
decision of such single appeal, by a common
judgment, reversing or modifying the claim in one
suit out of the two, can also be challenged by the
aggrieved party also, in a single appeal.
(iii) When two suits, though not consolidated, are
decided by a common judgment, resulting in the
preparation of two separate decrees, the aggrieved
party would be required to challenge both of them by
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filing separate appeals.
(iv) When both the suit and the counterclaim are
decreed by a common judgment, regardless of
whether a separate decree has been prepared in the
counterclaim, both would be required to be
challenged by separate appeals;
(v) In a case where two separate appeals are required
to be filed against the judgment of the suit and the
counterclaim and if the appeal is filed only against
one and not against the other, non-filing of appeal
against such judgment and decree would attach
finality thereto and would attract not only the
principle of res-judicata but also waiver and estoppel
and the judgment and decree not appealed against
would be taken to have been acquiesced to by the
party not filing an appeal;
(vi) When however, two appeals are filed against a
common judgment passed by the trial Court, both by
the plaintiff and the defendant, and are disposed of by
the first appellate Court by
modifying/reversing/affirming the judgment of the
trial Court, the aggrieved party, would be required to
challenge both by two separate appeals, in absence of
which, non-filing of appeal against one shall attract
bar of the principles of res-judicata against another.
(vii) Where more than one appeal are required to be
filed or are filed, and one or more of them are
dismissed for default, delay or any other similar
reason, any such situation would attract res judicata
and such dismissal would satisfy the requirement of
the appeal being heard and finally decided on merits
'in a former suit' for the purpose of attracting
principles of res judicata.
24. In the present case, two suits were consolidated,
common evidence was led, but separate judgments were passed.
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The suit and the counterclaim were disposed of by one judgment,
and the suit was disposed of by another judgment. The judgment
of the Hon’ble Division Bench does not deal with an eventuality
where the suits are consolidated, but different judgments are
passed. However, since common evidence was led, the principle
‘(i)’ should apply to the present case, and one appeal was required
to be filed challenging the judgments and decrees in the
consolidated suits. A separate appeal was required to be filed
challenging the decree in the counterclaim. Therefore, two appeals
were maintainable before the learned District Judge. Further, no
objection was raised before the learned District Judge that the two
appeals were not competent. These appeals were filed by Dila Ram,
the present respondent. If his objection is accepted that three
appeals were required to be filed, his two appeals preferred before
the learned District Judge would not be maintainable, and the
judgment and decrees passed by the learned District Judge would
be non est, being barred by the principle of res judicata . Therefore,
there would be no question of filing the present appeals by Govind
Ram, etc., and this submission, instead of helping Dile Ram, goes
against him.
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25. In Charan Singh vs. Ram Saroop Civil Appeal No. 1585 of
2025, decided on 03.02.2025 , a composite appeal was filed before
the learned Appellate Court, which was dismissed after holding
that such an appeal was not maintainable. The Hon’ble Supreme
Court held that the learned First Appellate Court was right in
holding that a composite appeal was not maintainable, but it
should have alerted the appellant by making him aware of the
requirement of law and by giving him the liberty to file a separate
memorandum of appeal. It was observed:
“7. In our considered view, reliance was rightly placed by
the first appellate court on precedents to hold that a
composite appeal was not maintainable in law, but, at the
same time, the first appellate court ought to have borne in
mind that courts exist for rendering justice, albeit in
accordance with law. Once the first appellate court found,
correctly, that challenge to the common judgment of the
trial court dated 16th March, 2021 had been laid in a
composite appeal but law requires to file two appeals with
separate memoranda of appeal, which had not been filed by
the appellant, the court ought to have at least alerted the
appellant by making him aware of the requirement of law
and giving him the liberty to file a separate memorandum
of appeal. In fact, in terms of Order XLI Rule 1 of the CPC,
the appellate court has the power to even dispense with the
requirement of law of filing a copy of the impugned
judgment twice over if it is part of the memorandum of
appeal already filed. In any event, the defect was not such
that it was incurable. The composite appeal was filed well
within the period of limitation and, except for the fact that a
separate memorandum of appeal was not filed, no other
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defect, far less serious defect, was shown to exist. If even
after being alerted, the appellant had failed to file a separate
memorandum, the first appellate court would have been
perfectly justified in dismissing the appeal. It is not shown
to us that any such endeavour was made.”
26. It was further held that the High Court should have set
right the wrong by its interdiction and technicality of this nature
should not have been allowed to prevail over the substantive
justice. It was observed:
“8. The first appellate court having failed to alert the
appellant, we would have expected the High Court to
intervene to set right the wrong by its interdiction.
Technicality of a nature such as this should not have been
allowed to prevail over substantive justice. The appellant
had filed two second appeals before the High Court,
meaning thereby that he had been properly advised, while
such advice might have been missing in the district of
which the parties are residents. Unfortunately, the High
Court did not address the point from the proper perspective
either. While spurning the objection of learned counsel for
the respondents, who has vehemently argued that there is
no occasion to interfere since the appellant did not adhere
to the law, we find good reason and ground to interfere.”
27. This judgment was followed by a Co-ordinate Bench of
this Court in Desh Raj & Anr. vs. Vinod Kumar & Anr.
2026:HHC:5450 , and the matter was remitted to the First Appellate
Court with liberty to the defendants to file an independent appeal
within three weeks, and once so filed, it was ordered to be treated
as within a limitation.
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28. Thus, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had treated the non-
filing of two separate appeals as not fatal and remitted the matter
to the learned Appellate Court to enable the appellant to file a
separate appeal without a memorandum of appeal.
29. Since in the present case, the single appeal was to be
filed regarding the consolidated suit and a separate appeal was to
be filed regarding the counterclaim, the submission that the
present appeal is not maintainable cannot be accepted. In any
case, the appeal cannot be dismissed on this ground as per the
judgment of Charan Singh. Hence, this substantial question of law
is answered accordingly.
Substantial Questions of Law in RSA 210 of 2007:
Substantial Question of Law No.1:
30. The term “loan” has been defined in the H.P. Debt
Reduction Act, 1976, as under: -
"loan" means an advance in cash or kind and includes any
transaction which in substance amounts to such advance
but does not include an advance by the Central or State
Government or by a local authority authorised by the State
Government to make advance, by a co-operative society or
by a bank or by the Life Insurance Corporation of India or a
loan taken or used for the purposes of trade.”
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31. It is apparent from the definition of the loan that it
applies to all kinds of advances in cash or kind and includes any
transaction that amounts to such an advance. In the present case,
the facts proved on record show that Dhani Ram had advanced
₹350/- to Laxmi Devi, who had secured the repayment of money
by mortgaging her land. Section 11 contained in Chapter IV of the
H.P. Debt Reduction Act provides that, notwithstanding anything
contained in this Act or in any enactment for the time being in
force, a final decree for foreclosure shall not be passed in respect
of agricultural land of a debtor in a suit to which this Act applies.
Therefore, there is an absolute prohibition on passing of the final
decree of foreclosure regarding agricultural land. It was laid down
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kanshi Ram v. Lachhman, (2001) 5
SCC 546, that the object of the Act is to grant relief to the debtors
and enable them to get back the property mortgaged by them with
possession for a loan. The Court is bound to grant the relief under
the Act when the cause of action had arisen after the enactment of
the H.P. Debt Reduction Act. It was observed: -
15. The object of the Act and the scheme underlying it, as
obtained from the provisions made therein, is to grant relief
to debtors and enable them to get back properties
mortgaged by them with possession for a loan. The use of
the expression “at any time” for making an application or
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filing a suit is indicative of the legislative intent that the Act
provides a fresh opportunity to the debtor for getting relief
under the Act. The legislature has taken care to make the
relevant provisions of the Act granting relief to debtors by
giving overriding effect over any law, agreement, contract
or decree contrary to the provisions of the Act. It was not
disputed before us during the hearing of the case that the
plaintiffs filed the suit under the provisions of the Act for
the restoration of the possession of the mortgaged
property. Undisputedly, there is no decree for foreclosure in
favour of the creditor/mortgagee.
16. In the backdrop of the above, the question of limitation
is to be considered. The reason given by the High Court in
support of the finding that the suit was barred by limitation
is that more than 30 years had elapsed since the date of the
mortgage (February 1946) when the suit was filed in 1981.
Therefore, the mortgagor had lost his right to redeem the
property mortgaged. The provisions in Section 27 of the
Limitation Act have been considered in support of the
finding. This reasoning appears to us to be fallacious. It
defeats the object and the purpose of the statute enacted by
the legislature, especially to give relief to debtors in the
State. The first appellate court had given cogent reasons in
support of its finding in favour of the appellants. The court
held, and in our view, rightly, that the suit was one for
recovery of possession from the mortgagee who was in
unauthorised possession of the mortgaged property after
the mortgage loan was satisfied. The cause of action for
filing such a suit under the Act arose when the enactment
was enforced in 1979. Viewed from that angle, the suit was
filed in time, and the trial court and the first appellate court
rightly recorded the findings to that effect. The High Court
erred in reversing the concurrent finding of the courts
below on the erroneous assumption that the suit was one
for redemption of the mortgage simpliciter. It is relevant to
note here that the present suit is not one filed under Section
60 or 62 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is a suit filed for
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relief on the basis of the Himachal Pradesh Debt Reduction
Act, 1976.
32. Mr Bhupender Gupta, learned Senior Advocate, was at
pains to submit that the suit in Kanshi Ram (supra) was filed under
the H.P. Debt Reduction Act, whereas in the present case, no suit
was filed under the provisions of the Act. Therefore, the judgment
in Kanshi Ram (supra) cannot be applied to the present case. This
submission cannot be accepted. When the legislature has provided
that the provisions of the H.P. Debt Reduction Act will override the
provisions of any Act, the Court can not refuse to apply the
provisions by holding that they apply to only the suits filed under
the provisions of the H.P. Debt Reduction Act and not to any other
Act. The interpretation suggested by Mr Bhupender Gupta, learned
Senior Advocate, would make the provisions of the H.P. Debt
Reduction Act illusory and would not provide the benefit intended
by the legislature to the persons who are sought to be protected by
the Act. Therefore, the learned Appellate Court was justified in
applying the provisions of the H.P. Debt Reduction Act to the
present case, and the judgment of the learned Appellate Court
cannot be faulted.
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33. It is undisputed that the land was mortgaged with
possession and was a usufructuary mortgage. It was laid down by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Singh Ram v. Sheo Ram, (2014) 9 SCC
185, that the right to redemption in a usufructuary suit will
continue till the mortgaged money is paid, for which there is no
time limit. It was observed: -
“21. We need not multiply references to the other
judgments. Reference to the above judgments clearly spells
out the reasons for conflicting views. In cases where
distinction in usufructuary mortgagor's right under Section
62 of the TP Act has been noted, right to redeem has been
held to continue till the mortgage money is paid, for which
there is no time limit, while in other cases, right to redeem
has been held to accrue on the date of mortgage, resulting
in extinguishment of the right of redemption after 30 years.
22. We, thus, hold that the special right of usufructuary
mortgagor under Section 62 of the TP Act to recover
possession commences in the manner specified therein, i.e.
when mortgage money is paid out of rents and profits or
partly out of rents and profits and partly by payment or
deposit by the mortgagor. Until then, limitation does not
start for the purposes of Article 61 of the Schedule to the
Limitation Act. A usufructuary mortgagee is not entitled to
file a suit for a declaration that he had become an owner
merely on the expiry of 30 years from the date of the
mortgage. We answer the question accordingly.”
34. In the present case, the plaintiffs had not asserted in
the plaint that the usufruct from the mortgage had extinguished
the mortgage amount of ₹350/-. Therefore, the right to mortgage
will continue, and the learned Appellate Court was right in holding
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that the period of limitation had not expired. Thus, the very
premises of the suit filed by Govind Ram, etc., that the period of
limitation of 30 years applied to the present case, and they had
became the owners by way of efflux of time, was bad. Therefore,
this substantial question of law is answered accordingly.
Substantial Question of Law No.2:
35. Mr Bhupender Gupta, learned Senior Advocate,
referred to the definition of creditor and submitted that the
provisions of the H.P. Debt Reduction Act apply only when a
person is engaged in the business of lending money. This
submission overlooks the fact that the definition of creditor
applies to chapter-5 of the Act, containing Sections 22 to 30 and
not to Chapter 4 containing Section 11. Therefore, no advantage
can be derived from the definition of the creditor. The definition of
a loan, as noted above, is quite wide and includes advances of any
kind. Therefore, the learned Appellate Court had rightly held that
the provisions of the H.P. Debt Reduction Act applied to the
present case, and the decree for foreclosure could not have been
passed without complying with the provisions of the Act. Hence,
this substantial question of law is answered accordingly.
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Substantial Question of Law No.3:
36. As per the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Singh Ram (supra), there is no period of limitation for redemption
of the usufructuary mortgage, and the conclusion drawn by the
learned Appellate Court that Dile Ram had a right of redemption
cannot be faulted. Hence, this substantial question of law is
answered accordingly.
Substantial Question of Law in RSA 216 of 2007:
Substantial Question of Law No.1:
37. It has been found above that the provisions of the H.P.
Debt Reduction Act, 1976, apply to the present case because the
suit was for foreclosure in substance; hence, this substantial
question of law is answered accordingly.
Substantial Question of Law No.2:
38. It has been found above that the definition of a loan is
quite wide and includes an advance of any kind; therefore, the
learned Appellate Court had rightly applied the provisions of the
H.P. Debt Reduction Act to the present case. Hence, this
substantial question of law is answered accordingly.
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Substantial Question of Law No.3:
39. It has been found above that there is no period of
limitation for the redemption of a usufructuary mortgage. The
plaintiffs never claimed that the usufruct of the mortgage was
sufficient to liquidate the mortgaged amount. Therefore, the suit
could not have been decreed on the premise that the right of
redemption was lost with time. Hence, this substantial question of
law is answered accordingly.
Substantial Question of Law No.4:
40. It has been found above that the period of limitation
does not apply to the usufructuary mortgage unless there are
pleadings that the usufruct of the mortgage was sufficient to
liquidate the amount. In the present case, no such pleadings have
been made; hence, the suit could not have been decreed by the
learned Trial Court, and this substantial question of law is
answered accordingly.
Final Order:
41. In view of the above, the present appeals fail, and these
are dismissed.
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42. Pending application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed
of.
43. Records of the learned Courts below be sent down
forthwith.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
th
25 June, 2026
(Chander)

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